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A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

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AND

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

NATURALISM AND HUMANISM.

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PHILOSOPHY, declining through acquired modesty or by compulsion the position of chief of all the sciences, may still rightfully claim an historical function. For that complex of human performances which we call civilisation turns out, as we examine it closely, to be a changing and shifting scene which has none the less a definable background. To discover that background, and to exhibit the varied lights and shadows as thrown up from it, is a proper task for philosophy. Indeed, each of us has such a background. Using other imagery, we may call it character or soul or personality, but what we mean by the words is some relatively fixed and fundamental body of habits and dispositions lying back of the rich phantasmagoria of our lives. There sits the helmsman, his hand on the tiller. When we are unconscious of his directing, we speak of our destiny or our fate; but when in the stress of things we suddenly grow aware of the definite pointing of our course, we boast of personal triumph. The background is thus the important factor, at once conservative and propelling. There, still to keep to our nautical figure, the log is kept, the reading of which is the true biography of any individual life.

Times as well as individuals have their backgrounds, a fact which leads us to speak of society as an organism and to ascribe a character to an age. Or we use the phrase "the spirit of the times," indicating thereby a kind of temporal destiny somehow responsible for the characteristic trend of events. At times it may be dreaded, as in 1848, when governments slept uneasily while the spirit of revolution stalked abroad. Or it may be hysterically welcomed, as in crusading days, when a continent could surrender itself to a visionary task. How such backgrounds are constituted and how they operate to afford the symptoms of a time's disease or health, are questions about which philosophy may properly busy itself. The general theme is well worth our study; but yielding to the current demand for the concrete and the specific, we may seek some insight into the general theme by a study of a particular case.

History did not have to preserve Cicero's cry, "O tempora! O mores!" in order to teach men to be critics of their own times and their own manners. So we to-day hear, on all sides, the cry, uttered now with shame and regret and now with enthusiasm, that our age is materialistic and industrial, that it has substituted utility for principle, that it has surrendered to mechanism and lost the idealism of the fathers. An age of naturalism, in short, which pictures man caught in the machinery of nature and forced to learn at his imminent peril the lesson of efficiency. The cry resounds from government halls and from the busy street, from platform and from pulpit, and has been heard along the length and breadth of our systems of education.

The cry suggests a contrast. Nay, more; the contrast has raised a conflict where individual estimates and judgments become uncertain holdings. The contrast which naturalism suggests is summed up in the word humanism. The war, so we have been told, is a struggle to preserve the humanities, to keep alive the classic literary heritage of the race, to preserve art and religion for ideal uses, to keep morality from sinking

into mere opportunism, to make education minister to the spirit and not simply to serve the body's wants.

We are all familiar, from the words of the teacher or from the newspaper or the magazine, with the many battles of this war; but what may be said of the background of the modern spirit? How comes it that naturalism and humanism stand out from it competitors in the interest of human happiness? It was once customary to dismiss serious consideration of such questions with a joyous optimism which regarded the whole conflict as academic merely. Full of the abundance of goods, this optimism could claim that nature and man could stand in no unfriendly relation to each other. The stern critic, full of caustic disapproval, was pointed out as an embittered and unfortunate misanthrope looking with ill-concealed jealousy at the fortunate man of the times, and we were warned from his path as one leading to contempt. We were assured of the essential soundness of the modern man, and told that he took Homer or Emerson with him on his travels and carried poems in his pocket-book. Now the creed of optimism is sound, else why should life result in values to be prized? But the professions of optimism in our day have, unhappily, proved untrue. To proclaim that

"God's in His heaven,
All's right with the world,"

may have been once the utterance of a satisfied faith, but it now sounds a challenge to a distressed civilisation. God may be in His heaven; but the world—who living in it, noting the events of the day, his eyes open upon man and his works, will venture the cry, "All's right"?

What we need is a clearer vision and less clamour. The call to the educated is to reflection rather than to panaceas or nostrums for our ills. We need to know how we stand and what our possessions really are. We need to see the background of our life, to find its controlling forces and so gain control ourselves. I do not mean that we should set our hopes on a multiplication of philosophers, for, with the best

intentions, that could not be an unmixed good. Philosophers are seldom statesmen, as Plato discovered, and was consequently led to place the perfect city, not on earth, but in heaven. There, where the main joy is supposed to be contemplation, the state might safely be entrusted to the lovers of wisdom. On earth, however, there are affairs, and philosophers must, therefore, be content to see men of affairs inherit most of the earth. But Plato made another discovery which his perennial influence has repeatedly demonstrated, namely this, that one of the chief uses of philosophy is education. The sun must be shown to the ignorant dweller in the cave, even if the vision is at first blinding. And I am convinced that our education to-day needs new methods and curriculums far less than it needs a new philosophy. That is why I take it that our need is primarily to see the background of modern life. Then, when it is seen, affairs may be more intelligibly illumined and the handling of them less perplexing.

This background is undoubtedly a highly complex thing, which fact makes some restriction necessary for the present study. I propose to deal only with some of its intellectual ingredients, and I shall begin by a study of naturalism.

I begin with it because it was the aggressor in the conflict and is now in the ascendancy. It found science neglected, and, what little science there was, quite insensible to the evident fact that nature has a history. It found a morality that thought mainly of precepts and little of the concrete goods of life. It found an art, beautiful indeed beyond compare, but secured and made possible in its monumental expressions at the cost of unmerited and unrequited human suffering. It found a religion busied in saving men's souls for another world in a manner neither complimentary nor humane, while it cared little for their sad estate in this. It found an education that prized the making of verses more than it prized the discovery of the laws of nature. So it declared war.

Geography, however, is necessary for war. You cannot invade with great hopes of success unless you have first spied

out the land. Once learned, the geography is soon taken as a thing for granted, and its importance as a factor in the conflict forgotten. Some error in the road is necessary for its re-establishment. The map which naturalism made was nature. It was drawn with new lines and showed unexpected elevations and depressions. It revealed man's place in nature in a new and contrasted light, reducing him from pre-eminence to insignificance. That change in man's place has become one of the essential ingredients in the intellectual background of modern life. It is worth attentive regard.

Recall the words of the Eighth Psalm :—

“O Lord our Lord, how excellent is Thy name in all the earth ! who hast set Thy glory above the heavens.

“Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings hast Thou ordained strength because of Thine enemies, that Thou mightest still the enemy and the avenger.

“When I consider Thy heavens, the work of Thy fingers, the moon and the stars which Thou hast ordained ;

“What is man that Thou art mindful of him ? and the son of man that Thou visitest him ?

“For Thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honour.

“Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of Thy hands ; Thou hast put all things under his feet :

“All sheep and oxen, yea, and the beasts of the field ;

“The fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas.

“O Lord our Lord, how excellent is Thy name in all the world !”

Surely, so thought of, man was thought of nobly. Yet the modern man considering the heavens can utter no such outburst of praise. Hear Huxley, for instance : “Our reverence for the nobility of manhood will not be lessened by the knowledge that man is, in substance and in structure, one with the brutes ; for he alone possesses the marvellous endowment of intelligible and rational speech, whereby, in the secular period of his existence, he has slowly accumulated and organised the experience which is almost wholly lost with the cessation of every individual life in other animals ; so that, now, he stands raised upon it as on a mountain top, far above the level of his humble fellows, and transfigured from his grosser nature by reflecting,

here and there, a ray from the infinite source of truth." We may be convinced that what Huxley says is true, but we cannot wholly escape the feeling that his words are an apologetic for human dignity. He sends man to us with a recommendation.

The contrast between the words of the Psalmist and the words of Huxley reveals in part the great change in intellectual background which naturalism represents so far as man's place in nature is the thing we are attending to. Man appears no longer as the Creator's last and supreme act, with all nature made for his conquest and dominion. He has become a part of nature, her master only as he has first become her attentive and obedient servant. She nourishes him in her bosom, but sedulously conceals from him the amount and length of her concern; her greatest child, but questionably her favourite. As a part of nature he can claim only a natural origin and destiny; he can no longer spontaneously believe that he can survive her. Being a part, he must measure himself up against the whole, laying his little stature off as something practically negligible in the vastness of things. There is such an overwhelming magnitude of universe to which his existence is entirely irrelevant that he can no longer instinctively regard human civilisation as the supremely important event in the history of that universe. It may be supremely important for him, but to say that it is supremely important in nature appears like uttering an untruth or an absurdity.

Now this altered estimate of our natural importance has become a widely diffused intellectual habit in the background of the thought of the modern man. It has dropped from the realm of speculation and become a controlling disposition. This is pre-eminently true of those who have had a modern education, but it is quite generally true of the mass of men who reflect at all. Is it surprising, then, that we should view things under the form of opportunity rather than under the form of eternity? Is it a thing to be wondered at that moral and religious convictions which have withstood the vicissitudes of centuries should, within our own memory, crumble in

decades? Is it not a mark of superficial reflection to regard the materialism and utilitarianism of the times as a symptom of moral decadence, instead of regarding it as the natural expression of an altered background? Is it not a desperate situation when morality and religion make their appeals as if the old background were still intact, while education goes on in cordial recognition of the new? There never was a time that did not need reforming. Our own, certainly, has not enough excellences to let us rest content. But that reformer is chasing an illusion or wickedly wasting our emotions and our strength who does not reckon with the intellectual background of the modern spirit.

The historian of philosophy in trying to understand this spirit cannot, however, rest content with noting simply that the view of man's place in nature has radically altered, for the modern view is not new. It was the natural and instinctive view of the Greek mind, and that mind produced the most exalted ethics and the greatest philosophy that human ingenuity has devised. The more clearly it envisaged nature the more intelligently it conceived human excellence, for nature with the Greeks still led a preferential life of which man was the most signal exhibition. But we have altered not only the view of man's place in nature, but also the view of nature herself. It is important, therefore, that we inquire what sort of nature it is of which man is conceived to be a part; for here lies the deeper source of the symptoms of modern naturalism.

Two factors, mainly, have shaped our conception of nature—the theories of modern physical science, and the part that machinery has played in our industrial and social development. These two factors, one of which is theoretical and the other practical, have led us to think of nature as a sort of vast machine controlled only by mechanical methods. The history of the science of mechanics is suggestive reading for the student of civilisation, for it shows how a study of appliances has been turned into a theory of the universe. Men like Archimedes were interested in mechanics that they might make

pumps and useful structures. But men like Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, and Laplace were interested that they might understand the processes of nature. Had Galileo used his knowledge as an architect might, or as an engineer, there had been no trial of him as a man hateful to God and dangerous to his fellows. Instead of being content to make machines, he essayed to make a world after a machinist's manner, and that was blasphemous. The tower of Pisa, illustrating in its wonderful structure many a mechanical law, was something to delight in and was assuredly no offence to Church or State. But Galileo, mounting its steps to drop his weights from its highest gallery, was a revolutionist. His offence, however, lay not in his ideas; they might have been pardoned, as were those of many another, had he not been measurably successful in his practice. Nature was responsible for his overthrow, for she answered readily to mechanical treatment.

From Galileo's time to our own day stretch several centuries. They mark in our intellectual history the steady and successful advance of the mechanical view of things, until to-day we can speak of the mechanism of thought and use no metaphor. To be sure, physical science is but a fraction of human knowledge; and the facts of life and mind do not readily yield to purely mechanical expression, yet mechanism has become the ideal of science. Indeed, our time does not lack historians who would make it the ideal of history also. In philosophy, idealism has made a valiant fight, but it has been a fight of defence. Its logic and dialectic produce a sense of bewilderment, while mechanism produces profitable industry.

Furthermore, the mechanical conception of nature has ceased long ago to be a speculation of scientists. It has become a popular conviction. The encyclopedia, the lecture, the magazine have brought the view within reach of everyone who can read. Your morning paper announces the latest scientific discovery as well as the latest divorce. The average man in the street knows as much about radium as the average college graduate. Galileo, in his day, was the exception. To-

day he is the exception whose view of nature is not essentially that which Galileo ventured to affirm. And this view has become a settled habit of thought. Who to-day thinks of the San Francisco earthquake as an act of God and not as a mechanical occurrence?

In our industrial and social development mechanism has ruled fully as much as in our intellectual development, for we have become dependent on machinery and organisation. In such things we have put our faith, and that not without good reason. It is machinery that has made modern civilisation with all its variety and effectiveness possible. That is a common enough remark which one could reinforce with a wealth of illustration. But what is not so commonly remarked is the intellectual habit which our civilisation has engendered, namely, the habit of demanding the appropriate machinery to make a cause effective before the cause itself may have an attentive hearing. We are no longer spontaneously visionary or romantic, but regard the man of visions and romances as mildly insane or as a man cultivating a pose. We may stand for ideas, as the saying is, but we are apt to do it from a sense of duty or from the desire to create an impression. We are not apt to do it instinctively as the free and natural expression of our settled habits; for our settled habits have been formed while we have conquered nature not through ideas, but by machinery. Attempts in that direction have been so abundantly justified both by theory and by practice that we no longer think readily of nature as a source of spontaneity and inspiration. We think of her rather as a vast machine.

Our background contains, thus, an altered view of man and an altered view of nature. Not only has man been dethroned from his exalted position as the lord of creation and made a part of nature, but he has been made a part of a machine. Wherever he turns, it is mechanism which confronts him and mechanical methods which commend themselves. He has by no means thought the matter out to a liberal acceptance of it and its consequences. It has been forced upon him without

his free consenting, as a thing inevitable, aggressive, and dominating. Did we consult our inclinations and preferences we might choose a more personal world, peopled with divinities responsive to our moods and their expression; but such inclinations on our part are rudely inhibited by our intellectual habits. To personify the world with success, it must be done instinctively and spontaneously, with no meddling intellect to stop the free impulse; but how can one personify the world if he is convinced that it is essentially mechanical?

I have likened the background to the geography which is often neglected in a campaign because knowledge of the land is taken for granted. So I would not suggest that it is my opinion that we are living our lives, meeting our problems and our promises with the philosophical proposition currently on our lips, "Nature is a mechanism, and man is a part of that machine." I mean, rather, that what that proposition signifies has become a settled intellectual habit about which we do not think because it is a habit, but which, for the same reason, controls our actions and attitudes, colouring all that we instinctively and spontaneously do. I have tried to indicate how this habit has been formed and what its justification has been. I have suggested that what is often condemned as our materialism, utilitarianism, and loss of ideals, is not a negative matter signifying a sinful deterioration of human nature, but a positive matter, the natural expression of an altered background forced upon us by the progress of events. All this I have done professedly in the interest of philosophy and education, convinced that what we need in these days of so much agitation and reform is a clear knowledge of the controlling forces of our civilisation.

In spite of its significance and its justification, naturalism has not been, however, emotionally satisfactory. Our greatest poets have been blindly optimistic, like Browning, or despairingly reflective, like Arnold. The social influence of the two men is interesting. Browning's poetry produced clubs to make of him a cult and to preserve his philosophy

through sectarian discipleship. Arnold's poetry produced strong individuals tenderly yet critically appreciative of human interests, but incapable of arousing great enthusiasm. He was by far the sounder thinker of the two; but he drew his inspiration from a past he could not justify, seeing in the future the intensity of human need more than an assured promise of good. Emotions, however, are not kept young and vigorous by clubs designedly constituted for raptures, or by beautiful expressions of despair; they must well up spontaneously from the background, and be so natural that they will need no cult and so instinctive that they will need no justification. It is just here that naturalism has failed. A mechanical world is emotionally bankrupt. In such a world one star does not differ from another star in glory; the difference is to be expressed directly in terms of mass, and inversely in terms of the square of the distance. To speak of glory in such a world is to speak theatrically.

Had not naturalism been marked by such emotional poverty, it would doubtless never have found humanism arrayed as its enemy. In that event humanism might have been enlarged or its best elements incorporated in a new inspiration. It was destined, however, to suffer a shrinkage and a diminution of its powers, so that it could fight only on the defensive and yield fortress after fortress. Yet it has been strong enough, in spite of successive defeats, still to preserve the front of a compact foe. At the outset, humanism had a distinct advantage, for it possessed culture as a lawful inheritance. That human treasure was not acquired by it through violence, but came as the natural legacy of an age grown sensitive to the accomplishments of man. Remember that in the inception of humanism man had achieved little as a student of nature, while he had achieved much as a student of his own impressions and ideas. Indeed, such a study is the characteristic note and definition of humanism. Such a study had produced a wonderful literature giving expression to noble sentiments. It had embodied itself in institutions which it maintained as the treasuries of its

wealth, giving to them a sanctity which history seemed to confirm. Humanism became, consequently, conservative and traditional, a tendency which naturalism forced into a habit. Remember, too, that for several centuries humanism was educationally effective. The classics presented models of statesmanship and social excellence which could serve admirably in a civilisation still owning kinship with the impressions and ideas of older times. Humanism could, therefore, claim the warrant of experience when naturalism assailed its system of education. But its strongest claim has been in its emotional richness. Under the spell of literature and art, of moral aspiration and religion, the spirit of man has been quickened and ennobled. The claim is true that naturalism tends to produce efficiency merely, while humanism tends to produce character, refinement, sensitiveness, and sympathy. Even to-day we admire the naturalist, but we love the humanist. To the latter we still assign a kind of superior excellence as we do to gentlemen of the old school. There, indeed, is a man.

It must be set down as a misfortune that humanism has found so little to support it in the background of the modern spirit and to make it effective. But misfortunes have their causes, and we can assign as a chief cause of the steady decline of humanism its foolish educational programme. I have said that it has been educationally effective, and can point to experience in proof. But its educational programme has a serious defect which naturalism has not failed to make apparent. That defect resides in the fact that the materials of its education are limited and can be exhausted by a progressive age. The source of Greek intelligence and its products was not antiquity, but nature. Those ancients drew from an inexhaustible source, one not located in the past or traditionally guarded, but one surrounding them and enfolding them with wonders daily new. The moment they forgot that source, they might still teach the wisdom of the fathers to the Romans ; but they ceased to be productive. They could hold up examples to imitate, but they could produce

no new models. Now, humanism in its educational programme has interested itself in the past of man, in what he has accomplished rather than in the immediate sources of his inspiration. It has sedulously cultivated the classic tendency. By that I mean that it has placed the foundations of human excellence in the past achievements of certain men, and not in the experience of living persons. It has shut human life up in books, making these books authoritative and forgetting that the men who wrote them, wrote, not out of contemplation of the past, but out of the richness of their own experience. That is why humanism was bound to exhaust itself.

I would not be understood as not valuing history, for it is man's great teacher. Our plight would be sad indeed if we had to relearn everything. We could enjoy such a condition only if the records of the past were periodically destroyed. That might prove an interesting experiment, but it would be folly to accomplish such destruction by our volition, for we have grown too dependent for that. But history should be studied not as a record of the past, but as the story of the present, as the backward look of current experience. Then it is illuminating and instructive. America to-day is what lends significance to the performance of Columbus. We are guilty of a foolish anachronism when we credit him with its discovery. Similarly, our own achievements can have significance only as the future owns them as its past.

But humanism tended to seal up the past and refuse to let it have its rightful vindication. We were bidden to write commentaries on it and introductions to it, as if a man could grow strong through the perennial contemplation of his youth. Thus it was that humanism in its educational programme provided mainly for reminiscence and little for the immediate sources of the imagination. It divided time into epochs, the least important of which was the present. It lived constantly in another world than its own. It thus became a producer of evil. Grant all its rich contributions to what we call the humanities, what has it done to lighten pain or poverty or

disease? Why has it nearly always been impotent in the crises of history? The answer lies in its method and its educational programme, for its sources were secondary, and not the primary and immediate fountains of life.

My object, however, has not been to disparage humanism any more than it has been to exalt naturalism. I have rather aimed at exhibiting their emergence from the background of the modern spirit as rival claimants for our acceptance. I have suggested that they might not have contended with each other had naturalism been able to supply that emotional uplift which is so characteristic of humanism at its best. In that case, each had doubtless ministered to the other's health. But naturalism, with its altered conception of man and nature, could see in humanism only a beautiful illusion, and, having nature to draw upon with ever-increasing justification of its draft, it has rapidly and signally altered our opinions and our practices. Without performing the interesting experiment of destroying the records of the past, we face, it seems to me, the present as men who must learn for themselves. We have returned to nature and learned the lesson of mechanism, with the result that both naturalism and humanism have become unsatisfactory philosophies of life. The times and the manners appear to be the natural expression of that result.

Philosophy, exercising that historical function of which I spoke in the beginning, might rest content with this diagnosis. But it has a critical function as well. It is never content until it has made an estimate, for in seeking knowledge it would aim at teaching wisdom. What estimates, we may therefore ask, does our study suggest? Surely it must be, after all, a high estimate we put upon the lessons of mechanism when we are mindful both of its achievements and its promise. A mechanical nature may not warm the heart or fire the imagination, but it is certainly a powerful and tractable instrument capable of being put to countless uses. It is too valuable to be neglected. Still, to deepen the consciousness that every end we may desire, every hope we may wish to see fulfilled,

has, could we but discover it, the machinery appropriate to its realisation, is decidedly worth while. This deepening consciousness begets a sturdy confidence. A mechanical nature is not whimsical, but a thing to be relied on, striking the proper hour at the proper time. It shelters no subtle malevolence which might elude our greatest care. It allows one no longer to have his hopes depressed and his will enfeebled by the belief that any evils are incurable. Our moral responsibility is thus put in a clear light, reinforced by a demonstration of the old saying that ignorance is the greatest of evils. For when once the appropriate mechanism for the achievement of any good is made known, no one can excuse the failure of its realisation, for the condemnation is that of folly; indeed, it is a great thing for man to be able to blame his stupidity rather than Providence for the greater share of his ills. We are entering to-day on the full significance of this truth and its many applications. We insist, for instance, as never before, and our insistence will grow to a relentless importunity, that we be allowed to live in sanitary conditions and that our food and water shall be pure. This we do not out of humanitarian benevolence simply, but because mechanism has taught us that there is no good reason why unsanitary conditions should exist. Such insistence is a prophecy of a new social order when we shall universally demand that knowledge shall minister to the public good, conscious that none can gainsay the justice of that demand. Consider Japan. Immobile for centuries, she has suddenly acquired our science of nature and given such an exhibition of civilisation that the world looks on amazed. That illustration seems to me to be typical of the future, for we have learned that the knowledge which counts is not primarily that of man's impressions and ideas, but knowledge of the mechanism of nature, which, when applied, yields its inevitable result. Yes, our estimate of mechanism must be high, convinced as we have become of its essential truth.

To deepen this conviction is the great business of education, and such education will be profoundly moral. There seems,

therefore, to be no good reason to conclude that what has been called naturalism is the only philosophy of life which our altered background can afford. It appears rather to be the superficial exhibition of a profounder view of life, something bound to pass in its crudity, to be replaced by a quickened and eminently rational view of human goods and the means of their attainment. That newer philosophy might still be called naturalism, for it would own nature as its source; but it might equally well be called humanism, for it would realise that nature affords the proper mechanism to minister to the ambitions and hopes of humanity.

If the narrow and straitened humanism which we have discussed erred in its educational programme, the narrow and straitened naturalism has erred in its estimate of nature. Having learned that nature works by machinery, it neglected the obvious fact that the machinery exists to support and maintain its product. The future historian will note the neglect and characterise our age as one strikingly lacking in intelligence. He will note our vast industry, and comment on the fact that while we made great machines to support and sustain the products of that industry, we could none the less regard nature as purely mechanical, with no product to exalt and sustain. We have been so afraid of the doctrine of final causes and of assigning deliberate intentions to nature, that we have forgotten that she has produced, supported, and sustained human civilisation. For man is a part of nature, carried on by her forces to work the works of intelligence. In him she bursts forth into sustained consciousness of her own evolution, producing in him knowledge of her processes, estimation of her goods, and suspicions of her ultimate significance. This is a truth of nature and not a product of human fancy; and it is a truth fraught with the profoundest emotional import. Without such creatures as man, nature might well exist, but she would exist unvalued and unobserved. Her natural beauties would fire no imagination, her wonders would rouse no curiosity, the fact that her

vast machinery supported and sustained a varied world would excite no comment and kindle no aspiration. Add man—ah! but you cannot add him as some extraneous figure tacked on as a negligible quantity to a sum already total, for he has grown out of nature's own stuff and been wrought in her workshop. He is, then, no mere commentator on the world or spectator of it; he is one of its integrations, so to speak, a supreme instance where nature has measurably evaluated herself. His comments are nature's self-estimate.

Led by an enlightened naturalism, therefore, we cannot regard the mechanism of nature as a factory where the machines run on, but where there is supreme indifference to the product. Rather must we regard it as that which supports and maintains what we choose to call ideal products, and finds in them its significance and justification, as the germ finds its reason for existence in the life it engenders. We have been half-hearted evolutionists, seeking the causes of variation and neglecting the fact that nature is always achieving results which may justify her labours. Yes, something must be achieved. It need not be something long ago devised or originally intended, but we know it must be something with a value suited to give the struggle significance. It is impossible, therefore, for philosophy to regard the emergence of reason as but the opportunity to condemn the cosmic process as the begetter of illusions, and to convince us that the ideal aspirations of man are the one great error in the universe. Nay, rather, an enlightened naturalism will call upon reason constantly to illumine our path with ever fresh glimpses of the light of nature, so that human life may be at once natural, rational, and joyous. Such a philosophy would be also an enlightened humanism, calculated to sustain culture and give birth to impressions and ideas suffused with spontaneous emotion. And such a philosophy, I am bound to believe, is a solid foundation for enlightened educational progress.

FREDERICK J. E. WOODBRIDGE.

THE UNIVERSE AS PHILOSOPHER.

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IF Nature produces all things, we cannot escape the conclusion that our theories of their production are themselves natural products. Philosophy must not be treated as a mere *addendum* to the universe it professes to interpret, itself having no intelligible place in the world. On the contrary, among the facts of which any complete view of things must take cognisance, the view taken surely counts for one.

This truth is always fading away and needing to be revived, and the present article is a plea for its revival. The theme is that our conception of the world remains incomplete until it includes the interpretation of the world as a vital element of the world-constitution. The philosopher who, like Mr Herbert Spencer and many others, professes to give an intelligent synthesis of all the facts accessible to observation, must not forget to include among them his own occupation at the moment. I shall plead that this occupation of the philosopher, as he forges the master-keys of truth, so far from being a fact of no importance, is precisely that one among all the facts which most vitally affects the significance of the rest. The effect of its inclusion, by any scheme of thought which has hitherto excluded it, is revolutionary.

In a sense, the question before us is the old one, of the relation of subject and object—an admission, it is to be feared, not likely to engage the interest of the reader. I propose, however, to vary the dull exercise by making it, as it seldom

is, specific and concrete. We shall not trouble ourselves with the abstract question of how mind is related to matter, but we shall enter the controversy at a higher point, and ask how Philosophy (as a special manifestation of mind) is related to *its* object, if it have one. We shall turn reflection on its own process and results; we shall ask the philosopher to consider his own act in putting forth any theory of the All-of-Things, and to tell us what place in the All-of-Things that act and that theory hold. Have they any place, or none? If any, what? If none, why not?

From yet another point of view our study may be said to refer to the general context of philosophical investigation. How comes the universe to provide room, not for intelligence in general, but for philosophic intelligence and for the philosopher's point of view? What kind of a universe is that which contains, as this universe undoubtedly does contain, Mr Herbert Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy? How is our conception of Nature affected if we are to admit that Haeckel, T. H. Green, James Martineau, with all their speculations, are natural products? Or when Huxley discovers that Nature is indifferent to the moral needs of man, what is that in Huxley which makes the discovery, and what is the discovery itself? Do these fall outside Nature or inside? If inside, what shall we think of a Nature which in the fulness of time is able to produce a brilliant essay on her own shortcomings, and advise men how best to bear themselves in consequence? If, on the other hand, Huxley and his works fall outside Nature and have nothing to do with her, then to what or to whom do they belong? Were Huxley to admit, as probably he would have done, that, after all, the Romanes Lecture is Nature's doing, then, we must ask, is she also responsible for the very different view of herself put forward in Martineau's *Study of Religion*, and, in addition to that, for the attempt to reconcile these contradictions which we call Hegelian? Are Huxley, Martineau, Hegel (or the Hegelian) mere spectators of a pageant in which they themselves as philosophers have no acting part?

Is the exhibition of their respective doctrines to be treated as something wholly severed from the pageant itself? Must we think of these great men as seated on the kind of throne once occupied by the God of Deism, neither of the world nor in it, but employed in that very work of *ab extra* criticism and unrelated vigilance which each of them has taught us to dissociate from the name of God? And if these questions are answered in the negative, and the whole situation thrown back into the arms of Nature, is not the reader immediately aware that a strange new element has appeared on the scene? Does not the fact that Nature can, at one and the same time, confess her moral indifference by Huxley, proclaim her moral concern by Martineau, and strive to harmonise the discord by Hegel—does not this fact radically transform the conception of Nature from which the inquiry began? And if, again,—the reader must be patient,—it be said that we are now showing symptoms of a “tender mind,” all the more must leave be given for a final question, namely this: Whether the pragmatic doctrine itself, pragmatically appraised according to its own rules, would not be pragmatically valueless if Kant and his tender-minded “crew” had not appeared on the scene? For if Kant had never set us wrong, it is hard to see what “difference would be made” by James setting us right; and whatever makes no difference is, according to Pragmatism, nothing. No tender mind, no tough: no Kant, no James. Pragmatism itself compels us to think that tender minds and tough are necessary correlates in an organic whole. They are like quarrelsome twins, each of whom finds it difficult to get on with the other, but impossible to get on without him.

In short, philosophy needs to consider her context. We ask the philosopher, who explains how all things come in, not to forget to explain how he happens to come in himself, and what in the total production is the significance of his part. The secret of the universe being, for instance, matter and force, is it a fact of no significance that the universe has somehow managed to find out and publish its own secret, and to grow

hilarious, contented, sadly pessimistic, or heroically defiant, as the case may be, over the discovery? This consideration, which becomes the more weighty as we ponder it, has been curiously overlooked. There are not many thinkers who have learned Fichte's lesson of catching themselves in the act of thinking out their own metaphysics, and asking whether the metaphysics so thought out are wide enough to embrace their own significance. If the reader will subtract from the sum total of modern philosophy all that which, while explaining all else, leaves itself unexplained, as a mere surd in things, he will find but a scanty remnant left on his hand. The type of thinker most commonly met with to-day is one who violently seizes a point of view outside the problem he is seeking to answer, and builds for himself a crow's-nest of observation on territory and out of material secretly filched from the object of his inquiry. I have in mind three schools of philosophy—Dualism, Naturalism, Pragmatism—claiming gifted exponents and a wide currency of which it is strictly true that they either beg, borrow, or steal a point of view clear outside the universe before they can tell you anything about it. There, in their crow's-nests of observation, they stand and speculate, as truly apart from the object as the soul seated in the pineal gland was apart from the body it was thought to control, and stubbornly negligent of the fact that all the difficulties of that long-exploded theory are suggested in aggravated form by their own attitude to the business they have in hand. In all these cases there is a suppressed factor—the philosopher himself,—and though this may look at first sight like a piece of splendid self-abnegation on his part, it turns out on nearer view to be mere defective logic. It is a lame sort of synthesis which omits the synthetising intelligence: *Hamlet* with Hamlet left out is complete in comparison. Had we not other business in hand, it would be easy to fill the rest of this article with modern instances of speculative theories which appear to “work” only so long as they and their authors are regarded as existing in two absolutely separate and

unrelated worlds, but which lose even the semblance of truth the moment you try to establish a relation between the two.¹ Give the philosopher a free charter to deal as he will with "his own" intelligence, so that he may introduce it into the universe and withdraw it without notice, and any conceivable interpretation of the world becomes equally possible with any other. He will prove to you, according to his bias or yours, that the world belongs to God, or to the devil, or to himself, or to nobody. Let him withdraw his intelligence from Nature, and he will show, for instance, that Nature can never produce the human conscience. Nature then becomes a mere machine, and is capable only of the works of a machine. Let him surreptitiously introduce his intelligence into that machine, as Haeckel does, and he will doubtless be able to persuade you that machines can say their prayers, play chess, and indulge in repartee. Such a charter has, indeed, never been given, but it has been assumed by many philosophers; and it is in virtue of this stolen right that not a few of our recent guides, deceiving themselves as well as their followers, have been able to account for the wonderful tricks the universe is able to play. As with the progress of education philosophy is forced to answer for its doings before the tribunal of public opinion, it is likely that the mischievous privilege of dealing as he likes with "his own" intelligence will be sternly withdrawn from the thinker.

Between the mental habits of the age and its moral tendencies action and reaction are incessant. The logic which governs great systems of thought inevitably reproduces the

¹ An instance of this, taken from the work of one of our finest thinkers, which I cannot forbear quoting, will be found in Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (vol. II. p. 171), in the famous passage dealing with the ten men and the ten suns. If the reader will carefully consider how the ten men, each perceiving his own sun, come at last to agree among themselves that it is one and the same sun they all perceive, he will find that they do so only because an eleventh man is surreptitiously introduced, viz. Professor Ward himself, who, unknown to himself or any of the ten, pulls the strings of the whole operation.

principles underlying the daily life of the communities in which they are born; and, on the other hand, practical tendencies gather a new strength from this reproduction. The correspondence is often as clear in details as it is on the grand scale, and many a trick of thought turns out to be the reflex of thoughtless tampering with the ends of life. In what immediately follows I shall suggest that this holds true of that false conception of the relation between interpretation and the universe interpreted which enters and remains unnoticed in so many current forms of speculation. It remains either unnoticed, or, if noticed, condoned, for this reason: that this is only one more instance of a divided mode of thought to which a divided mode of life gives perpetual encouragement. It repeats in a particular case, and in a less explored region, a conception of man's relation to his environment which, in a thousand ways, sets the one over against the other as unrelated and mutually exclusive terms.

Of the many forms of this divorce the characteristic example may be found in current ideas of private ownership. Here pluralism reigns supreme and needs no advocate. Here the ego is accepted without question as the starting-point of the whole adventure; and, since the adventurers are many, the word, which was obstinately singular for the tongue that coined it, is endowed with a plural for British use, and we speak of the "various egos of various men." Society is the sum total of these "egos," round each of whom possessions gather, as rubbish gathers round a stake fixed in the midst of a swirling stream. The relation which binds the ego to his goods is an external attachment only; like the stake aforesaid, he has them as long as he can hold them, and in no other sense; and the condition of their belonging to him is that they shall not belong to anyone else. The egos of this pluralistic society have for environment a world which is conveniently plural also; for it is divided into a sufficient number of small lots, and as you get the lots by dividing the world, so you get the world by adding the lots.

Each lot is of a mixed character : it comprises cash and other values of all sorts—money, health, mind, morals, religion, and a number of other things as well. As the egos are many, the lots are many also ; each ego has its own lot ; and thus a picture is constituted, of which it cannot be said that the interest of variety is lacking.

This is the pluralism of the natural man : what mischief it has wrought in the field of social ethics no serious observer needs to be told. I shall, however, endeavour to show that the same mode of thought, disguised under other names, has invaded the innermost citadels of speculation. Thought also is treated as the property of thinkers ; and the thinkers are merely “egos” of a special sort. Philosophy itself becomes a kingdom of small holdings. Its harvests are portioned out into a miscellaneous assemblage of “little systems,” each of which is assigned to its particular philosopher, who, like a pedlar, hawks it round the world in his pack. These little systems are exhibited as emphatically “ours”—and the truth remains unperceived that not only their littleness but their insignificance is often due to that very fact.

The idea of possession might be claimed with some plausibility as an ultimate category of thought. The question, “To whom does this belong ?” or “Whose is it ?” occurs as inevitably to the philosopher criticising a new system as to the child who has captured a stray kitten. As a popular type of what is unthinkable, a thing which belongs to nobody would serve as well as an event without a cause. If the thing does not belong to man it must belong to God. Taking the prevalence and force of mental habit as a test of truth, it might be claimed that the concept of possession is exempt from criticism. Let the reader at the outset measure for himself the extent of the tyranny which ideas of private ownership exercise in the thinking of the West. The thought of the East, or rather of India, here stands out in sharp contrast to our own, and perhaps the subject is best approached in the

light of that contrast. What makes Indian thought unintelligible, or at least unattractive, to many whose thinking has been fashioned in the British temper, is that it does its work without employing the category of possession. When Indian philosophy is discussing the nature of experience, or the self, no reference is made to what for the British mind is an essential feature of the case, viz. that "somebody" must be implied to whom this experience or self appertains as a freehold.¹ There is no point, I imagine, on which it is harder for East and West to understand each other. The philosophy which emanates from the well-furnished studies of Britain, and proclaims at the outset that experience also is "my own," must be a sore perplexity to those whose fee-simple in the world extends only to a loin-cloth and a beggar's bowl. Here we may find an interesting illustration of the influence of social conditions on mental habit. In the civilisation of the East possession, as the end of life, has not acquired the dominance it exercises in the West, where it may be said without exaggeration to control the structure of society, and to pass thence and return thither from the structure of our thought. The differences between feudalism and democracy, between individualism and collectivism, are reducible to different methods, theories, or ideals of possession. Industrial society, so far as it is merely industrial, is motivated from the same source. And we find ourselves unable to think save in terms of proprietorship. This concept is the centre of gravity of our legal system, and out of it we weave our theories of the rights of man. It is the basis of the most effective half of our moral distinctions and the characteristic notion of the

¹ For a recent example take the following:—"But as the Idealist *does* set forth from experience, we are forced to inquire from *whose* experience the start is made. . . . We must surely start from someone's experience. From whose experience, then, do we start? Each, we say, must start from his own experience or from the sympathetically imagined experience of another. But another's experience *qua* imagined is still one's own experience. Each, therefore, must start from his own experience."—Mr Boyce Gibson, "A Peace Policy for Idealists," *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, January 1907, p. 417.

West. We treat the whole universe as a thing to be exploited in somebody's interest, and build our doctrine of reality on a metaphor of cash-values. The rich man's difficulty in entering the kingdom of God is ours in an aggravated form; for riches are not so much the means of our forgetting God, as the form under which we try to remember him. God is the proprietor of the world. Even Milton, in times when the fever of possession was a milder thing than it is to-day, traced the history of the world, and the whole scheme of man's redemption, from an attempt to dispossess the Almighty of his own. Thoroughly native to the Gothic mind, and strongly reinforced by what the Goth has borrowed from the Jew, the concept of possession has laid its moulding hand on the entire history of Christian theology, and was never more potent than it is to-day. Not so long ago the present writer followed an argument for the existence of God based on the necessity of postulating an owner for the world. Was it conceivable that a property so vast and so eligible *belonged to nobody*? Surely the earth was the *Lord's*, and the fulness thereof. Whether there was or was not a First Cause, who could say? But the necessity of a First Owner was self-evident. Such an argument, whatever be its defects, may at least be praised for taking advantage of the weak spot in the heart of a property-loving age. When possession is treated as nine-tenths of the Law and the whole of the Gospel, it is not wonderful that men should ascribe proprietorship to God.

It is, however, in connection with an idea of man rather than of God that the category of possession is most unsparingly applied. Passing over the question of the rights of property, in the technical sense, let us consider how the matter stands in the realms of psychology and metaphysics. Here we are at once confronted with a doubt whether the philosophers of the West have ever taken heed that the verb "to have" which they use so freely in the psychical sphere must be given a totally different sense from what it bears in the purely objective or physical. When we say a man *has* five senses, reason, will,

conscience, soul, we are surely speaking of a different relation from that implied when we say he *has* five children, a grand piano, a medical adviser, and a balance at the bank. You *have* your character (an Intuitionist will emphasise this); you *have* also, let us say, a testimonial from your last employer; but “having” in the first case denotes the exercise of an essential function of your being; in the second, a purely accidental circumstance. Conceive then the confusion which results, when even in approved works of psychology the mechanical category is transferred into the spiritual world, and we are asked to do our thinking as though it meant the same thing in the one as in the other. Man *has* a body and he *has* a *soul*; but who is the man claiming these assets if he be not the assets he claims? Or perhaps the soul is the owner of the body. Is the body, then, a *corpse*? But these are crude examples taken from children’s primers and such like: let us consult the philosophers. According to them, man *has* a place in Nature; he *has* a relation to the universe and God; he *has* duties to his neighbour and to himself; he *has* an end to accomplish; he *has* experience in all its varieties; he *has* right impulses and wrong; he *has* individuality which he is told to guard lest it be taken from him; he *has* virtues of which hostile powers would “rob” him; he *has* vices which he had better get rid of; he *has* an ego which is his very own; he *has* a soul which he may sell—and so on through a veritable auctioneer’s catalogue of man’s effects. But who is the owner of these job-lots? He is behind the scenes; but if you seek him there you will not find him. When you think you have got him, he turns instantly into one of his own possessions. It helps not a whit to refer us to a *higher* self: for this higher self also turns out to be something man *has*. Who, then, is Man? Is he the selfless owner of himself? We flounder in a realm of nonsense, trying to cook the hare we cannot catch.

In regard to Philosophy itself we are apt to set up the same dualism, and again to think of the relation between

philosopher and system under the category of ownership. Noteworthy here is the impersonal character of the great systems of Indian thought. We of the West, although on occasion we can adopt impersonal language, are yet inclined to allow an importance to persons, in this connection, which is foreign to the philosophic temper both of India and of Greece, and which, I venture to think, has done much to darken the outlook of Western thought in the higher realms of speculation. The question, "Whose is it?" disturbs the significance of any interpretation of the universe we may happen to consider. It is Plato's; it is Spinoza's; it is Kant's; it is Haeckel's. We cannot rid ourselves of the obsession of the possessive case. The truths of thought, like Mr Boyce Gibson's "experience," must belong to someone, and the shadow of this someone—often, alas! his speaking substance as well—is only too apt to dominate our interest in the controversy. If truth is to be told, we must confess that no small part of the current output of philosophy is concerned with the rights of famous thinkers to possess their own. Standards are raised; parties formed; raids planned on the reputation of great names. There can be no doubt that this feature of the case has added something to the zest of philosophical controversy in the West, and won to it the interest of many persons who might otherwise have concluded that philosophy provides nothing worth fighting about. How much the higher thought owes to this kind of belligerency is not an easy question; but I am not one for overestimating the debt. Nor would I rate more highly the services of another set of individuals whose method, though a seeming antithesis to that just described, is but an exaggerated expression of the same spirit. Not least among the chastisements of that plague of egos wherewith our sins have afflicted us is the apparition of superior persons who, under the proud title of "independent thinkers," glory in the shame of being no man's disciples. Owing everything to the leaders they are so anxious to repudiate, and smiting them with weapons stolen

from their armouries, they contribute nothing to thought save an illustration of the utter blindness that overtakes it when ingratitude and vanity are allowed to enter in. To capture any portion of the kingdom of truth and to keep it for one's very own, is not only forbidden by the nature of truth, but is an ambition unworthy of the thinker. The service of philosophy is not exempt from the ethical laws of life. Plato, advancing far beyond the teaching of his Master, nevertheless placed his own thoughts on that Master's lips and himself passed out of sight.

Certain it is that the temper in which these lofty studies are pursued is too often identical with that which prompts an Englishman to proclaim his house as his castle or to form a syndicate for buying up a promising concern. To *have* a philosophy is dear to the heart of an enlightened Western, and he "has" it in the same sense that he "has" an edition of Plato in his library, a Morris paper in his drawing-room, and an ornamental knocker on his front door. It is the captive of his bow and spear. If you attack his views he will treat you as threatening his property. You shall not "rob" him of his faith; you shall not dispossess him of his point of view. It is remarkable that the sphere in which this temper is most active is that of Philosophy and Theology. "My philosophy" will always pass current; "my religion" is condoned; but "my science" is absurd. The field of scientific inquiry, alas! is not free from the curse of personal claims, but we should be startled to hear the ether described as Lord Kelvin's, or a treatise on iron introduced by the statement that the iron in question belonged to "somebody." The subject of science may safely be trusted to walk abroad by itself; but metaphysical entities must always be accompanied by the owner and led by a string. Why is this?

The foregoing discussion is intended to suggest that we are dealing with no casual metaphor but with a deeply rooted intellectual habit continuous in character with the ethical conditions of the age. We have now to examine the actual effects

of this habit in the field of philosophical inquiry. Briefly, the effects may be summed up as the introduction of an unsuspected dualism into the centre of the Monistic camp. Thanks to the power of the possessive case—a power equalled only by that of “juxtaposition”—philosophy has been detached from its fitting context in the All-of-Things and made the property of a set of persons, namely philosophers, whose business is to stand apart from the universe and take copies of its underlying principles. Here stands the philosopher, ready to begin; there lies the universe, the *corpus vile* of the experiment, a poor, passive, long-suffering object, waiting to receive a character and be clothed upon by any rag of a theory which philosophy may cast upon its nakedness. The inquiry proceeds, and, “facts” having been duly examined, and the victim graciously permitted to give evidence on its own behalf, sentence is pronounced for the One or the Many, for Chance or Design. The philosopher has given *his* award and the spectators may now disperse, leaving the universe in its rational clothes and with the judge’s label pinned on its back. That professed dualists should conceive the matter in this way need occasion no surprise, though to them one might commend the criticism of Mr James, and remind them that it “makes no difference” to the universe whether it is thus “copied” or not. But that any thinker who goes the length of asserting the essential unity of the world should thus desert his principles every time he enters his own front door, or makes a call on a brother philosopher, is, I venture to think, a very remarkable and perplexing phenomenon. Such combinations of fidelity abroad with treachery at home are by no means uncommon.

To one who professes Monism in any of its forms, this may be commended as self-evident truth: that every interpretation of the universe is itself an element in the universe to be interpreted; whence it follows that no interpretation is valid which fails to account for its own presence as an organic factor in the All-of-Things. Let the reader be perfectly clear on this point. If we take two philosophers, one of whom

habitually speaks of the universe as containing his own interpretation of it, and the other as not containing this, it is clear that they are speaking of different things. The conception of the latter is obviously incomplete, for there is something which *that* universe does not include, viz. the interpretation given, in consequence of which exclusion it cannot claim to be the *All* of things. Even Mr James seems to regard the world as containing the pluralistic hypothesis, perhaps as one of its unaccountable elements, and as owing not a little of its interest to that circumstance. The reader who is candid with himself will, I believe, have to confess that whenever he thinks of the world he always thinks of it with his own interpretation superadded, and cannot indeed think of it in any other way. The mere fact that he calls it "a world" shows that he has already put a meaning into it. Let us then suppose a formula to be discovered which should enable us to give a rational explanation of the universe throughout the entire range of its physical and psychical phenomena. The formula might be Spirit, or the Idea of the Good, or One Substance with infinite attributes, or Matter and Force: the content is quite irrelevant. What we have now to ask is, Does it cover its own presence among the facts to be interpreted? Is it self-explanatory? Has Plato's universe a place for Plato and his Republic, Spinoza's Substance for Spinoza and the Ethic, Haeckel's for Haeckel and his Riddle? Or does the formula fail at that precise point where the arrival of the philosopher is the feature of absorbing interest? Would the interpretation embrace every conceivable fact and problem save only the seeming detail that someone is interpreting all things in that precise and particular way? Would America be America if it had never been "discovered"? Would the universe be itself if it had never been explained? If the latter alternative be the true statement of the case, let the reader carefully consider what follows—which is nothing less than the absolute downfall of Monism. We are left with a Monistic formula on this side, and a Monistic universe on

that: but the formula and the universe are as separate from one another, as distinct in being, as mind and matter were in the Dualism of the Middle Ages. An explanation which explains the universe, but which the universe itself cannot explain in return, leaves us still grovelling among the beggarly elements of common sense: it fails to bring the controversy one hairsbreadth nearer to solution.

The point at issue is obscured by the abstract form in which the problems of philosophy are usually stated. Thus we are asked to consider the relation of mind to matter. Can matter account for mind? can mind account for matter? Well, let us suppose that either could be done. You have, say, a theory of the universe which sufficiently accounts for mind as the necessary consequence of some primordial arrangement of matter and force. But that is not the last question at issue. It is nothing to the purpose when you tell me how matter accounts for mind: what I want to know is, how it accounts for mind as manifested in the very act of putting this interpretation on matter's potencies and powers. For if your universe is really one, this is what it ought to do. It must show itself capable of producing not mind in the abstract, but those particular operations of mind which Spinoza's or Haeckel's answer to the riddle exhibits. If it is only Spinoza or Haeckel who provides the answer, and not the universe itself, then you are no Monist, but a Dualist, the universe standing on this side and Spinoza and Haeckel with their keys on that; but how the keys came to fit the lock will give rise to a new riddle several degrees harder than the old. If, on the other hand, you scorn such inconsistencies and boldly profess your willingness to regard Haeckel and his works as facts, organically related with all other facts to one another and the whole, qualifying by their presence the meaning of everything else and being qualified in return, then there is no escaping the conclusion that it is the universe itself by means of Haeckel, and not Haeckel apart from the universe, which answers its own riddles in the

systematic and intelligent manner of the German biologist. And that discovery will send you further than Haeckel in search of light. For what precisely we want to know is not in general how matter can evolve intelligence, but how the universe comes, first, to present itself as *this* riddle and then to evolve *this* answer. In other words, Haeckel will not explain the universe until he has shown how the universe explains him.

To say so much is but to repeat a doctrine with which every student of the first chapter of St John's Gospel is familiar. The Monist, of whatever complexion, who, consistently with his principles, casts his own philosophy back into the arms of the universe he claims to interpret, is a confessor of the Eternal Word. It is the Logos which speaks through him: and he is a revealer of the truth just in so far as he is also an element in the truth to be revealed. What *he* says about the Whole would be a meaningless story were it not read in the light of what the Whole says about *him*: save as himself explained by the system he would explain he is nothing, and his point of view is nowhere. At first he seems to himself to be looking *out*, from his private window, upon the All-of-Things, a mere spectator of the scene before him: but it is the light of the All streaming *in* through the window that renders his speculation possible and reminds him that he knows only because he is known. At this point philosophy begins. The philosophic ego, severed from his context, and claiming in that severance to interpret the context from which he is torn, is now seen to be a pure abstraction, ineffectual as any ghost. It is of the essence of mind that it embraces itself within the sphere of its own inquiries, and if the cost of admitting this is to introduce a paradox into every philosophical problem, the penalty of neglecting it is to strike philosophy dumb.

Indeed, the above doctrine, far from being novel,¹ can claim a witness wherever Religion and reflective Conscience have found a voice. "Thus saith *the Lord*" is ever the word of

¹ Students of Schelling, and of the transition to Hegel, are not likely to think it novel.

the Prophet: "thus thinks the Whole" is but the deeper implication of the Prophet's cry. "Our wills are ours to make them Thine"; and Thought is ours for no other end.¹ Were the second false, the first could not be true. Reason can never sit a stranger at the hearth where the moral consciousness is at home. Thought, like morality, must lose in order to find; and in surrendering her insight to the All-of-Things, she achieves on lighter terms a victory won in other spheres at the cost of agony and bloody sweat. We are not straining after far-fetched and unheard-of things; we are repeating our daily confessions and moving among our most familiar thoughts. With impeded utterance and with a slightly foreign accent, Philosophy is here speaking the language which ever flows from the lips of Religion with the easy music of a mother-tongue. What is far stranger than this doctrine is the spectacle of devout thinkers fiercely contending for subjective interests from which Christian men seek deliverance every time they repeat the Lord's Prayer. For the meaning of things is no more *my* discovery than the moral order is *my* creation, and the philosopher who discerns this and proclaims it deserves no harder name than the saint who cries "*Thy* will be done."

The habitual neglect of these considerations by Monistic thinkers is probably due to a one-sided tendency in the Western mind to assert the Right of Private Judgment—a right specially dear to the Goths and supported by the whole group of powerful instincts which gather round the concept of possession. But, if the foregoing exposition is sound, the first duty of a consistent Monist is to abandon the assertion of this right in its exclusive form. He must, from the outset, surrender the claim that his thoughts, views, or beliefs are exclusively

¹ O Light that followest all my way,
 I yield my flickering torch to Thee;
 My heart restores its borrowed ray,
 That in Thy sunshine's blaze its day
 May brighter, fairer be.

his own. If they are *his*, that is only because they are also Another's. This in general he is ready enough to do; but the full significance of his surrender will not dawn upon him until he has learnt to include within it, not his thought in the abstract, but that particular thought of his which achieves this final interpretation of the world—in brief, the Monistic philosophy itself. By hypothesis he has no status, as a being apart, from which to form an outside opinion of the Whole. His views of the Whole are also the Whole's views of itself. It follows that every form of Monism implies that the universe is self-conscious. No ultimate distinction can be drawn between what you the philosopher think of the world and what the world through you thinks of itself. In no wise do you escape this conclusion by holding "mechanical" or "materialistic views" of nature: for, if your Monism is consistent, the assertion on your part, "*It is a machine*," is just the assertion on its part, "*I am a machine*." Whatever *you* say "*It is*," *it* says "*I am*." Your only escape is to constitute yourself an outsider, or, which is the same thing, an unrelated part of the Whole—in other words, abandon your Monism altogether. Spinoza proclaimed this over and over again: in the deepest sense it is the theme of the *Ethic*. "The intellectual love of the mind towards God, is the very love wherewith God loves Himself."¹ The principle underlying this statement compels the Monist to translate every doctrine of reality from the form, "*It is*," into the form, "*I am*."²

To every Monist, one would suppose, the most thought-compelling fact of the universe is the continual effort it seems to be making to get its own nature expressed. This effort he will see reflected in every system of philosophy the wide world over. So far as these systems are true he will regard them as the self-confessions of Reality. But here a sore difficulty

¹ *Ethic*, pt. 5, prop. xxxvi.

² Religion also, it may be added, has but a secondary concern with the proposition, "*It (or he) is*": its main concern is with "*Thou art*." A demonstration of the existence of God, in the third person, would have no value for *religion* unless it were susceptible of translation into the second.

awaits him, for these self-confessions of Reality seem to be exceedingly various as to their import, inconsistent, and even contradictory. If some are true, it would appear that others cannot be free from error. And precisely the same line of argument which makes the universe responsible for the true makes it responsible also for the false. No serious Monist needs to be reminded that the gravest difficulties the system has to encounter are precisely those which gather round the origin of error. These difficulties come to a head when we remember that among the errors for which the All-of-Things is accountable, are those which attach to its own most intimate self-confessions in the form of philosophy. If certain systems, regarded as true, represent the effort of the Whole to explain itself, how can we resist the conclusion that other systems regarded as false reveal the Whole in the act of belying its own character? It may be said that to speak of "true" and "false" in this connection is to evince a *parti pris*. Let us be content, then, with the fact that the universe, monistically regarded, gives birth to a series of differing interpretations of its own nature. It would surely be hard to find any single fact which at first sight gives greater encouragement to a pluralistic view of Reality, and one is surprised that Pluralists have not made better use of its support.¹ The co-presence *in* Reality of differing interpretations of Reality would seem to be fatal to the hypothesis that Reality is the expression of Unitary Mind. If Nature is one, she surely cannot be simultaneously in two, or twenty, minds about her own constitution. How is it possible to read the Monism of Spinoza, the Dualism of Martineau, the Pluralism of James, as the self-confessions of a Single Being?

The consideration of this difficulty will form the subject of another article.

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¹ Perhaps the Pluralists have discerned that a theory, their own for instance, which is merely one among others, has no more claim to be true than any of the others among which it is one.

ARE WE PARTS OF NATURE ?

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NEAR the beginning of Pope's *Essay on Man*, the author admonishes his reader in the following strain :

“ He, who thro' vast immensity can pierce,
See worlds on worlds compose one universe,
Observe how system into system runs,
What other planets circle other suns,
What vary'd Being peoples every star,
May tell why Heav'n has made us what we are.
But of this frame the bearings and the ties,
The strong connections, nice dependencies,
Gradations just, has thy pervading soul
Look'd thro' ? Or can a part contain the whole ? ”

It may not create a favourable predisposition to begin with this strongly agnostic strain of eighteenth-century verse, but that is, in effect, the assumption which I wish to challenge. A part, we are told, cannot know the whole. Let us rather invert this reasoning, and look with favour on the thesis that *what is capable of knowing cannot correctly be described as a part*, or that *the conception of whole and parts cannot be applied to man as a rational being*. In other respects, man, as a body, may be a physical part of nature ; but such language is meaningless as regards his mind. We begin then with the idealistic analysis of knowledge.

I. The naturalistic view of man considers that he is a sequence of consciousnesses in time, which had a recent beginning, and must have a not too distant end. In other words, man is a thing in the world of time and sense like

other things round about him. We reply: This estimate omits from its consideration the fact that man is conscious of the moments as they pass; that into every shred of the life of reason there enters not only the hair's-breadth (or, if you prefer it, the time span) of the present, but a remembered past and an anticipated future; and that thus, amid the flux, man stands for permanent interests. If you float on the bosom of any current, you do not seem to be moving at all: many a voyager has found this to his cost! Only if you have some fixed mark against which you can measure the passing stream does its motion become perceptible. Knowledge then is not a flux but a rock, against which we measure the passage of the stream of sensations. And the knower himself is to be identified with the rock rather than with the stream.¹ Man is not in time; time rather is in the mind of man.

If we turn from Time to Space, we ought by parity of reasoning to be able to construct a similar argument; though Mr Pope might await us here with still more of smiling confidence. Do we really pretend to contain the whole boundless physical universe? Well, at least, we call attention to the same significant fact. Mind *knows* the manifold of the one as it knows the manifold of the other. The *here* and the *there*, like the *now* and the *then*, are both within a consciousness which grasps them in unity and investigates their relations at its leisure. Man's physical minuteness has not prevented his mind from darting across the abyss of space; he weighs, he measures, he investigates the chemistry of the remotest star. If you still call him a *part*, you must grant that, in this respect, he is an audacious and aggressive part.

Leaving time and space—or at least banishing them from focus to background—let us think of what reason further does with the material world. It erects general classes; or, as more recent phrase and thought might prefer to say, it establishes general laws. Behind the flux of endless random particulars, as they seem, knowledge discovers that which is

¹ In point of fact, of course, he is both.

permanent. A causal law once experimentally verified always holds true; just as the lines known to us in the spectra of minerals burned on earth reappear in the spectra of nebulae. Of course scepticism may strike in here. Perhaps it calls itself nominalism, as in the Middle Ages. Perhaps, at the present hour, it is found calling itself pragmatism or humanism; at least there are many, with no ill-will to humanism—rather with sympathy in some of its protests—who feel compelled to dismiss its utterances as ingeniously perverse. Sceptics then tell us that it is we, illegitimately, who simplify the facts. We pretend there is a law or an order; there is really only a chaos. Or, in the more modern form: we confine our attention to what interests us or is important to us. Yet I cannot help thinking that it is important for us to attend to facts, and that figments, or conventionalities which are purely conventional, will prove most unsatisfactory utilitarian implements should we lean our weight upon them. Knowledge and practice of course are allies: but, if knowledge and practice can master the bewildering complex of natural forces, it must be because we have, though imperfectly, learned Nature's secret, and have found in the world of matter such qualities as unity, system, steadfastness, the qualities of *thought*. It cannot be because we have imposed our own make-belief pretences upon the objective world! Against such insults as that, Nature can very well protect herself.

What do we say then that man is, if he is not a part? He is a focus; he is a knot, in the structural tissue of the universe, where the meaning of the whole reflects itself, and (within whatever limits) reveals itself. If knowledge is more than make-believe, man is a being who, on the mental side, is not reasonably described at all when he is called a part. Nor—so far as he is a knower—can man reasonably be said to occupy a position on the rim of the great wheel. Rather is it true that knowledge places him at the centre of things. For all knowledge is an awareness from a general point of view. Once known—lifted out of its sensuous particularity

into the light of universal experience—any fact can pass from hand to hand, from mind to mind, like current coin. Nay, much more than that. Your teaching me what you have found out does not make you any less wise. There is endless power of raising the whole intellectual tone of the race when one mind has taken a step in advance. So miraculous a thing is mind. Of course intellect has its limitations; and a knowledge which is *incommunicable personal experience* may prove in some respects not inferior but superior to science. However, for the present, we dwell upon the other inference. Man, the knower, is not chiefly a body, or particular parcel of matter, but a mind, at home in the house of thought, a lord of the universal realm of truth.

II. In the second place, let us try to say something in regard to man considered not as a knower, but as a doer. Is he in this instance a part?

The forces which tend to make us take the materialistic view of man have grown stronger, and have become more aggressive in the ethical and social region, through the triumph of Darwinism. It seems frequently to be taken for granted that, if it is possible, in any sense, to use Darwinian language as a description of human conditions, such language is the epitome of all wisdom—truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. A pretty large assumption! But it is freely made; and man in society is supposed to be a part excluding all other parts; a competitor, an embittered competitor, and nothing but a competitor. Similarly, many politicians—I will not say statesmen—seem to take it for granted, as a thing needing no argument, that the prosperity of another nation is necessarily our nation's loss; are we going to take it lying down? That mood and attitude arises, or may arise, out of obsession by the formula "struggle for existence." Hardly less troublesome, perhaps, are the people on the other side, who consider that competition is an unmixed evil, and that we must pass a steam roller over society to remove every vestige of the accursed thing. Let us try to understand what

competition really is. I have heard an elderly lady ask, after watching a set at lawn tennis, why the players did not try to send the ball towards each other, as she remembered the habit was in other days at the game of battledore and shuttle-cock. Well, a game *is* a competition, or it is spoiled; but it is a co-operation to compete. It would be no favour to the man on the other side if I served him soft balls, and dropped my returns gently over the net, so that he might run in and kill them, scoring every point. He expects me to play my best; that is part of the bargain. The first aim which we must set before ourselves is to have a good game; only the second aim is to be, if possible, on the winning side. Nor will anyone play happily unless he is a good loser. And, if in such cases competition is subordinated to co-operation, there are other regions of social life in which competition disappears. There is not less music for me because you are seated beside me at a concert; on the contrary, the purely æsthetic thrill is reinforced by a deep human thrill of fellowship, as often as a great multitude sways to a single emotion.

Of course we must not paint this subject in meaningless rose pink. Man has a body as well as a soul. Though we cannot live upon bread alone, yet without bread we starve. No more than you can "eat your cake and keep it," can you eat your loaf and give it away. Nor again is it possible for two men to win the same maid. Elsewhere we might laugh or might frown at the friendship between two which would not stretch to admit a third and be the richer. But here the love which is strong as death is never far off from jealousy cruel as the grave. And so marvellously are contrasted elements interwoven in us, that, according to all modern civilisation, the exclusive passion is the diviner of the two. Friendship is a glorious thing; but the love of husband and wife excels in glory. We find then natural exclusions and spiritual sympathies running together in one strange pattern throughout our mysterious nature. There *is* competition; and if there is the lover's joy of winning, there is also the

bitterness of loss. And yet, even in this rivalry, there is a fellowship and a co-operation. You should find yourself no happier, you sighing, anxious lover, if your mistress's name were fished out of a lucky bag and handed to you by fate; no, not though some supernatural agent, celestial or other, made sure that you were allotted the very lady of your desires. You must woo her, and you must win her, and you must guard her. If happiness is to come your way, you and she must freely choose each other. And if you fail, why, you must learn to be a good loser. You must play the game.

What do we say then that man is, when we think of his practical activities? Is he a part of the social whole? By no means. He is not a part but a *member* of society. With whatever reserves and explanations, yet essentially, the good of the whole community is *his* good; and even the sacrifice of self, if made for a worthy cause, brings its own deep joy. Nay, there are curious and intricate fashions, as already hinted, whereby, when we seem the merest rivals, we are in truth partners. The sense in which man, the active being, is a physical part, excluding his neighbour, works into that higher view of life according to which we are "members one of another."

Yet it is only right to note a contrast here. In knowledge we dealt with all that is knowable; and especially with the remotest regions of the material universe—as a supreme test-case of the powers of mind. In practice it is otherwise. Our savage ancestors long ago may have lighted fires at mid-summer to replenish the sun's prodigally wasted stores of heat; but we have had to form a more modest estimate of our powers. Physically, we are of the utmost insignificance. We are but reeds, though, as Pascal has said, reeds that think. We can do no more than faintly scratch the surface of our own planet. Mischief perhaps we sometimes can do on the great scale, but rarely physical good. If the human race were blotted out to-morrow by a cataclysm which allowed the lower tribes of life to survive, they would not miss their chief. No; it is only in what modern slang calls our *social environment*

that we find that larger life of action in which it is our happiness to be members. Nature is not our fellow—only man; unless we may dare to say only man *and* God. If God is truly manifested in human life, love, conscience—if the crown of terrestrial evolution is a real climax and not an aberration—there is perhaps no loss in the confinement of our co-operation to the human task, to that narrow groove where man's effort counts. Nature laughs at us, with her cold, mocking laugh; but what of God?

III. This brings me to the third and last part of my subject, the religious or theological. If I may assume that what has been contended for above is granted me, shall I find that it gives any help to religious faith?

It seems plain that the idealism, which bases its position upon an analysis of knowledge, is in some respects favourable to Christianity. If man were simply a parcel of animated matter—if he were no more than the “greater ape”—it would be ridiculous to assert any special kinship between man and God. But a philosophy, which draws a definite line between rational man and the irrational creatures, is in so far predisposed to favour Christian assumptions: even in the startling phrase in which they are presented to us by the home-spun laureate of English hymnology:—

“Were the whole realm of nature mine,
That were a present far too small;
Love so amazing, so Divine,
Demands my soul, my life, my all.”

Audacious words! A greater sacrifice than the whole of nature, *my* all! and yet most Christian words; hinted if not emphasised in the simple practical teaching of the Master of Christian souls: “What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose himself? or what shall a man give in exchange for himself?” Or again, in other homely words—words that can hardly have been spoken save with a smile: “Fear not, therefore, ye are of more value than many sparrows.” So far, Idealism and Christianity go hand in hand.

But, if Christianity accepts allies, it cannot pick and choose among their teachings. The apologist constantly finds that he wants to do that; but he is always laid under obligation to prove his right. And in this matter the idealist presses his analysis beyond where the Christian can accompany him. It is not merely made out that man is akin to God, we are told; the true inference is, Man is identical with God. That is the only part of the truth—or that is the nearest approach to truth—which religion attains to. So Dr MacTaggart tells us, expounding Hegel, and in this case at least, I believe, representing Hegel's real mind. Religion makes an immediate assertion of the immediate unity of God and man. For any explanation, for any justification, and for any balancing¹ elements, we must turn away from religion and look to philosophy. So the doctrine which was to help Christian faith turns into a meaningless pantheistical intoxication. Man is God—that is the logic of our creed, it appears; but, if that is truth at all, it cannot possibly be more than a fragment of truth.

This affirmation is supposed to be in some special sense the outcome of Christianity. Is it not rather a bewildered metaphysical version of the Christian gospel? Perhaps it is what an idealist naturally makes of Christian teaching, or naturally regards as its most interesting and promising suggestion. But he is hardly entitled to affirm that Christianity *consists of* the affirmation of man's identity with God; nor may he draw the off-hand inference that Christianity is sadly one-sided.

For in reality, while agnosticism declares that man (the part) is in no sort of proportion whatever to God (the whole), and while idealism declares that, according to religious thought, man is no other than the great Whole, Christianity simply declares that man is God's child, that God is man's Father. This assertion is no blind headlong identification; it affirms identity in difference, likeness amid unlikeness, dependence as well as kinship. Of course it is open to metaphysicians to ridicule, as Hegel does, the application to God of a term such

¹ In order to be brief, I speak "as a fool."

as Father, which is borrowed from the natural life of man. Into that further issue it is impossible here to follow the great metaphysician. But we are entitled to protest that the Christian message is not the grotesque assertion—man is God.

Much might be learned from a very unmetaphysical school of Christianity—Ritschl's. For it is there taught that the two sides of man's nature come together into unity in religious faith and in it alone. Man is both body and soul. His body is an animated parcel of matter, exposed to all material forces, to all natural risks. Gravitation, as Pope insists, cannot cease "when we go by"; and the consequences follow, even if they are death, or maiming, or bereavement and perhaps a grief that is almost despair. But man is also a soul, great enough to be capable of God's friendship, while little enough (in soul and body alike) to need God. And, if he is really in touch with God, evil becomes discipline and sorrow is transfigured by faith. One may compare at this point Professor William James's grouping of religions—healthy-mindedness and the sick soul. In that grouping again we meet with an attempt to tear asunder two elements of life which interlock. The simplest formula for religion is such as this: "I was brought low and He helped me." One need not insist on the *He*. "It" helped me—"something" helped me—from the psychological point of view that might suffice; the only thing that will not do is "I helped myself," since self-help, whatever may be said in its praise, is hardly a religious virtue. Looking back then at the formula, *I was brought low and He helped me*, we find ourselves ordered to tear it up. There is the religion of need—*I was brought low*. The other is a different, an opposite religion—*He helped me*. Well, there may be a fraction of truth in this. In some cases there is more consciousness of need, in other cases of help; but objectively the two things are correlates. A slight malady would need but a trivial remedy; and to whom little is forgiven the same loveth little. No one would report on an examination by saying, Some men have tried difficult unseens, and others have given

better translations. Of course ; that is a truism. You could predict as much beforehand. Your business as examiner is to establish some definite ratio between task and achievement ; and there is no excellence at all apart from the successful accomplishment of a hard task. We cannot estimate religions upon any other principle. A Pagan deity, sprinkling rose-water at a *fête champêtre*, may impart a certain elegance to human life ; or modern Indian worship, with its flowers and its incense and its shrinking from blood-stained sacrifices, may have a refining tendency. But a religion which can bravely say, "Neither death nor life shall separate us from the love of God which is in Christ," has solved the essential problem of religion at an immensely deeper level and with fuller success.

Similarly we might sum up conclusions in regard to our own special subject. Man is in one aspect a part, in another aspect a whole. Philosophy may claim that the second is the more important ; for as a knower man is a focus of the life of reason. In moral conduct, the two aspects come nearer together ; for, even when he is thrown into rivalry by natural needs, man continues to be a member of human society. But religion, declaring him a child of God, perfects the unity of his nature. His greatness here does not simply coexist with littleness. Nay, more, it does not merely outweigh his littleness. Both things work together under God's leading to fulfil man's destiny. It is true, man is not himself the infinite and absolute Being for whom all contradictions vanish. But, as in knowledge he stands near God's reason, and as in virtue he assumes the likeness of God's love, so in worship, according to the claim of every religion, he borrows strength ; but monotheistic religions tell us, strength from the Highest, and Christian faith adds, the very fulness of God. Not in isolation, but in dependence, as sons, as heirs, we receive all things. So indeed our destiny is fulfilled, and we are "with God at the centre of the universe."

ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

PROGRESS AND REALITY.

G. F. BARBOUR, M.A.

THE question of the relation of change and progress to the ultimate nature of things is one of the recurrent problems of philosophy, and the answer given to it is one of the most searching tests of a philosophical system. In the early dawn of Greek thought we find two opposite answers to this question set forth in sharpest and most emphatic contrast in the teaching of Parmenides and Heraclitus—the “doctrine of rest” and the “doctrine of motion,” as Pater has called them. Although subsequent philosophers have naturally failed to imitate the uncompromising thoroughness with which these doctrines were first proclaimed, and although mediating theories have been many, we may without serious inaccuracy classify metaphysical systems according as they reject or admit change and progress as factors in ultimate reality. To trace the fortunes of the doctrines of Rest and Motion through the centuries is, of course, impossible in a single article; but it may be worth while to inquire briefly into the “interest,” to use a Kantian phrase, “of Reason in these conflicts,” and to ask what appeal the different solutions of this question make to the spirit of man.

I. It is noteworthy that, after the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides, we find a tendency for a philosophy of Being, a statical system, to precede and lead up to a dynamical, a philosophy of Becoming. Thus Plato comes before Aristotle, Spinoza before Leibniz, Kant before Hegel. This suggests

that the speculative instinct first leads to a philosophy of permanence, and that it is only when this proves inadequate that the need is felt for a philosophy of progress. The fact of change is obvious; and the first task of metaphysics is the finding of some firm resting-place for the mind amid the flux of things.

In the search for such a fixed principle, the analogy of mathematical truth has played an essential part. Kant, when confronted by the all-dissolving sensationalism of Hume, appealed to the certainty of mathematical knowledge; just as Plato sought to meet the relativism of Heraclitean and Sophistic thought by a theory of permanent Ideas or Forms, which was founded largely on mathematical concepts. In Spinoza the influence of mathematics is too clear to need to be emphasised. In all these great philosophers the process of thought was the same. For each of them, the universality and certainty of mathematical knowledge stood out sharply against the shifting play of sensation; while each was in turn impressed by the intuitive clearness of its primary truths and the cogency of its demonstrations. So they were impelled to the belief that the results of philosophy must be at least equal in certainty to those of mathematics, while its object, the ultimately real, must share the timelessness of mathematical truth.

This mathematical type of reasoning was confirmed by epistemological reflections. In the *Meno* and *Phædo*, the dialogues in which Plato is seeking to find a ground of philosophic certainty in the theory of Ideas and Reminiscence, he appeals to the nature of mathematical knowledge as a proof that the soul does not share the mutability of her sensuous experiences. On the possibility and the structure of our knowledge he bases the argument that man is a being of "such large discourse, looking before and after," that his life must extend beyond that portion of time which he passes on earth and in the body, and that the soul belongs to a higher and a permanent order of existence. Thus Plato discovers an inner permanence answering to the permanence

of the ideas: the soul, "being in communion with the unchanging, is unchanging."¹ This epistemological argument to a subjective principle of permanence reappears in the Kantian doctrine that our knowledge would be impossible but for the agency of a noumenal ego, itself outside the time-series, and in the often-repeated assertion of T. H. Green that the knowledge of a succession in time can only arise for a relating consciousness to which the succession is presented, but which is not itself a member of the succession.

By these and similar paths thinkers have been led to a philosophy which emphasises the importance of the eternal element in knowledge and reality, and reduces the changing either to mere appearance and illusion or to a far lower rank in the scale of being. And these formal considerations have been supported by others less abstract. The dialectical argument is reinforced by sentiment and emotion. There is a religious, as well as a speculative, "interest" in the attribution of a higher reality to the Permanent than to the changing. To this belief regret for the irrevocable past contributes, and also the deep-set reluctance of the human heart to admit that there is nothing in beauty or in virtue, in the highest achievements or the noblest character of mankind, strong enough to withstand the merciless power which hastens all things to decay. To the poets and the moralists of well-nigh every age the transience of life and its gifts is the saddest theme in all experience; and in their revolt men look upward or forward to a place or a time in which

"No more change shall be,
But stedfast rest of all things, firmly stayd
Upon the pillours of Eternity,
That is contrayr to Mutabilitie."

It may be said that here we have wandered into the vague regions of sentiment, which lie outside the scope of philosophy. But in such sentiment, in such an attempt to transcend the changing manifold of sense and rise to a principle in which

¹ *Phædo*, 79. Cf. *Meno*, 81 ff.; *Phædo*, 74-5, 100.

the human spirit may more securely rest, philosophy has one of its chief springs. It is true that Aristotle denies that "good will be more good if it is eternal"; and Hegel warns us that we must "banish from our minds the prejudice in favour of duration, as if it had any advantage as compared with transience: the imperishable mountains are not superior to the quickly dismantled rose exhaling its life in fragrance."¹ Or, as Ben Jonson expresses the same thought,

"A lily of a day
Is fairer far in May,
Although it fall and die that night—
It was the plant and flower of Light.
In small proportions we just beauties see;
And in short measures life may perfect be."

Now, it is doubtless true that there is no occult virtue in the mere fact of duration, and that, to take the instance in regard to which Hegel makes the remark quoted above, the brief, bright span of Greek history and thought has done more to enrich mankind than the countless centuries of China. Nor, if we fail to find goodness and beauty in our transient experience here, need we expect to find them in a similar experience drawn out to infinity in some other region of the universe. But on these grounds to dismiss as a mere "prejudice" the thought, common to Plato and many other philosophers, that the Permanent has a higher value than the transient, shows a failure to grasp its real significance. It is an intense appreciation of those moral and æsthetic values, which come into being only to vanish swiftly and irrevocably, which leads to the belief that they are not utterly lost, but that in some form they persist, and that they may be rediscovered here or elsewhere by him who seeks strenuously. It is the conviction that the Universe cannot ultimately be indifferent to its own noblest products that gives rise to the belief in "the conservation of values," and to the exaltation of the Permanent above the changing.

¹ Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, bk. i. 1096 a, 4; Hegel, *Philosophy of History* (tr. Sibree), p. 231.

Thus we perceive one reason for the great emphasis laid on the Eternal and Unchangeable by all the chief religions of the world—by those which assign a real significance to ethical striving, the temporal relation, and progress, as well as by those which regard all such aspects of experience as mere illusion. It has been well said that, while from the ethical standpoint the victory of good over evil is thought of as something requiring to be wrought out in the sphere of moral conflict, Religion regards it as already assured, if not in some real and deep sense already accomplished. Even in the Jewish religion, for which the ethical aspect of life, including progress in time, was so intensely real, there was a still greater reality behind all such progress, and this reality was unchanging. It was as important a task, in the minds of the Hebrew prophets, to recall the nation to a sense of the changeless God behind life and history, as to emphasise the import of moral distinctions within the ever-changing scene of life and history.

In this reluctance to ascribe real progress or development as we know them, with their implicates of dependence and incompleteness, to the Absolute, Speculation is in accord with Religion. For, to mention a single difficulty, how are we to conceive or to measure development, in the case of ultimate Reality? Development implies a standard, progress a goal; but in this case there is nothing above or beyond to serve as goal or standard. Mr Bradley expresses this point of view with his usual force when he asks, "Is there, in the end and on the whole, any progress in the universe?" and answers in the negative: "Progress and decay are alike incompatible with perfection. There is of course progress in the world, and there is also retrogression, but we cannot think that the Whole either moves on or backwards. . . . For the improvement or decay of the universe seems nonsense, unmeaning or blasphemous."¹ And his appeal in this connection to "every considerable religion," and to Christianity in particular, is probably warranted by the facts, though we shall see that it

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, pp. 499-501.

is at the same time one-sided. We may now answer the question of the "interest" of reason in a philosophy of the statical type. With the reservations which are needful in every sweeping generalisation, it may be said that this interest is twofold—speculative and religious.

But, in passing to the philosophies of progress, we may remark that systems of the statical type always show a tendency to pass over into their opposite. For, if ultimate Reality is conceived as superior to change, and as existing by and for itself, it becomes impossible to relate it to the sphere of Becoming. The gods, in the serene calmness of interstellar space, or on the heights of some supra-mundane Olympus, can take no part in the affairs of men. Hence, as Höfding points out, there is a contradiction inherent in the religious thought of India and Greece: "Human life outside Olympus and Nirvana is, after all, not absolutely worthless. . . . Hence Olympus and Nirvana cannot logically assume the attitude of the sole privileged, uplifted above the happenings of this finite world, for without a living and positive union with this world their significance as the highest value would fall to the ground."¹ In other words, the unchanging and real being has been so far exalted above the changing and relative that it ceases to have any normative value for the latter, and becomes merely the unknowable. This has been the fate in turn of Plato's immutable world of Ideas, of Spinoza's *unica substantia*, and of the Kantian noumenal ego. As Plato himself argued in criticism of his own earlier theory, "If God has this perfect authority, and perfect knowledge, his authority cannot rule us, nor his knowledge know us, or any human thing."² It is the need for a vital connection between the ideal and the real worlds which has led to the philosophies of Progress and Immanence.

II. When we turn to the "Doctrine of Motion," we find that it may take two forms, according as the world-process is

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (Eng. trans.), pp. 233-4.

² *Parmenides*, 134 (tr. Jowett).

looked on as mere change, or as change directed to an end, and so Progress. In its former sense, that of pure change, this theory was first stated by Heraclitus, and stated so thoroughly that twenty-five centuries have found little to add to his expression of it; and one of the prophets of modern science has said that "no better expressions of the essence of the modern doctrine of evolution can be found than are presented by some of his pithy aphorisms and striking metaphors."¹ Its appeal is rather to the scientific than to the philosophic interest; for, as we have seen, Plato made clear for all time its inadequacy to the explanation of knowledge; and Hume's psychological relativism only brought home this inadequacy to thinkers of the modern world.

But the appeal of this doctrine to the scientific mind remains. The theory of universal change seems to be forced on the impartial observer; and, though at first it appears as violent a paradox as the counter-affirmation that true Being admits of no change, yet it is continually receiving fresh confirmation. Modern science is not content to hold that all which seems most stable in our immediate experience is in momentary process of dissolution—it goes on to add atoms and solar systems to the list of victims of this un pitying law. And the very fact that human nature protests against such a destructive philosophy does something to enlist on its side the impulse of scientific disinterestedness. Hence the "Doctrine of Motion" has, since the days of Heraclitus, been combined with a certain Stoicism of ethical outlook. One aspect of this spirit appears when Horace finds in the renewal of the earth in spring, not a reason for gladness, but a warning against the building up of immortal hopes. Another phase of the same spirit is expressed in Marcus Aurelius' question, "Can any useful thing be done without change? Do you not see, then, that this change which is working in you is even such as these and alike necessary to the nature of the Universe?" Finally we may note the thoroughly Stoical character of the passage

¹ T. H. Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 69 (Eversley ed.).

with which Huxley concludes his Romanes Lecture, after pointing out how little scientific ground there is for "millennial anticipations," or for the expectation that the law of alternate evolution and dissolution will be suspended in the case of that evolution whose consummation most deeply interests us.¹

But the history of this theory proves that it is no more tenable in its extreme form than the opposite, or purely statical, theory. Mere change without a controlling, and hence durable, element would produce a chaos, not a cosmos. Hence above the change there rises for science the form of the law which governs it; and the fact that Law is sometimes hypostatized, and almost personified, by scientists bears witness to the need that makes itself felt for a principle of permanence amid the constant flux. Even Heraclitus, although he held that "the way up and the way down is one and the same," yet distinguished the two ways; and, as Professor Burnet has pointed out, this distinction of upward and downward proves that "he was not a believer in absolute relativity."²

But it is when we go beyond the bare admission that there is a principle of change or a standard of reference, and think of this permanent and governing factor as the goal of the world-process, that we arrive at a true theory of Progress. Here the "interest" is no longer predominantly speculative or scientific, but distinctively ethical. This standpoint is not that of modern science, which tends to look on human life as a mere incident in the vast spectacle of cosmic change; it has become anthropocentric, and attaches a new importance to the doings and the aspirations of man. On the other hand it must be distinguished from the distinctively speculative attitude; for, as we saw, the speculative "interest" is to be found chiefly on the side of permanence. Even philosophies of Development, which aim at bridging the gulf between the immutable and the changing, tend, in so far as they exhibit

¹ Horace, *Odes*, iv. 7. 7; Marcus Aurelius, vii. 18 (tr. G. W. Chrystal); Huxley, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-6.

² *Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 169.

the intellectualistic character, to consider "development" and "progress" in a logical and timeless sense. Thus, in Hegel's thought, taken as a whole, the deepest element seems to be the timeless development of the dialectic. But in so far as he emphasises the reality and essential importance of historical progress, his thought may be said to have an *ethical* character in the widest sense of the word.

It is this sense of the reality of History on the great scale, and of the numberless histories that compose it, which marks the philosophies of Progress. This view of things has always been prominent in Christian thought, as it was in the pre-Christian religions of the Persians and the Jews. We are here in the sphere of the "practical reason." It is in the stress and conflict of the moral life that personality is developed; and we know nothing deeper than personality, nothing more fit to be the goal and crown of evolution. This conflict appears subjectively in the opposition of the categorical imperative of duty to the promptings of impulse—objectively in the secular strife of good and evil. And the overpowering sense of the reality and sternness of the conflict issues in the demand that progress shall be real both for the individual and for the world. Just as the individual cannot be content that reason should for ever negate desire, and yet that no progress should be made towards the moralisation of his whole nature, so the moral consciousness rebels against the idea that evil is only illusion, and hence that the warfare against it is also illusory. The sense of the vast issues bound up with the moral life of even a single human being, and of the possibilities of tragedy no less than of triumph which lie hidden in it, and still more the long conflict and hard-won progress of the ages, seem to make it certain that, if reality is to be found anywhere, it is here, and to forbid the belief that the moral life results in no real and absolute gain. Here we again meet the belief that the Universe cannot be indifferent to the gains of this warfare, the faith in the conservation of values.

This assertion of the ultimate nature of ethical distinctions

has lately been voiced by "Pragmatism." It appeals to the deep-seated belief that nowhere do we come so closely into contact with reality as in the experiences of moral effort and decision. "If this life be not a real fight," Professor James has said, "in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight—as if there was something really wild in the universe which we, with all our idealities and faithfulnesses, are needed to redeem."¹ The logical consequence of this view is that the issue of the fight has import for the Universe as a whole, and not for the combatants only. If this experience of conflict brings men into touch with the heart of things as nothing else does, then it may be held to result, not in a mere redistribution of moral energy within the Whole, but in an actual gain of moral energy to the Whole. So Professor James argues that "God himself may draw vital strength and increase of very being from our fidelity."

Here Pragmatism affirms the doctrine stated in an opposite interest by Hegelian intellectualism—that of the necessity of the Universe to God, the dependence of the Absolute Spirit on the development of the finite spirit of man. But, if Pragmatism has here joined hands with its great opponent, it has at the same time gone farther than common sense is prepared to follow; for the latter on the whole combines a firm belief in the real import of moral distinctions and moral effort, with a no less firm belief that the Deity stands above this conflict, and cannot be thought of as gaining or losing perfection as it swings back and forward. As we cannot think of the physical universe as progressing in space—for to measure such a progress would involve passing beyond the universe and fixing a landmark in the Inane—so, it is argued, we cannot conceive of the moral progress of the Whole, outside of which there can be neither end, goal, nor standard. So also, if we think of the Absolute as transcendent and the goal of progress,

¹ *The Will to Believe*, p. 61.

it cannot be conceived as itself liable to change, for then there would be no security that progress was genuine, and not the pursuit of a wandering and deceptive light. Thus the Doctrine of Motion no less than the Doctrine of Rest, when pressed to its ultimate conclusion, necessitates a transition to the theory which, appearing at first as its opposite, is in truth rather its correlative and complementary.

III. So far we have attempted to trace the inner motives of these two views of the universe, and to follow the principal arguments by which they may be supported. And in so doing we have seen that neither can be held in bare abstraction. The Doctrine of Motion, at least in its ethical form, suggests that there must be a permanent end and standard of progress; while, if the Doctrine of Rest is not to prove a mere fantasy of the abstract intellect, it is needful to think of the eternal and unchanging reality as in some way brought into relation to the changing world of our experience. Thus the opposition between the two tendencies of thought has already lost something of its hard-and-fast, unmediated character. And, although every attempt to indicate a solution of an ultimate problem such as this must be in a large measure halting and tentative, it may be worth while in the rest of this paper to inquire if there is any conception in the history of thought which may help yet further to resolve the dualism of these rival theories.

Such a conception may be found in those three pregnant words in which Aristotle summed up a whole philosophy: *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*. The highest reality is here thought of as persisting throughout all change, or rather as above the possibility of change, and thus the demand for permanence is satisfied; while progress is the path by which the striving creature ascends towards the ultimate Reality, and thus is the most real fact in all our experience. A similar thought is expressed in T. H. Green's statements that God "*is all which the human spirit is capable of becoming,*" and that He "*is the final cause of the moral life, the ideal self, which no*

one, as a moral agent, is, but which everyone, as such an agent, is however blindly seeking to become.”¹

This conception, as Green expresses it, brings out strongly the connection of the moral life with reality. Can we make a higher claim for that life than that the absolute Reality stands to it in the relation of its final cause? It is true that we do not hereby claim that moral progress and moral distinctions are themselves the Absolute; but would such a claim be a reasonable one, even if it could be harmonised with the other demands of reason? May we not be content *ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν*, and to believe that, although our moral life is not in itself the Absolute, just as our knowledge is assuredly not omniscience, yet it is the approach towards the Absolute, and thus possesses the highest validity. If we believe that our highest ideals are the reflection, dim and partial, but not in essence untrue, of that which actually exists in the highest reality, then they gain absolute validity *for us*, and the effort to realise them becomes our most real experience. From the central point of the Universe the end may appear to be already attained; but this does not prevent us from claiming complete validity *within the sphere of finite experience* for the effort to realise it in that finite experience.

We may now return for a moment to consider the words quoted from Aristotle. Here also the thought is that God is completely and eternally what all other beings are only striving to become, and that those who have risen highest in the scale of being and have approached Him most nearly have the highest degree of reality or actuality. The nature of the Divine Being operates as a final cause; that is to say, its action is attractive, and therefore spiritual, not of the nature of material force. If Aristotle's thought may be translated into modern terms, the words *τὸ ὀρεκτόν* or *ἐρώμενον* suggest, not the compulsion of an infinite and irresistible physical force, but the appeal of the ideal to wills that can respond to it, and which are therefore free. Now, whether or not the Greek

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 187; *Works* (ed. Nettleship), iii. 225.

thinker would have allowed that there is any kinship between his conception of the divine activity as the final cause of all things and such an idea as the Christian one of voluntary obedience and the appeal of the ideal to the conscience of man, it is quite open to us to connect the two. And this conception of the reality which is highest both ethically and ontologically, "moving all things by love and desire," carries a step further the harmonisation of the ideas of the Absolute as permanent and of moral progress as real and trustworthy. For if, as we ascend from lower to higher forms of life, the divine activity ceases to resemble physical compulsion and becomes more and more a free appeal, then the response of the moral nature to that appeal gains at every step in reality and import.

Another point of view from which the subject may be considered is that of the Conservation of Values. This is, as we have seen, a demand made by thinkers of two very different schools. From the side of the philosophy of Permanence, it takes the form of a belief that the highest æsthetic and ethical values which we know are superior to the law of change and decay; while the practical or "Pragmatist" argument is that the hard-earned gains of the moral life shall make some real difference to the Universe, and not "be cast as rubbish to the void" by the pitiless action of cosmic forces not themselves moral. Placed thus side by side, the two demands are seen to be in no wise irreconcilable. Rather their close agreement so far justifies Höffding's contention, in his *Philosophy of Religion*, that the axiom of the conservation of value is common to both the great types of religion—those which admit and those which deny the reality of the temporal relation and moral progress. Without going so far as to hold it proved that this is the fundamental principle of religion, we may admit that it may prove an important factor in the synthesis of the statical and dynamical types of thought both in religion and philosophy.

Höffding, it is true, professes at the outset to limit his

investigation to the *conservation* of value in the narrow sense, *i.e.* the persistence of a certain sum of value; but at more than one later point he tacitly admits the possibility of taking the principle in a wider sense, that of the preservation of *new* values.¹ And the latter would seem to be the natural sense of the term; especially when we consider it in connection with the life of moral conflict, where the demand for conservation of values is closely bound up with the belief that these values are actually gained in it. But the chief point to notice in regard to our present argument is that such a belief brings the Permanent into a more vital connection with the moral life. If religion has for its object not merely the ideal End of progress, Himself unmoved, and moving finite wills by the desire He creates, but if it also guarantees that human efforts to approximate to the ideal are not a matter of indifference to the Absolute, but will be taken account of and their gains conserved, then an important advance has been made. For religion has acquired, in addition to the element of aspiration and striving after the ideal, the element of faith and trust. The indifference of the Universe has been overcome.

This brings us a step nearer to the position of Christian, as distinct from Hellenic, theism. The latter tends to represent God as above and apart from the moral conflict of the world, while Christianity thinks of Him as manifesting Himself in it, and even sharing in the suffering which it involves. Thus Christian theism is far from being open to the charge sometimes brought against it of being too transcendent in character; it rather carries out the principle of immanence with a thoroughness which has often seemed "to the Greeks"—Aristotelians as well as Platonists—"foolishness." Yet it is bound to do so if it remains faithful to the belief that, if we are to know the Supreme Reality at all, it can only be through the attribution to Him of qualities analogous to, though infinitely transcending, the qualities which we recognise as highest in man, and consequently in the world as we know it.

¹ *Philosophy of Religion* (Eng. trans.); cf. p. 11 with pp. 249, 258, etc.

No other procedure is possible if we are to adhere to the conception of God as the Final Cause of the world, *i.e.* *our* world.

But it will be objected that this Christian attribution to the Absolute of qualities which we can best describe as moral, destroys the permanence and immutability of His character, and so completely nullifies our attempt to reconcile the permanence of the Ultimate Reality with the validity of moral progress. At first sight it seems that the objection is sound, and that we must choose between the Aristotelian conception of God as moving all things through their love and desire for Him, but Himself remaining unmoved, and the Christian conception of God as taking part Himself in the conflicts and the sorrows of finite creatures. But before accepting this conclusion, we may ask in what sense the term "moral" is here used. If it is used in the narrower sense in which it connotes the obligation of an ideal or an imperative upon a finite will which at best responds imperfectly, and if the consequent opposition between law and its fulfilment, duty and desire, is an essential element in morality, then morality cannot be attributed to God. In this sense Mr Bradley's challenge, "Make the moral point of view absolute, and then realise your position,"¹ is unanswerable. But the fulness of ethical experience is not exhausted by this definition of morality. Even if we accept it, we may still say with Kant that the Divine will must be thought of as holy, though not moral.²

Even so, there is doubtless a difficulty; but it is only the difficulty which is inherent in every attempt to qualify the Infinite by terms borrowed from finite experience. And there will always be those who prefer to use boldly the highest and most adequate conceptions at our command in speaking of the supreme Reality, rather than to employ such negative terms as suggest inferiority to the distinctions of the moral life.

One point may be touched on in conclusion. When it is

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 500.

² *Critique of Practical Reason*, bk. i. c. iii. (Abbott's tr., pp. 58 and 175).

argued that the attribution of ethical qualities to the Absolute, and the consequent belief that He cannot remain indifferent to the moral progress of man, but must Himself take part in the conflict, introduce an element of impermanence and changeableness at the heart of the Universe, we may reply that this argument is based on an inadequate conception of permanence. What is really involved in the demand that the Ultimate Reality should be above change is not mere immovability. There is a higher form of constancy than that of inert and dead matter. There is the constancy of an enduring and persistent force, the unchangeableness of a steadfast will. And so, the permanent Being at the centre of the Universe need not be thought of as devoid of activity, but rather as constant and consistent activity. Such was the scholastic conception of the *Actus Purus*; such the thought in the words, "We may best conceive of God as . . . a being of perfect understanding and perfect love, whose life is an eternal act of self-realisation through self-sacrifice."¹

In these high regions thought can only move reverently and with diffidence. But in some such conception philosophy may yet find a way of satisfying the double demand for permanence and for progress. She may learn to ask with Plato, "Can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and soul and mind are not present with absolute being?" and yet to say with the German poet:

"Ob Alles in ewigem Wechsel kreist,
Es beharret im Wechsel ein ruhiger Geist."

G. F. BARBOUR.

PITLOCHRY, N.B.

¹ *Memoir of T. H. Green*, by R. L. Nettleship (*Green's Works*, III. xciii.).

ACTION AND REACTION OF CHRISTIANITY AND HINDUISM IN INDIA.

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SOMEONE has said that India is not a single star but a constellation. This is true no less of the beliefs of the people than of their racial characteristics. In regard to Hinduism it is a commonplace that it is not one religion but a cento of religions; that it does not profess and maintain a single creed, but permits its adherents a latitude of belief or unbelief wide enough to bring about, if adopted in the West, not only a reunion of Christendom, but a combination comprehensive enough to include within it some of its bitterest antagonists. A story related by Lord Curzon is an admirable parable of this characteristic of Hinduism,—a characteristic which makes it almost a museum of religious beliefs. He tells how a friend of his examined the arrows in the quiver of a native hunter. “He found that the first was tipped with stone of the neolithic age, and the next was tipped with electric telegraph wire—a theft from the twentieth century.” Hinduism has its quiver filled with ideas equally remote from each other in time and equally alien in association.

Not only is the religion so vast and so amorphous; a closely related and equally remarkable property, though one less fully recognised, is its continual subjection to change, its continual self-adaptation to new circumstances and new demands. This is not merely a modern feature due to the

urgent pressure of new ideas imported into the land by the civilisation of Europe. At whatever period in its history this religion presents itself to our view, it appears in a condition of agitation, new cults and castes and customs constantly springing up within its borders. So long as India and its peoples were looked at only from without, as a province to be governed, as a land to which the adventurer went that he might shake the pagoda-tree, so long only was it possible to speak of the "unchanging East." Every religion, to be sure, takes on new aspects and is interpreted in new ways with the growing and developing and changing mind of man. But the body of beliefs and practices, now called Hinduism, exhibits, and appears always to have exhibited, a mutability of quite a different character, possible only in a structure of an equally different organisation. It is not one name and life, as in the case of Buddhism, Christianity, and Mahommedanism, that gives it unity. As the names Brahmanism and Hinduism suggest, it is the people who make the faith, and with the varying needs and moods and aspirations of their minds the worship and the doctrine assume varying forms. We might almost say of it that it is a circle whose centre is everywhere—everywhere, at least, in India—and whose circumference is nowhere. Were it not that there are influences at work upon Hinduism limiting this omnivorous capacity, there seems little reason why it should not take Christianity in some form within its hospitable borders and, as it has included Buddha among its incarnations, include Christ as well. The influence that is nowadays setting bounds to this absorbent power is due to its contact with faiths more systematic and more highly organised. Sir Alfred Lyall noted twenty-five years ago the probable effect upon the anarchic beliefs of Hinduism of the "ideas of rule, organised purpose and moral law" that have come to the country with the British power. One result that does not seem to have occurred to him is becoming apparent to-day. Hinduism is organising itself and

delimiting its borders, and in so doing is losing some of the strength that lay in its adaptability. In consequence it must now defend its position against aggression, and finds it less possible than in the past to conquer its enemies by accepting them as friends.

The two features of Hinduism that have been emphasised as peculiarly characteristic of it, its lack of articulation as a system of belief, and its adaptability to new circumstances, have been possible to it because of another peculiarity which is a main source of its strength and yet is likely to prove a fatal weakness. The danger of anarchy is avoided by reason of the fact that Hinduism is, at the same time, a fully organised and articulated social system. However frequently and completely the spiritual cabinet may change, the permanent department of caste carries on the government and maintains continuity. In this lies its strength to resist assaults upon the reasonableness or the truth of its doctrinal tenets. However it may be stricken and overcome as a system of truth, so long as it retains its authority as a social system it is unconquered and presently its vigour revives. But in this also lies a fundamental weakness, for time will at the last wear out even the most tenacious social system that rests on privilege and prejudice, and if, by that time, the spiritual content of Hinduism has not found a fitter tenement, the one may perish with the other. But whether this is an event that will happen soon or late, whether Hinduism is destined long to endure as a religion and a church controlling, however incoherently, the worship and aspirations of its adherents, are questions of secondary consequence. What is most interesting to the student of the religious situation in India is to discern how the elements of truth in this religion, with so long and so fascinating a history, will endure, and to what new shape they will be moulded. In the conflict of faiths that is at present raging in India, it is the spiritual content of Hinduism that alone matters; it is the wine that we must think of, not the bottles. The English legions may, as Sir Alfred Lyall

feared, "tramp across the Asiatic stage and disappear," but it does not follow, as he seems to have concluded, that "the clouds of confusion and superstition will roll up again." For Hinduism is something more than confusion and superstition, and every day is showing, what was no doubt much less manifest when Sir Alfred Lyall wrote, that other forces that have entered India are likely to be more permanent than the English legions, and that this religion is striving, with a success that is certain to be increasing and enduring, to slough its superstition and to recover and conserve the spiritual contents of its ancient heritage.

There is much on the surface that is perplexing in the present religious attitude of many Indians. It is nothing new to suggest that a close parallel may be traced between the condition of things among them and the religious situation in the Roman Empire in the second century, as described by Gibbon. Then, as now, the great body of the people followed superstitious practices with a freedom "not confined by the chains of any speculative system"; there was "the devout polytheist" whom "fear, gratitude and curiosity, a dream or an omen, a singular disorder or a distant journey, perpetually disposed to multiply the articles of his belief and to enlarge the list of his protectors"; there were then, as there certainly are in India to-day, the "ingenious youth, alike instructed in every school to reject and despise the religion of the multitude," as well as the philosophers who, "viewing with a smile of pity or indulgence the various errors of the vulgar, diligently practise the ceremonies of their fathers and devoutly frequent the temples of their gods." No description could be more accurate of many sections of the population in India, and no description could be more inadequate if accepted as complete. Contempt has never eyes to see beneath the surface, and such a description fails altogether to take account of the real inner striving of the people's spirit which there is in India, as we may be sure there was likewise within the Roman Empire. We cannot believe that a stream that has flowed down the

centuries, so strong and full, will end at last as a stagnant waste of waters. Nor are there signs of such an issue. There is hesitancy as to what future course the stream will take. There are divided counsels, and there is the clamour of many counsellors. But still, as of old in India, the claims of the spirit are reckoned paramount, and India's spiritual inheritance her most precious possession.

No thoughtful observer, whether Indian or European, will deny that the main factor in producing the movement of thought and the recombination of beliefs in the country is Christianity. Many influences, indeed, are pressing in upon its ancient civilisation, some of them material and gross and degrading. But along with and behind even the unworthiest of these there is something of the Christian atmosphere, some hint of the Christian attitude. It is an attitude very different from that which views the universe as a dream and desires only the "great release." The Vedantist can strive no less truly than the Christian, but it is a strife that he may cease from strife. The two points of view could not be more antipodal, nor could he who adheres to the Hindu ideal be more completely a stranger and an alien within the Christian civilisation. But whichever of the two we may consider to be higher, there is no question that the Christian civilisation is more widely prevailing. That it should have an influence upon its adversary is inevitable: its conceptions of religion as bearing fruit in conduct, and of the ideal character, which religion aims at producing, as directed towards the service of others, are foreign to the old Indian faiths. Accordingly, what we see happening in India is not merely the remoulding of religious ideals in view of a higher standard of morality; it is, on the one hand, the conjunction for the first time of morality and religion—the transformation of religion into a sanction for conduct—and, on the other, the interpretation of conduct as loving service.

A most interesting example of this new attitude is afforded by the movement begun by Swami Vivekananda, which has

made its influence felt in America as well as in India, and which calls itself, significantly enough, "Practical Vedanta." The words seem almost a contradiction in terms. The founder of this new school, Ramkrishna Paramhansa, though himself a recluse of the old Indian type, seems to have foreseen the task that lay before his successors—a task which Vivekananda, by his eloquence and his magnetic personality, carried as near to accomplishment as perhaps is possible. That task was really the reconciliation of incompatible ideals, and Swami Vivekananda seems, by the report of those who knew him, to have been profoundly aware at times of their incompatibility. One who founded orphanages and industrial schools, who taught his disciples to relieve the famine-stricken and to nurse the sick, who is reported even to have claimed that if he had only "twenty million pounds" he could "set India on her feet"—such a one had certainly come under many of the ideals—and not all of them the highest—of that Western world which he sought to conquer for Vedantism. His eloquence and activity seem far enough from attaining the ancient goal that Bhava summed up to Vashkali in the words: "This Atman is silence." No wonder he said once, as his European disciple,¹ Sister Nivedita, reports: "I have become entangled."

Not only does this modern Vedanta feel the need, under the influence of a new moral standard, of infusing the old ideal of release with the alien conceptions of service and of energy. The Indian who has breathed the spirit of the West feels likewise that his beliefs must aim at being reasonable and consistent. Swami Vivekananda would not have been, as he was, a typical product of his time, had he not been a patriot, passionately proud of his country's ancient past and possessed by ambition for her future greatness. "The queen of his adoration," says Sister Nivedita, "was his motherland." This spirit made him labour to demonstrate the unity and rationality of her various systems of religious and philosophical speculation in order that all schools might

unite in the service of her future. But here he separated himself from the closely allied propaganda associated with the Theosophical Society, and especially with Mrs Besant, which is exercising a still more powerful influence in the recombination and remoulding of Indian ideas. Swami Vivekananda pours the vials of his invective upon the popular religion. "Our god," he says, "is the cooking-pot, and our religion is 'Don't touch me, I am holy.'" For him there is nothing worthy in Indian thought that does not derive from the Vedas; his "universal religion" is the philosophy of the Upanishads. Mrs Besant, foreigner though she is, is much less of an iconoclast and far more tender to popular superstitions. The Puranas, rightly understood, have still their message which is precious. In this respect one cannot but be struck by the close parallel between the work of this modern interpreter of Hinduism and that of the neo-Platonists in the third and fourth centuries. Both are alike in their high moral tone and in seeking to purify and elevate the popular religion. But both are alike, we must also affirm, in "lending the forces of philosophy to deepen the superstition of the age."¹ Just as in the one case Saturn devouring his children was explained as intelligence returning upon itself, so in the other the churning of the sea of milk by the serpent Vasuki is an anticipation of Sir William Crooke's theory of the genesis of the elements, and the *lingam* of Shiva is glorified into "a pillar of fire, typifying creative energy." Just as Porphyry defended idolatry so also does Mrs Besant, but on the more modern ground that the image "forms a magnetic communication between the divine form and the worshipper."

Certainly Mrs Besant is exercising a remarkable influence throughout India, and an influence which, in spite of its adherence to much that is superstitious, is helping ultimately towards the purifying of Hinduism. To interpret a popular superstition as a symbol may preserve it, but only for a while. It is not symbols but concrete and gross facts that the great

¹ Dill's *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Western Empire*, p. 106.

body of the people worship. Mrs Besant is helping indeed to revive Hinduism, but it is mainly by directing attention towards its spiritual content and by moralising and organising it. Her superstitions, if we may call them so, have been kept for the most part hitherto in the background. Swami Vivekananda would have none of them. "These creepy things," he said, "these mysticisms . . . are generally weakening." He aimed at establishing what he believed would be a purely rational religion. Mrs Besant is in fuller agreement with him in her vigorous attempts to systematise Hinduism and reconcile its opposing schools of thought. Under her impulse and direction handbooks of Hinduism have been prepared and published, to serve as text-books in elementary schools, in High Schools and in colleges. One can trace throughout them the valiant efforts of this school to reconcile conflicting views, to rationalise by the aid of modern science and supposed psychic phenomena such practices as ancestor worship and the use of spells, and to moralise the ingenuous religion of nature. In the earnest propaganda that centres round these two remarkable personalities, one Indian, the other English, the unbiassed student cannot fail to see that, hostile as both movements are to Christianity, they are largely debtors to its influence and products of the moral ferment it creates.

These modern movements have somewhat overshadowed the older Theistic Samajes or Churches which have a most honourable record in India for consistent rejection of superstitious practices, and which are associated with some of the most distinguished names in modern India. The question is often asked why those societies have not proved more successful. While they undoubtedly still include among them some of the most single-minded and earnest of educated Indians, it cannot be denied that their progress in numbers has been disappointing and that the early enthusiasm has in great measure grown cold. The reasons that are commonly adduced in explanation of this fact by critics of the Samaj

movement emphasise the contrast between the position its adherents occupy and that maintained by Mrs Besant and her followers. These have been clearly stated by a thoughtful writer in a recent number of the *Hindustan Review*. They are, he says, in the first place, that "its religious creed is too abstract and impersonal, and, if I may say so, too *rational* to appeal to the popular mind. It is, in fact, too philosophical and metaphysical to satisfy the religious cravings of the average man. And the metaphysics, again, is of too Christian a character to suit Hindu taste. Secondly, its method is that of rebellion; it tries to reform the Hindu Society by cutting itself off from it." While there is, no doubt, considerable truth in this estimate of the causes of the slow progress of the Samaj, it has to be remembered on the one hand that Keshub Chunder Sen has often been charged with excessive emotionalism in the worship he encouraged, while, on the other hand, certain sections of the Samaj have always clung closely to the national religious inheritance and sought inspiration mainly from the poets and teachers of their own land. Perhaps a large part of the explanation that is sought may be found in the fact that much of the truth those Theistic societies maintain has been of recent years so largely adopted into Hinduism that it seems to many that they can accept it without forsaking the faith of their fathers. The position occupied by the Brahmo Samaj no longer appears as exalted as it seemed at first because considerable tracts of the popular religion have been levelled up towards it. Few, however, as these Indian Theists may be, there is no question that the consistency of their faith and practice and their testimony in behalf of high religious ideals are exercising an important influence in the remaking of India. The name of Ram Mohun Roy especially will ever remain memorable as that of the man who first among his countrymen led the way towards "the dangers and the glories of blue water."

It is not to be expected that amid so much spiritual striving there should not appear apostles of reaction. There is certainly

a real revival of religious faith, accompanying religious enquiry, in India as in other parts of the world, but there as elsewhere there seems to follow hard after it a revival of superstition. Patriotism in many cases has united itself to the ancient practices, and idolatrous festivals have been invested with a new political significance. A powerful popular leader sees fit, while denouncing the partition of Bengal, to affirm: "We are all Hindus and idolators, and I am not ashamed of the fact." But there is a manifest insincerity in such movements which rules them out of our consideration. At the same time, however, one may always expect to find a sincere patriotism which clings to the old ways and the old gods. With such a feeling Mrs Besant has considerable sympathy, and claims with reason to have helped greatly in the revival of Sanscrit studies. But often patriotism clings to customs and beliefs that even she cannot accept. It is natural for any people to be excessively proud of their own national achievement, and especially so in the case of a people in the position of the Hindus—at once of great intellectual ability and at the same time restrained from enjoying the full fruition of their own gifts by the pressure upon them of an alien civilisation, claiming to be higher. Their patriotism, unable to boast itself in the achievements of to-day, clings with all the more tenacity to the achievements of yesterday. The sanctity of their sacred books is multiplied many-fold to their jealous eyes. The holy land of their fathers seems the more hallowed in contrast with its profaned and dejected condition now. It is not to be wondered at that one who comes, like Mrs Besant, speaking smooth words and sparing their *amour propre* is welcomed by many. This is no doubt one reason why Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, had so great a success, and why the society that he founded still exercises so great an influence in Upper India. He called his countrymen back to what he claimed was the pure religion of the Vedas, purged of the abuses of popular Hinduism which he declared to be modern innovations. His learning was not profound and his

critical methods were not scientific; but he comforted many by convincing them that their ancient religion was not as corrupt and as degraded as they had feared, and addressed his appeal to their national sentiments of patriotism and of pride. The same feelings were gratified when he went on to maintain that every modern scientific discovery of the West was anticipated in their own ancient scriptures. Those meretricious elements in his teaching would not by themselves, however, have brought to his Samaj the real and enduring success that it is obtaining. That we must believe is due mainly to the fact that though Swami Dayanand had no Western education, he himself preached and he bequeathed to his followers an earnest spirit of self-sacrifice and a high ideal of duty. In the case of the Arya Samaj, the appeal to patriotism that it is able to make has no doubt guarded it from some of the suspicion that attaches to the Brahmo Samaj; but in this case as in all the others we have been considering, it is the purified moral and religious content that is the real spirit of life. More and more it is being recognised by those in India who are not blinded by political prejudice that, in the words of an eminent leader of reform, "what is not true is not patriotic."

In all this the working, consciously or unconsciously, of Christian ideals is unmistakable. A Bengali writer combating in the *Hindustan Review* a few years ago the view that Christianity will become the religion of India, yet concludes with the emphatic statement that its work there has not been a failure. "It has given us Christ," he says, "and taught us noble, moral, and spiritual lessons which we have discovered anew in our own scriptures, and thereby satisfied our self-love and made them our very own. It has awakened a new spirit of enquiry in the drooping Hindu mind. It has made Hinduism conscious of its greatness. It has held up to view the baneful effects of certain soul-degrading customs which used to prevail and prevail still in Hindu society. In short, it has quickened it with a new life, the full fruition of which is not yet." That is un-

questionably a true testimony. The only divergence of opinion will be as to its interpretation. What will this "full fruition" be which is not yet? That it may be and will be a fruition bearing within it much of the thought and experience of Hindu poets and rishis everyone will believe who holds by the Divine government and guidance of the nations. So long as it has at its heart the spirit and the power of Christ, the name it bears will matter not at all. Another able Bengali writer in a recently published historical work frankly faces the prospect of the disappearance of Hinduism before its younger rival, and refuses to regret such a result if Hinduism carries its message within Christianity and exercises there an enduring and a far more widespread influence. We refuse, indeed, to believe Mrs Besant when she affirms that "the propaganda of the Vedanta in the West is far more successful than that of Christianity in the East." But we believe that the influence has not been altogether onesided, and that the West might have learned more, and has yet much to learn in this school so ancient and so meditative. We may not consider that under that influence the interpretation of Christian truth will be in the direction of the "New Theology" of Rev. R. J. Campbell, which already has been claimed in India as a product of the Vedanta; but if "*Græcia capta*" conquered her spiritual conquerors and imposed upon them many of her modes of thought, so that they rule us to this hour, we need not be surprised if a similar triumph should await captive India.

It is true that there is not yet much token of this within the Indian Christian Church. Were it otherwise, that Church would have rooted itself deeper than it has yet done in the soil of India. There have been and are still great and greatly devoted Indian Christians. Personally and as a Church they have been and are, on the whole, a rebuke and a stimulus to those who are of the old faith. Drawn from every class, but especially from the lowest and most downtrodden, they hold forth an example of unity and progressiveness and of the

service of others which is widely acknowledged. Yet it has to be admitted that the prospect of the speedy coming of the Kingdom of God in India would be dim, were it not for the confidence on the part of those who watch for it that already within Hinduism the Church of Christ exists. There are certain special circumstances in India that tend to isolate the Christian from his countrymen and to preserve the Indian Church foreign and strange. And in the past little effort was made by the missionary to counteract this tendency. His people were to become Scotch Presbyterians, or his Church was to be the Church of England even in India. The typical product of mission work was such a man as Dr Narayan Sheshadri, who said of himself once, "I am just a black Scotchman." Splendid Christians he and such as he were and are, of whom their adopted nationality has reason to be proud, but unfitted by that fact from exercising as wide and as living an influence as by their abilities and their character they might in the regeneration of their people. "It was when Christianity appealed direct to the people," says Sir William Ramsay, "addressed them in their own language and made itself comprehensible to them on this plane of thought, that it met the needs and filled the hearts of the Roman world." It is in this direction certainly that the work of the future lies in the Christianisation of India, and those who have set their hands to it are full of hope, recognising as they do that while they are going forth to meet the East, the East is drawing near to them with ever quickening step.

In what has been said, it is throughout Hinduism, that has been kept in view as the one religion that need be reckoned with in India. For the adherents of other faiths are few in comparison with those whom this vast and complex system counts among its followers. And besides, its long and chequered history through unreckoned centuries has fashioned every section of the people to its mould and wrought its doctrines into the fibre of their being. In India perhaps more

than elsewhere, because of the poverty that makes the thought of each day's need absorb them, a great body of the people are "of the earth earthy" and scarcely lift their souls above the soil they till. In regard to the problems of religious enquiry their thought is that of the Irish peasant—"The feel of the spade in the hand is no different for all your talk." And yet it is amazing how much one finds the souls even of such people to have been moulded and fashioned by the doctrines of their ancient faith. It is not safe to dogmatise widely in regard to a land so varied as is India, but one may say with confidence that among vast populations of the very lowest rank a doctrine with such far-reaching effects on mind and character as that of Transmigration will be found to have stamped its impress. A transformation so radical as that which is in store for this system cannot come quickly nor can it be easily forecast. That it will come with much conflict there is already evidence. There are already thousands in India standing lonely and uncertain between two worlds, "one dead, the other powerless to be born." Greater battles are being fought in the land than even those of their early legends when Krishna guided the car of Arjuna on the field of Kurukshetra. The result, we may be sure, will be of deep significance not only for India but for the world.

N. MACNICOL.

POONA, INDIA.

THE GOSPEL OF KRISHNA AND OF CHRIST.

MAUD JOYNT.

THE Bhagavad Gitâ is the highest outcome of Oriental thought and aspiration. It may be called the Gospel of the East. The New Testament, on the other hand, though Asiatic in its origin, has been the strongest spiritual influence in the Occidental world; it is the Gospel of the West. We may therefore be prepared to find differences in the teachings of the two books, for East and West differ in many respects. But the reader who goes below the surface will be struck not so much by their difference as by their surprising agreement. Perhaps this agreement ought not to surprise us. For truth, in the highest sense, is not a matter of intellectual dogma, but of spiritual insight and experience; the higher men ascend in the spiritual life, the nearer their paths converge—however far apart the points from which they started—till at last they meet on the summit where knowledge and experience are one.

There are, of course, certain external differences of form and treatment which must be taken into account in studying the two books.

The Bhagavad Gitâ is a single work, entire in itself; it is, moreover, a philosophical dialogue, and presents its teaching in a more abstract and more systematised form than the New Testament. Yet it would not be easy to reduce the doctrines of the Bhagavad Gitâ to a definite system; it is rather a

synthesis, an attempt to combine previously existing philosophical systems, abstracting from each its elements of greatest ethical and spiritual value. And in this universality, which keeps it outside the pale of the recognised schools of thought, and prevents it from being regarded as the exponent of any one of these, lies perhaps the secret of the influence which the Bhagavad Gîtâ has exercised over the mind of India.

The teachings of the New Testament are less direct and explicit, being conveyed largely in the form of narrative, through the medium of the acts, words, and personality of Jesus Christ. And Christ spoke, not as a philosopher of the schools, but as a poet. He dealt not with abstract formulas, but living intuitions. He taught by parable rather than by precept, borrowing His illustrations from the natural objects around Him, and from the experience of everyday life. He cared nothing about creeds, being Himself content to remain in the one in which He had been brought up, and He constantly used its current phraseology—a fact which has sometimes led to misunderstanding of His teaching.

Perhaps the fourth gospel more nearly approaches the standpoint of the Bhagavad Gîtâ than any other part of the New Testament. It is impossible to read this gospel without feeling that it differs fundamentally from the three synoptics. The literal historic fidelity with which they set forth the life of Christ gives way in it to a larger, symbolic truth; and the figure of the human Jesus is merged in the conception (older than Christianity) of the Logos. The gospel of St John is, in fact, a presentation of the life and teachings of Jesus Christ from the standpoint of the mystic.

Another point must be borne in mind in reading the gospels. Christ addressed Himself to all classes and conditions of men, the lowly and ignorant as well as the enlightened; and this is one reason why the New Testament has acquired such a universal influence, and appeals more than the Bhagavad Gîtâ to simple and uncultivated natures. But there is none the less a distinct esoteric element in Christ's teachings; they

are not all to be interpreted in the same spirit; some were intended for the many, others for the initiated few. Christ Himself affirmed this, saying to His immediate followers, "Unto you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but unto them (the multitude) it is not given"; and constantly repeating, "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear."

In the Bhagavad Gîtâ the figure of Krishna, in his aspect as a personality, the friend and guide of Arjuna, offers a parallel to Christ in the gospels, while Brahman, the supreme, the absolute, bears the same relation to the Father of whom Christ spoke; and in either case these concepts are, as it were, linked together by an intermediate one,—Krishna, in his divine aspect, the changeless and all-pervading, seeming to identify himself with Brahman, just as Jesus, the human Saviour, dissolves into the Divine Son, the Logos, the manifestation of the Father.

The teaching of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is pantheistic in the highest sense of the word, and the 9th and 10th discourses contain perhaps the loftiest and most poetic outburst of Pantheism to be found in all literature. All things are in Brahman and Brahman is in all. He is the source of the outgoing of the whole universe and the place of its dissolution (B.G., vii. 6); the beginning, the middle, and the end of all (c. x. 20). This language finds a parallel in certain passages of the New Testament (*cp.* Acts xvii. 28; Eph. iii. 15; Col. i. 16, 17; Rev. xxii. 13).

But the God of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is not only immanent in creation, He also transcends it. "Having pervaded this whole universe with one fragment of Myself, I remain" (B.G., x. 42; *cp.* also xv. 17–19). Prakriti and Purusha¹ are the two aspects whereby He may be conceived by the human intellect; but Prakriti and Purusha are bound together in a higher, more fundamental unity. The doctrine of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is ultimately pure Monism.

¹ Corresponding, roughly, to matter and spirit; or the extension and thought of Spinoza.

When we speak of Pantheism, however, in connection with the Bhagavad Gîtâ, we must get rid of the popular interpretation of the term. Pantheism, in the sense in which we now use the word, does not identify God with the phenomenal universe. Far otherwise. This universe, as it exists for me, is the sum-total of my sense-impressions, arranged and interpreted by my understanding and reason, under the controlling notions of space and time. But in so far as the faculties of sense and reason differ very widely in different individuals, even of the same species, each of us may be said to have a universe of his own; my universe is a different one from that of my dog, or of a mind less developed, or of one more highly developed, than my own. I have no right to believe that *my* universe is the real one, or that the real universe is a sense-universe at all; that there may not be intelligences of a higher order than mine, which know things directly, as they are in themselves, without any sense-medium, and for which the noumenal universe, the transcendental object, or whatever you choose to call it, alone exists. Now, the universe in which, according to the Pantheism of the Bhagavad Gîtâ, the Deity is manifest, is not the universe mirrored in my mind or that of any other creature; it is not a universe existing in space and time. Were it so, it would be difficult to understand the optimism which lies at the core of its teachings, for the universe, as it exists for the individual mind, may not be good at all; in fact, there is a stage in the onward development of the soul at which it must inevitably appear evil. The individual presentation of the universe is what the Bhagavad Gîtâ calls Mâyâ—the illusory or sense world; and the object of the Bhagavad Gîtâ is to teach us to overcome Mâyâ; to rise above the illusions of the senses and the individual mind, the forms of time and space, and the resulting notions of plurality and separateness.¹

¹ Any metaphysical discussion of the theories of transcendental or subjective or absolute idealism is, of course, beyond the scope of this essay; but to avoid possible misconception it may be said that it is not the writer's

But in all objects of the senses, in themselves fleeting, imperfect, and, it may be, nugatory, there is a supersensuous element, eternal and unchanging, which is beyond our senses and understanding, but may be conceived by our higher reason. Every *form* implies a *type*. And in proportion as we rise beyond the concrete object to the apprehension or intuition of the type do we escape from the bondage of Mâyâ. Mâyâ, in fact, consists in thinking of *things*—i.e. sense-impressions—as realities; in living shut in by a world of space, time, and material relations. We get rid of it according as we pass from *things* to the *ideas* of things; and the very fact that the human mind, even at a low stage of development, can form general notions or concepts, implies in it the germ of the capacity ultimately to transcend and destroy Mâyâ. We escape from Mâyâ to a certain extent through the creations of art, in which forms present themselves as types, endued with a more universal truth and a more lasting vitality than their material prototypes; and also through the sublime speculations of philosophy and religion, which call us away from the material and fugitive aspect of things, bidding us behold in them “patterns of things in the heavens.”

“Alles Vergängliche ist nur ein Gleichnis.”

“All that is transitory is but a symbol.”

Bearing this distinction in mind, we shall readily find the key to the glorious pantheistic poetry of the Bhagavad Gîtâ. The universe which is spoken of in the 9th and 10th discourses as existing in Brahman and permeated by Brahman, is not one of concrete forms, but of eternal types.

intention to deny either the existence of *sense*, on the one hand, nor, on the other, of an external world which provides material for the operations of sense. Both are necessary elements of conditioned existence; according to the Gîtâ, the senses and Manas (the lower mind) are the means whereby the Spirit, on entering a body, connects itself with the external world in order to gain the experiences of conditioned existence (see B.G., xv. 7). The illusion, Mâyâ, lies in the assumption on the part of the percipient (not that he has senses and sensations—that is a fact—but) that his sensations—this visible, tangible, ponderable world—constitute the ultimate reality.

“Die Rose, welche hier dein äussres Auge siht,
Die hat von Ewigkeit in Gott also geblüht.”

“The rose whose beauty glads thine eyes to see,
Blossomed in God ere time began to be.”

—ANGELUS SILESIUS.

The same idea, of course, underlies the Christian doctrine of creation by the Logos, at any rate as it has been conceived by the higher order of Christian thinkers, mystics and poets like Scotus Erigena or Angelus Silesius. The world which the Logos brought forth—or brings forth, for we pass here beyond the conceptions of time—is an archetypal world, though divined by the finite intelligence only through sensuous forms, through spatial and temporal relations, through ever-changing phenomena—

“Was in schwankender Erscheinung schwebt.”

The creative activity of the human intellect, of the artist or poet, is an exact analogy. All creation is a mental act: the manifestation of the idea—of the Infinite and Formless—through the medium of finite forms.

But art and poetry offer us only a partial and temporary escape from illusion, *Mâyâ*, freeing our intellect and emotions, but in a measure only and for the time being; the *Bhagavad Gîtâ* offers us the prospect of a final and complete liberation. Its aim is practical: to bring the aspirant back to the ultimate Unity, not as a philosophical theory, but as a fact of consciousness. The sum of all religion is self-realisation—the passing from the surface, transient, personal self, the self of sensation and the lower mind, the “empirical Ego,” to the divine *Âtman*, “the Self seated in the heart of all things.” When this unity has been realised and the individual has become merged in the Self of All, he enters on the state called in the *Bhagavad Gîtâ* *Nirvâna*—absolute peace or equilibrium. He has (in a sense) surmounted physical existence: though dwelling in a body, he no longer identifies himself with it. He is free from desires; these bring unrest, and even their gratification gives but a short-lived and imperfect happiness. He is no longer affected

by the "pairs of opposites"—pleasure and pain, hope and fear, and the like, each of which involves the other. He sees the Eternal in the temporal, and the Divine Unity underlying all; hence the sense of separateness is lost; he is no longer an isolated unit in the universe, with aims and interests apart from those of his fellows, but works for the good of all, recognising in it his own; he has passed the limits of personality (*cp.* B.G., vi. 29, xiii. 30).

"As rivers flow and in the ocean disappear, yielding up name and form, so the sage, freed from name and form, enters into the Supreme Spirit" (Mundaka-Upanishad, iii. 2, 8).¹

Such a state is not (as is often ignorantly asserted by Westerns) one of complete passivity or nullity. On the contrary, it is a condition of the highest activity, in which consciousness, intellect, emotion are raised to their highest potency. The *peace* (a very different thing from *passivity*) of the Liberated arises from the complete balance or harmony which has been established between all his faculties. The ordinary man is passive, even when he deems himself most active, being under the dominion of Mâyâ, and impelled every moment by external sense-impacts. The man who has overcome Mâyâ is no longer acted on by his surroundings, but acts on them, and is able, in a sense, to create his own world—

"Und, schaffend, Götterleben zu geniessen."

The Bhagavad Gîtâ lays down practical rules to guide the aspirant towards Nirvâna. Self-control in all things, singleness of aim, and the practice of meditation, or concentration of the mind on that Supreme Self which is the goal, are the essential means. There are three main routes indicated, one or other of which the aspirant will follow, according as disposition and natural endowment impel him; though all three are really one, each implying the others, and all ultimately converging. These are—

¹ Perhaps the same idea—that of transcending the personality—underlies the passages in Revelation ii. 17 and iii. 12. *Cp.* in Tennyson's *Ancient Sage*, the lines beginning—"And more, my son! for more than once," etc.

The Path of the Intellect, or *Jñāna-Yoga*; under which might also be included *Saṅkhya*, the Yoga of Renunciation. (By renunciation is meant renunciation of action, or rather of the fruits of action, *i.e.* personal ends.) This path is to be followed by turning away from sense-objects (*Erscheinungen*), by curbing the sensuous imagination and the restless lower mind (*Manas*), and by developing the higher reason (*Buddhi*, *Vernunft*).

The Path of Action or *Karma-Yoga*: liberation through works—works performed without any personal motive or hope of reward, here or hereafter, but simply because they are right. This is described in the 3rd discourse.

The Path of Devotion, *Bhakti-Yoga*: liberation through love of the Supreme Spirit. With this the last discourse deals (xviii. 55–70; *cp.* xiv. 26).

Turning from the Bhagavad Gîtâ to the New Testament, we shall find that the ideal which Jesus Christ held up to His followers is essentially the same as that which Krishna proposed to Arjuna. It is, no doubt, described in different terms; Christ spoke the language of the poet rather than the psychologist; He is more figurative, less explicit than Krishna. But the state which He spoke of sometimes as the Kingdom of Heaven, sometimes as Eternal Life (the term used in the fourth gospel), is really the Nirvâna of the Bhagavad Gîtâ.

Christ, according to the fourth gospel, did not, by Eternal Life, mean the continuation of personal existence after death, as is commonly supposed. On the contrary, He always spoke of it as something to be achieved *now*, in this world; and never in terms of duration (*cp.* Jno. iii. 36, iv. 14, v. 24, 25, vi. 47, xi. 25, 26, xii. 50; 1 Jno. iii. 14, v. 11–13).

He defined it as conscious union with the Father—the Supreme Spirit. “Ye shall live . . . Ye shall know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you” (Jno. xiv. 20; *cp.* xvii. 3, 21). It is true, He did not give any metaphysical account of this state; using the figurative expressions of poetry, He spoke of it often rather as a visitation from without than a

development from within. "If a man love me . . . my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him" (Jno. xiv. 23; *cp.* Rev. iii. 20). But it is none the less an inward state, a life of the consciousness. "The kingdom of heaven is *within* you."

This is the awakening from Mâyâ. Throughout the New Testament Eternal or Spiritual Life (ζωή or πνεῦμα) is placed in opposition to life of the senses (ψυχή).¹ If we may judge by Christ's bearing towards individuals, He did not regard actual sins, *i.e.* wrong actions—these are often the outcome of mis-directed energy—as so great an obstacle in the way to Eternal Life, as that state of content which finds in the sense-world the full satisfaction of all its desires. Especially instructive is the parallel between the parable of the rich man who thought to pull down his barns and build greater (Lk. xii. 16), and the description of the demoniacal man in the Bhagavad Gîtâ (xvi. 7–17). The latter, like the former, is not a great sinner in the common acceptation; on the contrary, he may be a highly respectable and orthodox member of society (see xvi. 15). The enemies of the Cross of Christ, according to St Paul, are those whose thoughts are fixed on earthly things (οἱ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονούντες, Phil. iii. 19).

Like Nirvâna, Eternal Life involves absolute renunciation; renunciation of personal aims, interests, desires, even affections in so far as they are egoistic. On this point Christ's teaching is explicit. To buy Eternal Life, a man must sell all that he hath (Matt. x. 37–39; Lk. xiv. 33; Jno. xii. 25). The Kingdom of Heaven belongs to the poor in spirit. But renunciation, in both Bhagavad Gîtâ and New Testament, is not asceticism, but inner detachment; it consists, not in putting away things one would like to have, but in letting go things one has ceased to desire. He who gains Eternal Life wants nothing, because he possesses all things (2 Cor. vi. 10).

And, in truth, renunciation is the law of life and progress;

¹ *Cp.* especially Jno. xii. 25, in which the words ζωή and ψυχή are rendered, both in Authorised and Revised Versions, by *life*.

we have to practise it continually to gain even our petty personal aims. "This world is not for the non-sacrificer, much less the other" (B.G., iv. 31). Even natural duties and affections have sometimes to be sacrificed to higher claims. Cuchullin, in the old Irish epic, slaying in single combat Ferdia, his bosom friend, but the enemy of his people; Michael Angelo disobeying his father at the promptings of genius; the sons of Zebedee forsaking their nets and their father to follow a higher call; Christ Himself, leaving His parents as a boy to return to the Temple, afterwards renouncing all the claims of home and kindred for the sake of humanity—all these are illustrations of a law which is universal.

Eternal Life means overcoming the "pairs of opposites." The joy which Christ promised His disciples is a feeling as far removed from what we generally call happiness as it is from pain; it is rather a state in which happiness and pain are blent together in a strange and subtly sweet solution. It would be better called Peace, a word used by Christ Himself to describe it (Jno. xiv. 27; *cp.* B.G., iv. 39, vi. 15). The divine charity which we are commanded to cherish towards our neighbours has nothing to do with like or dislike; it is not the same as personal affection, which is founded on attraction, and therefore implies the possibility of repulsion (*cp.* Matt. v. 46; and B.G., xii. 17, 18).

Like Nirvâna, Eternal Life is a state of creative energy, in which the inner faculties of the man reach their highest potency. Jesus called this divine energy Faith, and taught that all things are rendered possible by it (Mk. ix. 23, xi. 33). And by it all the great moral revolutions in the history of mankind have been effected; before it physical force has always been impotent. Even material conditions may be transformed by it; the wonderful powers which, according to Patanjali, may be attained by the Yogi, have their parallel in the early history of Christianity, with its faith-cures and seeming miracles, and have indeed always been found sporadically in the Christian Church.

The practical methods prescribed by Christ for the attainment of Eternal Life are self-control and prayer (Mk. ix. 29 ; Matt. vii. 7, 8). By prayer, Christ meant that earnest aspiration and concentration of purpose which is described in the Bhagavad Gîtâ—not the repetition of liturgies or petitions, to which He seems to have attached little importance (Matt. vi. 7 ; *cp.* B.G., xviii. 66, ix. 20–22). And the three Paths of the Bhagavad Gîtâ are all to be found in the teachings of Christ—knowledge, leading to renunciation, works (Jno. ix. 4, xv. 5 ; 1 Cor. x. 31 ; with which *cp.* Bhagavad Gîtâ, ix. 27), and devotion (Jno. xv. 9, 12, etc.). Perhaps they are indicated in the threefold description of the Logos as the Way, the Truth, and the Life (Jno. xiv. 6), corresponding to the threefold division of our nature—will, intellect, emotion. According as these faculties predominate in different individuals, so will be the route taken—till that “harmonised” state is reached in which all faculties are in balance and the paths merge in one. The Gospel of Works (Karma-Yoga) finds characteristic expression in the New Testament in the epistle of St James ; it is, perhaps, specially congenial to the spirit of Protestantism, with its practical tendencies and its insistence on right conduct. The Gospel of Love or Devotion (Bhakti-Yoga) has its chief exponent in the Apostle John, and is the ideal which has appealed most to the higher spirits in the Roman Catholic Church. The Gospel of Knowledge (Jñana-Yoga) pervades the writings of that eager and subtle intellect, the Apostle Paul, and has in later times informed the works of many an eager searcher after truth, both inside and outside the Churches. One of the most notable expositions of it is the *Ethic* of Spinoza.¹

The view of Eternal Life which has just been set forth finds confirmation in the writings of the Christian mystics—of Eckhart, of Tauler, of Angelus Silesius, that profound and beautiful spirit, many of whose sayings might have been

¹ Especially the Fifth Book,—*On the Power of the Intellect or Human Liberty*.

directly inspired by the Bhagavad Gîtâ, so closely are they in agreement with it.

The state of Eternal Life, or Nirvâna, is the final and highest outcome of human evolution, and it is evident that it can be reached by a few only ; and this is taught both by Krishna and by Christ. Only after age-long discipline and countless re-births does the individual attain final liberation, according to the Bhagavad Gîtâ. And Christ speaks of it as a strait gate, entered but by few. "Many are called, but few are chosen." For not only will but natural endowments are required for its attainment ; and the distance traversed by each aspirant towards the goal depends on his starting-point—his stage of evolution. Christ, like Krishna, believed in a divinely appointed, or (what is the same thing) inherent, necessity. He knew that the freedom of the human will is empirical—a part of Mâyâ. Real freedom is reached only when the individual ceases to have a personal will, and relinquishes the power of choice ; or rather, when he has reached that degree of illumination in which his choice coincides with the divine order (Rom. viii. 28).

But the New Testament and the Bhagavad Gîtâ are not addressed only to the chosen few ; they are full of teaching, of encouragement, of consolation for all seekers, even those who have gone but a little way. They recognise the divine germ in all. Even the "demoniacal" has this seed of divine life, this inmost self, the Âtman, in latency, and may in the course of evolution come to liberation (B.G., xvi. 18, xvii. 6, ix. 30). And Christ's treatment of sinners, as well as numerous of His teachings—for example, the parable of the talents, and such sayings as Matt. x. 42 ; Lk. ix. 50 and xii. 48—show that He held a similar belief, that He was an Evolutionist in the moral sphere, and exacted from each man only that of which his nature rendered him capable.

The Gospel of Krishna and the Gospel of Christ have, in fact, the same ultimate aim—the same aim which underlies all the highest forms of religion, in all lands and all ages. That

aim is to open to the human soul a way of escape from the dualism of matter and spirit in which humanity is at present involved, and to enable it to return to the primal unity. In the Hebrew myth which tells how man plucked the fruit of the tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, and, as a consequence, fell from the primal state of innocence, we have a symbolic presentation of the descent whereby the soul came into this dualism and under the dominion of the "pairs of opposites." This is why the Fall—not mentioned, I think, by the other New Testament writers—figures so largely in the works of St Paul, who set himself to construct an intellectual basis for Christianity, and may be said to have given a philosophical interpretation of it, as St John gave a mystical interpretation. The re-ascent from dualism to unity is the root idea of the Pauline epistles. It is that redemption of the body, that glorious liberty, that manifestation of the sons of God, for which the earnest expectation of the creature waiteth (Rom. viii. 19, 21, 23). In this idea is to be found, I believe, the key to the real meaning of that famous chapter on the Resurrection, 1 Cor. xv.¹ In Christ we rise from the world of shadows to the world of substances or realities; and St Paul looks forward to a still higher consummation (a consummation of which the restrictions of the human intellect and of human language compel him to speak in the future tense, though, like all Eternal processes, it is outside time), when the Logos Himself shall be reabsorbed into the Divine Unity, and God shall be All in All (1 Cor. xv. 24, 27, 28).

"Infinite, God of Gods, home of all worlds,
Unperishing, Sat asat, *That* supreme."—(B.G., xi. 37.)

M. JOYNT.

DUBLIN.

¹ See 1 Cor. xv. 22, 44–50, 56. Note the contrast between *σῶμα ψυχικόν* and *σῶμα πνευματικόν* (v. 44); and between *ψυχὴ ζῶσα* and *πνεῦμα ζωοποιοῦν* (v. 45).

THE STATE OF THE DEAD.

THE REV. DAVID PURVES, D.D.

It has been said that the key to the interpretation of ideas is their history. The history of the idea of an intermediate state of the dead is one which carries us back to the Old Testament, in which we find in the doctrine of Sheol a general conception of the state of the dead which was closely akin to heathen ideas. The Old Testament conception of Sheol is that it was the abode of the dead, and of *all* dead persons. The essential thing to be remembered about it is, that it is a conception that admits of no moral distinctions. Sheol is the place where the departed meet in a condition of bare existence, irrespective of moral difference, and in which, so far as can be gathered from Hebrew, Greek, or Babylonian sources, the dead abide finally. The important thing for our present purpose is its moral significance, of which it may be said that it secured for Hebrew religion a definite belief in personality surviving death. The departed remained persons in Sheol, and, from scattered hints, it may be seen that they remained conscious, though Old Testament eschatology on this point wavered considerably, especially as to the extent to which the departed might be conceived of as related to the earth which they had left. The Old Testament Sheol was an important protest against the thought of the extinction of personality in death, and, in that respect, especially in its later developments, it laid the basis for a doctrine of immortality. It is impossible, from the Old Testament doctrine of

Sheol, to gain any help in the settlement of such questions regarding the state of the dead as arise to the modern mind. The fact that the essence of the conception of life in Sheol was that of separation from God removes it far away from the modern idea of the present state of the departed as one in which moral developments may be supposed to take place. From the time of Moses to the fourth century before Christ, Sheol retained its non-moral character. It may seem strange to us that Old Testament thought did not advance, at least for some centuries, beyond this somewhat heathenish conception, yet the explanation is not far to seek. It is that, in Hebrew thought, the nation, and not the individual, is the unit. This idea of solidarity prevailed until the exile, when the religious centre was changed to the individual, and the craving for personal immortality which finds expression in later Hebrew writings began to assert itself. "Never," says Professor Charles, "in Palestinian Judaism, down to the Christian era, did the doctrine of a merely individual immortality appeal to any but a few thinkers."

A change passed over later Hebrew thinking on the subject. Individual thinkers, or rather singers, arose who expressed the belief that the righteous might overleap Sheol. In isolated psalms Death and Sheol are resisted as the portion of the righteous in an emotional way; and in still later times, through reflection on the subject, Hebrew thought tended towards the idea of resurrection. But whether in the emotional or the reflective way, pious souls, by a protest of the heart, grasped the thought of deliverance from Sheol, and protested against the idea of a man who had enjoyed fellowship with God in this life being cut off from Him in the next. That, *e.g.*, is the specific thought in the sixteenth psalm, and it amounts to a belief in immortality. The late Professor A. B. Davidson was in the habit of saying that Jewish Eschatology was a corollary of Jewish Theology. When this idea of deliverance from Sheol arose, the character of Sheol immediately changed. Sheol came to be regarded as penal, and as the abode of the

wicked only, while the abode of the righteous, which was reached by escaping from Sheol, came to be called Paradise. This change was brought about by the sheer vitality of later thinkers, who could not conceive of a future state in which they should be isolated from God, and in which communion with Him would be impossible.

This means that Sheol had come to be regarded as a place with moral distinctions, and we find this conception more fully developed in apocalyptic literature.

The point of transition from the Old Testament to the apocalyptic view is to be found in Daniel xii. 2, in which there is a clear recognition of moral distinctions among the dead, and this was coincident with the rise of the idea of Gehenna. This facilitated the recognition of Sheol as an intermediate state, and that doctrine came to hold a larger place in Judaism. It is neither possible nor desirable to go into the vacillations of Apocalyptic Eschatology; but, taking the book of Enoch, which carries us forward to the close of the second century B.C., as illustrative of the general trend of opinion, it may be said that there is in apocalyptic literature a steady growth of opinion towards the recognition of Sheol as a definite stadium between death and judgment, with preliminary penalties, and, in some forms, with relative moral distinctions. Yet even so, the idea of an intermediate state is only partially ethical. Professor Charles says, "It aims at being moral, and ends in being mechanical." The apocalyptic books waver on the subject of resurrection. Some favour the Old Testament view, in so far as it can be said that there was an Old Testament view at all; and there was one only to the extent of recognising a resurrection of those who had been in fellowship with God on earth—that is, a resurrection only of the righteous. Others, following the hint in Daniel xii., teach a resurrection of both just and unjust; but it is right to state that in the Midrash and the Talmud there is no doctrine of a universal resurrection. With many oscillations, the dominant idea came to be that of retribution,

which tended more and more to obscure the Old Testament view that the future life would be a continuance of the present in so far as that had been one of communion with God. This is borne out by the terminology used, for in the later books there is a tendency to use Sheol in the sense of Hell, with Gehenna as another name for it, while the intermediate abode of the righteous is called Paradise, and Heaven comes into use as the name for the post-resurrection abode of the righteous. "It may be said that the main current of apocalyptic literature ends by recognising two contrasted abodes for the righteous and wicked—Heaven, which is occasionally called Paradise, and Gehenna, which is sometimes identified with Sheol." Thus, in apocalyptic as in modern literature, the idea of an intermediate state as one of moral probation was a purely speculative opinion, but eschatological ideas were so flexible at that period that no dogmatic result is attainable.

When we come to the New Testament we are in a different atmosphere, though we are not done either with variations or with Judaistic terminology. Hades and Gehenna, as we find them in the New Testament, are Judaistic survivals, and the use of them presents us with many irreconcilable elements. The outstanding difference is, that in the New Testament we find a perfect synthesis of the Judaistic dualism between the individual and the race in the Christian conception of the Kingdom of God. New Testament ideas regarding the End, especially in the synoptic gospels, are determined by this category. That has to be borne in mind in approaching the teaching of the Master on eschatological truths; and this also, that it does not appear that He ever intended to give a finished doctrine of the future state of mankind. There has been far too much building on single texts from the gospels on the part of theorists regarding the state after death, and specially on parabolic utterances; for it is a safe principle of interpretation, as Dr A. B. Bruce pointed out, that pictorial representation is not to be taken as dogmatic teaching. The most conspicuous of these interpretations is

the use that has been made, by writers on both sides of the question of an intermediate state, of the parable of Dives and Lazarus. The plain didactic purpose of this parable is far away from being a lesson on the state of the dead. Jesus is teaching the damning sin of selfishness, and laying down the general principle that sin pursues the sinner with its consequences into the next life; but to go further than this, and base a dogmatic theory of any kind on the figure of "the great gulf fixed," or on the intercession of Dives for his brethren, is fatuous. To rest the case either for or against the idea of an intermediate state of the dead, with moral discriminations, and of a gospel of recovery after death, on this and other parabolic utterances of the Master, is most precarious, and it is equally precarious to build upon the use by Jesus of the words "Hades" and "Paradise." In all the cases where they occur, it is manifest that the Master used them in a figurative, not a didactic, sense. We cannot claim for the words of our Lord that they give us an exhaustive disclosure of the Last Things at all; for, in relation to the future, He seems to have fixed His thoughts so steadily on the final conclusion as to skip the intervening stages. On this point we take without reserve the verdict of Dr Salmond: "Christ Himself gives no doctrine of an intermediate state."

The New Testament evidence for an intermediate state of probation after death, outside the gospels, is very scanty, and can be so used only by a strained interpretation. The fact is, that New Testament Eschatology runs on such diverse lines that it is impossible to construct a coherent scheme at all, and many of the questions on which we desire to have light did not arise to the minds of the New Testament writers. This is particularly the case with St Paul, of whom, in this regard, it has been well said: "Subjects like conditional immortality, or eternal punishment, the intermediate state, etc., did not present themselves to his mind in the guise or in the terms which form the battle-ground of modern discussions." As for the testimony of St Peter, and the vexed passage about the "spirits in

prison," and "preaching to the dead," it is hard to see why so many writers of note could bring themselves to rely so much on "an isolated passage, the key to which seems to have been lost." It is particularly perplexing to find a scholar of the standing of Professor Charles saying: "These passages in 1st Peter are of extreme value. They attest the all but complete moralisation of Hades." The literature of their exposition is largely an exegetical jungle, and the text, on any of the numerous interpretations of it, is "a theologoumenon of Peter." It cannot be made out, on exegetical grounds, that the New Testament either sustains or upsets the contention that the state of the dead is an intermediate state of moral probation, with a view to final restoration. So far as the letter of the New Testament is concerned, the evidence rather goes to show that the present life is the day of opportunity. In fact it comes to this, that, both in the Old and New Testaments, the verdict is an agnostic one as regards the fate of the unbelieving; while the weight of the case as regards the righteous is made to rest on the present fact of a fellowship with God, which will be extended beyond death into eternity. The result of a patient study of the Scriptural evidence is to make one feel that eschatological questions cannot be decided on grounds of philology alone.

That being the case, we are forced back on certain large general considerations, which must, in the last issue, regulate, if not determine, our attitude to this whole question. This is so in the nature of the case, and also because so many of the Scripture passages which may be quoted on both sides of the discussion are largely matter of dispute. Thus one writer says: "The explicit doctrine of the New Testament is one of endless torment." But he goes on to urge that "The spirit of the New Testament corrects its letter, and we are forced back from contemporary representations of future judgment, outside or inside the New Testament, to Christian facts and Christian principles." There is much force in this contention, for much of the New Testament phraseology as to the future

state was borrowed from apocalyptic writings, and the New Testament eschatology varies considerably. This must certainly be taken into account as modifying the letter of the New Testament in regard to future destiny, though we must also admit that when we talk of falling back from the letter of the New Testament to its spirit, we are launched upon a wide sea. Yet this is what, in the last issue, and apart from dogmatic opinions, most thinking persons do.

The consideration that determines our beliefs regarding the future state is the character of God as revealed by Jesus Christ. This consideration has logical consequences that cannot be ignored. If God loves all men, if He willeth that all should be saved; if God be not only transcendent but immanent, not only governing like a potentate, but living by His Spirit in the hearts of men, so that "Hell becomes that state of mind from which God is shut out, and Heaven is that purity where He can make His home," is there not an almost irresistible conclusion that all men shall be saved? Does that not logically follow from an atonement made by Christ for all, and from the universal call of the Gospel? Yet it is equally undeniable that there are those who die apparently impenitent. The freedom of the will, and the fact that the root of religious activity is in the will, is a rock on which the waves of an easy-going view of human life and destiny break into angry foam; and one feels that if the fact that constitutes man a responsible being renders possible an eternal resistance to the will of God, death may usher one into a position which is either irreversible, or reversible only on the supposition of a probation in an intermediate state. And yet, can we accept the dogma of such a probationary state, in view of the slender amount of evidence in favour of it? So it comes to this, that we are in a strait betwixt two—the longing to believe in the offer of mercy to those who have died without accepting Christ, and the unquestionable lack of evidence in support of this conclusion. There is, on the one hand, the apparently irresistible conclusion from our belief in

the character of God as revealed by Christ, "a Father doing the best He can for all His children, both in this world and in that which is to come." On the other, we are confronted with the stern fact of human freedom and responsibility, and, with that, the possibility of eternal resistance to the will of God. And, in the midst of our perplexity, there is the lack of sufficient evidence to justify a dogmatic assertion either way. What refuge is open to us but that of a reverent agnosticism? Is not "a merciful uncertainty the most desirable of all remedies for an age weary of over-dogmatism?"

There are two general considerations on which the advocates of an intermediate state of probation after death have rested their conclusion, which cannot be ignored. One is the undoubted fact that so many Christian characters remain imperfect so far as the present life is concerned, and the other is the apparent necessity to leave room for the development of character in the opposite direction after death. In other words, are we not forced by our knowledge of character to believe both that a process of sanctification will go on after death in the case of believers, and that a corresponding process of deterioration will take place in the case of those who die in their sins? The Shorter Catechism says, "The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness"; and St Paul prays for the Philippians, "Being confident of this very thing, that He which began a good work in you will perfect it until the day of Jesus Christ." How can an expectation such as St Paul's be fulfilled if the dictum of the catechism be accepted? Have we not often felt, in regard to the death of imperfect and immature Christians, that we can scarcely conceive of God's work being perfected in them without a further development of character in an intermediate state? And is it not equally inconceivable that death will suddenly stop the development of an evil character from bad to worse? Then there are the cases, like that of the dying thief, in which repentance takes place at death; and of these we ask—Can one who has rejected Christ in life be made meet for heaven

in the twinkling of an eye, during the moment of dissolution? Does not this type of case almost compel us to believe in the possibility of development after death? The answer to all these questions is, that we cannot tell what transformation of character may take place in a soul at the moment of death; above all, what may be involved in the tremendous change which death makes in moral relationships. It is impossible for us to say anything at all as to the possibilities of moral progress, and of growth into the perfect likeness of Christ, which open up to those who pass into His presence. That death will remove existing hindrances to such perfection of character may be assumed, but that the Christian character will be perfected by anything of the nature of further discipline in the intermediate state can never be anything more than a pious opinion.

These large general considerations appeal to certain minds with more or less force at all times, but it must be said that, while a certain validity must be assigned to them, they can scarcely be taken as settling a doctrine which is exegetically so improbable as that of a state of probation after death, in what is called an intermediate state of the dead.

We are now in a position to consider the possible alternatives which, both on the basis of Scripture testimony and of these general considerations, may be held regarding the present state of the dead. The state of the dead is either one of unconscious sleep, or one of probation and development, or one of eternal issues. On the basis of a few texts in the epistles of St Paul, in which sleep is used in a metaphorical sense, the view has been maintained by various writers that the state between death and the judgment is in the case of the departed a long sleep. But it is surely enough to dispose of this theory to point out that the use made of the idea of sleep in such passages is purely metaphorical; and further, that St Paul, following the Master in using sleep as an emblem of death, does so for purposes of consolation, not of dogmatic teaching. The comparison of death to sleep occurs just in those passages which we most

frequently use when we attempt to comfort bereaved persons regarding those who have departed this life; and the metaphor itself is against the dogmatic use which is made of it in the theory in question, for it cannot be contended that one is unconscious in sleep. The analogy of bodily sleep and of its extraordinary experiences is against such a supposition. The expression "sleep of death" is not a distinctively Scripture one, but was used by the Greeks, and was not regarded by them as involving unconsciousness. The slain heroes of Homer are regarded as fully conscious, and as deploring their lot. Apart from the danger of building a theory upon a metaphor, it may be claimed that the metaphor itself does not even suggest it. And a further objection to the theory might be taken on the ground that if the dead are unconscious, there is no room for the probation which, on a doctrine of an intermediate state, the departed are supposed to be undergoing. It is astonishing how many have fallen under the spell of this inadequate alternative. It grew up so early that Origen, in the third century, had to refute it. It appeared in Reformation times, and was the subject of a tract written against it by Calvin, though Luther came under the influence of it for a time. It finds no support in the teaching of our Lord, who, though He speaks of those who have entered the state of the dead as sleeping, uses the word for purposes of consolation, and not to indicate the state after death as one of unconsciousness.

The second alternative is that of probation and development, which is specifically what is meant by the doctrine of an intermediate state, and which has been fully discussed.

There remains as a third alternative that which may be called the doctrine of eternal issues, by which is meant the view that the present life is charged with issues which are determined at death. In view of the study of the whole subject, it is possibly needless to attach oneself to any one of the alternatives regarding the present state of the departed. Here, if anywhere, an attitude of reverent agnosticism is admissible;

but what is always most significant is, that the strongest words in regard to the finality of the present life as a period of probation are those of Jesus. "The contrast in His mind is always between life on earth and life hereafter. The world to come is not divided into two sections, the intermediate and the final. It is one world, where the conditions are wholly different from what they are here. Its characteristic is that the issues of the present life, whether for good or evil, are there made plain. Death and the last judgment seem almost to fall into one line of vision, and the interval between them is never clearly emphasised. Hence His language regarding the future carries with it a varying suggestiveness. If we look at the main lines of His thought, and do not force isolated phrases into a significance not belonging to them, then, though we are not entitled to say that He confined the probation of souls to the present world, we are bound to acknowledge that He did not encourage the thought of its extension into the unseen. His whole teaching on destiny has for its dominant note the awfulness of the issues with which life on earth is charged."

DAVID PURVES.

BELFAST.

ON CERTAIN ALLEGED DEFECTS IN THE CHRISTIAN MORALITY.¹

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IT has been customary, especially in an apologetic interest, to accentuate the difference between the ethics of Christianity and those of Paganism, to insist upon the originality of the ethical point of view of Christianity, and its reversal of all the old Pagan moral values. Greek virtues are, it has been roundly contended, from the new point of view occupied by Christianity, only "splendid vices." Missing, as it did, the secret of goodness, the best moral insight of the ancient world was blind to the essential distinction between virtue and vice; it remained, at best, within the world of moral appearance, and never penetrated to that of moral reality. The revelation of the true nature of goodness in the life and teaching of Christ has therefore meant, on the whole, the reversal of all earlier and non-Christian moral judgments, the transvaluation of all Pagan moral values. And if we find anticipations of Christian morality among the ancient Greeks and Romans or among other races, these have been regarded as simply happy guesses at ethical truth, unrelated, or related only by contradiction, to the rest of their ethical principles—guesses which waited for their confirmation and explanation in the Christian moral system.

¹ Murtle Lecture, delivered in the University of Aberdeen on 20th January 1907.

It was inevitable that such a line of argument should provoke a counter-argument, proceeding on the same lines, against Christianity as an ethical system; that the very originality or novelty of the ethical point of view attributed to it, its supposed effort to invalidate the moral judgments of the Pagan world, and to reverse all moral judgments other than its own, should lead to its condemnation as lacking the insight which led the Pagan mind to these judgments, and as inimical to the further progress of the race along the lines of the splendid ancient civilisations. As a recent writer has truly said, "The classes who formerly busied themselves with the criticism of Christianity on its historical side are now interesting themselves in the criticism of it from another side. A generation is growing up which is calling *ethical* Christianity into question just as two preceding generations called in question *historical* Christianity. . . . The difficulty which young men to-day have in accepting Christianity is not intellectual but moral" (Garrod, *Religion of all Good Men*, pref.). The reaffirmation of the Pagan, as against the Christian, point of view is, as this writer frankly confesses, the reaffirmation of a kind of ethical naturalism as against the ethical supernaturalism or spiritualism of Christianity. "The ideal which all healthy nations and all healthy individual men (if they could impartially analyse their ideals) set before themselves, is not the spiritual man, but what I may call the best kind of natural man" (p. 141). "Let us not be ashamed to acknowledge that by which we really live. Let us have done with pretence. Let us cease to call ourselves Christians when we do not follow Christ. Let us cease attempting to reduce Christianity to a metaphor and to make the words of Christ mean to us what they never meant to him" (p. 154; cf. HIBBERT JOURNAL, April 1905). Let us substitute for the medley of Christianity and Paganism which gets itself accepted as "Christianity" the Christianity of Christ himself and of the primitive Christians, and we shall see immediately the incongruity between our profession and our practice, and acknowledge not only the

impossibility, but the undesirability, of the practice of the Christian morality by the modern world.

The condemnation of the Christian ideal proceeds upon three main grounds. First, that ideal denies, it is alleged, the value of interests which must always possess value for the healthy-minded man, those interests which it sums up under the terms the "world" and the "flesh." In other words, it is merely a negative or ascetic ideal, and cannot therefore be the true ideal for such a being as man in such a world as this. Its very presupposition is that this world passeth away, and that man's true life lies in a future which imparts to this life the only value which it can possess for the spiritual man. Secondly, it not merely invalidates the instincts and interests of the healthy-minded man, and the "goods" which consist in the satisfaction of these natural desires; it further degrades and enslaves the human spirit itself, and paralyses, instead of stimulating, its highest powers. Its morality is not merely lacking in virility and strength, it destroys the virile qualities in human nature, and substitutes servility and cowardice for the masterfulness and courage which are inseparable from strength of purpose and self-respect. It is therefore the enemy of progress, which is the result of the struggle of the strong with the weak, of the fit with the unfit, and of the victory of the former over the latter. Still a third ground of condemnation of the Christian morality is found in its alleged anti-social tendencies, the impossibility of constructing any system of social order in accordance with its principles. While the morality of the Pagan world was essentially political, and resulted from a reflective analysis of the conditions of social and political existence, Christianity, it is contended, is essentially anti-political, and its fundamental principle of the non-resistance of evil implies the dissolution of the State. Accordingly we find Tolstoy arguing that the entire course of civilisation has been a mistake, the result of disloyalty to the Christian ideal of life, and that the State itself is, and must ever be, a Pagan and anti-Christian institu-

tion. Let us be true to the Christian ideal, he urges, and we shall have no use for the State; the civic virtues will give place to their Christian opposites.

Now the real question raised for us by this attack upon the Christian morality is the "previous question" whether the morality attacked is, or is not, the Christian morality. For we cannot deny that the morality thus represented as the Christian morality is, in the main, justly condemned on the grounds alleged. A morality which invalidates human nature and all its judgments of good, which fails to give a positive interpretation of the interests of the present life, is itself so far invalidated. The true morality must recognise the essential dignity of human nature and guard jealously the self-respect of the good man; a morality which humiliates and degrades man is justly condemned. And finally, a moral ideal which invalidates and, if practised, would destroy the State, is obviously not merely an impracticable ideal for a political being like man, but is so far inadequate and misleading; a morality which regards the State as simply the enemy of goodness is no less in error than a morality which regards the world and the flesh in the same light, or which insults the dignity of human nature and undermines the self-respect of the moral being. The questions raised for us, therefore, by this criticism of the Christian morality, are: (1) Whether that morality is essentially negative and merely ascetic; (2) whether it degrades human nature and destroys self-respect, and is therefore the foe of progress; (3) whether it is essentially anarchistic and anti-political in its spirit and tendency.

(1) In the first place, then, we must distinguish carefully between the asceticism which is an essential element in Christian morality and the asceticism of the Mystic or of the Monk. The latter counsels withdrawal from the life of the world, that is, from the avocations and interests of the ordinary man and of this life, because it holds that these are

two alternative lives between which we must make our choice—the worldly and the unworldly life, and that the only possibility of living the unworldly life is to withdraw from the life of the world. The antithesis between the Flesh and the Spirit, between the practical and the contemplative life, is absolute; the one must be exchanged for the other. Now the Christian ideal too is an unworldly life, the victory of the Spirit over the Flesh, the definitive choice of the Kingdom of God and the rejection of the kingdom of the world. But Christianity sees no essential evil in the earthly life, in the practical pursuit of natural satisfactions as such. “The Son of Man came eating and drinking.” “Your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things”—of food and raiment and the provision of all the other needs of the natural life. Christ did not summon his followers to a life in the wilderness, like the Baptist; he never counselled them to withdraw from the world of their ordinary avocations. They were to live the unworldly life *in the world*, to realise his ideal of life in the ordinary and not in any extraordinary life. The asceticism which he inculcates is an asceticism of the spirit and not of the outward conduct. As it is only our preference of external and material to spiritual and internal goods—our making of what ought to be merely means to higher ends into ends-in-themselves—that constitutes the evil of earthly goods, so the only asceticism to which we are called by Christ is that which consists in the subordination of instrumental to final goods, of means to ends, in the recognition that the only good which has absolute or unconditional value is the good of the spirit itself, or righteousness. “Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things”—all the other goods, in so far as they are truly good, that is, the means to the highest good—“shall be added unto you.”

Moreover, the unworldly life is synonymous with the unselfish life; the great commandment, the ultimate law of the good life, is Love. And the expression of love is service,

and the first opportunity of service is found in ministry to the earthly needs of our fellows. The ministry of Christ himself was a ministry of healing as well as a ministry of preaching, and it was in the first place a ministry of healing. The constant opportunity of the spirit, therefore, he teaches, will be found in the ministry to the earthly needs of our fellows. To those who urge, "Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name, and in thy name done many wonderful works?" he will say at the last, "I never knew you." The first and essential condition of his approval is to love our neighbour as ourselves, to see that no one to whose wants we can minister lacks anything which it lies in our power to supply. Even, therefore, if there were any danger, in the Christian ideal, of a tendency towards an asceticism of the mystic or monastic type—which I contend there is not—such a tendency would be corrected by the characteristic altruism, and resulting practicalism, of that ideal.

Yet it may still be urged that, although it may be true that Christ did not, in so many words, counsel the practice of asceticism, the characteristic spirit of his teaching is that of aloofness from the ordinary secular interests and avocations of human life; that he has no sympathy with civilisation, with the secular and industrial activities which promote it, or with the culture of the ideal life, whether of science or of art, in which it really consists; that his exclusive interest in righteousness is a survival of the narrowness of outlook, the unintellectuality and insensibility to the beautiful which characterised the Hebrew mind; and that if we would be perfect, we must add to the Hebrew interest in righteousness the Greek interest in the true and the beautiful, as well as the Teutonic enthusiasm for action and practical achievement.

Now the general and sufficient answer to such a criticism of the Christian ideal of life is simply that, by the very nature of the case, the teaching of Christ is limited to what he regards as the essential and all-important element in the life of man—the essential and all-important, but not, therefore, the exclusive

interest of that life. His teaching has nothing to do with civilisation, with culture, with work or industry as such. He is so preoccupied with the moral and religious interest that he almost seems to treat it as if it existed alone and apart from these other interests. His point of view is that of the Prophet, and that of the Prophet of the Kingdom in the new spiritual sense. By adopting that point of view, and refusing to abandon it even for a moment, he does affirm the supreme importance of the moral and religious interest: so transcendent is its importance that no other interest, however important and worthy in itself, can be allowed to compete with it. But this does not imply that, in their own place, when duly, that is, utterly subordinated to the religious interest, these other interests are invalidated. In righteousness he sees the supreme, but not the only good. If I may say so, Christ betrays the inevitable limitation of view of the specialist; his attention is so preoccupied with the problem of righteousness, with his own peculiar problem, that he does ignore the other problems of human life, the problems of civilisation, of industrial activity, and of culture. But to ignore these problems is not to deny that they exist, and that they demand their solution. Only, the problem of righteousness must be solved *first*, and its solution will govern that of the others. His depreciation of what we may call, by contrast with the religious, the secular interests of life is, in short, a relative, not an absolute, depreciation.

The view that he not merely subordinated, but condemned the industrial life, is the result of an unintelligent reading of such sayings as, "Take no thought for the morrow, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed," as if he had forbidden ordinary prudence and concern with the means of livelihood. All that he does condemn is such an anxious care for our material well-being as means distrust of the fatherly goodness of God, who feeds the birds of the air and clothes the lilies of the field and cannot forget the needs of his children.

What he condemns is such a preoccupation with the problem of material well-being as would distract the mind from the problem of spiritual well-being. In the pursuit of wealth he sees the great temptation for the human soul; the spirit of cupidity is the opposite of the spirit of the Kingdom. "Ye cannot serve God and Mammon." "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul"—his own proper life?

And must we not still admit that his standard is the true one by which to measure the value of material goods, and even of that entire system of material goods which we call "civilisation"? These goods have, after all, only an instrumental value, as means to spiritual good; as soon as material comfort is made an end in itself, it not only loses all its value, but becomes an evil. Civilisation is not an unmixed blessing, as history and our own experience are constantly teaching us; it brings its own peculiar temptations with it.

And even the life of culture itself, intellectual and æsthetic, to which the Greeks so wisely subordinated the practical and industrial life, must be subordinated, in its own interest as well as in the interest of the higher life whose minister it really is, to the ethical and religious life. Not in science, nor in art, after all, but in morality, in conduct, is to be found the true life even of the artist and of the man of science. To this extent it is necessary still to Hebraise.

The only real opposition, then, is between the Christian morality and a morality of mere naturalism, which finds the measure of good in the satisfaction of natural desires or animal needs, on the one hand, or an intellectualism or æstheticism of the Greek type, which exalts the scientific and æsthetic interests above the moral or practical, on the other. The Christian ideal prescribes no ascetic rule of life, it sees spiritual possibilities in all the natural interests of human life; and while it may ignore many problems which we are called upon to solve, while it may ignore the secular life as such, it is yet so far from invalidating that life that it postulates it as the

material, so to speak, of the higher life in which alone its real interest lies.

(2) The second aspect of the Christian reversal of Pagan moral values upon which criticism has fastened is that which we may call its social aspect, and it is obviously a no less important aspect of the Christian morality than the one which we have been so far considering. The Christian morality, as we have seen, is essentially altruistic; the sacrifice of the lower or animal to the higher or human self is at the same time the sacrifice of the self for others. In this sense also it is insisted that we must lose our life if we would find it, and die if we would live.

It is here, in the social reference, that the difference and opposition between the Christian and the Pagan point of view makes itself most acutely felt. It means a changed attitude towards our fellows, and the practical consequences of such a change of social attitude have been historically momentous. These consequences are to be seen not so much in the new philanthropy, the new effort to alleviate the sufferings and misfortunes of the masses of mankind, as in the new democratic feeling for these masses of mankind, the new conception of social duty. The exchange of the egoistic for the altruistic point of view implies a remarkable change of moral values—a changed *measure* of moral values. A new measure of moral greatness is implied: for the greatness of mastery there is substituted the greatness of service. “Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles exercise dominion over them, and they that are great exercise authority upon them. But it shall not be so among you: but whosoever will be great among you, let him be your minister; and whosoever will be chief among you, let him be your servant; even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many.” A man’s greatness is to be measured not by the services which he can command, but by the services which he is able to render: “It is more blessed to give than to receive.” The real opportunity of good is to be found in the opportunity

of service ; a man is not to think of others as existing for him, but of himself as existing for others. It is a new note, unheard in the highest ethical reflection of the Greeks, or only faintly heard in the claim of the State upon the citizen ; but the Greek State was essentially aristocratic, the many existed—lived and toiled and died—for the few, the ungifted many for the gifted few. But Christ says that the highest must serve the lowest, that the highest is simply he who most completely serves. And the essence of all service is self-forgetfulness, self-sacrifice, the brotherly love that takes no thought for itself but only for others. Its essential spirit is the spirit of humility, of lowly-mindedness, the opposite of the “high-mindedness” of the Greeks.

But such an ideal, it is contended, is fatal to all progress. Sacrificing the few to the many, it sacrifices excellence and distinction to mediocrity. With its praise of lowly-mindedness and service, it discourages the true heroic type, and substitutes for it an anæmic, unvirile, servile type of manhood. It is the morality of the slave, and is “prompted by the self-protective and self-preservative instinct of degenerating life.” It is the ingenious means by which the weak avenge themselves upon the strong, the slaves upon their masters. As soon as the masters come to believe that mastery is wrong and service noble, their mastery is gone ; the Christianising of Rome meant her conquest by Judæa. The victory of the weak, of the unfit to live, means the degeneration of the race, the sacrifice of the interests of the future to those of the present, the conquest of the will to live by the will *not* to live.

The answer to the question of the relative validity of Christian and Pagan moral values must depend once more upon our answer to the previous question of the value of life itself, what makes life worth living, or which type of life is best worth living. “Degeneration”—from what type? Degeneration from the animal type may well be progression towards the human type. The will not to live the merely

animal life may well be identical with the will to live the true life of man. Nietzsche's condemnation of the Christian ideal is in terms of a standard of value which Christianity itself has antiquated and rendered obsolete, nay, which even Paganism had already superseded. His condemnation of the Christian morality is in reality a condemnation of morality itself, an assertion of nature against morality, of the animal against the man. His ideal is that of sheer power, unrestrained by any considerations of moral obligation. He delights to speak of himself as an "Immoralist," and of his point of view as one "beyond good and evil."

And yet beneath all the paradox and extravagance of his language there is an important truth in Nietzsche's interpretation of the significance of the new altruism of the Christian morality; of the emancipation of the slave, the acceptance of the democratic ideal in place of the aristocratic ideal of Paganism, as its essential implications. So far from its being a servile morality, it has proved itself the moral inspiration of all movements for the emancipation of the enslaved masses of mankind. But this very fact raises the other question whether its influence has not been, and must not always be, on the side of mediocrity rather than of excellence and distinction; whether, in the interest of the highest type of manhood, it is not necessary to adopt the ancient aristocratic point of view, and subordinate the interests of the many to those of the few, rather than conversely. The answer is that while the Christian ideal is certainly democratic, breaking down the distinction between the many and the few, it is just for this reason aristocratic in the true sense. So far from levelling down to a dull mediocrity, it levels up to the standard of the highest excellence. It sees, in *all*, the possibilities which the best Pagan insight discovered only in the few. It sees in each son of man, however unfortunate or degraded, a possible son of God, in each soul or self a value commensurate with this high calling and possibility. For the Pagan contempt for the mass of toilers it substitutes a deep reverence for their potential greatness;

it raises all, it degrades none. How should a religion degrade man, or cause him to forfeit his self-respect, which tells him that his relation to God is that of a son to a Father, and his relation to his fellow-men that of members of a common family? How should it sap the springs of the more virile qualities when it calls upon its disciples to sacrifice life itself for righteousness and to rejoice when they are counted worthy to suffer for the Kingdom's sake? Is not the courage of the martyr at least equal to that of the soldier? Has not Christian virtue proved itself possessed of heroic quality?

And as for the survival of the unfit or the less fit, the perpetuation by Christian effort of the weaker and less healthy type, it is only from the standpoint of a physiological naturalism like that of Nietzsche that such an objection can be raised. Doubtless there is a measure of truth in the criticism of the actual altruism of so-called Christian society, which has too often contented itself with merely palliative efforts which have resulted in the further development of the evil thus superficially treated, instead of attacking its causes and eradicating it. The physiological point of view has its own relative validity, even in ethics. But it is not to be confused with the ethical point of view. Health is one of the goods of human life, and a condition of many more; but it is not itself the Good. From the ethical point of view the fitness or worthiness of the individual to live is not to be measured in terms of his physical fitness or physiological efficiency, but in terms of his ethical fitness, the ethical possibilities of his life. And surely Christianity has given us the true criterion of the life of the individual, as well as the true method of dealing with the physically and morally degenerate, when it insists upon the existence of the highest ethical possibilities not merely in the physically weakest but even in the morally most depraved.

(3) The discussion of the third objection to the Christian morality has been to a certain extent anticipated by that of the first. It is objected that, in spite of its altruistic spirit, that morality is distinctly anti-social in its actual influence

upon conduct, since it not only depreciates and ignores the importance of the State, which is the all-inclusive social institution and the presupposition of all social order and well-being, but by its insistence upon the principle of love as against that of force, of forgiveness and non-resistance of evil, sets itself in opposition to the State, which is founded on force and exists for the maintenance of justice and the punishment of evil. Now it cannot be questioned that Christ intended to substitute a new humanitarianism for the older exclusive patriotism of the Greek and Hebrew world; interest in the Kingdom of God, which is the kingdom of humanity, for interest in one's own city or State; the spirit of fraternity for the spirit of citizenship. If God is the Father of all men, then it follows that membership in the Kingdom of God is open to all men, and that in every member of the human race the Christian recognises the claim of a common brotherhood. The good citizen is no longer to be identified with the good man; the good man is a citizen of the world, no less truly from the Christian than from the Stoic point of view. But, as we have already seen, this subordination of the political to the ethical point of view does not necessarily imply the invalidating of the former, any more than the subordination of the economic or (in general) the secular to the ethical and religious interest implies the denial that the economic and secular interests have their legitimate place in the life of the good man. The fact that Christ does not concern himself with political or economic questions, with questions of the organisation of social life, is simply the inevitable result of his preoccupation with the supreme question of the nature of goodness itself, of his conviction of the supreme importance of this question and the comparative unimportance of all other questions. Doubtless, too, his lack of interest in the State is, in part, to be accounted for by the pettiness and hopelessness of Jewish politics in his time—it is a case of the fulfilment of Plato's dream of a great nature born to citizenship of a petty State whose politics cannot distract his mind from its higher

task—as well as by his conviction that the political order itself—the entire temporal and secular order—is shortly to be superseded, that the State is not the permanent, but only the temporary, medium of the social life.

Yet it never seems to have occurred to Jesus to counsel withdrawal from the State or neglect of civic obligations, any more than it occurred to him to counsel withdrawal from ordinary secular avocations or neglect of ordinary duty. He may have failed, for the reasons just suggested, to realise the ethical importance of the State, the ethical significance of citizenship; but he did not set himself in opposition to the State, he did not see in it, as his earliest disciples seem to have seen, the enemy of the true life of the individual. To interpret his teaching as implying such an antagonism to the State is to fall into the error, against which I have already argued, of confusing his spiritual and unworldly point of view with that of mere asceticism. That, when the question of the importance of social institutions is once raised, he does not fail to recognise this importance, is obvious from his deliverance regarding the family, which forms the great exception to his usual reticence on such questions. He answers the question put to him by the Pharisees about the legitimacy of divorce, and explicitly abrogates the law of Moses on the subject.

But, it is objected, the practice of the Christian virtue of forgiveness, obedience to the precept of non-resistance of evil, means disloyalty to the State. To allow injuries to go unpunished, to refuse to take advantage of the provision which the State makes for their punishment, is to do what in us lies to destroy the State; if all acted on this maxim, there would be no State. Now it must be observed, first, that this maxim, as enunciated by Christ, is a *principle*, not a *rule*, of conduct; secondly, that its obvious *application* is not to the public, but to the private life of the individual, just as in the case of the maxim: “Swear not at all, but let your Yea be Yea and your Nay Nay”; and finally, that he is contemplating the conduct of the higher spiritual life—the higher order of the Kingdom

of God—where love supersedes force, and no man looks to his own things but every man to the things of others; he is describing the ideal life, and legislating for it. And is it not the case that just in so far as we do submit ourselves to the higher and more stringent laws of the life of goodness, we transcend the sphere of personal rights and cease to attach the old importance to personal injuries? Is not the very necessity of the State, in its present form, the very necessity of forcibly protecting the rights of the individual from attack by other individuals, a sad commentary on the imperfection of our Christianity rather than an evidence of the inadequacy of the Christian ideal? Is not the State, in this sense, after all but a means to an end more important than itself? Is not the kingdom of righteousness in reality the kingdom of love and self-sacrifice, rather than the kingdom of force and self-assertion?

The criticisms which we have been considering are not only closely connected with one another, but rest upon the same fundamental misunderstanding of the ethical teaching of Jesus. They all alike insist upon a literal interpretation of that teaching, in the sense that it is to be taken as a system of rules, a code of duties, “an ethical code adequate for all time.” And it is not difficult to show that this (or any other code) is *not* adequate for all time, that the new time brings with it new conditions and reveals new duties. But surely, “the truth is,” as the author of *Ecce Homo* has well said, “that he did not leave a code of morals in the ordinary sense of the word—that is, an enumeration of actions prescribed and prohibited. Two or three prohibitions, two or three commands, he is indeed recorded to have delivered, but on the greater number of questions on which men require moral guidance he has left no direction whatever.” The very criticism which he had to make upon the teaching of the Scribes and Pharisees—the moral guides of his day—was that it was too casuistical, too detailed; that it endeavoured to stereotype, and codify, the

free life of the spirit of goodness. "Instead of giving laws to his society, he would give to every member of it a power of making laws for himself." Instead of enunciating rules, he enunciated principles of conduct, the application of which he left to the intelligence of the individual, guided by the illumination of moral experience. Nay, what he imparted was rather an impulse and enthusiasm that would captivate the will than a mere illumination of the intellect. Let the heart but be filled by the enthusiasm of humanity, by the love of righteousness for its own sake, and the individual may be trusted to discover for himself the duties—the ever new duties—which he owes to his fellows. Christ is too wise to attempt to anticipate the future course of moral experience, the future lines of duty in detail.

It is Christianity as a spirit and a point of view with which we must come to terms if we would rightly appreciate its ethical significance, not Christianity as a code of moral laws or even as a system of morality. Its spirit and its point of view are, I have sought to show, that of the highest morality we know. And yet here, once more, we must be careful not to mis-state the relation of the Christian to the Pagan morality. The spirit and the point of view of the former is higher than, but not opposed to, that of the latter. The advance of Christianity upon Paganism does not consist in a "reversal of all the moral values of Paganism," in the absolute condemnation of its fundamental principles. It is the fulfilment, rather than the negation, of Pagan morality: there is an identity beneath all the difference—an identity of essential spirit and point of view. Develop the deeper implications of Pagan morality, and you have the Christian morality. It has been said, for example, that the idea of duty is absent from the highest morality of the Greeks. But surely in Socrates, in Plato and in Aristotle, in the Cynics and the Stoics, we find the affirmation of the intrinsic claim of ideal excellence, of the obligatoriness of the rational life upon a rational being like man; and in Aristotle we find the affirmation of the superior

value and dignity of the "theoretic" or spiritual life to the practical life which is governed by the ideal of self-satisfaction. Again, it is often said that the spirit of altruism and self-sacrifice is absent from Greek morality. Yet the ideally good man of Greek ethics is the good citizen, and the good citizen is the man who unselfishly spends his life in the service of the State. So keenly does Plato feel the necessity of such a perfect disinterestedness in the ideal statesman that he disallows him all private possessions and enjoyments, while his definition of that quality of justice in which he finds the supreme good, alike of the individual and of the State, is "the doing by each of his own work"—that which he is best able to do—for the State as a whole. The Stoics developed and made explicit the idea of duty which was implicit in earlier Greek thought, at the same time expanding the Greek idea of citizenship into a universal humanitarianism, and reaffirming the Platonic paradox that "it is better to suffer than to do injustice"—ultimately better, better for the soul.

Surely this, rather than the opposite, is the true line of Christian apologetic: to show that Christianity is not the exceptional, the unaccountable, unrelated except by opposition to other modes of life and thought, but the supremely reasonable, the truly normal, including and interpreting, and thereby transcending, all the previous experience and insight of the race. For in a wider sense than that of their original application the words of its Founder are true, that he came not to destroy, but to fulfil.

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THE "DEFENCE" OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

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IN his lectures on the *Criticism of the Fourth Gospel*, Professor Sanday lifts this hosanna for an unexpected ally:

To one who himself firmly believed in St John's authorship of the Gospel, and in its value as a record of the beginning of Christianity, the outlook last autumn seemed very black. A single book dispelled the clouds and cleared the air. Dr Drummond's *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel* is of special value to the defenders of the Gospel . . . the whole work is something more than a defence of the Gospel.

In view of the distinctive character of Principal Drummond's remarkable book, and of acknowledged leadership accorded to Professor Sanday among the "firm believers," it seems desirable to raise the question, What is it to "defend" the Fourth Gospel? Is it the Gospel which is here defended, or only a certain second century tradition about the Gospel? We are dealing with an anonymous work, which makes no claim to be from the hand of John,¹ and which is only brought into connection with his name by means of an Epilogue (xxi. 24 f.), acknowledged by the most ardent "defenders," including Professor Sanday himself, to be attached at a later time by another and unknown hand.² Even the meaning of

¹ On the ambiguous passages alleged to be such, see below.

² See, e.g., Zahn, *Einleitung*, ii. § 66, pp. 485, 487, and Sanday, p. 81. The latter admits that C. 21 is an appendix, but "by the same hand as the rest of the Gospel," written when "the aged disciple, feeling death stealing upon him, might point out that no words of Jesus justified the expectation" (of his survival). The last phrase quoted by Sanday from Drummond.

this unknown editor is a subject of dispute, to say nothing of the value of his opinion. Yet Professor Sanday writes :

The critics who assert that the Gospel is not the work of an eye-witness, and even those who say (e.g. Theo. Zahn?) that the last chapter was not written by the author of the whole, wantonly accuse these last words (xxi. 24) of untruth. That is another of the methods of modern criticism that seems to me sorely in need of reforming. I hope that a time may come when it will be considered as wrong to libel the dead as it is to libel the living.

In this hope for better observance of the ninth Commandment we cannot but concur. As regards the fitting of the coat, the facts are these. To make it appear possible to accept the statement of the writer of Jn. xxi. 24, in the particular sense attributed to it by Tatian (?), Theophilus of Antioch, Irenæus, and subsequent tradition, two critics in modern times have ventured so far as to describe the story of the raising of Lazarus (Jn. xi.) as intentional and conscious fiction. One is Renan, whose stubborn clinging to the traditional authorship was not usually considered to atone for the violence done in its interest to both critical sense and religious feeling, when he explained the story of the raising of Lazarus as a pious fraud at which Jesus, under pressure of circumstances, was guilty of connivance. The scene was an acted fiction in which Jesus consented to be chief ὑποκριτής! The other vindicator of apostolicity at the expense of veracity is Principal Drummond, Professor Sanday's *Defensor Fidei*. Drummond imputes the pious fraud to the Apostle John as having not only invented the whole story “to set forth in a vivid and picturesque form the truth that Jesus is the resurrection and the life,” but expressly intended it as “a repudiation of the older (and truer) story” of the Synoptic writers.

To one who himself firmly believed in the *sincerity* of both the anonymous evangelist and of his editor in the Appendix, however slight the qualifications of either for historical or literary criticism, Principal Drummond's book did not come exactly as the clear shining after rain. Attempts to gain credit for a theory of authorship by discrediting the author

still seem to him more like "libel of the dead"¹ than the belief that the author of the Epilogue was in error. To Professor Sanday they convey "an enhancement of the value of the Gospel as a record of the beginning of Christianity." The mere unreformed critic might prefer not to be required to take the sacred writer's professed devotion to truth and loyalty to the concrete facts of history (1 Jn. i. 2, 3; Jn. i. 14-17 f., xix. 35) in a Pickwickian sense, nor to occupy in his own person the position of certain well-meaning rabbis whom Jesus rebuked for "making the word of God of none effect that they might keep their tradition."

It would seem, then, that the Fourth Gospel does need defenders.² We venture to offer (1) a defence against the sacrifice of its veracity to ecclesiastical tradition; (2) an appreciation of its value as a record of the beginning of Christianity.

1. The process of bringing down the ark of God into the camp is an expedient more venerable for its antiquity than for its success. How recently were we told that if Rabbinic tradition of the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch were suffered to fall before the attacks of Philistine critics, not only would the revelation of God in the Old Testament become valueless, but the word of Jesus himself be proved false? And to-day how many of those who thus argued are busy in the attempt to undo the evil effects of their own words, not realising that the Church is less eager to hear their explanation of how after all it makes no practical difference to their doctrine, than to know what practical difference it does make to the betterment of the doctrine in question? Among the earliest arguments against the Rabbinic tradition was the reference to Moses' own death in the last chapter of Deuteronomy. The exegesis is not yet wholly obsolete which declares that Moses wrote this by anticipation. The Talmud

¹ Let others say who has been guilty of "libel against the living."

² Let this fact excuse plain speaking against even the greatest advocates of truly "destructive criticism."

even depicts him bewailing his own end as the Spirit dictated the words. Later it was thought wiser to allow that the passages relating to the death of the assumed authors of the books of Moses, Joshua, and Samuel (these and *no more*) were written as appendices “by their disciples.” The history of the ecclesiastical tradition of Johannine authorship is following step by step in the same course. Does the Appendix appear to refer to the death of the beloved disciple?¹ It was written by him by anticipation. The contrast developed throughout the chapter between the “red martyrdom” of Peter and the peaceful end of “this man” is nothing. The allusion to current associations of the name of John with the earthly “witnesses of Messiah,” who according to Mt. xvi. 28 were to be alive and remain at the coming of the Lord, expectations which only the event itself could really disprove, is nothing. “The aged disciple felt death stealing upon him,” seized his pen and wrote the Appendix. The Gospel itself, though long since completed, had been kept from circulation until death should be just near enough to make it certain John would not survive the *parousia*, but not so near as to incapacitate him for his literary task. Does the Epilogue² refer to the same “beloved disciple” as having testified these things and written these things, just as various passages in the Pentateuch refer to Moses as having written the words of the Law or the Book of the Covenant, and by the claim itself exclude their own derivation from his hand? The “disciples” are immediately at hand to publish the posthumous work with full authority. But not too near! No more than the last two verses must be allowed to show traces of the later hand. “Even those who say that the last chapter was not written by the author of the whole wantonly accuse these last words of untruth!” Is this the voice of sober criticism? or of the inveterate panic for the ark of God?

In the judgment of the present writer Professor Sanday's interpretation of the sense of Jn. xxi. 24 should never have been

¹ Jn. xxi. 21-23.

² Jn. xxi. 24 f.

questioned. Even the authority of so eminent a scholar as Bousset is unavailing to make it seem probable that "the beloved disciple" of ver. 20 is to be sought among the nameless "other two disciples" of ver. 2, rather than "the sons of Zebedee" of the same verse.¹ In his third lecture (pp. 97-108) Professor Sanday does not conceal the strong attraction which he feels toward the theory of Delff, which explains the confusion in second century tradition between John the Apostle and "John the Elder," by attributing the Johannine writings to the latter and applying to him most of the traditions. The theory unquestionably gains weight from the growing evidence most forcibly presented by Bousset,² that the martyrdom of the son of Zebedee predicted in Mt. xx. 23 = Mk. x. 39, for which Lk. xxii. 30 significantly substitutes the *logion* Mt. xix. 28, not only took place in Judæa not long after that of the namesake of his brother,³ but was actually related by Papias.⁴ Nevertheless the objection which appears to be the most serious in Professor Sanday's view is to us also insuperable. Galatians and Acts certainly have the son of Zebedee in mind as the John who is associated with Peter as nearest in apostolic rank, and in Mk. iii. 16, 17 he is on the road to this distinction.⁵ It is not sound and impartial exegesis which would substitute in the Appendix, where the "two witnesses" are balanced

¹ Even those who consider "the beloved disciple" of the main body of the Gospel to be intended to represent an ideal figure, the Apostle Paul, Nathanael, the "Israelite indeed" of i. 40 ff., etc., do not deny that the author of the Appendix may mean the son of Zebedee.

² *Theol. Rundschau*, 1905, pp. 225 and 277 ff.

³ Schwartz, *Tod der Söhne Zebedaei*, thinks of the actual brother, Acts xii. 1, in spite of Gal. ii. 9.

⁴ Fragment vi., *ap. Apostolic Fathers*, Lightfoot-Harmer, 1891.

⁵ The trio, "Peter, James, and John," in the significant passages Mk. v. 37, ix. 2, and xiv. 33, is perhaps explained by Gal. ii. 9. Only Luke, who relates the early martyrdom of James, substitutes "Peter and John" occasionally, even in the Gospel (Lk. xxii. 8). For others the second "pillar" remains "James," regardless of the change of person, just as Philip of Hierapolis inherits the attributes of the Apostle. It is not because these three were special associates of Jesus that they became "pillars" in the Church, but conversely. For another explanation see the writer's article, "The Martyr Apostles," *Exposita*, 1907.

over against one another, Peter plus some utterly unknown personage in place of “Peter and John.” Delff and Bousset are ingenious but misleading.

We must further concede to Professor Sanday the real weight of that authority to which he refers as all-sufficient for the proof that the last chapter is by the same hand as the rest of the Gospel.¹ Lightfoot adduces some linguistic proof of that close connection of the Appendix with *portions* of the rest of the Gospel which the present writer thought more convincingly demonstrated by the connection of the disarranged material of the Gospel with the Appendix.² The inference drawn in our own study of the relation was that the Appendix (inclusive of the Epilogue) was part of a general revision and recasting of the “Johannine” material to bring it into acceptable adjustment to “Petrine” (Synoptic) tradition. Organic connection we grant; but Professor Sanday insists that “the tail must wag the dog”—only, not the tip end of the tail. That is amputated to clear the pedigree.

Since the relation of the three Epistles to the Gospel is vital to the question of “direct claims,” we are compelled, on the other hand, to take issue with Professor Sanday on a point of exegesis. In my *Introduction* (p. 268) I wrote:

The main source on which the compiler of John in its present form has relied is unmistakably the work of the writer of the three Epistles.

In the preceding chapter, on “The Apocalypse and the Epistles,” I had written (p. 249):

Their author superscribes himself simply “The Elder” . . . there remains nothing to indicate that the unknown Elder’s name was John rather than Alcibiades or Melchizedek.

Professor Sanday is a great exegete, but his statement³ that Professor Bacon “ascribes the main body of the Gospel to John the Presbyter” only proves how much a great exegete

¹ The note (p. 81) has only, “For the proof, see especially Lightfoot.” The reference is probably to *Biblical Essays*, p. 194.

² See Bacon, *Introd. to N. T. Literature*, 1900, pp. 269 and 274, especially the note (p. 274) showing the connection of xiii, 36 f. with xxi. 19, 22.

³ P. 24.

can read into one author what he gathers from another. Not from lack of appreciation of the privilege, but as a matter of simple truth, Professor Bacon must decline to be sent to school in Germany, whether as a disciple of Bousset, or of "those critics of vigour and rigour, Schmiedel and H. J. Holtzmann, who would distinguish the author of the First Epistle of St John from the author of the Gospel"! ¹ Professor Bacon is compelled to recognise the phenomena on which these great scholars base their discrimination, but, as the passage just quoted explicitly states, he does *not* accept their inference. He accounts for the phenomena by the same fact which accounts for the linguistic affinities of the Appendix, the recasting which the material of the Gospel has undergone, but which has left the Epistles untouched. *Per contra*, he has expressed ² with equal clearness his dissent from the partitionists Delff, Wendt, and Briggs, with whom he is classed on p. 24, and has presented his view of the historical development of the Gospel in language which Schmiedel, the protagonist of "uncompromising rejection," might easily adopt. In a recent article in the HIBBERT JOURNAL he has proposed, simply as a working hypothesis, to identify this nameless Ephesian "Elder" of the Epistles with the revered and nameless teacher of Justin Martyr.³ For convenience let us call him Theologos. The Elder *Theologos* will be the author of the Epistles in their present form; also of the Gospel in its original unadapted form, a form so widely divergent from Synoptic tradition, and laying so little claim to be anything else than the mystical interpretation of the Logos-Christ of Paul which it really was, that even Justin, though manifestly affected by it, could not use it as a source or an acknowledged authority. For the author of the Appendix and recaster of the Gospel, who adjusted the Asiatic or Pauline tradition to the Petrine of Syria and Rome, we have no designation save the title Redactor. This editor gave to the Gospel its authoritative currency by his not

¹ P. 57.² *Introd.*, p. 268.³ *Dial.*, iii.-viii.

unnatural identification of “the beloved disciple” with the Son of Zebedee, and by ascribing to him the writing and testimony. He was a contemporary of Papias, Polycarp, and Justin, and may have believed with Papias and Justin that “John the Apostle” had been “in the Spirit” in the island of Patmos, whence he had addressed letters to the churches of Asia. What more natural than to attribute to him the anonymous Epistles and Gospel? He also knew that Polycarp claimed to have seen and heard that Apostle—whether correctly or by confusion with some other depends upon the date of the Apostle’s death. Polycarp’s memories and the Seven Epistles of Rev. i.–iii. would make John the natural patron Apostle of Asia. Otherwise there is nothing to indicate that the redactor thought of him as having ever been there. On the contrary, it is Peter who is carried away “whither he would not,” and John who “abides” with the flock. So the *Muratorianum* understands the Appendix, and so it was probably meant. Even for Ignatius and Polycarp, Paul, not John, is still the Apostle of Asia. “The Elder John,” so called by Papias to distinguish him from the Apostle, is a dim and distant figure for Papias himself, utterly unknown in Asia, unquestionably a historical figure, but by all the indications of contemporary usage as regards the seat of the authoritative tradition of “the elders,” a resident of Jerusalem.¹ No objection exists to Delff’s view that the later tales regarding “John” related by Polycrates and others may have originally applied to this John; but the attempt to set aside the full, plain refutation by Eusebius of Irenæus’ confusion, a refutation made with the work of Papias open before him, is pseudo-science. John the Elder cannot possibly have written Epistles or Gospel.² The traditions actually traceable

¹ Cf. Hegesippus on the “succession” in Jerusalem “down to the times of Trajan,” *ap. Eus., H. E.*, III. xix., xx. 1–8, etc., *passim*, on “The apostles and elders in Jerusalem,” the superscriptions of “James” and “Jude” and the John of Jerusalem, *ap. Eus., H. E.*, IV. v. 3.

² The Apocalypse he might, if we distinguish the Palestinian nucleus from the Asiatic envelope.

to him are at the very opposite pole from the doctrine of these writings. They represent a crude millenarianism of the most pronounced type, utterly irreconcilable with their highly spiritualised eschatology.

The above is a plain statement of a plain theory, unfortunately necessitated by misstatement. The theory was not made for purposes of either offence or defence; but (since the occasion has come) it is submitted again as a defence of the Fourth Gospel against the imputation of insincerity. It can at least serve as an example of those which are declared to "wantonly accuse the Epilogue of untruth."

We decline to accept the redactor's opinion as to the authorship of the Gospel. So does Professor Sanday and every New Testament scholar that of "Jude the brother of James" on the authorship of Enoch. Is that a "wanton accusation of untruth" against the brother of Jesus? We decline in like manner to accept the interpretation put upon the Epilogue itself by the *Muratorianum*.¹ Will the same charge be made regarding this? The *Muratorianum* is a mixture of inference from the Epistle and Gospel (including the Appendix), with the witness of Papias regarding the Apostles and Elders and the gospels of Matthew and Mark. The inference drawn by its author from 1 Jn. i. 1-3 could be drawn just as well by the author of the Appendix, and the exegesis is no more infallible in the one case than the other.

The part of a real "defender" of the Fourth Gospel is to read the statement of the "other and unknown hand" of

¹ "Of the fourth of the Gospels the author is John, one of the disciples. At the instance of his fellow disciples and bishops (Jn. xxi. 24) he said, 'Fast with me three days, and whatever shall be revealed to each let us relate it to one another.' The same night it was revealed to Andrew, one of the Apostles, that John should write all in his own name, the rest revising (Jn. xxi. 24). What wonder, then, if John in his Epistle also, speaking of his own authorship, so boldly advances each detail, saying, 'What we have seen with our eyes and heard with our ears, and our hands have handled, these things we have written' (1 Jn. i. 1). For thus he professes himself not only an eye-witness, but a hearer, yea and a writer as well, of all the wonders done by the Lord in their order."

the Epilogue, ascertaining, so far as may be, its meaning and its grounds, as we have already done. Thereafter it is to study the statements of the Evangelist for himself and see whether he does or does not “profess himself not only an eye-witness but a hearer, yea and a writer as well, of all the wonders done by the Lord in their order.” The *Muratorianum* makes the “we” of the Epilogue mean John’s “fellow disciples and bishops,” viewing them through the spectacles of Papias, just as it rescues Solomonic authority for the Book of Wisdom by declaring it to have been “written by the friends of Solomon in his honour.” Traditionalists from that time down, including Professor Sanday, assume that it stands for some corresponding body of intimates in direct contact with John himself. This is pure begging of the question. Is redactor in contact with Theologos or not? The only evidence we have is his all too frequent maltreatment of his material.¹

Or will it be maintained that no one could honestly say “We know that his witness is true” who was not personally acquainted with the author? Surely any man who can thus argue must not only be ignorant of one of the constant refrains of the Johannine writings,² but of one of the most fundamental ideas of the New Testament, the “witness of the Spirit with our spirit that we are born of God,” the assurance of the fulfilment of the Messianic promise in the outpouring of the Holy Ghost upon every one that is baptized into Christ. The truth witnessed is in substance that “the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding.” What genuine Christian cannot echo, “We know that this witness is true”?

Since, then, there is nothing whatever to indicate that the writer of Jn. xxi. 24 had any other basis for his statement than what the *Muratorianum* also employs, let us see if modern methods of exegesis conduce to the same result.

¹ See Bacon, *Introduction*, pp. 271–274, and note that the Appendix, like the *Gospel of Peter*, follows the Galilean tradition of the resurrection, whereas the Gospel, like Luke, follows the Jerusalem tradition.

² E.g. 3 Jn. 12; 1 Jn. v. 9–12; Jn. iii. 11.

Among the "passages which make a direct claim," Professor Sanday cites first of all 1 Jn. i. 1-3, the reliance of the *Muratorianum*,¹ a passage which we also attribute to the author (not the redactor) of the Gospel. He disposes quickly and correctly of the interpretation of the reference of *θεᾶσθαι* to mystical vision. Certainly Theologos emphasises the visibility and tangibility of the incarnation of the Logos, just as in Jn. i. 13, 14, 16,² and xx. 24-31. We have every reason for accepting the ancient belief that the author is vindicating the historic tradition of the Church against the Docetism of Cerinthus. Cf. 1 Jn. iv. 2, 3, and v. 6-10.

Against the alternative view that the writer "is speaking in the name of a whole generation, or of Christians generally," the only objection raised is the "contrast between 'we' and 'you,' between teachers and taught." Here also we sustain the contention (if anybody disputes it) that

the teachers are in any case a small body; and they seem to rest their authority, or at least the impulse to teach, on the desire to communicate to others what they had themselves experienced.

Precisely; for they are genuine successors of the Apostle Paul in the great headquarters of his mission field, and therefore they speak with the authority of those who have been "entrusted with the ministry of reconciliation, how that God was in Christ reconciling the world." Because they are the conscious successors of this Apostle of the present, spiritual Christ, they emphasise and reiterate to the last degree that it is "the life," the life of the Logos, the life which was from

¹ "That which was from the beginning, that which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the word of life (and the life was manifested and we have seen and bear witness, and declare unto you the life, the eternal life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us); that which we have seen and heard, declare we unto you also, that ye also may have fellowship with us; yea, and our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ, and these things we write that our joy may be fulfilled."

² See the passage reproduced below (p. 130). As an illustration of the felicitous interpolations of R., we have printed also (in other type) verse 15, which is a self-evident impertinence, interrupting the connection of 14 with 16, and referring to an utterance of which we hear nothing down to verse 30.

the beginning, the life which was historically manifested and which since that manifestation, to which the writer and his associates have been ordained and set apart to bear witness, has been the continual conscious possession of the whole brotherhood of believers, constituting their fellowship, the life which flows from God, the life that so constitutes the being of the Christian that it is no more he that lives but Christ that liveth in him. The teachers are a small body—not because nobody can teach except those whose physical hands touched the incarnate Logos,¹ but because so few have come into living, conscious contact with the spiritual Logos. Its lines of limitation do not run across the generations at so many years after the crucifixion, but along all generations according as men receive or reject the Spirit. The author uses the same “we” to speak through the mouth of Jesus himself in Jn. iii. 11.² The witness is historical in its source, but personal and immediate in its verification. The record is confirmed by the experience; and the experience therefore makes subsequent generations fellow-witnesses with the first. According to Theologos there is no need for Christians to be disputing about the length of life of this “witness of Messiah,” or that. With Paul he holds that it is not physical but spiritual contact which gives Apostolic authority. The Logos is with them alway, even unto the end of the world. Because his life is in them, they are witnesses, that taste not of death till his *parousia*.

Hereby we know that we abide in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit. And we have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world. . . . This is he that came by water and blood, even Jesus Christ; not with water (of baptism) only (as the Docetists held), but with the water and with the blood (of the passion; denied by the Docetists). And it is the Spirit that beareth witness, because the Spirit is the truth. . . . If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater. . . . He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in

¹ This is the plane to which Theologos relegates the doubting Thomas. Cf. Jn. xx, 26–29.

² “We speak that we do know and testify that we have seen” is the utterance of the Church, conscious of having received the promised Spirit, to unbelieving Judaism.

him. . . . And the witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath the life. He that hath not the Son of God hath not the life.

This is the "witness." To talk as if it were something which none but the first generation can render, with mere tales about their experiences of the physical senses, is to force upon the writer as his only meaning "the witness of men," when he insists upon testifying by "the witness of God which is greater." This apostolic succession he belongs to, and would extend. Such teachers, God knows, are few enough.

If the nature of the "witness" is clear from the Epistle alone, it becomes ten times more clear when we bring into comparison the next of Professor Sanday's "passages which make a direct claim," Jn. i. 14, though this he regards as "more ambiguous."

It forms part of a context (Jn. i. 11-17), in which, as often in Paul, the spiritual Israel, "which were born not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (*cf.* Gal. iv. 22-31; Rom. iv. 16-18, ix. 7-9), are contrasted with the fleshly, "the Jews," as our author calls them.

"He came unto his own, and his own received him not. 12. But as many as received him to them gave he the right to become children of God. . . . 14. And the Logos became flesh, and tabernacled among us, and we beheld his glory, glory as of the Only-begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth. 15. *John beareth witness of him and crieth, saying, This was he of whom I said, He that cometh after me is become before me, for he was before me.*¹ 16. For of his fulness (of grace and truth) we all received, and grace for grace. For the law was given by Moses. Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ.

Does the author refer in "tabernacled among us," to us twelve Apostles; or does he mean us, the spiritual Israel, who "received him"?² When he says, "We beheld his glory full of grace and truth, *for we all received* from his fulness of grace," does he mean to exclude from this experience all but the first generation? If so, the ubiquitous signs of his relationship to Paul are very fallacious. What incredible belittling must the Gospel itself undergo, when it is a question of rescuing the tradition of Johannine authorship?

¹ Ver. 15 is borrowed carelessly from ver. 30, after the original report had been cut out. See above, p. 128, note 2.

² *Cf.* Ex. xxxiii. 5 ff., xl. 34, 35.

Professor Sanday has but one more “passage which makes a direct claim.” It is the famous crux of interpretation, xix. 35,¹ though Professor Sanday himself is fain to admit that if we accept the ordinary use of ἐκεῖνος (and he suggests no other), then I should be inclined to think with Zahn that ἐκεῖνος points to Christ, “he who saw the sight has set it down in writing . . . and there is One above who knows that he is telling the truth.”

The eminent “defenders” are quite welcome to this ingenious bit of exegesis if they can persuade their readers that anyone anxious to establish a historical fact would write in this ambiguous fashion. Only what then becomes of the “direct claim”? Manifestly it remains to be proved

that the bearing witness is that of the written Gospel, and that the author of the Gospel is the same as he who saw the sight.

Professor Sanday’s only “proof” is a reference to xxi. 24.

It is really difficult to see wherein this procedure differs from plain abandonment of the case as regards xix. 35. But since it is dropped here, let us take it up at the same point. The relationship is correctly stated. There is no need even to deny that “the bearing witness is that of the written Gospel.” What follows? “If we accept the ordinary use of ἐκεῖνος,” it follows that he who speaks thus in the third person of “the disciple which beareth witness of these things” in the Epilogue is the same who adds the similar comment in xix. 35, *not* “the author of the Gospel who (supposedly) saw the sight,” but “another and unknown hand.”

But in point of fact we do deny that “the bearing witness is that of the written Gospel,” or rather that it is exclusively to be found there. Granting that the evidence is too slight for introducing as a possible independent tradition the Western addition to Mt. xxvii. 49,² the language of this comment of R. indicates that his witness ἐκεῖνος had given something more

¹ “There came out (from the spear wound) blood and water. And he that hath seen hath borne witness, and his witness is true. And he knoweth that he saith true that ye may believe.”

² “And another taking a lance pierced his side, and there came out water and blood.”

than the bare statement of fact which here appears. In some way the witness must have also expressed a conviction of the truth of his witness, if not its motive, that others might believe. So much is implied in R.'s statement. "He (ἐκεῖνος) knoweth that he saith true, that ye may believe." According to some, the amanuensis (author of the Epilogue?) was standing beside the aged disciple at this moment and heard him give this assurance of his conviction, and appended the comment as it were in his own name.¹ But why go so far afield for suppositions when exactly such witness is as accessible to us as to the redactor? Everyone knows what great stress is laid in 1 Jn. v. 6-9 on this supposed incident of the crucifixion. It is true that the Elder Theologos is not insisting on his ocular witness to the fact, but only on the witness of the Spirit; but when we see how his claim of the authority of the Spirit making him a fellow-witness with "the very chiefest apostles" in i. 1-3 is handled by the *Muratorianum*, it is not difficult to understand how the author of the Epilogue could find in 1 Jn. v. 6-13 a statement by the beloved disciple, who, according to xix. 26-27, alone was near the cross, that "he knoweth that he saith true, that ye also may believe." If, in addition, he had before him Rev. i. 7, as ver. 37 makes very probable, that would simply make him doubly sure (if, indeed, it did not first suggest) that "the beloved disciple" was no other than John the son of Zebedee, who had seen and borne witness, and expressed his conviction of the truth of his testimony that others also might believe. The addition of R. accordingly may well include also the two fulfilments of Scripture of ver. 36-37, which only divert attention from the symbolism, though this, to the author of 1 Jn. v. 6-9, was the all-important thing.

We have examined seriatim all the alleged "passages which make a direct claim," and found nothing to support the contention. There is indeed a wonderful combination against the fantastic vagaries of Docetic Gnosticism of a

¹ Cf. the argumenta in Lightfoot-Harmer, p. 524, xix. and xx., and Corssen's *Monarchianische Prologe*, T. u. U., xv. 1, pp. 114 ff.

Pauline superiority to mere knowledge after the flesh through the witness of the Spirit, with a complementary sense of the value of the tangible, historic tradition of the Church. The combination, especially when such a passage as 1 Jn. i. 1-3 is taken by itself alone, is quite sufficient to mislead authors like the Muratorian fragmentist, more intent on questions of authorship than on the real sense; but so far from indicating insincerity, or a desire to obtain for himself unmerited authority, Theologos merges his own testimony completely in that of the Church. The witness of the Spirit is everything, “because the Spirit is truth.” The purest and loftiest Paulinism is reacting from the unbridled fancy of Gnosticism toward the historic tradition of the Church, but without the surrender of Pauline liberty in the Spirit. Space does not here permit the demonstration how far below this level is that of the redactor, who, by his additions and readjustments, particularly in the Appendix, has sought to harness this eagle to the wingless creatures of Synoptic tradition. But we certainly have no need and no inclination to accuse him of untruth.

2. We have now to consider the second element of our problem. If R., with his editorial ascription of the Gospel and Epistle (?) to the son of Zebedee, is simply doing what the writers of the *Muratorianum*, of the Monarchian Prologues, of the various *argumenta* and subscriptions, habitually do, presenting as fact his own inferences from the author he is handling, and if his exegetical inferences, together with the whole dependent chain of alleged “external evidence,” carries (to put it mildly) no conviction, what is the indirect evidence of the author himself? His “direct claims,” as we have seen, are not for himself, but for the body of witnesses to which he belongs, a body not yet divided into a “Catholic” camp which holds to the historic succession by physical contact, and a Protestant camp which declares “the Spirit and the gifts are ours” and despises the historic tradition. His witnesses stand for both. That he was an elderly man is suggested by his adoption of the Pauline form of address, “my little

children.”¹ That he occupied an important position as an elder is apparent from the “letters of commendation” with which he equips his travelling evangelists, addressed both to and from churches (2 Jn. i. 13) and to individuals (3 Jn. 1). That these churches were among those of “Asia,” and the author a resident of Ephesus or its neighbourhood, is matter of common consent, asserted by ancient tradition, confirmed by the literary affinities and history of the “Johannine” canon, which consists of a Gospel, Epistles, and an Apocalypse, the latter addressed to the Seven Churches of Asia. It is attested also by the nature of the heresy combatted and the weapons employed against it. That the author was by birth a Jew, like most of the early teachers of the Church, appears from his language (Jn. i. 41, ix. 7, xix. 13, 17), and otherwise. That he had been in Jerusalem and knew at least places along the straight high-road past the “city called Ephraim,” Jacob’s Well, Salem and Sychar, Ænon, Nazareth, Cana and Tiberias to Capernaum and Bethsaida, would be *a priori* probable in one of Jewish birth, and is indicated in his descriptions. More is not.² R. speaks anachronistically of “the sea of Tiberias” (xxi. 1), and in an ungrammatical gloss (vi. 1) appends this name, only given to the Sea of Galilee after Tiberias had risen to the predominant importance it enjoyed after 135 A.D., to the author’s more historically correct appellation. Whether the author or R. (if either) was misled by Asiatic usage into speaking of Caiaphas as high priest “for that year,” in xi. 49–52, cannot be certainly established, and would throw but little new light on the subject if it could. Jewish birth was not so great a matter for a Philo in Alexandria, a Paul in Tarsus, or a Spinoza in Amsterdam, as ability to lay hold of and

¹ Gal. iv. 19.

² Whether his “Bethany beyond Jordan,” from which Jesus comes to Bethany near Jerusalem, “the village of Mary and her sister Martha,” i. 28, x. 40–xi. 18, was a place which actually bore this name, must seem doubtful in view of the vain search of Origen, Eusebius, Jerome, and all subsequent geographers. The curious collocation suggests combination of Lk. x. 38–42 with Mk. xiv. 3. On Baṭneh near es-Salt, and in general “The Geography of the Fourth Gospel,” see Furrer, in *Z. n. t. W.*, iii. (1902), p. 257 ff.

master the greatest thoughts of Gentile philosophy. All mere questions of the precise individual and date are subordinate to those of historical environment.

To one whose conception of the beginning of Christianity is confined to the soil of Palestine and the narrations of those who had known Christ after the flesh, light upon the development of the Pauline Gospel may perhaps be a matter of small moment. The Pauline Gospel is resolutely disregarding of the sayings and doings of Jesus, in favour of the incarnation, crucifixion, and resurrection considered as a drama of the divine economy of creation and redemption. It is the tendency of modern Christianity, however, to look upon Paul's great appropriation of the Logos-doctrine, the doctrine in which, from Heraclitus of Ephesus to Cleanthes the Stoic and Philo the Gnostic, Greek monotheistic philosophy had embodied its loftiest interpretation of man and God and the universe, as having also had something to do with “the beginning of Christianity.” An extremist of the school of Roman Catholic criticism, to whom everything that has developed on the Christian stock is Christian, criticises the principle of an extreme Lutheran, who can admit nothing as of the essence of Christianity that cannot be traced back at least to the first century. But these counteract one another. The *via media* of criticism lies between them. The great insight which criticism is giving to the Church is the perception of Christianity as a vital germ which laid hold of, drew to itself out of the chaos of mingled religions, philosophies, systems, of the first century, which digested, assimilated, organised whatever was available for the world-religion that was to be, because kindred to its spirit; a germ which, so long as it retains its vitality, must also tend to throw off alien and morbid growths. Therefore modern thought sympathises with the magnificent syncretism of Paul, when he transforms the national messianic hope of Israel into a universal messianic hope, the second David into a second Adam, the redemption of Israel into a redemption of the world; makes the new law of

ministering love inclusive of all ethics, and all politics, and the law of the spirit of life shed abroad by the risen Redeemer, making us free from the law of sin and death in our members, inclusive of all religion. The new dynamic, God emerging in us, the *life* that was and is manifested, and the *love* which is the law of its manifestation, this is to Paul the Essence of Christianity. "This only would I know from you, Received ye the Spirit?" The idea of the Israel of God which is to be heir of the world is recast by him in the mould of Stoic thought. It becomes the body of those who died with Christ unto sin, were buried with him in baptism, and were raised to their new life by the Spirit, which vitalises the whole as the blood flows from the head through all the members. When a man so conceives the Gospel, not the "word of wisdom" of Jesus himself, not the mighty works of a faith that could move mountains will be the main thing; but the drama of the Redemption of humanity considered as a manifestation of the life and the love of God. It will be a message of reconciliation, how that God was in Christ reconciling the world. This is the everlasting Gospel of the Gentiles, and it will stand forever alongside the Gospel of the circumcision as it always has stood, an interpretation of the significance of Christ's person and work, just as essential to Christianity as the report of his sayings and his deeds.

It is this Gospel of the person of Christ which comes to its full expression in Ephesus, the great metropolis of the Pauline mission field. Jerusalem and Cæsarea give us our Matthæan teachings of Jesus viewed as a new *Halacha*. Rome and Antioch report the *haggadic* Petrine tradition of his doings and sayings. But Ephesus, in long conflict with the grievous wolves whom Paul himself contended with, over whose coming ravages he mourned, wrought out the Pauline Gospel of the Wisdom of God, the Gospel of the incarnate Logos. As Professor Sanday has well said, All of this doctrine save the name is present in the great Pauline Epistles. We will go further and say, This is the Gospel of Paul.

But records fail us after the time when Paul "by the space of three years" taught the word in Ephesus, reasoning daily in the school of one Tyrannus, struggling to make the most of his "great door and effectual" against the "many adversaries," the time when he assembled the elders of his Ephesian churches (was Theologos among them?) for a last warning and farewell at Miletus, the time when he sent to "the Churches of Asia" the twin epistles "concerning Christ and the Church" with their sublime Christology, the time of the Pastoral Epistles with their increasing emphasis on "the sound doctrine," the "form of sound words" against a *gnosis* that is falsely so-called. Between this time, into whose struggles of germinant Christology with all the theosophy wherewith that Phrygian-Ionic soil teemed and luxuriated, the New Testament itself affords us glimpse upon glimpse, and the later time, half revealed to us in the letters of Polycarp and Ignatius, there is a period of darkness in which Paulinism seems to bear fruit only in the great anonymous Epistle to the Hebrews, and that on distant soil. At its close the old conflict is still raging. The antagonists are still those who are puffed up in their proud *gnosis*, forgetful of the love that builds up. The Apostolic authority appealed to by name is still Paul, and only Paul. But now the issue is more definite, the heresy is more clearly defined. There is a Logos-doctrine, strong and crude in Ignatius, more refined and philosophic in Justin. But most significant is the increasing appreciation of the weapons to which Polycarp urges recourse, on which Papias at length lays hold.

For everyone who shall not confess that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is anti-Christ; and whosoever shall not confess the testimony of the Cross is of the devil; and whosoever shall pervert the *logia of the Lord* to his own lusts, and say that there is neither resurrection nor judgment, that man is the firstborn of Satan. Wherefore let us forsake the vain talk of the many and the false doctrines, and *turn to the word handed down to us from the beginning*.¹

It surely is not hard to see what literature has intervened here with its new interpretation of the old doctrine of the

¹ *Epistle of Polycarp*, vii.

anti-Christ, the false witness that exalteth himself against the true witness of the Church. Nor is it difficult to recognise the antagonists against whom "Papias and so many church fathers after him . . . as, for instance, Irenæus," and Justin, and Jude, and 2 Peter, advanced the Apocalypse of John. Papias and Justin are the first to bring in the authority of "John the Apostle" in favour of (a physical) "resurrection and (an apocalyptic) judgment," Papias, in addition, bringing that of "the Elder John." For their Logos-doctrine neither Ignatius nor Justin have any authority to cite save Paul. But in respect to questions about "the form of sound words, even the words of our Lord Jesus Christ," against those who are "puffed up with a doting *gnosis*,"¹ there is a new development.

The new feature is the turning toward "the Apostles and Elders" for "the word handed down from the beginning, the *logia* of the Lord," which are being perverted by those who do not accept the witness of the cross.² Papias follows this advice, turning from the "vain talk of the many" to "those who teach the truth, and from the false doctrine of those who relate alien 'commandments' to those who relate commandments given from the Lord to the Faith." Against the twenty-four books of Basilides' *Exegetica* on the Antiochian Gospel appear five books of Exegesis of the Lord's *logia*, based on the testimony of apostles and elders. The test of trustworthiness is now the historic tradition derived from an Apostolic group.³ Historical criticism has begun. Even the metropolis of the Pauline mission field is beginning to listen

¹ 1 Tim. vi. 3.

² Cf. 1 Jn. v. 6-9.

³ As to whether this Apostolic group is to be found at Jerusalem, where Luke places it, where all authorities seek it down to Irenæus, down to a time when not merely the Church of "the apostles and elders" had been scattered by Hadrian, but Ephesus and Rome had divided its inheritance and forgotten its distinction, see Hegesippus, the Epilogue of the Fourth Gospel, the *Muratorianum*, the superscriptions of "James" and "Jude," and the Preface of Papias. For the last-named, as he gathers from "those who came his way," traditions of the *logia* of the Lord, and tests them by virtue of their derivation from "the apostles and elders," it did not seem necessary to explain that the seat of evangelic tradition from which these travellers came was Jerusalem. It was the blundering zeal of Irenæus which has made this necessary.

for the voice of ecclesiastical authority. Soon it will be impossible for even the very embodiment of the Gospel of Paul to find standing save as accommodated to Petrine tradition, even its dialogues misunderstood as literal reports of actual interviews with Jesus.

The significance of the Fourth Gospel lies in its testimony to the growth and self-definition of the Gospel of Paul in the heart of the church of the uncircumcision, before the harking back to Jerusalem. When we are able to trace the history of “the Churches of Asia” from the time when Paul conveys their greetings to Corinth down to the annihilation of the Church of “the apostles and elders” in the war against Hadrian, and the transfer to Rome under Antoninus Pius of the leading minds in the great school of Ephesus, then we may realise against the background of that history that it is not all enhancement of “the value of the Fourth Gospel as a record of the beginning of Christianity” to wrest it out of its true setting, and attempt to change its witness to “the life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us” into an admittedly defective, unhistorical, and fictitious supplement to Synoptic tradition.

Its author makes no profession to be John of Jerusalem, whether apostle or elder. He gathers evangelic material, like others of his age and province, but he does not sift it critically, he does not present it historically. He expressly defines his object and method as expository and homiletic, and not historical.¹ He selects “signs” for their symbolism,²

¹ xx. 31.

² Whence he derived, or on what nucleus of historic tradition, if any, he builds up such “signs” as the changing of the water to wine at Cana, or the raising of Lazarus, is a hopeless task, to judge by his drastic transformation of Synoptic themes that are still recognisable in cc. v. and ix. (*cf.* Mk. ii. 1-12, iii. 1-6, and viii. 22-26; Mt. xii. 22-31). Where no pretence is made of speaking as an eye-witness, the largest liberty of imaginative description is admissible. Absurdity comes in when it is maintained that an Apostle, the most intimate of all, and the only survivor of the twelve at the time when the historic tradition was the most precious weapon of the Church against Gnosticism, should have deliberately chosen to concoct a Gospel out of

composes dialogues for their doctrinal import, because since Plato the dialogue was the accepted literary vehicle for philosophic material. The Christ that he depicts is, as he forewarns the reader,¹ the incarnate Logos, "the life which was with the Father and was manifested unto us." It is a Christ that "comes by water and by blood." The baptism of John that could not take away sin points to the Lamb of God that takes away the sin of the world. The water of Jewish lustrations becomes the wine of the marriage supper of the Lamb, the well of Jacob symbolizes the "living water" of the spirit. The pool of Bethesda with its multitude assembled at Pentecost, the feast of the giving of the Law, its healing of the paralytic on the Sabbath and its comparison of the authority of Moses, whose law could not give life,² with that of the Son to whom the Father had given to have life in himself; the feast of Tabernacles with its ceremonial drawing of water against Jesus' offer of the water of the Spirit, and the dialogue with Nicodemus,³ give our author's "teaching of baptisms." His Galilean passover and story of the feeding of the multitude with the discourse in Capernaum give his doctrine of the Agape and Eucharist. Dedication, or the "Feast of Lights," with the healing of the man born blind, by anointing and washing of the eyes, gives him occasion for the dialogues on Jesus as the Light of the World, the true Teacher and Shepherd of the Sheep.⁴ The final passover is introduced by the "sign" of Jesus as the Resurrection and the Life. The symbolism henceforth is not only of water but also of blood; water of the cleansing word, and blood of the Vine that courses through all its members,⁵ blood of "Christ our material known to be fictitious *in preference* to the immeasurable treasure of his personal memories of the Lord.

¹ i. 1-18.

² With Jn. v. 21, 26, 39-47, vii. 15-24, cf. Mk. iii. 2-4 and Gal. iii. 11-21.

³ I have endeavoured elsewhere to show that R. has changed the original order of ch. vii., which should include ii. 23*-iii. 21 after vii. 30. See my *Introduction*, p. 273, note.

⁴ On the original order of ch. viii.-x., see my *Introduction*, p. 273, note.

⁵ xiii. 1-15, xv. 1 ff. With the parable of the true Vine, cf. Isa. v. 1-7 and Eph. iv. 11-24. Ch. xiv. should follow xvi.

passover sacrificed for us” and water of the Spirit flowing from his side. Lastly we have the Pentecostal resurrection scene in xx. 19–23, where the apostles receive authority and power by the breathing on them of the Holy Ghost, and are sent forth commissioned to all the world, “even as the Father hath sent me.” The conclusion is *not* improved by the addition of another scene (ch. xxi), in which Peter, James and John, Nathanael and others, ignorant of this commission, unconscious of the resurrection, have returned to their fishing in Galilee and must be enlightened and commissioned over again, Peter to tend the flock of God till carried away for “witnessing” in blood at Rome, John to be the “witness” that abides to the coming of Messiah, not indeed untasting of death, but in the true “witness” bequeathed to the Church in his teaching and writing.

There are writings which are not history, whose authors had neither the power nor the wish to be “historical” in any save the broadest and loosest sense, which yet have a value, when not misused, as “records of the beginning of Christianity.” Among them we would place first those of Paul, and next those of his great nameless follower at Ephesus. No scholar to-day can question the immeasurable gain of insight into Old Testament revelation which has come by recognition of the true place in that development of the Priestly Law and the post-exilic Isaiah. The day is coming when New Testament scholars will recognise the true place in Christian history of the Ephesian canon, and instead of discrediting its “spiritual” gospel in the interest of “the tradition they have received,” will be ready to find in it an exponent of deutero-Pauline Christianity in the greatest of Paul’s churches, and to enter into the Christlike freedom of its “witness of the Spirit.”

B. W. BACON.

TRUST, FAITH, BELIEF, CREED

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TRUST in God is faith, faith is belief, belief may mean creed, but creed is not equivalent to trust in God. Trust is an attitude of the soul, an inward, spiritual experience. Creed is the doctrinal law of the Church, expressed in a set of formal and debatable propositions. A creed is not necessarily a personal experience. Creeds are defended in these days on the very ground that they need not be individual experiences of truth. Creed is not trust any more than a political platform is the personal sentiment of patriotism, and every student of Church history knows that the earlier Christological creeds were, in a sense, political party platforms.

Trust, faith, belief, creed—these words are waymarks along a tremendous transition in Christian thought. They indicate the sad descent from real religion, from the mountain of the Vision, from free and immediate communion with God, down to the arid and monotonous plain of conformity to phrase—under penalty of excommunication.

Trust is a soul-attitude. It involves the whole person, and the intellectual element, while always present, is not predominant. Trust assumes some knowledge of God, but this knowledge is neither source nor essence of the trust.

O Israel, trust thou in Jehovah,
He is their help and their shield.

These words express the quintessence of the Hebrew religion. The Psalms are living fountains of inspiration, because they are constantly voicing man's confidence in the Eternal and in His ways. They are full of faith in this sense. The beliefs concerning God which they contain are comparatively meagre. When the Psalmist says :

Jehovah is my rock and my fortress and my deliverer ;
My God, my rock in whom I will take refuge ;
My shield and the horn of my salvation, my high tower ;

it is evident that the faith so vigorously and graphically expressed is simply personal confidence. It would be literary obtuseness, if not imbecility, to regard this as a statement of beliefs concerning the attributes of God.

The English word "faith" is found only once in the Old Testament in the revised version. This is in the significant passage in Habakkuk (ii. 4) which Paul engraved on the corner-stone of his gospel : "The righteous shall live by his faith." On the margin of the English revision is added : "Or in his faithfulness." The Hebrew word, *Emunah*, means steadfastness, firmness, unshaken confidence. In the same verse in Habakkuk this quality is contrasted with the "puffed up" soul which is "not upright." The thought of the passage deals with the attitude of the soul, and with that alone, and it has nothing in common with creed or belief or faith in the intellectual, Hellenised sense. Yet with this text as his chief scriptural warrant, Paul, and Luther after him, showed the futility of justification by legalism. Those who over-emphasise the mental factor in faith appeal in vain to that grand prophetic utterance.

"The just shall live by faith." This has been the victorious war-cry in the two greatest conflicts in history for the emancipation of living faith from the bondage of formalism. To-day it is sounding a similar challenge in the present struggle in the Protestant churches for a pure faith, for a "faith alone," freed from the intellectual burdens and the moral entanglements of the creeds.

It may be said that this simple Old Testament conception of trust is modified when the New Testament realm of thought is entered. Here is found a much more definite idea of faith, and one which is more intellectual because more definite. For in the gospel, faith or trust is directed no longer to the unseen deity alone, but also to a distinct historical personality, Jesus of Nazareth.

It is a mistake, however, to hold that the New Testament places Jesus Christ as the supreme object of faith instead of God the Father. Jesus himself said, "Have faith in God"; and again, "Believe in God, believe also in me." When did he substitute himself for the Father as the one toward whom religious faith should be finally directed? All the fundamental New Testament ideas of Christ as Mediator, Intercessor, High Priest—yes, even as "the Word of God"—are incorrect and misleading if Jesus himself is regarded as the supreme object of faith. Faith in him is trust in him, and the committal of self to him as the full revealer of the Father's character and love.

To "believe on the Lord Jesus Christ" is, therefore, essentially the same thing as trusting in Jehovah, and it is this apart from any metaphysical theory of the relation between Jehovah and Jesus. For faith in Christ is faith in him as the way unto the Father. As our exemplar and as Saviour, Jesus is the exponent and not the final object of New Testament faith.

When Jesus asked men to have faith in him he was not requiring their assent to a Christological creed. So far as we know, Jesus never demanded that certain views of his pre-existence, incarnation, atonement, or Messiahship should be professed by those who would enter the kingdom of God, or even by those he commissioned to preach. The only Christological doctrine which seems to have been required of an apostle after the ascension was belief in the resurrection.

The two exhibitions of faith which Jesus commended most highly were shown by the Roman centurion at Capernaum

and by the Syro-Phenician woman. In both cases his encomium was drawn forth by the simple declaration of confidence in his ability and willingness to heal. In the case of the Syro-Phenician woman there was added the assurance that the sympathies of Jesus were not restricted by racial limitations. The trustful attitude toward him was the essence of the faith he commended, entirely apart from any intellectual theory of his person or work.

There is no New Testament warrant for the view that a mental judgment concerning the person and work of Christ is a pre-requisite for sincere and "saving" faith in him. From one end of scripture to the other, faith is trust and only trust, it is the committal and surrender of self to God and to Christ and to God in Christ, but it is not dependent upon any theory of the way God was in Christ. The atonement, or, to use the biblical instead of the theological word, the cross, is a life principle to be realised; it is not a formula to be assented to. The doctrine is as much a form as a crucifix.

The only suggestion in the Bible that belief may be intellectual rather than moral in its nature is found in the Epistle of James, where we are told that demons also believe and shudder. James certainly did not confuse belief and trust. So far as the New Testament notes the intellectual conception of faith, it does so to condemn it.

"How, and by what influence," asks Harnack, "was the living faith transformed into the creed to be believed, the surrender to Christ into a philosophical Christology?" This is a vital question in our Protestantism to-day. "Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ," ran the gospel—still the gospel. "Believe thus and thus about the Lord Jesus Christ," says the creed. "Trust in Jesus as Son of God," ran the gospel. "Believe in Christ as God the Son," says the creed. "If any man will follow me, let him deny himself and take up his cross," spake the Master. "If any man wills to be saved, without doubt it is necessary for him to hold the true faith or perish everlastingly," said the creed. This is one of the

most amazing contrasts under the guise of identity to be found in all the history of thought.

But in spite of its traditional influence and its present persistence, this credal conception of faith in Jesus Christ cannot be justified when tested freely. It must be laid aside as a Greek excrescence upon the pure gospel. It is neither biblical, nor spiritual, nor Christ-like. It substitutes a superficial and sterile intellectual judgment for the religious attitude of the soul. It departs from the searching severity of Christ's appeal for service, based on the denial and very crucifixion of self, and offers in place of this an empty ceremonialism of phrase, which furnishes no test for sincerity and no safeguard against hypocrisy.

Nor can the credal conception of faith abide Christ's own touch-stone: by their fruits shall ye know them. The age when dogmatic Christology prevailed was the era of schism and turbulence and a divided Christendom. The theory that faith in Christ necessitates certain beliefs concerning him has never been productive of the fruits of the spirit, except among those who have held identical beliefs. The Russian Church to-day proves the impotence of a credal Christology to regenerate.

Sad it is that the one life in history which revealed fully the futility of formalism came in time to be interpreted in terms of the most stringent formalism. Strange that he, who taught as man never taught before or since the emptiness of lip-worship, became in turn the object of lip-worship. "Why call ye me Lord, Lord, and do not the things which I say?" But we have not yet learned the lessons of the past, and "loyalty to his dear name" still requires us to ostracise or excommunicate those who appeal from Athanasius to the synoptic gospels. Why is it? We dare to differ with Augustine. Calvin is a man of like passions with us. Why is Athanasius alone infallible? Our Protestant churches are still entangled in the meshes of the ambiguous idea of "faith in Christ."

Vital, saving faith in God and in Jesus Christ is independent of all creeds, past, present, or future. It does not hang on any theory of the Bible as a whole or of the Gospel of John in particular. Its religious and saving character does not depend upon "views held" upon any subject. Beliefs change. Our beliefs concerning God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, are radically different from the beliefs of our fathers. The only words in that sentence of the Apostles' Creed which we interpret as our ancestors did are the words "the," "of," and "and." Beliefs must alter. Faith abides. *Manet immota Fides*. Self-surrender to the Most High is "justifying" faith. This exists under every form of Christianity. It exists under forms of so-called "Agnosticism." It exists under the forms of every religion known to man. The nations who are worshipping the One Father under a myriad names may be exercising far more faith than we have suspected.

This view only intensifies the clear, vital message of the gospel of Jesus to these nations. For the proclamation of the gospel does not create a relation between God and the hearers. It is the revelation or declaration of an already existing relation. The gospel is a discovery, not an invention. It is the unveiling of existing, eternal truth, and not a new, ingenious expedient.

Paul preached justification by faith alone and not by the law. Luther preached faith alone and not penance. Ménégos and Sabatier have taught us that we must hold to faith alone and not creed; that a man is justified in the sight of God by his personal trust in God, and in Jesus entirely apart from the letter of the creeds and his own intellectual beliefs. The great message, Faith Alone, which led Paul out of Jerusalem and Luther out of Rome, is beckoning us out of Geneva and the Wartburg.

Limiting the universal grace of God to a nation, a Thorah, a ritual, was the sin of Judaism, and the Gospel of Jesus broke forth, perforce, from those narrow confines. Limiting

the free grace of God to the one visible Church, to one sacerdotal system, to a certain sacrament, was the sin of Rome, and Protestantism came forth from the mediæval cloisters to breathe in a freer spiritual atmosphere. Limiting the free grace of God to the adherents of a certain form of doctrine has always been the menacing evil in Protestantism, from the days of Augsburg confession down to the last heresy trials in the Episcopal and Presbyterian churches in America. Free, pure, spiritual religion must break forth from its present bondage to the formulas of beliefs if a living trust in Him is the sole deliverance of the soul.

Protestant thought is rapidly coming to the fork in the road. On, to the right, is the untried way to spiritual freedom. No organisation has formulated this course, and no creed or symbol, thank God, has crystallised—and so arrested—this tendency. Yet this path to spiritual freedom is not so difficult a road as Christianity was to Paul, or Protestantism was to Luther.

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“DIRECTIVITY.”

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WHAT is the chief or fundamental characteristic of Life? Life is no longer regarded as a “force,” the old term “vital force” being discarded. What, then, should take its place? Mr Croll in his writings¹ strongly emphasised the fact that no force can direct itself, but that it must be guided if it deviate from its initial path, just as the rails guide a train round a curve, but use no force to check or increase its speed. That which directs is not a force itself. The batsman’s business is so to strike the cricket-ball as to send it where there is no man of the opposing field standing to stop it. The forces which send the ball reside in the muscles of his body, but the direction in which it goes has its source in his mind, which takes no part in the actual propulsion of the ball.

It has long been contended that there is no force in a living body which cannot ultimately be identified with the physical forces of the inorganic world or be converted into them—chemical, mechanical, electrical, or otherwise. No one disputes this now; but there is something else which cannot be so explained, and that is directivity; and it is my object to trace this property through the world.

The word itself is not to be found in any dictionary. I am indebted to the eminent chemist, Professor A. H. Church, F.R.S., for the use of it. He tells me that in the course of

¹ E.g. *What Determines Molecular Motion, the Fundamental Problem of Life?*

lecturing he felt a want of some term to express the following fact. He often had occasion to make some substance in the laboratory, which animals or plants can produce, by taking the particular elements and compounds, and then subjecting them to special conditions in his synthetic processes, the outcome of which was the vegetable or animal product. This raised the question—What is it in the living organism which does the same thing, and so, as it were, takes his place in *directing* the same elements and compounds until they arrive at the same results? He coined the word “directivity” to meet this want; not that it can *explain* anything, but only stands for observed phenomena which, as yet, it is quite impossible to interpret. Such directivity is no force, but a characteristic of life. Though Professor Church only applied it to the case of such substances—say indigo and madder—as chemists can produce in the laboratory, it covers a much wider field; for the entire structures of all animals and plants are built up out of materials of food, reconstituted and reconstructed so as to make all the tissues of the body, wherever and of whatever nature they may be. In every case the food may be the same for a great variety of organisms, as for a multitude of species of plants growing in the same meadow; or when sheep, oxen, horses, and even geese may be feeding in the same grass-land. In each case the molecular compounds of the grass are identical, but they find themselves ultimately disposed in very different arrangements in the different animals. This can only be possible under the influence of directivity, but “directing” differently in each creature. This directivity is, therefore, a characteristic of life. To take a familiar example. Suppose a kitten and a young hawk are brought up on precisely the same animal food, both being carnivorous, one develops into a cat, with fur, having bones and muscles, etc., of totally different characters from those of the adult hawk, with feathers, etc. The same molecules of food supplied the materials for the building up of their bodies: why are the results so totally different?

So, too, in all animals and vegetables: why should certain substances be guided to certain places—salts of lime to bones, silica to teeth and claws, phosphates to brain, etc. The molecules are first driven about mechanically in the blood by certain forces; various chemical combinations are made under the action of other forces; but what *directs* all the forces which finally impel the new-made molecules to take up certain positions and no others in the building up of a body? Directivity is a useful word to express the fact. It commits one to nothing as to its source; but it at least supplies a term to express the analogy between the chemist's mind and Nature's—what?

In connection with this matter, reference may be made to the oft-repeated contention of rationalists, that as chemists have made many organic products, once supposed to require a living organism for their production, so chemists will, they say, make protoplasm; and when they have achieved this feat, all the phenomena of life will burst forth in it. But they forget the necessity of providing directivity, which in Nature takes the place of the chemist in the laboratory; so that even if the latter succeed we are by no means nearer the origin of protoplasm from the inorganic world—which is, of course, their contention. All directivity in plants and animals is centred in protoplasm and the nucleus, more especially the latter; for they are the ultimate agents for the production of every structure in plants and animals. Since, therefore, protoplasm can now only exist by being continually renewed and increased in quantity under the directivity of existing protoplasm, we may ask of the first molecule of protoplasm that ever existed, which came first, the protoplasm or directivity, like the hen and the egg? If the hen might come out of its own egg, so might protoplasm come by means of its own directivity. One or the other *must* have come first, for no such directivity as occurs in the living world is known in the inorganic.

The problems really are something like the following:—*First*, how came the elements C, O, H, N, S, and P, not to add others,

to aggregate together, and, *secondly*, to unite in the very high proportions required for making protoplasm? *Thirdly*, whence came the directivity to obtain these results and secure their perpetuity?—for it is not one of the forces locked up in chemical compounds. *Fourthly*, since living protoplasm can be killed, yet remain chemically the same substance, while its directivity has gone with its life, what reason is there for supposing that life, together with all its phenomena, will necessarily follow on the manufacture of a lump of protoplasm, supposing it to have been made in the laboratory. Moreover, it was formerly thought that protoplasm and the nucleus were a “blob of a sort of homogeneous jelly”; but the increased powers of the microscope have revealed the fact that both have distinctly organised structures, the nucleus being not only far more complicated than a watch, but possessing innate powers altogether unknown in the inorganic world. Whence came they? The origin of the cell’s power, not only of reproducing a cell like itself, but of changing the form according to requirement, has no parallel in the inorganic world or in the manufactories of man. Directivity is behind this cell-power.

If we turn to look for anything like organic directivity in the inorganic world, we discover a certain kind or kinds, so to say, but of a very different quality. We need not discuss the origin of the directions in which heavenly bodies move; but we may at least consider when and how the force arose which first produced motion in them at all. But supposing there was a time when ether alone filled all space of a universal homogeneousness in character, what first started any motion in ether? Then, what caused ether to give rise to matter, whether by vortex rings—a hypothetical process which Lord Kelvin tells me he has long ago abandoned—or other forces of some kind which must have been at work; but why? What set force or forces going? Whence their directivity?—questions as innumerable as unanswerable. But there must have been some kind of Director to convert a potential into an actual force in ether, exerted in some special directions.

Leaving such primordial and unfathomable processes, let us look at existing states of matter. What one sees is that the same results always occur under the same conditions; such is said, metaphorically, to be due to natural law. Thus, if a crystal of quartz or calcite be examined, the angles between the facets have been constant through all ages; and if crystals of alum or other substance, as lead, be made from solutions or from a molten state, respectively, they are the same to-day as in all the past. There is here, therefore, a uniform constancy in the effects of inorganic directivity. If a crystal of alum be put into a concentrated hot solution of alum, why are the molecules formed *on* the crystal, so that it increases in size? We may say that they are *attracted* to the crystal; but this explains nothing: or we might say that they are *directed* to it; this, too, is no explanation. Either word only describes the *appearance* of the process. But it is quite certain that, by whatever *force* every one of the molecules (homogeneously distributed through the solution) passes from some one point in the solution *to* the crystal, something *directs* them in their paths along the radii of the basin, in the centre of which the crystal may be supposed to have been placed. Question after question arises. Suppose we had found out what guides the molecules to the crystal, why may the facets be of unequal sizes, but the angles between them always constant? There would thus seem to be two sorts of directivity, one producing variable, the other invariable results. We know how results may differ under different temperatures in the formation of crystals, etc.; but here again constancy is the law, as long as the temperatures are the same, respectively. Consequently, a chemist can tell beforehand what will be those results, as in allotropic phosphorus.

This *constancy of results* is the characteristic feature of the phenomena under directivity in the inorganic world. But we are still far from answering Croll's question—"What determines these molecular motions?"

But, with regard to directivity in the organic world, its

most characteristic feature may be expressed by the phrase, *Infinite variability, as proved by the results*. In point of fact, directivity is the fundamental feature of evolution. Without it, evolution of animals and plants could never have taken place at all. Not only is it patent in the existence of distinct species, varieties, etc., in all ages and places of the world, but it is obvious in the minutest molecular structure of any and every living being that exists. The moment a striking change of environment occurs, at that moment the inherent forces in protoplasm and the nucleus may instantly begin to obey directivity, and to build up cells and tissues quite different from those made up to that moment. Thus, if a water-plant be growing up submerged, but reaches the surface of the water and then grows into the air, the whole anatomy at once alters *at the water-level*. If a leaf happen to stand obliquely at the surface, so that one half grows under water, the other half developing above it, the former is constructed to be in harmony with a submerged existence, the other half being adapted to live in air. Again, if the hook-like extremities of the tendril of the Virginia creeper touch a wall, the points at once begin to swell into adhesive pads. What is it which *guides* the constructive forces to build up the tissues in response to the above external conditions? The provisional answer is, Directivity in life.

Directivity itself is thus seen to represent a natural law; but the phrase must be in a certain sense qualified. A natural law, as stated above, only means a constancy of results under identically the same conditions; but as soon as the external conditions of a plant or animal be changed, directivity brings about *adaptations by responses* to them; so that the natural law may be thus seen to be described as *adaptive variations under new conditions of life*, but without stating what the resulting variations may be. Still, provided the same conditions be maintained, *then* the same variations will persist or arise; and this is a second natural law. Thus certain characteristics are common to all water-plants, others to plants

in very dry situations, others, again, to alpine and arctic plants; showing that similar environments, in widely separated countries, are responded to by plants in the same ways respectively—the forces called into play acting alike under directivity in all cases, though many different species may be subjected to the same conditions.

Similarly is it in the animal kingdom. Animals that live in water have paddle-like limbs adapted for swimming. Such occur in fishes, reptiles, birds, mammals, as well as in invertebrata, as insects. Directivity has, we may assume, brought them about by response with adaptation under the conditions of life.

Hence arise what have been called mimetic structures in plants and animals. The simple interpretation is that under the same or similar conditions of life like structures are produced, whatever be the creatures subjected to them.

The above will, I think, be enough to enable the reader to realise the importance of directivity, or, as I would call it, the fundamental characteristic of life.

If now we turn to the writings of modern rationalists, or take Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe* as a type, we find the assertion made that there is nothing in the universe besides matter and force, which that author calls, in combination, the “One Substance” of his materialistic monism. But he, as well as his followers, never attempts to tell us *how* physical forces can work out complicated structures without any guidance of any sort. They can do no more than *assert* that it is all done by blind forces; as if forces possessed a sort of consciousness of what they are about, and a will to determine their own motions and directions. As man himself was evolved from lower animals, and all from primordial protoplasm conjointly with vegetation, and the totality of living beings, according to Haeckel, from the inorganic world, and all without any internal or external omnipotent intelligence; of course, then, if this were true, there can be no alternative to the disproved assertion that directivity resides in matter or force, or both.

It is, however, a subject for induction, to decide which is the more probable. Are all organic structures constructed to fulfil "ends," the result of automatic, unconscious, blind directivity? Or, are they the outcome of some Universal Intelligence, in some sort of way akin to that in ourselves, which every human being is profoundly conscious of possessing?

Proof by experiment is, one would have thought, obviously out of the question, yet one rationalist goes so far as to say that "the so-called knowledge [of God] must be submitted to the tests of observation and experiment; if it is knowledge at all, it is capable of verification, and the verdict of science on the subject must be final."¹ The same author quite ignores "inductive" evidence, and of course its value, appreciated by true scientists, as by all astronomers and palæontologists. How, then, is the question to be decided? It seems to depend on the capacity of individual brains as to their power of appreciation of induction. Those who can do so, have never hesitated to accept the conclusion of analogy, whether the induction be called "the Argument of Design," or its modern form, now evolution is accepted, the "Argument of Response with Adaptation."² In universal directivity there is recognised as immanent an Omnipotent Director at least; to which, again, judging by analogy with our own human consciousness of directivity, the result of our will, the induction now superadds consciousness and will. Because it is inconceivable how these properties of man's psychology can have arisen at all if there had not been some origination in qualities of a like mind or nature.

We thus realise the conception of God in Nature, or the "Power" of Mr Herbert Spencer, by direct inductive reasoning. If Haeckel cannot accept this induction, all we can say is that, from our point of view, his mind must have a "want." On the other hand, he will retort, "Your inductions are all superstitions!"

¹ *Mr Balfour's Apologetics, critically examined*, p. 102.

² *Williams & Norgate*, 1s.

In concluding this paper, I think it may be desirable once more to emphasise the profound difference between “directivity” and “uniformity of sequence.” The latter is identical with “natural law” as usually understood, or, in other words, the constant repetition of the same results from the same causes under the same conditions of action. Such applies strictly to the inorganic world. In the organic world, “directivity,” of a special kind, represents a procedure in *addition to the ordinary natural laws of life and propagation*. Thus, a tree puts on its leaves in spring as soon as the temperature rises to a degree peculiar to its wants. Such is a uniformity of sequence, and always recurs. But directivity is seen in *the responses with adaptations to the direct action of changed conditions of life*. Such occurs when a species of animal or plant is subjected to an environment different from that to which it has been subjected for generations. Thus normally terrestrial or aquatic plants may grow up to be the reverse, respectively, if the medium be reversed; the whole anatomical structure becoming altered, but so as to be in perfect adjustment to the new conditions. Similarly with animals, the wool of a sheep of temperate regions becomes silky in hot ones. Mr B. B. Woodward has shown—since this paper was written—that the peculiar details of the gills of molluscs have been evolved in adaptation to their conditions of life.¹ Lastly, the phagocytic character of the white blood-corpuscles, and their “duty” of absorbing and destroying pathogenetic microbes, with the aid of the necessary opsonins in the serum; or again, the marvellous reparative powers of protoplasm in healing wounds—these and other such properties may be all classified as illustrations of “directivity.”

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¹ *What Evolutionary Processes do the Mollusca show?*

WHAT AND WHERE IS THE SOUL?

HUGH MACCOLL.

ASSUMING as proved the old doctrine of teleology, or divine origin of the laws of the universe,¹ I propose here, within the limits of my faculties and data, to examine the nature, the position, and the durability of the soul. But as the word *soul* carries different meanings to different minds, I must start with a definition. It is one which many will, I fear, consider both arbitrary and paradoxical; but I do not think it will be found wanting either in clearness or precision. The *soul*, then, I define as simply that which *feels*. To prevent all ambiguity, it is necessary also to state that, whenever the context does not clearly show the contrary, I regard the words *feeling*, *sensation*, and *consciousness* as virtual synonyms. By express definition, therefore, the *soul* alone *feels*, has *sensation*, and is *conscious*; and anything that never feels, that is always insensible or unconscious, is not entitled to the name of *soul*. Like the plant or animal body, it may be spoken of as *alive* or *dead*, but not as *soul*. I do not assert that the soul is *never* unconscious; my definition does not necessarily imply that; I only assert that it is not *always* unconscious. Precision of language also requires that the soul should not be spoken of as if it were a mere abstraction. Though it *feels*, it is not merely a *feeling*; though it is *conscious*, it is not merely a *consciousness*.

¹ See the author's paper, "Chance or Purpose?" in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1907.

Consciousness, our own individual personal consciousness, is the one fundamental datum, the only reality, of which we are absolutely sure. All other entities may be divided into two classes: first, those whose reality we infer inductively, and therefore not always with certainty, by a comparison of our various sensations (or modes of consciousness); and next, those which are pure unrealities, and have therefore only symbolic existence. Matter, in its three conditions of solid, liquid, and gas, belongs to the former; round squares, flat spheres, and the "unconscious sensations" of Professor Haeckel belong to the latter. I place Haeckel's unconscious sensations in the latter class, because the moment sensation (in the ordinary acceptance of the word) becomes unconscious, that moment it ceases to be sensation. In the same category of self-contradictory unrealities must be placed the professor's "unconscious will" and "unconscious memory," with several other juggling catchwords which, so far as I can remember, he nowhere attempts to define. As a specimen of his reckless distortion of language take the following:—

"As everybody knows, the new-born infant has no consciousness. Preyer has shown that it is only developed *after the child has begun to speak*; for a long time it speaks of itself in the third person" (Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe*, p. 66).

The italics are mine. Preyer, it appears, has shown, what no sane mother will admit, that until the child has ceased to say "Baby eat," and has learned to say "I eat," or "Me eat," it has no consciousness! Yet, on the very preceding page, we read that—

"The consciousness of the highest apes, dogs, elephants, etc., differs from that of man in degree only, not in kind."

Thus, consciousness is denied to the human child until it has ceased to speak of itself in the third person, and has learnt the use of the pronouns *I* and *Me*; yet the same faculty is accorded freely to the ape, the dog, and the elephant; none of which (or of whom) has as yet (I believe) reached this stage of linguistic development! And mark the graceful ease

with which the learned professor, by means of the same word-jugglery, turns an awkward corner in the following passage:—

“In any case the ontogenesis of consciousness makes it perfectly clear that it is not an ‘immaterial entity,’ but a physiological function of the brain, and that it is, consequently, no exception to the general law of substance.”

Is it really so “perfectly clear”? To any simple, unsophisticated understanding, what is perfectly clear is surely the exact opposite. Is Professor Haeckel prepared to assert that consciousness is a solid, a liquid, or a gas? Can he even affirm that it is the ether—his vibrating, jelly-like ether? Hardly. He distinctly says that the ether is the *cause* of consciousness, and even a child can see that a *cause* cannot be its own *effect*. If consciousness, then, is neither ponderable matter, nor (as Haeckel considers the ether) imponderable matter, clearly, by the simple logic of common sense, it cannot be matter at all. In other words, it must be an “immaterial entity.” The assertion that consciousness is a “physiological function of the brain, and . . . consequently no exception to the general law of substance,” is a mere rhetorical flourish, which dissolves into nonsense when subjected to logical analysis. Here we are told that consciousness is a function of the brain, while elsewhere the brain is called “the *instrument* of consciousness and all the higher functions of the mind.” The emphasis on *instrument* in this quotation is mine. It is difficult to get at the professor’s meaning. Does he mean that the brain is an instrument employed by some agent in producing consciousness, or that the brain is an instrument employed by the agent consciousness in producing something else? In either case, who, what, and where is the agent that employs the brain as an instrument? And for what purpose? Agents who employ instruments have usually some object in view.

Again, in what sense does Haeckel use the word *function* in the last quotation? He probably means—though the meaning is far from evident—that just as we say that the eye sees and the ear hears, so we may say that the brain feels

and thinks. But physiologists say, and say truly, that this is merely elliptical language—convenient, but not strictly accurate. The eye and the ear, they say, are mere organs or instruments of transmission, which of themselves neither see nor hear. So far we are all agreed. But some scientists go further. The brain, they say, is the ultimate recipient of the impressions caused by the vibrations of the air and ether; hence it is the brain, and the brain alone, that hears and sees.

Ah! here let us pause—let us pause long and think slowly; for upon this point real science has not yet said her last word—nor her first. Scientists, especially those of Haeckel's type, are sometimes in too great a hurry, and, when investigating the ways of nature, a little too fond of such words as *final* and *ultimate*. On what grounds do they base their conclusion that the brain is the real terminus of the sensory medium of transmission, and therefore the sole seat of thought and sensation? I briefly touched upon this point in my former paper, but the exceeding importance of the question at issue justifies its reopening. We all know that a chloroformed patient whose leg has just been amputated commonly asks, on awaking, when the operation is going to begin. He has the illusive sensation that his leg still forms part of his body, that he feels pain in it, and that he can move its toes just as usual. We also know that if the trunk of a nerve be irritated anywhere along its course, the pain is referred by immediate consciousness, not to the point of irritation, but to the extremity where the nerve reaches the bodily surface. From these data, physiologists conclude that the eye, the ear, the nerves, etc., are mere channels or instruments of transmission, and are themselves as insensible as the wire which conveys the entity which we call electricity. But why do they exclude the brain from the category of insensible channels or instruments which we usually find in some mysterious connection with our sensations? I accept the facts, the actually observed experiences, related by physiologists and

biologists, even those related by experimentalists who, like Haeckel, are plainly, though not knowingly or wilfully, prejudiced; but some of the inferences which they draw from their observations seem to me wholly unwarranted. Let us first examine the *language* in which these conclusions are commonly expressed. Many years' study of symbolic logic has taught me the importance of analysing the signification, not so much of separate words or other symbols, as of the more or less complex statements which they express. The mere word, and sometimes the complete grammatical proposition, when considered apart from context, may be meaningless or misleading. When we say that the brain, and not the nerves, is the real seat or abode of all consciousness, what do we really mean? Usually only this: that something (we know not what—call it *force* or *energy*—the name is a mere arbitrary symbol) travels from the extremity of a nerve to its terminus in the brain, and there either becomes or produces what we call *consciousness*. But why there rather than elsewhere? The physiologist follows the trail of the mystery from the extremity of the nerve (where our deluded senses assured us it both originated and remained), and all along its course, till he finally reaches the brain, and there *he loses the scent*. Does it necessarily or even probably follow that the brain, the ever changing brain, is the real abode of consciousness—of the soul or ego that feels? Does not the ether, with its infinite possibilities (as shown in wireless telegraphy), lie beyond? When the hound follows the trail of the fox till it loses the scent on reaching a running stream, does either hound or huntsman jump to the conclusion that the stream is its real abode? Does not the possibility remain that it may have somewhere crossed the stream, and that its trail should be sought for and followed up afresh on the other side? Do not the phenomena of wireless telegraphy make it plain that certain mechanisms, wonderfully suggestive of the nervous system, can be operated upon by conscious Beings from afar, and by these made to transmit thoughts and

sensations which the mechanisms themselves neither feel nor understand?

The following experiment is suggestive. In the two compartments of a stereoscope place the photographs of two persons, clearly distinguishable, but resembling each other as regards sex, size, dress, and the direction in which they appear to be looking. If we look first with one eye and then with the other, we shall alternately see two clearly distinct persons, as in the separate photographs. But if we look with both eyes simultaneously, we only see one person—a third person, distinct from each. Now, two distinct pictures of two different persons are undoubtedly sent through the two eyes into the two separate hemispheres of the brain. In what hemisphere of the brain is the third picture which results from the combination of the two others? Can we with certainty affirm that it is in the brain at all? In what hemisphere is the conscious soul or ego (or sentient entity—call it what we will) that sees, or thinks it sees, the combination? Is it in the brain at all? Is it matter or non-matter? What physiologist, or biologist, or psychologist can give a satisfactory answer to each and all of these questions? Conflicting hypotheses can be suggested in unlimited numbers, all more or less plausible, and all, with our present data, incapable either of proof or disproof. How quick some scientists are to ascribe limits to the limitless resources of nature! And how forgetful they are of the exceedingly narrow limits—the literally infinitesimal range—of the human faculties! Can any of these hot-headed theorists, in his calm moments of sanity, imagine for a single moment that the infinite modes of operation of the infinite number of unknown agents in the infinite universe, of which he forms but an infinitesimal part, can ever be reduced by him or by anyone else to one simple little formula? Formulæ are often of the greatest utility; indeed, in many fields of research we could hardly advance a step without them; but we should not forget that they are all founded on mere linguistic or symbolic conventions, more

or less arbitrary and of our own fabrication. Serviceable and reliable in their own domain, they become treacherous guides when trusted beyond the proper boundaries of their application. The besetting danger of modern science is *symbolatry*—a blind belief in the efficacy of mere formulas. The moment a supposed scientific “law” has been expressed in a formula, it is too hastily assumed to have acquired validity from that fact alone. Hence, when we find a controversialist appealing now to the “law” x , then to the “law” y , then to the “law” z , and so on, we should be on our guard and carefully scrutinise his language. In nine cases out of ten, a close, searching analysis will detect some lurking fallacy in his argument. Either the “law” appealed to dissolves into mist, or it turns out to be wholly irrelevant to the question at issue. This is especially the case with Haeckel’s “law of substance,” to which he continually appeals as a universal solvent of all difficulties, just as if the mere combination of these three words sufficed to explain everything. In simple truth, his so-called “law of substance” explains nothing whatever—least of all consciousness, which he truly calls “the central mystery of psychology.” He makes the remarkable admission that “the only source of our knowledge of consciousness is that faculty itself”—an admission which (though he fails to see it) stultifies his whole reasoning. For if consciousness is the fundamental datum on which all inference must be based, must not his “law of substance,” whatever it may mean, be also an inference from the datum consciousness? Thus, the professor first deduces the “law of substance” as a conclusion from the phenomena of consciousness as data; then he deduces the phenomena of consciousness, his first data, as a conclusion from his first conclusion, the “law of substance.” Could there be a more glaring *petitio principii*, apart from all question as to the meaning or validity of this “law of substance”? There is no getting out of this circle. By no process of reasoning can we explain the mystery of consciousness, because we must necessarily assume that

mystery as the very basis of our argument. In the present stage of our development, and with our exceedingly limited faculties, all our attempts to get at the back of consciousness must be as futile as the attempts of a kitten to seek at the back of the mirror the embodiment of the feline image which the hard glass seems to place beyond the reach of its paws in front.

Is the soul, the ego, the sentient entity, the thing that feels, and (in its higher developments) thinks and reasons, matter or non-matter? The question does not admit of an intelligible answer till we agree as to the meaning of the word or symbol *matter*. Many years ago that acutest of philosophers, Berkeley, effaced the supposed fixed boundary between the material and the immaterial, and now it has become a mere question of definition. Each philosophic writer may arbitrarily fix the line of demarcation where he pleases. But, so far, the question of its exact position, the question whether the soul, the entity that feels, is matter or non-matter, in no way affects my argument. Its validity remains whether the soul be considered material or immaterial.

Physiologists assert, and probably with truth, that every thought, every sensation, is accompanied by some change in the substance of the brain; and this is supposed in some way to support the atheist's contention that the brain and the soul (or ego) are identical, or, at any rate, inseparable, so that the ultimate dissolution of the former necessarily leads to the extinction of the latter also. But surely the conclusion that legitimately follows from the premises is the exact opposite. Not only changes take place in the material substance of the brain, but, as I said in my former paper, this substance is passing away continually, so that the same conscious-thinking ego may be said to work with absolutely different brains at different periods of its existence. If the brain itself is the real ego, the real conscious thinker, how is it that the brain of to-day knows so much of the ideas evolved by the wholly different brain of ten, twenty, or even sixty years ago? The

old man of seventy has usually many clear memories of his sayings and doings, of his thoughts and feelings, when a little lad of ten. He has only to make an effort of the will, and the past of long long ago stands up ghost-like before him. In what compartment of his present brain had those images lain sleeping? In which hemisphere? In both, or in neither? And how came the images imprinted on the childish brain of ten to be passed on, in innumerable transmissions, through many successive brains, till they reached their last edition on the aged brain of seventy—or rather on the new brain of the aged *man* of seventy? Finally, and most important question of all, where is that inexplicable entity which consciously and deliberately *wills* to re-see, re-hear, and re-feel its memories of long ago? Is it not the same entity—so far as any entity in the universe can be regarded as constant—that, with a different brain, first saw, heard, and felt the actualities of which the memories have been transmitted to the brain with which it sees, hears, and feels other actualities to-day? While the material brain changes, *it*—the seeing, hearing, feeling, thinking *soul*—remains. When did it first come into existence? With the first awaking of the infant's feeling or consciousness, before or after birth? I doubt it. When will it pass out of existence? With the death of the man or woman into whom that infant has developed? I doubt it still more.

On the one hand, by careful comparison of the conflicting separate testimonies of our separate senses, we obtain irrefragable evidence that not a particle of the material body of the infant, of the child, or of the grown-up man or woman, *if we except the brain*, ever feels; and, on the other hand, *we have not the slightest data on which to ground the inference that the brain is an exception*. All analogy, on the contrary, seems to point the other way—to the conclusion that the brain, like the eye, the ear, and all other parts of the body, is a mere insensible link in a chain of sensory transmission. Yet, since feeling or consciousness is admittedly an ultimate fact of nature incapable of analysis, something—an intangible some-

thing, which here I call *soul*—does unquestionably feel. Where is that something? In the body or out of it? Nobody knows. We are completely in the dark. Science has absolutely no data at present from which to draw an inference, and, until some relevant data are forthcoming, true science must remain silent. The priests of pseudo-science, like those of the pseudo-religions of old, answer boldly and confidently enough, and, like their predecessors, deceive the people by false dogmas, which, sooner or later, the light of true science will banish into the land of detected myths and unrealities. Meanwhile, philosophy may legitimately send forth her truth-searching feelers in all directions, and, in the territories as yet unclaimed by science, weave as many hypotheses as she pleases. All of these may ultimately prove false; but one may, by some lucky chance, hit the mark, and strike out an illuminating spark which, to the ever-watchful eye of science, may point out the true path of research. Among many suppositions at present unprovable, but also unrefutable, let me suggest the following:—

The material body, including the brain and the whole nervous system, is a mere medium or instrument of sensory transmission, and is itself as insensible as the material apparatus in wireless telegraphy. The soul or ego, which, by definition, is the entity that feels, and, in its higher developments, thinks and reasons, bears some relation to the body analogous to, though different from, that which the invisible human manipulator bears to the unconscious electrical apparatus through which he sends, and through which he receives, communications. The *position* of the soul or ego, whether in the body, or near the body, or millions of miles away from the body, may be left an open question. With the educative memories of its successive past existences and past experiences, gone for the time, or perhaps for ever, as exact memories, but remaining as serviceable instincts, the ego receives a new instrument of education in the shape of a living, growing, but insensible and unconscious infant body, a body which inherits in the germ some of the qualities and

some of the defects of its many ancestors, human and pre-human. This body its guardian the ego loses sooner or later, in childhood through illness or accident, or in old age through decay. Then it receives another instrument of education, whether human or superhuman may depend upon the ego's fitness and development. This, in due course, or through accident, it loses in its turn, after which it receives another, and so on for ever—always rising in the long-run (though not always steadily and continuously) from higher to higher, and from better to better.

If we thus regard the body as an unconscious automaton, with its machinery and operations partially, but by no means wholly, under the control of the conscious soul or ego, we obtain simpler explanations than those commonly given of several puzzling mental phenomena—the phenomenon of ordinary vision among others. The explanation of this phenomenon given by the generality of physiologists is not convincing. They say that though two impressions or pictures of the same single external object pass through the two eyes into the two hemispheres of the brain, the mind, from habit and experience, “unconsciously judges” that they represent but one object. To begin with, an “unconscious judgment” (like Haeckel's “unconscious feeling,” “unconscious will,” “unconscious memory,” etc.) is a self-contradiction.¹ We might as well speak of the “unconscious memory” of a phonograph, or the “unconscious judgment” of an inanimate calculating machine. When judgment becomes unconscious it ceases to be judgment. And, apart from this objection to a misleading expression, the explanation breaks down in the case of the stereoscope, already touched upon. Here there are in reality two external objects, and the mind, by a comparison of conflicting sensations, judges, not “unconsciously,” but consciously and correctly, not that the two images which

¹ Even the usually lucid and logical physiologist, Huxley, has recourse to the self-contradictory assumption of “unconscious reasoning” in his not altogether successful attempt to explain the paradox of the stereoscope.

enter the two cerebral hemispheres proceed from one external object, as in ordinary vision, but that—in spite of the fact that it is conscious of seeing but one picture—they in reality proceed from two. It is surely inconsistent to affirm that the mind unconsciously and wrongly infers one thing, yet consciously and correctly, and at the same time, infers the exact opposite. The inconsistency is especially glaring when the two photographs represent different persons, and the combined image seen is that of a third but non-existent person. The many memories of past judgments and experiences may indeed affect by degrees the material constitution of the insensible medium of transmission, the brain, and ultimately render it suitable for merging the two images into one; but when this change has taken place, then the conscious soul or ego sees but one image. It is not at all a case of judging, whether correctly or incorrectly. The ego is conscious of but one sensation, the one image before it; but it also, at the same time, remembers that there are two photographs of two different persons in the stereoscope, and it correctly judges that these conjointly are the cause of the one illusive image or optic sensation which seems to represent a third and non-existent person who combines the features of the two that really exist. Where does the combination take place? And where is the ego that sees it? To neither question can science as yet give a convincing answer. But accepting the in no way inconsistent hypothesis of a feeling soul or ego outside, and, it may be, far distant from its non-sentient body, we may imagine many plausible answers. For example, the two real images on the two hemispheres of the brain may, through the vibrations of the ether, or of one of the millions of other natural media really existent, though unknown to us, send forth innumerable pairs of undulations in all directions, which, from the adapted conditions gradually effected in the constitution of the brain, meet at innumerable foci, where they form as many fresh combined images, one of which must perforce reach the sentient ego,

wherever in the universe that ego happens at that moment to be. Of course, this hypothesis cannot, with our present data, be proved, but the analogies in its favour are many.

The assumption of an unconscious automatic brain and body, partially controlled by, and in its turn reacting upon, a conscious mind, soul, or ego, would harmonise well with some of the phenomena described under such names as subconsciousness, unconscious cerebration, somnambulism, hypnotism, telepathy, dual personality, etc.; but any discussion of these would unduly lengthen this paper. One suggestive simile, however, may be given as an index to the general line of explanation. Before a man succeeds in moving a heavy waggon on a line of rails, he is conscious of strain and effort; but once the waggon is well in motion, it will proceed some distance without his aid. He may turn his back upon it and leave it, yet the unconscious waggon will still go on, and will not stop until the force first consciously imparted to it has been spent. The same principle applies to a wound-up watch, to many automatically working machines, *and to the unconscious human brain*. The mind or ego (but neither the brain nor the fingers) of a piano-player is conscious while he is learning to play a difficult sonata by heart. But once the piece is thoroughly learnt, the conscious mind need only give the first impulse. The unconscious brain and fingers—the whole complicated mechanism of the unconscious nervous system—once set in motion, will automatically play the whole sonata while the conscious mind, the real ego, is thinking of something else. Where is this conscious ego? When science can satisfactorily answer this question, man will have made a stride in advance which will place him as far above his present position as that position is above that of the inarticulate brutes around him. Meanwhile, science looks wistfully forward, patiently bides her time, and is silent.

HUGH MACCOLL.

WAS JOHN CALVIN A REFORMER OR A REACTIONARY?

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THE ethical system of John Calvin is often lost sight of because of the prevailingly dogmatic character of the interest in him. The character, moreover, of the ethical system has never been properly recognised in its fundamentally reactionary method. The little work of Lobstein¹ wholly fails to rightly estimate the ethics in its historical significance, and the outline treatment by Schweitzer² in the *Studien und Kritiken* for the year 1850 is exceedingly inadequate. Nor would it be fruitful to point out, as one easily might, the many misunderstandings and radically unprotestant point of view which mark Kuyper's exposition.³ In the standard histories of ethics, such as those of Stäudlin or De Wette, Gass or Ziegler, there is altogether too much effort to understand Calvin's ethics as purely Protestant. As a simple matter of fact, the ethical system of Calvin is profoundly reactionary, scholastic, and Roman Catholic in both method and aim. Hence it is quite comprehensible how barren Calvinistic theology has been on its ethical side. As a religious force of the first magnitude Calvinism has aided in high degree men's practical ethical life,

¹ P. Lobstein, *Die Ethik Calvins in ihren Grundzügen entworfen*. Strassburg, 1877.

² A. Schweitzer, "Die Entwicklung des moral Systems in der reformirten Kirche."

³ Abraham Kuyper, *Calvinism: Six Lectures on the Stone Foundation*, 1898. Princeton, N.J.

and inspired to wonderful devotion and self-sacrifice. But on the intellectual and philosophical reconstruction of ethics it has left no such mark as that made by one single work of Luther's, *Die Freiheit des Christenmenschen*.

The ethics of Calvin is contained in his sermons, commentaries, and numerous tracts. He has, however, himself summed it up in the *Institutio Christianæ Religionis*, book iii. 6. 10, and book iv. 20, in which last he deals with his doctrine of the State. Nor does one find any very material enrichment in his other writings, although the central points are again and again brought out, and with beautiful clearness.

It is not difficult to outline the ethical system of Calvin. By its very nature it is subordinated to theology. The whole scheme is dominated by the contrast between God and man. "The object of regeneration (*scopus regenerationis*) is to bring the life of believers into harmony with the Justice of God" (*Ins.* iii. 6. 1), and to restore in us the image of God. Thus the Scriptures become the means by which this is accomplished, by "instilling and implanting in our minds" the *amor justitiæ*, to which love of justice we are not by nature prone; and by giving us a norm (*norma præscripta*) that prevents us going astray if we study it (*Ins.* iii. 6. 2).

Thus Calvin substitutes for the Roman Catholic imperialism another authority. It is outward and final, and the fine and fruitful labours of Calvin on the Bible are prompted by this insistence. This authority is the Biblical Church. There is in him no such disorganised thinking on the Church as may be found in Luther. In the *Institutio* we find a clearly defined theory.¹ In the Church God has secured the effectual preaching of the Gospel, by depositing this treasure with the Church (*thesaurum hunc apud ecclesiam deposuit*). He has appointed pastors and teachers and has invested them with authority, and has instituted sacraments; into her bosom God is pleased to gather His children. God is Father, the Church is mother

¹ Book iv. chapters 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 11-14 treat of the Church, and iv. 20 treats of the State.

(*ut, quibus ipse est pater, ecclesia etiam mater sit . . .*, iv. 1. 1). He regards the Apostles' Creed as binding us to "believe the Church," for the preposition "in" is interpolated without probable ground. This Church is on the basis of God's secret election, so far as it includes all the elect; but the visible Church is the "communion of saints." So long as we continue in the bosom of the Church we are sure the truth will abide with us (iv. 1. 3). It is this *ecclesia visibilis* that is our mother, "since there is no other means of entering into life unless she conceive us in her womb, and give birth to us, unless she nourish us at her breast, and unless we remain under her care and pilotship until stripped of our flesh we become as angels." Beyond her pale there is no remission of sin (*adde quod extra eius gremium nulla est speranda peccatorum remissio, nec alia salus*). Hence the abandonment of the Church is always fatal (iv. 1. 4).

Luther soon despaired of any council really doing the cause of Reformation justice. Calvin was always interested in an ecclesiastical imperialism, to whose reformation he gave much time and strength. In his address to the Imperial Diet at Spires in 1544, he says: "For where can I exert myself to better purpose or more honestly, where, too, in a matter more necessary at this time, than according to my ability to aid the Church of Christ, *whose claim it is unlawful in any case to deny?*" Indeed, for Calvin the whole substance of Christianity, he says in the same address, is comprehended in, "first, a knowledge of the mode in which God is duly worshipped; and secondly, of the source from which salvation is to be obtained." Then come the sacraments and the ministry, which are for the preservation of these things.

Thus Calvin's Church is no democracy of believers, no family circle gathered in the inequalities of varied maturity about the Father, but a divine organisation for the purposes of ruling men's thoughts and conduct.

God has appointed teachers, and all who reject the spiritual food of the soul divinely offered to them by the hands of the

Church deserve to perish of hunger and famine. These ministers we are to listen to as to God Himself (*non secus atque ipsum loquentes audimus*, iv. 1. 5). The “notes” of the visible Church are clearly given. It is the whole body of mankind scattered over the world, who (1) profess to worship one God and Christ, (2) who by baptism are initiated into the faith, (3) who by partaking of the common table profess unity in doctrine and love, (4) who have agreement in the word of the Lord, and (5) lastly, who conserve the ministry for the preaching of this word. In this Church there are hypocrites whom our ignorance of the heart must tolerate; but as we must believe the invisible Church, so we must seek the communion of this visible one (iv. 1. 7). In lieu of full certainty as to the election we must accept as true members of the Church all who (1) confess the faith, (2) are regular in conduct, (3) who participate in the sacraments, and (4) unite in acknowledging with us the same God and Christ (iv. 1. 8). Hence the form of the Church is wherever we see the word of God sincerely preached and the sacraments duly administered (iv. 1. 9). Where this is the case, no one should separate himself from the Church or question her authority. To impair her authority is to impugn the authority of God Himself. No crime is more atrocious or sacrilegious than to break this bond (iv. 1. 10). We must even put up with minute errors of doctrine, for “we must either have no church at all, or we must condone hallucinations in such things as one may be ignorant of without injury to the substance of faith” (iv. 1. 12). In conduct our tolerance must be even larger, for doctrine is even more important (iv. 1. 13). In this Church we have constant forgiveness of sin, and to impart this blessing Christ gave the keys of the Church (iv. 1. 22); these are committed to the presbyters and bishops, who dispense forgiveness to us in the preaching and the sacraments (iv. 1. 22). This ministry has power as it is vested in the Church in spiritual matters, and consists in doctrine, in jurisdiction and making laws. The place of doctrine has two parts—“the handing down of

authoritative dogma (*authoritatem dogmatum tradendorum et eorum applicationem*), and their expounding" (iv. 8. 8). This power is given not to priests, prophets, apostles, or successors of the apostles, as to men, but to them as a ministry (iv. 8. 2). And this ministry is of the Word written and handed down to us. All inventions of the human mind are banished, and only the pure Word of God is to be proclaimed. The Church is not perfect, but in things pertaining to salvation she cannot err: "she has discarded completely her wisdom, and submits to the teaching of the Holy Spirit in the Word of God" (iv. 8. 13). The promise to guide a council is indeed given, but only a council in which Christ is present, and the evidence of His presence is the adherence to the written Word (iv. 9. 13).

In the relation of the authoritative Church to the authoritative State, Calvin adopts substantially the traditional Roman Catholic point of view, save only that it must be a true Biblical Church to be authoritative (iv. 11. 1-5). There is the power of the two swords, the one spiritual and the other temporal, both given by the authority of the Word of God. To the State is given the duty "to foster and maintain the outward worship of God, to defend sound doctrine and the condition of the Church, to shape our conduct for the society of men, to conform us to civil justice, to keep peace between us, and to maintain the common peace and tranquillity" (iv. 20. 2). Its object is not simply to permit men to breathe, eat, and be warmed; it must see that there is no blasphemy against the name of God, no idolatry, no calumnies against God's truth, or other offences to religion propagated amongst the people—in short, that a public form of religion exists among Christians, and humanity among men (iv. 20. 3). Magistrates "have a commission from God, and are invested with a divine authority, and in fact represent the person of God, as whose substitutes they in a manner act" (*ac omnino Dei personam sustinere cujus vices quodammodo agunt*, iv. 20. 4). When Calvin considers the forms of government treated by philosophers, he names (in the French) three forms:

“On conte trois espèces de régime civil; c’est assavoir Monarchie, qui est la domination d’un seul, soit qu’on le nomme Roy ou Duc, ou autrement; Aristocratie, qui est une domination gouvernée par les principaux et gens d’apparence; et Démocratie, qui est une domination populaire, en laquelle chacun du peuple a puissance.” These all have dangers, and Calvin inclines to aristocracy. “I, for my part, do not deny that the form surpassing all others is aristocracy, either pure or tempered by popular government” (iv. 20. 8). But the Lord has assigned the forms of government, and the wish to change the form is not only superfluous but pernicious. In whatever form He has appointed, our duty is to submit and obey.¹ The Church may not put to death, but the magistrate acts as God and puts to death. “It is not the part of the pious to afflict or hurt, but to avenge the injuries done to the pious is not to afflict or hurt. All is done in obedience to God” (iv. 20. 10). We ought indeed to obey God rather than men, but in obeying our rulers we are obeying God and not man (iv. 20. 32).

On such a basis no Protestant ethics can be built up. Calvinism has in point of fact been singularly barren in ethical work. Even her casuistry has been poor and feeble.

Holiness plays a large part in Calvin’s thought, just as it does in that of Thomas Aquinas and Ignatius Loyola, whose ethical systems are most nearly akin to that of Calvin. Holiness becomes a bond between us and God, “because it is greatly pertinent to His glory” that He should not be associated with iniquity and foulness (*Ins.* iii. 6. 2). To arouse us to this new purity the Scriptures exhibit God the Father, who has reconciled us to Himself in Christ, that in Him we may have the image to which He would have us conformed. “Since Christ has purified us with His blood, and communicated this purification through baptism, it is not fitting that

¹ Nam si illi visum est, reges regnis præficere, liberis civitatibus senatores aut decuriones, quoscumque locis præfecerit in quibus degimus nostrum est iis nos morigeros ac obedientes præstare (iv. 20. 8).

we should soil ourselves with new wrong-doing." We are engrafted into His body and should not stain it; we are temples of God and should not defile them; we are destined to immortality and should not live the corruptible life (iii. 6. 3). Doctrine is not of the tongue but of the life (*non enim linguæ est doctrina, sed vitæ*, iii. 6. 4). It must possess the whole soul and the innermost heart. To doctrine, in which our religion is contained, the first place must be given; but it must pass into conduct (*atque in mores transeat oportet*), and so transform us (iii. 6. 4).

Calvin does not insist upon perfection in this life, but on the life being directed toward perfection, and upon progress being daily made (iii. 6. 5). The law of God contains the most perfect method of life, but the celestial Magistrate has been pleased to adopt a more accurate way of training us to this rule, which is by making us present our bodies a living sacrifice; hence we should not think, speak, design, or act without a view of His glory. Philosophy gave the first place to reason, but Christian philosophy bids her (reason) give place and yield complete submission to the Holy Spirit (iii. 7. 1). We seek only God's will and act for His glory. Hence Scripture enjoins us to lay aside all excessive longing for wealth, or power, or human favour. We are to follow good for its own sake and not for the love of praise. Even the philosophers who most taught this were swallowed up by arrogance (iii. 7. 2). We deny ourselves and renounce reason.

Thus the two obstacles to virtue are taken away in us—ungodliness (*impietas*) and worldly lust (*mundanæ cupiditates*), and our lives are reduced to sobriety, denoting chastity and temperance as the pure and frugal use of temporal goods and the patient endurance of want; righteousness (*justitia*), comprehending all the duties of equity in rendering to everyone his due; and godliness (*pietas*), which connects us with God in true holiness. To aspire to these things Paul sets before us immortality, "because as once Christ appeared as

our Redeemer, so on His final advent He will give full effect to the salvation He has obtained for us" (iii. 7. 3).

Our abnegation has a twofold aspect—first to fellow-men, and secondly and chiefly toward God. Only divine grace can pluck out the pest (τῆς φιλονεικίας καὶ φιλαντηῆς) (iii. 7. 4). We are only the stewards of any endowments God has given us, and we are to see, even in the most unworthy, the image of God, and show it honour and love, especially to those in whom that image has been restored in Christ. Is anyone mean or unworthy, or has anyone done us injury, we are to love in him the image of God (iii. 7. 6). No arrogance should mark our service, for we are only paying a debt due from us (iii. 7. 7). Toward God we must assume an attitude of absolute dependence upon His blessing, and endure all things as from Him with tranquillity and thankfulness (iii. 7. 10).

The pious mind must aspire. We must take up the cross. "Those whom God has chosen and has honoured by His fellowship (*consortio*)" must prepare for a hard, laborious, troubled life, . . . it being the will of the Father to exercise them by making them endure the test. It was thus He began with His first-born, Christ, and thus He continues with all His children. It should, therefore, sweeten the Cross to think that we share it with Christ, and that our sufferings are not only blessed to us, but bring many aids to the much furtherance of our salvation (*sed ad promovendam quoque nostram salutem multum afferunt adjuvamenti*, iii. 8. 1).

The only reason Jesus had to bear the Cross was to demonstrate His obedience to His Father. There are many reasons why we should bear it constantly. It teaches us humility, and patience, and obedience. So the Cross reveals the virtues God Himself bestows (iii. 8. 2-5). Thus also it separates between sons and bastards. The sons are not condemned with the world, the bastards are hardened by the punishment (iii. 8. 8). And to suffer for righteousness' sake is to increase our real joy; if driven from our homes, we have a higher place in the Kingdom of God (iii. 8. 7). The endur-

ance is not, however, insensibility to pain or mere stoic endurance, but the believer acquiesces in the spiritual consolation of God (*in spirituali Dei consolatione acquiescit*, iii. 8. 8). So the difference between philosophy and Christianity is the attitude toward the will of God. Philosophy says, "Yield because you must." The believer says, "We yield because God's will is right."¹

The end, therefore, is to reach a contempt for the present life, and to exercise ourselves in contemplation of the future, for there is no medium between the two: the world must either seem vile to us, or it will detain us as slaves by intemperate love of it. It is, therefore, of the highest importance that we be convinced by experience of the miserable character of this life (iii. 9. 2). At the same time we must not be led into ingratitude to God. The world, ever abounding in all kinds of wretchedness, is yet justly classed among the divine blessings which are not to be despised, and it contains foretastes of the heavenly felicity (iii. 9. 3). Yet we are to ardently long for death, and constantly meditate upon it (iii. 9. 4). We are to use the world without abusing it, and fixed laws are out of place in so doing. The Scriptures lay down general rules, and we should keep within these limits (iii. 10. 1). The natural quality of things indicates to us their use, but they must never hinder our progress to eternal life (iii. 10. 2-3). Therefore, while the liberty of the Christian is not to be bound to external things, he is bound by the law—he must indulge as little as possible (iii. 10. 4). He must be patient and content, and treat all things as a trust confided to him. And every man's mode of life is a station assigned to him, and all is to be subject to the Will of God.

Such in brief are the foundations upon which Calvin raises his ethics. Many phrases, like "liberty of conscience,"

¹ "Iam vero quia illud demum amabile nobis est, quod saluti ac bono esse nobis agnoscimus, hac etiam parte consolatur nos optimus pater, dum asserit, se eo ipso quod nos cruce affligit, saluti nostræ consulere" (iii. 8. 11). "Which leads us to the thought, if afflictions are salutary, why should we not bear them in patience, for thus we are resting satisfied with our own good?"

"responsibility of the soul to God," are used, as countless passages demonstrate, exactly as any Roman Catholic schoolman would use them. The essential difference between Calvin and Trent consists not in the definition of the Church, but in the historic answer to the question, Is the Roman Church the true Church? For Calvin the Church was a sacramental organisation with an authoritative ministry of the Word, watching over the State in spiritual things, while the State did its behests in material things. The State only had authority in the Word of God, and the Church had the Word of God as its priceless possession.

On such a foundation the ethics of Calvin could only be a new and more elaborate casuistry. The ethics of Aquinas deal with a closed system given in the teachings of the Church, the ethics of Calvin deal with a closed system given in the written Word.

The glory of Protestant ethics as founded by Luther and developed by Kant is the autonomous, democratic, unpriestly character stamped upon it. All men should be kings and priests to God. The ministry according to Luther was purely functional. He did not carry out the logic of his assumption at all times, yet in the main he was true to them. In the last analysis for Luther the soul must stand alone for truth, and trust that it will not be forsaken. In the last analysis for Calvin the soul finds out which church has the sacrament and the Word and submits wholly to it. The difference is world-wide. For true ethical development there is no more room in logical Calvinism than in logical Romanism. And it has not, as a matter of history, contributed largely to either the history or the development of ethics. Ethics has been swallowed up in dogmatics and systematic theology. This is no accident. That is exactly where Calvin put ethics—inside dogmatics.

Reformed systems of ethics have, as a matter of fact, sprung up almost in defiance of theology. The vital principle of a real Protestant ethics is the logical and thoroughgoing accept-

ance of the relative character of all casuistical judgment. As the moral character of any judgment depends upon the motive, and only God can know the motive, we can only apply the objective test, and ask in utilitarian terms for the ultimate effect of any action; but for the agent the moral attitude and not the outcome is the determining element. For Roman Catholic scholasticism and for Calvin there is an absolute norm by which all actions can be truly and thoroughly tested, and Church and State must apply the tests. Even opinions and doctrines held by the individual are thus subject to an infallible review. It was therefore no hasty or ill-considered action for Calvin to hand Servetus over to the State for proper punishment. Calvin would have been false to his fundamental convictions had he acted otherwise. Rome only was wrong in shedding the blood of the martyrs because Rome was not a true Church. Given a true Church and her duty was to insist that the State protect pure doctrine. Calvin's ethics is based on an outward authority. A Protestant ethics must be based on the inward compulsion of conscience.

Over Calvin's ethics are flung the shadows of the twofold view of life that did so much damage to Christian thinking. For Jesus all life was under God's hand—the sparrow did not fall without His consent, and the hairs of our head are all numbered. For Luther also there sprang up the glorious assurance that life was good. That all life, all days, all places were sacred, if only we used them in the joyful service of God. So that the housemaid sweeping out a room was engaged, says Luther, in as sacred a task as the priest at the altar. For Calvin the world was primarily evil—human nature was in itself corrupt. The world must seem vile to us and we are to ardently long for death (iv. 9. 4). All the mediæval morbidness that has so often corrupted Scotch piety has its legitimate roots in the essentially Roman Catholic scholasticism of Calvin. His conception is in essence dualistic, and the world is *per se* evil. Of course, Protestantism has largely overcome this taint of Manichæism, which historically Calvin got, in the writer's

judgment, not from Paul but from Augustine. At the same time the phrases in which the oriental intrusion historically asserted itself have never been banished from the Reformed Creeds.

The most serious blunder of all was Calvin's acceptance of the Roman Catholic theory of the two swords. In point of fact, Calvin's State is a theocracy after the type of Gregory the Great, with the "divine ministry" in the place of the Pope. To mistake Calvin's theory of the State for democracy, and that in spite of his own statement, is so wildly far from the truth that we may assert on the contrary that all the services Calvinism has rendered democracy have been by indirection. Presbyterianism has, on the whole, been most true to Calvin's conception, and has never been truly democratic. It is essentially aristocratic in organisation and feeling. To a selected ministry (minister, elders, and deacons) are handed over all the spiritual interests of the Church. To this ministry the congregations owe not co-operation but obedience. That the tide of Protestant feeling in the Presbyterian Church has happily been too strong for Calvinism and its logic should not blind us to the real state of the facts.

Calvin's ethics partake also of the legal character common to all the scholastic systems. He founds his ethics on an exposition of the law of the Old Testament. Luther plainly saw that ethics was an inner compulsion, and that the Christian man was free from all merely external law just so far as he was Christian. So in his dealing with the ten Commandments in his catechisms there is a world-wide difference between his method and that of Calvin. For Luther the law of Christian freedom delights to expand in the atmosphere of loving submission. For Calvin the Christian life is bounded by an almost pharisaic attempt to determine the exact letter of written law. His comments on Romans are often painful reading for any really clear-thinking Protestant. Submission to legal requirement would be Calvin's interpretation of the Protestant Magna Charta in Galatians iv. 31-v. 12. For this

submission is in true Roman Catholic spirit made an act of faith. For the Christian man rejoices in the legal enactment, but, crushed and humbled by his inability to meet the requirement, flees in his weakness to the Mother Church and the sacraments, as sealing ordinances for his assurance of forgiveness. In Luther's system sacramentalism was an unfortunate and illogical intrusion upon his fundamental thought. In Calvin the sacraments are essential to the Christian ethical life. Baptism is the mortification of our corrupt nature, and without it there is ordinarily no ethical life possible. He simply puts it in the place of circumcision. One has only to read the *Institutio*, iv. 16, to see that to-day we as Protestants really hold with the Anabaptists at nearly all points as against Calvin, except in circles on the side of Roman Catholic scholasticism (High Church Presbyterianism, Lutheranism, and Anglicanism). In spite of Luther's most unfortunate realism in his interpretation of *Hoc est meum corpus*, he remains substantially unaffected in his ethics (though not wholly) by the element of sacramental magic. For Calvin the imparted grace of the sacrament is an ethical element of first importance. The superstitious regard of the older Scottish thought for the Lord's table is the direct outcome of what is an essential element in Calvin's teaching. For Calvin there was sacramental magic, and although it was by no muttered incantation that the elements became the bearers of special grace, yet by the clear spoken word they do (iv. 14. 4).

The Protestantism of to-day can hardly understand how large a part this sacramental element played in the Calvinistic system. Under the influence of a Protestant ethics that has developed independently of the theological and ecclesiastical intrusions, the average Protestant has an æsthetic and ritual interest in the sacraments, but almost no ethical or metaphysical interest whatsoever. Very different was the case with Calvin. As everyone may see in his fierce attacks upon Anabaptists, he clearly saw that his system was profoundly interested in the metaphysics and ethics involved.

The whole conception of the Christian life as Calvin draws it, is Roman Catholic rather than Protestant. The essential feature of Luther's message was that in Christ we were free to live more and more unto righteousness, and that that freedom was joy and peace and a sense of security and sonship, and that all might have it who claimed it. Thus, again, Luther's unfortunate incursion into the realm of metaphysical speculation on the freedom of the will had a genuine ethical interest, and can be resolved into a relatively harmless though unfortunate psychological determinism. This is not the case with Calvin's doctrine of decree. It is part of the warp and woof of a system of thought whose dominant note is God as Lawgiver, and not as Redeeming Father. Hence no more for Calvin than for the Roman Catholic can there be logically, in spite of the doctrine of perseverance, any assurance of faith. The secret decree of God by which corruption is changed to incorruption can only be known in the final glory. Fear and trembling is the note of the Christian life, and not joy and peace. Over Luther's faith flit the clouds of mediæval morbidity, as the scurrying clouds that follow on a storm well past. With Calvin we descend again into the twilight darkness of valleys the glad sunshine scarcely touches. The relatively gloomy, despondent type of piety which is connected with Calvin's memory is part of his fundamental thinking. It is the outcome of his essential conception of the Christian life.

Hence on ethical grounds we may say that Calvin was one of the last, though not one of the greatest, of the schoolmen. Thomas Aquinas is really greatly his superior in almost every particular as an ethical thinker. The ethical services of Calvinism have been indirect and in spite of his scholasticism. In breaking with the Roman sacramental system, Calvin happily failed in his attempt to establish an effective rival Protestant sacramental system; and in Calvin's tremendous and crushing attacks on the Roman hierarchy he made the establishment of a Protestant rival hierarchy impossible. We are still cursed by the attempts—made in the great name of

Calvin—to establish again a Protestant priestly sacramentalist organisation, with the power of the keys, interpreting again an infallible legal code ; but Protestantism is too virile and now too thoroughly independent in its judgments and feelings to submit again to the yoke. But it is quite remarkable how the attacks of intelligent Roman Catholic writers are directed largely against Luther rather than against Calvin. In point of fact, in sometimes unsympathetic form the truest Protestantism is to be found rather amidst the inconsistencies of Luther than in the logical completeness of Calvin.

To-day the new Protestantism finds Calvin still a force. In the aristocratic, authority-soaked, former slave - holding States of America, all the splendid virtues bloomed that a powerful, balanced, and on the whole benevolent oligarchy brings forth, and that same aristocracy saw rightly in Calvin a tower of strength. As over against so-called “liberal Presbyterians,” the conservative Presbyterians have Calvin on their side. Now also in the divisions taking place between class and class a really democratic spirit finds little comfort in Calvin. If anyone thinks of Holland as an ideal democracy, or Dr Kuyper as an ideal democrat, then perhaps Calvin’s ethics will be congenial to such an one. The facts, however, are that the political significance of the Calvinistic ethics is wrapt up in their undemocratic estimate of life, and in the wonderful skill with which aristocratic conceptions, once the pride and joy of a military land-owning aristocracy, are transferred to a commercial and trading oligarchy. This shines with an especial clearness through all the elaborate but highly inaccurate estimates of Calvinism by Dr Kuyper. The aristocratic spirit which is the essence of the Roman hierarchy, and marks at every turn its ethics, is stamped with unmistakable clearness upon the ethics of Calvin and Calvinism.

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DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the “Hibbert Journal.” Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

WHO IS THE CHRISTIAN DEITY ?

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1907, p. 821.)

I.

AMONG the writers whom Mr James Collier adduces in support of his thesis that “Christ and no other is the Christian God,” is Dr James Martineau. “We find,” says Mr Collier, “an unexpected ally in one of the loftiest Christian metaphysicians. In the last years of a long and honoured life, James Martineau put forward Christ-worship as ‘A Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy.’” This account of Dr Martineau’s meaning and purpose in writing the paper with this title, would, I believe, have called forth from the author of the paper, if he were still with us, a most emphatic disclaimer. If Mr Collier’s statement is understood in the natural sense which it bears upon its face, namely, that Dr Martineau put forward what he himself would mean by “Christ-worship” as a way out of the controversy, it is an obviously absurd statement; for, as Dr Martineau always regarded Christ as a created man, the worship of him would be, in his view, sheer idolatry. I can only suppose that Mr Collier really intended that his sentence should convey the idea that Dr Martineau put forward “Christ-worship” in the Trinitarian sense of the words. But even when so interpreted his statement is quite incorrect; for Dr Martineau in his paper suggested no change in either the Trinitarian or the Unitarian idea of the worship of God; he simply pointed out to both parties that they were really in all essential respects worshipping one and the same being under different names. Mr Collier appears to think that the most appropriate name for this common object of worship is “Christ”; but there is nothing in Dr Martineau’s paper which in the slightest degree favours this view.

Dr Martineau would also have been amazed to read that he put forward Christ-worship *in the last years of a long life*; for all who are familiar with his teaching well know that the view of Christ set forth in the paper

referred to is essentially the same as that held by him through the whole course of his ministerial career.

It is a pity that in the sentence: "The Father, Dr Martineau affirms, is absent from the Unitarian creed," Mr Collier did not place the words "The Father" within quotation marks, so as to indicate clearly that it is only the Father in the sense of the Trinitarian formula who is thus absent. Dr Martineau agrees with the Trinitarian that the true God is uncreated and eternal; and, as the Second Person of the Trinity is represented as possessing these attributes, and as possessing in addition all the other attributes which the Unitarian ascribes to God, Dr Martineau argues that the Unitarian and the Trinitarian God are, for all practical purposes, the same being under different names. But Dr Martineau saw no reason for holding that the immanent God, who manifested His moral and spiritual character in Jesus, was "eternally begotten" by a more ultimate Ur-God; and so he and other Unitarians apply to the being whom the Trinitarians call "God the Son," the term "God the Father."

The Trinitarian, by ascribing to "God the Son" all the creative and other attributes which appertain to the Unitarian view of God, had reduced the conception of what he regarded as the Ur-God, or God the Father, to such an abstract condition that He is little more than "a bare immensity," "a silent and unmanifested God." Such a conception as this has had no attraction or value for the practical and non-metaphysical Unitarians, and so, as Dr Martineau points out, they have generally ignored it.

If I understand Mr Collier rightly, his contention is, that Dr Martineau, having seen that the Trinitarian "God the Father" is so barren a conception for all religious purposes, recommends the Unitarians to drop the name "Father" as descriptive of the object of their belief and worship, and to substitute for it the worship of "Christ." Now I apprehend that Dr Martineau's view is precisely the reverse of this. He sees that the Trinitarian ideas of "God the Father" and "God the Son" are not really two ideas but one absolutely indivisible idea, and that for this idea the manifestly appropriate name is God the Father. The meaning which Dr Martineau assigns to God as "The Father" appears to be identical with that implied by Paul when he quotes with approval the words:—"For we are also His offspring."

The gist of the whole matter appears to be that Dr Martineau and Mr Collier are at cross-purposes; and hence, when the latter attempts to present the view of the former, he inevitably, and probably unconsciously, seriously misrepresents it.

CHARLES B. UPTON.

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II.

MR COLLIER'S article on the above subject is of more than usual interest, but he is in error when he tries to connect Unitarianism with the worship of Christ as God, by quoting from the works of James Martineau and

James Freeman Clarke. Unitarians never confuse Christ with God. They base their claim to the name Christian on the fact that they believe in the religious leadership of Jesus, but in their acts of worship they put all mediators aside and hold direct communion with God. The argument that Unitarians worship Christ, based on the fact that their conception of God is Christlike, is extremely weak. How does anyone arrive at a knowledge of God? Is it not through the manifestations of the divine nature in men and things? Our God is man projected into the realm of perfection, and as we have in Christ the nearest approach to manly perfection the world has ever seen, it is only natural that we should see in God the attributes we admire in Jesus. It is another form of the saying that God made man in his own image.

The writer seems to be unfamiliar with the works of Dr Martineau and Dr Clarke, and he makes an unfortunate use of what he has at hand by detaching certain phrases and sentences from their context and using them in a sense quite at variance with the meaning of the authors. Dr Martineau's paper entitled "A Way out of the Trinitarian Controversy" is mentioned briefly in the second volume of James Drummond's *The Life and Letters of James Martineau*, pp. 103-104, but for a more comprehensive and critical analysis we turn to A. W. Jackson's *James Martineau, A Biography and Study*, pp. 201-207. Space does not permit of a full discussion of this subject, but anyone who will read the above-mentioned pages, or, better still, the paper itself in *Essays, Reviews, and Addresses*, volume ii., will see at once that Mr Collier has been led astray. Dr Martineau does not advocate "Christ-worship." He is trying to find a common meeting ground for Unitarians and Trinitarians, and he believes that he sees it in a resemblance between the Heavenly Father of the one and the Deified Son of the other. The First Person of the Trinity is cold and lifeless beside the Heavenly Father of Unitarianism, who in turn bears a strong likeness to the Second Person. Therefore, when the Unitarian worships God, and the Trinitarian addresses Christ, both have in mind the same Personality, but the Unitarian is not thinking of the historical Jesus of Nazareth, nor is the Trinitarian worshipping any but the Supreme Being. Dr Martineau does not affirm that "the Father is absent from the Unitarian creed." What he does affirm is that the Father, *in the sense of the infinite primeval Essence, without finite manifestation*, 'is really absent from the Unitarian creed.'¹ Furthermore, "creative thought, guiding Providence, redeeming grace," may be distinctive characteristics of the Second Person, but they are allied with the belief in the deity of Christ; and instead of proving the Unitarian God to be Christ, they are in reality a part of the Trinitarian conception that Christ is God. It should never be forgotten that for the Unitarian there is no Christ in the *orthodox* sense, and Dr Martineau was never guilty of advocating the worship of any other being

¹ See Drummond, vol. ii. p. 104.

than God the Father. The outcome of the acceptance of his scheme would have been less "Christ-worship" instead of more.

Now for Mr Collier's references to James Freeman Clarke. He says that "in 1841 James Freeman Clarke founded in Boston 'a Church of Christ,' which took Jesus as its Head, as its Master, Teacher, and Saviour, as its Prophet, Priest, and King." Turning to the *Autobiography* of Dr Clarke, edited by Edward Everett Hale, we find the source of the above on pp. 155-156, in a letter addressed to his sister, written in Meadville, Pennsylvania, 7th January 1841, in his thirty-first year. Writing of the possibility of forming a new congregation in Boston, he says: "My object would be, not to form a congregation of Unitarians, but a Church of Christ." Not coincidence of opinion, but of practical purpose, was to be the basis of union. "Believing that Jesus intended to found such a church as this, we take him for our Head; he is our Master, Teacher, and Saviour, our Prophet, Priest, and King. All who join the Church express this faith in Jesus . . . and they dedicate themselves, with all the faculties of mind and body, to the service of Jesus Christ." There is a difference to be noted here between the *service* of Christ and the *worship* of him. A perusal of the correspondence following shows that Dr Clarke's work was to be in the nature of a ministry of reconciliation between Orthodoxy and Unitarianism, and while making his plans he was in frequent consultation with Dr W. E. Channing, who occasionally warned him of the danger of using old phrases in a new sense. On p. 160 of the *Autobiography* we find these two discussing a declaration of faith. Dr Clarke suggests, "In Jesus as the Christ, the Son of God," but Dr Channing thinks "In Jesus as the divinely appointed teacher of truth" would be more intelligible. "I contended, however," writes Dr Clarke, "for the other, on the ground that we wished to connect ourselves, not only with one another, but with the whole Church of Christ, the only way of doing which was to adopt a universal confession, and the only one which could be universal was that on which Jesus built his Church at the first." At the formal organisation of the Church, Dr Clarke's formula was adopted, with the following addition: "And we do hereby form ourselves into a Church of his Disciples, that we may co-operate together in the study and practice of Christianity." Writing to this Church of the Disciples from Nice, Piedmont, eleven years later, Dr Clarke closes with these words: "I am here apart from all communion of worship, but I feel myself more than ever at home in the great universal Church of the Lord Jesus. In that Church is one God, one faith, one baptism. Heresies and schisms are unknown in it. Its creed is a trust in God the Father, and love to man the brother. Its worship is obedience and benevolence, doing good and growing good."¹ The Church of the Disciples was organised under the leadership of Jesus, but God the Father was the object of its worship.

Mr Collier says Dr Clarke "recommended a young minister to 'preach Christ' and to 'preach faith in Christ as the Omnipotent God.'" The

¹ *Autobiography*, p. 200.

grouping together of these two quotations is unfortunate, for whereas the former is taken from "a charge at an ordination,"¹ the latter is from a sermon.² In the first part of the "charge" God alone is mentioned, but at the end we find the advice to "preach Christ," a phrase which loses its significance for Mr Collier as soon as it is put back into its context. Here is the complete thought: "Finally, my brother, I charge you to study and to preach Christ. You will find God in nature and history; you will find God in the intuitions of eternal truth which move your own soul. . . . But except you also preach God in Christ, there is a large portion of human experience before which you will stand helpless."

Mr Collier's use of the second phrase is almost unpardonable, for Dr Clarke never believed in "Christ as the Omnipotent God." The full quotation will be sufficient to show the author's meaning and Mr Collier's error. It is as follows: "If you have faith enough in Jesus as the Christ of God to enable you to undertake his work of saving your fellowmen from sin and misery here and hereafter, you may be sure that you have the true faith. But if you have not the courage to do this work, then, though you preach faith in Christ as the Omnipotent God, and utter that doctrine with the tongue of men and angels, yet you prove by your own cowardice in the presence of evil that you have no real faith in him as an actual Saviour of actual men and women."

With regard to Mr Collier's third point, the fact that Dr Clarke read a paper on "The Historical Christ as the Centre of Christian Theology" cannot be taken as evidence of "Christ-worship."

In conclusion, let me say a few words with regard to Dr Clarke's general position. He was a gentle mediator between the various denominations, trying to bring them to a better understanding of one another. Quoting from the *Autobiography*, p. 256: "He understood the language in which the Evangelical churches speak as few Unitarians do, and was indeed able to speak it himself with perfect sincerity." Thus he often used words which sound strange from Unitarian lips, but which might easily be misinterpreted by one not accustomed to his thought. At the celebration of his seventieth birthday he stated his position in clear and concise language: "I have never known the day when God did not seem to me a Father and Friend, Christ a human brother and heavenly teacher, and life made for perpetual progress."³ The statement of faith which he left as a legacy to American Unitarianism consisted of the following "five points": "I. The Fatherhood of God; II. The Brotherhood of Man; III. The Leadership of Jesus; IV. Salvation by Character; V. The Progress of Mankind, onward and upward for ever."

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¹ *Autobiography*, pp. 316, 317.

² *Ibid.*, p. 320.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

THE FREE CATHOLIC IDEAL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1907, p. 797.)

MR THOMAS, in his *Hibbert Journal* article, and in his interesting volume, *A Free Catholic Church*, has put together a collocation of terms that will bear further analysis. Is there not a radical and necessary contradiction between the concept "free" and the concept "Catholic"?

1. Let us look at the matter in the broadest and most favourable light. As M. Paul Sabatier and others are pointing out, there are numerous signs now visible of an awakening liberalism of thought in the Roman Catholic communion. As signs they are obvious enough; the question is, Whither do they point? No one thinks of claiming that the Roman Church as a whole is becoming free. Many significant indications point the other way; and even a casual observation of the popular Catholicism of France and Italy is enough to show upon what placid depths of ignorance and superstition the barque of Peter still securely floats. If the outlook is slightly more hopeful in England and America, it is because of the growth within the Church of that individualism which Mr Thomas seems so sincerely to dread.

But how stands it with the exceptional individuals in the Catholic Church—such men as are writing in so liberal a strain in this *Journal* and elsewhere? The situation is amply revealed when it is added that they are nearly all writing *anonymously*, with a "discretion" which Mr Thomas finds it in his heart to condone if not to commend. The world well knows how it has fared with those—like Father Tyrrell and M. Loisy—who were bold enough to criticize the sacred ark of Catholic doctrine over their own signatures. There are pathetic pages in the latter's *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, in which the brilliant scholar and charming writer confesses that he is not free to serve as he would the Church in whose behalf and for whose defence he stands ready to devote his great learning and talent. One has only to compare the situation in which such a man finds himself placed—his most significant book suppressed just as its second edition was about to appear, and the careful terms of his submission distorted to serve ecclesiastical ends,¹—with the position and influence that he would have enjoyed under the *akademische freiheit* of the German universities, founded on Protestant principles, to realise how far practical Catholicism is to-day in its intentions from tolerating anything like full individual freedom. M. Loisy's influence is undoubtedly great, but it is that of a martyr in the cause of freedom rather than as an exponent of what freedom can do for religion and for life.

Mr Thomas allows his mind to play lightly around the idea of Catholic "discipline." "Roman Catholics," he tells us, ". . . know when to range and when to come to heel." The metaphor is an unfortunate one with which to describe the movements of free men. "Is thy servant a

¹ Loisy, *Autour d'un Petit Livre*, second edition, pp. vii. 263.

dog, that he should do this thing?" The reverse of that much-lauded discipline is a spiritual tyranny. It is, on a grand scale, that persistent and unrelenting "tyranny of the majority" which Tocqueville saw to be an ever-present peril in great aggregations of men. Nor is it wholly absent even from the Free Churches which Mr Thomas seeks by his persuasions to lead back under the yoke of bondage. The shutting up of many Congregational pulpits against Mr Campbell because he has had a mind of his own and has dared to speak it, is just as clear an example of attempted ecclesiastical dominance as any instance of the Vatican policy that could be mentioned.

2. Can there be any escape from this conflict between the individual and the organisation, which has made the sharp issue between Conformity and Nonconformity ever since man had any aspiration to be free from the idols of his tribe? One does not well see how there can be, so long as the organisation is made the principal thing. While this is done, the individual will be suppressed—and that is the death of freedom. For *freedom* does not pertain to institutions, but to men. It is a personal attribute. The organisation is as free as the separate personalities that compose it—no more so. Spiritual freedom implies first of all an untrammelled individuality. It is something that the individual has to win, that historically has had to be wrested by the martyrdom of the single man pitted against the mass of men, still happy in dominating and in being dominated.

Mr Thomas speaks with scarcely concealed contempt of Protestantism. Yet it is to the protest of the individual soul that we owe the measure of freedom that we have. So long as there is even a threatened tyranny of the majority, so long must the free man be a Protestant and a Nonconformist.

But there comes a time when that protest is no longer called for—namely, when men, even in their organised life, have come to see that it is better to leave the individual utterly free. This is now largely the case with that small body of free churches to which Mr Thomas and the present writer belong. It is simply not true that those churches have "worked out into the full glare of day the fallacy of religious individualism." That statement could only be made in fervent advocacy of a preconceived theory. The facts are quite otherwise. They are that these churches, with some tendencies to fall into a petty ecclesiasticism always alive among them, have nevertheless for two centuries or more, both in England and in America, given perfect freedom to individual development, while yet they have maintained their organisation unimpaired. They have entered, more than any other body of men, into the "Religion of the Spirit," and they are its most promising organised expression, against a host of encompassing difficulties, in the world to-day.

It is true that these churches contain many people and not a few preachers whose escape from ecclesiasticism is recent, or who for some other reason do not yet know that they are free, and so continue to protest.

It is against this unnecessary self-assertion that Mr Thomas's argument is really directed. So long as men are still protesting, they cannot enjoy the full fruits of their freedom. But the true cure for such a condition is not *Catholicism*—an institution; it is rather *catholicity*—an inner grace of appreciation that can belong only to a free spirit. When men have once, by uttering the necessary denials and suffering the necessary separations, worked themselves out into an organic and self-consistent freedom, then they can turn back to gather up whatever in the old ordered beauty and dignity of life and worship is found to be not incompatible with spiritual liberty; and that is very much. Here, then, is the present path for the Liberal Churches, upon which many voices have long been urging them to walk, and not without response. This gracious and rewarding task of gathering up for future uplift and help "all of good the past has had," I believe it was and is in Mr Thomas's heart to press upon his fellow-believers. And to its accomplishment I would most heartily go with him, and with any and all others whom a full measure of individual freedom has made like-minded—that is, of a Catholic spirit.

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THE FORGIVENESS OF SINS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1907, p. 911.)

My critic, Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw of Hartley University College, Southampton, says that my argument is "vitiated by the writer's failure to distinguish between the two radically different meanings of the word 'law.'" Further, he says, "The whole argument is based on analogy, on the supposed similarity of moral law to physical law. But the analogy is an entirely false one." Then, having quoted Newton's law of gravitation, he asserts, "This 'law' did not exist till Newton formulated it. It was by him derived inductively from observations. . . . All other physical laws are in the same case. They are simply scientific generalisations, nothing more than provisional hypotheses. . . . A law is nothing more than a docket. . . . A moral law, on the other hand, is a command." These are, certainly, remarkable statements. It raises one's opinion of human intelligence to learn that Newton did not only discover the law of gravitation, but made it. I fail to understand how a law could be derived "inductively from observations" before it began to exist. The planet Neptune was discovered through the inductive observations of Leverrier and Adams, but it existed long before they, noticing the disturbances in the movements of Uranus, the former asked Dr Galle of Berlin to look for it.

But, surely, Professor Hearnshaw should have included others, more worthy of his sword than I am, in his attack. When Sir Oliver Lodge

wrote that "natural philosophers will not be prepared to tolerate any the least departure from the law of the conservation of energy" (*Nature*, 23rd April 1903), was he thinking of "nothing more than a provisional hypothesis . . . liable at any moment to be proved false"? When Dr Salmon, the late Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, declared that the minds of all thinking men are "filled with a sense of the universal prevalence of law," did he mean that they were all engrossed by the universal prevalence of "a temporarily convenient docket"? When he proceeded to observe that "human affairs do not seem to be less subject to the operation of law than the changes of inanimate nature," was he thinking of them as being dominated by "a doubtfully valid scientific proposition"? (*The Reign of Law*, pp. 1, 4.) When the Duke of Argyle wrote the book which suggested the Provost's sermon, did he mean by the Reign of Law the reign of "a provisional hypothesis"? When Professor Tyndall spoke of "bringing vital as well as physical phenomena under the dominion of that law of causal connexion which, so far as the human understanding has yet pierced, asserts itself everywhere in nature" (*Belfast Address*, p. 15), was he thinking of the dominion of "a docket"? If, therefore, I am in error, it is a consolation to know that I am in excellent company.

But I deny that they and I are in the wrong, for we speak of great facts in nature, whereas Professor Hearnshaw seems to confine his attention to words. He is correct when he says, "The Dean of Clogher may say that all this is a mere logomachy—a battle of words, not affecting essential issues." If he considers "physical law" to be only "a temporarily convenient docket," I regard it as the description of a fact that the forces of nature act with uniformity, and that when a man ignores physical law he suffers for his act. Professor Hearnshaw seems to me to argue on the pre-supposition that there is no moral or spiritual meaning in the world at large. I argue on the opposite supposition.

In morals, just as much as in physics, there is, as those who sin know to their cost, a sequence of cause and effect, or "a stream of tendencies," and it is this fact in life which I regard as analogous to the sequence of cause and effect which appears in physical phenomena.

In dealing with average men and women, I have found that the apparent analogy between the working of cause and effect in physics and morals is a source of much perplexity to their minds when considering the possibility of the forgiveness of sins which involve harmful consequences to others, and this was the practical difficulty with which I proceeded to deal.

I must, however, entirely differ from my critic when he proceeds to demonstrate "the fundamental difference" between moral and physical law. He says, "A moral law, on the other hand, is a command; it is uttered in the imperative mood; it is addressed, not to the intellect, but to the will. What is there in common between the authoritative injunction, 'Thou shalt not kill,' and the dynamical theorem, 'Action and reaction are equal and opposite'?"

Now the notion that the moral law did not exist until it was promulgated as "a command, uttered in the imperative mood," is exactly like the notion that the law of gravitation was not only discovered by Newton, but originated in his intelligence, and that it may be abrogated by some other equal intelligence.

The formal precept, "Thou shalt not kill," is a moral precept, only because it is the announcement of something deeply rooted in the nature of things. When Cain slew his brother, he was guilty of a moral offence, although no "command" forbidding murder had been issued at that time. Noah's drunkenness was also a shameful and immoral act, notwithstanding Professor Hearnshaw's assertion "that the taking of large quantities of strong drink has been in modern times—mainly because of a recognition of its injurious physical effects—condemned by morality." Those who work for the reclamation of drunkards are painfully aware that the moral degradation caused by that vice is tenfold worse than its physical injury inflicted on the body.

The formulating of laws which explain the constancy of cause and effect in the physical world may be as liable to revision as my critic asserts, without requiring any protest from the student of morals, except such as the man of science will readily agree with, since it is science which must suffer most if it be true that the laws of gravitation and of light and of the conservation of energy are all alike built on sand, none of them being more than a doubtfully valid scientific proposition which any day may be upset, or only a temporarily convenient docket.

That would be a happy and easy answer to one perplexed with scientific difficulties, if only we were sure that it was true.

CHARLES T. OVENDEN,
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ENNISKILLEN.

RELIGION IN EARLY ROME.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1907, p. 839.)

MR W. WARDE FOWLER's statement on p. 847 that "*Religio* is a *feeling*, the feeling of awe for the supernatural; that is the root-meaning of it," is hard to understand from a philological standpoint. When the writer justifies his assertion by saying: "I have lately followed the various meanings of this word throughout Latin literature," one is tempted to ask whether, by the "root-meaning," he does not really mean the earliest sense in which he has found the word employed. Probably, however, he has overlooked a possible earlier significance of the word which may throw light upon the real "root-meaning."

The distinguished Italian scholar, Alberto Gianola, author of *Il Sodalizio Pitagorico di Crotona*, writing in the new Theosophical review

Ultra, of Rome, for March 1907, on "King Numa Pompilius and Pythagoras," refers to the Roman tradition alluded to by Cicero and by Aristoxenus, according to which the early Roman religious institutions were profoundly influenced by the teachings of Pythagoras. He refers to the Twelve Tables of Numa Pompilius, and, as the date commonly assigned to this Roman king is earlier than that of the philosopher of Croton, he "prefers to think that there is an error in the later chronological calculations which attribute so great an antiquity to the mythical Numa," and concludes "that either Numa is a historical personage, and in that case he cannot have lived before the sixth century B.C., or else he is an entirely mythical and allegorical figure, and signifies nothing but the derivation of the principal religious institutions of Rome from Pythagorism."

Another Italian writer, A. Chiappelli, has also pointed out (in *Archivio Giuridico*, vol. xxxv., 1885, pp. 111-125) a relationship between the Twelve Tables and the doctrines of Heraclitus and Pythagoras.

Now Pythagoras is known to have studied in Egypt and in the East, and to have brought thence the ancient knowledge which was the foundation of his teaching. Later teachers who have expounded in the West the antique lore of the Vedas lay stress on a particular aspect of religion, which is, the unbinding of the soul from all attachment to earth and earthly desires. They teach that work should be performed "without attachment" in the form of desire for reward or subsequent gratification. And I venture to think that this detachment, this unbinding, is exactly the root-meaning of the word religion. It was after the higher meaning had been forgotten that the feeling of awe began to be the one primarily excited by the notion of religion and all that it was held to involve.

Many Latin words signifying the performance of a definite action, especially closing, sealing, and the like, are reversed in meaning by the prefixing of the particle *re*. Thus, to my mind, *religio* signifies, not binding again to divine ideas, as some have thought, but unbinding from attachment to things of this mortal life.¹

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¹ Since the above was written an article by Professor Giulio Buonamici has appeared in *Ultra* (July 1907), assigning a similar ancient origin to Roman religion through the Etruscans and Pelasgi, and connecting it with what the writer calls a *filosofia perenne*, or universal basis of the religious systems of all ages.

REVIEWS

The Nature of Truth: An Essay.—By Harold H. Joachim, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.

"I offer this Essay to my fellow-students," writes Mr Joachim in his Preface, "in the hope that it will induce them to reflect once more on the foundations of their philosophical thinking. If they will but reflect in earnest, I shall be amply satisfied." Such satisfaction has been speedily afforded. No recent philosophical book has secured, within so short a time of its publication, a larger amount of attention; it has probably ere this been read and discussed by nearly every student of philosophy in the English-speaking world. And undoubtedly it possesses a combination of merits which fully entitle it to the consideration it has received. The problem of which it treats is of fundamental importance in philosophical speculation, and to have that importance emphasised and the issues involved definitely and distinctly formulated is of itself a great gain. And the treatment is worthy of the theme. The author's argument is genuine and sincere throughout, his analysis of current theories patient and thorough-going, his criticism of them acute and searching. Moreover, the book is written in a style that befits a philosophical treatise. There is no attempt to throw a semblance of simplicity over questions which are essentially not simple, no attempt to resort to any other mode of overcoming difficulties than that of honestly reasoning them out. Hume complained that in his day, amidst all the bustle of disputation, it was not reason which carried the prize, but rhetoric, and that no man need ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant hypothesis, provided he had wit enough to represent it in any favourable colour. Unfortunately in this respect the habits of mankind seem surprisingly constant; and justification might still be found for Hume's assertion that "the victory is not gained by the men-at-arms, who manage the pike and the sword, but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army." But here, at any rate, we have a book in which all the devices of the propagandist are conspicuous by their absence, in which the method of the scientific investigator is everywhere apparent, and in which the writer acknowledges, without hesitation, the point beyond which he is unable to see his way. Such careful, painstaking investigation exactly meets the need of philosophy at the present time, and

the next step forward in philosophical construction can only be taken on the basis of work of this description.

1. Mr Joachim leaves his readers no excuse for mistaking the precise character of the problem with which the book is concerned. His aim is not to discover a *criterion* of truth, that is to say, "something other than the truth itself, by which we are to recognise the truth." His aim is to discover "what truth in its nature is, not by what characteristics in its opposing falsehood we may infer its presence" (p. 67). And yet he has been blamed for not having commenced his inquiry "by investigating how 'truths' are verified and 'errors' detected,"—in other words, for not having embarked upon the discussion of a totally different problem from that which he has taken the liberty of setting himself. Objections of this sort betray their irrelevance by the answers those who make them give to their own question. It may be a criterion of truth that it is "the expedient in the way of our thinking," just as it may be a criterion of the right that it is the "expedient in the way of our behaving." But the first statement supplies us with no more information about the *nature* of truth than the second does about the *nature* of right conduct. At best the former statement indicates a *causa cognoscendi* of the truth, not its *causa essendi*.

2. In the Essay before us no attempt is made to establish a new theory. Certain typical notions of the nature of truth, one or the other of which has hitherto served as the basis of philosophical speculation, are examined in turn, and grounds are furnished for the conclusion that none of them can be maintained as in the end and in all respects successful. Arranged in ascending order, according to their measure of comparative success, these three theories are the following:—

- (i) Truth is the ideal representation of fact, an image which faithfully reflects an original, the correspondence of knowledge with reality.
- (ii) Truth is a quality, an immediate characteristic feature, of independent entities which are what they are in and for themselves without relation to mind.
- (iii) Truth is that systematic coherence which is the character of a significant whole, or of an organised individual experience, both self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled.

i. The Correspondence-notion has its value and utility as a working hypothesis, but it breaks down if regarded as an adequate conception of the nature of truth. And it breaks down, our author contends, mainly for two reasons. In the first place, it assumes that the reality, with which the ideal representation called truth corresponds, can somehow be compared with that ideal representation, and that the faithfulness of the correspondence can thus be established. For such a comparison, however, to be possible, both the ideal representation and the reality it represents must be known or experienced, and the relation of correspondence between them must be 'for' a mind. But if reality in becoming known has of necessity to be translated into the language of 'ideas,' if reality as known is always the content of a

system of judgments, then obviously the conditions required for making the comparison can never be fulfilled. In the second place, even supposing that the difficulty just mentioned can be surmounted, even admitting that 'reality' expresses itself doubly in consciousness, on the one hand in the form of vague immediate feeling, on the other hand in the form of private opinion, and that truth means correspondence between these two expressions, even then an assumption is made which cannot be justified. It is assumed, namely, that we have on the one side a whole of experience at the level of feeling, on the other side a whole of experience at the level of reflective thought, and that there is, or may be, identity of structure between them. The phrase 'identity of structure' can, however, in such a case, only signify identity of form under which the different material elements of the two wholes are respectively subsumed. But neither a felt-whole nor a thought-whole admits of analysis into materials subsumed under an external form,—a form, that is, which is what it is, unaffected by the difference which it unifies. When this consideration is pressed, the importance of 'correspondence' sinks more and more into the background, and is seen to be itself derivative and to point to something more fundamental that determines the being and nature of the correspondence. In other words, a serious examination of the notion of correspondence leads ultimately to the view of truth as systematic coherence.

ii. The Independence-theory of Truth occasions Mr Joachim much greater trouble, and his treatment of it has already called forth able and interesting replies from Mr B. Russell and Mr G. E. Moore. This theory, as our author understands it, is founded on a metaphysical position according to which the ultimate constituents of Reality are certain absolutely independent simple entities and certain relations. The relations are conceived to be "external relations," relations, that is to say, which are not grounded in or based upon the nature of their terms. We get thus a world of many things, with relations which are not to be deduced from the nature or essence of the related things. And, in this world, whatever is complex is composed of related simple entities, entities, moreover, which do not themselves become complex by forming parts of a complex whole. From the axiom of external relations it follows, so far as knowledge is concerned, that 'experiencing makes no difference to the facts,'—a dictum which may be laid down as 'the fundamental postulate of all Logic.' In sensation, for example, there are involved two simple factors and a relation. The factors are (a) the quality apprehended,—a simple, independent Real; and (b) the apprehension,—something 'mental' or 'psychical.' The relation is unique and not further definable,—it is that peculiar relation which subsists between 'subject' and 'object' in experience; it holds the related factors together, but leaves them untouched and unaffected by the union. My vision does not make the greenness of the tree; no matter whether I see or not, the tree is green. Its greenness is *there*, altogether independent of the fact of seeing. And in regard to judgment and inference, the same principle holds. The equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two

right angles is not made by me in the act of judging. To experience that equality, I must, of course, judge or apprehend it; but the psychical apprehension is one thing, the equality apprehended is another. Independent of the apprehension, the equality itself is *there*, and it is indifferent to its nature whether anybody thinks it or not. It does not *exist*, but it has a *being*; and it must be, *before* it can be thought. Such an entity may be called a 'proposition.' Unlike the qualities given in sensation, a 'proposition' is always a complex, whose simple constituents unite to form a single entity. According to the nature of the relation between its terms, a 'proposition' may be either true or false, but what kind of relation makes a proposition true, what false, must simply be immediately recognised, for it cannot be further defined. There is, then, no problem at all in truth and falsehood. "Some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white; belief is a certain attitude towards propositions, which is called knowledge when they are true, error when they are false."

As against this view, Mr Joachim raises, in the first instance, the quite general objection that a plurality of absolutely independent simple reals cannot, even with the help of relations, constitute in any intelligible sense a unity. Only on condition that the constituent elements are not absolutely independent but interdependent features of one whole can there be a genuine unity. Let the relation be strictly 'external,' and then we have a third element alongside of the other two; we have coincidence merely and not connexion.¹ In the second place, Mr Joachim argues, with special reference to the dictum, 'experiencing makes no difference to the facts,' that in any sense in which this dictum is admissible it is irrelevant, and in the sense in which it is used and interpreted by the theory it is inadmissible. If it be meant only that the facts are independent of the experience of this or that individual subject, then the contention is no doubt justified, but it is not relevant, because, although the facts may be independent of *your* experiencing or of *my* experiencing, *qua* 'your' and 'mine,' it does not follow that they are independent of any and all forms of experiencing. If, however, the dictum means that the 'facts' are independent of 'experiencing' in any sense of the term, then the contention cuts the ground from under the possibility of explaining how there can be experience of such 'facts' at all. 'Experiencing' and 'fact,' in that case, simply come together, and we have an 'experienced fact,' but the meeting of the two is contingent and accidental, and indicates no necessity in the nature of things. "Their meeting is one of those ultimate inexplicabilities of which—on some theories at any rate—the Universe is full" (p. 43). And equally inexplicable is the supposed revelation of the truth or falsity of a 'proposition' in and through immediate intuition. For what we actually find is that the truth or falsity of our immediate experiences is revealed to us

¹ Mr Joachim asks in *Mind* (N.S., No. 63, p. 413) the very pertinent question whether if the terms are absolutely independent of the relation, the relation is also to be conceived as absolutely independent of the terms.

only by the success or failure of the attempt to mediate them, to fit them in consistently, that is to say, with the rest of our experience, and without that attempt they would possess for us neither truth nor falsity.

iii. The Coherence-notion of Truth has been implied in the criticism of the two preceding theories. It differs from the Cartesian conception of knowledge as a building made up of separate bits of truth, and also from the conception employed by formal logic of tautologous self-consistency. For it is the conception, on the one hand, of a system of *truth*, not of *truths*, and, on the other, of a living individuality, which moves and expands in the concrete articulations of its structure. Truth, thus conceived as a 'significant whole,' as an 'organised individual experience, self-fulfilling and self-fulfilled,' is, from the point of view of human intelligence, an ideal, and an ideal which can never in its completeness be realised as human knowledge. But, though nothing in our partial experience answers precisely to the demands of the Ideal, yet our partial experience involves through and through the being of an absolutely complete experience and draws from the actuality of the latter whatsoever being and truth it possesses. Mr Joachim tries to indicate how recognition of the ideal is logically forced upon us by taking a few typical instances of 'true' human judgments and inquiring what their 'truth' in the end involves. He shows that any such judgment expands into a system of knowledge which in its turn expands into a system of wider and more comprehensive scope, a process which evidently can reach no terminus short of a system at once self-sustained and all-embracing.¹ The judgment that " $3 \times 3 = 9$ " is, for example, very different as respects its significance and its truth in the thinking of an arithmetician and in the thinking of a child who is learning the multiplication table. To the latter it possesses a *minimum* of meaning, whilst to the former it may be a short-hand symbol for the whole science of arithmetic as known at the time. Whilst, then, no partial truth can ever be absolutely and completely true, yet every such partial truth has within it, so to speak, the capacity of self-development and growth. It tends constantly to open out and to be absorbed into a relatively completer truth, and that tendency is the expression of the ideal struggling in it for self-fulfilment. When absorbed into a body of knowledge we call a 'science,' the fragmentary truth does not retain the identical character which it possessed *per se*; it loses in greater or less degree its fragmentariness, and gains in richness and fulness of meaning through its interrelation with the rest of the whole of which it has become a part. For the progress of a science consists not in the mere *addition* of truth to truth, nor is a science, as at any time constituted, a mere aggregate or collection of single truths each of which is what it was in its singleness. On the contrary, the nature of the single truths is through and through determined by their scientific context, just as the nature of the constituent notes of a symphony is through and through determined by the harmonies

¹ The method, which is an old and familiar one, is exemplified in the sphere of morals, by Aristotle's famous argument at the beginning of the *Ethics*.

to which in the symphony they contribute. Carry on the reflection, conceive of the various systems of the sciences as constituent portions of the one coherent system of absolute truth, and the ideal presents itself as no unsubstantial dream or idle play of words.

Once again the apparatus of criticism is called into requisition. Although the Coherence-notion has, in Mr Joachim's estimation, carried us further into the heart of the problem than either of the other two theories, yet it too is in the end confronted with difficulties, and difficulties that demand for their solution a more thorough metaphysic than human thought has so far reached. In the first place, the assumption has been made, in tracing the advance from the relatively less to the relatively more perfect expressions of truth, that the ideal is a finished complete whole. Its dynamic character, as a self-fulfilling life or movement, has been allowed to disappear from view. But any attempt to exhibit the relation of such a rigid static system to human knowledge as developing in time would lead to an *impasse* before which we should find ourselves at a stand. In the second place, closer inspection reveals an essential difference between the significance of a scientific system of truth and the significant whole or self-contained meaning which has been taken to be the character of ideal experience. For whereas the significant whole can be no other than "substantial reality itself in its self-fulfilment," scientific truth is always truth *about* reality, and cannot, therefore, be identified with reality. Human knowledge of the completest kind still involves the antithesis of knowing and the known, and is, in that sense, subjective. Hence current logic is compelled to employ the notion of truth as correspondence, and if the ideal of coherence is to be sustained the possibility of a continuous passage must be shown from that conception of things, which the coherence-notion requires, to the dualistic conception which is involved in 'correspondence' (p. 120). But how the significant whole expresses itself *both* in our knowledge and in the reality known no metaphysical theory has hitherto succeeded in making intelligible. Moreover, it is at this point that the entire problem of error is thrown upon our hands. For error, the illusory appearance of knowledge, rests in the end, according to the coherence conception, upon a self-assertive independence on the part of finite minds which appears altogether irreconcilable with their dependence upon the substantial reality that fulfils itself in and through them. Just as Spinoza failed to show how the element of negation could find a place in the universe as conceived by him, so modern idealism fails to show how the complete coherence, which is perfect truth, involves as a necessary 'moment' in its self-maintenance that self-assertion on the part of finite minds which in its extreme form is error.

Mr Joachim closes, then, with an acknowledgment that philosophy has still much to do before it can fully satisfy the demands which the problem of the ultimate nature of truth makes upon it. And on the theory that truth is coherence, this result is in no way surprising, for if no judgment can be completely true, then that judgment in which the nature of

truth is most adequately formulated must itself fall short of absolute truth. Throughout the discussion, Mr Joachim has been trying to enforce the lesson, which evidently upon some of his critics has been thrown away, that unmitigated error is not the only alternative to complete truth. To ascribe to him a confession of "*total failure*" is an absurd misrepresentation. He makes no such confession. On the contrary, the confession he actually does make no more indicates the "final breakdown" of his theory of knowledge than Darwin's confession of inability to offer any explanation of the conditions that ultimately determine variation indicated the final breakdown of the theory of Natural Selection.

3. The admission that the coherence theory is inadequate and incomplete entitles us in no way to call for that theory's rejection. The very claim made for the theory is that notwithstanding its inadequacy and incompleteness it expresses a principle the alteration of which would render human knowledge unintelligible. To refute the theory the critic must be prepared to show that the validity claimed for it conflicts with some at least of those characteristics of experience for which as a theory it professes to account. We can only here try, in the barest way, to suggest the lines of reflection which seem to us to necessitate a far more radical clearance of the ground than Mr Joachim has attempted.

We raise, then, at once, what seems to us the fundamental question, and ask whether there is justification for assuming that, in an absolute experience, the three factors, (*a*) experiencing, (*b*) truth, (*c*) reality, must coincide, or, in other words, that from the point of view of the whole, these are different names for expressing the same thing. That the assumption has been made by Mr Joachim appears evident. The identification of *a* and *b* leads him to the assertion that, in the Absolute, "there is no 'Other' and therefore no 'Self.'" The identification of *b* and *c* leads him to the assertion that, in the Absolute, it is characteristic of truth to be no longer 'about' reality, or to have any reference beyond itself. Now, we need be in no way concerned to dispute that ultimately these three factors must be conceived from the point of view of a concrete unity, and that without that conception any theory of the nature of truth is bound to land us in contradictions. But it is an old fallacy to interpret concrete unity as sameness, or annulling of difference, and our contention is that from that fallacy our author has not contrived to free himself.

The severance of the 'experienced' from the 'experiencing' of it is, Mr Joachim tells us, the very mistake he discerns in the second of the theories he discusses. Of course, in a coherent universe, the 'severance' of any one thing from any other is illegitimate, and, in this sense, the table on which I am writing cannot be 'severed' from the ice round the North Pole. But that does not prevent these two things being decidedly different, nor the difference of experiencing from that which is experienced being a much more decided difference still. Mr Joachim fully recognises the importance of the distinction just mentioned when he is dealing with experience as we are aware of it. He recognises then the absurdity of

confusing, for example, the truth that " $2 + 2 = 4$ " with the psychical activity by which we become conscious of such truth. He recognises that the latter is a process or event occurring, whilst the former is neither the one nor the other. He recognises further that as we advance from a more or less isolated judgment to a systematic whole of truth such as is to be found in a science, the more pronounced and definite the distinction in question becomes, and that in reference to such a system of truth the thinking of a particular individual thinker is altogether irrelevant. What reason is there, then, we ask, for supposing that perfect experience implies the coalescence of factors which so persistently refuse to coalesce? So far as the finite subject is concerned, to regard him as a "solipsistic individual, conscious originally of a succession of psychical events as his own, and conscious of these alone," is "a discredited relic of subjective idealism" (p. 118). Why, then, should the infinite subject be conceived after this pattern as a huge "solipsistic individual" the 'moments' of whose being are certainly timeless, but who otherwise appears as the resurrected shade of the old relic? The notion we are combating becomes the more enigmatical when its implications as touching our experience are considered. It involves, so we learn, that our knowledge is animated by an endeavour, which, "fortunately for us," can never be accomplished. For the accomplishment would mean that knowledge would no longer be, since thought would be no longer distinguishable from its object. Can that be an ideal of knowledge, the attainment of which would destroy the very condition of knowledge? An experience so perfect that it cannot experience, an apprehension so complete that it cannot apprehend, seems to us, we confess, an odd receptacle for preserving the 'truth' contained in our partial judgments and limited scientific systems. And our bewilderment is increased, because we have entirely failed to discover why it should be supposed that even in perfectly complete knowledge the knowing subject must *be* what it knows and thus break down the antithesis on which the possibility of knowledge depends.

"Truth," says Mr Bradley, "does not as such exist," and he points out that in an Absolute where truth was "re-welded" to existence, truth would be truth no longer. Mr Joachim, on the other hand, in his presentation of the coherence theory, does not hesitate to describe the "solid and substantial and fully actual" Ideal as "the Truth." And we cannot help feeling that throughout the work before us there is a tendency to attribute to truth an existential character, and to interpret coherence as though it must imply that elements of truth and elements of existence are related to one another in a way similar to that in which either of these are related amongst themselves. In any case, such an interpretation would seem to us to indicate deep-rooted confusion. It is not to the purpose to reply that the "absolute severance" of truth from existence is an impossibility (p. 166). Of course it is; and no responsible thinker has ever maintained that they are "absolutely severed." But denial of "absolute severance" is very far from obliging us to assert that "truth is actual as true *thinking*," that it "*exists*

in finite experience" (p. 21), or that, in the Absolute, truth and existence are one. All these are cryptic sayings from which we shall vainly try to extract an intelligible meaning. And the reason is this. The features of timelessness, unchangeability, universality, which belong to the contents of truth, preclude us from regarding such contents as existing facts; they constrain us to admit that no content of truth can become a concrete individual and enter as such into the sum of existence. The ascription of existence to truth always means either that truth is conceived as a mere aggregate of particulars, or that the totality of existence is somehow pictured as a mysterious and baffling timeless process. "We first raise a dust and then complain that we cannot see." And the dust comes from our inveterate tendency of assuming that the known must enter into the knowing as part of the latter's structure, or that like, according to the old dogma, can only know like. It may well be that the independent being assigned to truth by the second of the three theories discussed cannot be maintained. Certainly it is no simple task the adherents of that theory have before them to render explicable, for example, the whole range of phenomena grouped psychologically under the head of memory and imagination. Nor do we think they would find it a light matter successfully to refute Mr Joachim's very able argument in support of the contention that the 'immediacy' of an experience can decide neither its truth nor its falsity. But the dependence of truth upon mind, as indeed our author himself allows (p. 52), need in no way imply that truth ever is or can be psychical or mental fact, part of the existing structure of that which we call the mind.¹ It need imply no more than that it is just the peculiarity of mental fact to represent to itself reality through means of a mode of being that is not itself existent fact, and that this non-existent mode of being would not *be* except as a way in which reality is apprehended by mind. A knowing mind is part of existing reality and cannot, therefore, be separated from the latter (p. 119); but the truth it knows, not being a part of existing reality, enables a knowing mind to transcend its position as a part and to contemplate the whole universe of fact from the point of view, so to speak, of an external observer.

But, if truth be thus dependent upon mind, it follows that the reality of existing fact cannot also in the same sense be dependent upon mind. We say, "in the same sense," because, on the assumption that reality is a connected whole, the extraction from reality of those existing facts called minds would not leave the other existing facts that are not minds unaffected, and we cannot tell whether after such a process of extraction the non-mental existing facts would continue to exist at all. The latter, however, cannot be dependent upon mind (even though that mind be infinite) in the sense that their reality consists in their being

¹ A writer in a recent number of *Mind* (July 1907, p. 408) says of an ideal "it exists, of course, as a psychical fact, in every mind that accepts it as an ideal." We do not envy the reader who tries to get a definite idea from this extraordinary sentence.

experienced. That cardinal tenet of idealism will have to be surrendered. For the process of experiencing is just what does not confer existence upon anything. Mr Joachim (pp. 61-62) treats rather contemptuously a statement made by Mr Moore to the effect that stars and planets are believed by the idealist to be very different indeed from what they seem, and he repudiates the suggestion that the idealist who holds that the universe is in its ultimate reality 'spiritual' understands by *the universe in its ultimate reality* the assemblage of such things as stars and planets. Let us grant the objection to be well-founded. Yet, after all, stars and planets have a reality, call it ultimate or not as you please, which fulfils a very essential function in this universe, and without reference to which the generalities of truth would lose their meaning and significance. No one has shown more conclusively than Mr Joachim himself how utterly impossible it is to conceive of such reality being taken up or absorbed into a timeless whole of 'ideal experience' (see, *e.g.*, p. 166).

After what has been said, there is no need for any extended comment upon the identification of the first and third of the three factors to which we have alluded. If our argument has not been altogether fallacious, it is obviously a thesis for which no convincing grounds can be furnished, that the ultimate core of *all* real existence is of the nature of experiencing. No valid reason can be given for assuming that that only can be experienced which is of like kind with the process by which it is experienced. Rather must we regard experiencing as one mode in which reality manifests itself, a mode peculiar to that type of existences to which we give the name of minds. We must not straightway transfer to our notion of reality in its entirety the characteristics we assign to specific parts of reality. We must not, for example, conclude that because the thinking of finite minds takes place in the Whole, therefore it is the Whole which, *qua* Whole, is thinking in them. For such an inference there is assuredly no logical justification, and if it has any other warranty the same, at any rate, has never yet been produced. A similar line of reflection renders it impossible to attach any intelligible meaning to the assertion that "the temporal process is nothing but a limited and arrested portion of the timeless actuality" (p. 168). Although a familiar dogma, this seems to us only a striking illustration of the difficulties that result from identifying truth and existence. No doubt we can and do *explain* the temporal by the timeless—all our science is such explanation—but no device of logic will enable us to conceive of the temporal as itself a portion, arrested or otherwise, of the timeless. One would be inclined indeed to go further and to insist that the phrase "the timelessness of reality" is a contradiction in terms. It is perfectly true that reality as a whole cannot be thought of as being *in* time, any more than it can be thought of as being in motion. Time and motion are in it, and not it in them. But this no more implies that reality as a whole is timeless, than does the statement that the moon is not *in* a mountain but mountains are in it imply that the moon is mountainless.

When once we are in earnest with the notion of the non-existent character of truth, the pressure of other difficulties that cling to the Coherence-theory, as Mr Joachim presents it, would be relieved. In particular, we should be no longer encumbered with the idea, more perplexing even in the field of Epistemology than it is in the field of Ethics, of a pre-formed end, in which there is actually contained and timelessly realised all that can ever come to be through development in time. Puzzling and embarrassing problems in abundance no doubt would still remain, but not, we think, of anything like so unpromising a character as those occasioned by the doctrines we have been considering. Signs are not wanting that the immediate business of philosophy will largely consist in the attempt so to re-think the conception of a concrete whole of being as to render it adequate to meet the demands of the distinction on which we have been laying stress. Be this, however, as it may, philosophic reflection cannot fail to be furthered by the stimulating and helpful criticism contained in Mr Joachim's book. That criticism will certainly assist in clearing away much sham knowledge and in preparing the ground for the 'construction' that is to come.

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Synthetica: being Meditations Epistemological and Ontological.—By S. S. Laurie, LL.D., Gifford Lecturer in the University of Edinburgh for 1905-6.—Two vols.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1906.

THE first of these volumes, Professor Laurie tells us, is a development of his previous works, *Metaphysica Nova et Vetusta* (2nd ed., 1885) and *Ethica* (2nd ed., 1885). It contains the metaphysical foundations of the doctrine of God and man which formed the basis of his Gifford Lectures and which is expounded in the second volume. Together the two volumes may be said to give us a summary of the ideas by which his philosophy as a whole is to be judged.

(1) Volume I. starts with a doctrine of Being which is defined at the outset as Natural Realism or Monistic Pluralism. The identity of meaning is not apparent. By the first of these terms he intends to emphasise his view, to the exclusion of all forms of subjectivism, or, as he prefers to call it, ideologism, that in all knowledge we are from the first in presence of reality, and that this coincides with the "natural" or common-sense assumption that our sensitive, associative, and reasoning powers are called into activity by a reality which is not exhausted in any of them; while, on the other hand, what they severally give us is, at its own level, real knowledge. Reality can indeed never be fully known as it is. Nevertheless, it is as we know it. "To suppose that mind in interpreting the object garbles it is preposterous . . . You cannot wipe out the given in the name

and for the glory of that which exists to know it." "God is great. This does not invalidate man's knowledge of Absolute Being as it actualises itself in his present recipient consciousness. In so far as a worm is aware of the object, it is aware of it truly and validly. The 'more' as seen by a higher spirit does not reveal the less to be an illusion." "Let any being—a snail or a man—negate its own 'absolute' or truth, and it will be first miserable and then perish." The writer has no sympathy either with the current self-depreciation of science or with recent agnostic developments of Idealism. Science tells the truth, though when it knows its own business it does not claim to tell it all. Neither can any philosophy be sound which fails to realise that, in knowledge as in action, man, and in him the Absolute, is born to trouble, and which seeks to substitute a "smooth perfection" for perfection through contradiction and suffering.

A similar attempt to reconcile philosophy with common sense is indicated by the second title. "Philosophy must be Monism. All is one—must be one, and the last and highest is already immanent in the first and lowest. Pluralism is self-contradictory. If the many seeks to cut itself off from the unity in which it has its being, it cuts itself off from all that is positive and life-giving." Should the pragmatist ask to have this idea converted before his eyes into its cash-value, the reply is that he applies a standard which all higher science disowns, but which in this case we need not shirk. Monism alone justifies the "conversation with the unseen divine" which James himself admits to be "vital." On the other hand, there must be real multiplicity. The One does not fear to give itself away to the many. Only in real individuals, with minds and wills that can freely choose and rationally reproduce the fulness of the One, can that fulness be itself realised. Any other view, whether materialistic or pantheistic, means the denial at once of the many and of the One. The reader might be tempted to find in all this a "return to Hegel (Schelling?)," were it not that the writer is at great pains to state his inability to accept the apparent identification by Hegel of self-conscious personality with the Absolute, reverting herein apparently himself to the more Spinozistic conception of self-consciousness as merely one of an infinite number of modes of the Infinite.

(2) What is ontology from one point of view is epistemology from another. At a certain point in its self-evolution Being appears in the form of feeling; the inanimate reflects back its meaning from conscious centres, though as yet subject and object are fused together in a matrix of feeling. At the next stage we have the rudiments of the separation between inner and outer of which space, time, and motion are the abstract forms, to be followed in turn by the emergence of a world of definite objects differing from the mind that senses or "attuites" them and from one another. Active selection, judgment, percipience are the work of a higher principle on the operation of which, under the name of the "will-dialectic," the writer expends all his powers of exposition. The motive of the dialectic is to be sought in the ultimate nature of man as committed to the complete unification

of his world. Its movement has to be traced through the various stages by which the mind advances from a mere aggregate of isolated individuals to a coherent system of interrelated parts in which its object is "inreasoned" and *ipso actu* its own being is realised as a finite embodiment of the infinite whole. First comes will as a dividing force dissolving the given complex into its factors; next the abbreviation known as general concepts and the extension of judgment through scientific inference that is thus made possible. Following on this, under the general head of "Causality," we have the moments of the "efficient," "formal," "formative," and "final" Cause leading as a last result to a complex presentate which, while taking up into itself all the preceding moments, passes beyond them in a grounded, necessitated whole, "an affirmation of the 'thing' as now a 'many' in the one of idea or end, . . . a fulfilled and explained actuality."

The second volume is a restatement of the doctrine as a detailed interpretation of our religious, æsthetic, and moral consciousness, of the existence of evil, and of the immortality of the soul. It follows at once from the unity of being and knowing that the various stages just enumerated of the self-revelation of the Absolute Being are stages in man's consciousness of God or in God's consciousness of Himself. "It is not the needs of man but the doctrine of knowledge that compels us to say that God must be All." "Accordingly the self-conscious spirit of man is, when it understands its place in the vast system, God feeling and thinking. His finite externalisation in and through a finite man is thus the veritable image of God." To realise this, to see his ideas and ideals in God as eternally beginning and end, source and fulfilment, and thus to find the significance of finite personality and all finite life to be its participation in an infinite and divine movement, is religion in the fullest sense. On the other hand, the various imperfect forms of religion are the result of fixing ourselves at some isolated and incomplete point of view and taking it as final.

Beauty is the evidence of the ideal in the forms of sense, "the effulgence thrown off from the sense ideal." It is therefore different from truth or expressiveness, as is evidenced to us by the uniqueness of the æsthetic emotion. Hence its educational value in raising man to the spiritual meaning of the sensuous without in the first instance any effort of his own.

Good is the actualisation of the "notion" of man. "The actualised idea is the end of each created thing, and there is a kind of quasi-ethics even for the atom and the plant. In the case of man that ultimate aim is the raising of the ego to concrete 'spirit'—a purpose immanent in the divine externalisation from the beginning." This realisation in its members, "the ethical fulfilment of a community of free personalities in traffic with each other," is the end of the State which is no mere abstract entity, but issues from persons and returns to persons as the highest expression of the corporate will. Hence, in addition to the negative justice recognised by the individualist, there is a positive justice laying upon the community the responsibility of seeking to unite individuals with the best through religion, knowledge, and the higher forms of recreation.

Evil is defined as the negative, and at the same time the condition, of the good. Without it, there could be no living movement of personality, no real achievement or development. On the other hand, we can only conceive of evil in relation to our plane of being. Here it is the condition under which God realises His ends, but how they may be realised elsewhere, or how evil is to be conceived from the point of view of the Absolute, is from the nature of the case undeterminable. God certainly is the *source* of evil, as of everything, but this does not mean that He *created* it.

Immortality of the soul is rendered probable by the definition of personality as the appropriation by the individual of the universal. It becomes possible at the point at which self-consciousness emerges in the spiral course of natural development. It is this that admits us to the fact of Absolute Being and to its infinity of life. On the other hand, it depends on the soul's own energy whether it will claim this inheritance: "Only he, His soul well-knit and all his battles won, Mounts, and that hardly, to eternal life." The demonstration is not coercive, but the passing of the man-person into a higher sphere when the body dies is as nearly demonstrated as the nature of the case admits. These last sections on the nature of evil and the immortality of the soul are the least technical and the most ably worked out, and will repay the study of readers who may hesitate to commit themselves to mastering the details of a complicated argument.

The interest of these volumes as a whole, apart from the feeling, and in many parts real inspiration and *élan*, with which they are written, will probably be found in the comprehensiveness with which the problem of philosophy is grasped, and the sustained effort that is made to escape from the Scylla of the static or "stagnant" Absolute without falling into the Charybdis of subjectivism and pluralism. In their own peculiar way they contain much that is helpful towards the restatement of Idealism which is the chief philosophical requirement of the present time. With an expression of personal gratitude this notice might, and preferably would, here end; but criticism would be unsatisfied if it were not added that the way is peculiar. Why this irritating form? It is not only that the second volume is merely a somewhat less technical restatement of the first, but in the argument of each there is endless repetition. For whom, again, is the book written? The uninitiated will find far too little; the initiated would be satisfied with much less; the positivist who could understand it if he would is not likely to persevere long in the attempt. But all this might be passed over if the writer had made clear the point on which, as he rightly perceives, the whole must rest. "The question of negation is the most vital question in philosophy." This being so, we should have expected somewhere a solid foundation in a careful logical analysis of the nature of affirmation and negation, and particularly of the relation between difference and contradiction. Yet we are left to glean what we can from various scattered passages. The clearest I find is this (ii. 74):—" *Omnis determinatio est negatio* does not mean that the determinate 'is' by virtue of the negation. Immanent in percipi-

ence as end of the percipient act is affirmation in and through negation of all else. The positive, the determined, does not rest on the negation as ground of its *reality*, but is determined by it only as ground of its *possibility*. So also with the Universal: the negation is ground of the possibility of externalisation only; the world is the 'positive affirmation' of absolute eternal Being; out of which affirmation negation issues as possibility of the affirmate or individual." This can only mean that individuality consists in the mere negation of universality, multiplicity in the negation of unity. But if this is so, what becomes of its reality? As an individual the concrete thing appears as the mere negation of Being, and nothing stands between us and a thoroughgoing phenomenalism.

To this there are two lines of reply traceable in the writer's thought. We may say that, though not of it, not-being or negation is contained in being, and in this sense the individual both is and is not. But if we leave the matter here, are we not stranded with an unsolved contradiction? It is perhaps "effeminacy" in a certain form of idealism to harp upon the contradictions of ordinary knowledge as a sign of its imperfections, but it is a still greater weakness to rest in opposites as ultimate and to treat philosophy as a mere roosting-place of insoluble problems. It may be true that "each thing is a contradiction"; but will not the critic be apt to reply, so much the worse for the thing and for the philosophy which leaves the thing thus broken on our hands. The only other way is to go back upon the distinction between ground of reality and ground of possibility, and to admit that there is a sense in which negation enters into the constitution of the affirmative. It is not surprising to find the writer driven in the end to this admission. After reasserting (ii. p. 410) in the strongest manner the merely formal import of negation as the ground of the possibility "of things which it does not in any way constitute," he returns to the subject on p. 416 and concludes that "the individual is a synthesis of affirmation or idea and of negation. The negation is thus a constitutive principle of activity contained in the affirmation, and enters into the method of the universe." But this involves a restatement of the whole relation, which is nowhere attempted.

At two other crucial points the ground gives way under us for want of a solid logical foundation. How are we to conceive of freedom? In spite of the author's repudiation of the liberty of indifference, the reader cannot escape the suspicion that the contingency upon which he insists as the opening for freedom is to be interpreted in the merely negative sense of absence of determination, and that we are left in the end with an unresolved contradiction of liberty and necessity to be united as best they may in the concept of the will. Here, as in the case of individuality, a collation of passages might provide us with hints of a sounder theory, as when man's "casualty" is traced "to natural law and the conflicting purposes of his fellow-men." But elsewhere such causality appears as merely the opposite of law. As a final test we suggest the treatment of the judgment of perception or recognition (i. 280 foll.). Is the writer in earnest in interpreting this as

properly symbolised by " $A = A$ "? If so, at what point and by what means do we escape from the logical treadmill of mere identity to the open world of identity in difference? These ambiguities, we suggest, would have been avoided if the writer had faced the logical question in its entirety, and had made clear to himself and his readers the fundamental distinction between difference and contradiction. It is perhaps not too much to hope from so vigorous and independent a thinker that he may yet see his way to providing the requisite underpinning of logical analysis, with the rearrangement of his conclusions that this would involve.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM.

The Philosophical Radicals, and other Essays. With Chapters reprinted on the Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel.—By A. Seth Pringle Pattison, LL.D., Fellow of the British Academy; Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh.—Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1907. Pp. xi+336.

THE varied contents of this volume, faithfully described on the title-page, are selected from the author's philosophical writings during the last quarter century. The earlier two-thirds of the book consist of articles and reviews which have appeared in various journals, and nearly all of these are of quite recent date. The remaining third is reprinted from two publications now for a long time out of print—the *Development from Kant to Hegel* (1881), and the *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, a volume of composite authorship, published in 1883. The essay reprinted from this volume, and entitled "Philosophy as Criticism of Categories," concludes the present work. On their own account both these publications are well worth preserving in the present convenient form. The latter is indeed of special interest. The author's opinions have not remained stationary in the interval since it first appeared; and yet it is not the difference between his earlier and later thought, but rather the continuity of his philosophical activity, that is suggested by a re-perusal of this striking article. It is not too much to say that it explains the point of view which determines the treatment of the varied topics discussed in the present work. Apart from a few phrases, it might equally well have been placed at the beginning of the volume and served as an introduction to the whole.

This essay is so much of the character of a lucid summary that it is impossible to give a short account of its doctrine without losing its peculiar impressiveness. Yet, reduced to its simplest terms, its main theses may perhaps be expressed in the form of two propositions. The first proposition is that conceptions which are adequate for certain aspects or certain regions of experience are shown by their own nature to be inadequate when the range of experience is widened or our view of it deepened. "True metaphysic lies in that criticism of experience which aims at developing

out of the material of science and of life the completed notion of experience itself." The second proposition defines more positively the complete whole from which we make abstraction in particular experiences and in the special sciences; and asserts that it is constituted by the notion of self-consciousness. Thus Kant's "assertion of the unity of the subject as the ultimate principle of thought leads directly to the conception of knowledge as necessarily organic to a subject, and as constituting in this form the complete Fact from which all so-called facts are only abstractions."

Both these propositions are much more familiar to-day than they were twenty-five years ago. The former proposition has indeed been repeatedly reinforced of late from the side of physical science itself; and it is necessary to remember that it is consistent with almost any kind of view as to the nature of the whole from which abstraction is made in the special sciences; a form of Naturalism, or even of Agnosticism, is not excluded by it. What distinguishes Idealism, in all its forms, is the assertion contained in the second or some similar proposition — the assertion that the nature of the whole is to be interpreted through the notion of self-consciousness or after the similitude of mind. This, according to the author's statement, is the gist of what is important in Kant's teaching, and indeed, we may add, in the teaching of Hegel also. The method and details of the Hegelian "criticism of categories" do not seem ever to have been adopted by the author; and in other works he has given his reasons for rejecting them. "It must all be done over again," as T. H. Green said. But it must be done if we are to have a satisfactory metaphysics. Hegel did attempt to show how each category revealed its own inadequacy but at the same time led up to the adequate Idea. His procedure may have been faulty, but his aim was sound and necessary. A good deal of recent writing of an idealist cast is itself too easily content with generalities—with abstractions. It is not enough to show the "inadequacy" of the various notions of the special sciences; the exact measure of that inadequacy and the way in which in each case it leads to its complementary notion must also be made clear. Otherwise our treatment of the various notions tends to be empirical, or even haphazard, and the relative positions of physical, biological, social, and ethical notions are always liable to be transposed in a manner hostile to idealism, while the supreme notion of self-consciousness remains otiose, until its supremacy is called in question.

This early essay also contains a number of suggestive illustrations of the way in which its point of view may shed light on questions of social science and of religious thought. The other essays in the present volume elaborate some of these suggestions. Three of the first four essays deal mainly with social and political ideas. These are the articles on the Philosophical Radicals, on Herbert Spencer, and on Mr Kidd's *Principles of Western Civilisation*. They are all very careful and instructive studies, and show the author's unerring instinct for what is essential philosophically as well as for distinction

in literary style. In these essays he may be said to be bringing out the inadequacy of certain notions or categories for the interpretation of the social order. The Philosophical Radicals treated human society as if it were a bit of mechanism which could be explained by the interaction of attractive and repulsive forces. And Spencer, in spite of his conception of evolution, was on the whole under the influence of the same notions. This point is well put by the author:—

“It may seem a strange thing to say that the ideas of the apostle of evolution were, philosophically speaking, of a pre-evolutional type. But, after all, it is not more of a paradox than what so many commentators have demonstrated of Kant, that the author of the critical philosophy was still, on many points, in bondage to the dogmas of pre-critical thought. Spencer’s idea of explaining all phenomena in terms of molar and molecular forces is akin to his treatment of religion; or rather, the latter is a special case of the general point of view. Religion is a phenomenon in which a historical development is demonstrable towards worthier conceptions and nobler feelings; but, although recognising this development, Spencer ends by finding the essence of religion in the acknowledgment of an unknowable power—a residuary belief which he finds common to all forms of the religious consciousness. To some extent, it may be said, Spencer emancipates himself from his own logic and seeks a law of development; but the tendency thus exemplified, to find ‘the essential nature’ in rudimentary abstractions like matter and motion or in some feature which remains the same through all the stages of a process, is really to thrust us always back upon a bare or an identical element, and so, in effect, to deny the reality of evolution altogether.”

The remaining contents of the volumes consist of two articles of an epistemological character—reviews of Professor Jones’s *Philosophy of Lotze*, and of Professor Dewey’s *Studies in Logical Theory*; the article on Martineau’s Philosophy, and a review of Dr M’Taggart’s *Some Dogmas of Religion*, both of which originally appeared in this Journal. In these latter, the author deals once more with the ultimate problems which he, many years ago, set out by discussing in the chapters on the Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel. In these essays the earlier point of view is retained and applied; but it is used for purposes of criticism rather than of construction. On occasion, however, his own views flash out between the criticisms. “‘God is the sole reality.’ Neither religion nor philosophy can seriously entertain any other alternative. In many cases this view has led to a denial of the personality of the divine; but even Martineau, personalist of the personalists, speaks of God as ‘the Soul of all souls.’ The preliminary difficulty . . . of conceiving ‘how one person could be part of another,’ is of a nature which suggests a reconsideration of the conception of personality rather than the omission of a thorough discussion of the only vital theory of God and man. . . . What does the existence of God, or the personality of God, mean for the religious thinker save the intense conviction of the rationality and the righteousness of the universe?”

The hope may be expressed that the author himself will some day give us this "thorough discussion of the only vital theory of God and man." Few, if any, in this country are better fitted to shed light on the ultimate problem of philosophy and theology

W. R. SORLEY.

CAMBRIDGE.

The Mystery of Newman.—By Henri Brémont. Translated by H. C. Corrance. With an Introduction by the Rev. George Tyrrell.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1907.

THIS is, in some ways, a difficult book, and yet a book which cannot, in the interests of Newman or religion, be neglected by anyone who realises the importance of either one or the other. The difficulty does not arise from the style, which is remarkably clear and entertaining even in the translation. It arises from a certain inconsistency from which the author suffers in consequence of a conscientious fear of bias. He began the study of Newman (as is evident) with an indiscriminating enthusiasm. He then became critical. "Having passed through the first period of enchantment," he tells us, "in which the eyes are still covered with the veil of uncritical admiration, I began to read the Oxford sermons with greater attention and freedom of mind, and took a mischievous delight in bringing together the passages which would allow me to write a chapter on the 'Jansenism of Newman.'" This particular chapter, indeed, never got written, because a maturer study showed him that it would not be just; but there are signs not a few throughout the book that this mischievous delight in collecting evidences of Newman's defects never quite left M. Brémont. On the contrary, it came to be reinforced and accentuated by the perusal of Dr Abbot.

There is no doubt that M. Brémont is one of the most brilliant writers in criticism that France at present possesses. Had he but trusted his own instincts, he would hardly have laid himself open to attack, for his instincts are little short of infallible. But, unfortunately, there is scarcely a chapter in which we cannot trace the influence of Newman's most uncompromising foe. If M. Brémont fights against it he fights but half-heartedly, and, in the long run, usually succumbs to it altogether. "M. Brémont fears too much," says M. Dimnet, "lest he should become Newman's dupe," and the consequence is that he writes like a disillusioned lover.

It is not so much, perhaps, that M. Brémont fears to become a dupe himself as that he fears lest Newman should make dupes of the young Catholics of France and introduce there that "weakening strain and distorting mark" which Mr Bagehot found even in the vigorous mind of Mr Gladstone and traced to the influence of Tractarianism. It is well perhaps that some warning of this kind should be given. It would be the

greatest of evils if the brilliant little band of modern French Catholics, who owe so much to Newman, should get, as it were, shut up in him, as have been some of his English admirers. No leader that is followed with absolute docility but will seem to leave on his disciples "a weakening strain and a distorting mark," and the more intense, concentrated, and attractive the leader the more dangerous the docility of his admirers. But M. Brémond seems rather to threaten with certain disaster than to warn of a possible danger. He speaks of Newman as "a magician," "an enchanter," of Mark Pattison and the rest as "his victims," and then so describes the type to which these victims belonged as to include the whole modern intellect and to leave Newman entirely responsible for the catastrophe which occurred.

Now M. Brémond himself has made the answer easy. His own misunderstanding of Newman shows us in what *their* misunderstanding consisted, and his own reading of Newman how they came to take theirs. He speaks of Newman as continuing to make between Liberals and Ultramontanes a kind of *via media* as if it were a compromise, and yet at the same time accuses him of using what is called an argument "that kills or cures." He quotes Newman's words: "First shoot round corners and then convert by the syllogism." And then he concludes that Newman depreciates logic and sets up imagination in its place. But Newman detested compromise; criticised the scholastic use of the dilemma; ridiculed the English distrust of logic, and regarded imagination as the most untrustworthy of guides. It is not because he despises the syllogism that he denies we can make converts by means of it. It is not in favour of imagination that he insists on the limits of logic. It is not in order to make a compromise that he attempts a *via media*. And his use of an argument that kills or cures is intended to enforce the rights of logic and to destroy the possibility of compromise. His aim is to find the place where consistency is the only possible test of truth, and where growth, life, and development (which may, at first sight, give an impression of inconsistency) may also become such tests.

Newman does not depreciate logic in order to set up imagination. He does but limit the scope of logic in favour, not of imagination, but all the faculties and potentialities of man taken together. For what is it that enables us to get rid of our narrowness as units in humanity? Not logic. We may be at once narrow and logical to the end of our lives. Not imagination. Imagination may take us out of the narrow way of logic only to throw us into a sea of error. Neither one nor the other, then, but all the faculties taken together—character, personality, sympathy, and the becoming aware of new facts, new hopes, new fears, new possibilities. Thus alone can we widen the premises from which we argue and gain a chance of "making for the truth with the whole man." Conversion is not brought about by logic or by imagination, but it is a change of the whole man consequent on the witness of a new fact or the realisation of a new possibility. But to say this is not to deny the use of implicit

reasoning or the fact that the process may be logically expressed. We may say roughly that even imagination may tell us that an idea is great. It is logic which considers how far it is true, and all the faculties together whether it has a true greatness. In short, the protest of Newman is not against any of the uses of the intellect, but against the intellectualism, first, of the schools, and then of the reaction against the schoolmen, which seemed to him to deal with man as if man were intellect alone.

This initial error of M. Brémond's vitiates his criticism not only of the writings, but of the character of Newman. Had Newman ever been seeking a compromise or insisting on a mere dilemma, his quarrels with Whately, Faber, Ward, and the rest would be inexcusable, as M. Brémond thinks they were. Was he but following his imagination and insisting on a sort of personal dictatorship, his uncompromising attitude would have been mere persecution. But he had convictions which were convictions of the whole man, and his friendships were a part of his very being. He could not continue in close friendship with Whately because the whole mental attitude of Whately had begun to wound him to the quick, and anything but a close friendship with one he loved so deeply would have seemed to him the bitterest of mockeries. It is because in these days we scarcely know what a conviction is that we suppose a compromise either in conviction or in friendship to be possible. With Newman it was a necessity of his being to be convinced with the whole man, and, with the whole man, to be a friend. "Those are but shallow souls," says Mr Gladstone, "who think that the relations of close friendship can continue after its daily bread has been taken away."

All this seems a severe criticism of M. Brémond. But M. Brémond is not altogether to be blamed for making a mistake which has been made so often. It is right that all these difficulties should be openly stated. It is right that all Newman's defects should be exposed. It is inevitable that they should be sometimes exaggerated. For defects he certainly had, and not insignificant ones, both in his dialectic and in his character. No one would suffer, in the long run, more than Newman, were he conventionalised into a saint or stereotyped into a text-book. And M. Brémond is to be congratulated on the boldness with which he has faced the most unattractive portion of his task, as well as on the brilliancy and insight which he frequently shows. But it is somewhat hard that Newman should have been accused by his contemporaries of falling under the sway of German rationalism, and, by his later critics, of not knowing anything about it; nor is it fair that criticisms such as those of Leslie Stephen should be half-admitted—criticisms, surely, as shallow as they are prejudiced, while the influence of Dr Abbot, wherever it appears, turns what might have been a living portrait into a semi-animated caricature.

W. J. WILLIAMS.

DORKING, SURREY.

The Structure and Growth of the Mind.—By W. Mitchell, Hughes Professor of Philosophy, University of Adelaide.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1907.—Pp. xxxi + 512.

THERE are two points of view from which mind is dealt with in this volume: the book forms an introduction to the problems of philosophy, and it offers a study, predominantly critical, of the conceptions currently applied to mental facts. As is indicated in the preface, it is meant to assist in the work of teaching, not by giving an elementary survey of facts, but by providing a basis for the more advanced reflection on psychological problems. The first point of view is emphasised in the remark which no one would care to deny that psychology in its treatment of the system of experience is the proper introduction to philosophy. And no doubt much can be said for this position; much also for an opposed view. It is the second feature of Professor Mitchell's work, its analysis and its criticism of psychological conceptions, that seems the more interesting and important. And while the detailed critical comments in which it abounds are most valuable, we will direct attention rather, in the space at our command, to the positive constructive conceptions which are employed. This work is without question an important contribution to the literature of psychology.

The contents of the volume are divided into four parts. In the first part there is given an examination of the two explanations of experience, the direct and the indirect, together with an analysis of experience. In the second, the subjects of imitation, sympathy, and æsthetic appreciation are dealt with. In the third part the growth of intelligence is considered in three divisions, sensory, perceptual, and conceptual; while in the last part the extension of the direct and indirect explanations is considered. There are eighteen chapters included in the volume.

The indirect explanation of mind may be taken up first. It seeks to assign the physical system and processes which correspond to the mental system. The view that there is a different brain charge for each difference in experience is accepted as a matter of faith rather than of demonstration; it is interpreted as meaning that mind and brain do not interact, that "the energy of the physical process remains physical throughout, and is neither increased, diminished, nor directed by the feeling with which it happens to be associated." In spite of this, "we do not define what the mind can do, nor deny any of its claims, least of all its claims to be a real thing." And this is so since "the capacity of the brain has to be inferred from the capacity to experience," and "whatever is possible to the mind is possible to the brain." Difficulties in regard to their relation are met by the solution, offered later on in the volume, that mental and physical facts are not co-ordinate, and that "a mind and its experiences are realities that are presentable to sense as the brain and its actions." At another point we learn that the use of conceptions of function and value

is primary in psychology, and that it is required also in physiology. But the old difficulty of bringing the teleological and mechanical views into rational connection hardly seems to be removed.

The direct explanation of mind develops the line of reflection which ordinary experience offers, but a detailed analysis is required before this explanation can be adequately applied. Accordingly an analysis is presented in which experience is regarded functionally as the work of bringing the self into conscious connection and adjustment with the world. Three fundamental forms of function are distinguished: thought and knowledge; interest, including pleasure and pain and emotion; seeking, and action. After this, which is termed the "cross-section," the "longitudinal section" is presented—an account of the course, or process, of experience. The main result of this second analysis is the determination of self-direction or self-activity, and the three functions or "attitudes" are finally interpreted as interconnected forms in which self-activity is experienced.

Through this analysis the problem is given which the direct explanation has to solve:—By what organisation, through what conditions, does the mind work and achieve its experience? Three causes or conditions of experience are commonly named—the self, experience, and faculties. But when we speak of the self, there is no distinct factor meant; we are only speaking generally, omitting to specify the condition more particularly. The relation of the two other factors is determined in this way. Experience is taken as the conscious occasion, while the rest of the cause, all the reacting part, is faculty. That this faculty is not another experience becomes clear, we are told, when it is observed that only by an erroneous application of physical concepts to ideas can we speak of them as agents. By the faculties of this explanation are not meant the ordinary faculties which are merely a generalised repetition of conscious experience; what is meant here by faculty is the power to experience, the condition to which consciousness is due. These faculties, gained by inference from introspective fact, "name the conditions that account for the systematic connection and growth of our conscious faculties." The reacting structure—mind and its faculties—is just as much a real structure as the brain or other physical object when we have no sensation of them.

What, then, are these faculties as actual factors? So far as a faculty is "all inherited, and thus purely instinctive, the explanatory analysis can give its factors only in physiological terms, as faculties, so to say, of the nervous system." In this way, too, we can explain the growth and decay that are not due to experience. On the other hand, so far as faculty or power is acquired, we can state the conditions of its acquisition and of its working when it is acquired. These latter faculties are not to be explained by reference to unconscious or subconscious mental activity; apparently, in the last resort, though this is not stated in so many words, they are to be interpreted as functions of the nervous system. This treatment of faculty, though suggestive, is not altogether convincing. It is well that we should be reminded that experience, or any other factor, works

through relation to a system of conditions that extend beyond it. But it is by no means plain that the factor which supplements the conscious occasion is not in part another experience—"in part" because it may be assumed that no mental activity is purely self-determining.

The direct analysis and explanation are followed and supplemented by an interesting account of mental growth. Structure can be understood only by following its development; it is through the consideration of growth that we become able to explain the intimate adaptation of faculty to its occasion. Three levels or grades of intelligence are named—sensory, perceptual, and conceptual; while distinguished, they are not to be separated, for they exist in manifold relation. In regard to each of these grades we may ask three questions: how is it connected with a lower grade? how is it affected when allied with a higher form? how does it proceed apart from connection with what is higher? Thus, to take sensory intelligence as an example, the first question is answered by pointing out that the instinct, on which it is based, is completed and defined by it; while, in answer to the second, it is noted that an idea or purpose supplies a spur to the sensory process. Finally, it is observed that where higher interests are lacking, the development may be brought about through the modification by the sensory whole of the parts, in the way of differentiation and of new construction. And thus the final theory of the work of intelligence is a theory of development.

Such are some of the outstanding features of this book. So brief an account, however, necessarily fails to do justice to the wealth in effective analysis and insight into the meaning of theoretical and practical problems. The fact that the views which are supported are throughout reasoned views gives it an unusually stimulating quality. And this quality would be still more in evidence were it not for a certain occasional elusiveness in the presentation of the argument, which is not altogether removed by the detailed analysis that is provided.

W. G. SMITH.

UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH.

Gaston Frommel: Études Littéraires et Morales.—Saint-Blaise: Foyer Solidariste, 1907.

GASTON FROMMEL, professor of dogmatic and apologetic theology in the University of Geneva, died last year at the early age of forty-two. His friends are preparing to issue, in a series of volumes of which this is the first, a selection of his literary remains, which will comprise more distinctly theological essays and academic lectures, as well as journals and letters.

On opening the book, the reader finds, placed together in the forefront, essays on Pierre Loti, H. F. Amiel, and Paul Bourget. If he be a serious reader, he may be inclined to pass them by as light literature, and seek more congenial matter under the headings of Tolstoi or Vinet. But to

do so would be ill-advised. These are no *causeries de Lundi*. Beneath the writer's brilliant and incisive style there is a fervour of moral criticism which makes itself felt at once. The juxtaposition of these three essays may have been quite fortuitous, but together they read as a critique of modern melancholy. Loti's hero (whatever his name) is posed as a "natural man" against a vast background of sea or forest. Frommel protests that the unmoral man is not the natural man. He is primitive, in the sense of being not perfectly developed, or he is degenerate.

"Un des caractères de l'école naturaliste est la simplification psychologique des héros qu'elle met en scène. Cela est inévitable, puisqu'elle ignore tout un côté de la nature humaine et que les choses de l'esprit lui échappent entièrement. . . ." "Malgré tout son charme, l'œuvre de Pierre Loti est un œuvre de mort, elle nous fait assister au déclin de la personnalité."

And life without moral purpose—life at best regarded as a series of *tableaux*—has its inevitable sadness; a sadness which sometimes refuses to be comforted because it finds a satisfaction in the artistic expression of itself, but which passes beyond affectation when it is touched by a sense of loss, and looks into a void where once dwelt some ideal sanction of life and conduct. So the case stands revealed in Loti's *Fleurs d'Ennui* :—

"'Mon ciel a toujours été s'assombrissant, Plumkett,' écrit Pierre Loti, 'depuis l'époque déjà lointaine où j'ai vu s'éteindre cette image du Christ qui éclairait doucement mon enfance.' Et Plumkett lui répond : 'J'éprouve cette sensation poignante que vous connaissez aussi, l'éloignement immense de quelque part où je ne suis jamais allé; de séparation de quelqu'un que je n'ai jamais connu.'"

In the *Journal Intime* of Amiel, Frommel sees a man's effort to divest himself of the obligations of conscious personality by a kind of self-mesmerising process. A constant *tête-à-tête avec l'infini*, and an aspiration to be Man, rather than *a* man, may lead to a mere weakening of character: "la prétention au *pouvoir-être* indéfini" may mark the egotism of the dilettante. The effort to get beyond the perplexities of life by a fetch of subjective exaltation leads to a melancholy which is only not pessimistic because it has determined to hold itself aloof from considerations as to the meaning of things and the lot of man, save only as matter for a kind of sermon that has no application. How well Amiel thought he had succeeded in his effort is to be read in his own words :—

"Tous les événements personnels sont pour moi des prétextes à méditations, des faits à généraliser en lois, des réalités à réduire en idées. . . . Telle est la vie du penseur. Il se *dépersonnalise* chaque jour; s'il consent à éprouver et à faire, c'est pour mieux comprendre; s'il veut, c'est pour connaître la volonté. . . . Il contemple le spectacle de l'amour et l'amour reste pour lui un spectacle."

Frommel's comment on 'la tristesse et l'accablante mélancolie' of Amiel is inevitable :—

"Spectateur immobile d'une lutte sans trêve, Amiel laisse couler des jours inutiles à lui-même et aux autres; il les 'voit fuir devant la mort' sans les avoir vécus."

Passing by the more elaborate essay on Bourget (in whom Frommel sees great but chaotic ability falling short of certitude in achievement from want of conviction, dropping even from effort into Buddhistic inertia "Je songe qu'aucun but ne vaut aucun effort"), we come to the real centre of gravity of the book in an admirable monograph on Edmond Scherer. Here we are no longer dealing with art or affectation—with a policy of *laissez-faire* diversified with cosmic emotion. Frommel sees here, and traces with a keenness of insight from which sympathy is never absent, the extinction of Christianity in a soul once deeply religious and always sincere. But he sees more; for Scherer is to him a type of a whole school of contemporary theology, which is, as he looks at it, being drawn by apparent logical necessity to an inevitable crisis.

He started with the Protestant orthodoxy of the *Réveil*—that is, with an intellectual dogmatism that supposed itself to be entirely Scriptural, and a theory of Scripture represented by Gaussen's *Theopneustie*; and, moreover, with a personal religion which was a mystical devotion to Christ, uttering itself in expressions which remind one of Henry Suso. His *Journal Intime* is entitled "Visites de Jésus-Christ." But it seems that mind and heart never made one music. Intellectual exigencies drove Scherer down from the mount of vision. When, in his orthodox days, he fixed upon external revelation as the criterion of certainty, he practically decided against the testimony of conscience. In this decision the beginning of the end is, in Frommel's view, implicit; Scherer's position is summed up in the words:—

"La morale ne peut nous venir que de Dieu, et Dieu n'a parlé que par le Christ, son Fils éternel. Tout en revient, on le voit, à la révélation extérieure."

Frommel's criticism is trenchant:—

"Il est impossible d'asseoir une foi plus ferme sur un scepticisme plus complet à l'égard des éléments mêmes de la foi. . . . Cette négation de l'autorité de conscience au profit de l'autorité externe est en contradiction directe avec l'esprit de l'Évangile. Elle cache un secret athéisme et contient déjà le principe de la catastrophe subséquente."

But when, in 1846, Scherer became professor at Geneva, first of history, and afterwards of Biblical exegesis, he was still quite unaware that scientific intellectualism and religious mysticism would prove to be incompatible. Even while he is discovering that—*Hélas! on ne fait pas impunément de l'exégèse!*—his personal religion is as fixed as before; he is praying that he may set forth the truth he knows with no veil of reticence, and that his heart may be as that of a weaned child. This is still his attitude when he publishes *La Critique et la Foi* (1850). His incipient rationalism, now distinguishing between the revelation and its literary vehicle, leads him to break with the whole orthodox theory of inspiration; but still, it is the essence of the faith, *i.e.* communion with Christ, which makes the Scriptures essential, as documents of the faith, to the Church and the Christian. We may not stay to mark the steps of Scherer's progress towards agnosticism; but from this point it is by way

of a philosophy which explained away the two elements which seem essential to the ethical side of religion, the sense of obligation and the sense of sin: "Le péché par excellence," remarks Frommel, "c'est la négation de péché." Scherer's last attitude of mind takes the form of stoical resignation—"the acceptance of things as they are, and the habit of taking them as the ineluctable conditions of life." With the fortitude and the melancholy of Marcus Aurelius, he says, "O Universe, I will what thou wilt." But here again we meet the blank sorrow that comes, not from fear, but from the sense of the aimlessness of it all,—never more accurately described than by one of the speakers in Scherer's *Conversations Théologiques*:—

"Il y'a dans les choses humaines une certaine pente qu'on ne remonte point. . . . Ainsi je me vois entraîné par les convictions de mon esprit vers un avenir qui ne m'inspire ni intérêt ni confiance."

The pages devoted to Tolstoi contain fragments of a course of lectures, and naturally lack the unity and form which distinguish the preceding essays. The papers on Vinet, the theologian whose influence is most seen in Frommel's own thought and teaching, are rather of the nature of an *éloge* than of characterisation or criticism. They presuppose a sympathetic knowledge (*e.g.* of Pressensé's monograph on Vinet); and the unprepared reader finds himself somewhat in the position of a chance attendant at a public funeral. The same is true, indeed, of the brief notice of Césaire Malan *filis*; but here there are some records of personal intercourse which are at once impressive and informing.

We shall look forward to making further acquaintance with Frommel, as a man and as a thinker, in the less critical and more didactic works which are to appear in the succeeding volumes of this series.

J. E. ODGERS.

OXFORD.

The Religion of Nature.—By E. Kay Robinson.—London :
Hodder & Stoughton.

THE problem with which the author of this book attempts to deal is part of the larger question of the compatibility of the existence of evil with the belief in an almighty and all-loving God. But it may well be taken by itself as requiring, to some extent, a separate method of investigation, and also as a burden that remains to weigh upon the minds of some, even after the rest of the problem may have lost much of its excessive pressure. Here, then, is the contradiction to which our author confines his attention—Nature's apparent reign of terror and cruelty on the one hand, and the supposed beneficence of its Creator on the other. And when we reflect upon the length of time in which this contradiction has seemed beyond the "wit of man" to reconcile, to venture the assertion that this little book,

written on purely scientific lines, and making no appeal whatever to faith, does in reality prove a wonderfully complete and satisfying theodicy within the limits we have mentioned, will seem to most people too incredibly good to be true.

Hitherto, the closer the attention bestowed by the inquirer upon the subject, the greater has been his sense of the terrible nature of the facts disclosed. The picture that is drawn by Romanes—to take but one of Mr Robinson's predecessors—is one of unrelieved gloom. "Throughout all this period of incalculable duration, this inconceivable host of sentient organisms has been in a state of unceasing battle, dread, ravin, pain. More than one-half of the species which have survived the ceaseless struggle are *parasitic* in their habits, lower and insentient forms of life feasting on higher and sentient forms; we find teeth and talons whetted for slaughter, hooks and suckers moulded for torment—everywhere a reign of terror, hunger, sickness, with oozing blood and quivering limbs, with gasping breath and eyes of innocence that dimly close in deaths of cruel torture." And to Romanes the inference was "obvious and unassailable," that beneficence was not an attribute of God; while there is little doubt that many who have remained theists have taken refuge in a sort of unconscious dualism, or in an over-statement of what we may call the "theory of by-products."

But now comes the author of this book with an entirely different method, with a knowledge of the animal world certainly not less than any of those who have gone before him, and with a deeper insight into the workings of evolution. And, as a result of his careful researches, it becomes evident to him that, in such statements as the above, observation has been confounded with inference, and that the facts are susceptible of a totally different interpretation. That interpretation depends upon the truth of the following assertions:—

- (1) That animals are not self-conscious.
- (2) That only self-conscious beings can feel pain or unhappiness in any real sense.

It may seem paradoxical to say of these two propositions that they only seem to need stating to win acceptance. One can hardly doubt, at any rate, that careful students of evolution will not see any insuperable obstacle in the way of accepting the first. And perhaps they will be as much surprised as was the author himself when they find that the two greatest authorities of modern times, the pillars upon which all recent science and philosophy rest—Darwin and Kant—had clearly perceived the same truth. The reasons for this belief are given very fully by the author. He examines ten of the strongest instances that can be conceived of the apparent moral sense and reasoning power of animals, and is able to account for them all easily and naturally by an examination of race-history, without recourse to the idea of self-consciousness. More important still is the explanation of facts that the old theory was powerless to meet. Habits and actions that would (on the supposition of self-consciousness)

be utterly foolish and self-injuring, others that would be persistently unnatural (in our sense of the word), and sometimes hideously repulsive—all these are gathered into the folds of this larger system, and find their proper meaning therein. And to explain a larger circle of facts than its predecessor is a *primâ facie* justification of a new theory.

As to the second article of our new creed, it is perhaps not quite so easy to see that this also is "sound doctrine." It is very difficult for us to conceive what is the nature of any real existence which is not also self-conscious, though we are well aware that there is such existence. But we get some glimpses of its relation to the question of suffering in one or two ways. Human beings seem to return, at times, to this state which we allege to be normal with animals. Since this book was written, for example, Captain Semenov has given his experiences at the battle of Tsushima. If it had been possible for an observer in a safe position to watch this commander while his ship was the focus of a terrific bombardment, it would have been obvious to him that the object of his attention was severely wounded, that he was in a most wretched and hopeless position, filled with pain at the sight of the brave men falling and dying all round him, and altogether most unhappy in the utter futility of the deadly contest. But such an impression would have been entirely wrong. There was no pain, and no unhappiness in any real sense, though there was intelligence and activity without ceasing. The shock of the firing had taken away the self-consciousness, and along with it pain and unhappiness.

Any reader can easily find for himself abundant instances of such wanderings of the power which brings the manifold into a unity. Livingstone in the jaws of the lion, operations under hypnotic suggestion, the indifference to bodily pain of ecstasies and fakirs, are all examples of similar import.

Many incidental questions are naturally brought within the purview of our author which we cannot do more than mention. The nature of non-self-conscious pain, the purpose of development which it serves, the utilitarian origin of animal outcries and struggles, the dawn of self-consciousness in man, are among the arguments—not all of equal value—which he adduces for his main thesis. But the final and most compelling argument of all, and one which seems to take the question out of the realm of speculation, is that derived from the law of natural selection itself. Any kind of variation, whether it be of limb or of faculty, has only one chance of survival, and that chance depends upon the answer to the question, "Is it *useful* in the struggle for existence?" By this canon everything is rigidly and incessantly tested; and as soon as Nature has decided that such a variation would have no survival-value, it is remorselessly eliminated. And clearly, for all animals that we know, continually in danger, and narrowly escaping death hour after hour, the gift of self-consciousness would have the effect of rendering them not only unhappy, but eventually defenceless. That is as much as to say that

Nature would eliminate it again almost as soon as it was acquired. It appears to us, therefore, in conclusion, that Mr E. Kay Robinson's theory stands already upon the firm ground of science, and that if the complete rationalisation of the "crux" of Theism is our far-off goal, this book certainly brings us more than a "day's march" nearer, and throws a "kindly light" upon the road that yet remains to be traversed.

JOHN W. MATTINSON.

ASHWELL THORPE.

L'Origine du Quatrième Évangile—Par M. Lepin.—Paris: Letouzey et Ané, éditeurs, 1907.—Pp. xi. + 508.

Das Johannes-Evangelium, by W. Heitmüller.—In *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, Band. ii., 1907.—Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht.

M. LEPIN has written a careful conservative handbook upon the criticism of the Fourth Gospel, which is, like the curate's egg, quite good in parts. The particular critic whom he has chiefly in view is his fellow-countryman and fellow-churchman, the Abbé Loisy, against whom he scores occasionally some fair points. Thus he slyly observes that, in an article written in November 1904, Loisy pronounced the evidence of the well-known Synoptic passage about the disciples drinking the cup of Jesus to be an "évident" allusion to the real martyrdom of James and John; whereas, the year before, in his commentary on the Fourth Gospel, the same critic was as yet oblivious of this telling fact (p. 119). But M. Lepin is less happy in his positive presentation of the traditional position. The statements of Irenæus and the silence of Ignatius upon the son of Zebedee form two problems which it is hard, upon any hypothesis, to reconcile frankly and fairly, and M. Lepin has scarcely improved upon his predecessors, Zahn and Stanton. The English reader at any rate will find little or nothing in his pages upon the external evidence which Dr Drummond has not previously weighed and placed in its proper setting. In his fifth chapter he arrives too easily at the conclusion that the Apocalypse, the Fourth Gospel, and the Johannine epistles were all written by the same hand, while the sixth chapter stoutly defends xxi. 24 as an integral part of the book. The value of the monograph really consists in the elaborate and painstaking scrutiny which it offers of the varied hypotheses lavished by modern critics upon each detail of the Johannine problem. Some internal considerations of momentous bearing are passed over, but these the author promises to discuss in another treatise upon the historicity of the Gospel. Otherwise, the relevant material is upon the whole collected and arranged with scholarly care. But, in discussing the relation of Ignatius to the Fourth Gospel, M. Lepin has missed a powerful ally. The conceptions of the former seem too characteristic and coherent to be explained by any mere hypothesis that he used the Johannine writings. The view of von der Goltz appears

tenable, in spite of all that has been urged against it. Ignatius may have been familiar with the conceptions popularised in the Fourth Gospel; yet even so, it is very difficult to postulate any literary relationship, and the balance of argument tells in favour of a common atmosphere rather than of any filiation. But any critic who, like M. Lepin, is disposed to reject the theories of von der Goltz, and presuppose the use of the Fourth Gospel in Ignatius, should not omit to use the incisive discussion by P. Dietze in the *Studien und Kritiken* for 1905, pp. 563-603. Dietze's paper goes into every aspect of the subject with considerable analytic skill, and may be said to constitute the most exhaustive treatment of the Johannine element in Ignatius which has yet been printed.

At the opposite pole of criticism we have an edition of the Fourth Gospel which is the most recent and by no means the least interesting of its class. Wilhelm Heitmüller's edition of the Gospel, in the concluding volume of the cheap, popular, and scholarly *Schriften des Neuen Testaments* series, is mainly on the same lines as the short commentary of H. J. Holtzmann. He joins the growing list of those who believe not only that the Fourth Gospel is occasionally correct as against the Synoptists, *e.g.* in the date of the Crucifixion, but also that the apostle John was martyred in Palestine, before 70 A.D.; while he ascribes the Gospel to an unknown Christian who wrote between 100 and 140 A.D. But, recognising the ideal traits in the description of "the beloved disciple," he rightly sees that, in chap. xxi. at any rate, we have to do with more than an ideal figure. A long-lived early Christian authority in Asia Minor certainly appears to stand behind the traditions of that chapter, and Heitmüller shows sagacity in calling attention to this fact, while affirming, at the same time, that the twenty-first chapter is an epilogue written probably by some later hand. A much less convincing suggestion is thrown out with regard to the problem of chapters xv.-xvi. Here Heitmüller (p. 288) arrives independently at a view similar to that which has been recently advocated by Wellhausen. He is so attracted by the resemblances between xv.-xvi. and the first Johannine epistle, that he almost inclines to connect these chapters with the author of that epistle, who may have edited the Gospel itself. This is extremely improbable. If any solution of the problem along the lines of literary criticism is to be sought, that of displacement seems far more likely. Another precarious hypothesis is the analysis not only of chap. xxi. into two sections, vv. 1-14 and 15-24, but of the former passage into two originally independent narratives in vv. 1-8 and 9-13. But, while several details in the commentary are unconvincing, and while the idealising motive attributed to the writer is allowed to evaporate unduly any historical nucleus, Heitmüller has certainly succeeded in meeting the legitimate ends of the series in which his work appears.

The plan of Lepin's volume relegates to its successor many of the considerations which Heitmüller has outlined in his introduction, and amongst these is the special function of the Fourth Gospel as a message to

the cultured Hellenism of its period. It is indubitably one proof of the superiority of Christianity that, "when the exquisite Greek world-science, the brilliant dialectic, the dramatic colouring, of the alluring life, the exalted death, the perfect self-sacrifice of the Platonic Socrates had failed altogether to influence the mass of mankind, the religion of Jesus, springing from a despised, unlettered people, triumphed over the world." So much the historian grants readily to Mr J. H. Shorthouse (*Literary Remains*, 1905, p. 229). But, in view of a writing like the Fourth Gospel, when taken with the Epistle of Diognetus, the Apology of Aristides, and one or two later documents of the second century, it is unfair of the author of *John Inglesant* to describe the religion of Jesus, in its initial approach to the ancient world, as "dressed in nothing that made it attractive to the cultured intellect." Heitmüller has, within his limits, rightly noted the educative and persuasive note of the Fourth Gospel. The difference between it and the Synoptists he compares to the change felt by one who comes in from the bright open air to a building with mysterious, coloured windows and elaborate architectural symbolism. If M. Lepin in his next book will face the presence of such artificial or artistic elements, he will do a real service to the criticism of the Gospel. But it is doubtful whether, on his principles of critical research, such an appreciation of the speculative and cultured side of the Fourth Gospel will appeal to him.

BROUGHTY FERRY, N.B.

JAMES MOFFATT.

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- Cox (W. A.)* Judas Iscariot. Interpreter, July 1907. [Arguing for the goodness of his intention and the sincerity of his repentance.]
- b** *Garvie (A. E.)* The Risen Lord. Expos., July 1907. [Another "Study in the Inner Life of Jesus," dealing with the post-resurrection period.]
- Chapman (J.)* On an Apostolic Tradition that Christ was baptised in 46 and crucified under Nero. J. Th. St., July 1907.
- Giran (Etienne)* Jesus of Nazareth. An Historical and Critical Survey of His Life and Teaching. Trans. by E. L. H. Thomas. 171p. S. School Ass., 1907.
- D** *Harnack (A.)* Zu MC. 5, 11-13. Zt. f. neuest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1907. [By comparison with Augustine, *De haeres.* 57, the suggestion arises that in the original form of the gospel account, the demons left the possessed in the form of swine and ran into the sea.]
- Schmidt (H.)* Zur Frage des ursprünglichen Markusschlusses. Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1907. [Gives a reconstructed text of the lost ending of S. Mark's Gospel.]
- Hart (J. H. A.)* Corban. Jewish Q. R., July 1907.

- [Reverses the usual exegesis and makes Christ a zealot for the law. The majority of Rabbis would have given exemption from the oath under the circumstances. The utterance of Jesus is one of personal emotion. He himself is *Corban*, vowed to God, and will not release himself, though it means forsaking his mother.]
- E *MacRory (J.)* Professor Harnack and S. Luke's Historical Authority. Irish Th. Quar., July 1907.
Harnack (Adolf) Luke the Physician: The Author of the Third Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles. Trans. by J. R. Wilkinson. (Crown Theo. Lib.) 231p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.
 [A translation of the work reviewed in the *Hibbert Journal*, vol. v., p. 942.]
- G *Lock (W.)* The Historical Character of the Fourth Gospel. Interpreter, July 1907. [Moderate and cautious plea in defence.]
Venard (L.) Chronique Biblique. R. du Clergé français, Aug. 1, 1907.
 [Reviewing especially recent works on the Johannine question, including those of Sanday, Swete, Abbott.]
- H *Corsen (P.)* Die Abschiedsreden Jesu in dem Vierten Evangelium. Zt. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1907.
 [With special reference to Wellhausen, "Erweiterungen und Änderungen im Vierten Evangelium."] *Moffatt (J.)* Wellhausen on the Fourth Gospel. Expos., July 1907.
Holdsworth (W. W.) "Faith" in the Fourth Gospel. Expos., Aug. 1907.
Magoun (H. W.) ἈΓΑΠᾶΣ καὶ ΦΙΛΕΩΣ. (A Suggestion for John xxi. 15-17.) Biblio. Sac., July 1907.
- W *Clark (H. W.)* Christ's Deeper Thought beneath His Promise of Rest. Interpreter, July 1907.
Wagner (W.) In welchem Sinne hat Jesus das Prädikat ἀγαπᾶς von sich abgewiesen? Zt. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1907.
- 7A *Bludau (A.)* Die Quellenscheidungen in der Apostelgeschichte. II. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 3, 1907.
- B *Johnson (W. H.)* Was Paul the Founder of Christianity? Princeton Th. R., July 1907. [The evangelical tradition was accepted by St Paul.]
Kreyenbühl (J.) Der Apostel Paulus und die Urgemeinde. Zt. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 2, 1907.
 [First article.] *Meyboom (H. A.)* De Hypothese—Völter. Th. Tijds., Mar. 1907.
 [Adverse criticism of Völter's Pauline hypothesis.] *Jülicher (D. Adolf)* Paulus und Jesus. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, i. 14.) 72p. Mohr, 1907.
 [A very able discussion of St Paul's contribution to historic Christianity.]
- S *Vos (G.)* The Priesthood of Christ in the Epistle to the Hebrews. Princeton Th. R., July 1907.
- U *Moulton (J. H.)* The Epistle of James and the Sayings of Jesus. II. Expos., July 1907.
 [The author is James, the Son of Joseph and Mary. The Ep. is addressed to Jews, and for that reason Christian names and terms are veiled in the hope of winning an unprejudiced hearing for Christian teaching.]
- 8 *Goddard (J.)* The Seven Churches: Ephesus and Smyrna. New Church Rev., July 1907.
 [Swedenborgian interpretation of the messages.] *Sanday (W.)* The Apocalypse. J. Th. St., July 1907.
- 9 *Anon.* The Theology of the Wisdom Literature. Church Q. R., July 1907.
 [The Wisdom of the Hebrews was not the greatest of the spiritual products of the race. It never rose to the heights of Prophecy. It supplemented, reflected, interpreted, but it rarely possessed the power to create.] *Stapfer (E.)* Les Apocryphes. Rev. chrét., June 1907.
 [Historical sketch of the varying practice in regard to the inclusion of the O.T. apocrypha in the Bible.] *Connolly (R. H.)* The Diatessaron in the Syriac Acts of John: Jacob of Serug and the Diatessaron. J. Th. St., July 1907.
Ragg (Lonsdale and Laura), ed. and trans. The Gospel of Barnabas. With a Facsimile. 500p. Frowde, 1907.
 [The Arabic glosses have been translated by Major Marriott and Professor Margoliouth, the text of the Italian MS. of 16th Century in the Imperial Library at Vienna by the editors. There is a long and scholarly introduction, and appended to it the most important passages bearing on the "Barnabas-controversy" from the 18th century writers are given.]
- C **CHURCH** 14" *Social Problems*, 20" *Polity*, 42" *Liturgical*, 50" *Sacraments*, 60 *Missions*.
Lewis (Canon) The Present Condition of the Evangelicals. 19th Cent., Aug. 1907.
- 15 *Temple (William)* The Religion of the Undergraduate. Oxford and Camb. R., June 1907.
 [In author's experience the deepest religious force in Oxford is the spirit of remorseless search, willing, with Descartes, to doubt everything that can be doubted, but proving its belief that God is by its continued search and its resolute refusal to take metaphor for definition.]
- 16 *Leighton (J. Alexander)* Jesus Christ and the Civilisation of To-day. The Ethical Teaching of Jesus considered in its Bearings on the Moral Foundations of Moral Culture. 248p. Macmillan, 1907.
 [Aim two-fold—to discover the fundamental ethical needs of contemporary life, and to determine the bearings of the ethical teaching of Jesus on this spiritual life of to-day.] *Mathews (Shailer)* The Church and the Changing Order. 255p. Macmillan, 1907.
 [Deals with the relation of the Church to scholarship, biblical criticism, social discontent, the social movement, materialism in thought and life.]
- 18 *Lathbury (D. C.)* High Churchmen and Disestablishment. 19th Cent., July 1907.
- 21 *Jones (T. W. S.)* The Making of a Miracle: The True Story of New Pompeii. 197p. Elliot Stock, 1907.
 [An attack upon Roman Catholicism.] *Lilley (A. L.), trans.* What We Want: An Open Letter to Pius X. from a Group of Priests. With the Papal Discourse Which Called Forth the Letter. 94p. Murray, 1907.
- 28 *Anon.* Convocation and the Church of England. Edin. R., July 1907.
- 36 *Thurston (H.)* The Feast of the Dead. Dub. R., July 1907.

- 57 *M'Donald (W.)* The Sacrament of Extreme Unction. Irish Th. Quar., July 1907.
[Critical review of Fr. Kern's *De Sacra. Ez. Unionis.*]
- 58 *Sweete (H. B.)* Prayer for the Departed in the first four Centuries.

J. Th. St., July 1907.

[There is nothing to show the existence of the practice by the Church of Eucharistic prayer for the dead before the second century: early in the third century the practice is found in N. Africa, and by the end of that century it is familiar everywhere.]

- 60 *Allier (R.)* Le Protestantisme au Japon. Rev. chrét., June and July 1907.
[Telling of its recent efforts. Quelques traits de son Histoire.]
- Anet (H.)* L'État indépendant du Congo et les missions.

Liberté chrét., June 15, 1907.

- Parry (O. H.)* Some Aspects of Eastern Christianity. East and West, July 1907.
- M'Neile (Hector)* The Waning Influence of Non-Christian Religions in India.

East and West, July 1907.

- Macnicol (N.)* The Growth of Christianity in the early Centuries and in India to-day: a Comparison and a Contrast.

East and West, July 1907.

- 95 *Weinel-Jena (D. Heinrich)* Die urchristliche und die heutige Mission, Ein Vergleich. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iv. 5.) 64p. Mohr, 1907.

D DOCTRINE 10 "God, 22 "Christ, 60 .. Eschatology, 70 "Faith, 90 Apologetics.

- Tyrrell (George)* Through Scylla and Charybdis, or the Old Theology and the New. 396p. Longmans, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Anon. The New Theology.

Church Q. R., July 1907.

[The problems that beset Mr Campbell are the same problems as those of the Gnostics of old. It is the same in his doctrine of free will, the same in his difficulty with regard to the existence of evil, the same in his doctrine of the Person of Christ. We have Christianity stated in the language of a decadent Pantheism.]

- Marshall (N. H.)* The Philosophical Method of the New Theology.

Expos., July and Aug. 1907.

[An acute and piquant criticism of Mr R. J. Campbell's philosophy in his *New Theology.*]

- Stimson (R. J.)* The Genesis of Reginald Campbell's Theology.

Biblio. Sac., July 1907.

[It is an old theology, not a step beyond the earliest form of Schleiermacher's "Reden über die Religion."]

- Ballard (Frank)* New Theology—Its Meaning and Value. An Eirenicon. 128p. Kelly, 1907.

[A plea for sympathetic and patient treatment. There must be no hesitation as to the necessity for a genuine re-statement of the main elements of Christian theology.]

- Sinclair (W. Macdonald)* The Catholic Faith and the New Theology. 48p.

Houghton, 1907.

- Balsillie (David)* Mr R. J. Campbell and the New Theology. Fort. R., July 1907.

[It is vain to derive the materials of a religious faith from any philosophical system. Philosophy is valuable only as a criticism of intuitions.]

- Lieber (W.)* The "New Theology," or

the Rev. R. J. Campbell's Main Conclusions Refuted. 53p. Washbourne, 1907.

- Rodgers (R. E.)* New Theology Problems. 91p. Warne, 1907.

[A friendly criticism.]

- Crespi (A.)* La Nuova Teologia di J. R. Campbell. Conobium, May-June 1907.

[A disparaging criticism.]

- Marshall (William)* The Testimony of the Sacred Writings concerning the Nature of Jehovah—Jesus. With interpretations of their testimony from theologies old and new. 80p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

[Directed largely against the "New Theology."]

- Austin (J. Worsley)* Unitarian Theology and the New Theology. 54p.

Cornish, Birmingham, 1907.

[Written from Unitarian point of view.]

- Mackintosh (H. R.)* Survey of Recent Theological Literature—Dogmatics.

R. of Th. and Phil., June 1907.

- Anon.* A Plain Man's Faith. 216p.

Constable, 1907.

[A thoughtful little volume dealing with such subjects as the Ideal in Theology, Sensation and its Spiritual Use, Creeds and Churches, Mystery and Faith.]

- h *Terry (Milton S.)* Biblical Dogmatics: An Exposition of the Principal Doctrines of the Holy Scriptures. 608p.

Eaton & Mains, 1907.

[An attempt to work out from an evangelical standpoint some of the great themes which lie at the foundation of Christian Belief.]

- Johnson (George B.)* Freedom Through the Truth. 77p. Longmans, 1907.

[An examination of Dr A. V. G. Allen's *Freedom in the Church.*]

- 2 *Lebreton (J.)* Catholicisme.

R. rat. d'Apologétique, July 15, 1907.

[Answer to the controversy between them, to Tyrrell's *Théologisme*. Writer complains that in T.'s system a Catholic holds towards the Church's definitions the old Protestant attitude towards the Bible. They are divine oracles, but to be interpreted by the spiritually illumined individual.]

Tyrrell (G.) Théologisme.

R. rat. d'Apologétique, July 15, 1907.

[Answer to Lebreton's criticism of the writer's doctrine. Father Tyrrell here says he refuses the name of theology or science to a hybrid system which, applying logical deduction to the inspired and largely symbolic phrases of Scripture, imposes its conclusions as obligatory for conscience and understanding. The "magistère" of the Church has for its end the keeping of Apostolic revelation identical with itself for all time and minds, and its dogmatic decisions possess only protective, not philosophic or scientific infallibility.]

- 3 *Gore (Charles)* Dissertations on Subjects Connected with the Incarnation. 347p.

St Paul's Epistle to the Romans, 2 vols. 326 + 241p. St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians. 278p. The Sermon on the Mount. 218p. The Body of Christ. 358p. (Cheap Reprints.) Murray, 1907.

- Houtin (Abbé)* The Views of an Anglican Ultramontane. 19th Cent., July 1907.

- 14 *Gerrard (T. J.)* The Enigmatic Vision. Catholic World, June 1907.

[Insists on the analogical character of our knowledge of God, and draws out the consequences for thought and practice in religion.]

- 17 *De Saligny (B.)* La notion et le rôle du miracle. Annales de phil. chrét., July 1907.

[Criticism of Le Roy's study (Oct., Nov., Dec. 1906) on Miracles.]

- 26 *Scott (Melville)* *Crux Crucis: The Problem of the Atonement.* 127p.

Simpkin, 1907.

[A re-statement of the doctrine of the Atonement, showing at once the truth of it, and the fiction by which it has been obscured. The dogmas of substitution, vicarious punishment, and imputative righteousness are as much contrary to Scripture as they are to sound reason.]

- 62 *Buckle (Henry)* *The After Life: A Help to a Reasonable Belief in the Probation Life to Come.* 294p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

[Belief in an Intermediate State was upheld and sanctioned by Jesus and taught by the Apostles and early Fathers.]

- 65 *Dole (Charles F.)* *The Hope of Immortality.* *The Ingersoll Lect., 1906.* 61p.

Crowell, 1906.

[Tries to set forth the mass of considerations that point to the way of hope. All these facts go together; they are cumulative. The reasoning is of the same kind that leads us to believe in the unity of nature.]

- 80 *Buchanan (E. S.)* *The Codex Muratorianus.* J. Th. St., July 1907.

[Transcription from the Codex of five creeds, from Ambrose, Lucifer, Athanasius, Nicea, and from an early liturgy.]

- 90 *Orr (James)* *The Bible under Trial. Apologetic Papers in View of Present-day Assaults on Holy Scriptures.* 323p.

Marshall, 1907.

[Papers contributed to *The Life of Faith*, from the standpoint of belief in the Bible as the authoritative record for us of God's revealed will.]

- E ETHICS.** 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics, 10 Theories, 20 Applied Ethics, Sociology, 23 Economics, 27 Education.*

- 6 *Illingworth (J. R.)* *Christian Character, being some Lectures on the Elements of Christian Ethics.* Cheap Reprint. 102p. Macmillan, 1907.

- Pigou (A. C.)* *The Ethics of the Gospels.* Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1907.

- Désers (Leon)* *Les morales d'aujourd'hui et la morale chrétienne.* 137p.

Poussiégué, 1907.

- 10 *Jevons (F. B.)* *Evolution and Morality.* Church Q. R., July 1907.

[Criticism of Westermarck and Hobhouse. Hobhouse fails to show that the good of the individual and of society harmonize in the life of individuals now living; he does not even claim to do more than argue that there is a tendency to such harmony. That tendency is only a tendency, not a necessity.]

- Trivero (Camillo)* *Il problema del bene.* Ricerche su l'oggetto della morale 262p.

Clansen, 1907.

- Stewart (Herbert L.)* *Self-Realisation as the Moral End.* Inter. J. of Eth., July 1907.

[Attempts to vindicate the principle of self-realization as the moral end against certain types of negative criticism.]

- Buquet (P.)* *Les Morales récentes.* Cenobium, Nov. 1906.

[Marking the great currents of recent theories, which are described as anti-Kantian and anti-theological. They are the morals of social solidarity.]

- 20 *Mill (J. Stuart)* *On Social Freedom.* Oxford and Camb. R., June 1907.

[A hitherto unpublished essay of Mill's dealing with the necessary limits of individual freedom arising out of the conditions of our social life.]

- Pearson (Karl)* *The Scope and Importance to the State of the Science of National Eugenics.* 45p. Frowde, 1907.

[Boyle Lecture delivered before the Oxford University Junior Scientific Club on May 17, 1907.]

- Galton (Francis)* *Probability, the Foundation of Eugenics.* (Herbert Spencer Lecture, 1907.) 30p. Frowde, 1907.

- Carrel (E.)* *Has Sociology a Moral Basis?* Inter. J. of Eth., July 1907.

[If sociology is to establish a claim to independence, it should investigate society, past and present; discover laws, if possible, and then deliver the results of its labour to morals for valuation.]

- Sociological Papers.* Vol. iii. 393p.

Macmillan, 1907.

[Proceedings of Sociological Society, 1906. Contains, *inter alia*, contributions from Dr W. McDougall, "A Practical Eugenic Suggestion"; from Prof. J. A. Thomson, "The Sociological Appeal to Biology"; from W. A. E. Crawley, "The Origin and Function of Religion"; and from W. H. G. Wells, "The so-called Science of Sociology."]

- Chatterton-Hill (George)* *Heredity and Selection in Sociology.* 571p. Black, 1907.

[After an exposition of the facts of heredity and selection, based more especially on the researches of Weismann, the author examines the question as to whether social polity at the present time tends to progress of the race, and then deals with the possibility of founding a social polity capable of maintaining the efficiency of Western civilisation, alike from the biological and the purely social standpoint.]

- Sorley (W. R.)* *Ethical Aspects of Economics,* ii. and iii.

Inter. J. of Eth., April and July 1907.

[The leading conception of ethics is that of intrinsic worth or goodness. There are two ways in which ethical science determines the real worth of things. It aims to establish a system of moral judgments covering the whole of life; it appeals to the moral judgment of the good man. Essay concludes with a general estimate of the worth or ethical value of the economic factor in life as a whole.]

- Fite (Warner)* *The Exaggeration of the Social.* J. of Phil., July 18, 1907.

[As the basis of a scientific classification the social category has no validity whatever. There are no social laws which are peculiarly and exclusively social.]

- Effertz (O.)* *La formule du Socialisme.* Cenobium, Mar.-Apr. 1907.

[Mathematical formulæ of value and distribution.]

- Kerby (W. J.)* *Aims in Socialism.* Catholic World, July 1907.

- Kerby (W. J.)* *Attitudes towards Socialism.* Catholic World, Aug. 1907.

- Vandervelde (Emile)* *Collectivism and Industrial Evolution.* Trans. by R. P. Farley. (The Socialist Lib., v.) 245p.

Indep. Lab. Party, 1907.

- Sumner (W. Graham)* *Folkways: A Study of the sociological importance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Modes and Manners.* 696p. Ginn & Co., 1907.

- Alston (Leonard)* *The White Man's Work in Asia and Africa. A Discussion of the Main Difficulties of the Colour Question.* 136p. Longmans, 1907.

[Gained the Maitland Prize at Cambridge in 1906.]

- Boxall (George E.)* *The Awakening of a Race: An Advance in Civilisation.* 312p.

Unwin, 1907.

[A discussion of some of the more important questions raised in the author's earlier book, *The Anglo-Saxon*. "History begins with the theory by which the race accounts for its presence on earth, and this is also largely the basis on which it builds its conceptions of the Deity."]'

Sarda (Har Bilas) Hindu Superiority: An Attempt to determine the position of the Hindu Race in the Scale of Nations. 454p. Rajputana Printing Works, 1906.

[An elaborate work, dealing with the Hindu Constitution, Colonization, Literature, Philosophy, Science, Arts, Commerce and Wealth, and Religion. Contains an account of the six schools of Hindu Philosophy.]

Lyall (Sir Alfred) The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India. 4th ed., with new chap. bringing the history down to 1907. With maps. Murray, 1907.

Adam (Edward) Land Values and Taxation. (Social Problems Series.) 196p. Jack, 1907.

Webb (Sidney) Paupers and Old Age Pensions. Albany R., Aug. 1907.

Stanley (Maude) Working-Girls' Clubs in Italy. 19th Cent., Aug. 1907.

21 *Petrie (W. M. Flinders)* Janus in Modern Life. 111p. Constable, 1907.

[Author discusses some of the various principles which underlie the course of political movements in the present age.]

Dole (Charles F.) The Spirit of Democracy. 485p. Crowell, 1906.

[Author's purpose is to show what real democratic government is. People have studied the outside of the body of democracy; they have hardly begun to know what makes its life.]

Sisson (E. O.) The State Absorbing the Function of the Church.

Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1907.

Stawell (F. Melian) Women and Democracy. Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1907.

O'Mahony (J.) The Bankruptcy Laws and Conscience. Irish Th. Quar., July 1907.

[Adverse criticism of the late Prof. Crolly's treatment of Bankruptcy in his *De Injuria et Restitutione*. The British law is condemned as very lax for the large debtor.]

Heath (Carl) Reform and the Death Penalty. Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1907.

Salter (W. M.) The Russian Revolution. Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1907.

27 *Dumville (Benjamin)* Philosophy and Education. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii, 1907.

[We cannot hope to arrive at anything but an empirical system of education until we find a comprehensive philosophy on which to build.]

Johnson (Harrold) Some Essentials of Moral Education.

Inter. J. of Eth., July 1907.

[The problem of moral education is above all the problem of the parent and of the home, of the social environment and of the nation as a whole.]

Lodge (Sir Oliver) The Religious Education of Children. Cont. R., Aug. 1907.

Tanner (Amy E.) The Elevation of the College Woman's Ideal.

Inter. J. Eth., Apr. 1907.

Russell (Mrs Bertrand) Some Lessons in Co-Education from the United States.

Oxford and Camb. R., June 1907.

Foakes-Jackson (F. J.) Athleticism at the Universities.

Oxford and Camb. R., June 1907.

Anon. The Future of the University of Durham. Church Q. R., July 1907.

[Writer is generally in favour of the Bill laid before Parliament this year. The abolition of the existing powers of the Dean and Chapter of Durham is most desirable.]

Anon. Books about Children.

Church Q. R., July 1907.

Rebora (E.) Il Presbiterio Laico.

Cœnobium, Jan.-Feb. 1907.

[Sets forth with sympathy Mme. Edgar Quinet's idea that school teachers and their families might discharge the same general good offices as parish ministers have done in the past in country districts.]

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

Maclaren (Alexander) Pulpit Prayers. 316p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

Ingram (A. F. Winnington) The Call of the Father. 247p. Wells Gardner, 1907.

[Bishop's addresses delivered during his missionary tour this year in London.]

Bethune-Baker (J. F.) The Old Faith and the New Learning. 64p.

S.P.C.K., 1907.

[Addresses to candidates for holy orders, Advent, 1906, with an introductory note by the Dean of Westminster.]

Berle (A. A.) The Runt of the Theological Schools. Biblio. Sac., July 1907.

[A strong attack on these institutions, and the type of man they turn out. They are made responsible for the failure of the Church to lead the moral aspirations of the masses.]

2 *Bricout (J.)* A propos d'une instruction à préparer.

Rev. du Clergé français, July 15, 1907.

[Recommending for sermon preparation the *Retraites Pascuales* of Monsabré.]

Wilkinson (John) Timely Topics touching Life and Character. 123p.

Allenson, 1907.

Richardson (G. L.) Sermons for Harvest. Social and Doctrinal. 96p.

Skeffinton, 1907.

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

Russell (G. W. E.) Garibaldi.

Albany R., July 1907.

[With reference to "Garibaldi's Defence of the Roman Republic" by G. M. Trevelyan.]

Anon. In Memoriam van Adolf Hilgenfeld. Th. Tijds., Mar. 1907.

1 *X. Jean Monod* (1822-1907). Rev. chrét., July 1907.

[Obituary notice.]

2 *Beaton (D.)* Thomas Boston. Princeton Th. R., July 1907.

[Minister of the Church of Scotland, d. 1732.]

Anon. William Archer Butler.

Church Q. R., July 1907.

Brinkerink (D. A.) Het onderwijs van Prof. J. G. R. Acquoy.

Th. Tijds., Mar. 1907.

[Prof. Acquoy, of Leiden, was a teacher of special interest to his old students.]

Cerisier (J. E.) John Watson.

Rev. chrét., July 1907.

Wilberforce (W.) Manning's Domestic Side. Catholic World, July 1907.

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

Whish (C. W.) The Græco-Roman World; or The Struggle of East and West

- during a Millennium of World Empire. Vol. iii. of "Reflections on some Leading Facts and Ideas of History; Their Meaning and Interest." (With special chapters on India.) 464p. Luzac, 1907.
- Pollard (A. F.)* Factors in Modern History. 287p. Constable, 1907.
- [Lectures on "Nationality," "The Advent of the Middle Class," "The New Monarchy," "Parliament," "Social Revolution," etc., all of great interest for understanding the social conditions of modern England.]
- Lea (Henry C.)* History of Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church. 3rd revised ed. 2 vols. 497 + 422p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.
- [Review will follow.]
- Pijper (F.)* Dogmenhistorische studien betreffende de oudste apologeten, i., ii. Th. Tijds., May and July 1907.
- [Deals with the Apologists, — Quadratus, Aristides, Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras and Min. Felix.]
- Batiffol (Mgr. P.)* Modern Theories on the Historical Formation of Catholicism. Irish Th. Quar., July 1907.
- [Takes Sabatier's presentation as typical, and after discussing it concludes that the standard theory of Protestant critics is a "scheme of systematisation which in its dogmatic rigidity does not correspond with the realities of history."]
- Delehaye (H.)* Saints de Chypre. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi., fasc. ii. and iii. [1. Eight new texts in Greek relating to the saints. 2. The Sources of the Cyprian hagiography. 3. The Panegyricon of Néophyte le Reclus.]
- Hocedez (E.)* La Vita prima Urbani V. auctore anonymo. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi., fasc. ii. and iii. [Inquiry into the date and sources of the work.]
- Poncelet (A.)* Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum Latinorum bibliothecarum Romanorum præter quam Vaticanæ. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi., fasc. ii. and iii.
- Poncelet (A.)* Récit de la mort du pape S. Léon IX. Note complémentaire. Anal. Bolland., tom. xxvi., fasc. ii. and iii.
- Salembier (M.)* Le grand schisme d'Occident au point de vue apologetique. R. Pratique d'Apologetique, July 15, Aug. 1, 1907. [Relating the history of the schism.]
- H Coulton (G. G.)* Priests and People before the Reformation, i., ii. Cont. R., June, July 1907.
- R Knappert (L.)* Geschiedenis van de Hervorming binnen Leiden van den aanvang tot op het Beleg, vii., viii., ix. Th. Tijds., Mar., May, July 1907.
- Berbig (G.)* Spalatiniana. Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1907. [Chiefly letters to and from Spalatin.]
- Gasquet (Abbot)* Some Victims of the Great French Revolution. III. Catholic World, June 1907. [Continues the narrative of the fate of the Compigne nuns.]
- 1 Bramston (M.)* The Unpopularity of the Abbeys. Church Q. R., July 1907.
- I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS.** *C Fathers* *2 R.C. Church* *3 Anglican.*
- Neatby (W. B.)* Mr William Kelly as a Theologian. Expos., July 1907.
- [Outlines the teaching of the theologian of the Darbyites. "A man," says Spurgeon, "who, born for the universe, narrowed his mind by Darbyism."] *Mayhew (W. H.)* Why I am a New-Churchman. New Church Rev., July 1907.
- Crafer (T. W.)* Macarius Magnes, a Neglected Apologist. II. J. Th. St., July 1907.
- [Defence of an early 4th century date for the *Apocritica*. The bearing of the work on the history of the text and canon of the N.T., and its theological and apologetic value, are also considered.]
- Mercati (Mgr. G.)* Some New Fragments of Pelagius. J. Th. St., July 1907.
- [I. The two fragments discovered last year by Souter are identified by M. as part of Pelagius' answer to Jerome's two anti-Pelagian treatises. II. Description of two leaves of a 6th century MS. of Pelagius on St Paul, discovered at the Vatican.]
- Souter (A.)* The Relation of the Roman Fragments to the Commentary in the Karlsruhe MS. (Augiensis exix.). J. Th. St., July 1907.
- [The Fragments are the two leaves of Pelagius' commentary found by Mgr. Mercati.]
- Winstedt (E. O.)* Notes on the MSS. of Cosmas Indicopleustes. J. Th. St., July 1907.
- C Conybeare (F. C.)* The Newly Recovered Treatise of Irenæus. Expos., July 1907. [Elucidates a number of difficulties left obscure in the German translation.]
- de Labriolle (P.)* Un Episode de l'histoire de la morale chrétienne. Annales de phil. chrét., July 1907.
- [Deals with Tertullian's struggle against second marriages, as exemplified in his three treatises, *Ad uxorem*, *De Exhortatione Castitatis*, and *De Monogamia*.]
- Warfield (B. B.)* Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority. Princeton Th. R., July 1907.
- [Concludes that St Augustine's submission was to what was, in his conviction, a divine revelation. Hence Harnack is wrong in affirming that he was at heart a sceptic all his days.]
- 2 Herbermann (Charles G.) and others, eds.** The Catholic Encyclopedia. An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline, and History of the Catholic Church. Vol. i. 826p. Caxton Pub. Co., 1907.
- [An elaborate work to be completed in fifteen vols. What the Catholic Church teaches and has taught; what she has done and is still doing for the welfare of mankind; her methods, past and present; her struggles, her triumphs, and the achievements of her members—all fall within the scope of the work.]
- Delehaye (H.)* The Legends of the Saints: An Introduction to Hagiography. Trans. from the French by Mrs V. M. Crawford. (Westminster Lib.) 241p. Longmans, 1907.
- Kinloch (Margaret)* St Ninian, a Missionary of the Fifth Century. Dub. R., July 1907.
- Baring-Gould (S.), ed.* Saint Francis de Sales. (The Lib. of the Soul.) 154p. Jack, 1907.
- [An Introduction on the Saint and Extracts from his writings.]
- Hamon (A.)* Sainte Thérèse, est-elle une hystérique? R. prat. d'Apologetique, June 15, 1907.

Brémond (H.) Les lettres de Saint-François de Sales.

Annales de phil. chrét., July 1907.

Hervey (Lord Francis), ed. Corolla Sancti Edmundi. The Garland of Saint Edmund, King and Martyr. 672p.

Murray, 1907.

Ward (Wilfred) Two Views of Cardinal Newman. Dub. R., July 1907.

[Discusses Brémond and W. J. Williams on Newman. The former fails to see or even to believe in Newman's depth, both of feeling and of thought; the work of the latter is in the main sound.]

Russell (H. P.) The Spirit of John Henry Newman. Cath. World, Aug. 1907.

Barry (William) Roma Sacra.

Dub. R., July 1907.

[The civilized world is entering on a phase at once more spacious and more liable to catastrophe than any it has yet gone through. East and West have begun a mighty struggle. We owe our civilization to the Pope; can it survive without him?]

The Holy Office. The Decree of the Holy Office.

R. prat. d'Apologétique, Aug. 1, 1907. [Text, in French, of the new so-called "Syllabus."]

Prezzolini (G.) L'Essenza del Cattolicesimo. Cœnobium, Mar.-Apr. 1907.

[Properly it is anti-Christian, permitting the few to enjoy the inner life and profound religion, and saving the majority from the social dangers of this profound religion.]

Sabatier (P.) Un Episode de la lutte entre le S. Siège et la France.

Cœnobium, May-June 1907.

[Recounts the history of the declaration of the Bishops in Jan. last.]

Sabatier (P.) Un aspect de la crise catholique. Rev. chrét., July 1907.

[Refers to the liberal movement of which *Il Rinascimento* is the organ.]

Schnegg (P.) Le paroissien romain.

Liberté chrét., June 15, 1907.

[Criticism, on Evangelical principles, of the doctrine and ritual of the Roman Liturgy.]

Terrasse (E.) "L'Eglise est finie! La Religion a fait son temps."

R. prat. d'Apologétique, June 1, 1907. [Recounts facts going to show that religion is still a living power in France.]

De Mun (Comte A.) La Question Religieuse en France. Dub. R., July 1907.

3 *Vaughan (Herbert M.)* St David and the Early Welsh Saints.

Church Q. R., July 1907.

Hodgson (Principal), ed. William Law. (The Lib. of the Soul.) 154p. Jack, 1907. [Extracts from "A Serious Call."]

4 *Albrecht (O.)* Katechismusstudien. III. Handschriftliches zum kleinen Lutherschen Katechismus im Jenaer Kodex Bos. q. 25^a.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1907.

Pöhlmann (H.) Die Erlanger Theologie: Ihre Geschichte und ihre Bedeutung.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 4, 1907.

[Concluding article dealing with the relation of this school's teaching with Ritschlianism, and with present conditions of religious thought.]

5 *Herkless (Professor J.)* The Church of Scotland and its Confession of Faith.

Interpreter, July 1907.

[Setting forth, with approval, the proposed new formula of clerical subscription, made possible by the Scottish Churches Act of 1905.]

L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

2 *Baker (G. P.)* The Development of Shakespeare as a Dramatist. 329p.

Macmillan, 1907.

Norton (Charles Eliot) Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. A sketch of his Life, together with his chief Autobiographical Poems. 121p. Constable, 1907.

[Published in connection with the Commemoration under the auspices of the Cambridge Historical Society of the 100th anniversary of the poet's birth.]

Anon. The British Novel as an Institution. Edin. R., July 1907.

[Compares Mrs Gaskell with some modern novelists.]

V *White (H. Kelsey)* Essays and Poems. Edited by Lionel S. Birch. 111p. Tutin, 1907.

Anon. The Aesthetic Outlook: Walter Pater. Edin. R., July 1907.

Mackail (J. W.) William Morris and His Circle. 22p. Frowde, 1907.

[Lecture delivered at the Summer Meeting of the University Extension Delegacy on Aug. 6, 1907.]

W *Esdaile (Arundell)* Bibliography of the Writings in Prose and Verse of George Meredith. 70p. Spencer, 1907.

Jackson (Holbrook) Bernard Shaw. 233p. Grant Richards, 1907.

3 *Bielschowsky (A.)* The Life of Goethe. Trans. by W. A. Cooper. 3 vols. Vol. ii., 1788-1815. 454p. Putnam, 1907.

Davidson (T.) The Philosophy of Goethe's Faust. Ed. by Prof. C. M. Bakewell. 162p. Ginn, 1906.

[The content of *Faust* is the entire spiritual movement towards individual emancipation, composed of the Teutonic Reformation and the Italian Renaissance in all their history, scope, and consequences.]

4 *Hugo (Victor)* Intellectual Autobiography. Being the last of the unpublished works and embodying the author's ideas on Literature, Philosophy, and Religion. Transl. by L. O'Rourke. 400p.

Funk & Wagnall, 1907.

Harrison (Frederic) Paris in 1861 and in 1907. 19th Cent., Aug. 1907.

V *Connolly (P. J.)* Ferdinand Brunetière as Critic and Man of Letters.

Dub. R., July 1907.

W *Masterlinck (Maurice)* L'Intelligence des Fleurs. 313p. Charpentier, 1907.

Frommel (Gaston) Études Littéraires et Morales. Foyer Solidariste, 1907.

[See p. 220.]

5 *Brooke (Stefford A.)* The Sea-Charms of Venice. 113p. Duckworth, 1907.

Coulton (G. G.) From St Francis to Dante. Translations from the Chronicle of the Franciscan Salimbene (1221-1288). 2nd ed., revised and enlarged. 446p.

Nutt, 1907.

[The present edition contains a considerable amount of fresh matter from Salimbene's chronicle.]

Leigh (Gertrude) Dante's "Inferno"—an Autobiography? Quar. R., July 1907.

[The "allegorical and true meaning" of the "Inferno" as a revelation of Dante's inner history can never now be fully apprehended.]

9 *Freeman (Kenneth J.)* Schools of Hellas. An Essay on the practice and theory of

ancient Greek Education from 600 B.C. to 300 B.C. 315p. Macmillan, 1907.

[A brilliant piece of work of a young scholar who died at the early age of twenty-four years. The book has been edited by M. J. Rendall, of Winchester College.]

Burrows (Ronald M.) The Discoveries in Crete and their Bearing on the History of Ancient Civilisation. Illustrated. 255p. Murray, 1907.

[An attempt to meet a need that has been widely felt during the last few years, not only by classical scholars, but by the general cultured public.]

Murray (Gilbert) History and Tragedy.

Albany R., July 1907.

[In praise of "Thucydides Mythistoricus," by F. M. Cornford, Arnold, 1907.]

Lindsay (J.) The Contribution of Greek Literature to the World's Religious Thought. Biblio. Sac., July 1907.

Ramsay (W. M.) The Divine Child in Virgil. Expos., Aug. 1907.

[Agrees with Mayor that Virgil got a hint from Isaiah, only not through the Sibylline verses, but through a Greek translation. The divine child was Rome itself, re-born under Augustus, and the 4th Eclogue is Virgil's answer of optimistic hope to Horace's despair in the 18th Epode.]

12 *Newmarch (Rosa)* Poetry and Progress in Russia. 270p. Lane, 1907.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4

Hinduism. 7 *Judaism.* 9 *Demonology.*

12 *Occultism.*

Breasted (J. H.) The Message of the Religion of Egypt. Bibl. World, June 1907.

Besant (Mrs A.) Religion and Patriotism in India. Hindustan Rev., June 1907.

[Religious diversity is not an obstacle to national unity in Europe, and it need not be in India.]

3 *Rollleston (T. W.)* Gods and Saints in Ancient Ireland. Cont. R., Aug. 1907.

4 *Deussen (P.)* La Filosofia del Vedanta. Cœnobium, Jan.-Feb. 1907.

Aston (W. G.) Shinto: The Ancient Religion of Japan. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 83p. Constable, 1907.

5 *Richard (Timothy), trans.* Guide to Buddhahood. A Standard Manual of Chinese Buddhism. 108p.

Christian Lit. Soc., 1907.

Chatterji (Mohini Mohan) Indian Spirituality; or, The Travels and Teachings of Sivanarayan. 146p. Luzac, 1907.

Richard (Timothy), trans. The Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana Doctrine. The New Buddhism, by the Patriarch Ashvagosha, who died about A.D. 100. 118p.

Christian Lit. Soc., Shanghai, 1907.

["If we estimate the value of books by the number of adherents to their doctrines, then, after the Bible, the Koran, the Confucian Classics, and the Vedas, this volume ranks next, or fifth, among the sacred books of the world.]

Neumann (K. E.) L'origine di Dio.

Cœnobium, Nov. 1906.

[According to popular Buddhist presentation in the *Dighanikayo*.]

Duca di Cesarò. Buddismo e Ateismo.

Cœnobium, Jan.-Feb. 1907.

[The atheism of the Buddhist system is only apparent.]

Lahor (Jean) Bouddhisme.

Cœnobium, Jan.-Feb. 1907.

[Under this pseudonym Dr H. Cazalis, a Paris physician, writes a eulogy of Buddhism.]

Pfungst (A.) Che è veramente il Nirvâna dei Buddisti?

Cœnobium, May-June 1907.

[Consciousness remains, will disappear.]

7 *Abrahams (Israel)* Judaism. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 107p.

Constable, 1907.

[An extremely interesting little volume in which a few of the most characteristic points in Jewish doctrine and practice are discussed, and some of the phases through which they have passed since the first centuries of the Christian era explained.]

Abbott (G. F.) Israel in Europe. 533p.

Macmillan, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Philipson (David) The Reform Movement in Judaism. 581p. Macmillan, 1907. [Studies on the reform movement in Judaism as exhibited in various countries of Europe and in the United States.]

Cohen (A.) Hebrew Incunabula in Cambridge. Jewish Q. R., July 1907.

Elbogen (I.) Studies in the Jewish Liturgy, II. Jewish Q. R., July 1907.

Henriques (H. S. Q.) The Political Rights of English Jews. Jewish Q. R., July 1907.

[Recounts the steps leading to Jewish representation in Parliament.]

Last (I.) Sharshoth Kesef. The Hebrew Dictionary of Roots, by Joseph Ibn Kaspi.

Jewish Q. R., July 1907.

[An abstract of some words, under the various letters.]

Worman (E. J.) Forms of Address in Genizah Letters. Jewish Q. R., July 1907.

9 *Clodd (Edward)* Magic and Religion. Quar. R., July 1907.

[Every advance in the comparative study of religions leads to the conclusion that, to borrow a term from chemistry, religions are allotropic. The component parts are the same; the variety is in the distribution of the parts.]

12 *Hill (J. Arthur)* Mysticism. Albany R., July 1907.

Pioda (A.) Ai Confini.

Cœnobium, Mar.-Apr. 1907.

[A presentation of theosophy.]

André (George G.) The True Light, or the Gospel of Christ in the Light of Spiritual Science. 193p. Watkins, 1907.

[A short exposition of spiritualistic belief and doctrine.]

Probst - Biraben. Le mysticisme dans l'esthétique Musulmane. L'arabesque, ascèse esthétique. Rev. Phil., July 1907.

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 • Metaphysics, 21

Epistemology, 33 • Psychological Research, 40 •

Psychology, 60 • Logic, 70 • Systems, 90 •

Philosophers.

Dilthey (W.), and others. Systematische Philosophie. (Die Kultur der Gegenwart. Teil 1, Abt. vi.) 440p. Teubner, 1907.

[An extremely interesting work. Contains the following dissertations:—*Das Wesen der Philosophie*, by Dilthey; *Logik und Erkenntnistheorie*, by Riehl; *Metaphysik*, by Wundt; *Naturphilosophie*, by Ostwald; *Psychologie*, by Ebbinghaus; *Philosophie der Geschichte*, by Eucken; *Ethik*, by Paulsen; *Pädagogik*, by Münch; *Ästhetik*, by Lipps; *Zukunftsaufgaben der Philosophie*, by Paulsen.]

Windelband (Wilhelm) Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einleitung in die Philosophie. 3^{te} Aufl. verm. 469p.

J. C. B. Mohr, 1907.

[Windleband's *Präjudien* have long been recognised as perhaps the most beautifully written philosophical essays in modern German literature. This edition contains much new matter—e.g. essays on "Goethe's Faust and the Philosophy of the Renaissance," "The Present Position and Problem of Philosophy"—and the previous essays have been largely altered and added to.]

Alexander (Arch. B. D.) A Short History of Philosophy. 623p. MacLehose, 1907.

[An endeavour to indicate the salient features rather than to give an exhaustive account of the successive systems of philosophy, and an attempt to show the place and influence of each in the evolution of thought.]

Lalande (André) Philosophy in France (1906). Phil. R., July 1907.

10 Koigen (David) Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik (Fortsetzung).

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii, 3, 1907.

[Discusses Petronievics' *Prinzipien der Metaphysik* and Gomperz's *Weltanschauungslehre*.]

Stern (L. William) Person und Sache. System der philosophischen Weltanschauung. Bd. i. Ableitung und Grundlage. 448p. Barth, 1906.

[An important work in which is developed a metaphysical view called by the author "critical personalism." The real world is a hierarchy of teleologically active individuals. Between the lower limiting notion of mere matter or pure thing (*Sache an sich*) and the upper limiting notion of the absolute or perfect person, every element of reality is at once person and thing—*person* as self-active and intrinsically worthwhile individual, *thing* as functional member in the complex of a higher person.]

Eucken (Rudolf) Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung. Veit & Co., 1907.

[Eucken here develops the point of view he calls "Activism" by contrasting it with other philosophical tendencies. Philosophy must start from living experience (*Lebensprozesse*). Such originating and sustaining activity is the power that makes for that complete renewal of the given, apart from which we can never hope to realise ourselves. Spirit and personality are *problems* to be solved by being realised through action.]

Mackenzie (J. S.) Lectures on Humanism. (The Ethical Lib.) 243p.

Sonnenschein, 1907.

[Dunkin Lectures at Manchester College, Oxford, 1906. By "Humanism" the author means a fundamental point of view, from which, as contrasted with that of Naturalism, the universe is explained by reference to ends and qualitative differences.]

Pringle-Pattison (A. Seth) The Philosophical Radicals and Other Essays: With Chapters reprinted on the Philosophy of Religion in Kant and Hegel. 336p.

Blackwood, 1907.

[See p. 212.]

Montgomery (E.) Philosophical Problems in the Light of Vital Organisation. 462p.

Putnam, 1907.

Bax (E. Belfort) The Roots of Reality: Being Suggestions for a Philosophical Reconstruction. 341p. Richards, 1907.

[In our last issue this work, which is a new one, was wrongly described as a new edition. A notice will appear later.]

11 Alliston (Norman) The Case of Existence. 275p. Kegan Paul, 1907.

12 Le Dantec (F.) L'Ordre des Sciences, i.

Rev. Phil., July 1907.

[Author would arrange the sciences in the following order:—i. Logic and Psychology, regarded as means to establish science, apart from their intrinsic value; ii. The exact sciences; iii. Biology, the application of the sciences to the

study of life. This will lead to the discussion of psychology, logic, ethics, and metaphysics.]

13 Bergson (H.) L'Évolution créatrice. 411p. Alcan, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Reyer (Eduard) Das Einfache in der Natur. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi, 2, 1907.

Heward (E. Vincent) Mars: Is it a Habitable World? Fort. R., Aug. 1907.

[Answers in the negative.]

14 Geissler (Kurt) Die Dimensionen des Raumes und ihr Zusammenhang.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii, 3, 1907.

15 Welby (V.) Time as Derivative. Mind, July 1907.

[There is no such thing as an ultimate problem of Time, nor indeed even of Space; the only ultimate problem for us in this connexion is that of Change.]

16 Lemcke (B.) De motu curvo.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii, 3, 1907.

19 Pestouan (C. Lucas de) Sur les fondements de l'arithmétique.

Rev. de Phil., June, Aug. 1907.

21 Volkelt (J.) Die Quellen der menschlichen Gewissheit. Beck, 1906.

Devey (John) Reality and the Criterion for Truth of Ideas. Mind, July 1907.

[The condition which antecedes and provokes any particular exercise of reflective knowing is always one of discrepancies, struggle, "collision." The intellectual and logical is a statement of this conflict, an attempt to describe and define it. The criterion of the worth of an idea is thus the capacity of the idea to operate in fulfilling the object for the sake of which it was projected.]

Devey (John) The Control of Ideas by Facts, iii. J. of Phil., June 6, 1907.

[In this concluding article the author discusses the categories of meaning and of agreement or correspondence.]

Hodgson (Shadworth H.) Fact, Idea, and Emotion. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii, 1907.

[The existence of an idea is governed by quite different laws from those which govern its truth. The former depends upon its proximate real condition; the latter upon the facts and laws of nature as a whole, to which the object of the idea is represented as belonging.]

Walker (L. J.) The Nature of Incompatibility. Mind, July 1907.

[The theory of Incompatibility upon which Leibniz based his Ontological Argument is valid. Between positive qualities as such, incompatibility cannot subsist. But Leibniz's view of the nature of incompatibility does not seem to complete the Ontological Argument.]

Pfordten (Otto von der) Der Erkenntniswert der chemischen Synthese.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx, 2, 1907.

[Reality is the external world as it appears to our senses, and is for us. Absolute being is the external world in the form in which it exists independently of our senses. This absolute being is only accessible to us through conformities, which possess, however, a distinct worth from the point of view of knowledge.]

Russell (Bertrand) On the Nature of Truth. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii, 1907.

[Criticism of Joachim's book. Contests the axiom of internal relations. On the view which admits many truths, two theories seem possible—(i) truth is the quality of beliefs which are belief in facts, the only non-mental complexes; (ii) truth and falsehood are both capable of belonging to non-mental complexes, which are called propositions, of which there are two kinds—facts, which are true, and fictions, which are false.]

Joachim (H. H.) A Reply to Mr Moore. Mind, July 1907.

- Bauch (Bruno)* Erfahrung und Geometrie in ihrem erkenntnistheoretischen Verhältnis. Kantstudien, xii. 2, June 1907.
[A discussion of the mathematical works of Cassirer, Hilbert, Russell, etc.]
- 25 *Nunn (T. Percy)* On Causal Explanation. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii., 1907.
[Seeks an answer to the question,—"What is the relation of the explanatory notion of "cause" to the data which it is supposed to explain?"]
- Sterling (Stefan)* Die polnische Philosophie der Gegenwart.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 3, 1907.
[Discusses dissertations by Lukasiewicz, Baudrowaki, and Kobylecki on the notion of Causality.]
- 26 *Aars (Kristian B. R.)* Der freie Wille. Eine Frage an Herrn G. Noth.
Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 2, 1907.
Manno (R.) Zur Verteidigung der Möglichkeit des freien Willens, i.
Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 2, 1907.
Lanzalone (G.) Intorno al Libero Arbitrio. Cenobium, May-June 1907.
- 28 *Eller (George)* Der Mensch und das Unendliche.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 3, 1907.
- 30 *Cousinet (R.)* Le rôle de l'analogie dans les représentations du monde extérieur chez les enfants. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1907.
- 32 *Dupuis (L.)* L'Hallucination du Point de Vue Psychologique.
Rev. Phil., June 1907.
- Leroy (E. Bernard)* Nature des Hallucinations. Rev. Phil., June 1907.
[Hallucination is certainly not exaggerated voluntary attention, but is on the contrary the substitution of a particular mode of automatic attention for voluntary attention, which has become impossible.]
- 33 *Searle (G. M.)* The Recent Results of Psychical Research.
Catholic World, June, July, Aug. 1907.
Foa (Pio) Public Opinion and the phenomena termed "Spiritistic."
Annals of Psy. Sc., June 1907.
- Morselli (Enrico)* Eusapia Paladino and the genuineness of her phenomena, cont.
Annals of Psy. Sc., June 1907.
- 40 *Davies (Arthur E.)* Suggestions towards a Psychogenetic Theory of Mind.
J. of Phil., June 20, 1907.
- 41 *Bush (Wendell T.)* The Continuity of Consciousness. J. of Phil., Aug. 1, 1907.
[Consciousness is empirically not continuous, but occasional and intermittent.]
- Frischeisen-Köhler (Max)* Über den Begriff und den Satz des Bewusstseins. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 2, 1907.
[Discusses the conception of consciousness from the point of view of psychology and epistemology, and introduces the notion of a "primary consciousness." The consciousness which is the supreme condition of all experience is not individual; both the inner and the outer world lie within it.]
- Chide (A.)* La conscience sociale; Catégories logiques. Rev. Phil., July 1907.
- 42 *Pillsbury (W. B.)* The Ego and Empirical Psychology. Phil. R., July 1907.
[The self is merely all that we are and know, organised, self-unified, and self-identical, a growing vital unity that as a whole is effective in every experience. When it is directed towards the control of action, we know it as will; when choosing from the many stimuli that offer, as attention; when interpreting the stimulus, as perception or judgment.]
- 43 *Bodkin (A. M.)* The Subconscious Factors of Mental Process considered in relation to Thought, ii. Mind, July 1907.
[Tries to show the presence within the thought-process of factors which are at once felt and operative, but the character of which cannot be exhibited or communicated except by directing upon them a process of reflective discrimination.]
- 48 *Binet (A.)* Une expérience cruciale en Graphologie. Rev. Phil., July 1907.
[In handwriting there are indications of intelligence, and a good graphologist can distinguish the writing of an intelligent man from a man less intelligent, even when the contents of the text can be absolutely no guide.]
- Morse (Josiah)* The Psychology of Prejudice. Inter. J. of Eth., July 1907.
[Prejudice is located in deficiency or excess, and it is not a product of apperception.]
- 49 *Bierbriet (J. J. Van)* La psychologie quantitative: La Psychophysologie, ii. Rev. Phil., June 1907.
- 52 *Brentano (Franz)* Untersuchungen zur Sinnespsychologie. 168p.
Duncker & Humblot, 1907.
[Contains some very valuable psychological work on the colour green, on the quality and intensity of sense-phenomena, and on the analysis of tones into their primary elements.]
- 53 *Shearman (A. T.)* Intuition. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii., 1907.
[Holds with Hicks that there cannot be a direct cognition of the act of cognising, but agrees with Stout that there is immediate apprehension of sense affection.]
- Magnin (E.)* Observation. Rev. de Phil., July 1907.
- 55 *Thorndike (Edward L.)* On the Function of Visual Images. J. of Phil., June 6, 1907.
- 60 *Jones (E. E. Constance)* Logic and Identity in Difference.
Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii., 1907.
[Identity in Diversity may mean (a) "numerical" or "individual" identity in qualitative difference; (b) numerical difference in qualitative likeness; (c) qualitative likeness in qualitative difference.]
- 64 *Frankl (Wilhelm)* Gegenstandstheoretische Beiträge zur Lehre vom sogenannten logischen Quadrat.
Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 3, 1907.
- 72 *Külpe (Oswald)* Immanuel Kant. Darstellung u. Würdigung (*Aus Natur und Geisteswelt*, Bd. 146). 160p. Teubner, 1907.
[A most useful and valuable little work, presenting the chief features of the Kantian philosophy in a very clear and suggestive way.]
- Zschocke (Walter)* Über Kants Lehre vom Schematismus der reinen Vernunft. Kantstudien, xii. 2, June 1907.
[The author died at the early age of twenty-six, and this suggestive essay is published by his teacher, Prof. Rickert.]
- Evellin (F.)* La raison pure et les antinomies: Essai critique sur la philosophie kantienne. 320p. Alcan, 1907.
- Sentrout (C.)* Les préambules de la question kantienne. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1907.
- Thomas (M.)* L'objet de la métaphysique selon Kant et selon Aristote. Rev. de Phil., June 1907.
[Discusses Sentrout's book with this title.]
- Farges (Abbé)* Comment il faut réfuter Kant. Rev. de Phil., July 1907.
[A propos of the work by M. Sentrout.]

Siebert (Otto) Die Erneuerung der Friesschen Schule.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 2, 1907.

- 73 *Rensi (G.)* Hegel, il Cristianesimo e il Vedanta. Cœnobium, Mar.-Apr., 1907.
[No Christian church could accept Hegelian doctrine as its own. With the Hegelian system Western thought ends by reaching the same results as Indian philosophic-religious thought reached long ago.]

- 74 *James (William)* Pragmatism: A new name for some old ways of thinking. 309p. Longmans, 1907.

[This book will be dealt with in an article to appear in a future number.]

James (William) A Word more about Truth. J. of Phil., July 18, 1907.

Perry (R. Barton) A Review of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge. J. of Phil., July 4, 1907.

[Insists upon emphasizing the object as the element which plays the determining part in the constitution of truth.]

Perry (R. Barton) A Review of Pragmatism as a Philosophical Generalisation. J. of Phil., Aug. 1, 1907.

[In so far as pragmatism cleaves to subjectivism, it must abandon its empiricism for some sort of transcendental idealism; since if the thing known is to be reduced to the knower, the knower himself must be erected into a permanent and self-subsistent entity, capable of supporting the whole.]

Mentré (F.) Note sur la valeur pragmatique du Pragmatisme. Rev. de Phil., July 1907.

[Pragmatism is connected with two currents of ideas—the sceptical and the mystical, both unscientific and unphilosophical. Utility is a criterion absolutely devoid of value from the rational point of view.]

Brown (W. Adams) The Pragmatic Value of the Absolute. J. of Phil., Aug. 15, 1907.

[The belief in a universal will executing its decrees and working out the universal destiny has been the faith of statesmen as well as of philosophers; of soldiers as well as of dreamers. A faith like this then is worthy of serious consideration on pragmatic grounds.]

Sidgwick (Alfred) Humanism. Albany R., Aug. 1907.

[Everywhere in judging, the conception of a purpose which the judgment will serve is what gives us reason to care about judging correctly, even where the purpose is so wide as (e.g.) that of increasing our general knowledge in the faith that it will thus become a better instrument.]

Schiller (F. C. S.) Humism and Humanism. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii., 1907.

[Hume cannot be said to have refuted the volitional theory of causation. That theory yields an answer to Hume which is simpler, directer, completer than any other.]

Pratt (J. Bissett) Truth and its Verification. J. of Phil., June 6, 1907.

[Truth for the pragmatist does not mean verifiability; it means the process of verification.]

- 77 *Sickel (Paul)* Das Verhältnis des Pantheismus zum Theismus in Lotzes Lehre vom Absoluten. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 2, 1907.

[An elaborate criticism. Lotze is neither a consistent pantheist nor consistent theist; his intermediate standpoint is untenable and full of contradictions.]

Cuche (Paul - Joseph) Étude sur le Monisme. Rev. de Phil., Aug. 1907.

- 79 *M'Gilvary (E. Bradley)* Prolegomena to a Tentative Realism. J. of Phil., Aug. 15, 1907.

[Exposes the sophistry which attributes to the realist the assumption of two numerically different objects, the perceived object and the unperceivable object beyond the field of awareness. It is perfectly possible to conceive the object of vision, for example, as being not a "modification of consciousness" at all, but as the real thing.]

- 89 *Rashdall (Hastings)* Nicholas de Ultricia; A Medieval Hume. Proc. Aris. Soc., N.S., vii., 1907.

[Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society, 1906.]

- 90 *Pidon (J. Allanson)* Spinoza. A Handbook to the Ethics. 272p. Constable, 1907. [Review will follow.]

- 91 *Falckenberg (Richard)* Eine Textverwirrung in Leibniz' Nouveaux essais bei Gerhardt. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxx. 2, 1907.

Görland (A.) Der Gottesbegriff bei Leibniz (*Philosophische Arbeiten*, herausg. v. Cohen u. Natop.) 144p. Töpelmann, 1907.

- 92V *Paulhan (F.)* Herbert Spencer d'après son Autobiographie. Rev. Phil., Aug. 1907.

["Spencer will not suffer through the publication of his autobiography. He remains a great mind, in spite of all his weaknesses."]

- 94 *Legrand (G.)* Ampère et Maine de Biran: La théorie des rapports. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1907.

Manzoni (R.) Il Pensiero di Renouvier. Cœnobium, Jan.-Feb. 1907.

- V *Cauwelaert (F. Van)* L'empirio-criticisme de Richard Avenarius. Rev. Néo-Scol., May 1907.

- W *Camille (Hémon)* La philosophie de M. Sully-Prudhomme. 483p. Alcan, 1907.

Gibson (W. R. Boyce) Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life. 2nd ed. 182p. Black, 1907.

[The 2nd Ed. of this book contains an additional chapter entitled "Activism," dealing with two new works of Eucken.]

V ART. 83 Sacred Music.

Gardner (Ernest A.) The British School at Athens. Oxf. and Camb. R., June 1907.

[An account of the school and its work.]

Strong (Mrs Arthur) Roman Sculpture from Augustus to Constantine. Ill. 408p. Duckworth, 1907.

[Based upon a series of lectures delivered at different times during the last seven years. An attempt is made to discuss Roman art in view not only of its intrinsic merits, but of the special place it occupies at the psychological moment when the Antique passes from the service of the Pagan state into that of Christianity.]

Jacoby (G.) Herders und Kants Aesthetik. 357p. Dürr, 1907.

Ellis (Havelock) The Art of Spain. Cont. R., July 1907.

Binyon (Laurence) Mr Sturge Moore's "Correggio." Albany R., July 1907.

- 83 *Julian (John), ed.* A Dictionary of Hymnology; Setting Forth the Origin and History of Christian Hymns of all Ages and Nations. Revised ed. 1768p. Murray, 1907.

[The number of hymns annotated is about 35,000, and the number of authors, translators, etc., recorded, over 6000.]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE PROSPECTS OF MODERNISM.

THE REV. GEORGE TYRRELL.

THAT somewhat small section of the public which is interested in ecclesiastical affairs must by this time be rather weary of the Encyclical *Pascendi* and the endless discussions it has evoked. It has been attacked and defended, vilified and glorified, sometimes indiscriminately, sometimes with discrimination. It is important precisely as the fullest, purest, clearest possible expression of principles and tendencies latent in the Church from the earliest times; from which the Reformation was an instinctive rather than a critical or complete revolt; and which have been emphasised and worked out to their rigorous consequences by the negative or anti-Protestant spirit of the Counter-reformation.

The purpose of this paper is not to dissect the dissected, or to fell the fallen, but rather (1 and 2) to study the two Catholic "mentalities" now brought into conflict, and (3) to forecast dimly the possible issue of the struggle. I call both these mentalities Catholic; for the faith of Pius X. and of Abbé Loisy is one and the same; the difference is in their understanding of its embodiment—intellectual, practical, institutional. This has been said and explained so often and so well that I need not insist on it.

I. One point in the Encyclical *Pascendi* throws considerable light on what we may call the scholastic mentality, namely, the elaborate and very ingenious attempt to discredit historical criticism and to retort the charge of apriorism brought against scholastic theologians by the modernists. Obviously, before we investigate we must have some notion of what we are looking for, and of where and how we are to look for it. We must have a method. And this method is to some extent *a priori*, the joint product of experience and philosophical reflection. We presuppose the uniformity of Nature, the canons of induction, the validity of our senses and reason. Assuming the method, it is the part of the investigator to apply it skilfully and impartially (whether to Homer, or the Bible, or the Koran, or Church History), and to accept whatever results it may yield. Apriorism in the opprobrious sense consists in assuming the results and choosing or adopting the method so as to obtain those results. Thus, histories of the Blessed Virgin and S. Joseph have been written, unhampered by any historical evidence, so as to yield and support certain dogmatic conclusions; and church history or hagiography written on the same lines has entailed wholesale manipulation and suppression of inconvenient evidence. The Encyclical makes a valiant attempt to prove modernists guilty of a like apriorism—as though two blacks would make a white. It accuses them of starting with a belief in the evolution of religion, of the scriptures, of the Church with her dogmas and institutions; and then of arranging evidence to accord with this hypothesis. Only a profound ignorance of the huge masses of irresistible evidence which have forced the evolution hypothesis, not merely on the modernist, but on the modern mind, could explain the desperate recklessness of such a charge. To some extent, however, it is the daring of desperation. The results of historical criticism, if true, justify beyond all dispute the modernists' demand for theological reform and re-statement. They are absolutely incompatible with the rigid neo-thomism

of the Encyclical; with the conviction that all the institutions and dogmas of Catholicism were the immediate work of the historical Christ, and that even the Hebrew patriarchs were familiar with Mary's Immaculate Conception. As such, the results of the critico-historical method must, in the interests of scholasticism, be boldly and roundly denied as mere aprioristic fancies and illusions. Evidence that calls for Newman's hypothesis of development and for the modernist extensions of the same, must be met with a stout and audacious resistance. It has taken some fifty years to bring into complete evidence the radical opposition between Newman's historical method and scholastic theology. He strove with all his skill and subtlety to yoke them together, and as long as the results of his method were controversially useful and kept within the traditional bounds, it was tolerated, except by that "insolent and aggressive faction" whose instincts were truer than their arguments; whose murmur of discontent never ceased, and has now become clamorous in the Encyclical *Pascendi*.

The solidarity of Newmanism with Modernism cannot be denied. Newman might have shuddered at his progeny, but it is none the less his. He is the founder of a method which has led to results which he could not have foreseen or desired. The growth of his system has made its divergence from scholasticism clearer every day. If scholasticism is essential to Catholicism, Newman must go overboard, and the defiance hurled in the face of history at the Vatican Council, and reiterated with emphasis by Pius X., is superabundantly justified. That such a defiance should be quite serious and honest seems almost incredible to men of ordinary education. We need not deny that to some extent it is backed up and made practically effectual by men morally and intellectually unscrupulous, the monopolists of an effete educational system, the defenders of a narrow class-interest; by men who feel instinctively and rightly that Modernism will eventually spoil their market, curtail their revenues, depreciate their importance,

and disturb their tranquillity in a thousand ways. Every cause has its rabble of self-seekers. But there must be some good apples on the top of the basket. No cause could live on its rabble alone, and the cause of obscurantism must have, and has, numbers of sincerely convinced and enthusiastic defenders to whom it owes its vitality, and who lend respectability to its camp followers. To understand and believe in the possibility of such sincerity, it is first necessary to realise that seminary system of education to which the great masses of the Catholic clergy owe their mentality and which flourishes more vigorously at Rome, the official centre of the Church.¹ It is a simple fact that in these days, when the whole battle rages round the Bible and ecclesiastical history, men still can and most often do obtain the doctorate in theology in complete and grotesque ignorance of those two subjects. If lectures are sometimes given in either or both, it is clearly understood that they may be neglected as forming no part of the *theses ad gradum*; and neglected they are. Scholasticism, as is plain from the Encyclical, is the sum and substance of learning, of *doctrina*—scholasticism with its aprioristic contempt of the contingent, of experience, of history—of all that my excellent professor used to dismiss contemptuously as “*mera eruditio quæ postea facillime acquiritur*.” If there is a very small percentage of learned priests, it is in spite of, not because of, the system. They have made themselves. As long as their learning is in fields remote from the widespreading territory of theology, they are invoked as witnesses to the compatibility of Catholicism and intellectual freedom. Those, however, whose thought and research have any actual bearing on their professional interests as priests fare badly. To count them is almost to count the modernists. For though by no means ignorant of scholasticism, they are usually inclined to ignore it.

¹ Cf. *La Réforme intellectuelle du Clergé*, par P. Saintyves, Nourry, Paris, 1904, which will very soon become an understatement of the organised ignorance of the seminaries.

It is therefore not only possible but infinitely probable that these theologians who have hurled such a quixotic defiance at history have done so without any sort of first-hand or even second-hand knowledge of the forces arranged against them. With isolated facts and instances they deal as with the isolated texts of scripture from which, regardless of context, they deduce their dogmatic conclusions. Of the cumulative argument; of the historical sense; of reasonings that defy syllogistic statement their method knows nothing. For them the truest notions and judgments are the most abstract, the most remote from undefinable concrete reality. Even of patristic and mystical theology, of the past teachings of the Church, their knowledge is usually limited to little scraps used in text-book controversies. Thus the Encyclical fetches a passage from Gregory IX., out of Denzinger's *Enchiridion*,¹ to belabour the modernists, all unconscious that it had been written to belabour the pioneers of scholasticism. Let anyone who doubts the compatibility of theological and dialectical pre-eminence with such historical and critical innocence consult Abbé Houtin's volumes on the Biblical question in France in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Until we allow for these facts it is impossible to realise the sincerity and good faith of many of the champions of what else must seem wilful obscurantism.

Again, it is necessary to consider how easily tradition, habit, and fashion can weld together into one solid block a whole multitude of really separable and even antagonistic beliefs and principles so as to make them inseparable for a given mind, in such sort that to deny one is to deny all. Thus for the average and uncritical clerical mind, Catholic faith and scholastic theology are tangled together in a practically hopeless confusion; and the stronger a priest's faith is, the more promptly will his conscience be up in arms in defence of his

¹ I ground this conjecture on the fact that the Encyclical dates the letter of Gregory 1223 instead of 1228—a mistake which is made in the body, but not in the index, of the *Enchiridion* (ed. 1900).

theology; nor will he hear of distinction between heresy and theological heterodoxy. It is hard for the modern undogmatic Christianity of Protestant countries to realise this frame of mind with any sort of imaginative sympathy. Yet let us suppose for a moment that we found a formidable array of unanswerable reasons and facts, and of intelligent educated opinion, drawn up against our most fundamental moral instincts and convictions and in favour of cruelty, tyranny and selfishness, should we not be driven by our faith in goodness to a sort of scepticism; should we not say: "So much the worse for facts and reason and intelligence"? And do we not actually meet this scepticism continually in people whose hearts are better than their heads? This preference of faith to reason is bad scholasticism; but at times it may be good sense. A supposed conflict between what professes to be divinely revealed truth and the demands of reason must issue in pious scepticism or godless infidelity, in fideism or rationalism, and there is no question as to which alternative the religious temperament will choose. And now consider what Modernism must appear to the mind of a perfectly convinced and perfectly uncritical Roman Catholic, who takes his faith with its scholastic interpretation and all its traditional accessories as one solid block; who views the vessel and its contents with equal reverence and as of equally divine authority. It is not without plausibleness that the Encyclical designates it the compendium of all heresies, and tries to trace its ramifications through the whole frame of Catholicism. It is of course the very natural mistake of a scholastic critic to seek in Modernism a finished and coherent theological system deduced, like scholasticism, from a few definitions. But Modernism is a method and a spirit rather than a system; a mode of inquiry, not a body of results. Here is its weakness against the compact unanimity of its adversaries. Men can stand united shoulder to shoulder because they are motionless; but let a panic scatter them, and their only unity is that of the *terminus a quo*, or at most that of general direction. Modernists agree

as to their point of departure, as to the general method and way ; but their goal is below the horizon ; their rate of advance unequal ; their courses by no means parallel. Hence not one of them will subscribe to all the positions of his fellow-modernists ; still less will he accept the compact system fathered on him by the Encyclical. Not one of them would die for the modernist interpretation of Catholicism which it condemns. But all of them repudiate the scholastic anti-historical interpretation which it implies and imposes. Here is their unity—a unity of negation. And so far as this negation permeates all branches of the scholastic presentments of Catholicism, it is possible to attribute to Modernism a positive and systematic unity which is simply that of the shadow or negation of scholasticism.

Scholasticism was also in its day regarded as the compendium of all heresies. For there was no part of patristic tradition that it did not modify and disfigure in the endeavour to squeeze the whole into the categories of the formerly anathematised Aristotle. Hence the above-mentioned letter of Gregory IX. is even more violent against the then modernist scholasticism than the Encyclical *Pascendi* is against the modern anti-scholastics. Again, it is clear from the official and other contemporary documents that the teaching of Galileo was likewise regarded as a compendium of all heresies ; for indeed there was no department of traditional belief which it did not modify, directly or indirectly, and it was hastily assumed that such modification must be disastrous. It is hard for us to put ourselves back into those days and to realise how reasonable such an apprehension must have seemed, and how probably we ourselves should have shared it. We can never imagine ourselves crucifying Christ, or siding against causes that have triumphed over persecution. As a shock and scandal to the religious imagination of the masses, the thesis of Darwin is insignificant beside that of Galileo. Compared, then, with partial “heresies” which result from some new application of generally received categories, those that

portend the bankruptcy of an old and the introduction of some new category have this all-pervasive character, and are opposed with the same sweeping condemnation by the panic-stricken defenders of the past. Modernism with its historico-critical method leaves nothing untouched; and if to touch is to destroy, it is all-destructive. To those who cannot distinguish the flexible fabric of Catholic tradition from the scholasticism with which it has been starched and stiffened these eight hundred years, it must seem as though the historical method were an all-destructive agency. If it was hard to believe in a moving earth it is harder to believe in a moving Church, and to reconcile *semper eadem* with *nunquam eadem*. The impression on minds dominated by statical modes of thought can only be one of irreparable disaster and chaos. This must be well borne in mind if we would enter into the mentality of which the Encyclical *Pascendi* is the expression. Except those who have actually lived in seminaries, few can at all realise how, by a most elaborate and well-organised system of fences and barriers, a section of the medieval world of thought and sentiment has managed to survive into the twentieth century, as much at home there as Cleopatra's Needle on the Thames Embankment, but hardly as innocuous.

II. While the Encyclical, in virtue of what it implies and asserts, rather than of what it denies, is a faithful expression of what we have called the scholastic mentality, its delineation of Modernism will be of little service to us. The later can understand the earlier, as a man can understand his youth; but the earlier cannot understand the later, or the youth the man.

A scholastic representation of Modernism, even were it designed to flatter rather than traduce, is like an attempt to photograph the flight of a bird or the gallop of a horse. At best we get a series of positions; never the movement of which they are but "arrests." Modernism is a movement, a process, a tendency, and not, like scholasticism, a system—

the term or "arrest" of a movement. It is a movement away from the scholastic position in a variety of directions. But whereas in former years such movements have been in quest of some new position to be accepted as final and permanent, Modernism recognises movement as itself a permanent condition, and seeks only to discover its laws and determine its direction. Growth is its governing category. In other words, it is an attempt to reconcile the essentials of Catholic faith with those indisputable results of historical criticism which are manifestly disastrous to the medieval synthesis of scholastic theology. It does not demand a new theology, or no theology at all, but a moving, growing theology—a theology carefully distinguished from the religious experience of which it is the ever imperfect, ever perfectible expression. It does not demand a new institutional framework of Catholicism, or no framework at all; but a recognition that the framework has grown in the past and should be suffered to grow in the future under the guidance of the same Life and Spirit.

The life-story of the average modernist is the best refutation of the charge of doctrinaire apriorism levelled at him by those masters of apriorism to whom the cogency of experience is hardly intelligible, and whose dealings are all with notions and universals. As a rule, the modernist is inspired in his early years with a desire to prove, what he has always been taught, that the Catholic faith is perfectly reconcilable with the assured results of science and history. He sets forth as the valiant champion of faith against the misguided unbeliever or misbeliever. Not distinguishing that faith from its scholastic expression, he finds himself slowly and reluctantly driven from position after position, till finally, after the old categories have been stretched and strained out of all recognition in the effort to make them cover the masses of intractable evidence, they have to be abandoned altogether in favour of the categories of movement, life and growth. In nearly all cases it is the story of buoyant, all-daring, inexperienced faith and hope, followed by struggle, disillusionment, temporary confusion and despair; ending with

a clear intuition of the perfect concord between faith and reason, between the unchanging facts and experiences of the supernatural life and the ever-changing and growing expression of those facts in doctrines and institutions.

The same sort of zeal that has brought him into and out of his trials usually makes him an energetic advocate of the remedies that have served in his own case, and for which he recognises a large and increasing demand. Having raised his head above the seminary wall he perceives, what those within are wholly unaware of, the approach of a deluge, and the imperative necessity of preparing an ark of refuge. To those within he is simply an alarmist, a busybody, a wanton lover of novelty. Their remedy is to build the walls higher, so that no one can see over and disturb their peace. In the measure that he is pressed and harried by the irritated votaries of fatuous ignorance and inertia, and that his ears are filled with the roar of the storm through which they are slumbering, he is brought face to face with the practical problem of the limits of authority and obedience. How far is he to obey authority to its own hurt, and to the hurt of the general good for which alone it exists? Is he to do what the ruler actually wills in ignorance, or what he would, or certainly ought to, will, if he saw what was on the other side of the seminary wall? Disobedience is never lawful, but may not obedience to a lower law be disobedience to a higher law? What was the attitude of Christ and His apostles towards those who sat in the seat of Moses when it came to such a conflict of duties? When the house is in flames should one wait for orders or for leave to cry "Fire"?

The recalcitrance of modernists is not to be explained as the zeal of philosophers for their system or of doctrinaires for their doctrine, as an *odium-theologicum* or *anti-theologicum*. It is the unceremonious desperation of men who find their house in flames and the fire-engines out of order; who would be sceptics if they denied the existence of the danger that stares them in the face. They have had palpable and extensive experience of the positively mischievous and faith-destroying influence of

scholastic apologetic and church-theory upon the modern mind. Whatever else comes, that must go. They are far less certain of the truth and adequacy of the various substitutes they propose, than of the imperative need of some substitute. It is not what the Encyclical condemns, but what it implies and asserts, that unites them in an energetic and uncompromising negation—an “everlasting No” as emphatic as that of nascent scholasticism to the perilous intransigence of Gregory IX.

III. Will this No be equally effective, and elicit from Pius X. such a “climb-down” as that by which Gregory in 1231 explained away his words of 1228? Nothing more impossible. For not only has the weight of all papal utterances been doubled and quadrupled since the thirteenth century, but we are dealing to-day with an Encyclical and not with a letter to a university. Popes were talked to more roundly in those days, nor were even their Encyclicals supposed to be infallible and irreversible.

What, then, are the prospects of Modernism? Plainly, things are at a deadlock. “There is everywhere and at all times a blending of separate types of religious faith, until a notable crisis brings men suddenly face to face with the necessity of a choice.”¹ Such a crisis has arrived in the post-Reformation Church of Rome. It is no small gain that modernists of the temporising, compromising type should be rudely waked up to a criticism of their position by the Encyclical *Pascendi*, and that the whole movement should be brought to a deeper and fuller consciousness of its own meaning, origin, and tendency. Adverse tendencies can live side by side in the same spirit or the same social organism, unconscious of their opposition until their full development shows that there is not room for both of them. Long before scholasticism and its correlative theory of church government, the principles of that system existed in the juridical categories and church-theories of Tertullian and Cyprian, and in the intellectualist conception of faith dating from the war with Gnosticism. Still older are the spiritual

¹ *History of the Reformation*. By T. M. Lindsay, D.D. Vol. I. p. 156.

conception of authority and the experiential conception of faith, dating from the controversy between Christ and the synagogue. The coexistence of these opposite spirits, which was possible and even profitable in the earlier stages of ecclesiastical history, when the Church had to take the lead in civilisation, is neither possible nor profitable now that the lead has passed from her hands and left her free to attend to her principal and proper mission—the preaching and realising of Christ's Gospel. To get to the root of his divergence from the scholastic mentality, the modernist will have to dig deeper than he is usually aware—deeper than the sixteenth century, or the thirteenth or the sixth. As the Reformers found out, it is vain to combat consequences until one's mind is purged of the principles from which they spring. It is idle to combat scholasticism or ultramontaniam, if one confounds faith with theology, and spiritual with juridical authority. If modernists dream that the present juristico-scholastic system either can or will commit suicide, or reform or limit itself in any way; or that reasoning with it will produce any direct effect upon it, they are Utopians who have read history to little purpose. It is not a question of brain against brain, but of brain against the inherent logic of a living system or process, working itself out independently of individuals—shaping them rather than shaped by them. Any concessions a more liberal pope might make to modernists' requirements, could only be concessions of diplomacy and opportunity, like the suspension of the medieval theocracy, or of the burning of heretics; temporising concessions to the exigencies of evil times and contrary to the true spirit and logic of the system.

History, however, teaches us that pressure from the environment has again and again forced that system to yield in various ways, for the time being. One might instance the triumph of Aristotle or of Galileo. But for the triumph of Modernism it would have to yield altogether and become extinct. Is this conceivable?

So certain is the Encyclical that the results of the historico-

critical method are fatal to the juristico-scholastic church-theory, that its logic is directed principally to an attack on that method ; and lest logic should prove too frail a weapon, it decrees that the seminary walls shall be raised higher ; the windows buffed ; the doors barred and the chinks stopped up. Modernism, as it rightly perceives, is due to infiltrations of current knowledge and enlightenment. If there is to be a clergy to support and advocate the scholastic church-theory, it is necessary they should know nothing but scholasticism ; that they should know nothing of science or history but what scholastic theology dictates and permits. Now if these infiltrations of light and intelligence could be prevented by an inconceivably perfect police system such as the Encyclical suggests, it is not hard to forecast the result of thus rapidly widening the gulf that already yawns between the clerical and the lay mentality. For to protect the laity from the contamination of history is practically impossible. Thus the shepherds will be safely folded and the sheep scattered abroad. But it is manifest that the same conditions of environment as have in the main produced Modernism by letting daylight into convents and seminaries, are bound to prevail and increase more and more. To keep her hold on school and university education ; to satisfy the standards and requirements and to receive the financial support of modern governments, the Church must have an ever-growing proportion of qualified teachers among the ranks of her clergy and religious. It is through this channel chiefly that the virus of Modernism has entered, and must increasingly enter, into the medieval mentality. But more than this ; it is plain that, even now, "liberal" governments are beginning to realise the limitations of Cavour's principle, and to see that it is no true liberty to suffer the minds and morals of the masses to be practised on and tampered with by men whose ethical, social, and political notions are those of another age ; whose education positively unfits them to understand the mind of their own age and country ; who lack that guarantee against fanaticism and subversiveness which only some measure of

liberal university education can secure—men, moreover, who are bound in conscience to work in every way for the downfall of liberalism and for the re-establishment of the medieval theocracy, and for whom the secular state is an embodied heresy to be combated by political intrigue, inspired by all the most sacred influences of their religion.

True liberty of thought does not imply licensed error and ignorance, but the means and opportunities of arriving at a sane judgment—means wholly denied to the seminarian by the prescriptions of the Encyclical *Pascendi*. To require a university degree of those who teach and form the public conscience is as necessary a measure of public safety as the licensing of medical practitioners.

Once more, it must not be forgotten (to put it crudely) that those who pay for the piper will call for the tune. Modern conditions make the ecclesiastical body more and more dependent on the purse of “the harmless but necessary” layman, so unmercifully pulverised by the Encyclical. It is equally plain that whatever little temporary success methods of police may have in protecting the seminarian from the knowledge of awkward facts, they will have none at all with the layfolk of modernised countries, who will find their clergy more and more incapable of guiding them through difficulties of whose existence the said clergy are unaware. Already there is considerable restiveness on the part of the most docile, indifferent, and long-suffering laity that a successful sacerdotalism has ever produced. We cannot conceive their daring to demand an educated clergy in any effectual way. But we can well conceive their turning away quietly in considerable and increasing numbers, from guides with whom they have no ideas or language in common. This of itself will force the guides to make themselves more efficient, and will bring them into contact with the sources of evil from which the Encyclical would guard them.

Thus, through inevitable pressure from outside, the attempt to create and maintain an uneducated clergy ignorant of real

history and of everything except scholasticism and what scholasticism sanctions, is doomed to speedy defeat. With education will come the knowledge of history, and still more, the sense of history, the category of growth and development. It will be utterly impossible to keep from the Catholic clergy of the near future the knowledge of those facts which are fatal to the whole juristico-scholastic conception of Catholicism, to the notion of the Church with all her essential dogmas and institutions, as an abrupt and immediate creation of Christ, and as exercising in His name, not a spiritual, but a juridical authority in intellectual, moral, social, and political matters, which He never exercised.

That the medieval interpretation of Catholicism is doomed is far more evident than that the various efforts of Modernism to find a re-interpretation will be successful. This is a matter of faith and hope rather than of reasoned prediction. The general tendency of such efforts is to retain the old forms and formulas as unchanged as possible, while carefully distinguishing them from the supernatural experiences and values of which they are but the contingent vehicles; and while pushing theory and theology and externalities more and more into the background, to lay all possible stress upon faith, hope, and charity; upon the evangelical, mystical, and practical sides of Christianity, and upon that purely spiritual authority by which the shepherd draws the sheep after him instead of driving them before him.

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THE PAPAL ENCYCLICAL. FROM A CATHOLIC'S POINT OF VIEW.

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IT may, I suppose, be assumed at starting that the "Modernism," with which the Pope deals in his recent Encyclical, is that, and that only, which he describes while he denounces it, and that he does not, as some would appear to assume, include in his condemnation anything besides one special system of doctrine, advocated as being suited to our present stage of evolutionary progress, the old theology being considered no less useless for our generation than the swaddling-clothes of the infant for a grown man. Hence the name "Modernism" to designate what is not merely new but bases its claim to acceptance precisely on its novelty.

To sketch in any detail the character of the system, as we have it thus presented, would not be easy, even did the space at my disposal permit of any such attempt. Neither is this necessary. It will suffice for my purpose to sketch the main features of the Modernist system in the broadest outline, and to examine one or two crucial points in illustration of its nature.

On the Kantian principle, that all which is beyond the limit of the phenomenal must be unknowable, so far as reason is concerned, our Modernists declare that whatever is supernatural must necessarily be beyond our intellectual ken. We have no proof that anything of the kind exists, nor any right to speak of it as a truth. Nothing of all on which religion has hitherto

been supposed to rest has any real existence of its own, apart from the human mind. It is by the process of "vital immanence" that the objects of religious belief are evolved, and they may be true in their religious aspect, though making no claim to be true, scientifically or historically. Thus, for example, in the actual life of Christ there were no miraculous elements. He was not born of a Virgin; He did not rise from the tomb, nor ascend to Heaven. So far as Science has to do with them, these things are untrue. But they are true nevertheless in the province of religion; the actual facts of our Lord's life having been transfigured and refracted in the mind of His followers, whose common consent has evolved and communicated the attributes with which He is invested; whereas in fact He was but a man of the choicest nature, whose like has never been nor will be.

Thus it is claimed that while Science and History have equipped themselves with sound methods, which show much to be incredible which was formerly accepted blindly, there can yet be no collision between Science and Faith, since they move in different planes, the one dealing with things as they objectively are, the other as subjectively "transfigured."

So again, to take another point of fundamental importance, with regard to the Sacraments. They were not in reality, says the Modernist, instituted by Christ, they do not produce any supernatural effect in their recipients, nor were they from the first what they are now; for this would contradict the law of evolution. They are, in reality, bare signs or symbols, with no power whatever to impart grace (there being, indeed, no such thing as grace to be imparted); they were instituted by the Church long after the time of Christ, or rather were introduced by the gradual evolution of the life of Christian faith, being born of two needs—that of giving to religion some sensible manifestation, and that of propagating it by some sensible acts; and their efficacy is due wholly to the felicitous character of the phrases embodied in them, on account of which they have proved themselves to be powerful

instruments for propagating certain great and impressive ideas. And, because of the part they have thus played in the life of the Church, faith is justified in referring their institution to Christ Himself.

The like holds good of all else. Dogmas do not represent, for the Modernist, additions to our Natural Knowledge, delivered once for all by supernatural revelation, the logical significance of which may be more and more fully comprehended, as time goes on and new questions arise, but which remain in themselves final and immutable. On the contrary, it is of their very essence to change with time, for "they are born of the species of impulse or necessity, by virtue of which the believer is constrained to elaborate his religious thought, so as to render it clearer for himself and others; which elaboration consists in the power of penetrating and refining the primitive formula, not indeed in itself and according to logical development, but as required by circumstances, or *vitally*, as the Modernist more abstrusely put it."

So, too, for Scripture. This, in the Modernist view, is a collection of experiences, not indeed of such as may come to anybody; but of choice and extraordinary experiences which may have occurred in any religion. Nor must their inspiration be set down to the Voice of God, speaking from without; but of God speaking from within, through the impulse of *vital immanence* and *permanence*, only more vehemently than in the ordinary case of the religious sentiment declaring its beliefs.

It would be easy to mention other points in illustration; but for our present purpose let these suffice. They indicate the character of the system which the Pope condemns, and his condemnation affects those alone who advocate such a system.

It is not my object at present to examine such doctrines in themselves, nor to ask what can be urged in support of them, or even how far they are intelligible. I shall confine myself to one or two considerations of a simpler and more obvious character.

In the first place, if such principles be accepted as those upon which Modernism rests, it is obvious that the Catholic Church must cease to be herself. The entire groundwork upon which she has been based proves a mere quicksand. From the first, her claim has been to be founded upon truths supernaturally revealed, beyond the competence of the human intellect to discover or to alter. Consequently, with St Paul, she has ever peremptorily insisted, "Though we, or an Angel from Heaven, should preach another Gospel than that which ye received, let him be anathema." For nineteen centuries it has been the belief of Catholics that the doctrines comprised in the Christian revelation are true, beyond fear of doubt, for all times and places, and that the warrant for their truth is ultimately the testimony of Christ, and proximately the teaching of His Church, safeguarded from error in her doctrinal office by the Holy Ghost. If, on the other hand, it should appear that the articles of their creed are, of their very nature, in a perpetual state of flux, that they are no more than religious formulæ tentatively set before the religious sentiment by the devout mind, as approximations to truth, and merely symbolic in their relation to the object-world, and therefore subject to reconstruction and rejection as times pass and investigation progresses, while the final test of their validity is not the voice of Christ speaking with authority through the Church, but acceptance on the part of religious sentiment which finds them conformable to its needs—in such case, how many Catholics will continue to believe, or will consider that anything is left worth believing?

Another consideration both confirms the first and adds to it. How many members of the Church could by any possibility ever get so far as to understand the Modernist system? Quite apart from everything else, it is evidently a system that can be comprehended only by philosophers, and not very many of them. What could be made of it by the vast majority of men, by a flock of Breton or Tyrolese or Connemara peasants? We are assured that Pius X. himself does not properly under-

stand it, and it will probably be allowed that the bulk of his subjects are even less likely to do so, that whatever else it is, it is not a creed,

Which he may read who binds the sheaf,
Or builds the house, or digs the grave,
Or those wild eyes that watch the wave
In roarings round the coral reef.

But, even if we do not go so far as to argue that to appeal to all sorts and conditions of men is sufficient proof of the truth of a religion—its incapacity to make such appeal is certainly enough to disprove it. “*Pauperes evangelizantur*” has from the first been a note of the Gospel, and it was among the ignorant and lowly, rather than the wise and cultivated, that the first conquests of Christianity spread and its power grew.

If it be replied that the simple and unphilosophical multitude being manifestly incapable of comprehending things at their true value, it is precisely for them that the dogmas of theology were rendered necessary, and on that account are justified, such a plea surely cannot mean that, in the name of truth, the favoured and enlightened few are to set before the many what in fact are falsehoods, knowing and intending that they shall be taken for actual truths. And, if not this, what does it mean?

Another consideration regards the all-important point of religion in its moral aspect. If our true foundation is to be the sanction of the human mind, enlightened by the evolution of thought, why should not Christians look to the future, as well as to the present, and incorporate in their belief and practice what they assure themselves is inevitably going to be the outcome of the trend of human opinion as they scientifically study it? A man or body of men, for instance, concludes that a century hence the sanctity of marriage will be given up by the general consent of civilised nations—and this being a still higher point of evolution than has yet actually been reached, asks why we should not enter forthwith upon its

consequences. What, on Modernist principles, could be replied to such an argument?

Here again, therefore, for Catholics with whom their faith is the deepest and surest of all certitudes, the Modernist system contradicts every principle which they hold most sacred, and, were it suffered to spread amongst the faithful unopposed, would effectually stifle all true religion in the souls of many. With "A Catholic Layman" in the *Times*, they say, that had it not been denounced, they would have been inclined to despair of Catholicity and Christianity.

I would add a word about a particular question which, although not directly connected with the Encyclical, has been much quoted in recent discussions—namely, that of Cardinal Newman, whose teaching various writers confidently declare to be condemned by Pope Pius. The grounds upon which such a supposition is based are instructive, and afford a practical illustration of the misapprehension which easily arises if such a document be not carefully interpreted.

It is argued, in the first place, that Newman must needs be aimed at by the Encyclical, inasmuch as he believed in doctrinal "Development," and the "Modernists" are condemned for teaching that doctrines and dogmas undergo evolution as time goes on.

It would, however, seem to be obvious that there is nothing in common between the logical development of dogma from a dogmatic *depositum fidei*, which Newman upheld, and the evolution of the whole system of dogma from the mere religious sense, which the Encyclical condemns. The doctrine of development, in the sense understood by Newman, did not commence with him. It was, for instance, clearly set forth in the Council of Florence (1441),¹ by the Archbishop of Rhodes, a chief spokesman on the Latin side, who contended for the liceity of "explanatio" (ἀνάπτυξις) and "declaratio" (σαφήνεια) as against addition to the *depositum* from without (προσθήκη), which was illicit. As the Archbishop summed up

¹ Mansi, *Collectio*, tom. xxxi., col. 554, seq., Session VI.

the matter, "It has from the beginning of the proclamation of the Gospel been lawful to unfold and make clear those things which are implicitly contained in the principles of faith, and that alone is permitted." But, according to the Modernist system, extrinsic infiltration from science or the *Zeitgeist* is of the essence of dogmatic evolution.

Very appositely to our present topic, Newman says (*Office and Work of Universities*, c. xvi.):—

"The oracles of Divine Truth, as time goes on, do but repeat one message from above which they have ever uttered, since the tongues of fire attested the coming of the Paraclete; still, as time goes on, they utter it with greater force and precision, under diverse forms, with fuller luminousness, and a richer ministration of thought, statement, and argument. [Sometimes] before the Church speaks, one or other of her forward children speaks for her, and while he does anticipate to a certain point what she is about to say or enjoin, he states it incorrectly, makes it error instead of truth, and risks his own faith in the process. Indeed, this is actually one source, or rather concomitant, of heresy, that it is the misshapen, huge, and grotesque foreshadow of true statements which are to come. . . . Supposing Abelard to be the first master of scholastic philosophy, we shall have still no difficulty in condemning the author, while we honour the work. To him is only the glory of spoiling by his own self-will what would have been done well and surely under the teaching and guidance of Infallible Authority."

It has likewise been urged that because Newman wrote that "No religion is from God which contradicts our sense of right and wrong," he held the personal individual revelation of God in the soul to be above all dogma and a test of its truth or falsehood, and so was at one with Modernists, according to whom the authority of the Church and her *magisterium* springs, in its last analysis, from the individual consciences of her members, particularly those more elevated and enlightened whose new and original experiences are most fully in harmony with the needs of their respective generations.

But it is obvious that here again the difference between Newman and his alleged successors is fundamental and absolute. What he quotes is the *fact* of conscience, the manifest reality and authority of the law of right and wrong written in the human heart, and he uses this as a guiding line for himself, the most effective guiding line, by which men

may be led to find truth of religion. As he adds in the same paragraph, "A religion which commanded us to lie or to have a community of wives, would *ipso facto* forfeit all claim to a divine origin" (*Grammar of Assent*, p. 414). In exactly the same way he used the argument from our intellect, and would say that no religion can be from God which contradicts the teaching of reason.

Having started from reason and conscience as guides to conduct us to the truth, to say that no doctrine can be true which is in contradiction to them is a self-evident proposition, or, rather, tautological. According to the system of Modernism, it is the human conscience, or consciousness, which *constructs* the articles which faith is to accept.

And can anyone who is familiar with his writings have the slightest doubt as to what would have been Newman's attitude towards a system which resolves dogma into a nebula of human sentiment and Christ Himself into a lay-figure, draped in attributes which have no other origin than the minds of men actuated by "vital immanence"? Did he not declare in his *Apologia*, "Dogma has been the fundamental principle of my religion. I know no other religion. I cannot enter into the idea of any other sort of religion; religion as a mere sentiment is to me a dream and a mockery"?

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THE PAPACY IN ITS RELATION TO AMERICAN IDEALS.

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AMONG the few master-motives of life the religious or spiritual are perhaps the most potent. The more life comes under the sway of reason, the greater is the influence upon man's activities of those fundamental views of life which, whether materialistic or otherwise, constitute man's religion. The Church deals primarily with these fundamentals, and because the Church of Rome touches and shapes the life of so large a number of individuals in their fundamental convictions, it is one of the most important of contemporary phenomena.

Yet a true historical appreciation of the Papacy is rare. Protestant sectarian prejudice is incapable of forming a balanced judgment. Still more inadequate is the shallow verdict of those historians whose attention is absorbed by politics and economic interests, to whom religion is unintelligible and therefore beneath their serious notice.

One often speaks of the Papacy and the Church of Rome as synonymous. But historically they are not identical: the Church is perfectly conceivable without the Papacy; the latter is grafted upon the Church and owes its origin to causes which are wholly distinct and separate. There was once a Church without a pope, and to trace the steps by which the Bishop of Rome achieved the primacy and finally attained infallibility is one of the interesting problems of History.

The Papacy assumes that as an institution it represents the legitimate and necessary development of the Christian Church, that its essential nature lies embedded in the Church of Christ, that it stands for the purpose of the Founder of Christianity, that He foresaw the future history of His Church and provided that there should be a head to the Church and that the Bishop of Rome was to be that head. The claim assumes that the motives which have led to the establishment, as we see it to-day, of the Papacy are to be found within the sphere of the Christian religion.

We shall have to realise how far from the mark this official and popular conception of the Papacy is. It ought to be superfluous, in this generation of advanced progress in the science of history, to point out the fallacy of the argument which alleges the words of Christ to St Peter as the foundation of the papal authority. Unfortunately, it is still repeated by those who interpret the terms and conceptions of the New Testament by the meaning which the same terms and conceptions have acquired in long centuries of use, and whose judgment of historical problems is too often vitiated by some sort of dogmatic prejudice.

The act comes first, then the theory. After Charlemagne had assumed the imperial crown it was found necessary to substantiate what had been done by a theory of the act, and many pages of learned disquisition were written in the search for the theoretical foundation of the transfer of empire. So it has always been. So it was in our case. The Petrine claims were an afterthought. The foundation of the papal power had been laid: then men bethought them of Christ's words to St Peter. The ignorant have always been deluded by just that sort of flimsy but striking argument. It served its purpose to give to the fact the foundation which the popular mind required, and in the long centuries that followed it became the lever and means to ever-enlarging pretensions.

But we are learning to divest ourselves of *a priori* conceptions in the study of the origin of ecclesiastical as well as

other institutions. Just as we now find, in the Bible, natural forces at work in segregating those books which we call the New Testament, so historical scholars are learning to withdraw the Papacy from the cloud-land of ecclesiastical prejudice, to place it alongside of all other great institutions, and to understand the real and perfectly natural motives which guided what is perhaps the most remarkable development that History knows of.

We may distinguish three factors by which this development was brought about: the motives which prompted it, the means by which the ends were accomplished, and lastly, the conditions and circumstances which made the development possible.

As to the first two of these, the motives and the means, it is not necessary here to say much. It is a long story; but for our purpose it is enough to point out that the motives and the means were the same as have gone into the building-up of many other purely secular institutions. One ruling motive was operative through the centuries. While, doubtless, some popes cherished lofty ideals, while we may allow to a Gregory VII., as he looked on the emperor prostrate at his feet, a measure of nobility alongside of gross hierarchical pride, yet one cannot fail to recognise that in the development of the Papacy the master-motive was ambition, an ambition essentially no higher than that which has led many a vulgar conqueror to a throne.

Mr Henry C. Lea has pointed out the far-reaching significance of the right of appeal as a means to the exaltation of the papal power. The claim to be the ultimate tribunal of every cause in Christendom, the presumption, which the aggrieved party too readily allowed, that the pope had the right to hear every cause referred to him in whatever province, and either to confirm or to reverse the sentence already pronounced by bishop or synod: this claim, put forward and pushed with unyielding persistency, became the most effective means of establishing the autocratic power of the pope.

Other causes contributed to the same end. No pious fraud

has ever been more successful than that of the pseudo-Isidorean Decretals. These forged documents, the pretended decretals of early popes, were for centuries accepted as genuine and became largely instrumental in the establishment of the papal power. When their spuriousness was made known to a more critical age, that power was too firmly grounded to be disturbed.

But nobler means came into play. In the long line of popes, among many insignificant names, who stood for nothing except the never-ceasing pressure of hierarchical ambition, a few shine by contrast as the representatives of great ideas, sometimes of grand moral forces. When Leo I. went out of Rome to meet Attila, he personified the cause of civilisation against barbarism. When Nicholas I. brought all the powers of the Church to bear against the iniquities of Lothar, he stood forth as the ideal of a great moral power to rescue virtue and punish vice. Such exhibitions of beneficent force have always been impressive and resulted in vast gains to the Papacy.

Another kind of power was displayed, and was no less effective, when a forceful personality mounted the throne of St Peter and with a strong will swayed the pontifical sceptre in favour of a policy, sometimes selfish, but always purposeful. Such were Gregory I., Gregory VII., Innocent III., and, in the time of the Renaissance, Sixtus IV. and Julius II. Men of this stamp, if they did not win the love and gratitude of mankind, yet shed the lustre of great personal power upon the papal office and raised its authority.

But by far the greatest weight in the development of the Papacy belongs to the conditions and circumstances that made possible this development.

Few institutions have left so deep a mark upon the history of mankind as the Roman Empire. Few institutions have given rise to sentiments as lasting. When the city by the Tiber by slow steps had become the mistress of the world, and at last the power of Rome became centred in the Cæsar, two sentiments had been begotten and had graven themselves

deeply in the minds of men: the sentiment of concentrated empire and the sentiment of universality. The Roman Empire was the world. In the nature of the institution there could be but one empire, and the Cæsar represented the imperial power. The Empire decayed and broke up, and then another institution stood forth as the heir of these two sentiments: the Papacy.

It is not that the Papacy copied or followed the example of the Empire, or that it merely resembles the Empire. The Papacy to-day is the continuation of the Holy Roman Empire, in that the sentiments of concentrated power and of universality were, by a natural process, transferred from the Empire to the Papacy. Here is the real secret of the Papacy. Herein we discover its essential nature. The opportunity made it what it is. It fell heir to the imperial power of Rome.

The persistency of great sentiments is one of the interesting objects of study to the historian; and nowhere is this persistency more noticeable than in the ecclesiastical sphere, where—to take a striking illustration—the high ethical value still attributed to the virtue of resignation comes down from the early ages of martyrdom when resignation was the cardinal Christian virtue. So the sentiments which surround the Papacy show a long pedigree. That the Church of Rome is the only true Church, that to the pontiff belongs supreme power: these sentiments, which to-day secure to the pope his authority and substantiate his claims, come down from the pagan empire of Rome.

Had the sentiment of association been strong enough to give direction to the development of the Christian Church, surely Jerusalem would have been the appropriate seat of the primate. But the more practical sentiment of empire was stronger, and Rome became the seat of the chief bishop, as London, Paris, and New York are the seats of the most influential bishops in their respective countries to-day. The central authority of the Church naturally gravitated to the secular capital, and it was natural, in a time when no constitutional safeguards existed, that the bishop of the great

city should presume upon his position and arrogate to himself increased power. This was the beginning of the papal authority.

When the seat of empire had been transferred to Constantinople in the turmoil of the barbarian invasions, when Italy was at the mercy of Goth, Hun, Vandal and Longobard, the Empire was extinguished or, at best, prolonged a precarious and feeble existence in the persons of the exarchs, the representatives of an Eastern Rome. This was the great opportunity for the Bishop of Rome. What the Empire lost the pope won, and the sentiments that formerly attached to the imperial government were now transferred to the Church and its head, the pope. The peculiar spell which belonged to the eternal city as the seat of empire was intensified when the conception of the imperial authority became enshrouded in the mysticism of religion, when through the restlessness and turbulence of those early centuries there stood forth that great conception of a power, spiritual and temporal at the same time, embodying itself in the Bishop of Rome.

In the course of time another power arose, at first the ally, then the enemy of the Papacy. The pope needed the aid of more carnal weapons than excommunication and interdict supplied. The vigorous Frank stood ready to lend those weapons, and there followed the transference of the Empire to the king of the Franks. The long conflict which, after the recovery from the iniquitous régime of the dark centuries, ensued between the popes and the German emperors was a natural outcome of the historical development; for the pope had usurped the place of Cæsar, and the new Cæsar from across the Alps found the authority which belonged to his office pre-empted. The Middle Ages laboured to find a theory which would reconcile the two great authorities, and witnessed the life-and-death struggle of Franks and Hohenstaufen with popes who claimed equality or superiority to the imperial power.

Since then the Papacy has passed through various phases. At one time forcibly repressed by the strong hand of France,

then lost in the jealousies of the great Schism, the imperial traditions were revived during and after the era of the Councils. Then came a time when the popes themselves seemed to forget their larger ambitions in the effort to found a papal state. After that came the long struggle with the Reformation, ending in a renewed assertion of empire.

Finally, in the last century, after the French Revolution, the Papacy entered upon a new career of activity and energy : a phase of its existence most fascinating to the historian, and to us moderns of the greatest immediate interest. Our own age has seen the Papacy, which four hundred years ago took the foremost place as the representative of European culture, become the determined opponent of all that in our modern world makes for progress and enlightenment. Once more were brought into full effective life the old Roman traditions, the traditions of empire, and in this century was set the capstone of that wonderful development, the ultimate expression of the aspiration of imperial Rome : the declaration of papal infallibility.

The candid student of History will thus discover in that institution a growth according to laws which have been universally operative since the world began : a growth which has no sanction in religion, no connection with Christianity other than that the religion of Christ has been made the means in the pursuit of ambition, an ambition which sought various means of gratification, but whose opportunity was chiefly found in one of the most deeply graven sentiments that mankind has known, the sentiment of empire, of the Roman Empire. And Pius X. is to-day more truly the successor of Augustus than of Peter.

The declaration of Infallibility in 1870 was the culmination of centuries of struggle, the final victory for the Papacy. What is the meaning of that victory ? Few ask this question, and yet it is safe to say that there are few others which to us Americans are wrought with so great and so far-reaching significance.

Protestant prejudice dates back to the times of persecution. Yet Protestants have persecuted as well as Romanists, and it is an open question whether the spirit of persecution necessarily attaches to the Church of Rome any more than to the Protestant Churches. The danger lies not in this direction.

Mr Gladstone long ago pointed out the significance of that clause in the Decree of Papal Infallibility which gives to the pope the sole authority in all the concerns of the Church. He says (*The Vatican Decrees in their Bearing on Civil Allegiance*, p. 28): "The sounding name of Infallibility has so fascinated the public mind, and riveted it on the fourth chapter of the Constitution *de Ecclesia*, that its near neighbour, the third chapter, has, at least in my opinion, received very much less than justice." This third chapter of the Decrees of the Vatican Council deserves to be carefully studied by those who would estimate the position and influence of the Papacy in this country. A few extracts will show the gist of the chapter: "Hence we teach and declare that by the appointment of our Lord the Roman Church possesses a superiority of ordinary power over all other churches, and that this power of jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is immediate; to which all, of whatever rite and dignity, both pastors and faithful, both individually and collectively, are bound, by their duty to hierarchical subordination and true obedience, to submit not only in matters which belong to faith and morals, but also in those that appertain to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the world," etc. The pontiff is "the supreme judge of all the faithful"—"in all causes, the decision of which belongs to the Church, recourse may be had to his tribunal"—"nor can any lawfully review its judgment" (Schaff's translation). Thus by reiteration in various forms of expression, the pontifical authority is bound upon the faithful. Again Mr Gladstone says: "Even, therefore, where the judgments of the Pope do not present the credentials of Infallibility, they are unappealable and irreversible; no person may pass judgment upon

them ; and all men, clerical and lay, dispersedly or in the aggregate, are bound truly to obey them ; and from this rule of Catholic truth no man can depart, save at the peril of his salvation."

Whether the pope ever pronounces an infallible decision on faith or morals is of little moment, but it is a matter of no slight concern to the civilised world that to one man is given this tremendous practical power and influence over the spiritual, moral, and intellectual life of great masses of humanity. A tremendous power it undoubtedly is, a power for good or ill probably greater than that which any one man, so far as we know, has ever held in his hands. Here is the significance of the Papacy of to-day. It is only because that power lies in the spiritual sphere and is, therefore, mostly unobserved in its operation that we fail to estimate its magnitude, and that the average man cannot understand how the power of a Napoleon, a Cæsar, or an Alexander dwindles into insignificance compared with the power of the modern Papacy.

Yet it is not difficult to gain an appreciation of that power. It certainly does not lie in doctrinal pronouncements. These might be disregarded as of no consequence, were it not for the injury that must be inflicted upon the sense of personal honesty and Christian self-esteem of a priesthood which is obliged to subscribe to the Decree of the Immaculate Conception and the Syllabus of Pius IX. The chief significance, however, of these documents (and to them we may now add the other Syllabus of Pius X.) is that they reveal the spirit of the modern Papacy. What shall be said of the head of a Church who has nothing to say against the supplanting of the Trinity by the Virgin and the Saints, the abuses of relics, charms, and holy places, and the cult of the Sacred Heart, whose growth and increasing spread honest and enlightened Romanists will deplore as much as Protestants? To these superstitions the Papacy is officially blind ; its fulminations are reserved for beliefs and for social and political principles which we Americans have come to consider as axiomatic and funda-

mental, and it lays down definitions and opinions on critical questions which, to those who know, are ludicrous. Such is the spirit of the modern Papacy.

To the wise writers of our daily and periodical press these things are but a matter of passing curiosity. They find in them but one more proof of the inveterate prejudice of ecclesiastics, or sneeringly compare the reactionary tendencies of Protestant bishops or synods with the obscurantism of the Vatican. But whoever thinks a little further finds food for reflection when it occurs to him that the Papacy possesses the power to enforce its views and beliefs to the utmost confines of the earth. The Vatican Decree gives to the Pontiff Supreme an irresponsible authority. The pope can appoint bishops or priests wherever he will; he can dismiss any member of the hierarchy, can silence any ecclesiastic or layman who expresses views which are not consonant with the principles accepted in the Vatican, and can dissolve any association or society. In short, the pope can do anything to enforce his will upon the Church, and any limits to his power are self-imposed. And the Papacy has exercised this power and is exercising it ruthlessly. How many writers have been silenced in the last ten years? How many books put upon the Index?

The pervasive influence of the head of the Church of Rome, who can bend every operation of that vast system to his will, is illustrated by the so-called Thomas-encyclical of Leo XIII. On 4th August 1879, Leo XIII. issued the Encyclical "*Æterni patris*," in which he imposes the study of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas upon the Church. The recommendation, in this document, that the Church should provide with singular vigilance "*ut ad fidei Catholicæ normam ubique traderentur humanæ disciplinæ omnes*," gauges the papal conception of truth. St Thomas is "*inter scholasticos doctores omnium princeps et magister*," and after a lengthy disquisition on the excellencies of his philosophy the pope admonishes all that nothing is more desirable than that "you should furnish liberally and copiously to the studious youth

the most pure waters of wisdom flowing in a perpetual and rich stream from the angelic doctor. . . . We strenuously admonish you, venerable brothers, that for the protection and ornament of the Catholic faith, for the good of society, for the furtherance of all knowledge, you restore and diffuse as widely as possible the golden wisdom of St Thomas."

The present writer (who has no first-hand acquaintance with this philosophy) is informed that it stands in clear-cut distinction to the modern views inaugurated by Kant, which are the philosophical basis of present-day progress and enlightenment, and that the teaching of the great schoolman is the natural basis for the peculiar interpretation of Christianity and the hierarchical pretensions which have their home in the fold of the Papacy. An army of priests—unless the pope's authority is defied—is being trained to accept the philosophical basis of mediævalism as opposed to the modern views of life, and from this host of priests the same philosophy is filtered down to the countless multitudes of the faithful. Is it surprising that at certain times a certain church in New York is crowded by people eager to worship a piece of the wrist of "the grandmother of God"?

The fact, therefore, which we have to face, and the danger to American institutions, is this, that an Italian ecclesiastic possesses to a large degree the power to maintain the intelligence and spirituality of millions of Americans on a level with his own.

Life rests on spiritual foundations, and the pope has a large power to determine the quality of these foundations. If we could have a superhuman pope, this arrangement would be ideal. But we know of no pope in modern times who has been fairly abreast of the best spiritual life of his age. There was one period, the Renaissance, when some of the popes stood forth as the embodiment of the highest culture of the age. But that culture was intellectual and largely pagan, and no one would celebrate an Æneas Sylvius or a Julius II. as the ideal of a Christian.

It cannot be too distinctly borne in mind that the spiritual and intellectual conceptions of American Romanism must necessarily approximate the ideals of the Vatican, and these are irreconcilable with the ideals fundamental to our American democracy. Can the two continue to exist side by side ?

It required some eighteen centuries for the Papacy to attain its ultimate triumph. The long struggle is an interesting story. The early Church, in the persons of such fathers as Cyprian and Jerome, refused to allow the pretensions of the Roman bishop, and through the history of all the centuries runs the constant struggle of bishops, councils, and kings against the assumptions of the Papacy. The great councils of the fifteenth century seemed to have won the victory for the episcopate, but it was soon taken from them. After the Reformation, such movements as that of the French Assembly of 1682, with the four Gallican Propositions, the protest of the German archbishops in the so-called "Punctuation of Ems" in 1786, and the reforms of the Emperor Joseph II. and of Leopold of Tuscany and Bishop Ricci, showed that the opposition was still alive. But that opposition received its final blow at the French Revolution. An insane desire seized the nations to escape from the horrors of revolution by enthroning the principle of authority, and the legitimate result of the terrible catastrophe in France was the Vatican Council of 1870 with its decree of Infallibility. The episcopate of the Church of Rome now lies prostrate, an abject tool in the hands of the pope.

But within the last few years another enemy has arisen, not a declared enemy, but a movement in which may lie concealed the germs of a revolution such as the Church of Rome has not yet known. That enemy is modern learning and modern views of life ; for the movement presents moral as well as intellectual elements. It is a recent sign of a current in the Church of Rome that a number of priests should have published an open letter to the pope, protesting against the suppression of intellectual life and of democratic aspirations. In Rome itself ecclesiastics are criticising the credulity of

relic-worship. Roman Catholic scholars are now the friendly and acknowledged rivals of Protestants in historical and critical research. In literature, Fogazzaro is the honoured representative of the same tendency which is looking towards higher and better things.

Whoever overlooks this most interesting field of intellectual and spiritual aspiration is tempted to hope, when once the great modern movement of progress has found a home in the Church of Rome, as it seems to be doing, and when Roman Catholic scholars shall have faced and pondered the facts of history, that the fictions upon which the Papacy stands will be unable to hold their ground and that its true origin and nature will be made plain to the Christian world. And then the solution may be in sight, even though it may take centuries more to overcome the terrible inertia of the masses.

There is but one solution of the problem: a break with the Papacy. It has been the bane of the Church that its best men have been willing to acquiesce in compromise. History teaches this lesson too plainly for misconception. Any attempted compromise, as of a "*primus inter pares*," leaves the door open for the operation of one of the most powerful spiritual forces in the world: hierarchical ambition.

To speak of a possible break with the Papacy will sound to most readers like speaking of a possible suicide of the Church. The Papacy is held to be identical with the Church of Rome. This is the judgment of ignorance, and, unfortunately, ignorance on this question—to the average man so far removed from the vital issues of the day—is all but universal. But there are some few who still study ecclesiastical history, and they know that there was once a Church without a pope, that the conception of the Papacy as inherent in the nature of the Church is a modern one, the result of a long development whose ways and means we can accurately trace and measure, and that a Church or a set of national Churches without a pope is perfectly conceivable for the future.

Granted, then, that a break with the Papacy in the remote

years to come is a possibility, what would happen? Would the Church of Rome in this country remain the same as before?—the same lust of power? the same masses steeped in superstition and alien views of life incompatible with liberty and progress?

Doubtless, if the Italian bishop should lose his power of interference with the Church in America, no great change would immediately follow; but there would be removed the one greatest clog to the development of a truly Christian democracy. A free field would be given to those forces of our American life which we have hitherto trusted in the social and political sphere. Why should we lose our belief in them when they are applied in the religious sphere? And, after all, is not the delimitation of the religious from the social and political impossible?

We Americans have nailed the flag of liberty to our mast-head. We believe, and we think we have reason to believe, that, granted no interference, no impediment to the free action of the forces which are moving society forward, the tendency in this our day must be toward better conditions. There may be set-backs, there may be counter-currents which will produce temporary evils, but we refuse to believe that the God who guides the course of history has established any other law than the law of progress in the long run, wherever the natural forces are allowed to work. It is our glory that, in having cast off old-world prejudices and corruptions, we have removed the obstacles to a free development.

The Papacy, in re-imposing upon us that spirit of mediævalism which the noblest minds of Europe are endeavouring to exorcise, acts as a check upon American liberty, as an impediment to the free action of the forces which are shaping for good the destinies of our commonwealth. This interference has been most evident in the question of the public schools. But whoever reflects that the laws of a people, the spirit and efficiency of a people's government can never rise higher than the spiritual and moral level of a people, that this Italian bishop, through the power of appointment and removal

and regulation, by means of command and advice as expressed in briefs, encyclicals, and allocutions, has in his hands a power such as has never yet, so far as we know, been given to any individual to wield, to influence the spiritual and moral condition of millions of our countrymen, and that this influence must be away from American standards down towards the level of the spiritual and moral life of the Vatican—and what this is anyone who takes the trouble can learn to know by reading the latest manifestoes of the popes—whoever reflects upon these things will be able to estimate how serious a check upon American liberty is the Papacy to-day.

Let that check be removed, and the weight would be released that drags the Church of Rome in America downward. The field would be open for a free development, for the unrestrained give and take between the many religious conceptions and moral forces that are finding expression in our heterogeneous society. It is surely not too much to believe that in this great complex network of action and reaction the superstition and the lust of power would be gradually sloughed off, while the good would survive. And, the check to growth removed, we may confidently hope that there would result, not only the purification of the Church of Rome and an impetus given to the great spiritual forces that it contains; but Protestantism, which now is in arms against an alien power, would be the gainer by coming under the influence of all that is good in the Roman Church. The elements making for a purer and truer Christianity, which the latter retained when Protestantism lost them, would then act as correctives to much that is one-sided and extreme in Protestant development.

Whether the two will ever coalesce in one organisation is a matter of small moment. The concern of patriotic and intelligent Christians is with the positive evil which is to-day the greatest impediment to American liberty and the most serious menace to country and religion.

Professor Harnack, in a recent address on "Protestantism and Catholicism in Germany," has drawn a pleasing picture of

the mutual approximation in doctrine that has taken place between the two great divisions of Western Christendom. As an eirenicon the lecture is beautiful in spirit. We must feel, however, that in it the author lags behind his own high standard of keenness and breadth of view, when we observe how easily he dismisses the subject of the papal supremacy. He does indeed judge rightly that on this point "an approximation . . . is quite impossible," but he fails to point out how completely obedience to the pontiff has come to overshadow every other dogma, and how the authority of the pope is the crux of the situation between Romanism and Protestantism. Professor Harnack would certainly have been more keenly sensitive to this fact, had he written in America as an American and had he felt the sting in the thought of the proud traditions of Anglo-Saxon liberty being sapped of their power and influence by an Italian bishop three thousand miles away.

It will be said that the proposition with which this paper deals is purely academic. In the sense of the "practical" politician, who sees only what is immediately before him, it is so. But to those whose field is wider, whose imagination can survey centuries of the past and look forward centuries into the future, and who recognise in the present the seeds of possible revolutions long years off, the question of the Papacy and its future relation to America is one of intense practical interest. And there are surely in America patriotic and religious Roman Catholics to whom it is a matter of grave and immediate concern that the worship of their Church should degenerate into the now popular cult of the Sacred Heart, to whom it must cause pain that the pure faith of Christ should be supplanted by a superstitious use of relics and the adoration of the Saints. These may ponder a remedy.

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THE CATHOLIC CHURCH : WHAT IS IT ?

THE BISHOP OF CARLISLE.

WHAT is the Catholic Church? By what notes may we recognise it? These are questions of great interest and importance to all Christians who believe that the Church is as truly the body of Christ as He Himself is the Head; and they are of special interest to national Churchmen who believe that nationalism, far from being a foe and a hindrance, is a help and a friend to true Catholicity.

It is obvious that if by Catholicity be meant complete agreement in doctrine and absolute uniformity in discipline, it is a very long time since Catholicity wholly vanished from Christendom. Indeed, it is doubtful whether in such a case Catholicity has ever been a note of the Christian religion at any epoch anywhere. For on some important matters even Apostles withstood each other to the face. Their writings show that they ascribed various values to Christian doctrines, and that on questions of usage they frequently held different views. St Paul gloried in the fewness of his baptisms. St Peter attached great weight to circumcision; St Paul declared that in Christ Jesus it was nothing. St Peter was an ardent ceremonialist; St Paul taught that in ceremonialism there was an inherent tendency to spiritual bondage. St James cared little for a creed which did not work itself out in daily conduct. St John taught that religion means love, and that no man is born of God unless he loves his fellows.

No doubt there were some truths and practices on which all the Apostles were agreed; but it is equally clear there were others on which they differed. Catholicity, therefore, could not mean agreement in all things even in apostolic times: though it might mean the few things in which all were agreed.

Directly we leave the apostolic era the differences multiply, the diversities thicken. And as they thicken, they deteriorate into trivialities such as the shape of the tonsure and the relation of Easter to the moon. Then great differences arise concerning the nature of the Christ, the procession of the Holy Ghost, and the designation of the Virgin Mary. These differences demand councils for their settlement; but the outstanding result of the councils is the irreconcilable perpetuation of the differences, and the permanent sundering of the Eastern from the Western Church. If Catholicity means identity in every particular of doctrine and organic union in every item of worship, then œcumenical councils dealt the death-blow to Catholicity. For since the last œcumenical council there has scarcely ever been in Christendom even the semblance of an undivided Church.

In later times a prodigious effort was made to attach to Catholicity an entirely new type of meaning. The spirit of pagan Rome took possession of Christian Rome. What the Cæsars had been the popes attempted to become. As the Cæsars would brook no rivals, neither would the popes. As outside pagan Rome all were barbarians, so outside papal Rome all were to be heretics. The old imperial Rome was dead, but out of its dust the popes resolved there should arise a new ecclesiastical Rome, beneath the splendour of whose world-embracing majesty the old imperialism should sink into dimness. The kings of the earth were to bring their tribute to the new pontifical Emperor. The islands were his inalienable fief. Worldly monarchs must receive their crowns from him. If they resisted his will they were driven to Canossa, or to sue for pardon beneath the lash at the tombs of their rebellious clerical subjects. If they de-

clined to be thus trampled under foot, then fell the bolts of excommunication, of interdict, of deposition. At times, to save themselves and their liberties from the thrall of this new ecclesiastical imperialism, civil rulers were compelled to sack Rome, to imprison the pontiff, to keep him in captivity and exile for seventy years at a stretch. It was a battle of giants, this battle of ecclesiastical imperialism, under the title of Catholicity, to make humanity its vassal, and to purchase ecclesiastical uniformity and supremacy at the price of religion's life and the liberties of religion.

But from the first it was a battle in which the defeat of a Catholicity fundamentally political was sure. Even at the height of its triumph, when its enemies lay most prostrate at its feet, its doom was sounding. It is customary to look on Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII. as the three greatest of the popes. To me they seem, if greatest, greatest chiefly as authors of its decline. They overreached themselves. They invented doctrines against which the reason of mankind has revolted, and sanctioned customs against which the conscience of mankind has rebelled. Transubstantiation was an irrational fiction; the inquisition, in later days, a moral monster. Even the clergy rose in revolution against this form of Catholicity, which spelt for them, as for the laity, a dumb universal subjection to an irresponsible despotism. They clamoured to be heard in councils—councils which were to reform religion and bridle autocracy. If Catholicity signifies agreement either in word or action, such councils as those of Constance, Pisa, Basel, Ferrara, Florence were pre-eminently non-Catholic. The end of them was an anti-pope. Hence the bull *Execrabilis*, in which Pius II. declared “an appeal from a pope to a general council to be punishable with excommunication, and in the case of a university or college with interdict.”

Thankless and painful would be the task of reciting the countless subterfuges, the hierarchical plausibilities, the forged miracles, the wrested Scriptures, the false history, the pious inventions, the remorseless cruelties, the cajolings and the

curse by which ambitious and desperate hierarchs sought to set up this imperial form of Catholicity. It is enough to say that the result, as was inevitable, was endless division and horrible disaster :—division of East from West, of Latin from Teuton, of the inventors and worshippers of the traditions of man from the students and believers in the Word of God ; disasters in the loss of North Africa to Christendom, in the failures of the Crusades, the loss of the Holy Places, in which at the present hour Mohammedan soldiery are stationed to keep “ Catholic ” Christians from rending each other in pieces ; the fall of Constantinople into the hands of the Turk, whence the dismembered Catholicity of Europe has been powerless to dislodge him through more than four and a half centuries.

It is impossible to imagine how different, how marvellously and gloriously different, might have been the course of Christianity, its moral dominion and spiritual conquests, but for the financial greed and the lust of authority which have characterised the efforts to establish an imperial and hierarchical Catholicity—efforts which have driven simple-hearted, high-souled, God-fearing men by millions into noble exile, contemptuously called “ schism ” by those guilty of the exile. A thousand years of trial on a scale which can never recur, and under circumstances, favoured by ignorance and nourished by the feudal spirit, impossible of repetition, have conclusively shown that, wherever else Catholicity may be found, it is hopeless to seek for it in the Roman Church, unless, abandoning her hierarchical pretensions and forsaking her mediæval superstitions (which may God of His goodness grant !), she returns to primitive truth and primitive simplicity. Infallibility will not do instead of truth : especially a self-constituted infallibility proved both by experience and the reason of the thing to be palpably absurd. Nor will a specious, but spurious, doctrine of development stand against the assaults of undeniable facts. The capital property of development is upwardness. The true name for downward development is reversion. But whether regarded from the point of view

either of reason or faith, the developments of the papacy for a thousand years have been downward—reversions in the direction of Judaism and paganism. While the world has been moving onward and upward, the Church of Rome has been falling downward and backward. Catholicity is a grand and heavenly ideal, and cannot be found in any organisation so long as it continues of the earth, earthy.

I cannot linger to write of the Catholicity grounded on the primacy of St Peter, nor of the commonplace claim of the Roman Church to unity. St Peter's primacy is of itself a dubious matter. He was not the disciple whom our Lord Jesus especially loved. Nor has his influence on Christianity been comparable, either in width or depth, length or height, to that of St Paul. But assuming his primacy, it is difficult to prove it was not a personal primacy, more difficult still to prove that it has descended to the popes, and quite impossible to prove that the popes have maintained it in its evangelical integrity. Such primacy as the popes possess they owe to the splendid traditions of Rome rather than to their succession from the fisherman. And the oft-repeated claim to unity within the Church itself, in the sense of identity either in doctrine or discipline, is, be it respectfully said, conspicuously futile. The whole history of the Church of Rome for a millennium and more is one long contradiction of the claim. The contests between the African and Italian Churches, the disputes on celibacy and the Eucharist, the bulls of retractations, the battles *à outrance* between regular and secular clergy, the fierce jealousies between Dominicans and Franciscans, realists and nominalists, Thomists and Scotists, popes and anti-popes, Colonna popes and Orsini popes, cardinals and popes, universities and popes, councils and popes, Jansenists and Jesuits, traditionists and modernists—these are but some (the list might be indefinitely prolonged) of the evidences of absence of unity within the Roman Church. At one time or another there have been as many schools of thought, as many codes of custom, within the Roman Church as there are sects beyond its pale.

Nor, if oneness of mind be indispensable to Catholicity, can Catholicity be found in the English Church. There are some hymns which are really terrible in their inaccuracy. Such a hymn is :

“We are not divided, all one body we ;
One in hope and doctrine, one in charity.”

Applied to the English Church, this refrain is an inaccuracy of the first magnitude. In one of her noblest collects the English Church prays that the danger she is in by reason of her “unhappy divisions” may be laid seriously to heart. Is it not truly a contradiction in terms to pray one thing and sing another? As an ideal the hymn is splendid; but as a pitiful fact the prayer is grounded in truth. Within the Church of England divisions are loudly rampant. And, unlike those of the Roman Church, they are publicly advertised. No secret is made of them. They are strong and obvious: amounting at times to bitter hostility. Charity is indispensable to Catholicity—far more indispensable than uniformity either in creed or custom; but in this prime element of Catholicity I earnestly wish that the Church of England were more opulent to-day, and that all controversialists, not excluding those who call themselves Anglo-Catholics, were more conspicuously eminent.

It is difficult indeed to get at any exact definition of the term Anglo-Catholicism, or to understand with anything like precision what they mean by it who so proudly indulge in its use. Roman Catholicism we know; but what is Anglo-Catholicism? Roman Catholicism is that species of Catholicism which originates from Rome, whose doctrine and worship are controlled from Rome, whose centre is the Bishop of Rome, and whose circumference is limited by obedience to Rome. By parity of reasoning and terminological analogy, Anglo-Catholicism ought to mean the Catholicism which originated in England, whose doctrine and worship are governed by England, whose centre is at Canterbury, and whose circumference is defined by obedience to Canterbury. In other words, Anglo-Catholicism ought to mean the religion of

England as Roman Catholicism means the religion of Rome. But whatever else Anglo-Catholicism may be, it is indisputably not, nor indeed ever likely to become, the religion of England. Nor are its disciples conspicuous by their obedience to Canterbury. On the contrary, one great boast among them is that the Anglican Church is *not* the Church of England; that the Reformation, which had for one of its objects to make the Church of England a National Church in deed and in truth, was a movement to be repented of and wept over in dust and ashes; and in accordance with these convictions, which are doubtless sincere and honest, their devout ambition is to denationalise the Church of England—to Catholicise it, as they say. In this direction some of them have already gone the length, and probably others will follow, of forming an association within the Church for its liberation from national influences—its emancipation, as the phrase runs, from national control. So earnest are they in this resolve that on its behalf they are prepared to sacrifice all the historic, beautiful, and tender relationships of the parochial system; all the large liberties inseparable from a national Church and not to be found elsewhere; and all national recognition of God. As they have joined with the secularists rather than give up their Anglo-Catholicism in schools, so they are meditating a junction with the liberationists rather than not practise their Anglo-Catholicism in church. Whether these efforts to denationalise the Church will not end in sectarianising it, and this alliance with liberationists will not end in discomfiture both for liberationists and themselves, the future alone can disclose.

Meanwhile it would be interesting to have some definition of Anglo-Catholicism, if by any means it could be procured. Most certainly it is not Catholicity. Any geographical adjective prefixed to Catholicity of itself destroys its universality. You cannot have a local universality or a particular Catholicity. Catholicism you may have at Rome, but not Roman Catholicity: Catholicism you may have in England,

but not English Catholicity. And perhaps it is Catholicism, not Catholicity, that the Anglo-Catholics desiderate: Catholicism largely, if not chiefly, Roman in doctrine, although strongly adverse to the discipline of Rome. If this be not a true description of Anglo-Catholicism, then let us know what the true description is, and where the actuality may be found. Is Anglo-Catholicism national Catholicism, or pre-Reformation Catholicism? Is it the Catholicism before or after the dogma of transubstantiation and the decree of auricular confession were promulged? Is it Roman or Greek Catholicism—the Catholicism which affirms that the Divine Son is of one substance, or of like substance, with the Father; the Catholicism which declares the Double Procession, or that which denies it; the Catholicism of the original or the extended Creed of Nicæa? If the latter, then is the orthodox Church not Catholic, but in a state of heresy and schism. Will the Anglo-Catholics join the Roman Catholics in excommunicating the orthodox Church? If not, then why hold aloof from fellowship with orthodox Nonconformists; seeing that orthodox Nonconformists profess a creed nearer to the Nicæan formula in the Book of Common Prayer than that of the orthodox Church?

True, orthodox Nonconformists do not hold Episcopacy to be of the essence of the Christian religion. Episcopacy I deem to have enormous, immeasurable value. It is a visible link connecting the Church of to-day with that of the Apostles. It possesses the genealogy of a definite historical succession. It also forms the basis of a good kind of Church government, so long as it is restrained by constitutional checks, both lay and clerical, and is not irresponsibly autocratic. But are the three orders of the Christian ministry clearly laid down in the New Testament? That they may be inferred from the apostolic writings is, to my mind, perfectly clear. But an inference is not a proof. It may be, and to me in this instance is, a probability sufficiently strong to be a guide. Great Biblical scholars, however, within the Church

of England, like Bishop Lightfoot, do not hold Episcopacy a fact established in the New Testament; and a whole host of great Biblical scholars outside the Episcopal Churches go the length of affirming that only two, and not three, orders of the Christian ministry were recognised by the Apostles. This being so, however dearly we prize the historic succession of the episcopate, can we reasonably maintain that it is indispensable to the validity of the Word and sacraments? Can we maintain that sacraments are always acceptable to God when ministered by men devoted to episcopacy, and otherwise always unacceptable?—acceptable when ministered by a Cæsar Borgia and unacceptable when ministered by a Richard Baxter? To do this is to grant higher sacramental preference to moral monsters than to acknowledged saints: to put all Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists, Congregationalists, Quakers, and many others outside the reach of a valid holy communion; while at the same time we know of a surety that God the Holy Ghost is richly blessing them in their bodies, souls, and spirits, in their work and worship, and above all in their holy zeal for foreign missions. If by their fruits we may know churches as well as men, then may these non-episcopal churches be certainly known to be branches of the True Vine, incorporated by sacrament and nourished by humble faith and active love.

Here is no question either of the interchange of pulpits or the general interadmission to each other's altars, or the recognition of each other's Orders by the various Christian communions in the world. Every branch of the Church Catholic has its own proper right to frame its own rules for its own administration, so long as they be not repugnant to Holy Scripture. Here the one simple question is: Are the non-episcopal Churches to be deemed members of the Holy Catholic Church, or not? If we answer No, then do we not refuse to bless those whom God hath blessed in plenitude, and do we not make the bounds of Catholicity less large than the friendship of the Christ?

If, then, Catholicity cannot be limited either to universal agreement in every doctrine or to absolute harmony in every practice; if it is something better and broader than ecclesiastical imperialism; if Episcopacy, however ancient and historical, is not its absolutely indispensable requirement; if no single Christian communion has exclusive possession of that which has been believed and done everywhere, believed and done by all,—are we to give up our faith in the Holy Catholic Church, visible on earth, and in its invisibility extending far, far beyond the dominion of death? To relinquish this faith would be to relinquish one of the most beautiful and precious articles of the Christian creed. It would be to affirm that our Lord has failed to build His Church on the rock of St Peter's grand confession; that He is a Bridegroom without a bride, a Head without a body. To me at least such a relinquishment and such an affirmation are impossible, inconceivable, unthinkable. For me there exists a true Catholic Church partly triumphant and invisible in Paradise, partly militant and visible on earth. As yet its visibility on earth is vague and dim; but with the procession of the ages it will yet grow bright as the sun, clear as the moon, and glorious as an army with banners.

At present its clearness is clouded by the mists of ecclesiasticism; its brightness is dulled with the dark shadows of developments which are reversions and not developments; its glory has departed because men have tried to treat the living body of the Christ as if it were a lifeless machine, and have magnified their own predilections and opinions as if they were unmistakable revelations from God. In the ineffable revelations of Jesus Christ our Lord there is no room for question either about the grand fact of the Catholicity of His Church or the real character of its unity. He prayed that His Church might be one with Him as He is one with the Father. Of all that this Eternal Unity implies we cannot yet even dream, far less can we be sure. But this at least is certain: the unsearchable unity is that of a living, loving relationship. So must it be with the Church. Its unity must be the unity of living, loving,

personal relationship. And not of relationship only, but of discipleship also—the discipleship of an unfathomable, self-sacrificing charity. “By this shall all men *know* that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another.” When love reigns supreme in all communities of Christians, then, and not till then, will the visibility of the Catholic Church break in all its splendour on the wondering eyes of mankind.

Meanwhile, the functions of the various members of the whole body of the Christ will continue diverse and manifold. Some will be national, others congregational; some episcopal, others presbyteral; some with ancient customs, others with customs more modern; yet the national cannot say to the congregational, “I have no need of thee,” or the episcopal to the presbyteral, “I have no need of thee.” The one only need for all alike will be life flowing down from the Universal Head, and love flowing back from every member to the Universal Heart.

This, then, I take to be the distinguishing note, the fundamental characteristic of the Catholic Church: the all-resounding note of love to God and man. Faith, too, the Catholic Church of the future will have; not so much a faith defined in Creeds, as the faith which is the realisation of things hoped for, and the proof of things not seen. Experience has shown that reticulations of articles of faith are both results and causes of controversy; and that the simpler the Creed, the more sure and Catholic is the conviction it commands. Hopes also the Catholic Church will have: hopes of social progress and individual righteousness in this life, and hopes unspeakable, immeasurable, anchored within the veil. In the true Catholic Church there will be diversities of gifts; its methods will not be mechanical, neither will its administrations be uniform, nor its ceremonial elaborate. It will be a confederation of communities: as man’s body is a confederation of organs. Each in its respective province will co-operate with the rest; and all will receive their guidance from the One Head.

J. W. CARLIOL.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.¹

PART I.

THE TRANSITORY AND THE PERMANENT.

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

"If a man is shut up in a house, the transparency of the windows is an essential condition of his seeing the sky. But it would not be prudent to infer that, if he walked out of the house, he could not see the sky because there was no longer any glass through which he might see it."—M'TAGGART, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 105.

DR M'TAGGART, in his book called *Some Dogmas of Religion*, from which I have taken the excellent apologue² prefixed as a sort of motto to this article, says some things with which I am not able wholly to agree. I should like to deal with these at greater length in some other connexion, but meanwhile I will quote one of them. In his chapter on Human Immortality he says that an affirmative answer to the question, "Has man an immortal soul?" would be absurd. He wishes to maintain that man *is* a soul rather than that he *has* one; because the possessive case would indicate, he says, that the man himself was his body, or was something that died with the

¹ Part of the Drew Lecture (1907); to be concluded in the April issue. The present articles belong to a series on the question of Immortality, of which the first, by Professor J. Royce, appeared in the HIBBERT JOURNAL of July 1907. The next article, after the second by Sir Oliver Lodge, will be by Professor Eucken of Jena.—EDITOR.

² This must not be understood as sustaining what Mr Haldane derisively calls the "window" theory of the senses, as if they were apertures through which an inner man looked out at an alien universe: a parable must not be pressed unduly.

body, and that he owned something, not himself, which at death was set free.

But if we make the correlative statement, and say that "man has a body," surely we are stating an undeniable truth. And as to what the man himself is—I apprehend that he is a union of soul and body; and that without the one or the other he is incomplete as a man, and becomes something else—a corpse perhaps, a spirit perhaps, or it may be both. But whereas the two were necessarily united during the man's life, death separates them; and the final product, whatever it is, can be described as "man" no longer. Hence the form of the question preferred by Dr M'Taggart, "Are men immortal?" does not seem to me so appropriate as the more popular and antique form, "Is the soul immortal?" For surely without hesitation everybody must give to his question, about man, the answer: "Not wholly," or "Not every part of him." Part of what constitutes human nature is certainly mortal. On one side man undoubtedly belongs to the animal kingdom, and flourishes on this planet, the Earth, by aid of particles of terrestrial matter which he utilises for that purpose.

By the soul, then, we must mean that part of man which is dissociated from the body at death: that part which is characteristic of a living man as distinct from a corpse. It may be said that it is really more an inter-relation than a part, and that this inter-relation is what is meant by vitality; so that it can be roundly asserted that the apparently disappeared "vitality" is a nonentity or figment of the imagination, and that to speak of it as still existing is like speaking of the "horology" of a clock which someone has smashed with a hammer.

Very well, admitting that vitality is a mere relation between the body and something else, it is just the nature of this "something else" that we are discussing; and it is no help to start by assuming that this dissociated and perhaps imaginary portion is the man himself, any more than it is helpful to start with the equally gratuitous assumption that the visible and tangible body is the man himself.

The vanished constituent with its attributes may turn out to be more intimately characteristic of, and essential to, the man's real nature and existence, than is the material instrument or organ which has been discarded without having disappeared: they may turn out to have a more permanent and therefore a more real existence than the temporary vehicle which served to manifest those attributes and properties during their short tenure of earth life; they may be more especially the seat of his personality and individuality;—but those are just the things which are subject-matter for debate, and they must not be postulated *a priori*.

As a matter of nomenclature, I want to discriminate between the term “vitality” and the term “life”; to use the former as signifying a union or *relation* between the body and something else, and the latter to denote the unknown entity which by interaction with material particles is responsible for their vitality. True, life, thus defined, is a portion or partial aspect of what is often spoken of as “soul,” but the term life can be used by many to whom some of the associations of the more comprehensive term are objectionable.

The first simple and important truth that must be insisted on, is the commonplace but often ignored and even denied fact, that there is nothing immortal or persistent about the material instrument of our present senses, except the atoms of which it is composed.

Any notion that these same atoms will be at some future date re-collected and united with the dissociated and immaterial portion, so as to constitute once more the complete man as he appeared here on earth, who is thereafter to last for ever,—any notion of that sort, though most unfortunately believed, or at least taught, by one great branch of the Christian Church, is a superstition, not by any means yet really and thoroughly extinct or without influence on sentiment, even in quarters where it may be denied in words. It is too much to expect that it should be so extinct.

Nevertheless, the teaching of natural science is in accord-

ance with the teaching of common sense in this matter. The present body is wholly composed of terrestrial particles; it consists of atoms of matter collected from food and air, and arranged in a certain complicated and characteristic form. The elemental atoms are first combined into the complex aggregate called protoplasm, which is an unstable compound whose chemical constitution is at present unknown, but whose property it is to be always in a state of flux: it is not rigid or stagnant or fixed, but is constantly breaking down into simpler constituents, on one side, and constantly being renewed or built up, on the other, so that it has a kind of life-history, for a certain period. This period of activity, in any given case, lasts as long as the balance between association and dissociation continues. While the balance is tilting in favour of assimilation, we have the period of youth and growth; when the balance begins to tilt in favour of disintegration, we have the commencement of old age and decay; until at a certain, or rather an uncertain, stage, the disintegrating forces gain a final victory, and assimilation wholly and sometimes suddenly ceases. Then presently and by slow degrees the residue of protoplasm left in the body—unless it is speedily incorporated into some other animal or plant—is resolved into simpler and simpler compounds, and ultimately into inorganic constituents; and so is restored to mother Earth, whence it sprang.

What, then, can be legitimately meant by the phrase Resurrection of the body? Well, it is highly desirable to disentangle the element of truth which underlies ancient beliefs and is the condition of their durability; and, whatever may be the case with other forms of religion, it is clear that Christianity both by its doctrines and its ceremonies rightly emphasises the material aspect of existence. For it is founded upon the idea of Incarnation; and its belief in some sort of bodily resurrection is based on the idea that every real personal existence must have a double aspect—not spiritual alone, nor physical alone, but in some way both. Such an

opinion, in a refined form, is common to many systems of philosophy, and is by no means out of harmony with science.

Christianity, therefore, reasonably supplements the mere survival of a discarnate spirit, a homeless wanderer or melancholy ghost, with the warm and comfortable clothing of something that may legitimately be spoken of as a "body"; that is to say, it postulates a supersensually appreciable vehicle or mode of manifestation, fitted to subserve the needs of future existence as our bodies subserve the needs of terrestrial life: an ethereal or other entity constituting the persistent "other aspect," and fulfilling some of the functions which the atoms of terrestrial matter are constrained to fulfil now. And we may assume, as consonant with or even as part of Christianity, the doctrine of the dignity and sacramental character of some physical or quasi-material counterpart of every spiritual essence.

But though some such connexion is essential, any actual instance of it may be accidental and temporary. Take our present incarnation as an example. We display ourselves to mankind in the garb of certain clothes, artificially constructed of animal and vegetable materials, and in the form of a certain material organism, put together by processes of digestion and assimilation, and likewise composed of terrestrial materials. The source of these chemical compounds is evidently not important; nor is their special character maintained. Whether they formed part of sheep or birds or fish or plants, they are assimilated and become part of us; being arranged by our subconscious activities and vital processes into appropriate form, just as truly as other materials are consciously woven into garments, no matter what their origin. Moreover, just as our clothes wear out and require darning and patching, so our bodies wear out; the particles are in continual flux, each giving place to others and being constantly discarded and renewed. The identity of the actual or instantaneous body is therefore an affair of no importance: the body which finally dies is no more fully representative of the individual than any of the other bodies which have gradually been discarded *en*

route: there is no reason why it should persist any more than they: the individuality, if there is one, must lie deeper than any particular body, and must belong to whatever it is which put the particles together in this shape and not another.

There is nothing at all similar to this automatic decay and replacement, this preservation of form amid diversity of particles, in the mechanism of a clock. All that its "horology" could mean would be the special assemblage or grouping of parts which enables it to fulfil certain functions, till it wears out, or so long as its worn parts are periodically replaced by the clockmaker. The "vitality" of an organism means this and more, for it can replace its own worn parts. A clock has nothing of personal identity, it is not a good illustration of a living organism. The identity of a river is a much closer analogy; and many are the associations which have accordingly gathered round the names "Tiber," "Ganges," "Nile." Rivers have always had attributed to them a kind of poetic personality, though no one can have really supposed them to possess genuine life.

I wish here to make a short digression in order to say that the old and true statement that "everything flows and nothing is stagnant," thus conspicuously exemplified by the material basis of life, need not in the least signify, as it is sometimes taken to signify, that everything is evanescent and nothing is permanent; still less that everything is fanciful and nothing is real. The ancient aphorism of the inspired Heraclitus makes a statement about existence which is vitally and comprehensively true; and it is a truth which constitutes the keynote of evolution.

To return. The more frankly and clearly the truth about the body is realised, viz. that the body is a flowing and constantly changing episode in material history, having no more identity than has a river, no identity whatever in its material constitution, but only in its form,—identity only in the personal expression or manifestation which is achieved through the agency of a fresh and constantly differing sequence of material

particles,—the more frankly all this is realised, the better for our understanding of most of the problems of life and being.

The body is the instrument or organ of the soul: and in its special form and aggregation is certainly temporary,—exceedingly temporary, for in the most durable cases it lasts only about a thousand months—a mere instant in the life-history of a planet.

But if the body is thus trivial and temporary, though while it lasts most beautiful and useful and wonderful, what is it that puts it together and keeps it active and retains it fairly constant through all the vicissitudes of climate and condition, and through all the fluctuations of material constitution?

For remember that we are now not dealing with the human body alone. All animals have bodies, and so have plants. All that has been said, of the temporary character of the material aggregate animated by life, applies to a vast variety of organisms, many of which can be encountered on the earth: not to speak of the myriads of other worlds.

What causes the very same particles to be incorporated first into the form of a blade of grass, then into the form of a sheep, then into the form of a man; then into the form of some low invertebrates—"politic worms" (for whose existence, however, in normal cases there is, I believe, no biological authority),—then perhaps into a bird, then once more into vegetation—perhaps a tree? What is it that combines and arranges the particles, so that if absorbed by root or leaves they correspond to and form the tissue of an oak, if picked up by talons, they help to feed the muscles of an eagle, if cooked for dinner, they enter into the nerves and brain of a man? What is the controlling entity in each case, which causes each to have its own form and not another, and preserves the form constant amid the wildest diversity of particles?

We call it life, we call it soul, we call it by various names, and we do not know what it is. But common sense rebels against its being "nothing"; nor has any genuine science presumed to declare that it is purely imaginary.

Let us now, therefore, try to define what we mean by "soul," though in our necessary ignorance the task is not easy. The term is indeed so ambiguous that many may think it is better avoided altogether; but the more precise term "mind" is too narrow and exclusive for our present purpose.

The following definition may sufficiently represent my present meaning:—The soul is that controlling and guiding principle which is responsible for our personal expression and for the construction of the body, under the restrictions of physical condition and ancestry. In its higher development it includes also feeling and intelligence and will, and is the storehouse of mental experience. The body is its instrument or organ, enabling it to receive and to convey physical impressions, and to affect and be affected by matter and energy.

When the body is destroyed, therefore, the soul disappears from physical ken; when the body is impaired, its function is interfered with, and the soul's physical reaction becomes feeble and unsatisfactory. Thus has arisen the popular misconception that the soul of a slain person or of a cripple or paralytic has been destroyed or damaged; whereas only its instrument of manifestation need have been affected. The kind of evils which really assault and hurt the soul belong to a different category.

It may be said that, in so far as soul is responsible for bodily shape, soul seems identical with the principle of *life*, and that all living things must possess some rudiment of soul.

Well, for myself, I do not see how to draw a hard and fast distinction between one form of life and another. All are animated by something which does not belong to the realm of physics and chemistry, but lies outside their province, though it interacts with the material entities of their realm. Life is not matter, nor is it energy, it is a guiding and directing principle; and when considered as incorporated in a certain organism, it, and all that appertains to it, may well be called the soul or constructive and controlling element in that organism.

The soul in this sense is related to the organism in some-

what the same way as the "Logos" is related to the universe ; it is that without which it does not exist,—that which vivifies and constructs, or composes and informs, the whole.

Moreover, in the higher organisms, the soul conspicuously has lofty potentialities ; it not only includes what is connoted by the term "mind," but it begins to acquire some of the character of "spirit" ; by which means it becomes related to the Divine Being. Soul appears to be the link between "spirit" and "matter" ; and, according to its grade, it may be chiefly associated with one or with the other of these two great aspects of the universe.

Now let us consider what is meant by Immortality. Is there anything that is not subject to death and annihilation ? Can we predicate immortality about anything ? Everything is subject to change, but are all things subject to death ? Without change there could be no activity, and the universe would be stagnant ; but without death it is not so clear that its progress would be obstructed ; unless death be only a sort of change.

But is it not a sort of change ? Consider some examples :—When a piece of coal is burnt and brought to an apparent end, the particles of long-fossilised wood are not destroyed ; they enter into the atmosphere as gaseous constituents, and the long-locked-up solar energy is released from its potential form and appears once more as light and heat. The burning of the coal is a kind of resurrection ; and yet it is a kind of death too, and to the superficial eye nothing is left but ashes.

Take next the destruction of a picture or a statue, let it be torn to pieces or smashed to powder : there is nothing to suggest resurrection about that, and the beautiful form embodied in the material has disappeared.

Such a dissolution is a more serious matter, and may be the result of a really malicious act. It is perhaps the nearest approach to genuine destruction that is possible to man, and in some cases represents the material concomitant of a hideous

crime. True, nothing material is destroyed, the particles weigh just as much as before; yet the expression is gone, the beauty is defaced, an idea perhaps is lost.

But, after all, the idea was never really in the marble or in the pigments; it was embodied or incarnate or displayed by them, in a sense, but it was not really *there*. It was in the mind of the artist who constructed the work, and it entered the mind of the spectators who beheld it,—at least of those who had the requisite perceptive faculty; but it was never in the stone at all. The inert material, from the impress of mind it had received, was able to call out and liberate in a kindred mind some of the original feelings and thoughts which had gone to fashion it. Without a perceptive faculty, without a sympathetic mind, the material was powerless. Set up in, or sent to, a world inhabited only by lower animals, it would convey no message whatever, it would be wholly meaningless; just as a piece of manuscript would be, in such a world, though it contained the divinest poem ever written.

Nevertheless, by the supposed act of vandalism a certain incarnation of beauty has been lost to the world. Though even so it is not destroyed out of the universe: it remains the possession of the artist and of those privileged to feel along with him.

Consider next the destruction of a tree or of an animal. Here again the particles remain as many as before, it is only their arrangement that is altered; the matter is conserved but has lost its shape; the energy is constant in quantity but has changed its form. What has disappeared? The thing that has disappeared is the life—the life which appeared to be in the tree or the animal, the life which had composed or constructed it by aid of sunshine and atmosphere, and was manifested by it. Its incarnate form has now gone—no more will that life be displayed amidst its old surroundings, it has disappeared from our ken; apparently it has disappeared from the planet. Has it gone out of existence altogether?

If it were really generated *de novo*, created out of nothing, at the birth of the animal or of the tree, we should be entitled to assume that at death it may have returned to the nonentity whence it came.

But why nonentity? What do we know of nonentity? Is it a reasonable or conceivable idea? Things when they vanish are only hidden. And so conversely: it is readily intelligible that some existence, some bodily presentation, can be evoked out of a hidden or imperceptible or latent or potential existence, and be made actual and perceptible and what we call real. Instances of that sort are constantly occurring. It occurs when a composer produces a piece of music, it occurs when an artisan constructs a piece of furniture, it occurs when a spider spins a web, and when the atmosphere deposits dew. But what example can we think of where existence is created out of nonentity, where nothing turns into something? We can think of plenty of examples of change, of organisation, of something apparently complex and highly developed arising out of a germ apparently simple; but there must always be at least a seed, or nothing will arise; nothing can come out of nothing: something must always have its origin in something.

A radium atom is an element possessing in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Every now and then it explodes and fires off a portion of itself. This can occur several times in succession, and finally it seems to become inert and to cease to be radium or anything like it; it is thought by some to have become lead, while the particles thrown off have become helium, or occasionally neon, or sometimes argon. Let us suppose that. We cannot stop there, we are bound to go on to ask what was the origin of the radium itself. If it explode itself to pieces in the course of a few thousand years, why does any radium still exist? How is it being born? Does it spring into existence out of nothing, or has it some parent? And if it has a parent, what was the origin of that parent?

Never in physical science do we surmise for a moment that

something suddenly springs into being from previous non-existence. All that we perceive can be accounted for by changes of aggregation, by assemblage and dispersion. Of material aggregates we can trace the history, as we can trace the history of continents and islands, of suns and planets and stars; we can say, or try to say, whence they arose and what they will become; but never do we state that they will vanish into nothingness, nor do we ever conjecture that they arose from nothing.

It is true that in religion we seek to trace things farther back still, and ultimately say that everything arose from God; and there, perforce, our chain of existence, our links of antecedence and sequence must cease. But to allow such a statement to act as an intellectual refuge can only be a concession to human infirmity. Everything truly arose from God; but there is nothing specially illuminating in such a statement as that, for everything is in God now; and everything will continue to be animated and sustained by God to all eternity. It is not legitimate explicitly to introduce the idea of God to explain the past alone; the term applies equally to the present and to the future.

So the assertion just made, though true enough, is only a mode of saying that what was in the beginning, is now, and ever shall be, world without end. This is a religious mode of expressing our conviction of the uniformity of the Eternal Character, but it is not a statement which adds to our scientific information. We may not be able to understand Nature, we are certainly unable to comprehend God. If we say that Nature is an aspect of the Divine Being, we must be speaking truly; but that only strengthens our present argument as to its durability and permanence, for we shall certainly not thus be led to attribute to anything so qualified any power of either jumping into or jumping out of existence. To make the statement that Nature is an aspect of the God-head is explicitly to postulate eternity for every really existing thing, and to say that what we call death is not annihilation

but only change. Birth is change. Death is change. A happy change, perhaps; a melancholy change, perhaps. That all depends upon circumstances and special cases, and on the point of view from which things are regarded; but, anyhow, an inevitable change.

I want to make the distinct assertion that no really existing thing perishes, but only changes its form.

Physical science teaches us this, clearly enough, concerning matter and energy: the two great entities with which it has to do. And there is no likelihood of any great modification in this teaching. It may, perhaps, be induced in the long run to modify the form of statement and to assert conservation and real existence of ether and motion (or, perhaps only, of ether *in* motion) rather than of matter and energy. That is quite possible, but the apparent variation of statement is only a variant in form; its essence and meaning are the same, except that it is now more general and would allow even the atoms of matter themselves to have their day and cease to be; being resolved, perhaps, into electricity, and that into some hitherto unimagined mode of motion of the ether. But all this is far from being accepted at present, and need not here be considered.

The distinction between what is transitory and what is permanent is quite clear. Evanescence is to be stated concerning every kind of "system" and aggregation and grouping. A crowd assembles, and then it disperses: it is a crowd no more. A cloud forms in the sky, and soon once more the sky is blue again; the cloud has died. Dew forms on a leaf: a little while, and it has gone again—gone apparently into nothingness, like the cloud. But we know better, both for cloud and dew. In an imperceptible form it was, and soon into an imperceptible form it will again have passed; but meanwhile there is the dewdrop glistening in the sun, reflecting all the movements of the neighbouring world, and contributing its little share to the beauty and the serviceableness of creation.

Its perceptible or incarnate existence is temporary. As a

drop it was born, and as a drop it dies ; but as aqueous vapour it persists : an intrinsically imperishable substance, with all the properties persisting which enabled it to condense into drop or cloud. Even it, therefore, has the attribute of immortality.

So, then, what about life ? Can that be a nonentity which has built up particles of carbon and hydrogen and oxygen into the form of an oak or an eagle or a man ? Is it something which is really nothing ; and soon shall it be manifestly the nothing that an ignorant and purblind creature may suppose it to be ?

Not so ; nor is it so with intellect and consciousness and will, nor with memory and love and adoration, nor all the manifold activities which at present strangely interact with matter and appeal to our bodily senses and terrestrial knowledge ; they are not nothing, nor shall they ever vanish into nothingness or cease to be. They did not arise with us : they never did spring into being ; they are as eternal as the God-head itself, and in the eternal Being they shall endure for ever.

“ Though earth and man were gone,
And suns and universes ceased to be,
And Thou wert left alone,
Every existence would exist in Thee.”

So sang Emily Brontë on her deathbed, in a poem which Mr Haldane quotes in full, in his Gifford Lectures, as containing true philosophy. And, surely in this respect there is a unity running through the universe, and a kinship between the human and the Divine : witness the eloquent ejaculation of Carlyle :—

“ What, then, is man ! What, then, is man !

“ He endures but for an hour, and is crushed before the moth. Yet in the being and in the working of a faithful man is there already (as all faith, from the beginning, gives assurance) a something that pertains not to this wild death-element of Time ; that triumphs over Time, and *is*, and will be, when Time shall be no more.”

OLIVER LODGE.

THE RELIGION OF SENSIBLE SCOTSMEN.

WILLIAM WALLACE, LL.D.

THE title I have given to this paper is provocative, and may seem even egotistic. According to the familiar *mot*, the religion of a sensible man is precisely that which the sensible man keeps to himself; and the reasonable presumption, also, is that the man who speaks thus is absolutely convinced that he himself is not only sensible but has a monopoly of sense. To speak, therefore, of "the religion of sensible Scotsmen" may seem a contradiction in terms, because, according to the dictum, every sensible Scotsman should keep his views to himself, and in that case a religion common to sensible Scotsmen would be an absurdity. The restriction, however, must in any case be taken with reserve. If a man is certain that he has found the true religion, or, for that matter, the true politics, the true ethic, or the true economic, it would not be sensible but cowardly to keep it to himself; his duty would be to proclaim it from the house-tops. A sensible man, therefore, who is also courageous is justified in keeping his religion to himself only because he is at once modest and conscious that "through the seasons an increasing purpose runs." He is doubtful as to the finality of the decisions he has arrived at, and he is more than doubtful as to the infallibility of his own judgment. A Scotsman who is not quite devoid of humour, and who is conscious of the tragic failure of all

human endeavour, especially in the world of abstract thought, is always sceptical, although, being constitutionally reverent, he is seldom a Sceptic. The very fact that he is sceptical, and declines to consider either himself, or anyone else, impeccable, impels him to take an impersonal view of the ultimate problems of duty and destiny, and still more of the various creeds, confessions, and formulas in which these problems have been set forth. At all events, when I venture to speak of the religion of sensible Scotsmen, I express not my own views—which, coming from a layman, are in themselves of so little value, metaphysical or theological, that they deserve nothing but suppression—but those of the men and women whom I have met in the course of my life, and whose judgment seems to be so well balanced that we may fairly regard them as characterised by that virtue of “central-mindedness” for which, in other departments of human activity, there seems something like a demand at the present moment.

To understand what the religion of sensible Scotsmen is, I cannot do better than, in the first instance, indicate what the religion of such men is not. No English critic has recommended himself more to level-headed Scotsmen than Sir Leslie Stephen. His *Hours in a Library* comes nearer, in their opinion, to sanity and common sense than any criticism that Scotland itself has in recent years produced. Yet take from *The Science of Ethics* this same common sense and sanity as applied to religion :—

“A religion implies a theory of the universe. It rests upon some doctrine as to the ultimate facts ascertainable about human life and the world in which we live ; and therefore, of course, every moral theory is based upon, or at least closely implicated in, the religious doctrines of the persons who hold it. Whatever is meant by ‘best,’ we can only say what is best for man as man by considering him as part of the general system. But many relations are equally possible. The theory, for example, that the universe is governed by some inscrutable and invisible power may be worked out with little reference to morality ; the gods may be conceived as indifferent to moral considerations, and when a moral system is evolved they may take up very different attitudes with regard to it ; whilst, again, in some systems the supreme power may be regarded as essentially moral, and perhaps as revealed to us through the conscience. In any case, where there is a philosophical

religion the ethical doctrine will doubtless be vitally connected with the religious, and will be stated partly in religious language."

The sensible Scotsman, who, I may say at once, is to be found in all classes and orders, and is no more to be labelled "bourgeois" or "upper class" or "upper middle class" than he is to be labelled sceptic or agnostic, would not spend his time in criticising such a deliverance as this; he would leave such criticism to the theological experts of his own Church. The truth is that, by constitution, heredity, and national tradition, he is incapable of understanding such a view of the relation between religion and ethic. Whatever religion may have been to his grandfather of the eighteenth century, it is to him a matter much more of daily practice than of Sabbath faith. He does not trouble himself whether society could exist on a Stephenic ethic or an Arnoldian "morality touched with emotion." If he subscribed to any emphatic and rhyming rendering of his conception of religion, it would be on some such lines as—

"For forms of faith let graceless zealots fight,
He can't be wrong whose life is in the right";

with this difference, that he is utterly devoid even of the controversial bitterness implied in "graceless zealots." The sensible Scotsman's attitude towards that portion of religion which means theology, formal or informal, cannot be better illustrated than by his view of Unitarianism. There is in Scotland at the present time a good deal more of philosophical Unitarianism, at all events in a veiled form, than there has been at any period in the national history. The only exotic and democratic denominationalism which offers any serious rivalry to Presbyterianism north of the Tweed is Congregationalism. Some of the most popular preachers in our large cities are Congregationalists; they alone hold spell-bound crowds comparable in size to those which, in an earlier generation, were swayed by a Guthrie, a Caird, or a Macleod. Yet it is almost self-evident that the more militant and progressive Congregationalism on both sides of the Tweed is

passing not slowly but swiftly into Unitarianism, of the kind which is exemplified in the teaching of Mr Stopford Brooke. Nevertheless, in the mild theological excitement which was caused in Scotland a few months ago by the advent of Mr Campbell of the City Temple with his "New Theology," Unitarianism and Unitarian ministers played no part worth mentioning. This was not due to the fact that the membership of the Unitarian churches in Scotland is a negligible quantity. In some respects that membership is spiritually the most exclusive in the country. Nor, as was said by a shrewd and careful observer thirty years ago,

"is the critical, rationalising, self-reliant spirit of which Unitarianism is an expression alien to the Scottish character. On the contrary, a Scotsman is naturally of a doubting, questioning, contradicting temper. Hume was no abnormal product of the national spirit. But withal a Scotsman is practical and cautious, and does not willingly take up an extreme and singular position, especially upon speculative questions. In his secret heart he may, and in many cases does, rebel against his clergyman if he seems to dogmatise too confidently on the mysteries of theology; but he is disinclined to make any public stand in the matter, and prefers waiting to see what other people will do. Besides, it occurs to him that formulated Unitarianism is perhaps too much given to dogmatise in its turn. The belief it assails has lasted for eighteen hundred years, and must, he thinks, have something to be said in its favour; and although he might easily be puzzled by a few scientific questions in Trinitarian theology, yet such is his affection and veneration for Christ, as presented to his mind from infancy, that he conceives he can be making no practical mistake in paying him the highest honours which it is possible to imagine."

This attitude is on the whole maintained by those matter-of-fact Scotsmen of to-day who may be described as, alike in ethics, in politics, and in religion, the governing class of the country, not only towards Unitarianism but towards everything in the shape of formal revolt from what they regard as the common sense of their ancestors embodied in that venerable theological standard, the Confession of Faith. Carlyle, with an eye perhaps on the industrialism of his wealthier countrymen, spoke of "the hell of not getting on." To the Scotsman of a speculative turn of mind, who is, however, central-minded, the "hell" means rather a breaking away

from the continuity of a great and noble tradition. He has something more than a suspicion, for example, that the ferocious "Calvinism" of the eighteenth century, which was exploited and exploded by Burns, which still lives in the pages of Mr Henry Grey Graham's vivid but rather too lurid picture of social life in Scotland, was never really held as a working creed by quiet people with any sense of humour and any capacity for sustained thinking. He even fancies that the raucous orators of the "Black Russel" type who figure in the "Holy Fair," cannot have been quite sincere when they proclaimed the doctrine of eternal torment in language which has been epigrammatised in "The Toothpick for Swearers."

"Hot burning coals of juniper shall be
Thy bed in doom, and there to cover thee
A quilt of boyling brimsone thou must take
And wrap thee in till thou full payment make.

Thy head, thy ears, thy nose, thy eye,
Ye every member shall tormented be
Apart. And such exquisite tortures fill
Each joint as would great Liavathan kill."

His belief is that the really thoughtful people of those days, whether Moderates or Evangelicals, paid as little attention to the orgies of theological denunciation described in the "Holy Fair" as did Arnold's Asiatics to the tramp of the Roman legionaries; they turned them to their common sense again. His grandfather, being contented with the continuity of essentials, did not find it necessary to found a special sect by way of protest against the fulminations of an extreme theology which, nevertheless, he believed to have the kernel of good in it. Why should he not follow the same tactics, under different circumstances? The time, he may think and as a rule does think, is nearly ripe when a vigorous effort should be made not only to relax but to simplify the creed of Presbyterianism, to "bring it up to date," and openly to declare the fact. He holds that too much mystery is being preserved on the subject of the formula in the one great branch of Presby-

terianism, and on the Higher Criticism in the other. Yet, conscious above all things that only through union among Christian agencies that already exist can practical Christianity be established, he declines to form a new denomination, or to join an old one which seems to him, although he cannot say why, to savour of religious Bohemianism. "Like priest, like people"; after all, the minister whom he accuses at his own fireside of cowardliness in dealing with theological standards is but a layman licensed to preach upon the ultimate problems of life. He may be a little slow in thought, and far too slow in action, but he will move some day. The sensible Scotsman will not put new wine into old bottles if there is any danger of their bursting.

The religion of the typical Scotsman, who regards it as a duty to think of others as well as of himself, may be judged by the manner in which he spends a typical Sunday, and in which he translates the teaching of that day into practice during the week. He takes a stroll before breakfast cheerily rather than painfully, conscious that his grandfather might have regarded it as a crime to do so. After breakfast, he and his family go to church in the spirit of the Village Blacksmith or Burns's "Cottar." Like his grandfather, he is a sermon-taster; but his taste in sermons is mellowed and more tolerant. If the discourse to which he listens is not quite to his mind as a doctrinal exposition, he dilates on the fact to a male friend on his way home to a substantial early dinner. But he never dreams of suggesting to his wife, after complimenting her on the roast, that a heresy hunt should be set on foot against the minister. When he was a young man he thoroughly approved of the sweetly jingling journalese of Tennyson, "There is more faith in honest doubt than half the creeds." His grandfather dwelt on the firstly, the secondly, and the thirdly; he himself, with his mind wandering in the direction of the poor, at whom instead of for whom the Gospel is sometimes preached, values only the practical application. If his minister has spoken of the

human side of life in such a sympathetic way as to compel him to rush to his cheque-book after breakfast on Monday, the sermon has been a perfect success alike from the standpoint of pulpit and of pew. In the afternoon he may, especially if requested by his minister, deliver an address to the Sabbath School of his church or to a Boys' Brigade meeting; his admonitions are full at once of shrewdness and of kindness, of the spirit of Christ and of that perfectly justifiable commercial astuteness which inspires Burns's "Address to a Young Friend." In the evening he may again go to church, but his family are under no compulsion to accompany him; or he may spend the hours between tea and family worship browsing among his books. Family worship—which in such circles is, as a rule, now held once a day—concludes a full and well-spent Sunday.

During the week the theories of the First Day are carried into practice. What time the busy layman can spare from affairs which absorb his energies for at least six hours a day he devotes to municipal or other public work, and to the organisation and successful carrying on of voluntary philanthropic enterprises. He is morally certain to be a member of the Town Council, the School Board, or the managing committee of an Infirmary or an Hospital. When he reaches the top of his tree, as Lord Provost, or Chairman of a College or local Trust, the public work of a sensible Scotsman consumes the whole of his time; he has to leave to his junior partners or his sons the task of continuing the family mercantile tradition of honour, energy, and adaptability to the changing conditions of national life. In this work pulpit and pew are again associated; the lay element is, of course, the predominant partner in most charitable and practical religious undertakings but ministers of all denominations also take a large part as spiritual assessors. Scotland has long ago ceased to be priest-ridden, even in the sense and to the extent which Buckle's unconscious humour has rendered immortal, but it has no objection to be presbyter-guided.

Such is the religious life of the sensible Scotsman in a large city, who has an income from £2000 to £5000 a year. No doubt critics who are socialistic in theory, or fundamentally artistic in temperament, may discover such life to mean the conversion of religion into "the handmaid of the capitalist," or to be in itself at once ineffably dreary or intolerably patronising. Yet it leads to not a little practical good in the relief of human misery. The man who lives it is indeed fully alive to the fact that he is only preparing the way for a determined and truly scientific effort to solve that problem which in the most eloquent of his speeches John Bright described as "descending to moral depths deeper than ever cable fathomed, and bringing thence Misery's sons and daughters and the multitude that are ready to perish." The "submerged tenth"—which he fears is very nearly a third in such a city as Glasgow—is the Banquo's Ghost that haunts all his feasts, the embarrassment that sicklies o'er his weekly tale of something attempted, something done, in the shape of benevolence, with the pale and tragic cast of imperfection. In moments of depression or impatience he feels inclined to welcome the partial success of any social gospel, either a modified Salvationism or a diluted and pacific Socialism, which, proclaiming from the house-tops, or in the slums, the old Gladstonian doctrine of "save yourselves," would do something towards putting an end to maniacal drunkenness and unspeakable moral squalor. All he can do is to hope that the same evolutionary processes—although he is often sick to death of the comfortable "cant of evolution"—which have comparatively civilised and Christianised the social stratum to which he belongs, will exercise a similar influence on those other *couches sociales* where at present a morbid energy finds expression mainly in the counsels of despair and embittered agnosticism. He is in heart and soul an individualist, and as a consequence he has no tolerance for any doctrines which seem to him to introduce even the thin end of the wedge of "State Socialism." But he gives his active sympathy to all agencies, whether in Church or State, which are calculated

to elevate the social problem above sectarian squabbles and the often vulgar complications of party politics.

And now, what of the theology and ecclesiastical policy of the sensible Scotsman? Is he a Calvinist, or an Arminian; a Disestablisher, or a believer in State Endowments? Here again it is necessary to contrast his position with that of his grandfather. It is safe to say that if he were catechised he would decline to pronounce himself either a Calvinist or an Arminian. As a matter of fact he has read the treatises of none of the great theological protagonists, and his spiritual guides, bent like himself more on practical than on theoretical religion, do not burden his judgment with the treasures of their Divinity Hall erudition. His grandfather occupied a different position and took a different view. True, he read neither Calvin nor Calvin's opponents, but his guides, philosophers, and friends, Moderate or Evangelical, poured into his ears what they regarded as "Calvinism" or "Arminianism." To the student of Burns, and still more of the period in which Burns lived and which helped to mould him, there is nothing more interesting than the almost passionate zeal with which the farmers of Ayrshire and Dumfriesshire read the books that embodied the crude ratiocination of such free-thinkers as Taylor of Norwich. When Burns wished to make a present to his friend and his father's friend "Auld Glen," he could think of nothing better or more likely to be appreciated than the translation of a Rousseauite brochure, which, as Mr John Morley testifies, had not a little to do with the spreading of revolutionary sentiments and pioneering the work of Jacobinism. *Tempora mutantur.* The present-day Scotsman of "Auld Glen's" type of mind and intellectual force, whether he is a farmer or a merchant, certainly does not trouble himself to any real extent with the questions of Fate, Free Will, Foreknowledge Absolute. He may borrow from the circulating library the works of the favourite professors of his Church, especially if they have been subjected at an earlier stage in their career to a mild and feckless "persecution." Not many

years ago the annual tracts of the late Henry Drummond had as much popularity and as wide a circulation as the most successful of "Christmas Numbers." Even to these the middle-class Scotsman did not greatly incline; he left them with a smile to his womankind, as a species of theological afternoon tea, quite innocuous, non-inebriating, and calculated to have a benignant effect upon the gossip of "days at home." Now, however, it is the realities of social politics which are of absorbing interest. He discusses not the rival virtues and weaknesses of "Calvinism" and "Arminianism," but of Protectionism and Socialism, as gospels competing for the possession of the working-man's brain and the body politic.

The mental horrors set forth in Mr Grey Graham's piquant volumes are to him nothing more than a nightmare which has spent itself and left no heartache or even headache behind. In a moral sense this is well; in an intellectual sense it is not so well. A second Burns could hardly stumble on a second "Holy Willie," although he might meet an "Oily Gammon" or two; the demoralising logicity of a relentlessly systematic creed, eventuating of necessity in hypocrisy, is gone like the gregarious scandals of the "Holy Fair." And yet Scotsmen have a genuine respect for that "Calvinism" which, imperfectly understood and scarcely studied at all by their grandfathers, nevertheless "held the strong hand of its purity" on the impulses of many a lad in every condition and walk of life till the battle of the spirit was over, and the hearts and hopes of youth had found their permanent channels. The Kailyard, like the Solemn League and Covenant, "now brings a smile, now brings a tear"; at the height of its success, indeed, it brought too many tears. But with all its weaknesses it stands for much that was sound in practical Scottish ethics as well as for a stage in Scottish sociology. The sensible Scotsman holds with Froude that Calvinism is the influshing of the sense of law on the human conscience. Nor does he greatly object to the view of its latest Academic apologist, Professor Reid of Glasgow University:

"If we test the Calvinistic system, viewed broadly and generously, in its relation to social questions of our day, we must very soon realise how strong and timely it is. For it holds fast to the personal supremacy and individual providence of God: it recognises the eternal relation of God to man: it sees with clear and unfaltering eye the grim fact of sin: it declares the sacrifice made by God to meet that fact; and it points to the final triumph of good over evil. On these points the recent theologies have shown signs of weakness and bewilderment. . . . Amid the perplexities of theories which seem to rob us, like pantheism, of ourselves, or, like the new Deism, of our God, we may do worse than go back to the careful study of that massive doctrinal system which made Scotland once a home of piety, combining the most realistic subjection to God with the keenest sense of human individuality."

This may seem to be, and probably is, Calvinism—I use the word strictly in its popular and not at all in its scientific sense—Hegelianised in accordance with the metaphysic which has been dominant in Scotland for nearly a quarter of a century. But the Hegelianisation of Calvinism is, in its practical result at all events, no mean achievement, as may be demonstrated in a somewhat remarkable fashion when, two years hence, Scotland sends its contingent of thinkers and exegetes to assist in the Calvin celebrations at Geneva. History may repeat itself. Even Mr Henry Grey Graham, after inducing his readers to sup on the theological horrors of the eighteenth century, admits "as the century advanced, a new and finer religious feeling sprang up among the better type of Evangelical clergy, and though the dogmas were in reality as hard and grim as ever, they were either kept in the background or presented in a softer light."

The chief feature of the purely ecclesiastical situation in Scotland is the absence of any enthusiasm for Disestablishment at a time when such a policy would, under ordinary political circumstances, have obtained a large measure of lay support. There is in power a Government which has accepted Mr Gladstone's legacy of Scottish Disestablishment as one of the planks in the Liberal platform. The majority of our national representatives in Parliament are pledged to that policy. Year after year the General Assembly of the United Free Church passes a resolution in favour of practical steps being taken to

ensure the triumph of religious equality on this side of the Tweed. When, in the last year of the late Unionist Government, a measure was passed dealing with the Churches of Scotland, and containing a clause permitting the Establishment to deal with the formula of ministerial subscription to the Confession of Faith in a spirit of freedom which has never before received parliamentary sanction, it was said in some quarters that a step forward towards Disestablishment had been taken. The Church of Scotland had been placed in a position of theological "privilege"; the other Churches would be practically forced to assail, and if possible capture that position, by all the political influence at their command. Nevertheless, Disestablishment does not "move," and does not seem likely to "move." For this several reasons might be assigned. In particular, the leading Dissenting Presbyterian communion, the United Free Church, is fully occupied with its truly heroic efforts to recover from the religious and social effects of the celebrated House of Lords decision of August 1904 in the litigation which has legalised the position of the much smaller Free Church as the heir to the "Disruption" of 1843. It must set its house in order with the help of its generous laymen before it can proceed to assert itself against its "auld enemy" Erastianism.

But as a matter of fact the chief reason for the present languor of attitude towards Disestablishment is to be found in the fact that union among the Presbyterian bodies of Scotland is much more in favour than a policy which must of necessity emphasise and perpetuate the existing disunion. In ecclesiastical and what may be termed clericalised circles in Scotland it is the "scandals" caused by clerical "waste of energy" and the "over-lapping" of religious agencies that are chiefly discussed, not those due to the fact that one Presbyterian minister, in a rural parish, obtains a "living wage" of less than £200 a year from teinds or the Small Livings Committee of his Church, and that his neighbour, friend, and co-operator obtains it from voluntary lay contributions. Whether the efforts that are

now being made through committees and otherwise to accomplish Presbyterian re-union can be successful without the preliminary of a Parliamentary statute disestablishing the Church of Scotland remains to be seen. Meanwhile there is no enthusiasm for that preliminary. Nearly all the published schemes for establishing such re-union, including that of the Rev. Dr Mair of Edinburgh, one of the most venerable figures in the Church of Scotland, minimise this difficulty. They do this, moreover, largely because the younger ministers, both of the Church and of the United Free Church, have no living interest in the questions which rent Scotland before, and immediately after, the crisis of 1843. Representative and distinguished Professors in both, like Dr Paterson of the University of Edinburgh and Dr George Adam Smith of the United Free Church College of Glasgow, may be profoundly interested in the problems of Creed Revision and Biblical Criticism; they are scarcely at all interested in the questions conjured up by the phrase "spiritual independence." Occasionally indeed the voice of a venerated and worthy Abdiel of Disestablishment is heard in the land; such as that of the Rev. Dr Hutton of Paisley, who, now that Dr Rainy has gone where beyond these voices there is peace, may be regarded as the Grand Old Man of Scottish ecclesiastical controversy. He is the most relentlessly logical of Scottish Voluntaries, and declines to have any fellowship with the unfruitful works of State subsidy to religion. In every Assembly of his Church he has his field-day. By means of a resolution he carries his colleagues with him in his protest in favour of what he believes to be "the liberation of the Church." Doubtless he is happy for that day, and deserves to be. But the rest of the year is silence.

It is not impossible, therefore, that as the years pass, and the difficulties both of Union and of Disestablishment continue and are complicated as they must be by the other problems of churchlessness and Socialism, in alliance with if not based

on agnosticism, the mind of common-sense Scotland may turn towards that modified and clarified idea of Church Establishment which years ago found shape in Coleridge's "Clerisy." I read in the report of a meeting of the latest Church Congress in Dundee such an utterance as the following from so capable a clergyman of the Church of Scotland as Mr Martin of Scone:—"Popular agnosticism can only be met by laying bare the flagrant misconceptions underlying it; its twin bases are an erroneous conception of evolution and a still more erroneous conception of the Christian Religion." This tempts me to introduce a personal note. Exactly thirty years ago my late brother, who died member for East Edinburgh, but who at the time was one of the acknowledged leaders of the Church of Scotland, published, in a volume entitled *Recess Studies*, an essay on "Church Tendencies in Scotland." As it would be the insanity of fraternal delicacy for me not to state my belief that his was one of the most robust intelligences that since the days of Burns have grappled with all the questions of life and destiny in Scotland, I feel no compunction in quoting from him:

"The true policy of Church preservation lies in widening its doctrinal basis as the times permit. This alone will conciliate the intelligence of the country (which ultimately leads it) by assimilating the form of the Church to the one type of establishment which is defensible in such a constitution of society as our own. Here the path of policy is the path of duty. If the religious thought of the country is moving towards a new point of view, the Church must go there to meet it, if it means to be instrumental in preserving a living faith in the mind of the nation."

But to indicate the true meaning of this "living faith," and how the common sense of Scotland may at once preserve and control it, I must also quote that part of the essay which is supposed to voice the attitude of the State regarded as a person:

"I can call into existence a body of learned men taken bound to devote themselves to the discovery of the true religion. I can secure that they are both diligent in their duties and perfectly free in the search and expression of truth. I can arrange that, from time to time, they shall, by their joint labours, issue or revise a declaration or creed of what seems to them, or the

most of them, to be the truth upon the chief points of religion; and that in their stated instruction of the people they shall read and expound this declaration, and explain the grounds on which the general body of their instruction has been arrived at—being at perfect liberty, however, to state and defend whatever may be their own personal convictions.”

These words seem to me as true now as they were thirty years ago. How far the magic of time, which has already justified them to some extent, may, in the immediate future, give them still more the character of a prophecy, I cannot say. But it is certain that only in some form of Church re-union can the old association between all classes of Scottish society be revived and the country become once more a theocracy. How are the churchless, the drunken, the devotees of coarse pleasure, the too militant believers in Socialism and a *Clarionesque* Agnosticism to be brought back to that fold which not more than a hundred years ago made Church and State—in the large sense of both words—practically identical? The demand for Creed Revision does not seem to me to be so pronounced as it was a generation ago, when, as a consequence of the agitation caused by “innovations” in public worship, it appeared not impossible that the intellect of Scotland would go over *en masse* to that picturesque and benignant Broad Churchism which Dean Stanley preached from so many pulpits in Scotland, and of which he was the gracious and gentle embodiment. We have now no such exciting controversies as those in which Robert Lee, Norman Macleod, and John Tulloch took part, and which shortened their lives. Heresy hunts are practically unknown; such as are attempted have all the pitiableness of unreality. The days when the introduction of an organ into the services of the Presbyterian Church was proclaimed, and by some of the most capable of clerical leaders, to be the thin end of the wedge of atheism, can never be recalled. That battle has been silently won; the religious services in most Presbyterian Churches of Lowland Scotland are as well ordered as are those of any Church in England, Anglican or Nonconformist. The future may have in store for us an

equally great and equally inarticulate triumph of what Mr Gladstone termed "those social forces which move on in their might and majesty, undisturbed by the fury of our debates." At the present moment, "official" Presbyterianism may seem afraid openly to face the question of substituting for the Confession of Faith a simple creed, representing the best in modern theological thought; it is apparently satisfied to consider, with closed doors, the contents of that formula which represents an individual minister's method of accepting his Church's standards. This same "official" Presbyterianism may seem helpless in presence of the extraordinary portent of large masses of men and women who are either absolutely indifferent or actively hostile to church-going Christianity. Whether to allow these to "save themselves," or to aid in their salvation—that is the question which must be answered in some fashion. What that answer is to be it is impossible to forecast; but that it will not be answered seems incredible to all who remember the successes of Scotland at crises which have demanded and produced practical unanimity of opinion, and who are conscious that the "social problem" weighs down, and in a sense renders null, or at least inefficient and exasperating, all political and religious controversy.

And is this the last word to be said of the religion of sensible Scotsmen? No. In the last resort religion regarded as that which binds the heads and hearts of men is an individual concern. I am reminded of a pathetic and picturesque passage—although I cannot recall its exact words—in which the most indomitable and erudite of Scottish controversialists on ecclesiastical questions, Dr Taylor Innes, declared after a long and elaborate argumentation, that true religion did not lie in the rightness or wrongness of a particular view of a particular question, but in seeking God "personally," in the persistency of the individual conscience. Whenever a man does this, whenever he tries to secure a subjective basis for his objective life, or to discover a moral cosmos in the apparent chaos of environment, whenever he subjects temperament to the control

of a will purged of selfishness, whenever he casts off not only every weight and the sin that doth so easily beset him, but the small habits which often prevent and always delay the accomplishment of great ends, whenever, of set purpose and not intermittently, he does justly, loves mercy, and walks humbly, he "finds religion." For him and him alone "all is well, though faith and form be sundered in the night of fear." He and he alone is entitled to "keep aye something to himself he winna tell to ony"; he and he alone is entitled to share the final calm of that Goethe who, as Professor Hume Brown has reminded us in his recent eloquent *apologia*, was so little of a pagan that "when he spoke in his last days of the Founder of Christianity, he could not control his tears." The earnest man, perplex't in faith but pure in deeds, may always seek shelter, if not equanimity, in "Bleiben Sie fest im Bunde des Ernstes und der Liebe: alles übrige ist ein leeres und trauriges Wesen."

WILLIAM WALLACE.

GLASGOW.

THE "JERAHMEEL" THEORY AND THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF THE NEGEB.

WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF PERSONAL
EXPLORATION OF THE COUNTRY.

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SPECIAL attention has been directed in recent years to that part of Arabia Petraea which the ancient Hebrews called "The Negeb" by the theories connected with the names Muzri and Jerahmeel. Professor Hugo Winckler, of Berlin, one of the foremost Assyriologists of our time, and a man of very unusual originality and independence of thought, was led by his investigations to the opinion that there once existed in North-Western Arabia a kingdom known by the same name as that used by the Semites to designate Egypt. Tentatively at first, in 1893, and then with greater assurance in 1896 and 1903, he presented the proof-texts upon which he relied for the support of this conclusion, and suggested far-reaching inferences as to the earlier history of Israel which it seemed to him legitimate to draw from the existence of this hitherto unknown state.

In some inscriptions of Tiglath Pileser III., Sargon, and Sennacherib, Professor Winckler had found Muzri mentioned in such a manner as to render it, in his judgment, probable that an Arabian power, rather than Egypt, was referred to; and in one inscription of Esarhaddon it appeared to him necessary to suppose that both were mentioned side by side.

He also felt that an important South Arabian inscription, Halévy 535, must be interpreted as voicing the gratitude of certain Minæans who had lived in this Muzri, and not in Egypt, for a happy escape from the country of their sojourning.

It was inevitable that this growing conviction should cause him to seek among the numerous passages where the term Mizrim occurred in the Hebrew scriptures for some instances where it could reasonably be supposed to have originally referred, not to Egypt, but to the same Arabian kingdom. The so-called "Brook of Egypt," or *nahal Mizrim*, was generally identified by scholars with the modern Wadi el Arish. This seemed to show that the term was attached, not only to Egypt, but also to a region quite removed from the valley of the Nile. Hagar was a Mizrite slave. Could the mother of the Ishmaelites possibly have been thought of as an Egyptian woman? Numerous other cases presented themselves. The most important suggestion, however, was that the whole story of the sojourn of Israel in Egypt and the Exodus may have been dislocated. The original tradition may not have contemplated Egypt at all, but the N.W. Arabian Muzri.

The circumstance that the later narratives have a more distinctive Egyptian colouring than the earlier, and the fact, so convincingly set forth by Professor Toy, of Harvard University, that there is a remarkable absence of Egyptian elements in all parts of the legislation ascribed to Moses, added much to the plausibility of this Muzrite theory; while the centuries that must have elapsed between the invasion of Palestine by the Hebrew tribes and the composition of our earliest Pentateuchal sources seemed to give ample time for the confusion of the two countries bearing the same name. A number of scholars accepted the existence of the new Arabian kingdom as an established fact. The most eminent among these as a Semitic philologist was Professor Fritz Hommel, of Munich. This learned and brilliant investigator

limited Mazor, or Muzri, which Professor Winckler had made coextensive with Arabia Petræa, to the Midianite territory east of the Gulf of Akabah, brought it into closer relations with the Minæan empire, found references to it in more Biblical texts, though unwilling to substitute it for Egypt in the story of the Exodus, and sought to emphasise the importance of the Ashurites between the Ælanitic gulf and the Nile valley.

It was reserved, however, for another distinguished scholar to supplement this Muzrite theory by one calculated to bring into stronger relief the historic importance of the country immediately south of Palestine. Professor T. K. Cheyne, of Oxford, to whom the world owes a heavy debt of gratitude for his fearless and noble championship of free investigation and critical methods, and for the monumental work which more than any other marks the advance of Biblical criticism and theological thought at the dawn of the twentieth century, drew attention to the significant rôle that must have been played in the Negeb by the Jerahmeelites, and with the resourcefulness, persistency, and boldness characteristic of his scholarship endeavoured to fill the lacunæ in our knowledge of this people.

We knew, from a good old source, that, when David wished to deceive Achish as to the character of his raids, he told him that he had invaded the Negeb of Judah, the Negeb of the Jerahmeelites, and the Negeb of the Kenites (1 Sam. xxvii. 10), and that, when he had taken revenge upon the Amalekites for their sack of Ziklag, he sent presents to the elders of Judah who lived "in the cities of the Jerahmeelites," "the cities of the Kenites," and elsewhere (1 Sam. xxx. 29). But little significance was attached to these allusions. The Kenites had received considerable attention from the time when Philo asked, "Where did Cain get his wife?" to the day when it could be announced that Cain had furnished Israel with a god. According to 1 Sam. xxx. 14, there was a Negeb of the Cherethites and a Negeb of Caleb, besides the three that

have been mentioned; and scholars had occupied themselves much with the name and identity of the Cherethites, and had even widely accepted the view that Abram once was the local divinity and hero of the Calebites in Hebron. The part played by Jerahmeel in the life of the Negeb had been ignored, or regarded as beyond our ken. Yet the home of these Jerahmeelites, as ancient texts and modern toponymy alike indicated, was precisely in that part of the great plateau where the most flourishing cities of the Græco-Roman period stood. A high age and political pre-eminence seemed to be reflected in the genealogical scheme which made Jerahmeel the first-born son of Hezron, Judah's son, and Aram, the ancestor of David, and Caleb, his younger brothers.

As Professor Cheyne sought to penetrate the darkness enveloping the life of this manifestly very important tribe, he was gradually led to see in the history there unfolding before his eyes the answers to many puzzling questions raised by our fragmentary records of the life of Israel. Whether Israel came into Syria from Egypt or Arabia, it is a strange fact that the emphasis upon the thrilling experiences connected with the nation's birth should appear so late in its history and with such peculiar force in the period that produced the Psalter. Was there a more recent contact, a fresh conflict reviving the memories of the past and developing old traditions? Professor Cheyne became convinced that not only had the most important ethnic elements entering into the composition of the Bene Israel, and the most significant religious movements characterising their existence, come from Arabia through the Negeb into Palestine, but friendly and hostile relations between Judah and Jerahmeelites, Mizrites, Ashurites, and other southern tribes had also been the distinguishing feature of post-exilic life in Judæa. The textual corruption, which, as every student of the early versions knows, is particularly great in the case of proper names, caused him to suspect the accuracy of transmission in a very large number of passages, and his emendations, which at first were tentative

and regardful of our earliest witnesses, in course of time became more independent, and followed, no doubt, too eagerly the behests of a fascinating theory.

My own attitude toward these theories has been determined, not only by a high personal regard for the eminent scholars who had propounded them, but also by a growing conviction that, whether there was an Arabian Muzri or not, whether Jerahmeel filled as large a place in actual history as in Professor Cheyne's restoration of it or not, the two theories deserved respectful attention and painstaking investigation, and had been of undeniable value in forcing us to new points of view. Already in 1894 I expressed the thought that "it would not be strange if an Assyrian scribe should have regarded Egypt as beginning at the Wadi el Arish, which even the Hebrews called Nahal Mizraim" (*Hebraica*, April 1894), and observed that "Idibiil may well have been made governor of a part of the Sinaitic peninsula which a court historian would not scruple to call Muzur" (*ibid.*). Later, I modified this view by suggesting that the territory around Wadi el Arish, including possibly the city of Raphia and a part of the Negeb as well as the Sinaitic peninsula, may have still been referred to as Muzri, *i.e.* Egypt, even after the Egyptian occupation had ceased and independent rulers maintained themselves there. Practically the same name would then apply to the country east of Egypt and to Egypt itself. But the population would be different, and individuals like Hagar, the boy who told David of the destruction of Ziklag, and others, might still have been Semites and strangers to the speech of Egypt, though living in what, in a wider sense, would be known as Muzur. In my article on the Scythians in *Encyclopædia Biblica* (1903), I said that "the Jerahmeelite theory promises to throw much light on the obscure history of the Negeb," though I could not persuade myself that the enemy from the north, in Jeremiah, in reality came from a Zaphon in the Negeb.

The chief reason for my hesitancy in dealing with these

theories was my ignorance of a region of which we had no good maps and no accurate descriptions. Some parts had never been visited by Western explorers. There was no information to be had anywhere in regard to some topographical questions of fundamental importance. Professor Winckler had abandoned the identification of Wadi el Arish as the “brook of Egypt,” and maintained that “the stream that rushes into the sea at Raphia” was the *nahal Mizrim*. Was there such a wadi, and how did the Wadi el Arish look? Professor Cheyne had rejected the identification of the Cherethites as Cretans, or Philistines, on the ground that the topographical conditions rendered it improbable that the Philistines should seek from Gaza to enter the Negeb where these Cherethites lived. Was this really so? The same scholar assigned the greatest importance to the two cities Ruhaibeh and Sebaita. Did the Byzantine cities represented by the present ruins rest upon the accumulated débris of older towns, or on the rock? Were there in the Negeb such “tells” as those farther north that had been excavated or were waiting for the spade? Was there really an oasis, with abundant vegetation, around Ain Kadeis, such as Dr Trumbull had described? Were palms to be seen elsewhere than at Ain el Weibeh? What was the character of the ground, of the soil in the wadies, of the water-supply? How extensive was the present cultivation of the land, and what were the signs of cultivation in ancient times? I greatly desired to see the country before turning my attention again to the problems of its history.

The opportunity came with my appointment as Director of the American School of Archæology in Jerusalem. With my students I was able to undertake a number of expeditions into the Negeb. In January 1905 we surveyed the territory between Gaza and El Arish; at the end of February and the beginning of March we successfully accomplished the first complete circumnavigation of the Dead Sea, exploring the shores on both sides, and securing a large number of photo-

graphs; in May and June we visited the ruined cities between Bir el Seba and Ain Kadeis, and then continued to the end of July the exploration of the eastern Negeb, the Arabah, the mountains of ancient Edom and Moab, and the East Jordan country.

It is not my purpose here to discuss the topography of Arabia Petræa. That must be reserved for another place. But I wish to indicate briefly what seems to me to be the historical importance of the Negeb. Etymologically, the word Negeb seems to be connected with the Aramaic root *negab*, meaning "to be dry," and therefore designates "a dry land," "a steppe." The boundaries of the Negeb were probably never very well defined. On the east, the Dead Sea and the Arabah formed the natural limit; on the west, the Mediterranean littoral; a line running north of Hebron and south of Gaza would perhaps indicate the northern boundary; one running through the wadi of Ain Kadeis to El Arish the southern. But each section was a *negeb*, a steppe-land, known by the name of the tribe inhabiting it.

The undisturbed ruins of the Byzantine cities speak with sufficient plainness of the condition of this land since the Muslim conquest. At the present time it is occupied by various tribes, such as the Terabin, the Haweitat, the Tiyahah on the west, the Azazimeh and the Saidiyeh on the central plateau, and the Dhullam and Jahalin toward the Arabah and the Dead Sea. How long they have lived in these parts is difficult to ascertain. Occasionally a reference to one or the other may be found in an Arabic writer. Sometimes the story of their wanderings is told by the *wasms* they have scribbled on a ruin or a well. It is not impossible that these *wasms*, or tribal marks, may some day clear up the relations of the Arab tribes in the Negeb to their Nabatæan predecessors. I prize my long list of *wasms*, secured often with great difficulty, almost as highly as my collection of potsherds. Selim I., who built Khan Yunus, seems to have paid little attention otherwise to this region. Sultan Barkuk, at the end

of the fourteenth century, erected the fortress at El Arish, but there are no marks of his building activities in the interior.

There is a bare possibility that the Crusaders had something to do in the Negeb. At Sebaita, a large and beautiful Christian Church, still in a remarkably fine state of preservation, has evidently at some time been transformed into a fortress. The original walls, built of smoothly cut stones, have been surrounded by a wall of roughly hewn stones, slanting down to the ground where it is deepest. The church was probably erected in the sixth century. The Muslim attack upon Syria in the seventh century was sudden, and there are no traces of similar defence-walls in the other cities of the Negeb. Besides, the method of construction seems to be peculiar to a later period. Can it be that Reinaud de Chateillon, the lord of Shobek and of Hebron, who regulated the navigation on the Dead Sea and made raids in the neighbourhood of Mecca, also extended his interests to Sebaita? Certain it is that the Negeb has played no important part in history since the days when Byzantine emperors were prayed for in its churches. What has been lacking is an external power strong enough to maintain order, and civilised enough to create prosperity.

It was this that made the centuries between Alexander and Muhammad the most flourishing period in the history of the Negeb. Greek civilisation and Roman statecraft made the desert places blossom like a garden; covered the valleys with golden grain and the terraced hills with clinging vines; caused cities to grow, with beautiful streets, and squares and walls, with temples and theatres, basilicas and churches, baths and aqueducts; and filled the land with a large and thrifty population, drawing from nature not only the necessities but the comforts and luxuries of life, and keeping in touch with the progress of the world. During the fifth, the sixth, and the early decades of the seventh century, Christianity was the official religion of the realm. Ecclesiastically, the Negeb was dependent upon Egypt until 534, and was in somewhat close contact with the Coptic Church. After that

time it came under the patriarchate of Jerusalem, but the chief churches were under the control of the see of Gaza. This relation to Egypt and to Gaza is not without its significance. There is a manuscript in the library of the Greek Patriarchate in Jerusalem which gives a list of bishoprics according to the new arrangement of ecclesiastical affairs by Justinian in 534. It contains many names of cities in the Negeb. Among these are Lysa, Abida, Chalaza and Chollus, and also Pharan, or Cadis. In view of the fact that there was a Byzantine city by the name of Cadis, it is strange that there should be no ruins in the immediate vicinity of Ain Kadeis. Approaching this place from the north-east by a route not followed by any other Western explorer, I discovered, indeed, the ruins of two large houses from the Byzantine period, and digging in the corner of one of them, I found several pieces of ribbed Roman pottery, of a type very familiar in the ruined cities of that epoch. I also saw the foundations of a building some distance west of Ain Kadeis. But nowhere was there any sign of a city. On the other hand, there is an important ruin and there is a real "tell" that should be excavated in the Wadi el Ain, on the way to Ain Kudeirat. This is "the Ain" *par excellence* in the whole region; from it a fine stream flows forth, and there is an abundance of vegetation on its banks. I am strongly inclined to the belief that the Kadesh of the Græco-Roman and Byzantine periods is to be sought there.

The mosaic map in the Greek Church at Madeba is particularly rich in this section. Of the names given, a few can, with some assurance, be identified with present sites, such as Beersheba, Elusa (Halaza), Gerar (Jerur), Arad (Tel el Arad), Oga (El Aujeh). It is possible that Thamara was at Ain el Weibeh, the only place where palms abound in the Negeb, and Hasemon at Ain el Hasb. Others, like Abida (Eboda), are missing; and one asks in vain what names on the map correspond to the great ruins at Ruhaibeh, Sebaita, Meshrifeh, and Saidiyeh. A Byzantine rescript recently discovered at Beer-

sheba mentions at least two cities in this region, Præsidium and Thamara, both in or near the Arabah. Several Greek inscriptions have been found by the Dominicans in Jerusalem. Forty inscriptions were discovered by ourselves at Ruhaibeh and Bir el Seba. Some of these are dated. Among the ruins of a number of cities there are the apses, walls, and marble floors of churches. It is impossible to pass through these places without being impressed with the very great importance of the Negeb in the Christian period.

But Christianity did not introduce Hellenic civilisation into the Negeb. It was grafted on it. The most eminent agents of this civilisation were the Roman emperors, and behind them were perhaps the greatest forces for the establishment of order and prosperity that have ever been organised in this world. Especially Hadrian, the Antonines, and the Syrian emperors took a deep interest in Arabia Petræa. Through Roman legions, Greek-speaking colonies, and visiting scholars, orators, and artists, Hellenic modes of thought and life spread among the Nabatæans, as among their neighbours, the Philistines. From Gaza, Anthedon, Raphia, and Rhinocorura, as well as from the Greek cities of Egypt, the tidal wave swept over the Negeb into the mountains beyond the Arabah, where the noblest art in the world united with the most solemn grandeur of nature to create at Petra the tombs and temples of its marvellous city of the dead. Ptolemy, the Peutinger Tables, and the *Notitiae* give us the names of many cities in the Negeb. Elusa, the sacred city, where, according to Epiphanius, the virgin goddess Halasa and her son were worshipped, vied in religious importance with Petra and Madeba on the other side the deep depression. Before the Roman province of Arabia was created in 106 A.D., Nabatæan kings exercised their authority in the Negeb. It is possible that the first Obodas has his tomb at Abdeh. It was from the Arabs, *i.e.* the Nabatæans, that Alexander Jannæus (102–88 B.C.) wrested Elusa, and probably also Arad and Obida (Alusa, Arydda and Orybda), as well as Madeba and other cities,

according to Josephus, *Ant.* xiv., l. 4. It is not likely that the Seleucidæ, even after the battle of Panias in 198 B.C., were able to take possession of the extreme south of Syria. The quiet rule of the Ptolemies extended its influence not merely to the Negeb but to Petra itself, as the tombs of the third century show. The old Edomites had apparently been crowded into the north-west corner, and the Jerahmeelites, the Kenites, and the Calebites seem to have become full-fledged Jews.

Was there any civilised life in the Negeb before Alexander? Professor Eduard Meyer, of Berlin, whose mastery of the vast material, exactness of method, and rare insight have made him *facile princeps* among historians of antiquity, seems inclined to the view that before the advent of Græco-Roman civilisation this region was as little under civilisation as it is at present, that it was only a dry steppe-land where nomadic tribes pitched their tents. I venture to think that in this historic estimate some important considerations have been overlooked. The Persian period was marked by an event of great significance for this territory. The Edomites were crowded out of their mountain fastnesses by the Nabatæans, and, crossing the Arabah, made of the Negeb a new Idumæa. As the tombs in Petra show the Nabatæans to have been in possession of this place apparently as early as the sixth century, the beginnings of the immigration into the Negeb probably go back at least to the time when Achæmenian rule was established in Syria. Now, it is inconceivable that the Edomites, who had for many centuries been a settled people, with kings and walled cities and cultivated fields, and quite as much of a civilisation as their neighbours to the north and north-west, should have been satisfied with a return to the primitive conditions of their remote ancestors. They undoubtedly were anxious to occupy such cities as already existed, and to build for themselves new ones in which to continue their life in the accustomed manner. Their arrival forced the hitherto independent or semi-independent Jerahmeelites, Kenites,

Kenizzites, Calebites, and Korahites further north, and into so close a connection with Judah that they in course of time could be regarded as descendants of Hezron, Judah's son. This process of assimilation, no doubt, carried with it a modification of the type of Judæan life, as the native stock had been greatly reduced, and also an increase of information concerning traditions in the Arabian peninsula. Professor Cheyne has rightly, as it seems to me, divined an influence of this kind by Jerahmeel upon Judah in post-exilic times.

If the Edomites furnished in the Persian period the external impetus which seems to be the *conditio sine qua non* of civilisation in the Negeb, it was chiefly the Judæan kingdom that supplied it, so far as it was extant at all, in the period from David to the Babylonian exile. The relations to Egypt cannot at this time have been as close as they were later, in the Græco-Roman period, and had been earlier, in the days of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties. Sheshenk I., the founder of a new and more vigorous dynasty in Egypt, indeed invaded Syria in the tenth century, and Sharuhēn and Arad were among the cities taken. But it is not easy to determine whether the mention of these two places indicates that all the land to the south of them belonged to Egypt, or that no other towns in the Negeb were strong enough to offer resistance to a sudden raid. There is, so far as I can see, no satisfactory evidence that a part of the Negeb belonged to a kingdom of Muzri, having its centre east of the Aelanitic Gulf, in Petra, or on the Sinaitic peninsula. The inscription of Esarhaddon, which seemed to Professor Winckler to speak of two Muzris, is, as he subsequently recognised, more likely to refer to Muzri and Mi(luhha), which may very well, here as elsewhere, be Egypt and Ethiopia. While I still maintain the priority of the Minæan to the Sabæan kingdom in Arabia, the inscription Halévy 535 no longer seems to me as old as it did formerly. It probably belongs to the time when Cambyses invaded Egypt, and there were colonies of Minæans in the districts between the Nile and “the brook of Egypt,” Wadi el Arish.

The Mizrite kings, whose assistance seemed to some Judæans in the eighth and seventh centuries so desirable, and to others so utterly valueless, may have been petty princes in the Delta. But they may also have been local dynasts at Zar, El Arish, or Raphia. Tell el Rafa is one of the most impressive artificial mounds of Syria, to be compared only with those at Hamah, Sebastiyeh and El Sheria, or such excavated mounds as Tell el Mutesellim, Tell Taanak, Tell el Hesi, and Abu Shusheh. Going over it, I picked up pieces of pottery, not only from the Græco-Roman period, but of much earlier types. It should be excavated, though it is to be feared that practical difficulties may arise from the fact that part of it belongs to Egypt and part to Syria. The wadi near it is quite insignificant, and there is no rushing stream of waters in it. El Arish must always have been an important place. The broad and clearly marked river-bed of Wadi el Arish shows what a volume of water descends here during some seasons, and the *shadufs* on the shores tell the same story. Esarhaddon's scribe noted the fact that there was no water in the wadi when he was there. The same was the case when I visited the place. But the governor of El Arish told me that two years earlier there had been plenty of water in the river. Wadi el Arish is the one great waterway in this whole region; and El Arish is to-day, as it has been for thousands of years, the most important place between Egypt and Syria, only Raphia being at certain periods a formidable rival. One is impressed in travelling down the coast from Syria to Egypt with the broad belt of well-cultivated land that stretches out toward the foot of the mountains. In days when more strenuous efforts were made to check the inroads of the sand, this region must have been very attractive.

But even if the kings of Muzri or Mizrim are to be sought in the Nile valley or the districts adjoining it on the east, it does not follow that the people of the Negeb may not at this time have come into contact with tribes beyond Akabah.

There was evidently in the Assyrian period a movement among the peoples on the peninsula caused by the pressure of the developing Sabæan kingdom. The Nabatæans were pushed into the territory of Edom: the Minæans of the district around Medain Salih may have been forced north-west and drifted into the Negeb or Egyptian territory. At times, when there were independent kings of Edom seeking to maintain themselves against Judah, it is quite probable that they entrenched themselves in some of the southern cities of the Negeb.

But characteristic of the period was the determining influence of the Judæan kingdom. There were numerous cities as well as villages in the Negeb occupied by Judah. The list of these cities (Joshua xv.), which was edited by priests in the Persian period, may include names of towns that only temporarily were in the hands of Jewish clans, or that once had been possessed by some of the tribal elements that subsequently formed a part of Judah. But many of them, no doubt, belonged to the territory held by the Judæan kings. It is not easy to identify them. There are few “tells” in the Negeb. The most important artificial mounds south of the Judæan mountains are Tell el Sheria (Sharuhén), Tell el Arad (Arad), Tell el Rapha (Rapihu, Raphia), Bir el Seba (Beer-sheba), Halaza (Elusa), and Kurnub (Præsidium?). Another site where there is no mound, but which gives the impression of high antiquity, is Meshrifeh. It is situated on a lofty hill, has many caves, structures of stones cut in the fashion of those found in the excavations at Tell el Mutesellim (Megiddo) and Abu Shusheh (Gezer), at a depth pointing to this period, and has preserved through the ages, in the public square, right in front of the Christian Church, three huge stones circles with entrances and rudimentary altars. This, in all probability, is the ancient Zephath. The name appears to have been attached to the newer town on the plain, Sebaita; but the Byzantine buildings rest on the rock, and there is no “tell” of accumulated débris or other sign of a high age. Ruhaibeh, no doubt, goes back to an earlier Rehoboth, preceding the unknown

Greek name. But here, too, there can scarcely have been a city of very great size, of solid construction and marked antiquity, or there would have been more of an elevation above the surrounding plain. A number of the towns had names compounded with Hazar, *i.e.* enclosure, and it may be conjectured that they only differed from the open tent-villages by having enclosures of stones set on end, which afterwards may have been removed. South and east of the Judæan cities were those of the Jerahmeelites, the Kenites, and the Calebites, who seem to have led a semi-independent existence, without endangering Judah, except possibly at times when the Edomites were stronger in the Negeb than the Judæans.

David was the creator of the Judæan state. The beginning of his kingdom was the Negeb. Through him the worship of Yahwe became the officially recognised national cult of Israel as well as of Judah. It is largely the merit of Professors Winckler and Cheyne to have discerned this epoch-making character of his career. There was indeed a Negeb of Judah as well as steppe-lands belonging to the Cherethites, the Jerahmeelites, the Calebites, and the Kenites. But it was he who, occupying much of the territory of these tribes, merged it into a large kingdom of Judah, pushed its boundaries to the north, and gave it a capital, first at Hebron, and then in Jerusalem. There had been centres even in Israel for the Yahwe-cult, at Shiloh, Dan, and elsewhere. Yah is referred to in the Song of Deborah, and Samuel was his prophet at Ramah. But it was David who, as Yahwe's vicegerent in Zion, with the old palladium, the sacred chest, in his royal residence, gave to the Yahwe-cult the prestige of a national, not a merely tribal, character. His position as a Philistine vassal gave him early the adherence of the Cherethites, whose cities, therefore, became a part of the territory of Judah. His raids he did not make, as he assured Achish, against Jerahmeel and Cain, but against Amalek and Goshen, by which he secured the south-western border. He courted the favour of the Jerahmeelites and the Kenites, and by a shrewd

move became the "prince of Caleb" in Hebron. His reign falls in the end of the eleventh century.

About two centuries earlier the kingdom of Edom was established in the east, and the Philistine invasion was made from the west. The kings of Edom, whose names have been preserved in a precious document found in Gen. xxxvi., were: Bela, or Balaam, ben Beor, of Dinhaba, who was afterwards transformed into a prophet and transferred to far-off Pethor on the Euphrates; Jobab ben Zerah, of Bozra, probably the prototype of Job; Husham, or Cushan, possibly belonging to the Edomitish tribe Aram, native of Taiman, prince of Ittaim, who fought the Kenizzite clan of Othniel in the Negeb; Hadad ben Bedad, of Awit; Samlah, of Mashrekah; Saul, of Rehoboth on the river, probably a place in Wadi el Hesa, as the insignificant wadi at Ruhaibeh cannot have been called "the river" *par excellence*; and Hadad II., of Pau. Evidently some of these kings made raids into the Negeb. It is also probable that, in this period, Jerahmeel and Caleb established themselves, chiefly in the old homes of Simeon and Cain, where Levi may once have extended his influence. There can be no serious question as to the accuracy of the view taken by the author of 1 Sam. xxx. as to the substantial identity of the Cherethites and the Philistines. It is becoming increasingly certain that the Philistines who invaded Syria in the time of Ramessu IV. came originally from Crete. The Cretans (Cherethites) were either Philistines called by this name because of their origin, or a branch of the Philistine (Pulsta) people more closely related to the main stock, the Eteo-Cretans. There is no force in the arguments from topography against this identification. There are no obstacles in the way of an extension of Philistine power from Gaza to Halaza or the cities of the interior. The Jebel Hillal chain runs farther south. At the present time there is constant intercourse between Halaza and Gaza. The probable site of Ziklag is Asluj, a little to the east of Halaza.

The centuries that lie between the Amarna epoch (*ca.* 1400

B.C.) and the Philistine invasion (*ca.* 1200 B.C.) may, for our present purpose, be designated as the Mosaic period. Fourteen years ago I ventured to express my conviction that, though we possess no *dicta Mosis*, the *gesta Mosis*, his creation of Israel and his giving to this people a new divinity, could not be doubted ("Moses, his Age and his Work," in *Biblical World*, 1894). Study and reflection since that time have convinced me that this statement must be modified. Israel and Judah have a different origin, and neither of them was created by Moses. If the work of the Levitical priesthood in the name of Moses in one sense may be said to have created Israel as well as Judah, it is not in the sense I then had in mind. Investigations carried on by a number of scholars from entirely different points of view have led to the conclusion that Moses is not a historic personage, that this mythical figure had his original home in the land of Midian, and then in Kadesh Barnea, and that the connection with Egypt is of an entirely secondary character. This conclusion does not in the least depend upon the acceptance of the Muzri theory. Professor Eduard Meyer, who rejects this theory in every form, clearly recognises that the earliest tradition knows nothing about an Egyptian Moses, and he regards Moses as the mythical ancestor of the Levitical priesthood at Kadesh Barnea, and first representative there of the cult of Yahwe, the God of Sinai, a volcanic mountain in Southern Edom. Nothing can show more clearly than his recently published work, *Die Israeliten und ihre Nachbarstämme*, 1906, how inevitably modern historical research, when it seeks for the earliest history of the Hebrew tribes, must travel away from Egypt into North-West Arabia.

The repeated references to Sinai in connection with Mount Seir, or the land of Edom, the indications that the land of Midian was east of the Aelanitic Gulf, and the movements of Israel according to the earliest account, leave scarcely any room for doubt that the sacred mountain was situated in the southern part of Edom, or east of Akabah. Whether

Sinai and Horeb are the names of two mountains, or two names for the same peak, is of little importance. The question may also be left open, whether the accounts of the theophanies unmistakably prove that the mountain was a volcano. So strongly entrenched in Israel was apparently at one time this tradition of an eastern location of the holy mountain, that one cannot help wondering how it ever was transferred to the Sinaitic Peninsula. The sense of amazement grows as one realises the full significance of the fact that the earliest form of the story of Moses has nothing to do with Egypt. If the Muzri theory does not rest on sufficiently secure foundations, some other explanation must be found. The later direction of topographical tradition was, of course, occasioned by the Egyptian colouring subsequently given to the Moses story, and the Egyptian setting given to the deliverance wrought by Mosheh, the “deliverer.” But how did Moses ever get to Egypt? It is possible that the answer to this question may be found in connection with the origin of the Ephraimitish narratives, often referred to as the Elohistie documents.

Professor Felix Adler once called my attention to the remarkable similarity of the story of Aaron to that of Jeroboam. Both make golden calves; the sons of both have the same names, Nadab and Abihu. The figure of Aaron seems, indeed, to have been modelled, or remodelled, on that of Jeroboam. I prefer to say remodelled, because originally he appears to have been an Edomitish divinity, having his shrines on Mosera and Hor. Surveying a wide stretch of land in the eastern Negeb, in June 1905, from the top of Jebel Madherah, and the following month the mighty Alp-land of Edom from the tomb of Aaron on the top of Jebel Harun, I was impressed with the probability that both have been holy places since very early times, and that the life and death of Aaron were commemorated on Jebel Harun before Jebel Madherah was held in honour as the place where Aaron died. As an Edomitish god, Aaron was apparently coupled with his brother Moses, the “deliverer.” Now Jeroboam had been a sojourner

in Egypt, and an Egyptian sojourn may, therefore, also have been ascribed to that other maker of golden calves and father of Nadab and Abihu. Moses, the "deliverer," who had his shrines farther south, on Sinai and at Kadesh Barnea, then, naturally followed his older brother.

Under all circumstances, this new Egyptian setting must be due to a later and more intimate acquaintance with Egypt. Whenever a fresh and vital contact with Egypt would occur, there would be an enlargement of, or increased emphasis upon, the deliverance from this land of bondage. So in the last centuries of the monarchy, when at Samaria and in Jerusalem a party favourable to Egypt vied with one that preferred Assyrian or Babylonian suzerainty rather than an alliance with Egypt. So in the Greek period, when allegiance and sympathy were divided between the Egypt of the Ptolemies and the Syria of the Seleucidæ. From Kadesh Barnea, apparently, the traditions of the priestly Moses-clan found their way into various parts of the Negeb and beyond. At Shiloh, the Elidæ seem originally to have claimed Mosaic descent. At Dan, the Gershonidæ counted themselves as descendants of a grandson of Moses who came from the south. Nor is there any reason to doubt the account of the migration from the south, either of Micah's priest or of the tribe of Dan.

In the places later occupied by the Cherethites and the Jerahmeelites, the tribe of Simeon had its home. The priestly editor of Joshua, after the exile, is puzzled over the problem what to do with the cities that an old document assigned to Simeon, and a later one to Judah. Fortunately, he left it for us to decide by copying both. The decision cannot be doubtful. These cities manifestly passed from the hands of Simeon into those of Cherethites and Jerahmeelites, and from them to David's house. Perhaps the most important among them were Beersheba, Bethel (the modern Halaza), Zephath (Horma, the modern Meshrifeh), and Ziklag (Asluj). How early Simeon entered this part of the Negeb, is difficult to determine. Possibly a clue may be found in the religious

cult. Professor Stade long ago pointed out that Isaac, the “laughing” (or shall we say, the “benignantly smiling”?) El of Beersheba, is a Simeonite figure. If the Bethel with which Jacob, the “swift,” “heel-lifting” El, is connected should prove to be this southern Bethuel (called in one place sarcastically Kesil, the “fool”), then the occurrence of the name Yakubir, or Jacob El, apparently in this region at the time of Thotmes III. (1503–1449) may be an indication that Simeon was already settled here before the Amarna letters inform us of the aggressive movement of the Habiri, or Hebrews, against the district around Jerusalem. Professor W. Max Müller is inclined to place as many of the names as possible in Galilee and Samaria (*Die Palästinaliste Thutmosis III.*, 1907); but the names surrounding 102 Yakubara certainly point to southern Judah, such as 98 Tepunu (Daibon, Josh. xv. 22, Neh. xi. 25, El Dhaib, near Halaza), 103 Kaputa (Gabatha in Daroma, twelve Roman miles from Eleutheropoli-Bet Jibrin), 104 Kaziru (Gezer, Abu Shusheh), and 97 Batiya may be the southern Bethuel. The Calebite divinity Abram, the Dhu ’l Sharra, or Lord of Sarah, at Hebron, probably also goes back to the same high age.

When the Hyksos were driven out of Egypt (*ca.* 1580), they fell back upon Sharuhén, where they were long besieged. Professor Breasted is probably right in his view that the Hyksos, throughout their rule in Egypt, had control of a part of Syria, and that Sharuhén was one of their great centres. All the more significant is the occurrence among the Hyksos kings of the name Jacob-her. Already in the twelfth dynasty, towards the end of the third millennium B.C., Egyptian influence was strong in Syria, as scarabs found by Mr Macalister at Abu Shusheh, and others found by Dr Shumacher at Tell el Mutesellim, prove. At this time, Sinuhe made his long visit to Syria. He first dwelt among the Haru, or Horites, and then went further north and north-west to the king of the Lotanu, evidently a people of a higher civilisation. There are no caves along the Mediterranean littoral, between

Egypt and Syria; it is in the southern Negeb, or in Mount Seir, that we must look for these Horites. There can be little doubt that the name Lotanu is connected with Lot. Both the Haru and the Lotanu were apparently Semitic peoples. Beyond this period we cannot go.

From a religious point of view, the historic significance of the Negeb can be summed up in the following statements. It was the land where the patriarchal figures, Abram, Isaac, Jacob, Lot and Ishmael, Sarah, Rebekah, and others developed, by a rationalising process, from local divinities to human heroes, types, and ideals. It was the home of Mosaism, where an influential priesthood learned to use the *torah*, to give oracles in the name of the mythical ancestor, and whence, therefore, the impulses came which in course of time produced the Ephraimitish Code, Deuteronomy, the priestly laws of the Persian period, the Mishnah, and the Talmuds. It was the cradle, if not the birth-place, of Yahwism, where the faith was first nursed which issued in the religion of the prophets, Christianity, and Islam. It was there that David fashioned a kingdom which became the national representative of the Yahwe-cult, and the incentive to the framing of ever higher apocalyptic ideals of the kingdom of righteousness and peace. It was there that Caleb, and Cain, and Jerahmeel, Jew, Edomite, and Nabatæan fused and blended the contents of their religious consciousness into an influence that was felt from Beersheba to Dan. It was there that the Hellenic civilisations of Petra and of Gaza, of Egypt and of Palestine, met and grew until they could carry some of the noblest fruits of Christianity along the old caravan roads to Sheba and Dedan, to the greatest shrine of Arabia, and produce a ferment that dissolved the ancient polytheism of the peninsula, and developed a simpler monotheism than that of Christianity itself, and an agency for the uplift of many races.

NATHANIEL SCHMIDT.

RELIGION A NECESSARY CONSTITUENT IN ALL EDUCATION.

PROFESSOR J. H. MUIRHEAD.

IN spite of all that has been said and written of modern education, an essential fact has hitherto, so far as I know, escaped general recognition. The present situation is in one fundamental respect entirely unprecedented. In all the great ages of the world, and in all the great countries, education has been inspired with one central idea and pervaded with one central emotion, whether that of citizenship, as among the Greeks, or divine choice and guidance, as among the Jews, or racial solidarity as among the Japanese. We in Western Europe and America have inherited the medieval tradition of education as moulded and directed by the conception of the necessity to fit the child for membership in the Christian Church. But for the last century and a half at least this tradition has been breaking down, and experiments have been made more or less consciously in forms of education which, if not in name, yet to all intents and purposes are secular in the sense of being not only unrelated to the Christian ideal, but unrelated to any dominating spiritual purpose whatsoever. What blinds us to this deficiency is that, while the spirit and purpose have in great degree vanished, the body remains. The character of the linguistic teaching in secondary schools illustrates what I mean. That the literature of Greece and Rome is a treasure-house of man's noblest aspirations no one familiar with the classics can deny; but it is no betrayal of the

just claims of humane learning to admit that the monopoly of the best talent of our public schools that grammatical study still enjoys is a survival from a time when these languages were the key to the literature and tradition of the Christian Church and Roman law.

We are thus face to face with a situation of sufficient seriousness. The old ideal no longer suffices for new needs, and yet nothing has hitherto been found to take its place as a principle of unity and source of inspiration. It is the sense of this supreme want that underlies the educational unrest of the present time and explains, if it does not justify, the almost feverish zeal of those who seek in the name of the Church to re-establish control over the spirit and atmosphere of the school. What makes it impossible to admit this claim, in spite of the ability and manifest sincerity with which it is advocated, is the fact that our conception of the universe and man's relation to it has deepened and widened so that it no longer finds adequate expression in the forms to which the Church would confine us. If the situation is to be saved, it must be met in its entirety. The anomaly and the impossibility either of building up a true system of education out of the wood, hay, and stubble of current secular ideas, or of returning to an outworn theological framework, must be recognised, and the task faced by the leaders of educational progress of re-introducing into school training, under modern conditions and in harmony with modern intellectual and moral requirements, that unity of spiritual purpose which it has lost.

The following article seeks to indicate in the first place the conception or group of conceptions from which guidance must be sought in such an attempt; secondly, how in the light of them the problem of education comes to be defined; and finally, what means lie to the teacher's hand of making them effective as a principle of unity in his work.

I.

To the above claim for a new synthesis in education it might be retorted that this is precisely what the leaders of science have been attempting for the last quarter of a century, and that in nothing is the bankruptcy of modern thought more obvious than in the failure of the evolutionist idea of education as expounded, *e.g.*, by Spencer and Huxley, to inspire any real enthusiasm or win any wide acceptance as a basis of reconstruction. But the failure of the attempt to substitute the conception of adaptation to the environment for the older theological conception of the end of education does not touch the present contention. It merely proves the inadequacy of that idea for the end in view. It is not to any theory of natural origins or of the subjection of man to nature, but to quite another order of ideas, that we must look for the principle of the new synthesis. To take the current naturalistic rendering of evolutionist theory as representative of the best contemporary thought and to allow our outlook to be limited by it, is to ignore the real tendency and the real achievement of the present time. While the attention of its friends and enemies alike has been concentrated on the naturalistic conception of life, silently, like the dawn, has been stealing over men's minds quite a different ideal. There has in latter days been growing up, under influences it is unnecessary here to specify, a recognition of the solidarity of human society, witnessed to in every department of corporate life, and with it, differentiating the present generation from any other in which the feeling of a common citizenship has been prominent, a deepening sense of the ultimate kinship between the human mind and the world it inhabits which forbids any hard and fast separation between nature and society, or between either and the indwelling principle of their common life. Though without logical basis in the experiential philosophy that has been popular in England since the time of Bacon, these ideas have found justification in the deeper analysis of experience inaugurated

by Kant.¹ This is not the place for a restatement of the idealistic argument. I confine myself to the opener witness of the sciences to which education has learned to appeal for the elucidation of its aims and methods.

If we approach the subject from the side of early human consciousness and inquire what place in it we must assign to religion, modern anthropology leaves us in no doubt. Religion is an entirely natural product of the human soul in its intercourse with the material world and with other souls. To suppose it, as was common in the eighteenth century, to be the invention of priests and soothsayers, or in any way an artificial product of civilisation, is to invert the order of fact. Priest and prophet, the whole organisation of the Church, and even civilisation itself, have themselves been motivated and moulded by the religious consciousness. Religion as a primary fact owes nothing to them.

With the teaching of anthropology that of modern psychology abundantly corresponds. It is of course impossible to isolate the natural utterances of children's feelings from the ideas suggested by the advanced social consciousness into which they are born, but one only needs to cast an eye over any of the many paidological studies of the questions and elementary notions of children as to the origin and nature of the world, to realise how naturally interest in the great problems of creation and preservation, of the existence of evil and the being of eternity spring up in the mind of the child, and how certain it is that here also it is the heart that makes the theologian, and not the theologian the heart.

It is of course possible to admit the testimony of comparative religion as to the naturalness and universality of religious consciousness and yet to regard it as an abnormal and on the whole morbid product—the source of Aberglaube, rather than of valid and essential beliefs. But this might, without much difficulty, be shown to be the result of fixing

¹ See T. H. Green's essay on *Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life*, Works, iii. p. 92.

attention on the excrescences of particular creeds instead of upon the essence of all creeds, and of ignoring the essential continuity of religion with other ways of apprehending the world of finite experience. On these points recent philosophy of religion speaks as unambiguously as does its history. With singular unanimity philosophers have fixed, not on isolated beliefs, but on the underlying faith in the reality and beneficent guidance of our highest ideals as the essence of all religion. Two quotations may suffice. "The religion of a time," writes Professor Wallace,¹ "is not its nominal creed, but its dominant sense of the meaning of reality—the principle which animates all its being and all its striving, the faith it has in the laws of nature and the purposes of life." "Religion springs," says Professor Höffding in his recent book on the *Philosophy of Religion*,² "from the need to hold fast to the conservation of the highest values beyond the limits which experience exhibits and in spite of all the transformations which experience reveals." If this be so—if religion stands for faith in the permanent reality and value of the things which the soul creates or reproduces in its upward striving in science and art, morals and politics—it seems to follow that in its essence it is no mere excrescence, no mere scaffolding thrown out for the temporary support of something more solid than itself, which will by-and-by take its place. On the contrary, it must be strictly continuous with the partial and less emotionally sustained beliefs in the value of knowledge, beauty, and social well-being on which these other structures themselves depend.

The further development of this thought is here out of place. I pass to a second point of even more direct educational interest, on which there also may be said to be general agreement among students of religion. I mean the different stages or levels through which religious consciousness tends to pass as it is strained to purity by the reflection of the race. The transition from fetishism to polytheism, from polytheism to monothe-

¹ Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind*, p. xxxvii.

² P. 216.

ism, and finally from the conception of a God who dwells apart to One who reveals himself in the world—or, to put it in terms suggested by recent controversies, from the idea of God as a “familiar” spirit to that of God as a transcendent reality and thence to God as an immanent principle—has long been a commonplace of the historian of religion. What we owe to more recent study, guided by philosophical interest, is the emphasis on the inner side of these transitions, more particularly on the transition from nature religion to ethical, and again from ethical to what, for want of a better name, we may call spiritual. The first is in general the passage from such a conception as that represented by Greek religion to that of the Hebrews, but the movement is clearly discernible within the history of each of them. The most striking example of this is in the Hebrew prophets themselves, whose writings are a call to turn from nature worship, to cast away its symbols and ceremonies and cleave to the God of judgment and righteousness, whose sacrifice is a broken and contrite heart. From this point of view we are asked to conceive of the second stage as a gradual deepening of man’s sense of the relation in which he stands to the realities amid which he is placed, as the birth of a new world in the soul, bringing with it a readjustment of all its values. In the distinction between the natural and the moral, man becomes conscious of what he is in contrast to the natural things about him. He comes to a knowledge of himself as born not of the flesh but of the spirit. Finally, this stage is superseded by a higher still when God is conceived of not merely as different from his creatures, but as the working spirit in them. If we were to isolate the element here added we might describe it as the Eastern, the mystic, or the pantheistic. But this would be misleading. We shall obtain a better idea of it for our present purpose if we think of the higher as standing to the lower as the God of the New Testament stands to the God of the Old, as the God we have in the poems of Wordsworth, of Tennyson, and of Browning stands to the God of William Cowper or of John Wesley.

Turning again from this to the psychology of the individual, we find, of course, no literal reproduction of these phases. Yet the more closely we study the phenomena of religious development the more we are struck with certain fundamental analogies. More particularly in recent adolescent psychology attention has been turned to the central point in this progress, the birth of the ethical ideal, and with it of the soul in the growing child. This has long been familiar in religious biography under the term of "conversion," but it is only recently that it has been made the subject of informed and sympathetic study. The general result may again be said to have been to bring home to us in the first place how entirely natural and indeed in a sense universal the change is, whether it take the more orthodox or less covenanted forms, and in the second place (contrary to the ordinary view which makes it an end), how secondary and altogether transitional it is as a stage of religious development. True, it represents an awakening—the great awakening—but what it is an awakening to is still far from manifest to the soul itself, and cannot be other than a matter of life-long experience. Rightly regarded, conversion is merely a stage in the soul's progress to a deeper form of religious life. It is the point at which it first dawns upon it that life has significance—if it be preferred, is a gift from above. But what that significance is in all its fulness and power, still awaits revelation.¹

While it may be said that it is this revelation which is the real goal of religious education in the individual as in the race, it need hardly be added that it remains remote from anything we are likely to meet with in schoolboys or school-girls. Yet there is a danger of underestimating the extent to which in particular often little understood cases there may

¹ It is this partialness of the insight that arrives with conversion that chiefly explains the "backslidings," variously estimated as 77 per cent. and 99 per cent., from grace. Most of these would probably be found on examination not to be backslidings at all but forward movements of the soul towards fuller light and a securer hold upon its world.

be anticipations of it even in quite young children. It is just these foretastes, or, as Wordsworth would have it, after-tastes, that give a certain completeness to some children's experience which is not confined to the lives of the mystics.¹

II.

If this general account of the nature and course of religious development be true, certain educational consequences at once follow to which I desire to call particular attention.

1. If religion means the sense of eternity in connection with our higher experiences—our ideals, we might say, substantiated and endowed with stability, *sub specie unitatis*—the nature of the education which can best succeed in developing it, in “bringing the eternal into the form of a child's daily life, and into the form of a child's daily thought,” must always be the central problem of all pedagogy. At the present time circumstances have raised it into prominence. Western nations have made themselves responsible as never before for the moral well-being of the vast majority of the coming generation. This at a time when the circumstances of modern industry in general and of city life in particular—the hurry and excitement they bring with them, the decay of the family and of other “pieties of old religion” they involve, are in the last degree hostile to the religious spirit. A clever writer² has recently pointed out in this connection how even the language and the once familiar peace-giving metaphors of

¹ Compare the verses happily quoted from Vaughan in *The Child and Religion*, p. 207—

“Happy those early days when I shined in my angel-infancy,
When yet I had not walked above a mile or two from my first love
And looking back—at that short space—could see a glimpse of his bright
face.

When in some gilded cloud or flower my gazing soul would dwell an hour
And in these weaker glories spy some shadows of eternity”—

with the chapter on “Boyhood” in the recently published *Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn*.

² C. F. G. Masterman, *ibid.*, p. 98.

religious literature are rapidly ceasing to have any meaning for the city child, and how entirely blind the next generation of city children is likely to have become to a whole world of soothing and refining imagery on which our own religious life has been fed.

It would indeed be a paradox if just at the time when educationists are beginning to realise how crying the need for devising effective means to counteract these influences and give this touch of higher feeling to national education, political and denominational differences should render united effort to meet it a remote ideal.

2. Coming to the particular aim of religious education in young people, few, I suppose, would be prepared to define it as conversion or "early piety" in the old sense of the word. The defect of the old view was not that it aimed at a change in the soul, nor even that it sought it through a supernatural supervening grace. It was that in the first place it treated human nature as essentially corrupt, and that, in the second place, it took as the proper aim of religious education the precocious development in the child of the religious experience of the adult, reversing, as has been well said, the New Testament principle, "Unless ye become as little children, ye shall by no means enter the kingdom of heaven." Yet the whole burden of the new psychology is to remind us that with all its errors the old emphasis on conversion concealed a vital truth. There are no breaks in the child's religious development any more than in that of the race. But there is real change, and this is vital to remember. I have already referred to it as the birth of the soul, insisting that it is as entirely normal as it is crucial in growing spiritual life. This is no discovery of modern pietism. All the great educationalists may be said to have recognised it. To Plato there seemed no better description of education as a whole than the turning of the eyes from the shadows of the cave to their meaning in the world of realities. To Aristotle it was a case of evolution from the life of mere natural and habitual virtue into the life of insight

founded on self-knowledge and devotion to things of real worth, first in the life of ordinary good citizenship, thereafter in the ideal fellowship with the divine in which we put off our mortality.¹ We have thus a central point from which to regard religious development. The aim of the teacher who realises the dignity of his mission must be first to do what he can to lead up to this change by gradual stages, and secondly, to secure that when it takes place it shall be accompanied with the least internal disturbance, the least conflict between the habits and ideals that have controlled the past and the new ideals that now open to view. Some shock is inevitable in the discovery that much of the early language of religion was metaphorical. The teacher has to see that the shock is not an upheaval. That this is a task requiring insight and tact need hardly be said. Success will depend on his keeping before his mind from the first as the aim of education in general the harmonious development of the different elements in human nature, not forgetting the æsthetic and the religious (which itself supplies the principle of the harmony), and secondly, in his resolutely refusing the temptation to secure cheap moral results by appeal to the ordinary theological sanctions.

III.

But the more we dwell upon these aims of religious education, the more pressing becomes the practical question of the means the teacher has at his disposal to attain them. It would be mere quackery to pretend to deduce from theoretical premises such as the above conclusions which can be of much value in actual school management. Yet one or two points emerge from our previous discussion which have undoubted bearing upon educational practice.

It follows from our general definition of religion as the feeling of the reality and permanence of all we most value, that religious education cannot rightly be conceived of as something

¹ *Ethics*, x.

separate from other education. Before there can be a feeling of the "permanence of values" there must be a feeling of the values themselves, and we are thus brought by another path to the conclusion that modern pedagogy presses upon us on other grounds as to the object of all true education. The object is defined in different ways as the formation of tastes, the creation of interests, the development of the sentiments, or, more technically, of selective apperceptive groups. But one thought underlies all these definitions of the end of education, viz. that education is not primarily information, nor even development of powers and dexterities, but the training of feeling, the feeling for nature and for knowledge, for beauty and for art, for types of moral goodness, for law and order in individual and social life. Without this, the soul comes stillborn from the school: whatever may be the development of power and dexterity, there is no will to use them in an ennobling way. With it, whatever be its deficiencies, the soul possesses the seeds of a truly human life, and withal of a true religion. It is therefore to the teaching of ordinary subjects in such a way that they may deepen and ennoble feeling that attention must first be turned by those who are interested in a true religious education.

Of these subjects, by common consent, history and literature offer the best opportunities. There is, indeed, a sense in which it might be said that these are themselves religious subjects. It is difficult to conceive what of the great historical movements would be left if we took away what has been inspired by religious motives and religious ideals. We read of holy wars. In the end, all great wars have been holy wars in the sense that the issues concerned what men have most valued, the faiths they have held in the purposes of life. Recently reading some of Father Benson's historical novels, I have been struck with the opportunity that is opened to the teacher of the times he deals with for the sympathetic treatment of great religious ideals such as those for which Catholic and Protestant, Church and Dissent,

respectively have stood, and the place of each in a larger conception of the meaning of life.

And this suggests the place of poetry and romance as an even readier means of bringing home the underlying causes or over-ruling Providences that work in the affairs of men. Poetry, Aristotle said, is more philosophical than history. The reason is that it leaves the writer free to select what is essential to bring out the working of character and destiny, of law and purpose, in events. Hence the intimate connection which the Greeks discerned between the drama and religious worship. We are just beginning to re-discover this, and to have an inkling of what might be made of it,—witness our school revivals of the Greek drama and the reverent reproduction of the Sacred and Miracle Play. When the power of the drama is fully realised we shall have recovered one of the noblest means of religious development.

But few that believe in religious education are likely to be satisfied with the thoughtful use of the ordinary subjects as their instrument. And Aristotle's principle again suggests the reason. Religious instruction in the special sense enables us to select the precise material we want and obtain the nourishment we seek in its most condensed form. But with this admission our main difficulty emerges. Educated Christendom as well as Judaism seem agreed that nothing else will serve than the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, with or without the Church's interpretation of them. But how, under modern conditions, to make full use of them for this purpose? On the one hand there are those who feel an insuperable difficulty in using them at all, either as reliable historical accounts, or as a true reflection of their own deepest thoughts on man's relation to the unseen. On the other hand, there are those who can only see in them the basis of a sectional creed which they are forbidden to teach. The one are like those who cannot see the trees for the wood, the other like those who cannot see the wood for the trees. The one cannot see the ocean in the pool among

the rocks, the other takes the pool for the great wide ocean that has left it there.

From these difficulties I confess I see no immediate prospect of escape. The beginnings of a new state of matters will come, I believe, with the diffusion among teachers of a deeper understanding of the meaning of religion and the course of religious development. This seems to me one of the most crying needs of the present time; to meet it must be one of the chief aims of the Universities in the future. To them has passed from the churches the task of inspiring the future generation with the conceptions of the meaning of life, which will, in turn, be carried by it, through the press, the teaching in the schools, the pulpit, and general social intercourse and discussion, into the working ideals of the nation. Whether the Universities will rise to this conception of their mission remains to be seen. What seems certain is that the spiritual well-being of nations will depend in the coming century on the extent to which they realise it.¹

¹ While I am writing, confirmation of the view here advocated comes from a correspondent to whom, along with some hundred other experienced teachers, I had addressed the questions recently drawn up by Professor Sadler in his *Inquiry as to Methods of Moral Instruction in Schools*. I am permitted to quote the passage at length:—"I believe that the whole business depends on the character of the teacher, and that moral lessons can be excellent in the hands of a spiritually-minded teacher. At the same time, I do not think that our present educational system aims at making people perceptive of spiritual things, nor that teachers are, as a class, more sensitive to such than other people—perhaps they are less. I do feel as if the University or the Training College were the right place to try to get some notion of the spiritual side of things into people—but here, again, it entirely depends on the staff. As a matter of fact, light on the world of things comes mostly through some book or poem, or some personal influence. The whole world is different after knowing some particular person, or reading some book, or coming into contact with the ideas of some group of people. I think the citizen ideal should be brought before everyone, but I feel myself (perhaps more and more keenly) that the average person goes through the form of citizen duty (school manager, guardian, settlement worker, or the like) with heavy feet and dull mind. He is apt to be satisfied with the doing, and not to trouble much about the intelligence he brings to it. In direct political and religious talk to children, there is always the difficulty of the enormously varying ideals of society which the average middle-class home reflects. I believe that the teacher who has spiritual insight can sur-

Meantime, what are the chief planks in the present framework of our educational system by which we can hold?

(1) For those who feel themselves free to use it, the Bible remains as the one clear record of the development of the "Soul of a People" from naïve nature worship to the worship of the God of all the earth and all the heavens. Like no other history, it is written from beginning to end (and herein lies the inspiration of its books) by men possessed with overmastering religious emotion penetrated throughout with the idea of a spiritual purpose in national and human affairs.

It is for this reason that I am inclined to think that we are not at the end, but only at the beginning, of the usefulness of the Bible in the school. So far from decreasing its value (as is held by some), the new historical criticism will make the full use of it for the first time possible.

(2) Religious education cannot afford to dispense with any of the ordained means whereby the sense of spiritual fellowship on which in the last resort religion depends is deepened and fixed as an element in character. Of these the family and the Church are by far the most powerful. Religion begins in the family; it is continued in the Church. The work of the school teacher, to be fully successful, must be a co-operation and a preparation. The first is too obvious to need comment, the second is a more difficult matter. We are committed in modern pedagogy to the recognition of the importance of corporate life and the necessity of connecting the work of the school in general with the larger life of the community. This principle has a particular bearing on morals and religion. "The strategic position in the campaign of moral and religious education," says Dr Coe, "is the element of fellowship." Such fellowship in its fully organised form is found only in the Church, in which I

mount all these difficulties, but it needs pretty deep apprehension of spiritual truths. When once one gets hold of a great idea, any work gets illuminated thereby, but I do feel that neither art nor music nor morals nor the Bible nor any study in itself *gives* a constructive idea to a boy or girl. I tend more and more to feel that that comes from human personality, whether expressed in a book or a living being."

include each and every religious or ethical organisation from the stately Church of Rome to the humblest dissenting conventicle. It is the Church that is the interpreter of religious symbols and the director of religious emotion. The Church connects the present with the past, making us partakers in a larger life. It holds up the permanent, and reconciles to change and loss. It directs and organises effort, and thus keeps feeling fresh and vigorous. All organisations do this in connection with their particular objects, but the Church, as we have seen, stands for the unity of all worthy objects, and therefore adds an element which all the others lack when taken separately.¹

It is this dependence of religious consciousness for complete development on a common life, rather than any abstract right of parents over the religion of their children, that seems to me the real ground of the contention of the denominationists in the present controversy. I have no sympathy (I do not think that either theory or practice justifies any sympathy) with the contention that the State ought to have nothing to do with the religious education of children. If what I have already said is true, in pledging itself to education of any kind the State has pledged itself to religious education. Nor is there any argument that can be urged in behalf of any form of education which may not be urged equally in behalf of religious education. So far, I feel bound to differ from the claim that it shall be left to the denominations. On the other hand, we seem to be equally pledged to the view that the child shall be treated as a potential member of a religious community, and have its mind directed to the significance of such a membership. If to the reader these seem contradictory requirements, I admit the appearance, but I maintain also that the contradiction is only apparent. The analogy of the secondary schools seems to show that the difficulty of combining undenominationalism with respect for the "religion of the parent" is enormously exaggerated, and that in practice

¹ Cp. Professor MacCunn's eloquent statement of the function of the modern Church in his admirable book on the *Making of Character*.

it sinks into a negligible or at least a manageable quantity. The very fact that the children are regarded in the way I suggest would seem to bring its own safeguard with it. If all are regarded as members of different churches, the teacher will be careful how he deals with the differences of any. What the parent has a right to require is that no obstacle shall be placed in his children's way to their seeing the light as he sees it, and being received into the fold in which he himself has found peace. Strange indeed must be the view of what constitutes the heart of religion, as of what constitutes the heart of the child cherished by those who maintain that the elements of corporate religion as they may be permitted to exist in even the most undenominational of schools—the common meeting, the common hymn, the common gospel, the common prayer or aspiration—are influences hostile to membership in any particular church.

Though this article has dealt primarily with the wider aspect of religious education, it has not been written without a view to the present religious crisis in England. Whether anything like the principles it advocates will find formal recognition in the new proposals to which the present Government is pledged with regard to religious education, remains to be seen. What all who are interested in true education have a right to demand is that their adoption in the actual working of the schools shall not be rendered more difficult than it at present is by the acceptance, under political pressure, of any rigid system of enforced or prohibitive secularism.

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THE SOURCES OF THE MYSTICAL REVELATION.

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THE present revival of mysticism springs, no doubt, from needs of the human spirit that are as old as religion. But its apologetic is largely new. It is also daring, for it aims at nothing less than the incorporation of psychological supernaturalism within modern science. Of course the terminology of supernaturalism drops away, and the mystic is forward to say that his experiences fall under universal laws of mind. Nevertheless, when we reach the end of the new and supposedly scientific argument, we find that we have somehow moved from the plane of empirical observation to that of a transcendental ontology. If a physicist should assert that scientific observation reveals the ontological reality of matter, we should suspect that he had somehow mixed metaphysical speculation with his empirical generalisations. The same suspicion attaches to the supposed scientific evidence for the validity of mysticism. To many minds this one consideration is sufficient to settle the matter. But, inasmuch as the new mystical apologetic has secured lodgment among professional psychologists, it will be worth while to inquire in some detail where and how in the mystical experience the ontological certainties of mysticism arise. As a contribution toward this inquiry, I shall analyse two types of argument, the first based upon experiences of the ecstatic type, the

second upon the widespread feeling of the reality of spiritual things.

I. The datum of the first argument is the generic similarity in the content of mystical experiences. From the trance practices of all religions, from the psychical effects of certain drugs, particularly anæsthetics, and from the recurrent spontaneous obsession called "cosmic consciousness," to which some persons are subject, there comes a common report. It is that the limits of the individual self are transcended through some kind of mingling in, or other immediate realisation of, a larger world of the spiritual order; that this larger reality is good, and that in it the contradictions and the mystery of existence are solved.

Alongside this common report we find, of course, other asserted intuitions which vary with the mystic's training and view-point. One devotee experiences union with a personal God, or with Jesus; another sinks into an impersonal deity, into nature, or into the void of mere being; one beholds definite objects and hears specific words; another reports that he has advanced beyond all definiteness into the completely ineffable. Thus each brings back confirmation of his own creed. These special features are accounted for, of course, by auto-suggestion; the entranced person merely interprets his strange experience in the thought-terms with which he is familiar. But it is said that the common content of this world-wide experience requires a different explanation. Here, it is argued, are the marks of valid perception, namely, immediacy, certainty, and the universal agreement of experts.

The formulation of this argument comes from Professor James, who has been followed by various writers. Lest I overstate James's position, however, let it be said that various lines of argumentation cross and recross in his fascinating *Varieties of Religious Experience*. He certainly intends to give standing to mystical practices because of their practical results, and at times he also claims for them the kind of immediate authority that they assert for themselves. Mystical

states, he says, have noëtic quality (p. 380); consciousness of illumination is their essential mark (p. 408, note 2); they not only do convince the mystic, but they also have a right to do so (p. 422); for "they are absolutely sensational in their epistemological quality" (p. 424); they are "definite perceptions of fact" (p. 454); he cannot help ascribing some metaphysical significance to his own anæsthetic revelation of the reconciliation of opposites (p. 388). On the other hand, he admits that, since the mystical illumination is incommunicable, it is not authoritative for anyone but the mystic himself (p. 422), and even that the mystical feeling has no specific intellectual content of its own (p. 425).

Without attempting to unify these statements, let us examine the argument for mysticism upon which James has seemed, at least, to bestow the authority of a great name in scientific psychology. It is admitted that the sectarian or philosophical peculiarities of each class of mystics can be traced to a source other than the mystical experience itself. Thus the universal factor of the revelation is "capable," James remarks, "of forming matrimonial alliances with material furnished by the most diverse philosophies and theologies" (p. 425). Is the figure of matrimony really applicable to the facts? Between the universal and the sectarian factors in the mystical revelation, is there any such difference in nature and origin? May not the two be continuous, so that, just as the sectarian factor is accounted for by particular conditions without reference to ontology, so the universal factor is explained by general conditions? I shall endeavour to show that this is the case.

(1) The universal elements in the mystical revelation are generalised from selected cases, and in fact from cases so selected as to secure approximately uniform subjective conditions and modes of mental operation. The selection is, of course, unintentional, but it is actual. How unintentional selection occurs can easily be illustrated. If we put into a class by themselves all the persons whom we can find who

have witnessed an earthquake, and then ask them their opinion of free trade and protection, we shall probably not select them in any such way as to affect the average of the views that they render. But if we ask the same question of a group composed of men who have read Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, we shall probably "load the dice," since the mental habits of philosophers, as well as the substance of their theories, is likely to incline them to a particular side of the question. Now, when we heap up the testimonies of mystics, we similarly gather together a class of mental tendencies that we are not looking for, and specifically tendencies that affect the thing that we are looking for. The difficulty is the same as one that attends the question-circular method of securing information concerning private religious experiences. In both cases, the persons who are most ready to give a full account of their inner life constitute a homogeneous temperamental group; or, rather, they represent only the extreme wing of such a group. For the same quality that determines free communicativeness determines also a certain type of religious experience. The extreme cases of this type are reported with especial fulness; but the reports of other cases, even within the same type, are relatively meagre. Thus arises a misleading appearance of a break between certain religious experiences and the more ordinary life of religious men. Thus arises also a degree of uniformity in the returns that would disappear if the data were gathered with equal fulness from a wider range.

(2) Nor is this all. One of the particular qualities unintentionally selected in collections of mystical experiences is of a kind to determine directly the degree of certainty with which one asserts one's religious beliefs. No psychologist will question that mystics, as a class, are highly suggestible, or that their suggestibility leads them to regard as actual experiences that which analysis shows to be only interpretations of experience. In this way anything can become a "direct perception of fact." Some Christians, for example, say that they have experienced the atonement; others, that

they have consciously realised the presence of a personal devil; still others, that they have recognised as an actual presence each of the three persons of the Trinity. The source of the supposed revelation is not different from the source of the dogma. There is entire continuity; we have dogma asserting itself at one end of the scale as belief, at the other end as intuition. The reason why we do not readily perceive that this is the fact is that our method of selecting mystical confessions has caused a break to appear where none really exists.

We need only one more factor in order to account completely for the general agreements of mystics as to the content of their revelation. No one will question that there is practically universal human aspiration after the good and after a systematising or unification of our scattered and discordant lives. We have just seen that mystical confessions proceed, in general, from a homogeneous group of minds whose suggestibility is sufficient to give to ideas the force of present experience or intuition. If, now, the formal conditions of trance and trance-like practices provide sensations or other mental modifications that easily suggest the goal of religious aspiration, the suggestible mind of the mystic will do the rest—the goal will be asserted as a present intuition.

(3) Such formal conditions do exist. Before naming them, let us catalogue the more common elements of the mystical experience. They are these:—Loss, in greater or less degree, of the sense of personality; an impression of being “out of the body” and in a spiritual world; a sense of identification more or less complete with the object of one’s thought or perception; an agreeable feeling-tone, which may have any degree of intensity, from mere general ease to ecstatic joy. All this is expressed as the realisation of a blessed life through union with ultimate spiritual being, a union in which the bonds of body and of individuality are loosed.

A recent writer has shown that such apparent loss of personality merely exhibits in extreme form a sort of abstrac-

tion or self-forgetfulness that is entirely commonplace. The psychological condition of the sense of personality is the act of mentally relating the self and its objects, and this mental act has for its physiological background some muscular contraction. Relax the contracted muscle, cease to think the relation, and the sense of personality in some measure disappears.¹ I shall now offer evidence to show that not only the loss of the sense of self, but also the entire series of characteristic mystical intuitions, can be traced to similar formal conditions of the mystic's mind and body.

The typical mystical process, which culminates in trance, is, formally considered, nothing else than partial or complete self-hypnosis. This is the mechanism of the process, whatever be the mental content, and whether or not this content expresses ontological truth. Therefore the most direct method of examining the formal conditions that now interest us is to make the experiment of self-hypnosis.² The following is an account of such an experiment. It was undertaken, not from any religious motive, not in the interest of the psychology of religion, but solely for the purpose of seeing hypnosis from the inside.

The subject placed himself in a comfortable position upon a couch and fixed his eyes and attention upon a moderately bright object elevated somewhat above the ordinary plane of vision. After some little time there developed a profoundly new state which can properly be called a mild trance. Its main marks are three:—First, the bodily sensations were modified. A sense of strangeness came on, and it increased until the mind seemed to be freed from the body. The body seemed to be *there* rather than *here*—alive, yet not “mine” in the old intimate way. Here is the precise phenomenon upon

¹ Ethel Dench Puffer, “The Loss of Personality,” *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. lxxxv. pp. 195 ff.

² There is nothing *per se* injurious in hypnosis. Nevertheless, the dangers that accompany ignorant or careless experimentation in this field are so many and so serious as to render decidedly unwise all efforts at hypnosis except under strict scientific control.

which theosophists of the type of Mrs Besant lay so much stress. They interpret it as an actually experienced separation of soul from body. Similarly, Paul was on a certain occasion uncertain whether he was in the body or out of it. The explanation lies in the persistent narrowing or retraction of attention, and the phenomenon is strictly parallel to the psychical anæsthesias, blindnesses, etc., of hysteria, which Paul Janet has so carefully investigated.¹

One effect of narrowing the attention is that different sensation-groups are less firmly organised in consciousness. A particular group may be so deeply dissociated as to be unrecognised even when attention is turned toward it. We then have psychical (as distinguished from organic) anæsthesia. In the case before us the bodily presence is dimly recognised because the dissociation has not reached this lowest depth.

Second, the self-feeling underwent an equally marked change. It seemed as if the self melted into its object, or as if two fluids were poured together. The result was like a generalisation without particulars, or a sort of pure being. The explanation has already been given; attention had been narrowed to such a degree that the usual contrasts and antitheses by means of which we define our world had grown dim. Consciousness was absorbed, as it were, in the bright object at which the eyes gazed, and this one object seemed somehow to become a One-All, at once subject and object, and yet neither one. Here is a counterpart of the absorption into deity, of which mystical saints speak, a parallel to the realisation of a larger life continuous with our own and of the same quality, of which Professor James speaks. These asserted intuitions are obviously interpretations of this formal condition of trance. The claim to having experienced enlargement, absorption, ineffable illumination now becomes entirely intelligible. The experience does tend to be ineffable, certainly,

¹ His latest exposition of the subject is in *The Major Symptoms of Hysteria* (New York, 1907), Lecture VIII.

but not because of an unusual fulness of mental content ; rather because of an unusual emptiness.

Third, the feeling-tone of the whole was agreeable. In spite of the sense of separation from the body, moreover, this agreeable feeling seemed to rest upon a general bodily resonance, being not unlike the diffused comfort that accompanies complete muscular relaxation after severe muscular effort. It is, indeed, obvious that muscular relaxation was in this case a chief ground of the agreeable feeling-tone. Moreover, it is easy to see how, from this beginning, if religious auto-suggestion had been active, or even if the strange experiences of the hour had been met with naïve wonder instead of scientific coldness, pleasurable emotion of any degree of intensity might have developed. Here, evidently, is the root of the mystical feeling of attainment, of the resolution of discords, of the goodness of the All.

(4) Confirmation of this explanation may be had by analysing certain features of the anæsthetic process. In general, an anæsthetic acts first as a stimulant and later as a depressant. The final and complete relaxation of the muscular system is frequently preceded by tonic muscular rigidity. The psychical effects of such a change will hardly be realised by anyone who has not become familiar, in his own person, with the relation between muscular tension and anxiety, restlessness, and a divided self, on the one hand, and that between muscular relaxation and calm, poise, and self-reconciliation, on the other. When everything goes wrong, and you cannot adjust yourself to yourself or your work ; when you find yourself doing under high tension what ought to be easy ; when you cannot let go your cares or secure restful sleep : then hunt for tense muscles and relax them. In forehead, jaws, fingers, legs—somewhere you will find a physical basis or condition of your unrest. Relieve the tension, and your self and your world will be less divided and contradictory ; you will experience in some degree the very unification that the mystic looks upon as a revelation. Relaxation has always been one

feature of mystical practices, in fact. It is not strange, then, that here and there a medical patient gives a mystical interpretation to the change from tension to relaxation under an anæsthetic. The wonder is rather that such reports are so rare. If a census of them could be taken, I surmise that they would be found to emanate chiefly from minds already occupied before the anæsthesia with the great problems of life.

In short, the mystical revelation can be traced down to the formal conditions, physiological and psychological, of the mystic himself. Let not this conclusion be misconstrued, however. The point is not that the mystic revelation has a physiological basis; even if there were a direct intuition of God, it would doubtless have law-abiding correlations with brain-processes. What discredits the mystic's theory is that it accepts as immediate intuition what is palpably an interpretation. His spiritual monism may be true or not; that question does not here concern us; the present contention is simply that the mystic acquires his religious convictions precisely as his non-mystical neighbour does, namely, through tradition and instruction, auto-suggestion grown habitual, and reflective analysis. The mystic brings his theological beliefs to the mystical experience; he does not derive them from it.

Thus far we have had before us mystical experiences of the more extreme sort—those that approach or reach the condition of trance. Our conclusion is resisted by appealing to one of the simplest phenomena of ordinary religious experience, which is said to convey to the masses the same kind of certitude that the expert mystic claims for himself. It is declared, in effect, that the consensus of experts is supported by a sort of *consensus populi*. We turn, therefore, to a second supposed scientific support of mysticism.

II. The datum of the second argument is simply the broadly human feeling of the reality of spiritual things. This feeling is said to be the actual basis of men's religious belief. Rather, since feeling, thus described, includes belief, the

primary and practically universal religious experience is an experience of belief. The aim of the argument is to show that feeling as such can convey ontological messages which are of final validity. They cannot be criticised by the rational consciousness, it is said, because feeling and reason are incommensurable. The steps of the proof are as follows:—Self-direction by means of a rational analysis of conditions is only one way of successfully adjusting ourselves to our environment. Our rational cognitions are only mountain-peaks of mind which reach above the clouds; underneath are unseen foundations of unknown depth and breadth. If we fix attention upon the degree of awareness with which we act, we discriminate between the conscious and the subconscious. If we have in mind self-activity rather than awareness, we distinguish between the voluntary and the automatic. If we take our starting-point in feeling, we contrast the cognitive with the affective life. Of course these three contrasts do not exactly cover one another; yet they do point, in a general way, to the same two contrasting groups of facts. We certainly perform a great many functions which, when we attend to them, appear to be ours chiefly in the sense of feeling or tendency or obscure impulse, rather than either cognition or volition.

By indirect means we discover that such functions are often adjusted to the conditions of life with surprising accuracy. Consider, for example, the delicate responses made by our organic feelings to changes in the quality of the blood. Compared with such responses, our deliberate attempts to regulate diet and exercise are clumsy enough. Similarly, feeling makes a fine reaction to the varying composition and temperature of the atmosphere, and by ways that we do not observe, our conduct is modified accordingly. We are, then, in commerce with a larger world than that of clear perception and self-guided reason. Indeed, the most successful adjustment even to perceived conditions is often made by letting go and drifting with the tide of feeling. This is true not only in

matters related to physiological well-being, but also in literary, artistic, and scientific production.

Upon this basis Professors Starbuck and Pratt build a mystical theory. Starbuck maintains that religion is throughout a matter of the affective life; that it is, in fact, directly opposed to the cognitive processes. Feeling and ideation he looks upon as two different means whereby we take note of parts of the general reaction-mass which constitutes the basis of mental life. Feeling as well as ideation gives "reports," "accounts," "hints," and "intimations," not only of organic processes, but also of environing conditions. Religion he looks upon as such a feeling-adjustment to the larger reality that encompasses the personal life, and he claims that the religious feeling as such contains objective content. The theory is therefore mystical.¹

Similarly, vital feeling is declared by Professor Pratt to be the permanent source of religion. Out of it spring ideas which, though unreasoned, carry irresistible conviction. He is careful to distinguish this immediate certainty contained in religious feeling from arguments drawn from the feeling. He has in mind an experience of belief which possesses absolute certainty of a larger life encircling our own.²

No one will deny that religion is primarily an unreasoned reaction. Theology derives its interest from an antecedent religious belief, and this belief springs out of and expresses feelings, impulse, practical attitude. But the fact that belief has this incentive and background does not yet justify the assertion that religious feeling contains in itself final ontological information. Further analysis is needed. We experience a similar certitude with regard to many things—monogamy, for example. Most of us feel certain that monogamy is one of the necessary conditions of a high civilisation; just why we

¹ "The Feelings and their Place in Religion," *American Journal of Religious Psychology and Education*, vol. i. pp. 168 ff.

² James B. Pratt, *The Psychology of Religious Belief* (New York, 1907), pp. 43, 295, 297.

think so, however, we find it difficult to say without considerable reflection: if we are very frank with ourselves, we will confess that we do not really know after all, and that our certainty is rather a practical attitude than anything else. May it not be the same way with the religious feeling of certainty, and may not the content of religious belief have arisen through processes of growth and accretion and social tradition precisely as our belief in monogamy has grown definite? Before attempting to answer this question directly, I must point out two or three of the more obvious difficulties that attach to the arguments in question.

In the first place, let us scrutinize the evidence for the existence of an experience of irresistible religious certainty. It is easy enough to secure testimony to such an experience, of course, and it is upon question-list testimony that Pratt largely relies. But, under appropriate circumstances, one could secure testimony to a direct intuitive certainty of the fidelity of a friend or the perfidy of an enemy; or to an immediate conviction, welling up out of the depths of one's nature, that a certain illness is to have a favourable or unfavourable outcome, or that a certain gold-mine is going to pan out well! That there is a widespread feeling of religious certitude may be granted; but that, apart from auto-suggestion, and when freed from errors of untrained introspection, it has the form attributed to it may be frankly denied.

Again, the argument overlooks a point that is vital to its success. That we are in interaction with environmental factors that do not appear in clear perception is true. Our nervous systems and our moods of feeling register meteorological and other conditions so fine and so complex as to bewilder the imagination. Very likely, as Leibnitz said, we carry within us an index to the entire universe. But this formal statement does not show how we discover the specific character of these environing realities. As a matter of fact, not until our affective responses are brought into the focus of attention, where they can be analysed and their relations consciously

noted, do they acquire coherent significance or authority. Our affective responses to the weather become significant, for example, when we definitely note the relation, as Dexter has done, between a certain state of the atmosphere and the conduct of school-children. Feeling yields no direct knowledge of the amount of moisture in the atmosphere. At most, then, feeling can claim to be only one link in a chain of evidence.

In the next place, precisely what ontological message does religious feeling convey? Starbuck declares this question not pertinent, because only feeling can appreciate the deliverances of feeling. If that were so, the way to carry conviction would be to awaken religious feelings in the reader, not to argue the case. To argue that religious feeling conveys truth, and then to avoid the question, What truth? looks like a very direct method of discrediting the whole argument. What is the use of arguing before the court of reason that a decision in the court of feeling is correct, if at the same time we deny that the court of reason has jurisdiction in the case, and even confess that the record of the decision in question is entirely inaccessible to said court?

An effort is made to escape this *impasse* by generalising the content of the supposed feeling-intuition. That is, racial, sectarian, and individual differences are ignored, and the pale remainder upon which religionists agree is declared to constitute a valid intuition. Without stopping to ask how far they really do agree, we may assert at once that this argument for the validity of the supposed intuition destroys itself. For the certainty of the religionist extends to his racial and other peculiar tenets. The alleged intuition of spiritual things grasps them only in some such special form. If, then, a part of the content, as all investigators agree, is a historical accretion, the whole may be, and the claim to final authority is vacated.

III. The tendency of this discussion is toward the view that the supposed mystical revelation is part and parcel of the general historical movement of religious life; its sources are

the same, and the superior certainty and authority that it claims for itself are illusory. The illusion arises, specifically, through strong auto-suggestion, which gives the form of reality or experience to ideas or ideals. The mystic does not passively receive a revelation; he actively takes a religious attitude, actively gives himself the certainty that he believes to be bestowed *ab extra*.

This conclusion, however, does not wholly dispose of mysticism. A problem more difficult than the two that have been touched upon remains behind. For, though we trace the ideas of the mystic to some social tradition that he has imbibed, the tradition as a whole remains to be accounted for. The religious belief of humanity, taken in its grand totality, cannot be a product of external suggestion, as the belief of a single individual may be. It is clearly not the result of critical or analytical reflection. It has been evolved somehow from within the mind of man. We may call this racial auto-suggestion, if we like. However we name it, its analogy with the mystical experience of the individual is unmistakable, and we may even go so far as to say that all real religion consists ultimately in some mystical practice, namely, the making real to ourselves of that which we do not perceive. Here is where the mystic's psychology falls short. He will not admit that his certainty of spiritual things is self-produced; he insists that it is infused. Our need here is a deeper analysis of the function of the will in religion, and specifically in relation to religious certitude. We may be sure that such analysis will lead us toward a faith-philosophy, and away from mysticism. Yet, when such a faith-philosophy has done its utmost, there will remain the question whether our will, after all, is merely ours; whether, indeed, communion with God may not genuinely occur in our religious will-acts, one of which is the auto-suggestion of religious beliefs.

GEORGE ALBERT COE.

THE MAGIC AND MYSTICISM OF TO-DAY.

MRS STUART MOORE.

“THE philosophy which is indiscriminately called transcendental, Hermetic, Rosicrucian comprises an actual, positive, and realisable knowledge concerning the worlds which we denominate invisible, because they transcend the imperfect and rudimentary faculties of a partially developed humanity, and concerning the latent potentialities which constitute, by the fact of their latency, the interior man. In more strictly philosophical language, the Hermetic science is a method of transcending the phenomenal world, and attaining to the reality which is behind phenomena.”¹

These words, with which one of the most distinguished of living occultists prefaces his text-book upon the theory and practice of Magic, constitute a great claim, set forth in language which seems more appropriate to metaphysics than to the arts of necromancy and divination. Nevertheless, most persons who do not specialise in eccentric opinion will be disinclined to waste time on a serious discussion of such “occult science.” They imagine, having no evidence to the contrary, that Magic only survives in the modern world in either the commercial or the academic form. The Bond Street palmist may stand for one branch, the annotator of improper *grimoires* for the other. In neither department is the thing supposed to be taken seriously; it is merely the

¹ A. E. Waite, *The Occult Sciences*, 1891, p. 1.

subject of money-getting or of curiosity. Such a view is far from being accurate. The solemn treatises of Dr Papus, the many learned works of Mr A. E. Waite, are testimony enough that the Hermetic Science is still to be reckoned with. There is, has always been, and probably always will be a living school of occult thought, because this form of thought corresponds with an eternal element in the human mind—its curiosity, its arrogance, its love of mystery. Hence occultism is at the present day the refuge of many of those alert and delightful souls who have “tried everything else” in their longing to combine a picturesque certainty devoid of moral discipline with unlimited transcendental speculations. Those who could scarcely take Genesis seriously find deeps of illumination in the Tarot, and accept Elementals, Astrology, and the Astral Plane with a good will which they would certainly not extend to the Athanasian Creed. The attraction of miracles without the miraculous, of a system which brings the invisible to us instead of requiring us to go to it, and makes it our slave instead of us its worshippers—of an exclusiveness that elevates initiation into occultism into the spiritual equivalent of entry into the Smart Set—cannot fail of effect in a restless and self-conscious community.

The theory of modern occultism is simply this: that the will is potentially king, not only of the House of Life, but also of all the forces of Nature, known and unknown. The foolish marvels which the word “Magic” connotes for the average man—the spells, entrancements, apparitions, divinations, etc.—are merely the side issues, not the main objects of the genuine science. In the will there resides, for the occultist, a force as powerful and as amenable as electricity. This force can operate in the “natural,” *i.e.* sensual, plane, and also in planes not yet recognised as “natural.” Beyond the world of sensual perception—or rather entangled in it—the Magus perceives another world, or aspect of the world, the unfortunately-named “Astral.” His education is wholly directed towards an understanding of the laws of this world; he

develops, by a discipline of his whole nature, and by the liberation of certain "subconscious" faculties, those forms of perception which in it are analogous to his sensual perceptions of the material plane. Hence clairvoyance, clairaudience, all non-fraudulent mediumistic phenomena, and prophecy; and, in the less developed personality, presentiments, intuitions, and veridical dreams. The forces of the astral plane are peculiarly susceptible to the directive powers of the will, whether deliberately or impulsively applied; and the result of such application is seen in telepathy, "human magnetism," materialisations, evocations, etc. From the exercise of the will comes also magical therapeutics, the ancestor of Christian Science, for "toute la puissance du médecin occulte est dans la conscience de sa volonté, et tout son art consiste à produire la foi dans son malade," says Éliphas Lévi, the founder of modern magic.¹ But the will must not only be trained, it must be put in the right mood; and here the ceremonies and external observances on which occultists have always laid great stress receive a plausible explanation. They are instruments for the direction and concentration of will-power, necessary in so far as they minister to this, but wholly subjective in their use and appeal. "Une pratique, même superstitieuse, même insensée, est efficace, parce que c'est une réalisation de la volonté," says Éliphas Lévi again.²

The occultist, however, seems unable to rise above and do without these practices: and here his method is sharply differentiated from that of the mystic, whose interior way, once found, needs no external signposts. Mysticism, of course, has nothing to do with phenomena, nor with enlarging the boundaries of the phenomenal world. It displays no marvels, performs no miracles. It is "the quest of the Absolute," undertaken in terms of adoration and desire. Where the occultist is an investigator, the mystic is a lover. Strictly speaking, his science can only be understood by those who

¹ Éliphas Lévi, *Rituel de la Haute Magic*, 1861, p. 312.

² *Ibid.*, p. 72.

have tried it. These know and proclaim that it is "the one plank which bridges Infinity"; but the formulæ under which they try so hard to convey this truth differ enormously, and their divergences are only to be reconciled by other mystics, who, as Saint-Martin says, "all speak the same language, because they come from the same country." Newman's word, *cor ad cor loquitur*, is indeed the last word of the mystics: these see essential unity beneath differences of language, and catch the accent of home wherever it may be heard.

This "hard saying" has been reiterated many times by those who have essayed the ungrateful task of explaining mysticism to the unmystical. The difficulty of such an explanation is, that mysticism, whilst it may or may not begin in a form which is amenable to that which Maeterlinck calls "supernatural psychology," certainly ends by transcending all human power of analysis. The deepest utterances of Plotinus, Ruysbroeck, Saint John of the Cross, awaken in our minds either an intuitive sense of uncomprehended truth, or the anger of a practical person to whom nonsense is being deceitfully addressed in the solemn periods of an unknown tongue. "I spake as I saw," said David; but Saul did not find his candour enlightening.

Now, it is curious to note that, in spite of the great popularity of "everything mystical," from crystal-gazing to the symbolism of the Catholic Church, this pure mysticism, the divine and impassioned science of ultimate things, has no professed adepts in the modern hurly-burly of beliefs. Self-seeking or curiosity—generally both—are the incentives which send present-day adventurers from the phenomenal to the invisible world. The disconcerting fact is that we know—as our masters did not—all about mysticism from the intellectual side. We can describe the differentiating marks of Purgation, Illumination, and Ecstasy. We know that the science which we desire is the very science of the saints. Our contempt for the materialist is magnificent and unbounded. Yet, reading the books of modern mysticism, one is struck by

a chill feeling, as of an otherwise comfortable room in which the fire has been allowed to go out. That flaming rapture which made Saint Augustine cry out, "My God, my Joy!" and Saint John of the Cross,

"O burn that burns to heal!
O more than pleasant wound!"

and Ruysbroeck declare his one desire to be *in vastissimum divinitatis pclagus navigare*, seems to have died, and left only intelligent ashes behind it. The mystic of the present day, learning anxiety, has forgotten adoration; yet adoration was of the essence of his contract, as it must also be of the essence of the contract in all perfect earthly love.

Now, a mysticism from which the element of love has been withdrawn, whilst restlessness, curiosity, and a taste for transcendentalism remain, naturally tends either to relapse into an academic interest or to pass over into mere occultism. As a fact, the newest developments of mystical literature do seem to suggest that the term is now being employed with a certain perversity, (1) to describe a cool and judicious application of Platonic principles to Christianity; (2) to justify semi-occult speculations in which the true mystical sense plays no part. Dr Inge's recent works are prominent examples of the first tendency; Mr A. E. Waite's of the second.

Dr Inge has earned the gratitude of many students, who owe their first introduction to the mystics to his admirable *Bampton Lectures*.¹ Since the publication of that work, however, his point of view appears to have undergone a gradual change, which shows itself unmistakably in his recent *Paddock Lectures* on "Personal Idealism and Mysticism."² In this book "the science of the saints" becomes a philosophic system of a peculiarly polite, well-balanced kind, chiefly useful as a stick with which to beat the holders of strict views on

¹ W. R. Inge, "Christian Mysticism," *Bampton Lectures*, 1899.

² W. R. Inge, "Personal Idealism and Mysticism," *The Paddock Lectures* for 1906-1907.

personality. It explicitly rules out the very existence of a distinct "mystical sense" in man;¹ and with it, of course, the strange and incalculable results obtained by this sense under conditions of asceticism, contemplation, ecstasy. Such lawless and unnatural doings are not recognised by this philosophy, which, though clinging to the label of mysticism, really exhibits the tendencies of its antithesis, the neat and well-finished system of the schoolmen. Its appeal is to the highly cultured, unemotional, but mildly imaginative person, who prefers the temperate illumination of a religious idealism, in which, as we are specifically informed, the intellect takes the reins, to the *noche escura* through which all voyagers must pass on their way to the "divine sea." If this be mysticism, one wonders what is to become of the sudden and unexplained flashes of insight and of rapture with which the darkness of the true *via mystica* is lit: of Coventry Patmore's strange declaration that "love raises the spirit above the sphere of reverence and worship into one of laughter and dalliance"; or Ruysbroeck's "silence caligineux où tous les amants se sont perdus"; or Saint-Martin's abrupt and vivid cry, "God was my passion!" which seems to come from some warmer source than a natural taste for Platonic philosophy.

For these things Dr Inge has no place, and apparently not very much sympathy. In Mr Waite's work, on the contrary, ecstasis, desire, the reality of the mystical experience, are given due prominence, though mixed with luggage almost as unnecessary to the prosecution of the "great adventure" as Dr Inge's convincing arguments on the doctrine of the Logos. Mr Waite must at present be accounted our most learned and important writer upon those subjects which lie "between the desert and the sown" of occult and mystic science. He is also a deeply interested and sympathetic observer of certain aspects of the mystical experiment, and, in his most recent books, shows a growing inclination to approach the boundaries of true mysticism; though this is still combined with a curious

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

inability to separate himself from the false lights of a merely occult philosophy. Hence the reader may detect in his work a strain of intense desire and gathering sadness: of all the material having been ordered and investigated, yet something—and that the veritable object of the quest—ever eluding the pursuer. Always serious, never sentimental or fatuous, Mr Waite's dicta upon mysticism are often brilliant and profound.

“So far as it is possible to express the unsearchable heart of the universe, the whole mystery lies in the *Venite Adoramus*, and it is enshrined after another manner in the *Pange Lingua*, because everywhere the *latens Deitas* passes into expression in life.”¹

“The invitation of the mystic life is to come and see; the promise of the mystic life is that we shall attain to see.”²

“The search after God is not the quest of joy, which itself is the counsel of the search, but the satisfaction of a craving impelled by the spur of necessity.”³

These things being so, it is the more disappointing to find, as the conclusion of his interesting and important *Studies in Mysticism*, that Mr Waite's quest of the ultimate leads only, after a careful and wholly irrelevant examination of Spiritualism, Mesmerism, and other side issues of the occult order, to a vague sacramentalism of the non-dogmatic kind; and finally to a recognition of the fact that the initiations of the antique mysteries dramatised the essential features of the inward mystical experience, and that the outlines of this drama may still be detected in Freemasonry and other forms of ceremonial initiation. Thus, setting out to look for a spiritual certainty, we find only an intellectual hint; together with a confession that this hint is hardly wanted, since it can only be understood by those who are already set upon the mystic's way, and these will find that which they seek without guide-books of this kind. A formal outline of initiation bears about

¹ A. E. Waite, *Studies in Mysticism*, 1906, p. ix.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 53.

³ A. E. Waite, *Strange Houses of Sleep*, 1906, p. 211.

the same relation to mystical attainment as "How to be Happy though Married" bears to the rapture of wedded love. The constant preoccupation with symbols, interpretations, forms of initiation, the outer and inner meanings of things, is indeed foreign to the whole spirit of true mysticism; which, having made the great surrender, is hardly interested in dissertations upon the sense of the infinite, methods of approach, and the rest. It *knows*, where its modern apologists only *know about*.

This is, perhaps, the explanation of a fact which must be patent to all students of this form of literature; namely, that all the interpretations, proclamations, and theories of the semi-occult school of mysticism, which is here under consideration, lack that note of peace, certainty, and satisfaction which Professor James finds as the mark of a mind that has "unified itself" in the course of its religious experience; and all mystical experience must be classed as religious, in the psychological if not in the theological sense. The immediate cause of this seems to be the importation of an intellectualist, self-confident note: the divorce of knowledge and love, the presence of an element of spiritual self-seeking, and the complete elimination of the essential element of surrender. The learned mystic of the moment is always a strong individualist, whereas the satisfaction which he seeks can only be obtained by the destruction of the barriers of personality, —a fact very clearly recognised on its philosophic side by Dr Inge. But the whole tendency of contemporary thought is to build up these barriers, and make of them an impregnable shield.

This passion for individualism, and its accompanying business-like determination to exact cash payments for all work done in the spiritual sphere, is everywhere noticeable; but since, in the last resort, the full implications of that which was conceived in the study are always manifest in the conduct of the crowd, it is even better exhibited in the cheap transcendentalism which is known as the "Higher Thought,"

than in the more dignified, if arid, pages of so-called mystical philosophy.

We turn, therefore, from the academic to the popular, and consider the form in which that supersensual egoism which is the essence of occultism, disguised by a vocabulary borrowed, without acknowledgment, from mysticism, metaphysics, psychology, and the New Testament, is now being offered to a community too self-indulgent for the discipline of religion, too materialistic for mysticism, too credulous to be satisfied with the wary certitudes of an agnostic philosophy. To mingle Buddhism, Christianity, magic, physical culture, and feeble metaphysics, and make with these ingredients a faith whose chief rewards shall be health and wealth, "heaven here and now indeed," seems a considerable task; but the Higher Thought has managed it. This philosophy, still young, has already spread from its birthplace, America, to England, where it shows signs of "catching on"; and has split up into innumerable sects, which respectively preach Menticulture, Soul-culture, Higher Health, Yogi, The New or Cosmic Consciousness, etc. etc. These varied manifestations of being, however, are reducible upon examination to comparatively simple beginnings; and these beginnings, expressed in the crude language of older philosophies, are three—personal idealism, magic, and pantheism. In other words, the New Mystic seeks by will-power, self-suggestion, the use of Words of Power, and a modified form of occult discipline, to construct his own universe and attain union with the divine principle of his own life; with an indwelling, not with a transcendent, God. He seeks this union, as a rule, from strictly utilitarian motives, connected with his own physical health, comfort, or success. With what some persons may feel to be an excess of definition, he confines the presence of this divine principle to one particular spot in the body, namely, the Solar Plexus; the nerve ganglion which an old-fashioned and unmystical physiology had supposed to direct the operations of the stomach.

That the solar plexus might somehow be connected with the soul was an old guess on the part of transcendentalists, and is mentioned by Saint-Martin, who, however, asks "how a metaphysical entity can be localised physically?" This pertinent question is eluded by the New Thought, which is nothing if not dogmatic.

"The Solar Plexus is the radiating centre of life, the centre from which flows the divine energy. . . . We must learn to control the action of the Solar Plexus, just as we learn to control the action of the fingers in learning to play the piano."¹

It will therefore be understood that the popular textbook of New Thought, entitled *Just How to Wake the Solar Plexus*, has a more serious purpose than its name suggests; for the awakening of the solar plexus, means, on this hypothesis, the birth of the New Consciousness, and the consequent physical and spiritual regeneration of man.

The method is simpler than might have been expected, being merely a combination of breathing exercises and auto-suggestion. "Lie down flat upon your back with arms outspread and without pillow; *let go* of everything mentally; inhale slowly through the nostrils a full breath; hold steady a second or two; then force the breath suddenly into the upper part of the lungs; hold there a second or two, and then suddenly throw all the breath *down* as far as possible, at the same time exclaiming mentally to the solar plexus, 'Wake up! Wake up!'"²

Those in whom the solar plexus still sleeps—and it is to be feared that most of the sainted names of history were in this melancholy condition—have no right, from the point of view of the Higher Thought, to be considered as spiritual persons at all. True spirituality, according to this theory, expresses itself in terms of health and wealth. Had Saint Francis of Assisi been a New Mystic, he would neither have

¹ E. Towne, *Just How to Wake the Solar Plexus*, 1904, pp. 8 and 9.

² *Ibid.*, p. 18.

wedded the Lady Poverty nor died before he was fifty years of age. The ideals of the latter-day saint are very different from this, and must receive a different treatment.

“All life is growth, and a live Ideal is no exception. *Let it grow.* Stretch your imagination to take in all you can. When you find yourself approaching the \$5000-a-year mark you have set for yourself, you will find yourself wanting \$10,000. Now don't accuse yourself of never being satisfied. Just *rejoice in this evidence of spiritual growth*, and go in to win on a larger scale.”¹

Under these circumstances, the further counsel to “Loose the body and get enthused over the Ideal” would seem to involve a contradiction in terms; for the ideals of the New Mystic are mostly of the corporeal kind, and directed towards the total elimination of the troubles and chances of this mortal life. When he is not curing himself of nervousness and indigestion, he is busy checking the inordinate affections which might cause him to feel fear or anxiety for the safety and happiness of other people. “How unkind we think we are if we do not sympathise with our neighbours' sufferings!” says “The New Mysticism.” Such an emotion is incompatible with Higher Thought, and here the element of personal idealism comes in—though in rather a dilute form—to testify to its irrational nature, and prove that self-help is the only real altruism.

“Each man is an epitome of the whole creation; and as he rebuilds his consciousness, he re-makes the consciousness of the world. This is comfort for those first bewildering hours when the deep-seated ‘heresy of separateness’ tempts us to think that this new mysticism is a selfish disregard for the salvation of any soul but one's own.”²

The temptation, nevertheless, remains strong for the unregenerate, particularly when we come upon such counsels as this:—

¹ E. Towne, *Joy Philosophy*, 1903, p. 50.

² A. Curtis, *The New Mysticism*, 1906, p. 89.

"Just rise into the realm I AM, and by imagination and affirmation pump yourself full of—I AM power. I AM wisdom. I AM love. I AM whatever I desire to be. ALL things work together for the manifestation of what I AM."¹

"Inhale slowly, but not too slowly; just easily; as you inhale, say mentally, with eyes raised under your closed lids, I AM—say it slowly and distinctly, and try quietly to *realise* that the Infinite is really *you*. . . . This same exercise, used with the words "I AM *money*," is the finest treatment for opulence."²

Here the pantheistic element in the New Thought comes out clearly, quaintly mingled with a rudimentary form of auto-suggestion; which is, indeed, the "practical arcanum" of this system, and accounts for its immense power over imperfectly disciplined minds, and real success in the healing of physical and psychical disease. In its method of developing this will-concentration and self-suggestion, the Higher Thought borrows freely from both Western and Eastern sources, and uses the "magic word" of occultism side by side with the "entering into silence" of the Christian contemplatives, and forms of meditation framed on the most approved Oriental lines.

"You may fix the mind upon the tip of the nose or upon the tongue," says the New Thought Manual, "and so experience a sort of absorption in the particular enjoyment upon which you happen to be meditating. Again, you may fix the attention upon the heart, and imagine that you see a lotus-like form. . . . This you may think of as turning towards you, as you breathe gently and rhythmically, whilst you repeat the sacred word OM. Such a practice as this will have a very tranquillising effect upon you."³

At the same time, the "sacred word OM" has no more dogmatic significance than the many references to Christian theology which are scattered over the more recent works of

¹ *Joy Philosophy*, p. 8.

² *Just How to Wake the Solar Plexus*, pp. 25, 26.

³ R. D. Stocker, *New Thought Manual*, No. 1, 1906, p. 112.

the New Mystics. The pioneers of this school displayed considerable coyness in their use of religious terms, though quite unable to get on without the root ideas which those terms define. Hence, where Saint Bernard speaks openly of the Love of God, Mr Ralph Waldo Trine refers only to the advantages of being "in tune with the infinite." But times have changed; and the bolder spirits, stating candidly that Christianity is now being understood for the first time after twenty centuries of misrepresentation, re-edit the Bible drastically in the light of the New Consciousness. The results are often striking; and if they leave something to be desired from the point of view of good taste, cannot, at any rate, be charged with a narrow and unimaginative orthodoxy.

"Let your light [*i.e.* your solar plexus] so shine that men may see your good works—your love-sunshines—and glorify your I AM GOD which is in heaven."¹

"The wages of ignorance is death, but the gift of Omniscient Goodness is Eternal Life, through Faith in the Christ-Consciousness within."²

A religion such as this, which frankly declares that the first and only concern of the believer is with himself, with the prevention of his own ills, the increase of his own income, the recognition of his own Divine Principle waiting within his own solar plexus — which offers prompt and practical results, demands no charity and no adoration, and never mentions the Four Last Things—is sure, at the present time, to be popular. It is, of course, the antithesis of mysticism, as the mystics understood that science of love; but it shows extraordinary agility in its misquotations of their dicta, and in its re-handling of those eternal principles of occultism with which its connection is so much closer than might at first be supposed. Its object and its promise is indeed the same as that of magic: power, first over self, then over the world and fate, together with immunity from all agitation, poverty, disease. It is true

¹ *Just How to Wake the Solar Plexus*, p. 10.

² *The New Mysticism*, p. 184.

that the appeal to curiosity is knocked out, but an even baser appeal to self-indulgence comes in.

The vices of this creed seem hardly to need insisting upon. Its outrageous individualism, its concentration upon the ideas of comfort and tranquillity, make its rapidly increasing influence a grave evil, whether looked at from the spiritual or from the social point of view. Its interest, to the observer of life, lies in the cunningness and perfection of its adaptation to a half-educated and over-sensitised community. Our selfishness, our unhealthiness, our conceit, our terror of pain and death, our love of long words and hatred of "anything dogmatic," are here traded upon in turn. From one point of view the spectacle is an amusing one; from another, and for those who take humanity seriously, it has its element of sadness.

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THE REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH.

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AT a recent college commencement the writer was conversing with the president of one of the leading American universities, when a chance remark betrayed to his neighbour the fact that he was a teacher of systematic theology. "You have my sincerest sympathy," was the quick response; and when the speaker was pressed for the reason for his condolence, the fact developed that there seemed to him to be no longer any rational basis for the definite structure of beliefs with which that branch of seminary training is supposed to deal. "When I was a boy," said the college president, "I was brought up to believe that the Bible came as straight from the hand of God as the letters my father wrote me when I was at school came from his. But you no longer believe any such thing. To you it is the work of men like ourselves, containing elements of diverse character and of different historical value, and you apply to it the same critical methods which you would use in reading Homer or Horace. How is it possible, then, that you can claim for doctrines drawn from such a source the same unquestioning assent which has been given to the teachings of Christian theology in the past? What substitute can you provide for the infallible revelation you have given up, strong enough to furnish a rational basis for Christian faith?"

I have thought it worth while to attempt an answer to this question. For the attitude of this distinguished educator is typical of that of many modern men. Science they can understand, for they live in a world where logic reigns supreme. Theology they can understand, for those who still hold the old faith in revelation. But a scientific theology—a theology, that is to say, that shall handle the subject-matter of religion with the same rigorous methods of logic which characterise the other sciences, and yet shall attain the definiteness and certainty which seem necessary to religious, or at all events to Christian, faith—seems to them a contradiction in terms.

To attempt an adequate statement of the reasons which lead modern theologians to believe that the chasm between historic Christianity and the scientific spirit is not impassable, and that a faith is still possible which shall be at once reasonable and Christian, would carry me beyond the limits of an article; but it may be possible to indicate in a few words the method by which one teacher of theology has made the transition for himself. And if the exigencies of editorial compression require me to speak more briefly than I should desire, the resulting necessity for condensation may not be without its advantages for the reader.

There are two distinct steps in the process by which a man of scientific habit of mind may persuade himself of the reasonableness of a Christian faith. The first hinges upon his definition of faith; the second, upon his conception of Christianity; and to each I shall devote a few words.

In Mr Lowes Dickinson's charming essays on religion,¹ he gives admirable expression to a conception of the relation of faith and knowledge which is widely held by thoughtful men to-day. According to Mr Dickinson, faith begins where knowledge ends. Knowledge is an affair of the reason. It is attained by the methods of scientific research and of logical demonstration, and its results are certain and trustworthy so far as they go. Faith, on the other hand, is

¹ *Religion : a Criticism and a Forecast* New York, 1905.

a function of the imagination and of the will, reaching out into the dark in hopeful anticipation of what may there be found, and trustfully pressing in the direction whither its hopes point; but in the nature of the case it is precluded from ever arriving at its goal; for, with the attainment of the goal, it would itself become knowledge, and, *ipso facto*, cease to be faith. Now religion concerns itself with faith, as science with knowledge; and all attempts of the former to reach over into the territory of the latter and claim dominion there are dangerous, and in the end are certain to prove futile. What we call ecclesiasticism is simply that form of religion which tries to bar men's path to true knowledge by the fences of a knowledge falsely so called; and revelation, in the traditional sense, is the foundation-stone upon which this barrier has been erected.

So far, Mr Lowes Dickinson. It must be confessed that there is very much that is plausible in such a statement of the case. There is a region of our experience in which sequences are so uniform that it is possible to attain such a consensus of opinion as to make differences practically impossible. There is another region where variety is so constant and so perplexing as to make any attempt at uniformity seem hopeless. That two and two make four; that water will seek its own level; that the stone will drop to the ground when the cord by which it is suspended is cut,—are propositions so generally accepted that to doubt any one of them would make people think the doubter a proper candidate for residence in an asylum. But in estimating the causes of national failure, or in predicting the chances of moral progress, we enter a more disputed territory, and find opinions differing so widely that uniformity is out of the question. For here we have to do not simply with matters of fact, but with judgments of value, and our decision in any particular case will be determined quite as much by our sentiment and by our taste as by our reason. This realm of value-judgments, so important for the moral and religious life, we commonly

regard as belonging to faith rather than knowledge strictly so called ; and it is upon this fact, no doubt, that the familiar distinction between the two is based.

None the less it is true that the hard and fast line which is often drawn between knowledge and faith proves upon examination to be less distinct than is often supposed. When we follow back the complicated structure which we call our science to its ultimate foundation, we find that it rests in the last analysis upon certain moral judgments of probability which we call hypotheses, which are only faith in disguise. We cannot prove that this is a world of uniform law, for, as a matter of fact, there is very much in our experience which is as yet inexplicable ; but we adopt the hypothesis because we find that in practice it works well, and because, if we were to reject it, it would be impossible to bring order and unity into our thought. We are ourselves rational beings, and find ourselves at home only in a rational world, and so we make certain great assumptions which we formulate into laws, and the gradual verification of these in experience constitutes our knowledge. The difference between religion and science is not that one uses faith and the other is able to dispense with its use, but that the subject-matter with which the former deals renders the verification of its postulates a more complex and difficult matter than is the case with the other.

Indeed, as has been often shown, the whole antithesis between religion and science results in large part from a confusion of terminology. The two words belong to different spheres. Religion is a word which is descriptive of experience ; science, of thought. Religion is contrasted with art and politics and ethics, and whatever other term you please, which describes the activities of man in his practical reaction upon his environment. Science, on the other hand, is a term which describes man's intellectual interpretation of his environment, so far as it is based upon orderly procedure and issues in trustworthy results. Its correlates are philosophy and theology. There can be no conceivable contrast between religion and

science, though there may easily be a conflict between science and theology. The real question which we need to settle is not whether religion has some organ of knowledge distinct from science, whether we call it faith, or revelation, or what you please, but whether the experience which religion brings and the ideals by which it is inspired bring us into contact with objects which are capable of sufficiently exact description, and whose effects upon life may be tested over a wide enough area, to justify their description in scientific terms. The contention of those who believe in the possibility of a scientific theology is that this is the case, and the belief of those who call themselves Christians is that the character of these objects, when so described, will be found to agree in substance with the content of the historic Christian faith.

There is nothing, then, irrational in the attitude of the religious man in accepting as true a conviction which it is not yet possible completely to verify in experience. In this he is only doing what the man of science does in his own sphere, what every rational man must do if he is to lead a rational life. Faith is not the special prerogative of religion. It belongs equally to art and to politics, to medicine and to business,—in short, to every activity of man, by which he seeks to relate himself practically to his environment and to make it answer to his needs. If we were to wait until all possibility of mistake had passed before making up our minds to act, we should never act at all; and this inaction, as Professor James has so well shown, would be itself action of the worst kind, for it would close to us all those doors of possible experience which our venture might have opened to us, and so preclude the possibility of that very knowledge in the name of which it was invoked.

The recognition of this practical function of faith is so common that it is not necessary for me to dwell upon it here. Under the name of pragmatism it has already clothed itself with a philosophic name, and made for itself a place so respectable in the intellectual world that no one need any longer be

ashamed to own himself its advocate. Mr Dickinson himself, whom we have already quoted, is loud in his praises of faith. He recognises in it one of the highest functions of man, and upon the fact that religion deals with it so largely and trusts it so completely, he bases his belief in the continued vitality of religion and its permanent place in the life of man. When we have come to the end of our capital of experience and face the great unsolved questions of the future ; when we have to decide whether we are to believe that mankind is simply one among the many families which have appeared upon the earth only to disappear again, leaving no trace behind, or whether there is in each one of us an immortal spirit, a spark of the Eternal which links us to the Unseen Source of all life, and makes us akin to the Divine ; when, in short, we have to make the ultimate decisions, and find no evidence at hand clear enough to compel assent, then religion, reaching forth into the mists where vision cannot penetrate, lays hold by faith upon the object of her hope, and by the power of her undying ideal enables us to live and to die as those who are the heirs of an immortal destiny. Such an attitude, according to Mr Dickinson, is not irrational, but, on the contrary, most worthy of a man of reason, and so far, at least, the faith of religion may be justified at the bar of science.

But this vague religion of the twilight is very different from the series of articulated convictions with which Christian theology deals. One might be sincerely religious in Mr Dickinson's sense, and yet have no definite theology. Indeed, one might deny the possibility of religious knowledge altogether, as he does. The question which primarily interests us here has to do with the intellectual significance of religious faith. It is the question whether, in the realm of religious experience, there is room for the definiteness and stability of conviction which we are accustomed to associate with knowledge, and whether the methods of exact observation and inference which we call scientific promote or hinder such definiteness and stability of conviction.

Here is where the ways part. Mr Dickinson is not, indeed, willing to close the door to the possibility of such a theology, but he regards it as so far in the distance as to be practically negligible to-day.¹ Certainly it cannot be identified with any existing form of religious teaching, even with that of Christianity at its best. Others are bolder in their forecast. They agree with Mr Dickinson in regarding historic Christianity as antiquated, but they are not satisfied with the vague religion of feeling which he would substitute. Like Mr Garrod, they think it possible to discover, or at least to contrive, a "religion of all good men" in which the virtues which happen to hold the foreground of present interest shall receive more generous expression than in any existing form of religious faith; and they explain the adhesion to historic Christianity of men whose intelligence they cannot deny, and whose sincerity they do not call in question, by the dulling effects of familiar association or the laudable desire to utilise for useful ends existing forms of social machinery.

I should be the last to deny the part played by tradition in the formation and preservation of religious belief. Indeed, as I shall presently show, it is one of the most important factors in the argument which I am conducting; but I think it easy to exaggerate its importance, and to overlook the extent and the importance of the intellectual agreements in matters of religion which modern science has brought to light.

For it must not be forgotten that the region of imagination and of forecast which Mr Dickinson assigns to faith, and which he finds so vague and misty, has its definite geography which may be mapped and charted, and by means of which it is possible to find one's way from one island of the spirit to another as confidently and with as much precision as mariners of the ocean steer their course through the trackless sea. One of the great services of modern scientific theology is its contribution to such a chart of the spirit. It has shown that religion is not an isolated thing, springing up arbitrarily,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 77.

no one knows whence, and leading no one knows whither, as the wind seemed to do in the old Palestinian days before there was a science of meteorology. We know to-day that religion has its permanent types and its definite laws; that it passes through certain regular phases and issues in certain inevitable consequences; in short, that it is as much a part of the world of fact which forms the object of our knowledge as any other realm of human experience. Science has made it possible for us to distinguish and to classify these types, and to formulate and interpret these laws, and so to apply to the realm of religion the general canons of truth and of falsehood which we use in other fields of human knowledge.

There is, for example, to name only the outstanding types, the contrast between the mystical and the ethical, the pessimistic and the optimistic, the authoritative and the rational type of religion. These forms recur again and again in the history of religion, and the character of specific religions is determined by the extent to which one or the other predominates. Thus, in the religions of India, Brahminism and Buddhism, the mystical element is dominant, and union with the Divine is sought through the suppression of those individual peculiarities through which the ethical life is realised. In the Semitic religions, Judaism and Mohammedanism, on the other hand, the ideal is ethical, and man realises his true relationship to God through the devotion of his will to the Will that is supreme. Buddhism, having its goal in Nirvana, the dreamless sleep which is possible only through the suppression of all desire, is profoundly pessimistic; whereas Judaism, with its Messianic ideal of a golden age, is optimistic to the core. Within Judaism itself we distinguish the authoritative religion of the scribes, with its blind submission to a ceremonial code handed down by tradition from the spiritual religion of the prophets, in which appeal is made to the reason and conscience of the individual man. Yet, obvious as are these distinctions, the contrasted types are not so exclusive that any single religion can claim the

monopoly of any one of them. Hinduism has had its ethical reformers and Mohammedanism its mystics. Judaism has its pessimistic moods as well as Buddhism, and in every great religion the scribe and the prophet are figures which recur again and again. The fact would seem to be that each of these great types is rooted in permanent characteristics of human nature, and a religion which is to justify its claim to world-wide supremacy must, in some way, make place for them all.

But because each one of these great types of the religious life has its roots in the constitution of man, and cannot be permanently ignored without peril, it by no means follows that each is of equal value, or, if indulged without check, will produce equally beneficial results. The solitary self-indulgence of a Simeon Stylites is not to be compared in the fruitfulness of its consequences with the social ministry of a St Francis; the world-conquering hope of a St Paul lays hold upon instincts more permanent and more healthful than the world-denying despair of a Gautama; the confident appeal of a Luther to the reason and conscience of the free man in Christ Jesus creates characters more virile and erects ideals more heroic than can be found in a society where authority has been systematically employed to impugn the competency of the intellect of man and to exalt unquestioning submission to the throne of the virtues. Science not only observes; it measures and compares. It shows us not only what are the types of the religious life and the postulates from which they spring, but what are the effects which they produce and the ends which they subserve, and so enables us to choose intelligently between them. For a man who has seen the daylight wane, a religion of the twilight may be better than none; but the wise man will not choose to walk by the stars when he may guide his steps by the light of the sun.

It is at this point that the second step in our argument begins. This requires us to show that the particular type of conviction which we associate with historic Christianity rests upon an experimental basis so permanent, and produces results

so beneficial to the individual and to society, that the hypothesis of the ultimate truth of the objects which it postulates is one which it is reasonable to entertain. Two points in particular it would seem to be necessary to prove in order to establish the validity of a Christian faith :—First, the fact that the object which the Christian religion presents for man's worship is large enough and many-sided enough to present points of contact with all the differing needs of the religious nature, as the history of religion has disclosed them ; and secondly, that it presents this object in a form sufficiently definite and enduring to preserve its character unchanged throughout the vicissitudes of human history, and so to make possible that accuracy of comparison without which scientific judgment is impossible.

And first, of the catholicity of Christianity. In a singular degree the Christian religion unites within itself characteristics which answer to each of these great outstanding needs of man. Its ideal of communion with God has the warmth and intimacy which characterise the religion of the mystic. But the God with whom its worshippers commune is not the nameless Absolute of the Indian religion, in the depths of whose mysterious recesses all distinctions vanish, but spirit, ethical, personal, manifesting Himself as loving will, and setting for His disciples in the Kingdom of God a task which involves the social transformation of the world. It has its profound sense of evil, and ceaselessly from the lips of its prophets sound the warning tones, "Repent, abstain." But this sense of evil, unlike that of the thorough-going pessimist, is not based upon a philosophy of ultimate despair, but is born through contemplation of an ideal of moral excellence so exalted that the highest righteousness which man has yet attained seems tarnished with the stain of sin ; while at the same time it is accompanied by the assurance of a divine supply of forgiveness and strength so inexhaustible as to make each recurring moral crisis a new minister to the buoyancy of its unconquerable hope. It is reverent of the past, having its Holy Scripture and its ancient traditions handed down from

generation to generation by the loving care of its worshippers ; but the truth which they enshrine is truth which makes its direct appeal to the reason and conscience of the individual, and by this test it claims at the last to be judged. Thus Christianity has something to offer to every need, and men of the most different types have found within it the satisfaction of their religious desires. The mystic and the rationalist, the individualist and the socialist, the man of sanguine temperament and the man of self-distrustful spirit, have all called themselves Christians, and each has found under the capacious shelter of the religion of Jesus a home and a refuge for the spirit.

Indeed, it is the great variety which is disclosed by the study of historic Christianity which constitutes one of the most serious obstacles in the way of establishing the Christian claim. It might not be impossible to show that it was *reasonable* to be a Christian, if we could first discover what it *means* to be a Christian. But this is just where the difficulty begins. For, as we have seen, almost every one of the great contrasts which we meet in the history of religion in general reappears within the confines of historic Christianity. How different is the world-view of a devout Catholic from that of a convinced Protestant ! The Greek Catholic, proud in the sole possession of the orthodox faith, looks upon the Roman Catholic, with his claim to a continuing tradition through the Papacy, as an upstart. Within Protestantism, the high churchman and the broad churchman stand at the antipodes, and the evangelical of the old school looks with equal suspicion upon the practices and beliefs of both. And when we pass from a study of schools and sects to the consideration of individual convictions, we find ourselves plunged in a variety so endless that any thought of agreement seems out of the question. If the truth we seek to defend be so broad as to include all these types, it would seem also to be so vague as to be little removed from the twilight religion with which we have contrasted it.

Yet real as is this difficulty, it proves on closer inspection to be less serious than would appear at first sight. For the

same science which reveals this diversity of type, enables us also to understand and to explain it. Not all that calls itself Christian can show an equally good title to the name. Like every growing thing, Christianity has had to live its life and to make its way in an alien environment. The variety inherent in its own nature as a religion of spirituality and freedom has been reinforced by contacts from without. Men of other faiths, attracted to the religion of Jesus by those features in which it most resembles their own, have brought with them ideas and practices which had their origin in different surroundings and were designed to minister to other needs. So there have grown up within Christianity types of religious life which have little in common with the genius of the original stock on which they were grafted, and which have been able to maintain their right to the Christian name only through the powerful influence of an indiscriminating tradition. Clearly, when it is a question of scientific discussion, it is necessary to return from these derived, and in part alien, forms to the parent stock, and to seek our standard for determining that which is truly Christian in the creative days when the new-born faith first vindicated its right to an independent existence and a distinctive name.

It is failure to observe this distinction between the parent stock and its derived forms which is responsible for much current criticism of Christianity. When Mr Garrod,¹ to take a recent example, would discard Christian morality as antiquated because it has no place for the individual virtues of chivalry and honour which bulk so largely in his own ideal of the religious life, he identifies Christian morality with the ascetic ideal which is so prominent in Catholicism; but Catholicism is only one of many forms which Christianity has assumed in the course of its history, and by no means the purest. In Protestant Christianity the virtues he extols have always found large recognition, and in this exaltation of the individual Protestantism has claimed, and with justice, to be

¹ In his *Essay, Christian, Greek, or Goth? The Religion of all Good Men*, New York, 1906.

true to the original teachings of the Master. A juster discrimination between Jesus' own ideal and that of later ages would have prevented the confusion, and shown that, instead of the substitution for historic Christianity of some newly invented religion of local origin, what is really needed is the recovery of that purer, simpler, and more human form of Christianity which the course of the later development has tended unduly to obscure.

It is precisely upon the fact that we are able to recover and to observe this parent type, that we base our belief in the possibility of giving a rational defence of Christian faith. Christianity differs from other religions not simply in the manifoldness with which it meets the differing needs of men, but in the fact that the ideal which it reveals is incarnated in a Person. In Jesus of Nazareth it presents us with a figure of definite character and distinct outline, through a study of whose life and teachings it is possible to distinguish between that which is truly Christian and that which is falsely so called, and so to obtain that standard of comparison which is the prime requisite in scientific inquiry. That only is Christian in the sense of our present discussion which expresses the spirit and promotes the ends for which the Founder lived ; that development only is legitimate which brings to clearer expression the principles by which His own life was regulated, and the faith by which His own conduct was inspired. Here we have the permanent which we seek in the midst of the changing, the type by which we may measure the later development, the norm to which we may bring all for final test.

This constant reference to the Christianity of Jesus must not, of course, be so understood as to call in question the legitimacy of the later development, provided only it be development and not perversion. It is the chief glory of the religion of the Nazarene that from the first it has promoted an independent religious life, and invited its worshippers to the same intimacy of communion with the Father which was enjoyed by the Master Himself. The manifoldness of the

points of contact between Christianity and other faiths, the freedom with which it has taken from them the truth and the beauty which they contain, is not a mark of its weakness, but of its strength, the proof that it is indeed the universal religion which it claims to be. What is meant is only that, in estimating the significance of the development through which Christianity has passed, the test of that which is truly Christian must be sought in the principles of the Master, and that no type of faith which is alien to His spirit and inconsistent with His ideals can rightly shield itself under the shelter of His Name.

Here is where the scientific method, which has contributed so largely to our understanding of the history of religion, has rendered its most signal service to Christian faith. Retracing the history of Christianity to its source, it has brought us, at last, face to face with Jesus. In Him we find a personality so comprehensive in His sympathies, so sane in His judgments, so uncompromising in His devotion to duty, so intolerant of meanness and hypocrisy, however speciously disguised, so full of faith in common men, and of joy in common things, so serene and untroubled in His trust in the unseen Spirit after whom all religion has been a reaching out through the dark, that we may well recognise in Him the revelation of that which is normal to the religious life of man. If the science of religion has shown us anything, it has shown that no type of religion which omits any of the elements which were essential to the religious life of Jesus has been able permanently to satisfy the heart of man, and, conversely, that there is no permanent need of the religious nature but can find in what He has to give its enduring satisfaction. But if this be true, it would seem to follow that the convictions by which He lived and for which He died form hypotheses which it is reasonable for us to employ in the solution of the religious problems of our own lives, and of the life of mankind.

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THE ALCHEMY OF THOUGHT.¹

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THE previous article concluded with an undertaking, perhaps rashly given, to entertain a problem the statement of which is prophetic of difficulty. The argument professed to lead up to the conception of philosophy as the Self-confession of the Whole. Now, the least we can demand of a world which tells its own story is that the story shall be consistent with itself. The voice that contradicts itself cannot, it would seem, be the voice of God ; the philosophy that says and unsays, that affirms and denies the same thing, is no part of a Divine Revelation. This, however, is precisely what philosophy appears to do. One philosopher grounds existence on matter, another on spirit ; one exhibits evolution as the progressive realisation of a moral ideal, another finds evolution absolutely unmoral ; one proclaims unity, another treats unity as a meaningless term. In the face of such contrariety, how shall we treat the assertion that philosophy is the Self-revelation of Unitary Being ?

The work of philosophy, like that of its kindred² occupation charity, begins—and ends—at home. Whatever ultimate truth or law the philosopher may discover, it is obvious that the process of discovery is itself subject to the law or truth discovered. The denial of this means that the law or truth is not ultimate. Thus Mr Joachim has written an extremely

¹ The sequel to an article published in the HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1907, under the title, "The Universe as Philosopher."

² See Fichte, *The Way of the Blessed Life*.

able defence of the "Coherence" theory of Truth. Does Mr Joachim's defence of the theory itself conform to the theory defended? I am far from saying it does not: I suggest only that conformity to the theory defended is essential to the validity of the defence. Again, in the field of speculative ethics there are theories of the Moral End (one need not name them) in the construction of which the philosopher shows no sign of being himself subject to any moral end whatever. There are others which, in the endeavour to give morality an assured scientific basis, let so many dangerous secrets out of the bag as to completely de-moralise any person who accepts their final results. No department of his business can vie with that of ethics in the number of temptations it offers the philosopher to detach himself from the moral order he is considering, and to evoke a set of ethical principles to which his own manual or treatise can only be regarded as one flagrant act of disobedience. And in general, any system of thought which fails to illustrate its own principles in the very process by which those principles are reached stands self-condemned. The philosophy which merely legislates for its "other" is worth little: that alone will stand secure which submits to be tested by its own standards and bows its neck under the yoke itself has set up. The consciousness of subjection to its own results is the breath of the nostrils of speculative thought. Nowhere else is the rule of "Practise what you preach" so stringent; and nowhere else is that rule treated with such sublime disdain. How great the temptation is to lay down a law which one violates in the very act of laying it down, few persons who climb the slippery heights of speculation can long remain unaware. Here, for example, is a system which proclaims the rule of universals, and itself remains a particular outside their sway. Here is one which places an everlasting gulf between subject and object, but in so doing bridges the gulf with its own arms, and is itself that very unity which it declares to be impossible. Here is one which teaches that man is free, on the ground that he is compelled to take that

view, and therefore not free to take any other. Here is one which announces determination, but pauses not to consider that determination loses its sting when it has thus been found out. Here is one which gives the Will priority over Reason, but does so by a process which is apparently an attempt to reason, and not to will, us out of our other beliefs.

To interpret experience is to control it. Experience will not submit to be treated as the *corpus vile* of a philosophical experiment. Of all the errors which have been suffered to creep in through the back-doors of the towers of speculation, I give the place of chief malignancy to the notion that experience is a kind of tailor's block, which, having already displayed a hundred different suits in the shop-window, remains on hand for the display of as many more. To suppose that knowledge, or volition, or feeling remains passive under our effort to understand it, and is the same when understood that it was before, is as though one were to say that the bacon which a man eats for his breakfast is still bacon when it has been digested and used up in the nourishment of his brain. An interpretation is a kind of alchemy which, when applied to any object, transforms that object through and through. The object *grows* in and with our knowledge of it; and this growth of the object is no mechanical addition of moments, no mere loading of the tailor's block with successive overcoats each a size bigger than its predecessor, but an organic process as genuinely such as the growth of an animal body. The results of each stage become the raw material of the stage following, not to be lost there nor destroyed, but to suffer a process of transubstantiation. A fact understood bears the same relation to the fact not understood, both as to its sameness and difference, as the man bears to the boy.

This, I imagine, will not be seriously disputed. Philosophers are ready enough to proclaim it—in regard to everybody's business but their own. In the walks of physical science illustrative instances might be gathered by the handful. When, however, we enter those realms of speculative philosophy

where this truth was born, and whence it has been announced, we encounter an order of "facts" to which it has seldom been applied. The most striking examples are, as I have said, in the field of ethical thought. It is surprising that John Mill, for instance, having explained the love of virtue as the love of pleasure in disguise, does not seem to have realised the effect of such a theory upon any person who should happen to close with it. Mill seems to have assumed that the love of virtue, confronted by this explanation of itself, would remain passive under the operation, and retain the place and character it had before. Plainly it would do no such thing. The moment I understand that what I am really aiming at is not virtue, as I previously supposed, but pleasure, all my delusions about the supereminence of virtue will vanish, and the love of virtue will, if I am true to my convictions, give place to an entirely different order of desire. I dreamt that I was in a palace: you have now awakened me to the truth that I am in a sty; and being awake you cannot expect me, as a rational being, to play at believing that my acorns are pearls and my wash the nectar of the gods. Assuming Mill's explanation of the love of virtue to be true, my only chance of retaining that love is to remain in total ignorance of the explanation. Similarly, Mr Sidgwick bases a loftier theory on the "reasonableness of Egoism." But a little reflection will disclose the interesting fact that (again assuming Mr Sidgwick's system to be true) the only egoists whose egoism would be reasonable are those who know nothing and suspect nothing of the conclusions to which Mr Sidgwick is leading them. No sooner do these unfortunate egoists close with Mr Sidgwick's conclusion, and look upon themselves under the searchlight of his Rational Utilitarianism, than they discover that nothing is more unreasonable than egoism: whereupon the basis of the theory will vanish entire. It is certainly reasonable to be an egoist provided you know no better; but such blissful ignorance the *Methods of Ethics* has rendered impossible; so that now

the position of the reasonable egoist becomes embarrassing to the last degree. He must either give up his egoism, and so leave Mr Sidgwick without a base of operations ; or he must stick to his egoism and defy Mr Sidgwick.

Yet another instance is afforded by the controversy about the Freedom of the Will. The process of proving the Will to be free is itself an instance of the exercise of free-will. On the theory of the organic unity of Reason and Will, which no competent psychologist will deny, it is obvious that the activity of a philosopher constructing a theory of moral freedom is as plain an instance of the operations of Will as that afforded by any kind of human activity whatsoever—as plain or perhaps plainer. To those who have made the attempt it will be evident enough that the realm of such inquiries is a realm of effort through and through, and of effort under law. Hence, whatever theory of moral responsibility you set up for conscious activity in general must apply to your own activity in setting up the theory, unless you would maintain the convenient but absurd proposition that as a philosopher you are exempt from the rule to which you are subject as a man. If a man's views as to the nature of the Will are determined for him by logical necessities over which he has no control ; if, that is to say, he can allege that Truth *compels* him to hold either this theory or that, then it must be remembered that this plea of compulsion by Truth is open equally to the honest fatalist, as to the honest libertarian ; and it is certain that the Truth which has compelled the man to adopt the one theory, say fatalism, cannot condemn him for conducting his life accordingly, nor hold him responsible for not conducting it as those other men do whom she has equally compelled to believe in free-will. Fatalism and free-will do not represent two ways of dealing with the same moral situation, which remains passive and unaffected whether we interpret it in one way or the other : they represent two entirely different moral situations, each of which becomes what it is precisely because we understand it in this way

rather than that. My theory of the Will creates my moral world. It follows that the construction of a theory of responsibility itself represents the supreme responsibility the human agent is capable of incurring, inasmuch as the nature of such a theory inevitably determines the attitude of all who accept it to all responsibilities whatsoever. A doctrine of freedom, therefore, which proves me morally free in regard to other activities, but cannot prove me free, in the same sense, in regard to each and all the steps by which I have reached that conclusion, has failed of its purpose. But how many of the apologies for free-will will stand that test?

It is not, however, in regard to such special problems as those noticed above that the constitutive function of interpretation is most fully operative. The function is seen at its maximum activity when we pass to that final view of things which metaphysic attempts. Now, the work of metaphysic is essentially that of building the universe. Whosoever offers me a final philosophy offers me a world. To accept the view, for instance, that the world is the manifestation of a good Spirit, or again of an unconscious Will, is to accept a principle according to which the whole length and breadth of my experience must henceforth be constituted and to which it must be conformed. The function of such a principle is essentially creative: whatsoever it touches, whether in the realm of perception or of morals or elsewhere, is changed as if by magic to a new thing. Nothing is left as it was before. The broad fact of the world becomes just such a fact as the principle makes it, and every one of my relations to that fact becomes charged with a corresponding meaning. To me, holding either one of these doctrines, nothing is what it would be if I held the other. Neither the stars in their courses, nor the moral law in the heart; neither God, my neighbour, nor myself retains the values under the second which they hold under the first. All are transvalued; and in so far as I may forsake either of these philosophies for the other, or for a third or a hundredth, the possibility of a fresh transfiguration of the world is ever before

me. So long, therefore, as thought is growing, the universe grows with it. And as there is no such thing as fixed, static and final thought, so there is no such thing as a fixed, static, and final world. The moral law even is no more "stablished for ever" than the mountains with which it has been compared. Nor is the case altered one whit if I adopt the pragmatic contention that a principle of unity is not to be found, that the world will submit to no kind of comprehensive synthesis. For those who assert the principle of unity and for those who deny it the position is the same. The Pragmatist is no less a world-builder than the Kantian. His philosophy is the offer of a new kind of world—the world of adventure—a world as strongly characterised, as sharply differentiated from others, as it would be if informed by any attributes which a rigid rationalism could confer. To say that the world cannot be interpreted is just to interpret the world in a particular way: to regard the Real as unknowable is to put a character on experience as definite and individual as the most enthusiastic Gnostic could desire. If you want a non-creative philosophy, you will not get it by exchanging Kant for James, Hegel for Spencer. When you have made the exchange you will find that you have not escaped from the necessity of constituting your world, but merely given up one way of constituting it in favour of another. The passage from the one system to the other is a stage in the evolution of the thought-process: it is one more illustration of the endless transformations to which the universe is subject under the alchemy of the interpreting mind. The thinker who does not perceive this, who fails to realise that things are "born again" in every fresh synthesis of their relations, that the world is for ever growing new under the process of understanding it, is a plougher of the hungry sand. It is with the objective world as it was with the water from "the well of Bethlehem by the gate" for which David was athirst: no sooner brought at the cost of human peril than it ceases to be water and becomes the blood of the mighty men who had risked their lives to obtain it, which

David cannot drink for all his thirsting, but must needs "pour out unto the Lord." So, too, the life of thought penetrates the substance of its objects and causes them to live in new forms according to the spirit of its own life.

By no great thinker has this truth been missed, though often forgotten, and those who are not among the greatest can seldom overlook it for long. How else shall we explain the ardour, the eagerness, the moral tension, the sense of a burden almost too great to be borne, which, easily discernible between the lines of all earnest thinking, betray the thinker in the acknowledgment of a tremendous responsibility? Why so much in earnest, we may well ask, if all you are doing is to take a reproduction of the world which makes no difference to the thing reproduced? It is with the thing and not with your reproduction that life has to do. Cannot Reality be trusted to take care of itself? Does the world need to sit for its photograph? Shall we not find out what the world is, and what life is, far better by looking at the thing than by looking at your wretched copy of it? Why trouble to interpret it at all? Why not leave it to tell its own tale? Why wear yourselves to shadows in trying to daub me a picture of the sun, when the sun itself is shining before me in all its glory and its strength? "What difference does it make?" What fruit have you of all these intellectual agonies if when your systems are complete I can learn nothing from them which I could not learn with infinitely greater success by turning my back on you and your works and going for first-hand information to the thing itself? If systems of philosophy are to be treated as so many photographs of Reality, which, needing not their aid, effectually asserts its own principles and declares its own nature independently of them, then it must be confessed that, of all the ridiculous exhibitions man has made of himself before high heaven, his attempts to interpret the universe or to prove it non-interpretable are the masterpiece. On such a theory of the function of philosophy Protagoras and Socrates, Hume and Kant, Butler and Nietzsche, Hegel and Spencer,

are to be classed without exception as self-tormentors, who must be strictly restrained from tormenting other people, and encouraged only for the "turn" they provide in the Folly Theatre of human life. When pressed by the question, "Why so hot?" not one of them would have a word to say. They must fall back on another view of their calling if they would justify their zeal. Zeal indeed they have, and that zeal is due to a conviction, implicit perhaps, that the work they are engaged on bears the issues of life and death. They are the builders of worlds, and they know it. To accept their conclusions is to put their value on the world: and when I put their value on the world, I *make* it precisely what it *is* for me.

At this point I would beg any reader who may be interested in the discussion to compare the result of the present argument with that which was offered at the conclusion of the first article. On the comparison of those results the possibility of further progress depends. Putting them side by side, they appear to be contradictions. In the first argument I was led to conclude that interpretations of the All-of-things proceed from that Reality which they profess to interpret; that to explain the world is, for anyone who regards himself as organically one with the world, to proclaim the ability of the world to explain itself,—thus attributing to the All-of-things precisely that kind and degree of intelligence of which the interpreter's own work is the manifestation. On this view systems of philosophy are so many self-confessions of Ultimate Reality, whether we call this God or by any other name. In the second argument just offered, we reach the opposite conclusion. Instead of the universe creating its own interpretation, we now see the interpretation creating the universe. In the first case we were led to see that the individual thinker, when he reflects on the part he is playing, and catches himself in the very act of trying to solve the riddle of the universe, finds himself compelled to surrender the torch, by the light of which he is working, to that universe whose riddles he is trying to

solve. So then it would appear that the individual thinker is completely swallowed up in the universal, and that no further proceedings are possible by which the universal may be compelled to disgorge him. Perhaps I may be pardoned for saying that when once the individual thinker has admitted that he himself is an organic element in Nature, the logic on which the above conclusion rests is irresistible. The will to resist still remains, but apparently there is no logical apparatus to give that will effect. But now all this has been reversed. In flat contradiction, as it would seem, to what has been before advanced, we have made the thinker responsible for the world, instead of making the world responsible for him. We have given a charter for world-building to an indefinite number of persons who may happen to be inclined to construct systems of philosophy. We have said that to interpret experience is to control it, *i.e.* to determine what is experienced, to make it mean what it does mean, and therefore to create the world of experience itself. Here, then, the individual thinker recovers his rights—recovers them with a vengeance, for he gets back more than he wants. And here again I will permit myself to say that, granting a few simple assumptions to begin with—given, as Kant would say, a favourable “orientation” at the outset,—there is no logical possibility of escaping the conclusion we have reached. If you insist on reading your experience exclusively from that end of it at which the experient stands, you will find that the philosophy at which you finally arrive actually creates for you the world you are investigating, and in so doing charges that world with all the problems and all the answers your philosophy professes to handle. We stand, therefore, in the presence of a situation which has all the characteristics of a fierce antinomy. Either conclusion has only to be stated to evoke a spirit of indomitable resistance. Yet both conclusions follow inevitably from certain assumptions; and the assumptions from which they follow are of such a kind that we cannot avoid making them in the ordinary process of thought.

Nothing can be further from the aim of the present writer than to disguise the intensity of this contradiction. Rather, as the sympathetic reader has discerned long ago, his aim is to bring the contradiction into the full light of day and to set it up, where it is seldom seen, by the main entrance to the City of Speculation. The statement of this antinomy is of course nothing new; but, except in a group of rare instances, it is not recognised that the seat of the opposition is in the philosophic consciousness itself. You find it in knowledge, and you propound a theory of knowledge to solve it: but what we may easily overlook—for no less a thinker than Kant overlooked it—is that in the theory of knowledge so propounded the antinomy turns up again in a conflict of opposites yet more intense. Not until we pass from the sphere of *νόησις* and enter that of *νόησις νοησέως* do we encounter the antithesis in the extremest form, and grasp the principle in which, if at all, reconciliation may be found. In other words, the only hope for a solution of this problem lies with that philosophy which begins at home. And till this is solved nothing is solved.

From the Master who has taught us that the principle which discovers contradiction is *eo ipso* the principle of reconciliation I have learnt what I have now to offer. It is plain that the world may be read in two ways: I have sought to indicate both ways in these essays; and we have seen that each reading contradicts the other. But the active principle which so reads the world must not be confused with what is read; and the reader must not be forgotten in the reading. If we can catch ourselves in the act of discovering the contradiction, we shall perceive that the conflicting elements stand over against one another just because they are so *held* by the strong arms of the spirit. The very contradiction in which we are all but finally involved is itself the doing of spirit. By means of this deeper unity, and because spirit is in possession of it, we may be able to grasp the truth that the two processes of thought we have considered, each leading to an opposite conclusion to that of the other, are not two but the

same, differing only as it is read from left to right or right to left. The opposite conclusions are not only intelligible but necessary, for the very reason that they lie within and are embraced by the unity of a universal Self-consciousness. As the two ends of a straight line are *extreme* opposites because it is the *same* straight line of which they are the opposing ends, so the negation of our first position by the second, and our second by the first, involves the spirit's consciousness of its dominion over both. Such a unity, far from being the empty abstraction it is often misrepresented to be, stands rather for the fulness of concrete reality. It is revealed, as we have now to show, as *the philosophic consciousness itself*, a true meeting-ground of God and man, in which the whole content of experience, grasped and transfigured by its final interpretation, is taken up into those higher meanings which the language of religion is alone able to express.

The results of human speculation are not a mere aggregate of inconsistent systems. The history of philosophy is the exhibition of a single life continuous with itself through the ages. In tracing the process of this life backwards from the mystical synthesis by which the soul loses and finds itself in God to the most rudimentary forms of knowledge, we follow in an inverse order the steps of the process of evolution in the external world. And again, in connecting one system of philosophy with another we shall find ourselves dealing with an organic whole, the parts of which, like the parts of a living body, are so related to one another that the withdrawal of any one of them, far from leaving the others more intelligible by its absence, has the immediate effect of weakening the vital principle in virtue of which all the systems have their being. So closely knit is the organism of the world's thinking that the deletion of any one of its members would threaten the life of the whole. A universe which is tolerant of the spiritual interpretation cannot dispense with the sceptical; just as, in the absence of the spiritual, there is nothing for the sceptic to

doubt. The very affirmation of God is an unthinkable contradiction in a world which provides no room for His denial; and the sceptical denial, when it comes, always turns out to be undertaken in the interests of a positive Better which presupposes a positive Best. Both affirmation and denial are organic to the unitary life of Reason. This point attained—and I freely admit that it is not easy: but what deep truth is?—a heavy burden will fall from the shoulders of thought. The problem with which we set out, that of understanding diversity in the self-confessing of the Supreme, will pass out of sight. The universe stands no longer chargeable with self-stultification in the multiplicity of its utterances. These utterances are the self-revelations of one reality. In their diversity they are as the single words of a sentence, meaningless till we read into them the one meaning which the sentence conveys: they are as the scenes of a drama, which tell us nothing when torn from their context in the action of the play: they are as the organs of the body, which live and die, flourish and perish, in the unitary life of the system to which they belong. The total life which is rich enough to require the tiger as well as the good Samaritan for its full manifestation requires also Nietzsche as well as St John, the Pragmatist as well as the Kantian, and Thomas à Kempis as well as James Mill.¹ It requires them, were it only to make them share in their own refutation, rise on stepping-stones of their dead selves, and partake of what is Best—namely, a Becoming Better. By nothing short of such diversity can the final unity be declared. With a unitary life, thus diversely expressed, the philosophic consciousness holds communion; there lies the field of its experience; and the history of that experience is the history of the world.

The philosophic consciousness has received but scanty treatment in the British schools. From Plato to Plotinus its rights were recognised by the Greeks; but by Plotinus its

¹ I believe this is a reminiscence of Professor Royce, but I have failed to discover the passage.

contents were refined away until it came to mean nothing but a vision of pure truth abstracted from all contents whatsoever. Such vision was supposed to be the prerogative of God and godlike minds. This remains the standard account which the philosophic consciousness gives of itself. But it is evident that no intelligent consciousness can be associated with these conditions. To be aware of truth in the abstract, *i.e.* to be aware of truth only as true, is to be aware of nothing. Intelligent consciousness is comparative and self-discriminating, and to suppose a higher form of consciousness to which this does not apply is to speak of a consciousness which is not conscious. A being limited to any single experience, whether of truth or anything else, obviously would not rise even to the level of knowing that anything was the matter with him; unless, indeed, you commit the atrocious fallacy which has been the bane of psychology ever since it became a science, and suppose that it means to the experient himself precisely what it means to you, the student of the situation. In the same way the common talk about beings who enjoy an unclouded vision of the truth is disguised as to its absurdity by the reservation that the visionaries in question, in addition to their vision, have been let into the secret of our philosophy, and know what they are after as well as we do. On their supposition, no doubt they will understand the blessedness of their condition and be able to join us in our hymns. But it is evident that in this way we have entirely destroyed the unitary character of their experience. The simplicity of their contemplation must be utterly broken up before they can know, as we know, how simple their contemplation is. Until we thus break up the conditions of a unitary experience of the truth, the consideration of such experience cannot be proceeded with: which is another form of saying that the whole undertaking is absurd. The attempt to set up a form of consciousness occupied in the sole contemplation of the truth does not carry us *upwards* to God, or to man at his highest, but *downwards* to the worm and the amoeba.

This may serve as a warning against that over-refinement in the conception of God which springs from timidity and would keep Him sacrosanct in the holiness of exclusion, lest He be stained by contact with the finite. The disposition to refine it is natural and strong: hence the danger lest we refine it away altogether. In the whole realm of thought there is no partition so thin as that which divides God from nothing, and such is the eagerness of the soul in its flight Godwards that it constantly breaks through and plunges into the abyss on the other side. Certain forms of Buddhism, and Plotinus among the mystics of the West, have done this. But when once philosophy has reached the point of conceiving God as the only True, or the truly Real, the moment has come for thought to return upon itself. Not a step further can be taken, and the warning to turn back is instant and peremptory. If thought neglects the warning, and tries to refine once more its last refinement; if thought ever seeks to rest in its goal and refuses to continue the endless cycle of its allotted movement, it passes the boundary between God and nothing, and enters the realm from which there is no return. More precisely, we are helped by the negative result that the correlate of a unitary whole is not the single experience of the Truth as true. The unity of the whole must not be taken, as Professor James seems to take it, as the mere equation that the whole = 1, nor is the self-consciousness of such a whole—"I am one"—exhausted in the consciousness that $1 = 1$. To be conscious of self at all I must be conscious of myself in many forms, including that of not-self, and conscious of my own variability among them. It is either with this meaning or no meaning that we attribute self-consciousness to the whole. If the whole knows itself at all, it knows itself as many-wise interpreted and determined; and it is in the light of this principle that room may yet be found for regarding "the Monism of Spinoza, the Dualism of Martineau, the Pluralism of James" as the self-confessions of a Single Being.

Every system of thought, as we have seen, has its being in

relation to the systems from which it differs. If we tear any one of them from its place in the living whole, and regard it without reference to the body of which it is a member, we find ourselves in the presence of a perfectly empty conception. Let the reader who doubts this try to explain to some novice the meaning of monism without employing the conception of pluralism as a means for making his explanation intelligible. He will find himself making bricks without straw. Systems of thought other than *this* are to philosophy what facts other than *this* are to perception, what organs other than *this* are to the living body: and just as this concrete fact fades into an empty abstraction when the relations are broken which bind it to others, so a particular philosophy sheds all its contents the instant you regard it as self-contained. To speak of a philosopher whose philosophic consciousness contains nothing but his own mode of thought is, as before, to make it contain nothing at all. The absolute idealist, for instance, whether he be a god or a man, is one who offers a solution of problems which have arisen from systems other than Absolute Idealism. Remove these other systems from the contents of the philosophic consciousness, and no problems are left for him to answer—his occupation has gone, and himself, as absolute idealist, has gone with his occupation. Let us suppose that in course of time the whole race of man comes round to his way of thinking, and let the victory of Absolute Idealism be so complete as not only to refute all other systems, but to erase them from the world of thought and cause them to be utterly forgotten. It would be a Pyrrhic victory. In forgetting the others, Absolute Idealism would forget itself. It would drag itself along with its opponents into the pit of oblivion, and none would be left either to rejoice over its fall or to celebrate its triumph. A world possessed of a single type of philosophy is a world which has ceased to philosophise; and as there is no knowledge which is not knowing, so there is no philosophy which is not philosophising.

Once again, the pragmatic consciousness contains a manifold of elements which, while essential to its being, need careful distinction from Pragmatism itself. The significance of Pragmatism is bound up with its attempted rejection of Idealism, and one may well ask what would become of Pragmatism if there were no Idealism to reject. The conflicts of the philosophic consciousness are determined not otherwise than the conflicts of desire in the moral life. As in the conflict between hunger and honesty I must ideally present myself as satisfied in both ways before I can freely determine myself as realised in either, so I must reproduce Idealism and become ideally an idealist before I can decide that Idealism is not for me. This is what is meant by a thinker's rejection of Idealism, viz. that he rejects it as a mode of the philosophic consciousness *through which he has passed and into which he can return*, but in which he has decided not to remain. Short of having thus reproduced Idealism and made it his own, he has no competence to reject it, whether pragmatically or otherwise. You must pay your adversary the compliment of understanding him before you prove him in the wrong. And understanding him means that for the time being you take up his consciousness into your own. Ere you can escape from the Kantian position, or persuade me to follow, you must show that you are really there yourself; *i.e.* you must reproduce in yourself (and so must I) the Kantian consciousness. Then, and then only, are you and I in a position to discuss the question of getting away from that condition into a better. It is an interesting question how far the pragmatic method can be applied to the process, through which every serious pragmatist must pass, of understanding the systems which are not pragmatic; how, for instance, the comprehension of Kant by James, as the logical *prius* to his rejection, conforms to the principles in the name of which he is rejected. But that is beyond the strict limits of our subject.

The points I have desired to make clear by these illustrations are that the philosophic consciousness is a manifold

embraced in a unity; that the very conception of philosophy involves a variety of progressive but divergent forms, for the same reason that morality involves a variety of conflicting desires not on the same level; that philosophy is an organic whole, the logical *prius* of all the philosophies; that its history is the evolution of a continuously developing life; that this life in each and all of its diverse manifestations is the expression of one and the same ultimate principle; that the full expression of this principle is the goal of the whole process, never attained under finite conditions; that no system is unnecessary which another system can use as raw material for a fuller expression; that that system, therefore, comes nearest to Absolute Truth which shows the largest capacity for taking up the others into itself by means of the principle which is the living spring of them all.

To guard such conclusions against all possible misapprehension is here out of the question. But it will help to reveal their true nature if I simply set down what in my judgment would be the extreme form of misunderstanding them. If it were said, "Your one philosophy, then, is just the sum total of all the systems, each of which stands in relations of equality to all the rest, externally coexistent in one collection, so that none is afore and none after, but every one as good as his neighbour,"—I should answer that such a position is not only unwarranted by the course of the argument, but is negated by it at every point. To say that philosophy is the mere sum total of the systems, is as absurd as to say that a fully developed organism is the sum total of the stages of its evolution; while to treat all the varieties of human thought as equal manifestations of the truth is to make the acorn equivalent to the oak. In philosophy, as in every other form of evolving life, antagonisms are possible only because they are embraced by a unitary principle, whose vitality they express in their conflict, and develop by their reconciliation into higher truth. In philosophy, again, it is the whole that constitutes the parts, and not the parts that, by addition, constitute the

whole; and truth, far from being equally distributed among the parts, is exactly proportioned to the measure in which any part reveals the secret of the whole.

We are so absorbed in explaining what we in our philosophies think about God, that we seldom pause to inquire what God may be thinking about our philosophies. When so much is being said of the unity of God and man, it is at least not irreverent to ask what part or interest, if any, the Divine Being is taking in these manifold human speculations as to His own nature. Various alternatives suggest themselves.

(1) We may suppose, if we will, that these speculations lie entirely outside the sphere of Divine knowledge. The Infinite, we may say, knows the secret of its relation to the finite, but we have no reason to suppose that this knowledge coincides, either in whole or in part, with the account of the matter given by any human intelligence: perhaps God may choose to ignore such accounts altogether. Knowing Himself as He really is, God may know nothing of Himself as proved by Descartes, presupposed by Hegel, or postulated by James.

(2) We may suppose that there is some one among these accounts with which the Divine self-consciousness is somehow identified. God may know Himself as the postulate of James or as the Moral Ordainer of Martineau, and know nothing of Himself as the *Ens entium* of the scholastics, or the One Substance of Spinoza. As a person recognises himself in his own photograph, so the Divine Being may recognise Himself in *this* philosophy and reject all the others as false. I imagine that this is the way in which most persons who think about the matter at all tend to think about it at first. And with this a good, honest, mechanical theology may rest content. That a God, who is one among the objects of the universe, should identify Himself with one among the many theories of His own nature seems consistent enough.

The doctrine of Divine Immanence, in the form which represents God as the Life of Thought, "the Master-light of

all our seeing," is now so common, and endorsed by thinkers otherwise so sharply opposed, that we may take it as the clue to the final issue, which is now before us. Like much of the language of which religion makes frequent use, the description of God as the Life of Thought is apt to be adopted by persons who have the vaguest notions of what it means or involves. If it means anything at all, it cancels both the alternatives we have just discussed. For, as we have seen, human thinking, throughout the ages, is not a chaos of fragmentary and unrelated efforts, but a continuous organic process, each moment of which has a necessary function in the constitution of the whole. It is only, therefore, as the Life of the whole process, considered as the manifestation of a unitary principle, that the conception of God as the Life of Thought has any meaning whatsoever. To reserve this view of God for the moment when our favourite philosopher is thinking, and to refuse to apply it when the torch passes to his critics, is as much as to say that divine light is limited to that kind of thought which happens to commend itself to us. This, of course, renders the whole doctrine perfectly futile. We must either abandon the conception altogether, or be prepared to say that God is not less able than man to regard Himself as either postulated, presupposed, proved, or denied, and that, as the Life of the total organism of thought, He could not regard Himself under any one of these forms did He not also regard Himself under the rest, and perhaps in infinite other ways which human thought does not touch.¹

The final step is taken when the doctrine of Divine Immanence is extended to that very doctrine itself—when, that is, God is regarded as the life of that thought which thinks Him as immanent in all thinking. Here the philosophy which begins at home will end at the home where it began; the return of thought upon itself will be complete. The doctrine of Divine Immanence must submit to its own yoke. Let the reader who believes that the life of reason is the manifestation

¹ Cf. the Infinite Attributes of Spinoza's Substance.

of a divine principle be on his guard against reserving one moment in the life of reason in which the divine principle has no part, the moment, namely, when reason declares for the Immanence of God. The reservation of such a moment as outside the circle to which Divine Immanence applies is tantamount to saying that, whereas God is the life of all other thought, He is *not* the life of that thought which is turned upon Himself. An admission more fatal to the conception of an immanent God it would be impossible to frame. If this, the last deliverance of the reflecting process, has to stand on one side as a human product; if, that is, while the science which is turned upon Nature and man is a reproduction of Divine thought, the science which has God Himself for its object is an affair for which finite minds alone are responsible, we can only say that the doctrine of the Indwelling God is cleft and shattered into an incoherent and unthinkable proposition. This point reached, the further consequences must be faced. Having admitted that God is the life of thought concerning Himself, we cannot limit this truth to our own mode of thinking. If God is in the thought that is about Himself, He is in that thought *in all its organic diversity* as the living Principle progressively revealed in its growth. We have seen that to tie self-consciousness to any single form is to annihilate it altogether. If, therefore, any meaning whatsoever attaches to the idea of a self-conscious Absolute, there is involved in the Absolute a plurality of self-expressions so diverse as to comprise the extreme forms of difference, even as they are comprised in self-consciousness such as our own. Not only, therefore, is a plurality of self-expressions *compatible* with the unity and self-consciousness of the whole, but it is an inherent logical *necessity* if we are to speak of God in any of the terms that are applicable to Spirit.

L. P. JACKS.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

THE GOSPEL OF KRISHNA AND OF CHRIST.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, p. 77.)

To those who are casting about for any form of religion other than the Christian, the mere title "Gospel of Krishna" will doubtless be pleasant; and the article itself may, to the unwary, seem a veritable revelation. But there are reasons, not a few, and best known to those living where Krishna-worship has existed and is fast fading, why the belittling of such a word as "gospel" by attaching it to the name Krishna is little less than repulsive to every Christian feeling. Of such feeling and its cause the writer of the article seems ignorant; but if comparative religion is to be worth anything it cannot content itself with the faintest outline of those whom it would compare with the Christ. The portraiture must be complete, and then the pitiful contrast will be as obvious as the apparent similarity. The cause of truth will not gain by the theosophic device of accepting and magnifying the latter and concealing the former.

In instituting any comparison between the mythological Krishna and the historic Christ, was it not due to your readers to remind them that the Bhagavad Gîtâ, the contents of which alone are considered, is a mere interpolated fragment of 700 lines in the great epic, the Mahâbhârata, which consists of 200,000 lines divided into eighteen sections or Parvans? In the Bhagavad Gîtâ Krishna is the mere mouthpiece of a philosopher who wishes to reconcile conflicting systems of thought, while in no less than fourteen Parvans of the great poem we have such pictures of the Krishna life as only a pagan imagination could paint and a pagan sensuousness love. And these doubtless are an integral part of the Gospel of Krishna.

To take a few of the sections only; in the *Adi Parvan* Krishna appears on the scene as a beneficent prince bestowing on a newly-married couple thousands of young and beautiful female servants; and on a later occasion, distributes costly presents to women "unsteady with wine." The *Sabha*

Parvan depicts him in public assembly striking off the head of King Sisupála, whose speech had offended him. In the *Vana Parvan* he is an ascetic who lived for thousands of years on water and stood for a hundred years on one leg while subsisting upon air. The *Udyoga Parvan* turns the prince into a deity whose body emits myriads of gods brilliant as lightning. In the *Bhishma Parvan*, which contains the Bhagavad Gîtâ, Krishna on the eve of battle is made to utter the whole of its philosophy to Arjuna, to prove to him, when his conscience troubles him, that he does no wrong in slaughtering his kinsmen. That is his caste duty as a soldier. In the *Drona Parvan* Krishna tries to bring about the defeat of Drona in battle, by falsely reporting to him that his son is slain. Such falsehoods he further defends in the *Karna Parvan* whenever it is a case of marriage, of illicit relations with women, of possible loss of one's whole property, or the defence of a Brahman. "These five kinds of falsehood have been declared to be sinless." And it requires no very long experience in India to ascertain how willingly this teaching has been accepted and consistently obeyed. The same doctrine Krishna further expounds in the *Salya Parvan* as follows:—"If I had not adopted such deceitful ways in battle, victory would never have been yours, nor kingdom, nor wealth. You should not take it to heart that this foe of yours has been slain deceitfully." The *Anusasana Parvan* presents Krishna as the worshipper of Shiva and praying to him for "firmness in virtue, the slaughter of his enemies, the highest fame, the greatest power, ascetic devotion, Shiva's proximity, and hundreds upon hundreds of children." The *Mausala Parvan* describes how Krishna compasses the death of a tribe of warriors (Yadavas) by taking in his hand a bundle of the grass that grew near and which turned at his touch into a deadly weapon of iron. Finally, Krishna is himself shot by a hunter whose arrow pierced his foot, in fulfilment of a previous prophecy.

Much of this is clean and wholesome compared with the details given in the Vishnu Purana (Bk. 5), in the Bhagvata Purana, and in the Hari Vansa. In these we have the crudest pictures of Krishna as a disobedient, mischievous and thieving child, a sensuous youth, and a man said to have been possessed of eight queens, one of whom he stole on the eve of her being married to someone else, and 16,000 wives. For these stories, not a few of which are unprintable, the reader is referred to the Sacred Books of the East, volumes which, in view of such articles as the one under consideration, will need far more frequent handling in the future than they have received in the past. Can it be wondered at that, as Bishop Caldwell said, "The stories related of Krishna's life do more than anything else to destroy the minds and corrupt the imagination of Hindu youth"? That it has done so is abundantly proved historically by the gross immorality carried on in the name of religion, especially by the Vallabhas, a sect founded in the sixteenth century, whose religious ideal was sensuous enjoyment after the manner of Krishna. Their descendants too, the Maharâjas, who have been regarded as incarnations of Krishna, have carried on the

awful tradition, and as late as 1862, when a suit was instituted for the purpose of exposing their corrupt life, the following statement was made in the judgment given by Sir Matthew Sausse, the Chief Justice :—

“The Maharâjas have been sedulous in identifying themselves with the god Krishna by means of their own writings and teachings and by the similarity of ceremonies of worship and addresses which they require to be offered to themselves by their followers. All songs connected with the god Krishna, which were brought before us, were of an amorous character, and it appeared that songs of a corrupting and licentious tendency, both in ideas and expression, are sung by young females to the Maharâjas upon festive occasions, in which they are identified with the god in his most licentious aspect. In these songs, as well as stories, both written and traditional, which latter are treated as of a religious character in the sect, the subject of sexual intercourse is most prominent. Adultery is made familiar to the minds of all : it is nowhere discouraged or denounced ; but, on the contrary, in some of the stories, those persons who have committed that great moral and social offence are commended.”

In the light of facts of this kind it comes as no slight shock to read that “the ideal which Jesus Christ held up to his followers is essentially the same as that which Krishna proposed to Arjuna” (p. 84) ; and again, “the Gospel of Krishna and the Gospel of Christ have, in fact, the same ultimate aim.”

Doubtless the writer refers only to the Krishna of the *Gîtâ*, but the lamentable fact remains that he is one and the same as the Krishna of the *Puranas* ; and, as Prof. A. Holtzmann says, “What fatality impelled the Indians to elevate such a man into an incarnation of the Supreme Deity is an, as yet, unsolved enigma.” But granted that a less offensive Krishna is presented in the *Gîtâ* and that many points of similarity may be found between its teaching and that of the New Testament, yet is it possible for the reader of the *Gîtâ* to feel that he is breathing any purer or more morally elevating atmosphere than that of the paganism in the midst of which Christianity was born and over which it triumphed ? It has been often pointed out that the character of Arjuna in his reluctance to slaughter his own kinsmen is more noble than that of the god Krishna who urges him to do so ; and in saying, “The four castes emanated from me, by the different distribution of energies and actions ; know me to be the author of them, though the actionless and inexhaustible” (B.G. iv. 13), Krishna is justifying the existence and perpetuation of the bitterest class-feeling which any nation has known and the strongest barrier to any realisation of the brotherhood of man. This can hardly commend itself to the Christian any more than the amalgam of pantheism and polytheism which the *Gîtâ* attempts to make. He who has learned to commune with God, not as the sum total of the forces of the universe nor as that noumenal somewhat about which nothing can be asserted, but as the personal, moral Governor of the universe, a Holy Father, immanent yet transcendent, is as little disposed to worship him merely as “primal unity” as to say to himself “I

am Brahma," and set about worshipping himself; and he who has realised in any degree what sin meant to the One Perfect Man, and has learned to say

"They who fain would serve Thee best,
Are conscious most of wrong within,"

will be slow to speak of moral evil merely as one of the terms of a "pair of opposites" which will ultimately vanish; nor will he have anything in common with those who speak of "going beyond the stage of ethical consciousness," whether in Europe or Asia. And since both personality and morality must be ascribed to the Supreme Being as also to man, the various devices offered in the Gîtâ by which man can rise superior to both must appear to the Christian as nothing better than false. Renunciation, self-sacrifice, and altruism should be his daily food; but at the same time a will directed toward the good, holy desire and spiritual affection are his eternal possession by means of which he appropriates the life of God, and for him merely to seek the annihilation of Nirvâna would be a selfishness subversive of the highest good.

"The Indian sages seek for a participation in the divine life, not by pure feeling, high thought, and strenuous endeavour—not by an increasing effort to learn the true and do the right—but by the crushing out of every feeling and every thought, by vacuity, apathy, inertia and ecstasy" (Gough on the Philosophy of the Upanishads). This is not the Eternal Life offered by Christ.

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ANANTAPUR, SOUTH INDIA.

TRUST, FAITH, BELIEF, CREED.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, p. 142.)

In this paper, remarkable rather for its vagueness, Professor Henry Goodwin Smith tells his readers that "Our Protestant churches are still entangled in the meshes of the ambiguous idea of 'faith in Christ.'" "The theory [he says] that faith [he is using the term *faith* in the sense of *trust*] in Christ necessitates certain beliefs concerning Him has never been productive of the fruits of the spirit, except among those who held identical beliefs"—whatever the last phrase may mean. And he adds, "The great message, Faith [*i.e.* Trust] alone, which led Paul out of Jerusalem and Luther out of Rome, is beckoning us out of Geneva and the Wartburg."

With all due deference, we would suggest that it was *Belief*, not Trust, which prompted St Paul to travel, and that it was Pride that drove Luther from Rome. Be this as it may, it concerns us not; what strikes us as very curious is Professor Smith's play with terms. "Trust in God is faith, faith is belief, belief may mean creed, but creed is not equivalent

to trust in God." Surely, Trust is faith only in a sense. That faith, in the technical theological sense, is trust or confidence, we deny: that trust is faith in *one* sense we admit; that faith is belief we agree; and that "creed is not equivalent to trust," we do not wish to dispute: but that faith and trust are, in the technical sense, co-responding terms, we think absurd to suppose.

Hitherto, for our part, we have considered that Faith is an act of the *intellect*, commanded and brought about by the will; it is "the substance [or reality] of things that appear not" (Heb. xi. 1); the motives of credibility convince the reason that God has spoken, and then the will commands the *intellect* to assent (often to what it cannot understand) on the authority of God.

Trust, on the other hand, is merely, as Professor Smith lays down, "an attitude of the soul, an inward, spiritual experience," *which must be brought about*, and that by faith and reason, or by reason and faith. Trust rests in Faith, but it is distinct from faith, for it is something over and above. It is *consequent* on faith.

Now, Professor Smith tells us that the "English word 'Faith' is found only once in the Old Testament in the revised version," namely, at Habakkuk ii. 4. He tells us also that the Hebrew word there used, *Emunah*, means "steadfastness, unshaken confidence," and not faith, in the sense of belief. He then proceeds to point out that St Paul takes this very text, "The righteous shall live by his faith," as the "corner-stone of his gospel," and that the English version elucidates the text by a marginal comment—"Or, in his faithfulness."

"The thought of the passage," says the Professor, "has nothing in common with creed or belief or faith in the intellectual sense." "Yet," he continues, "with this text as his chief scriptural warrant, Paul showed the futility of justification by legalism." Without here entering into the side-issue raised by "legalism," may we ask the learned Professor whether he has forgotten, for the moment, that St Paul has quite another meaning for the term "faith" when he quotes, at Rom. i. 17 and Gal. iii. 11, the text of Habakkuk? The Hebrew word *אֱמוּנָה* undoubtedly signifies "steadfastness" and confident trust; but the LXX. word *πίστις* (*ἐκ πίστεως*)—which St Paul made use of—clearly allows of another meaning, namely faith in the sense of *belief*; and this signification the apostle was quick to seize upon to support the whole purport of his epistle—to wit, the necessity of *belief*.¹ Euripides had used the term *πίστις* in the sense of *belief*, 400 years before. Whether St Paul is to be justified for twisting the meaning of the original, I do not presume to discuss; but the accepted LXX. rendering of *Emunah* allowed him the chance, and he accepted it. As to Habakkuk, the entire Book is a masterly statement of belief: God is He who is; the proud whose "soul is lifted up" shall be undone, and the humble man of trust and steadfastness shall be justified.

¹ Cf., on this matter, Hastings' *Dict. Bible*, vol. ii., p. 272.

From this somewhat lame start, Dr Smith argues that the term "faith" merely means "trust": from a particular instance he jumps to a general conclusion. He says nothing of the hundreds of times in the New Testament when "faith" does *not* mean "trust" (principally), but signifies *belief*. Thus, belief (*i.e.* intellectual assent) is beside the point for us Christians, and trust in (*i.e.* reliance on) Christ is all that is necessary for a Christian's salvation. The sequel naturally points the moral, namely, that a *creed*, which after all is only the verbal summary of the truths proposed for intellectual assent, is unnecessary.

"Trust, faith, belief, creed," he continues, "are waymarks along a tremendous transition of Christian thought. They indicate the sad descent from real religion, from the mountain of the Vision, from free and immediate communion with God, down to the arid and monotonous plain of conformity to phrase." This seems to us an absolutely illogical statement. We should be inclined to quite reverse the order, and show that the Vision of God should come not at the commencement, but at the end, of the string of terms. Faith, belief, creed, and trust is the true order; for rational Trust is (and can only be) the outcome of the other three. How can a man have "free and immediate intercourse with God," if he knows Him not? if he has no idea of His attributes? But the Professor does admit that "Trust assumes *some* knowledge of God, *but this knowledge is neither source nor essence of the trust.*" (The italics are mine.) On the contrary, we would maintain that "this knowledge" must *necessarily* be the *whole* source and essence of any trust at all.

"The two exhibitions of faith which Jesus commended most highly were shown by the Roman centurion at Capernaum and by the Syro-Phœnician women. In both cases His encomium was drawn forth by the simple declaration of confidence in His ability and willingness to heal." Quite so, but, to quote only one example, let us instance the occasion when Jesus asked His disciples whom men said He was. Turning to Peter, Jesus asked: "And whom do you say I am?" And Simon answered and said: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." And Jesus said to him: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-Jona, for flesh and blood have not revealed this thing to thee [no soul-attitude of thy own], but my Father Who is in heaven." And, if words can mean anything in this critical age, Jesus gave to Peter the highest reward he could possibly name—the Keys to the Kingdom of Heaven, and He told him that "whose sins ye shall loose, shall be loosened, and whose sins ye shall retain, shall be retained." Peter had his faith; he spoke his creed; there is no mention of trust: yet his reward was immeasurable. Trust in God is, of course, most excellent; but Trust without Faith is pure presumption and utterly void, for "he that believeth not shall be damned" (Mk. xvi. 16).

Now, how can a man believe in the veracity of another, unless he first allows intellectual assent? And, if he grants this assent on grounds of sound judgment, must he not be able to put into definite words his formal expression of belief? He should be able, surely, to speak his *faith*, *i.e.*

say why and wherefore he *trusts*. By analogy, if a man trusts in Christ, must he not believe Christ is a being, a man reliable in his veracity? And, if Christ is to be believed, and is to take him out of the sphere of the natural and into the regions of the supernatural, does he not need to know *why* Christ should be believed and relied upon? And if so, is not a *creed*, expressed or implied, a corollary? Can trust, then, be separated from definite belief? In proportion as the belief is definite may the trust become determined. Indeed, without intellectual belief (in however undeveloped a state) trust is impossible, unless it is irrational. Who would be inclined to give a purse of golden sovereigns for safe keeping into the hands of a stranger? If Christ was merely man, even a superlatively good man, how could we "Trust in Him," without belief? We put our confidence, our unshaken trust, in Christ, not because we know nothing definite about Him, not because we know Him to be man; but because we *believe without doubting* that He is the Son of the living God, and only for that reason. Hence, it is quite useless to talk of "Trusting in the Lord Jesus," unless one *believes* (with intellectual assent) that Christ is God. *Faith*, in the strict sense of *belief*, is necessary, before the will can operate on the heart to trust.

The corollary of this is that *dogma* (*i.e.* definite creed), which is merely the expression of the belief which prompts the trust, is a necessity to a thinking man, and without it (to a reasoning being) trust becomes nothing more nor less than a confidence which is irrational. Hundreds and thousands may trust with no reason at all; but if any one of them "thinks in his heart," belief (in the theological sense) is a *sine quâ non* unless he wishes his trust to be shatterable, as based on a bubble. A man who trusts and has not faith, is like unto him who expects the cart to go without the horse.

But Professor Smith advocates the removal wholesale of the inconvenient distraction of creeds, *i.e.* definite belief and dogma, and he counsels (blind) trust—as the one thing necessary. Verily, if perplexed Protestantism is to *rely* on Christ and yet not *believe* in Him, it will inhabit a castle without a foundation. For, if we do not believe and know concerning Christ, how can we really trust or rely on Him; in that case, why should we? Nevertheless, Professor Smith is persistent, and he insists that it is now high time that Protestantism should remove the foundations of its belief, and continue the superstructure in the air!

When the writer speaks of the lamentable variety of creeds in Protestantism, we recollect again that a creed is merely, as already pointed out, a summary of truths taught by Christ (as those holding the creeds maintain) for *all* Christians to believe. Necessarily only one creed in the world can be right and the Truth; and that Truth can only be proposed to us by a competent authority: before accepting it we must know that that authority is infallible, and if once infallible it must always remain infallible; for there is no reason to suppose that God would reveal His Christ to us twenty centuries ago rather than now, unless He provided

that His teaching should remain. His Christ on earth declared that not even the gates of hell would prevail to upset or overthrow it. It is, therefore, only faith founded on a Rock which can endure for all time.

DOM J. BASIL WELD, O.S.B.

FORT AUGUSTUS, N.B.

II.

Is there not in this article some confusion of two separate lines of thought? The writer contends that faith in God is a soul-attitude, unshaken personal confidence, self-surrender; and that in this complete act of trust the intellectual element, though not wholly absent, is still not predominant. With this we should all agree, and this is the language many of us use. But the writer adds that belief in "the Lord Jesus Christ," as "Son of God," "exemplar and Saviour," "the way unto the Father," is also an attitude of soul, hardly, if at all, connected with intellectual judgment, and therefore essentially the same thing as trusting in Jehovah. Is this so? Faith in God is the result of spiritual instinct. We do not, in the first instance, infer Him from evidence, or receive Him through testimony; He anticipates external proof; He is known from within. But the entrance into the outer world of a historical personality, born of a woman, in the likeness of sinful flesh, does not appeal to antecedent instinct, and does not command instinctive response. We are not, then, surprised to find that in the Gospel narrative the instances of disbelief in Christ far outnumber the instances of belief. For each of the above titles involved a personal claim, and a personal claim is not admitted without credentials—here the mental factor comes in—and the credentials were by many not thought to be sufficient. Either, then, the titles ought to be kept out of the writer's argument, or the confession of faith which retains them must be a credal confession.

But, says the writer, no acknowledgment of these claims was ever demanded of those who would enter the kingdom of God: "the trustful attitude toward him was the essence of the faith he commended, entirely apart from any intellectual theory of his person or work." First, we may ask, what were the claims? If we go no further than St Mark's Gospel, as the author of *Ecce Homo* has shown, we find that Jesus claimed: (1) to be the Messiah (viii. 29, 30; ix. 41; xii. 6; xiv. 62); (2) inexpressible personal rank and dignity (xii. 36, 37; xii. 6, 7); (3) the right to revise and reinterpret the Mosaic Law (ii. 28; x. 4); (4) the power to forgive sins (ii. 10). Why were these claims made, if it were quite immaterial whether they were accepted or not? and is it possible to accept them now without holding "views," without giving intellectual assent to Christological doctrine?

Even in St Paul's writings the place of judicious intelligence in an act of faith is clearly recognised (see Rom. vi. 8; 1 Thess. iv. 14; 2 Thess. ii. 11, and *cf.* Rom. x. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 3), whilst in the Acts there is hardly a convert

who is not argued into belief by a formulated theory of person and work (viii. 5, 37; xi. 20; xiii. 8, 12; xvii. 31). Nor should it be forgotten that in the Gospels Christ himself more than once speaks of belief in prophecy as a ground for belief in him. This is surely an appeal to mental judgment.

The right conclusion would seem to be that belief *in* Christ, as the revelation of a character, may be rightly termed a state of heart, a disposition of soul—*fides formata charitate*—but that if I say what I believe *of* him—as I do when I speak of him as “Lord,” “Son of God,” “Saviour”—I by that very act commit myself to a creed.

EDWIN P. BARROW.

MANCHESTER.

CHRISTIAN MORALITY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, p. 101.)

PROFESSOR SETH, in the above article, asserts that “the teaching of Christ is limited to what he regards as the essential and all-important element in the life of man—the essential and all-important, but not, therefore, the exclusive interest of that life. His teaching has nothing to do with civilisation, with culture, with work or industry as such. He is so preoccupied with the moral and religious interest that he almost seems to treat it as if it existed alone and apart from these other interests.” This is literally true, and it shows up one important point where Christianity fails. Civilisation, culture, work and industry must go on. These things are as necessary as the moral system which guides them. Without intellect, where were the need for religion? And what were the means of appreciating it? No system of human conduct can be complete or even altogether beneficial which does not take account of these things, “as such.”

By his use of the word “preoccupied,” Professor Seth appears to imply that Christ’s view of human life was somewhat abnormal. But one feels bound to remark that Christ’s views of life were singularly consistent, and that his teaching quite evidently expresses *his normal* opinions. Thus, I take it, Professor Seth, in order to meet the criticisms to which he replies, is willing to admit that modern Christianity need not coincide with Christianity as deliberately taught by Christ. He would make allowances for Christ, on account of his preoccupation. This can hardly be called a defence of Christianity as “the supremely reasonable, the truly normal.”

Professor Seth states that “they (the criticisms referred to) all alike insist upon a literal interpretation of that teaching, in the sense that it is to be taken as a system of rules, a code of duties, ‘an ethical code adequate for all time.’” This he characterises as a “fundamental misunderstanding.” Now, Christ’s teaching is capable of being developed, perhaps, along its

own lines, but if we *put in* something, the germ of which was not there originally, we cannot call the product Christianity.

Further, modern criticism requires something more than the mere acquiescence of religion in secular pursuits, provided they are subordinated to the religious interest. What a poor outlook for "civilisation, culture, work and industry"! What is to become of our enthusiasts—our artists, our musicians, our intellectual workers—if it is to be borne carefully in mind that their work is subordinate to the religious interest? The intellectual and artistic life is inextricably bound up and interlocked with the religious, and cannot be regarded as subordinate to the latter. One is as necessary as the other. Together they form the expression of a man's character, his total relation to his experience.

I cannot reconcile these views with the teaching of Christ, which contains few references to intellectual progress, and certainly not a word of encouragement to stimulate its prosecution. Claiming, as it does, to be a direct revelation of the Divine Being, it cannot be handled in the way that Professor Seth suggests, and still retain the authority which must characterise such a teaching if it is to be treated seriously.

Thus, in my opinion, Professor Seth's article, while intended to be a vindication of Christianity, is practically an admission that Christianity, "as such," is inadequate to deal with human conduct in all its phases. I would not say that Christian morality is "essentially negative and merely ascetic." But I do assert that, as taught by Christ, it is to some extent both negative and ascetic, and thus, in its relation to certain fundamental phases of man's mind, it does tend to destroy self-respect. With its political consequences this criticism does not undertake to deal.

ARTHUR JAKUES.

BRESLAU.

THE FREE CATHOLIC IDEAL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, p. 191.)

DR BOYNTON's concluding sentences indicate a promising appreciation of the true inwardness of the Free Catholic position, and if he will only penetrate a little more deeply into what is really involved in his own admissions, he will either have to advance more boldly on our lines or beat a retreat into the mediocre and vulgar rationalism of "One God, and twenty shillings in the pound."

(1) Since Dr Boynton contributed his discussion, the Pope has relieved me of the necessity of refuting my critic's depreciatory estimate of the meaning and strength of Modernism. If he has studied the Encyclical *Pascendi dominici gregis*, he must by this time know that not even the Pope is under any delusions as to the significance and power of the new movement. As Father Tyrrell said in his *Times* articles, the Encyclical

bears reluctant testimony to the astounding energy, versatility, and diffusion of Liberalism in the Roman Church.

To argue from the fact of the Modernists being marked down for ruthless suppression that their heroic labours do not point to any hopeful issue, seems to me a singularly perverse and wrong-headed logic. It is as if one were to say that the ignorance of the peasantry, the massacres, and the dissolutions of the Duma prove conclusively that no national importance need be attached to the Russian democratic movement.

Dr Boynton comments on my statement, that the liberal Catholic knows when to range and when to come to heel. "Is thy servant a dog?" he asks. And I ask, is it not that Dr Boynton must be ignorant of the consecrated peasantry (so often expressed in Art) about the Dominicans being *Domini Canes*?

(2) My ideal of Freedom is certainly not my critic's. His is anarchistic; mine is socialistic in the interests of true individualism. Our great-grandfathers were indeed familiar with the cry of "the tyranny of the majority," but for us it has surely become the stale and faded catchword of a discredited social, or rather anti-social, philosophy. Is not Dr Boynton still in bondage to the notions that underlie the Declaration of Independence? I know no freedom except that of a spirit who realises himself, not as an insulated, "untrammelled individuality," but as an organic member of the Divine Fellowship—the Church where

"Man shall be at one with God
In bonds of firm necessity."

The true view seems to me to have been expressed once and for ever in the words, "whose service is perfect freedom."

I agree with Dr Boynton's remark that the group of churches which we both have the privilege of serving offer the "most promising organised expression" of the Religion of the Spirit. But I should abandon all hope of them were I not convinced that they are advancing steadily on Free Catholic lines. The "inner grace" of *catholicity* is but an impotent self-indulgence unless it has sufficient strength of purpose to translate itself into an outward and organised fact of a free *Catholicism*. It is the supreme effort of the Modernists to liberalise their Catholicism: it must be ours to catholicise our Liberalism.

J. M. LLOYD THOMAS.

NOTTINGHAM.

WHAT AND WHERE IS THE SOUL?

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, p. 158.)

MR HUGH MACCOLL, in his paper, "What and Where is the Soul?" offers the following suggestion as unprovable but irrefutable:—"The material body, including the brain and the whole nervous system, is a mere medium

or instrument of sensory transmission, and is itself as insensible as the material apparatus in wireless telegraphy." . . . "The *position* of the soul or ego, whether in the body, or near the body, or millions of miles away from the body, may be left an open question."

Subjecting the term "material body" to logical analysis, and taking humanity as a *fundamentum divisionis*, we see that the phrase includes the material body both of man and the lower animals. Now the question arises, can the above hypothesis be applied to the former and not to the latter? Darwin, in *The Descent of Man*, states that "the lower animals, like man, manifestly feel pleasure and pain, happiness and misery"; and he further enumerates many emotions and *feelings* common to man and the so-called brute creation—such as terror, suspicion, rage, etc. Now, if man's nervous system (including the brain) is but a channel conveying sensation to the soul (which by definition is that which alone feels), and if Darwin's statement is true, then it follows that the lower animals also have souls.

This conclusion may not at first sight seem altogether improbable: but let us examine it further.

By this conclusion we allow souls to the lower animals—to *all* the lower animals: not merely to the more intelligent species, such as the anthropomorphous apes, but also to the very lowest forms of animal life, even down to the mycetoza. Mr MacColl's hypothesis further provides that the ego on losing its body—which it must do sooner or later—receives another "instrument of education," and after that another, and so on, rising in the long run from higher to higher, from better to better. Now, if all animals have souls, this must apply equally to the souls of man and the lower animals: or, if not, where is the dividing line to be drawn? But is it quite conceivable that an *Amœba proteus*, for instance, should possess a soul, which eternally takes charge of successive bodies, and rises from higher to higher? And, again, what are we to suppose happens to the ego of an amœba that multiplies by binary fission?

From these considerations it would appear that the suggested hypothesis, so far from being capable of proof, is somewhat simply refutable.

CYRIL H. FOX HARVEY.

CHRIST CHURCH, OXFORD.

THE NEUROTIC THEORY OF THE MIRACLES OF HEALING.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1907, p. 572.)

WITH reference to Dr Ryle's article on this subject, I think I am right in saying that it is an established fact that diseases other than nervous are susceptible of faith-healing. *Vide* three cases quoted by E. I. Brewster in an article on the evolution of Christian Science in the *Monist*

for April 1907. The first—painless tooth-extraction—is taken from Dr Bernheim's *Suggestive Therapeutics*; the second—eczema of four years' standing—from Dr Bramwell's address before the British Medical Association, July 1898; and the third—knee-joint swollen, painful, and stiff for a month, in consequence of a blow—from Dr Wetterstrand's *Hypnotism in its Relation to Practical Medicine*. And I am sure I have read of many other equally well-authenticated cases. But besides all this, what about maternal impression? What are we to say when a sudden and passing thought in the mind of a woman can cause radical structural changes in the embryo? In the first month of pregnancy, a grotesque wooden image is thrown into her lap—and the child takes after this image (*Medical News*, 10th September 1898). Or she sees a legless man at a show, with abnormally long arms and large hands that he uses as feet—and her child is born in his image (*New York Medical Journal*, 29th October 1898). Here we get out of the region of faith-healing, which now appears merely as a particular instance of the direct action of thought upon organism. Evidently here is a force at work of which at present we understand nothing. We only see its results. To us at present these results are merely marvels; and it is all too early as yet for us to dogmatise as to the limits of action of this force. Why should we even limit the action to the organism's own thought? Why may not the thought of one person affect the body of another—as in the case of the vicarious faith of Jairus, whose little daughter was at the point of death, but was said by Jesus to be not dead but sleeping? We are all too ignorant yet to dogmatise on these subjects.

W. E. AYTON WILKINSON.

THANATPIN, PEGU, BURMA.

REVIEWS

L'Évolution Créatrice. Par Henri Bergson.—Paris : Alcan, 1907.—
Pp. viii + 399.

IN the world of philosophy and metaphysics there is to-day a great inclination to "mark time," which contrasts sharply with the bewildering progress of the mind in other directions. If there is something sound in a return to the classical systems of the past, and in the desire to readjust and use structures too impatiently abandoned in favour of alluring novelties, there is also a suggestion of uninventiveness and exhaustion in these revivals—in neo-Kantism, neo-Hegelianism, neo-scholasticism, and the like. This somewhat senile distrust, this settled despair of new lines, is one of the chief obstacles that M. Bergson will have to encounter. For he is before all else an inventor; and if Kant has been called the Copernicus of philosophy, it will be difficult to find a name for M. Bergson should his contentions prove right. To get at his point of view he frankly admits that we must stand on our heads, and seize that brief moment of unstable equilibrium to snatch a hasty glance at things as they really are. We must use our minds in a wholly unaccustomed way, and recognise that its customary use is fatal to speculative truth just in the measure that it is adapted to practical ends. In short, we have to approach philosophy with a new mind and a new method. Fortunately, our guide in this arduous enterprise is as conscious of the value as of the danger of the imagination as an instrument of philosophic thought and expression, and is possessed of a lucidity without which his task would be doomed to certain failure.

This last work of Professor Bergson's rests very directly on his thesis in regard to Time, or rather Duration (*Durée*), set forth in his remarkable *Essai sur les données immédiates de la Conscience*, of which it is the inevitable development; and to some extent on his later work, *Matière et Mémoire*—surely revolutionary enough and serious enough to have deserved more attention than it has roused on this side of the Channel! To review his *Évolution Créatrice* at all intelligibly for those unacquainted with his former volumes, or to resume the substance of these latter in a few short paragraphs, is entirely out of the question. It will be best to sketch the positions and conclusions of the new volume, trusting that

their very strangeness may stimulate the curious to read and examine for themselves. However few may be willing to accept, yet none can afford to neglect, hypotheses which, if they are as true as they are certainly plausible, must bring all the philosophical structures of the past in ruins about our ears.

In the introductory programme M. Bergson reminds us that, the history of the evolution of life teaches us to see in man's understanding or intelligence a department of general consciousness set aside and arranged in the interests of that endless process of self-adjustment by which man adapts himself to an endlessly changing environment. Man's action on the world is ultimately limited by the extent to which he knows how to break it up into pieces, move them about, and put them together again in more convenient combinations. His intelligence is shaped for this sort of knowledge; it is truly at home only with the inert, the solid, the divisible, the measurable; its concepts are framed on this model; its logic triumphant only in geometry. Here he is at one with the Aristoteleans and the schoolmen, who hold that extended body is the "connatural" object of human intelligence—the object to which alone it is perfectly adequate. If, then, this intelligence is an instrument devised by life for but one of its own services, how can it possibly be adequate to the understanding of life—of its creator—or of the process of evolution of which it is itself but one of many products? Every attempt to fit life into the categories of matter and of action dealing with matter—unity, multiplicity, mechanical causation, design, etc.—has failed and must necessarily fail. When ever has pure deduction led to biological discovery? The utter failure to explain life by the category of mechanical causation or by that of design has led to a hasty belief in the relativity, the merely algebraic, practical value of all our knowledge indiscriminately; whereas the fact that our knowledge of the inert and mechanical gives us control over the inert makes it plain that there, at least, we touch something of the real and absolute. Only when the intelligence goes beyond its immediate purpose and capacity, and tries to apprehend the supra-corporeal in terms of the corporeal, and so far as it presents certain appearances of the corporeal, does its knowledge become a knowledge of the merely apparent and relative.

Is it, then, possible to get any *real* knowledge of life; to evade the inevitable illusions of the mechanical and finalist explanations of which alone our intelligence is capable? Plainly the intelligence cannot raise itself above itself by its own waist-band. But the intelligence is perhaps merely a condensation of a generally diffused consciousness coextensive with the whole process of life; a constellation continuous with its parent nebula; a nucleus limiting and specialising the richer and more diversified potentialities of the surrounding plasm. If, then, we have an abiding consciousness of the life-process, if we attain its reality intuitively, albeit as it were "with the tail of our eye," if it only vanishes when we would focus our attention upon it and view it through the distorting categories of the purely practical intelligence, fashioned for dealing with the corporeal, may

it not be possible by a sort of alternation between states of reverie and attention to get some clearer sense of it, and of the directions in which our intelligence of it needs correction? According to M. Bergson, we cannot approach the theory of life with an uncritical confidence in the sufficiency of our scientific faculty to deal with the task. Criticism of that faculty will teach us that philosophy demands the use of the whole field of consciousness, of which the intelligence is but a specialised and organised department. The theory of life and the theory of knowledge are mutually dependent—parts of one whole. We must have a theory of life in order to know the purpose of intelligence in life and the genesis of its categories. We must have a theory of knowledge in order to know how far its categories are applicable to life. We must, then, try to draw into ourselves; to put ourselves in the midst of that conscious vital process, and so attain that evasive experience on which the only satisfactory theory of life and knowledge can be based; one “that will substitute for the false evolutionism of Spencer—which consists in cutting up the product of evolution into fragments and rebuilding it out of what are thus the very results of the process to be explained—a true evolutionism which follows the actual genesis and growth of the real.” To defend this method and to show the possibility of its application to some of the leading problems of philosophy is the scope of this volume.

In the first chapter we have a criticism of the attempts to fit the evolutionary process into the categories of the understanding—now into that of mechanical causation; now into that of plan or design. And while the former is rejected as quite impossible, the latter is allowed a certain, very limited, degree of approval. We are first reminded of what a previous work has shown to be the nature of that archetypal reality which alone is inwardly known to us, and is necessarily our key to the interpretation of all other reality. As given in consciousness, before it is thought, transformed and materialised by intelligence, our existence is an unbroken process of self-adaptation to an equally unbroken process of change in a surrounding environment with which it is continuous as a part is with its whole. In this process of self-change, each moment swallows up and yet retains all the preceding moments in a fuller form of existence by a veritable act of creation, or invention, not caused by, though resting on and refashioning, the resultant of preceding acts—a sort of self-rolling snow-ball determining its own direction according to the new exigencies of each moment.

In this continuous process the intelligence takes note only of the discontinuous points that mark a change of direction, and which we call psychic “states,” not really because the process stops, but because it preserves the same direction and undergoes no “interesting” change that attracts attention. In the interest of such critical actions the intelligence breaks up the whole process into an imaginary series of separate states or experiences which it threads like beads on a string—the string being a purely passive, unchanging *me*, as much an abstraction, an *ens rationis*, as is the

snowball viewed as a changeless subject distinct from the increment which creates it. The self never stops "rolling" and growing; it is only by an imaginary arrest of the process that we can even say it "is" at any given moment. When the intelligence resolves the perfectly simple self of the present moment into all the preceding "states" that are preserved in its constitution, and strings these out on a spatial line in the order of their dependence, we get the concept of Time, as it were, of a third dimension giving solidity and depth to the surface-world of the present. When we realise that this Time is merely a practical device of intelligence, we recognise the process so symbolised as the very stuff and reality of our being.

We drag the growing totality of our past experience—personal and hereditary—along with us at every step; nothing is forgotten; everything tells. The brain is an organ of action rather than of thought. It is no repository of images and ideas. Its function is to forget rather than to remember; to sift from the totality of our experience as much as, and no more than, may be needed for the inventiveness demanded by the immediate emergency to be dealt with. Where there is no choice to be made, no problem to be solved, no call for invention, or where habit has frayed a passage, experience slips through the brain and does its work unconsciously without an appeal to intelligence. But just in the measure that the possible courses are manifold and the combinations new and complex, great masses of experience present themselves to consciousness, pending the process of decision. "We think," says M. Bergson, "with but a little fraction of our past, but we desire, and will, and act with the whole of it."

It is plain from all this that no two moments of our real life can ever be perfectly similar; that the psychology which cuts it up into states classified by their similarity is a practical fiction of the intelligence; that, however conditioned by preceding results, each fresh moment of that life imports a new element of creative invention that gives to the whole moment a character of originality which no knowledge of the antecedents, however infinite, could possibly foresee.

An unending process of self-creation,—that is what, according to M. Bergson's previous works, existence means in the case of a conscious being. Can the same be said, he now asks, of existence in general? Is the evolution of the organic world and the inorganic world, and of the whole universe, a self-creative process whose future is free and undetermined, "unpredictable" even to omniscience? Or is it given, as a foregone conclusion, from the very beginning, whether as the mechanically inevitable resultant of primeval force and matter, or as an end that is foreseen and provided for in its causes?

As regards the inorganic world of inert matter, it presents at first sight characteristics quite opposite to those of conscious existence. We conceive it as made up of ultimate elements essentially immutable. The groupings and combinations of these elements are essentially reversible, and are all precontained potentially from the first. The new arrangement does not include and add to, but simply abolishes, the old.

There is no addition or growth or creation, whether of matter or form, in the mutations of the kaleidoscope. Time in this kaleidoscope world is relative to a unit x whose reality and value are indifferent. It is a world with no history, no past that is taken up with the present—a rolling-stone rather than a snowball.

But this geometrical world has no reality—at most, a foundation in reality. It is a practical fiction of the natural intelligence, perfected artificially by science; an endeavour to spread out and cut up and rearrange the inorganic world so as to facilitate our action upon it and our control of it. That this fiction is practically fruitful is because it is true to the tendency of matter whose movement is in a direction inverse to that of consciousness and life and creation. It is a movement of failure, decay, undoing; a falling to pieces of the laborious products of creative effort. Its ideal limit, never attained or attainable, would be that absolute disintegration and sundering represented by the notion of pure space, and in dealing with which our intelligence, made for matter, reaches its maximum clearness and certainty, even as it finds its minimum at the opposite pole of the spiritual, the conscious, the living. Unlike that of the organic world, the order we find so marvellous in the inorganic is simply that which relates the fragments of a broken vessel to one another, and it points just as little to design. But because, in order to break up and rearrange the world according to our greater convenience, it is needful to study the lines of its cleavage, it is precisely to this, the material aspect of the world, that our intelligence is adapted; and it is precisely in geometry, the science of space, of the abstract materiality of matter, that its logic is most at home. Its unfitness to get at the reality of the inverse upward constructive movement of life, consciousness, invention, creation, or to attain it except under symbols of its diametrical opposite, is, at that rate, self-evident. It can deal with the living only so far as this presents some of the appearances of the dying.

But living and dying, growth and decay, are merely parts of one complete process of nature, inextricably tangled together. It is only the abstraction of intelligence in the interests of action that cuts out of this concrete totality a material system of force and atoms, a geometrical skeleton from which growth and absolute duration are eliminated because they are indifferent to its purpose, which is satisfied by mathematical or relative Time. These material systems, as artificially isolated from the unity of the whole, are indifferent to acceleration or retardation; their day might be a second or a century; their compass a pin's head or a solar system. But in their solidarity with the universe they belong to a process or duration which is absolute, irreversible, historical—a process of effort and failure, of active making and passive unmaking.

Passing from these material objects and systems, isolated from the continuity of the real by science or by ordinary perception in the interests of action, to those other living bodies which have been individualised and cut out by Nature herself, M. Bergson contends that this individualising

admits of many degrees, and is never so perfect as to destroy the solidarity of all the branches of the one tree of life; that as the tendency of the inorganic is towards an ideal of dispersion and homogeneity, so that of life is towards an ideal of concentration and character, of perfectly closed and isolated systems; that the note of organic bodies is the registration of their past history in their present, a sort of organic "memory"; that in every way the process of life, like that of our own conscious existence, is one of inventive, creative self-evolution.

Thereupon he proceeds to criticise skilfully, yet most destructively, the mechanical and the finalist explanations of the evolutionary process, both of which assume that the present was contained and predetermined in the past; both of which mistake the lifeless, unproductive intellectual symbol of Time for the creative reality symbolised, and the point-series that tracks the path of motion, for the motion itself; both of which ignore that work of creation and invention from which the intellect abstracts a mere scheme or skeleton which they confound with the reality, and yet is merely an instrument to guide our action upon reality. Hence, in either view, Time is relative and in a sense useless; the whole process might have been instantaneous for all that is gained by its protraction; the end was packed up in the beginning and only needed unfolding.

Taking as a test case the recurrence of so complex a device as the eye, occurring far down on lines of animal life so divergent as those of molluscs and vertebrates, M. Bergson makes manifest the utter inadequacy of the various theories of transformism to explain the phenomenon, owing to their trust in the sufficiency of the intelligence fashioned to deal, not with life, but with the inverse movement towards pure materiality. To the finalist, the marvel of such a device is due to the false supposition that it is a work of calculating intelligence, like a watch or a phonograph, and, as such, is within the competence of intelligence to explain. It is, however, the invention and creation of that consciousness, that vital effort (*élan*) of which intelligence itself is an invention and specialisation, and which we attain immediately and intuitively in our diffused self-consciousness. It is no more marvellous than the cast which the foot makes of itself on the wet sand, but which the art of the modeller would have to produce part by part, ordering a long series of actions according to a preconceived plan. What were a marvel of intelligence in the latter case, is, in the former, a direct and simple issue. Whereas intelligence has to seek out and order the series of means to the end, to life the whole sequence is given in a single intuition and actuated by a single stroke. The possibility is there. But, while intelligence has to search for it part by part, it is ever present in its simplicity to the apprehension of life. After all, the end of all our inventive reasoning is just to show us certain connections which are given immediately to instinct and to creative genius; which are, as it were, *felt* by life.

In a second chapter the river of life is shown us somewhat as if caused by the bursting of a reservoir of limited capacity over a rough country; as

streaming out in various directions from one source, each branch fed at the expense of the others; as frequently checked in its progress and brought to a standstill; as finding only in a few directions, above all in that of humanity, a full and free outlet for its creative energy. Fundamentally its potentialities are the same throughout; but since they do not all admit of simultaneous development, circumstances and opportunities call for choice and specialisation. The plant and animal characteristics are largely incompatible; and among animals, the fuller developments of instinct and of intelligence exclude one another. Yet because the root is the same, we are not surprised to find such devices as the eye, or as bisexual generation, in divergent branches that have little else in common.

In the light of this life-theory a third chapter discusses the problem of knowledge and of intelligence, and shows how, without a vicious circle, it is possible for philosophy to get outside intelligence by the intuitive method and to observe the process of its genesis—a process simultaneous with that of the genesis of matter. This is undoubtedly the most obscure and difficult part of M. Bergson's synthesis, and even his powers of lucidity are taxed by an effort to go behind intelligence and seize life—as it were by a snapshot of intuition—in the very act of generating intelligence.

Regretfully passing over other discussions of deep interest, we come, in the last chapter, to the root of the understanding's incompetence to attain the absolute where life, movement, and spirit, and not merely matter, are concerned. The intelligence is simply a cinematograph. However multiple its pictures, however rapidly they follow one another, so as to produce the illusion of life and movement, they are pictures of states, of interruptions, of cessations, and not of movement itself. They break up movement at the points that interest action, that mark practically important changes of direction. Qualities, forms, essences, acts—adjectives, substantives, verbs—mark points of possible repose in an unbroken, universal *devenir*, in a self-creating process which is given directly to consciousness, but it is instantly distorted and materialised through the medium of intelligence.

Nothing is more valuable in this most valuable book than the concluding criticism of the classical philosophical systems in the light of these principles. Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza, Kant, and Spencer—one and all are convicted of being victimised by their naïve uncritical confidence in the categories of the understanding, by their ignorance of its cinematographic character, by their confusion of symbolic Time with real Time.

The extreme difficulty of M. Bergson's system is no reason for distrusting it; for though what is obscure is not thereby true, yet in philosophy truth is necessarily obscure, and simplicity fallacious. He has given us more to think of than we can digest for many a long day. He has suggested a new method and almost invented a new mind. Not one of the views, so rudely touched on here, but would need far more than the whole space at my disposal to develop adequately, and must suffer considerable distortion in the attempt to present it in a paragraph. Enough if I have aroused

curiosity and stimulated the incredulous to a study of M. Bergson's writings, beginning with the *Essai sur les données immédiates de la Conscience*.

G. TYRRELL.

CLAPHAM, S.W.

Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart.—Drei Vorlesungen von Rudolf Eucken.—Berlin: Reuter & Reichard, 1907.—Pp. 120.

The Religious Conception of the World.—By Arthur K. Rogers, Ph.D.—New York: The Macmillan Co., 1907.—Pp. 285.

It is a feature of the philosophic situation at present that a certain sympathy of spirit and method is visible among those who treat of the ultimate problems of thought. One can see tokens of this in the two works before us, written though they be from different standpoints. Neither Eucken nor Rogers makes any claim to rational completeness of system, and in contrast to intellectual idealism they emphasise the worth of personality and the personal values of life. Experience for both is not a static whole but a living growth, and in this movement the demands of the inner life have a special importance. But references to the history and psychology of religion are scanty; and had either writer pretended to give a complete philosophy of religion, this would have been a serious defect. Even as it is, the reader feels that he has before him what the writer takes to be the "religious conception of the world," but it is not clear to him how far this theory coheres with and is justified by the broad facts of man's religious history.

The little work of Eucken's contains a plain and effective statement of his leading ideas on religion. It consists of three lectures, dealing respectively with "The Psychical Foundation of Religion," "Religion and History," and "The Nature of Christianity." Students of Eucken will not expect a psychology of religion in his first lecture. The psychological method, he allows, may have a certain subsidiary value; but his own method is vitalistic, or, as he terms it, "noological." The only feasible point of departure, he argues, is the living process of spiritual experience: we must go beyond the division of the psychical faculties and recognise a world of higher reality growing up within man. For religious experience does not come as a supplement to existence as already given; it is the birth and development of a new reality. This spiritual life is not simply subjective, nor is it mere emotion: it envelops an objectivity within it, and it calls forth in man the movement towards itself. And, as Eucken expressly says, this higher experience comes to us as a whole, it is appropriated as a whole, and it makes our existence the point of departure for an infinite life. Such experience takes form in a movement from individuality to personality; and personality in its turn becomes the basis for a rich and comprehensive life of humanity. This activity of the spirit stands out in contrast to the average and commonplace; in its temporal

working it calls forth conflicts and spiritual crises; and it demands heavy sacrifices. The new life is its own sufficient witness. It is more than human: it is a manifestation of the divine in humanity. This independent spiritual life, developing within and proceeding from within outwards, is for Eucken the true content of religion. Hence he sets aside as no longer valid the older arguments for the being of God and the truth of religion, which were purely intellectual in character. The truths of religion are personal; but they rest on the living whole of spiritual experience, and are, therefore, not subjective. This fundamental and personal order of truth lies behind all impersonal truths so-called. And while Eucken contrasts his view of the spiritual content of religion with intellectualism, he also distinguishes it from mysticism, vague feeling, and superstitious devotion.

Eucken's whole philosophy of life issues in this conception of religion as a living and self-verifying experience, inward and personal, which vivifies our social relations and discloses to us a new world of values—an experience which we freely appropriate, but which comes to us from a divine and transcendent Source. Yet one who is not predisposed to this interpretation of religion will probably not be convinced by Eucken's presentation of it. He will complain that we have rather *ex cathedrâ* statements about the spiritual life than close and systematic reflection upon it. And he may object that the independent spiritual life, about which the writer is so sure, does not witness to itself in a way that precludes doubt and difference of opinion in regard to it. Without identifying ourselves with this attitude, we may still admit that it indicates a real difficulty, a difficulty which could only be met if Eucken brought within the scope of his religious philosophy a historical and psychological investigation of religion, and also gave some logical connection to the different elements in his theory of religious experience.

Eucken's views on religion and history and on Christianity are exceedingly suggestive, but we can only touch on them briefly. Those who regard history as a mere process in time fall into a relativism which is content to set off one phase of culture against another, and which denies any absoluteness to religion. For Eucken truth must transcend time, and the reality of the spiritual life lies beyond the temporal process. But, while religion is the revelation of an eternal order, to influence man it must enter into time, his particular existence-form. So a religion draws colour from the local and temporal environment, but its substance is no time-creation. Eucken goes on to protest against the tendency to explain the present by a causal relation to the past. He sees a danger here to the independence of the spirit; and he justly argues that the present is not fettered by an unalterable relation to what has gone before. For the image of the past takes form according to the inner conviction of truth we bring to it from the present. In this connection Eucken warns us against identifying the absolute truth of religion with any one point in history. His philosophy is in close sympathy with spiritual Christianity, but he

insists on the need of distinguishing the temporal accidents from the eternal substance. We require, he says, freedom and breadth not less than depth and substance. One may acquiesce here, and yet point out that Eucken gives us little guidance in separating the accidental from the eternal. Nor am I able to understand how we can so make the past our living present, that its timeless truth shall be an experience of our timeless nature.

Professor Rogers is not, like Eucken, a thinker dominated by one great principle: he rather represents the candid and alert mind which is at home among current philosophical ideas, and which tries to show the religious conception of the world to which an intelligent study of contemporary thought points. He lays the foundations for his treatment in epistemology. The way is thus opened for a discussion of the central problems of religious philosophy: the relation of God and Nature, of God and Man, and the nature of God. The concluding chapters of the book deal with the further questions of Freedom, of Evil, and of Immortality. Mr Rogers thus indicates his general object: "I propose in the following pages to defend a view of the world which is frankly theistic, in opposition to certain modern types of philosophical thought which are now widely prevalent. The results which I shall advocate do not therefore depart very far from the presuppositions which underlie the ordinary Christian consciousness, when these are interpreted not in a dogmatic but in a broadly philosophical way."

In his theory of knowledge the author emphasises the personal interest and the selective activity in virtue of which we organise the world of experience after the pattern of our needs. It is the "will to live" that spurs us on "to postulate the order we require." At the same time Mr Rogers does not agree with those Pragmatists who reduce the given element in experience to a passive $\nu\lambda\eta$, and he denies that the being of things lies wholly within a developing human experience. He holds, and we think rightly, that there is an inevitable element in our consciousness of things, and while we freely recognise that order we do not make it. The fact of an extra-experiential reality, as he terms it, is not to be gainsaid. As regards the nature of mental process, the greatest stress is laid on its purposive character: our whole outlook on life is in terms of purpose, and facts are values as well. Reason is the harmonising element in experience; but the idea of pure rationality is an abstraction, and if we make it an exclusive end it loses concrete content. So thought is regarded as secondary and representative—a means always to something beyond itself. In keeping with this, Professor Rogers admits the right of emotional demands to share in forming our world-view: indeed, for a man "to keep them from influencing his judgments of the world will be not only an impossibility but an inconsistency" (p. 59). We have no space for discussion, but we sympathise with the view that philosophy must allow the claims of all aspects of the self to contribute to a theory of life.

It will help us to understand Professor Rogers's speculative interpretation of God, Nature, and Man, if we bear in mind his strongly purposive

view of experience. Nature, he shows, cannot be regarded as a material and independent fact; and science itself construes it ideally. But while we know it through experience, we are compelled to postulate that its being is beyond as well as wider than this experience of ours. We seem driven, then, to the conclusion that Nature stands for an experience analogous to our own, and that things, united in a common world by causality, are so because they are really related to one central end or purpose. If, now, we look on the world as the embodiment of the divine reason and life, we grasp the teleological principle which gives it unity—the unity of a personal being. Yet, while Rogers holds that *things* are elements in the unitary consciousness of God, he advances weighty reasons against the theory that *persons* can likewise be explained as elements in the divine consciousness. For the moral life demands an autonomy which this absorption would destroy, and our finite experience cannot be at one and the same time “this concrete state of mind” and exist also unchanged within God’s consciousness. The key to the universe is not self-consciousness but a *society of selves*. God is the central Self, absolute inasmuch as His life is perfect and self-inclusive, and yet finite in the sense that He is one of the company of selves and not the whole of reality. Like Dr M’Taggart and Professor Howison, Professor Rogers holds that finite persons are ultimate and eternal constituents of the universe; and with Howison he also finds that this ultimate character of the self is the guarantee of freedom. In dealing with evil, our author practically treats it as “good in the making”—a fact which has a relative justification in the process of experience, but which becomes evil by asserting itself as final.

Heine, in his *Confessions*, records, with keen irony, how there was begotten in him for a while, the result of Hegelian speculation, the cheerful consciousness that not “He who dwelt in the heavens but I myself on earth was God.” Mr Rogers is, of course, very far from making any such suggestion, though, if he and some other thinkers are right, we finite creatures must be a good deal greater than we know. For on this theory we are ultimate and eternal beings, members of a society in which God, one might almost say, is only *primus inter pares*. I cannot help thinking that, if the writer had kept in touch with the demands of the religious consciousness, he would have felt that this “religious conception of the world” is in some respects out of harmony with that consciousness. On the one hand, direct and living dependence on God (not merely indirectly through nature) is a persisting feature in the religious mind. On the other hand, the conception of finite selves as ultimate centres of reality makes it hard to understand the indwelling and uplifting power of God in the soul—an experience which seems to imply that the individual, though not absorbed in God, has his living ground in Him. Nor can I think that Professor Rogers is very successful in his treatment of moral evil; and his theory that Nature is a part of God—and therefore the human body, as he admits—seems to involve ethical objections of a very serious kind. It is this conception of Nature as divine experience which

appears to me to offer the greatest difficulties. Why, in the face of the principle of continuity, should we draw the line at man, and say that only he has a being for self, and that all life of a lower order is God's life? There is something very strange in the supposition that the spiritual life of man is his own, while the instinctive life of an animal is divine. Nor, again, is it evident why the human mind, as it progressively apprehends the mind of God without it, should construe that mind into the material image we term Nature.

But it is easy to criticise; and it is a more grateful duty to say in closing that Professor Rogers's book is an able piece of work, well written and clearly argued, the production of a fully-equipped and competent thinker.

GEORGE GALLOWAY.

CASTLE-DOUGLAS, N.B.

The Theory of Good and Evil: A Treatise on Moral Philosophy.—By Hastings Rashdall, D.Litt. (Oxford), Hon. D.C.L. (Durham), Fellow and Tutor of New College, Oxford.—In Two Volumes.—Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1907. Pp. xx, 312, xv, 464.

THERE are three points upon which Dr Rashdall seems to lay the greatest stress as being the most fundamental among ethical truths. He insists (1) that the question whether an action is right or wrong always depends, in some sense or other, upon the value of its consequences; and not merely upon the value of its consequences to the agent himself, but of its total consequences. And he himself emphasises the fact that, so far as this point is concerned, he agrees with the Utilitarians. But he is no less anxious to insist (2) that, when we go on to inquire upon what the value of the consequences depends, we must answer that it does not depend exclusively upon the quantity of any single element which they contain, but depends, on the contrary, upon very many different factors. And, therefore, he is very strongly opposed to Utilitarianism, so far as it asserts that the value of an action's total consequences, and hence the rightness of the action itself, depends solely upon the quantity of pleasure and pain which it produces. He expresses his opposition to this view by insisting that many different elements in human life, beside pleasure, have "*intrinsic value*," and that the degree of their "*intrinsic value*" is by no means always in proportion to the amount of pleasure they contain. And he insists particularly that virtue and right action itself have "*intrinsic value*," and indeed more intrinsic value than anything else. Finally (3) he insists that when we judge an action to be "*right*," or one of its results to have more intrinsic value than another, both kinds of judgment are, in some sense, "*objective*" and "*rational*."

That Dr Rashdall not only holds but emphasises *all three* of these propositions constitutes the most distinctive feature in his ethical views. And he does, I think, make it plain that he considers each of them, *in some*

sense or other, to be not merely true, but of fundamental importance. But *in what sense, exactly*, does he hold them to be so? To ask this question is to indicate what is the most serious defect in his book. He does not explain very clearly in exactly what sense he himself understands these fundamental propositions; and consequently he fails to make it plain that they really are both true and important in any sense at all.

As regards the first of them, he does seem to mean, for one thing, that there is some sense in which *every* right action differs from *every* wrong one in respect of the value of its consequences. But in what sense exactly is this true? He sometimes speaks as if it were true that an action is *always* right if it tends to promote the "good" or "well-being" of mankind in general, and *always* wrong if it does not. And he never, so far as I can discover, expressly sets himself to explain that this proposition is by no means strictly true, and why it is not. Yet I do not think he really means to maintain that it is true, and he certainly often says things which are inconsistent with it. What he is really most anxious to assert about the matter is apparently the very different proposition that an action is right if, and only if, it is likely, *so far as the agent has the means of knowing*, not merely to promote the general good, but to promote it *as much as possible*—at least as much, that is, as any action *which the agent could have done instead*. And this, I believe, is strictly true, *in one sense of the word "right."* But, over and above the fact that Dr Rashdall does not make it quite plain that this, exactly, is his view, and what exactly it implies, there are apparent objections to it, which he does not discuss, and which certainly need discussion, if it is to be made quite plain that the view is a true one. For one thing it seems to be the case that, even if this proposition is true in one sense of the word "right," there certainly are other senses in which it is not true. It implies, for instance, that right and wrong do not depend upon the *actual* consequences at all, but only upon those which the agent has reason to expect; and hence, that an action may be right even where it does not actually promote the general good in the least, but the very reverse, and conversely, that it may be wrong even where it not only promotes the general good, but promotes it to the highest possible degree. And though I think we must admit that these things are true *in a sense*, we must, it seems to me, also admit that there is a sense in which they are not true. But Dr Rashdall never makes it plain whether he does mean to admit this or not, and still less whether or not it is true: he omits, that is, to discuss the question whether and in what sense right and wrong do depend upon the *actual* consequences, or whether they depend solely upon those which the agent has reason to expect. Moreover, even if we say that, in one sense, an action is right if, and only if, it actually does promote the general good as much as possible, and that, in another sense, it is right if, and only if, the agent has reason to think that it will, there still seems to be a sense in which an action which fulfils both these conditions may nevertheless be wrong. For even where an agent "has the means of knowing" that an action is likely to produce

the best possible results, he may not have used those means, and hence may himself believe that it will not promote the general good at all, but the reverse. Suppose, then, that in such a case he does the action, believing that it will on the whole do harm, and intending that it should, although, as a matter of fact, it won't, and he himself might have discovered that it probably wouldn't,—can we say, without qualification, that his action is right? I do not think we can; and yet such an action would be right in both of the two senses hitherto considered. Dr Rashdall does not discuss these apparent ambiguities in the use of the word "right," although he himself certainly uses it in different senses in different places. Yet surely, without a discussion of them it cannot be made really plain in what sense, if any, right and wrong do depend upon the value of their consequences.

Moreover, even if these points were settled, we should only have made it plain that right and wrong depend upon consequences, in the sense that a right action always does differ from a wrong one in respect of the value of its total consequences, actual or probable or intended. And this is not all that Dr Rashdall means to assert. I think he means to assert not merely that the value of their consequences is *one* mark by which we may distinguish a right action from a wrong one, but that it is the *only* mark by which we can *always* distinguish them. And it is this second proposition which constitutes the most important difference between his view and views of the type which he calls "Intuitionistic." Many Intuitionists would not deny his first proposition: they would not deny that a right action always does differ from a wrong one in respect of the value of its consequences. But they all, I believe, do hold that, even if this be so, there is always some *other* mark by which we may distinguish them. In order, therefore, adequately to refute views of this type, Dr Rashdall should have shown not merely that his test of right and wrong is a true one, but also that, if it is a true one, no other test which has ever been proposed is a really universal test; and I think he has certainly not made this point sufficiently clear.

As for Dr Rashdall's second proposition, it is plain that he means by it to make some assertion which he thinks that some Utilitarians have denied. And he represents the point in dispute as concerning the relation of pleasure and pain to "intrinsic value." But what exactly does he mean by these words "intrinsic value"? He obviously holds that the question what has "intrinsic value" has some bearing on the question what is right and wrong. But what bearing exactly does he suppose it to have? Assuming he is right about what has "intrinsic value," what consequences about right and wrong does this proposition entail? Does it entail any which the Hedonistic Utilitarians have denied? He does not make this point at all clear, and yet, until it is made clear, it is impossible to be sure whether what he says about "intrinsic value" is or is not both true and important.

One thing which he means to imply by what he says about the relation

of pleasure to "intrinsic value" is, I think, the following. He holds apparently that an agent could never by any possibility be acting wrongly in choosing an action whose total results he knew would have a maximum of "intrinsic value," but that an agent might quite well be acting wrongly in choosing an action whose total results he knew would contain a maximum balance of pleasure over pain. And if this is so, it follows that there is a sense in which the "intrinsic value" of an action's total results does not depend merely upon the quantity of pleasure and pain contained in them. It follows that the question whether it ever *is* wrong to choose an action which will produce a maximum balance of pleasure depends upon the question what results, *other* than pleasure and pain, such an action will produce. This is one of the things which Dr Rashdall means to imply by what he says about "intrinsic value"; and so far as he means this, his view is both true and important. But if he does mean this, there follow two consequences which it is important to notice.

It follows, firstly, that his views about "intrinsic value" by no means necessarily imply that it ever actually is wrong for a man to do an action which will produce a maximum balance of pleasure over pain. The question whether such an action ever actually is wrong depends, we have seen, on the question what *other* results, beside pleasure and pain, such an action will produce. But obviously every action which does in fact produce a maximum balance of pleasure might always *also* produce such other results as would give the total a maximum of intrinsic value; and considering how immensely complicated the total results of actual actions are, it is very difficult to be sure that this is not the case. Dr Rashdall does apparently hold that it is not: he appears to hold that cases do sometimes actually occur in which it is wrong to do an action whose total results are likely to contain a maximum balance of pleasure. But he certainly gives no sufficient reason for this opinion, and indeed he hardly tries to do so. So far, therefore, as Hedonistic Utilitarians merely hold that it is, as a matter of fact, always right to do any action which will produce a maximum balance of pleasure, his views about "intrinsic value" do not necessarily conflict with their view as to what is right; nor does he succeed in showing that his views about "intrinsic value" do actually lead to any conflict with *this* view. All that his views about "intrinsic value" *necessarily* imply is that cases *might* occur in which it would be wrong to do what was likely to produce a maximum balance of pleasure; and it is, therefore, only in so far as they deny this that his views about "intrinsic value" necessarily conflict with their view of right and wrong. They necessarily conflict, that is to say, not with any view about what actually is right, but only with the view that it always *would* be right, *no matter what the consequences might be in other respects*, to do any action which would produce a maximum of pleasure.

So much follows as to what is *not* implied by his views about "intrinsic value." But there follows also that something is implied. It follows, namely, that no result or set of results, A, can be truly said to have more

"intrinsic value" than another, B, unless it be true that, supposing A were the *total* result of one action, X, and B the *total* result of another, Y, it would be the duty of any agent who knew this and had to choose between X and Y, to choose X rather than Y. And if this be clearly understood, it becomes plain that some of Dr Rashdall's judgments about "intrinsic value" are very doubtful. He appears to hold, for instance, that pleasure always has some "intrinsic value," and that a greater quantity of it always has more intrinsic value than a smaller quantity. But this, we now see, must imply that *if* an agent had to choose between an action which would produce pleasure and *nothing else whatever*, and an action which would have no results at all, it would be his duty to choose the former rather than the latter. And surely this is very doubtful: it is, I think, very doubtful whether the greatest quantity of pleasure, wholly unaccompanied by any other result whatever, would be at all worth producing. The fact is Dr Rashdall does not really mean to say that it would, but is unconsciously using the words "intrinsic value" in another sense. What he does mean to say is, I think, that where we are dealing with results which do contain other elements beside pleasure and pain, it is true that of two results, precisely similar in all respects except quantity of pleasure, the one which contains more pleasure always has more "intrinsic value" than the other. But even this, it seems to me, is by no means universally true. What certainly is true is only that of two results, which differ in no respect except quantity of pleasure, the one, nevertheless, *very often* has much more intrinsic value than the other; and Dr Rashdall has, I think, not clearly seen that, even if this be true, neither of the other two propositions necessarily follows.

As for his proposition that Virtue has "intrinsic value," and more "intrinsic value" than anything else, here, too, he has primarily in mind, not the question whether Virtue itself has "intrinsic value," but the question whether, of two complex results, which differed in no respect except quantity of Virtue, that which contained more Virtue would always have the greater "intrinsic value." And with regard to some forms of what is called "Virtue," this may, I think, be true: at all events, he is undoubtedly right, as against pure Hedonism, in holding that of two results, which differed in no respect except quantity of Virtue, one would *very often* have a much greater value than the other; and this is the main point. But he frequently implies that a *single right action* always has the very highest intrinsic value, without warning us that he means by a "right action" anything more than an action which will, either actually or so far as the agent has the means of knowing, produce the best possible results; and it should, I think, be emphasised that, if no more than this is to be meant by a right action, it may well be doubted whether such an action ever has any "intrinsic value" in any sense at all. Moreover, it is doubtful whether any form of Virtue can be truly said to have *more* intrinsic value than anything else. Dr Rashdall himself tells us that he does not mean to say that the smallest quantity of Virtue

always has more value than a very large quantity of other goods; and if so, the only question can be as to *how much* of other goods is sufficient to outweigh a small quantity of Virtue. On this question he says nothing very precise, but he certainly seems inclined to exaggerate the quantity that would be required.

Lastly, as to the "objectivity" and "rationality" of ethical judgments, Dr Rashdall sometimes speaks as if all that he meant to assert was that, when a man judges a particular action, A, to be "right," or one of its results, B, to be "good," then, if he judges truly, any being who judged that A was not "right" or that B was not "good" would judge falsely. But plainly moral judgments would be "objective" in this sense even if the judgment "A is right" or "B is good" were merely equivalent to the assertion that some particular man or set of men had a particular kind of feeling towards A and B. If I judge truly that I like sugar on 18th November 1907, then any being who judges that I did not like sugar on 18th November 1907 will judge falsely. And plainly one of the things which Dr Rashdall means to assert about moral judgments is that they differ in some ways from such judgments as "I like sugar." But in what way exactly? One thing which he means is, I suppose, simply that the two kinds of judgment are not identical: *i.e.* that what is meant by the words "A is right" or "B is good" is not merely that any person or set of persons has some particular kind of feeling towards A and B. And I do not find he points out clearly that he means any more than this. And yet I think he plainly does mean something more. If this were all, it might still be true that just as a thing which pleases me at one time may fail to please me at another, or may not please other men, so what is good or right in me at one time may be bad or wrong in me at another, or bad and wrong in other men. And yet Dr Rashdall plainly means to assert that this is in some sense not true. He means, I think, to assert that if A is right or B is good at one time or in one man, then any action which had precisely the same results as A would be right at any time and for any being, and any state of mind precisely similar to B would have "intrinsic value" in any being and at any time. In other words, he means, I take it, not merely that if the judgment "virtue has intrinsic value in me on 18th November 1907" is true, then anybody who judged at any time that virtue has not intrinsic value in me on 18th November 1907 would judge falsely; but that, if virtue has intrinsic value in me on 18th November 1907, precisely similar virtue would have precisely the same value in any one at any time. That Dr Rashdall does not point out clearly the distinction between these three different senses of "objectivity" or "rationality" is, I think, the chief defect in his treatment of the matter. Owing to his failure to do so, he fails also to make it plain that moral judgments really are objective and rational in the two latter senses, which are by far the most important.

G. E. MOORE.

Lux Hominum: Studies of the Living Christ in the World of To-day.—
 Edited by T. W. Orde Ward.—London: F. Griffiths, 1907.

THIS is a book of more than common interest. Like other volumes published in recent years, it consists of a number of essays designed to emphasise the permanent elements of Christianity in the disintegrating light of modern knowledge. But the book before us has a comprehensiveness that is remarkable. Unlike, *e.g.*, *Contentio Veritatis*, it is not the work of members of one communion or profession, but embraces amongst its contributors Anglican clergy, Nonconformist divines, and a member of the Roman Catholic communion. And a new note is struck by the inclusion of essays by two ladies. The atmosphere of the volume, it may be said by way of preface, is definitely Christian. For all the writers Christ is the Master and Guide of the human soul, or, as the preface puts it, "A just God and a Saviour."

The volume is roughly divisible into two parts; viz. the essays which deal with the witness to Christ of the Old and New Testaments, and those which bring us into the wider atmosphere of the relation of Christ so attested to modern life and its conditions.

The Biblical essays seem to us the more solid and valuable element in the book. Mr Hewlett Johnson deals with the revelation of God's Being as the essence of Israel's revelation, and shows how the aspirations of that nation's teachers were prophetic of a still fuller revelation of God in Christ. The essay, unlike some others in the book, is written in admirable style, and, from a conservative critical standpoint, is a helpful outline of some permanent elements in the Old Testament anticipation of Christianity. Professor Peake deals more specifically with Messianic prophecy, and the use made of it in the New Testament. The writer is handicapped by want of space, and his contribution is necessarily somewhat sketchy. But it is full of helpful suggestion.

From the Old Testament we pass to the New, and here first to the Gospels. Mr Laurence Brown gives us a clear statement of modern critical conclusions about the first three Gospels, and emphasises their witness to a miraculous Christ. Much that he says will be familiar to those who are acquainted with recent gospel literature; *e.g.*, the writings of Dr Sanday or the Dean of Westminster. But his essay is modestly written, though occasionally marred by a loosely constructed sentence, or a too colloquial word or too sweeping a statement.

Dr Allan Menzies writes on the Fourth Gospel. No doubt in so limited a space it is impossible to present fully all sides of a subject, but this essay is unsatisfactory on account of its one-sidedness and exaggeration. The differences and contrast between the Synoptic Gospels and St John are too sharply drawn, and are unduly emphasised by the omission of any consideration of the common element. "The Synoptists," says Dr Menzies, "tell the story of one who was a man; though he transcended human measure and was afterwards advanced to divine honours." How can this be reconciled with the Virgin-born Son of God of St Matthew, "the

Son who alone knows the Father" of St Matthew and St Luke? To Dr Menzies the Christ of the Fourth Gospel is not the historical Jesus, but a creation of the Evangelist, with a frail foundation of historical detail drawn from the Synoptic Gospels. But wonderful as the Fourth Gospel is, it can hardly be such a miracle of inventive insight as this view presupposes. Readers of this essay should ask whether the historical Jesus was not rather one who combined in Himself characteristics and aspects into which Synoptists and Fourth Gospel alike give us only fragmentary and partial insight.

The last two Biblical essays are those of Principal Adeney on the Resurrection, and of Mr Major on St Paul's Presentation of Christ. The former is a thoughtful statement of the evidence for, and importance of, the Resurrection of Christ. The latter is in some respects the most solid and valuable piece of work in the volume. Mr Major discusses St Paul's presentation of the Person of Christ in the light of the philosophic and theological tendencies of the first centuries, and asks the questions: Is this presentation legitimate? and Is it eternal? His essay is strongly and sympathetically written, moderate alike in statement and in conclusion.

At the head of the essays which do not deal primarily with the Bible may be set the contribution of Mr W. J. Williams on the Divinity of Christ and Modern Criticism. This portion of the book seems to us of less value than the Biblical essays already mentioned. The writers too often deal with vague generalities, and the line of argument is sometimes difficult to determine. The authors strike us as sometimes overpowered by their theme. Mr Williams's essay, however, is valuable as insisting on those elements of Christ's Personality, which transcended the limits of human individuality, and reveal the Divine nature. Miss Larter's contribution on Christ and Popular Science and Philosophy discusses pleasantly and poetically the prevalent tendencies to Nature-worship and to materialistic conceptions based on the theory of Evolution, and contrasts with them the teaching of Christ. She points out, further, the one-sidedness of current rationalistic philosophies, and of the modern pragmatic school. An anonymous writer deals with Christ and Society, and finds in the Christian principles of love, of self-sacrifice, and of valuation of human life as spiritual, the real solution of the social problem. Miss Dallas writes on "Christ, the Mystic." The writer, after quoting three *agrapha* dealing with the virtue of wonder, discusses passages in the Gospels which have a mystical ring, and attempts to explain Christ's teaching as to His coming from a mystical standpoint. She ends with a few remarks upon the problems raised by the study of comparative religions. The essay is too slight and loosely construed to be very convincing. Lastly, the editor contributes a chapter entitled "The Truth as it is in Jesus." He lays stress on the essential quality of Christianity, in contrast to the other great historical religions, as the revelation of a Divine personality which recapitulates all that is good in humanity, and discusses the way in which this revelation of goodness transforms our conceptions of sin and suffering.

WILLOUGHBY C. ALLEN.

The Human Element in the Gospels.—By George Salmon, D.D.—
London: John Murray, 1907. Pp. xxiv+550.

THIS volume has a deep personal interest in addition to its great intrinsic value. It is a posthumous work, prepared for publication by an admiring and grateful student from the note-books of his "revered and honoured teacher." It reveals a great change in the author's standpoint in regard to the criticism of the Gospels, "especially as regards the Fourth Gospel." That for the author this change was painful, he himself confesses; the recognition so fully of "the human element in the Gospels" was, from the theological standpoint in which he had been trained, a grievous demand; but so candid was his mind that, once convinced that the demand was warranted, he did not shrink from meeting it. "The views here expressed," says the editor, "are the spontaneous and untrammelled judgments of a trained and powerful intellect on an entirely fresh study of the Gospels" (p. x.). To those who have been from their student days familiar with the methods of the higher criticism, and have reached the reconciliation of the free use of these methods with the firm hold of their Christian faith, the author's difficulties may seem unnecessary; but by placing ourselves in his position, we shall invest his book with a more living meaning. While the work is described as a commentary on the Synoptic narrative, the textual and exegetical discussions are entirely subordinated to *Quellenkritik*, the analysis of the sources of each narrative.

"My object in the present investigation," says the author, "is to ascertain what conclusions as to the genesis of the Gospels can be drawn from a study of the documents themselves, without the assumption of the truth or falsity of any traditional accounts" (p. 21). As regards Papias' account of Mark's Gospel he states: "I do not believe that St Peter had any share in the composition of St Mark's Gospel, or that he was in any way responsible for its contents. But I consider that critical study would lead us to believe that some of the Evangelist's statements were derived directly or indirectly from that Apostle; and therefore I would not hastily reject a tradition that there had been personal intercourse between the two. What inclines me most to accept the statement of Papias, is the marked difference of style between the section of the Gospel which relates what happened before the calling of Peter, and those which tell of what happened after it—the contrast between the meagreness of St Mark's narrative in the one case, and its fulness in the other" (pp. 21–22). The letter P is used by him "to denote the authority used by the Evangelists in passages which all three Synoptics have in common," without any assumption of the identity of P with our present Second Gospel. Mark's greater fulness of detail is explained not by his "greater powers of graphic description," but by his "access to more accurate information," the source of which was Peter. The letter Q is used "to denote the common authority of the sections common to Matthew and Luke," without assuming either the identity or the distinction of Q and P, or

even that Q was a single document. An oral Gospel prior to the written Gospels is held to be probable. The authorship of the Third Gospel by Luke is accepted; and this Gospel is supposed to be derived from "the version of the Gospel history weekly recited in the Church" at Antioch, with the addition of "materials which had reached him from other sources." In regard to Papias' statement about Matthew's Gospel as written Ἐβραϊδὶ διαλέκτῳ, and as translated by each as he was able, the author holds that this probably refers to the reading of the Gospel in Aramaic in the public worship of the Church, followed by a translation into Greek by the official charged with this duty. The attempt made to reconcile variations in the existing records by translation from an Aramaic original appears to him to offer "very few results which we can adopt with entire confidence," for the reason "that the Gospel history had passed out of the Aramaic into a definite Greek form before any of the existing Greek Gospels had been written" (p. 29). The view of Matthew's Logia as a collection of sayings only is rejected. "We shall find," he says, "as we go along, that the very earliest forms of the Gospel which we can trace were all like the Gospels we have now, dealing with the things that Jesus did, as well as those which He said. And, above all, if there had been any early Gospel treating exclusively of our Lord's sayings, we should find traces of the order of that book in the arrangement of these sayings by subsequent writers. But, in point of fact, it is especially with regard to the sayings of our Lord that we find so much variety of arrangement as to preclude the idea that all drew from a common source, whose order we might expect would be followed by all" (pp. 29-30). As regards the respective values of the Synoptics, he distinctly asserts as the result of his whole study "the superior value of St Mark's Gospel" as "in some cases a trustworthy report, obtained from an eye-witness" (pp. 30-31).

The conclusions reached on many important points are scattered throughout the volume; and the author's views on the problem as a whole can be reached only by combining these separate allusions. In one section, however, that dealing with the Rich Young Ruler, he has, happily for the reader, given a summary of his views. "What we now call St Matthew's Gospel contains a quantity of matter presenting such marks of antiquity and authenticity that I cannot reject the tradition that it came direct from an Apostle. In fact, I count St Matthew's report of our Lord's discourses as the most accurate. But, on the other hand, there are passages which, in my judgment, exhibit clear signs of dependence on St Mark's Gospel. It seems to me that the best way of reconciling these phenomena is to accept what is also an ancient tradition, viz. that St Matthew wrote his Gospel in Aramaic, and that what we now know as St Matthew's Gospel is a Greek Gospel of later date, founded on the original Aramaic" (p. 403). The publication of this Aramaic Matthew was first oral, and not literary; and with it may be identified the source called Q. "The results of criticism substantially agree," he says, "with all that historical testimony enables us to assert; and if they be accepted as correct, we may place the Gospel

records in chronological order as follows:—First must have come the lost Aramaic by St Matthew, which is the basis of all three Synoptics; next would come Mark, whose Greek appears to have been used both by “Matthew” and St Luke. As between the last two, the Greek Matthew seems to show more signs of posteriority; but until I am shown more satisfactory proof of acquaintance by either with the work of the other, I must hold that the interval between their dates of composition was not so long as to allow time for the earlier of the two to pass from being the local form in which in a particular district the history of our Saviour’s life was told, to become the property of the whole Church, and thus arrive at such general circulation as necessarily to become known at a distance from its place of composition” (p. 405). It is maintained by the author that the Fourth Evangelist knew the Greek Mark and Luke, and the Aramaic Matthew; but as the Greek Matthew belongs to the same age—the late Apostolic or early sub-Apostolic—as the Fourth Gospel, an acquaintance with it cannot be affirmed. In regard to the Fourth Gospel, as compared with the Synoptics, he says: “It is, moreover, as all agree, considerably later than the other three; and, therefore, if it were the case that it contradicted the earlier accounts, it might naturally be regarded as of less authority than they. But undoubtedly it may to a certain extent be used in interpreting these accounts, as showing what meaning was attached to them before the end of the first century; for I do not think that the Fourth Gospel can be placed later; and if it was not written by the Apostle John, it must at least have been written by a disciple of his, who claimed to speak with his authority” (p. 483). In regard to the Feeding of the Five Thousand, the Synoptic is preferred to the Johannine account (p. 318), and it is expressly stated that the Fourth Evangelist was not an eyewitness (p. 320).

A few other interesting remarks may be noted. That the same incidents are found connected in all the Gospels is explained as due to the fact that these “sections formed one day’s reading in the Christian weekly assemblies,” and “that Q was originally a collection of the notes of such readings” (p. 282). As regards the First Beatitude, Luke’s version is preferred to Matthew’s, because (1) Luke was “incapable of making a substantial change in a discourse of his Master’s, in order to bring its doctrine into greater conformity with his own”; and (2) the words of Jesus reached the Greek Matthew with an addition, “to prevent the disciples from putting a false construction on the Saviour’s words” (pp. 115–116). That Matthew “collected into the form of a single discourse words uttered on different occasions,” as the context given to them in Luke shows, is fully admitted (p. 112). That Mark is in his Gospel more influenced by Paul than Luke is maintained and thus explained: “I have to express my belief that St Luke was an older man than St Mark, and had learnt the Gospel history in Antioch before he ever became a companion of St Paul” (p. 38). The confession of ignorance of the day or the hour of His second coming, made by Jesus, is generally regarded as

beyond doubt or question ; but this is what the author says of it : " Was verse 32 of Mark part of the original tradition of our Lord's sayings? or was it added in church reading, after doubts and speculations had made some explanation necessary? The chief thing which suggests doubt to me on this point is that St Luke has no parallel to this verse of Matthew and Mark, though it seems to me unlikely that if he had found this verse in any document he was using he would have left out the solution of a difficulty likely enough to have perplexed his readers " (p. 476). The volume is full of such suggestive remarks on all the questions that emerge in the study of the Gospels.

To discuss the contents of the book is impossible. Only one or two comments may be added. The author departs from the generally accepted *two-document* hypothesis in insisting that Mark used the original Aramaic Gospel, and was not dependent exclusively on the Petrine reminiscences. Although this does complicate the analysis, much can be said for it, especially in regard to what he calls " the Prologue of St Mark's Gospel " (i. 1-13). He agrees with Harnack in regarding the Logia as consisting of records of events as well as reports of utterances, but includes more in this work than Harnack does. He rates Luke's trustworthiness as a historian more highly than Harnack ; and agrees with Holtzmann's high estimate of Mark's Gospel as exhibiting clearly the course of the ministry. It is to be regretted that only a few stray hints of his view of the Fourth Gospel are given ; from these it is evident that he assigns to it as history less value than English scholars have generally done. In this book there is offered to the students of the fascinating problem of the story of the life of Jesus a mass of valuable material in its detailed discussions, as well as of stimulating thought in its general conclusions. While the editor deserves our gratitude for the excellent way in which he has discharged his task, we cannot but regret that the author himself was not spared to give to his own labours the finishing touches. As one who has been recently going over the same ground, I cannot but regret that I had not with me this helpful guide.

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The Fourth Gospel, its Purpose and Theology.—By Ernest F. Scott.—Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark, 1907.

The Johannine Literature and the Acts of the Apostles.—By Henry P. Forbes, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Canton Theological School (" International Handbooks to the New Testament," vol. iv.).—New York and London : G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1907.

It is a significant fact that a well-known publishing firm in the field of theology should inaugurate a new series on " The Literature of the New Testament " with the exposition of the purpose and theology of the Fourth Gospel by Mr E. F. Scott. Frankness, sincerity, courage, are stamped upon every page of this remarkable volume. At the outset the writer

assumes the position "which is now generally accepted by Continental scholars." The defenders of the apostolic authorship, especially Dr Drummond, to whose learning and ability the author pays a warm tribute of admiration, have done all that can be done with the external evidence, and the result is indecisive. The future judgment will rest on the internal characteristics of the Gospel itself. With this view it is interesting to contrast the learned and laborious work of M. Lepin, reviewed in the last number of the *Hibbert Journal*, p. 226. Following Father Calmes, whose commentary was in print before Loisy's appeared, Lepin has undertaken to reply to M. Loisy. He is quite at home in the immense literature of the great controversy; and the collection of critical opinions which he weighs and discusses is extremely interesting. But one single principle enables him to dismiss the whole argument of Mr Scott. The authenticity of the work guarantees its historicity. Not for him is it possible, as for Dr Drummond, that an apostle should have related what did not happen. Nor can he grant those concessions to the ideas of "translation" or a "subjective element" by which traditional apologetic sometimes seeks to make peace with the critical schools. There can be little doubt with which method the student of the coming generation will be mostly concerned.

The reader who compares Mr Scott's book with the only other work in the English language which can be put by its side—*The Johannine Theology*, by the late Professor Stevens of Yale—is conscious at once of an important difference of outlook. The four opening chapters are devoted to an examination of the character and intention of the Gospel, the sources on which it is based, the influences which have shaped its ideas, and the polemical and ecclesiastical aims which lie behind it. In this process there is no parade of authorities, but the author is evidently familiar with the best modern guides of varying schools of thought. The result is to show the Gospel as a work belonging to an age of transition, when new forces were affecting Christian thought, and new dangers were threatening Church life. From the beginning to the close of the book this idea is repeated with frequent emphasis. If Mr Scott's exposition had its origin in the spoken word, such reiteration is not unnatural; but the reader who is ready to start with the author's assumptions will not need it: the other sort of reader will in reality often require a more detailed textual handling. This is the side on which the book is weakest, from the point of view of the previously uninstructed. Mr Scott writes of results. Long study and much reflection have given him an assurance, a breadth of view, an ease of handling his material, which carry the sympathiser along with him in happy companionship of thought; but many of his *dicta* will appear harsh or exaggerated to those who have not gone through a similar training.¹ He does not hesitate to apply the word "magical" to the

¹ Of course the symbolic view of the great miracles is throughout assumed. But here, too, the note of confidence often needs more justification. Thus "the miracle at Cana reveals its symbolic meaning with perfect transparency" (p. 58); but it is only at p. 259 that we learn that "by the change of water into wine He expressed symbolically the ultimate purpose of His coming—to transmute man's nature into something richer

Johannine conception of the Eucharist (p. 128; cp. pp. 293, 365). He hardly does Paul justice when he lays it down that John realised more fully than his predecessors that Christianity is a new life (p. 262); that "he perceived, as not even Paul had done, how profound and radical is the 'change of mind' involved in Christian discipleship" (p. 373). How can that idea be expressed more forcibly than in the Pauline figures of "new creation," the death and burial of the old man, the resurrection of the new, the formation of the Christ within? And, on the other hand, he surely underrates the Johannine significance of "believing," when he reduces it to granting "the hypothesis that Jesus was indeed the Christ, the Son of God" (p. 267). Of this he is himself conscious, for on the very next page he points out that with John belief is not the beginning but the end of religious experience, and has no meaning except as the outcome of a deep inward conviction. In these bursts of over-emphasis the rhetorician speaks more loudly than the calm inquirer.

The result to which the author conducts his readers, that the Fourth Gospel is "a daring re-interpretation of the words and the life of Jesus" (p. 350), was of course implicit in the confession of the preface. In common with the great majority of theologians of all schools, he finds the key to this reinterpretation in the Logos doctrine of the Prologue. The second part of the book describes the transmutation of the Synoptic Christ under its influence. We are not, indeed, convinced that his great functions of Life and Light and Love, his pre-existence and return to celestial glory, may not be equally well (or better) derived from the exalted representation of Sonship which pervades the whole Gospel, and is the great object of faith in xx. 31. Mr Scott, however, regards the idea of the "Word" as fundamental, though it does not reappear after the opening, except in forms which show that it had a much wider application. With resolute insistence he dwells again and again on the survival of unreconciled elements of earlier thought by the side of the higher speculative conceptions. He exhibits with unsparing candour the limitations and contradictions of the Gospel, its universality and its exclusiveness, its lofty spiritualism and its ecclesiastical and sacramental tendencies. Among the most interesting of his chapters are those on "Life" and its communication, where an effective contrast is made on the one hand with the Old Testament idea, and on the other hand with the Aristotelian. Its dual nature, according as it is presented along the line of historical continuity or of metaphysical thought, is alternately displayed. Following the Synoptic tradition, the Gospel portrays it as ethical and religious; following the Logos hypothesis, the Evangelist describes it as supernaturally communicated through material media. The

and higher." And in view of numerous other interpretations, such brevity seems to call for expansion. Thus, M. Jean d'Alma, who has just published two small volumes on *La Controverse du Quatrième Évangile*, argues that the entire Gospel narrative is a symbolic description of the early fortunes of the Christian Church under the guidance of the Word, and the Cana incident belongs to its early reconstitution in Galilee after the death of Jesus, as against the Jerusalem tradition of Luke!

Logos is, in fact, a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence to Mr Scott. He declares that the Logos-philosophy "empties the life of Christ of much of its real worth and grandeur, while seeming to enhance it" (p. 173); it "substitutes an abstract philosophical relation of being, for the relation of love and faith reflected to us in the actual life of Jesus" (p. 319). He finds in the Synoptic narrative "a far truer and grander impression of his divine character" than in the elaborate theological Gospel (p. 371). These are brave words, and it is well that they should be spoken with such earnestness by one who believes that the divine worth of the Person of Jesus is the central fact of Christianity. Here is the result on a candid mind of the age-long struggle to define the indefinable, and compress into the mould of theory the transcendent significance of an abiding spiritual force. Yet the author is conscious at the same time that without some such theory Christianity could never have captured the Greek mind. Only, the theory has now served its turn, and might be dropped with advantage. We no longer need it to bring us to Christ; the true disciples have access to him for themselves; as they follow the guidance of the Spirit into new truth, they are already in communion with him.¹

To readers who desire to study the Gospel with the aid of a commentary starting from critical presuppositions generally resembling those of Mr Scott, the work of the American scholar, Dr Henry P. Forbes, may be sincerely commended. The volume covers a wide range, as it embraces the whole of the Johannine literature and the Book of Acts. A brief introduction sets forth the general theory that an elder at Ephesus named John, who had probably been once a priest at Jerusalem,² familiar with Jewish learning and with the earlier and later forms of Christian tradition, came to be revered as a "witness" at the end of the first century. After his death some Asian disciple reshaped the Synoptic presentation largely in accord with his teachings, and thus composed a "spiritual" Gospel, designed to express the essentials of Christianity in forms more suited to the changed scenes and the new atmosphere of the Gentile world. From this point of view the Gospel is explained, incident by incident and discourse after discourse. The exposition is necessarily brief, but the author contrives to inspire faith in his guidance as a well-equipped interpreter, with stores of learning of which he makes no parade, and sufficient warmth of religious sympathy to prevent anyone from being wounded by his clear-cut decision. It were well if English scholarship could produce a work of the same quality on a larger scale.

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¹ As the book is sure to pass soon into another edition, Mr Scott may like to be reminded that Paul was not caught up into the *seventh* heaven (p. 47), but only into the third. In the discussion of the Nicodemus-teaching, it might be well to notice Professor Lake's view (as also Wendt's) of the probable insertion of the words "of water and" in John iii. 5. On the other hand, the conversation with the Samaritan woman may not unfairly be interpreted as including a reference to baptism.

² Compare the essay of the Rev. H. L. Jackson on *The Fourth Gospel and some Recent German Criticism*, Cambridge, 1906.

Les Saints successeurs des Dieux.—Par P. Saintyves.—Paris: Librairie Critique: Émile Nourry, 14 rue Notre-Dame-de-Lorette, 1907.

Not very long ago it was considered a decisive argument against Christianity, and especially against the Catholic form of it, to prove the derivation from paganism of its ideas and modes of worship, while its orthodox defenders played into the hands of such critics by endeavouring to prove the opposite. In taking this line of defence the Church had certainly forgotten her past policy, when she conquered paganism by absorbing it into herself, not by destroying it utterly. But at the time that the question of Chinese ancestor-worship arose, "the Church was powerful, and was no longer obliged to fight for her existence. She thought herself strong enough to abandon her old traditions. She may be said by that same action to have renounced the conquest of Asia" (p. 92).

In spite, however, both of the impugnors of Catholicism and its official apologists, the theory which the first thought altogether destructive of its claims, and which the latter, for the same reason, rejected, is now generally regarded as established. As our author observes, "the worship of the saints sprang from the pagan worship of dead heroes: it is in the strict line of succession. This is an ascertained fact and no longer an open question." But though the fact is admitted by all those whose opinion is worth consideration, the old anti-Catholic inference drawn from it is now seen to be worthless. Not indeed in one sense, for, as part of the wider theory of development which traces the origin of all Christian ideas and institutions to external sources, it is even more powerful than before in shattering the comparatively modern absolutist traditions of ecclesiasticism. But it is being recognised more and more, even by those whose interest in Catholicism, as that of M. Saintyves, is mainly, if not entirely, scientific, that this wide-reaching theory is double-edged, and that, while destructive of indefensible ecclesiastical pretensions and orthodox positions, it forms the basis for the apologia of a wider Catholicism which can be truly so termed because it is coextensive with humanity. "The worship of heroes, and still more of saints, is infinitely superior to all the old forms of primitive naturalism. A grateful recognition of what we owe to past generations, it bears witness to a profound intuition of the religious character of the sentiment of human solidarity" (p. 94). At the same time it should be mentioned that M. Saintyves seems to make too sweeping an assertion when he declares (p. 89) that "the Greeks and Romans reckoned all their ancestors as Gods." And in writing of the festival of All Saints he seems to confuse it with All Souls' day.

The question of the sources of the legends and the festivals, of which the author treats in the second and third parts of his volume, is more obscure. Doubtless the negative conclusion of MM. Bédier and Brune-tière (p. 208) is too sweeping: "All research into the origin and propagation of these stories is vain." At the same time, the material

affords scope for a great deal of guesswork and opposing theories, and under such circumstances it is dangerous to generalise, or, at least, to press one theory too far under the influence of that *a priori* desire for unification which is nevertheless one of the most necessary elements of thought and of scientific progress. Before such a general conception can be reached, it is better to rest on the safer ground of various and contributory causes. M. Saintyves recognises this danger in the case of the solar theory, by which a certain class of investigator has sought to explain everything of the kind. Yet, even so, he is perhaps himself inclined to attach too much weight to it, at least in the ingenious parallels he attempts to draw between the old solar worship and the chief Christian festivals of Christmas and Easter.

Prepossessed by this notion, he rejects the theory that the Christmas festival was determined by the date of the Passion, "without regard to the feast of Mithra, the unconquerable Sun," as "having no solid foundation." But it has at least in its favour the unwavering tradition, as recorded in the Gospels, that Christ died about the time of the Jewish Passover, and that the date of Easter was from the first avowedly regulated by this belief. To insist on this is not to deny the influence of pagan ideas and festivals on Christian beliefs and rites. But, in this as in other cases, they may merely have contributed to the form taken by the Christian tradition, and have helped to fix the dates of the festivals where an approximation already existed.

So in the case of the legends of the Saints, M. Saintyves does no doubt in numerous cases establish their pagan origin. But many of his proofs, though not lacking in ingenuity, can hardly be considered decisive. Doubtless he is able to produce sufficient instances of such transition to justify the application of the hypothesis to more doubtful cases. At the same time, there is at least one important contributory element which he has not even considered. Many of the stories of these visions and miracles, instead of having been derived by direct filiation from heathen sources, may have been due to a constant human element, which of late years has only just begun to receive proper attention, viz. hallucination, whether individual or collective. This element, forming, as it does, the very basis of savage religious philosophy, and becoming recrudescant in every age, may account for many similarities of idea, and even of narrative, in different ages and peoples whose historical and external connection is obscure, and may ultimately prove the means of affording that unifying theory which is the desideratum of all scientific searchers in the field of historical religion as of others. Speaking more generally, it must be admitted that like effects, and even the more startling resemblances, such as between some forms of Buddhism and Christianity, may be due to elements which are common to humanity at a certain stage of development, to internal rather than to external causation.

H. C. CORRANCE.

Le Dogme de la Trinité dans les trois premiers siècles.—Par Antoine Dupin.—Paris: Émile Nourry, 14 rue Notre-Dame-de-Lorette, 1907.

MODERN researches into the origins of dogma have ever been thrusting further and further back the assumption of its primary "revelation." It is no longer possible for anyone in the slightest degree acquainted with its history to maintain the old idea of its absolute unchangeableness. Even Roman theologians are beginning to see that something must be allowed for development, and Newman's theory at least has never been condemned by them at present.¹ But that theory, assuming, as it did, that each doctrine had a germ, in the shape of an original and absolute revelation, has been proved untenable by the exhaustive researches of Harnack and others. Newman's categories of development implied that each doctrine was a distinct germ, complete in itself and containing implicitly the fully developed dogma, to which subsequent thought added nothing beyond bringing out more clearly its hidden meaning. Newman's theory, in fact, though more fully elaborated, was practically identical in principle with that of St Vincent of Lerins. The modern theory is far more in harmony with the actual facts—the theory that dogma, as it grew up in the Church, was a synthetical compromise between certain heterogeneous and even contradictory ideas.

This was certainly the course followed by the Trinitarian dogma. The data were—the baptismal formula; the historical Christ, His deification, whether through the medium, as in the West, of the pagan categories of divinisation, or, as in the East, through the Logos-idea; and finally and above all, the strict notion of the Unity of the Godhead which had to be preserved in any case. The Trinity emerged from the clash and conflict of these heterogeneous elements.

This is more than a theory, for it can be shown to be, on its main lines, historically true, and M. Antoine Dupin, in this little work, has given a summary, admirable in its conciseness and lucidity, of the process which actually took place. Absolutists may still attempt to take refuge in the baptismal formula, with the venerable plea that the conjunction of the three names implies distinctness combined with unity and identity of nature; that the formula, in fact, contains a germ from which the Athanasian creed was developed by a sort of inner logical necessity. But, in the first place, as the absolutist assumption has so far been proved unhistorical, the burden of proof rests with those who still try to maintain it in that early period of Christianity whose scanty records are still used to shelter the plea of ignorance. They have to show cause, and good cause, why the same theory which has proved so fruitful in the region of ascertained facts, should not be applied also to those periods of which less can be known with certainty; that, in short, the baptismal formula itself was not the result of development, but an original and absolute "revelation." And, in the second place, when that theory is so

¹ The above was written before the issue of the latest Encyclical.

applied, it is found to be as fruitful in interpreting the meagre facts of the earlier, as it was in the case of the fuller data of the later, centuries.

From this point of view it becomes clear that the assumption is quite unwarranted which attempts to read some sort of logical consistency and homogeneity into the threefold baptismal formula. That formula implied at first nothing more than the coupling of the name of Christ with the Father's as having carried out His work for man on earth, and the Holy Spirit as representing the charismatic powers of the early Christians. Yet there is a sense in which the formula must be regarded as the root of the Trinitarian conception, since, as our author observes, "the Trinity was brought to birth under the influence of the threefold formula; and it was, again, to this formula that it owed its preservation" (p. 17).

As regards the relation of Christ to God, and the nature of the Holy Spirit, whether person or gift, the early theology was in a state of flux and confusion: it was this devotional formula which held the names together and gave shape to the idea which emerged from that confusion. But the Trinity as such, the idea of three equal Persons in one God, was not reached till after a long struggle of conflicting theories. It was a compromise, brought about through the agency of Pope Dionysius, who welded together the positive ideas contained in the Trinities of Tertullian and Sabellius. The result was a formula which, while lacking the rationalism and logical coherence of either, yet satisfied more than any other the rival claims of the Unity of God with those of the Three Persons. By removing the idea from the sphere of reasoning and controversy into the region of mystery and incomprehensibility, it closed for ever the disputes of which that idea had previously been the subject. "It is the work," says M. Dupin (p. 77), "not of the philosopher who examines, but of the pastor who seeks to steer clear of speculations. It bears, in the highest degree, the mark of the Roman spirit."

And, like other dogmas, it did good work in its time, in releasing the Church from fruitless logomachy about matters which the mind of man can never solve, thus leaving her activities free for more practical matters.

H. C. CORRANCE.

ISFIELD, SUSSEX.

Lay Sermons and Addresses. Delivered in the Hall of Balliol College, Oxford. By Dr Edward Caird, late Master. — Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons, 1907.

It will not be necessary to acquaint readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL with the philosophic outlook which Dr Caird brings to these sermons, nor, if there were any elements in that outlook which seemed open to criticism, would this be the occasion to criticise them, the book being, by its nature, one in which philosophical exposition is not aimed at, but the philosophical construction of a lifetime presupposed. To Dr Caird, as we all know and rejoice in knowing, progress is, as it were, a postulate in philosophy. To philosophise is to seek after truth, and the search implies

not only the existence of its object, but that potential kinship between the seeker and the sought which cannot fail to issue at last in the unification of the two. Perhaps the most impressive characteristic of these addresses is the security with which Dr Caird relates this abstract thought to its concrete fulfilment in the history of our own time. The period which saw their delivery was one during a great part of which our national outlook was by no means bright. Moreover, there has been a tendency, a tendency perhaps now on the wane, to regard the latter half of the nineteenth century as a time when progress materialised, and thereby ceased to be progress—when there was a development of the external at the expense of the internal elements. The period is apt to be spoken of as a period of disintegration, of the decay of ideals, a period during which it might almost be said that religion had become discredited, or had, at least, lost all immediate influence upon national life and thought. And nothing brings more invigoration and sustainment than that a man of experience and authority like Dr Caird's, a man who, with so firm and comprehensive a grasp of intellectual methods and principles, combines so delicate an intuition into the forces by which human character is moulded and a human sympathy so living and so wide, should be able not merely to point us to the unique achievements, spiritual no less than material, which this period has added to the annals of progressing civilisation, but still more, making every allowance for new difficulties and new dangers, should be able to read in these very dangers and difficulties themselves, if only we can rightly brace ourselves to meet them, the earnest of a still brighter future both for our own country and for the world. This is the kind of faith that communicates itself, the faith before which the barriers of sceptical misgiving go down. There is a nobler destiny before us than any that has hitherto been offered to mankind: a greater concentration of effort is therefore required of us if we would hope to enter upon our inheritance. "He who looks beneath the surface may see in the agitation and uncertainty of the world, in the doubt and trouble of our intellectual life, the indications of the dawn of a faith in God and man, wider, calmer, freer from illusions, and more comprehensive, though not less keen and earnest in its charity, than has ever been seen in the world before." This note of confidence dominates the book, and it is the more authoritative, the more inspiring, because the confidence is, as it were, conditional, felt, one may say, to be conditioned not a little by the nature of the response that might be awaiting it among those whom Dr Caird addressed. "To you," Dr Caird says, "who, many of you, will eventually come to occupy important posts in the public service and in the great professions, . . . this appeal comes with peculiar force"; and he adds: "One who has been a teacher of youth in this and another University for nearly forty years would be blind indeed if he could suppose that the seed of intellect and character was beginning to fail in this country." Words like these can hardly fail to call out that quickened sense of public responsibility on which they depend for their fulfilment.

This dominant note of inspiring confidence in our future is supported, as alone it could be supported, by every evidence of a balanced and penetrative appreciation of the present conditions on which that future is to be built, as well as by the completest recognition that the spiritual life of man—whatever the future that awaits him—is realising itself here and now, and that the problem before us, both as individuals and as members of a community, is to so act that the conditions of what we call the material earthly life may appear to us in the true light of their spiritual meaning. This holds equally of the ethical and of the religious attitudes which Dr Caird takes up; he would of course allow of no ultimate division between them; and it is not a small part of the value of sermons like these that the two are presented in such perfect fusion. Stating with unhesitating firmness his belief in a personal immortality, he formulates the belief in such a way, and places it in such a context, as to suggest that the idea of an unending future, far from relaxing the importance of present issues, immeasurably intensifies it. Religion is not to be conceived as the earthly anticipation of a heaven postponed. Life being eternal, we are already living the eternal life. Thus throughout the volume that “rapture of the forward view” which breathes in all its pages appears as naturally and inseparably connected with an immediate vision of spiritual law and spiritual power manifested day by day, on the one hand governing, on the other evoking, the energies of living men; and perhaps the finest sermons in the book are those such as “Spiritual Development” or “The Great Decision,” in which certain details of this vision are worked out in their relation to the problems of the individual life. This, as well as the other characteristics earlier noted, finds forcible expression in the following very noble passage: “There is a great danger of losing sight of the ideal in our immediate life, and thinking that it is to be found only in the past or in the future. In every age, the ideal of the present is hidden from superficial eyes by the petty accidents, the trivial round of each day’s common life, by the inevitable exaggeration of that which lies nearest to us; while the distant past stands out in grand and simple outline, and the future is whatever you choose to paint it. But . . . if the old Jewish prophet could see the stars in their courses fighting against Sisera, could feel that his little struggle was part of the great conflict of good and evil in the universe, much more may we, in this age when man’s knowledge of the movement of history has become so much greater, when we can trace so much more clearly the reciprocal influences of men and nations upon each other, when we can discern how the spirit of Christianity has been slowly and gradually but inevitably overcoming and transforming the life of men, and gaining victories over the spirit of the world and also of the Church itself—much more may we realise that our life is not an aimless or meaningless vicissitude of events, but an essential step in the great process.”

BASIL DE SÉLINCOURT.

KINGHAM, CHIPPING NORTON.

History of Sacerdotal Celibacy in the Christian Church.—By H. C. Lea, LL.D.—3rd ed., 1907.—Williams & Norgate. 2 vols.

THERE is perhaps no living writer in the English tongue who has done more than Dr Lea for students of mediæval sociology. Others have no doubt made fewer technical mistakes, or given us more brilliant generalisations; but none has collected so many facts and documents for the general reader to consider and digest. This *History*, already forty years old, is admitted even by hostile critics to be substantially correct in its quotations, while there are no rhetorical exaggerations to mar their force. The second edition appeared twenty-three years ago, and the third has been called for at a time when the author “had made no special preparation for recording and incorporating . . . new material”—a modest apology which will be readily understood by those who have read the ten or twelve monumental volumes which Dr Lea has published in the interval. It would therefore seem ungracious to insist unduly here on omissions: yet it is necessary that the reader should realise how heavy is the harvest of evidence on this subject, and how far beyond even Dr Lea’s industry to glean. He still omits much of supreme value which was cited as long ago as 1828 by the brothers Theiner in their work on the same subject—a work which in mere weight of erudition is perhaps superior to Dr Lea’s own—and indeed he seems comparatively unfamiliar with German, and has omitted much valuable evidence from *Minnelieder* and sermons. Even more important, however, are his omissions of the abundant official records of visitors, many of which have been published since the Theiners wrote, and which supply perhaps the most curious evidence of all: viz., the diaries of Odo Rigaldi in the thirteenth century, Busch and Ambrose of Camaldoli in the fifteenth, and Felician Ninguarda in the sixteenth; the Norwich and Southwell visitations (Camden Society); those of Ripon and Beverley (Surtees Society); those of Cerisy (*Société des Antiquaires de Normandie*); with the Cluniac records published by Duckett and in the *Bibliothèque de l’École des Chartes*. A full analysis of these visitations and those recorded in the episcopal registers, with a detailed estimate of the methods of procedure and the significance of the evidence, would have been almost as important to the student, and quite as interesting to the general reader, as all the other evidence collected by Dr Lea for the last three centuries before the Reformation; and no history of the subject can be called complete until this work has been done. The task, however, would have taken years. Dr Lea has meanwhile been well occupied, and we must be very grateful for all that he has given us. Yet here again it may be well to note a few minor errors in view of a fourth edition. The *Duits* of vol. i. p. 295 is really *Deutz* by Cologne. The quotation from St Bernard (i. 390) is, if not incorrect, at least misleading; for the evidence tends to show that the man whose marriage the Saint would have allowed had never actually taken monastic vows. Again, the “quasi maritali copula” of i. 347 is far from conveying a direct assertion

of marriage; and in another place Dr Jessopp's vague language about married *clergy* seems to have misled Dr Lea into the belief that these were necessarily *priests* (i. 354). These two points, small as they seem, would beg a very important historical question. Another reference quoted (i. 354) is not (as the author implies) to foreigners intruded into English bishoprics, but to bishops "in partibus"—i.e. Englishmen, mostly friars, who often held roving commissions from the Pope under the titles of outlandish sees, such as the "Bethleem and Babiloigne" of the poet in question—a system which lingers still. The *De Ruina Ecclesiæ*, which Dr Lea frequently attributes to Nicolas de Clamenges, is not really his, as M. A. Müntz has shown in his monograph on Nicolas. More important is Dr Lea's apparent identification of *conventual Orders* with *conventual system* (ii. 89). The "conventual Orders" which the commission of cardinals (A.D. 1538) proposed to "abolish," or rather bleed to death, were only the unreformed friars, a numerous and powerful body indeed, but only a fraction of the whole conventual system. The allusion to Cardinal Morton's visitation of St Albans (ii. 16) needs considerable modification in the light of Dr Gairdner's recent remarks in the *English Historical Review* (vol. xxii. p. 365).

But these are only small flaws in the mass of valuable information which Dr Lea has brought together upon a subject of such vital historical importance. It is difficult to exaggerate the influence of the celibate ideal on mediæval civilisation. If we had nothing to guide us but the fact, lately revealed by the *Dictionary of National Biography*, that the reformed clergy have reared far more than their proper proportion of distinguished children for the service of their country, that alone would draw a sharp line between mediæval and modern life. But clerical celibacy influenced the life of our forefathers through even deeper and subtler channels than this; and nobody can understand mediæval society—it may almost be added, none can understand certain strong currents of modern life—until he has at least partially realised this struggle of centuries for and against a system repudiated by the Apostles, riveted at last on Christendom by Hildebrand, and erected practically into an article of faith by the Council of Trent.¹ On the surface it is a sordid story, and even Dr Lea, for all his discretion, may seem here and there to heap testimony upon testimony almost to weariness. Yet the facts are there: men may indeed differ widely in their interpretation, but nobody can afford altogether to neglect them.

G. G. COULTON.

EASTBOURNE.

¹ See the note on p. 640 of the 2nd edition.

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[Liberalism follows Christianity in observing the great moral principle formulated by Kant—that man is to be regarded always as an end, never merely as a means.]

- 15 *Benn (Alfred W.)* The Churches and Modern Thought. Albany R., Oct. 1907. [Emphasises the essential incompatibility between the theory of evolution and all theology whether "natural" or "revealed."] 19th Cent., Sept. 1907.

- 26 *Palmer (W. Scott)* The Church and Modern Men. 166p. Longmans, 1907.

[A thoughtful presentation of a layman's difficulties in regard to Anglican theology. Six of the papers here collected deal with the relation of the church to modern thought, and the other six are studies in the interpretation of important matters in religious doctrine and practice.]

- 40 Pontifical Services: Illustrated from Woodcuts of the XVIIIth Century. With Descriptive Notes by F. C. Eeles. (Alcuin Club Series, viii.) Vol. iii. 145p. Longmans, 1907.

- 43 *Beeching (H. C.)* The Revision of the Prayer Book: A Plain Man's View. Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

[Advocates revision of the lectionary, relief from reciting imprecatory Psalms, permissive use of the Communion Office and of the Burial Office of the 1st Edwardine book.]

- w *Barnes (W. E.)* The Use of the Psalter in the Services of the Church of England. Interpreter, Oct. 1907.

[Desires the omission of the imprecatory ps. or passages, the restoration of antiphons, and correction of some unsatisfactory renderings.]

- 50 *Beet (Joseph Agar)* The Church, the Churches, and the Sacraments. 158p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[That the Christian Pastorate and the Sacraments are subordinate to the teaching of Christ and His apostles about Himself and the way of salvation, is proved by the comparatively small place given to the former, and the great prominence of the latter, in the N.T.]

- 53 *Berville (J.)* Les Origines de l'Eucharistie (Messe, Saint-Cène). Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1907.

[Taking the literature on the subject in regressive order, from Justin Martyr backwards, the writer attempts to reach what is common to it all. This "fond commun" must be the original. 1st art. here analyses the documents from Justin to the Didache.]

Drury (T. W.) Elevation in the Eucharist, its History and Rationale. 188p. Clay, 1907.

D DOCTRINE 10 • God, 22 • Christ, 60 • Eschatology, 70 • Faith, 90 Apologetics.

Gore (Charles) The New Theology and the Old Religion. Eight Lectures and five Sermons. 311p. Murray, 1907.

[The Lectures were delivered in the Cathedral of Birmingham at the mid-day services in Lent, 1907. Their object is to make plain, as against the assumptions of the New Theology, the substance of the original revelation as it touches the nature of God, of sin, of Christ, etc.]

Egerton (Hakluyt) Is the New Theology Christian? 174p. Allen, 1907.

[Principal conclusions:—(1) Mr Campbell's New Theology is a non-Christian system of Doctrine, which borrows from Christian thought only certain illustrations; (2) The central conception of the New Theology can be held reasonably—up to a certain point—only if developed into a non-theistic philosophy.]

Hügel (Baron F. von) Relations between God and Man. Albany R., Sept. 1907.

[A criticism of Mr Campbell's New Theology as regards (1) the category of "Consciousness," (2) the immanence and transcendence of God, (3) the

nature of evil, (4) man as literally a part of God, (5) the final restitution of all souls.]

Baynes (Bishop) The New Theology and the Doctrine of the Fall. 19th Cent., Sept. 1907.

Barr (F.) The Old "New Theology." A Backward Glance, I. Hindustan Rev., Sept. 1907.

[The "new theology" is write, a serving up of old philosophies.]

Mackintosh (H. R.) Christian Theology and Comparative Religion. Expos., Sept. 1907.

[Considers the bearing of the comparative study of religions on the internal state of Christian theology.]

- h *Gardner (Percy)* Exploratio Evangelica: A Survey of the Foundations of Christianity. 2nd ed. 520p. Black, 1907.

[Prof. Gardner, in a prefatory note to this edition, deals with two positions which have especially been called in question by his critics—(1) his attitude towards speculative philosophy, (2) his attitude towards the miraculous.]

Author of "Pro Christo et Ecclesia." Christus Futurus. 385p. Macmillan, 1907.

[A series of successive efforts to think what the gospel of Christ really is. Review will follow.]

Figgis (J. N.) The Creed of Christ. Albany R., Nov. 1907.

[“Christianity may be false, may be outworn, may be superfluous, but at least it has never professed to open the kingdom of heaven, except on the condition of our becoming as little children. This is why I think that the new theology will not win a permanent popular hold.”]

- 2 *Anon.* Rome and the Repression of Thought. Edin. R., Oct. 1907.

[This last act of the Papacy cuts off the Roman Church, as represented by its authorised exponents, from that truth of things upon which life rests. History will hold one man responsible.]

Gardeil (Le Père A.) La Crédibilité et L'Apologétique. 299p. Lecoffre, 1907.

[This volume, the spirit of which is in entire conformity with the last encyclical of Pius X., ends with an appendix on the proof of miracle.]

Laberthonnière (l'Abbé L.) Le Catholicisme et la Société. 350p. Paris, Giard et Brière, 1907.

[Historical account of the part played by Catholicism in the shaping and inspiration of European society down to the present day. Concludes with a discussion of the relation between Catholicism and Socialism and a plea for the necessity of an enlightened Catholicism in the coming social reconstruction.]

Bricout (J.) La condamnation du modernisme. Rev. du clergé français, Oct. 1, 1907. [Acceptance and defence of the recent encyclical.]

Bricout (J.) Ce qui n'est pas du modernisme. Rev. du clergé français, Oct. 15, 1907. [Indicates, and in a liberal sense, those domains and methods in philosophy, theology, and history which the condemnation leaves untouched.]

Aveling (F.) Two Catechisms. Catholic World, Sept. 1907.

[I.e. Sir O. Lodge's Substance of Faith . . . compared with the Explanatory Catechism of Christian Doctrine.]

- 10 *Allan (Archibald)* The Advent of the Father. 486p. MacLehose, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Ullingworth (J. R.) The Doctrine of the Trinity Apologetically Considered. 267p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

- 26 *Harnack (Adolf), and others.* The Atone-

- ment in Modern Religious Thought: A Theological Symposium. 3rd ed. 376p. Clarke, 1907.
- 30 *M'Kinney (S. B. G.)* The Origin and Nature of Man. 483p. Oliphant, 1907.
- 40 *Du Bose (W. Porcher)* The Soteriology of the New Testament. Reissue. 391p. Longmans, 1907.
- Lacey (T. A.)* The Christian Idea of Grace. Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.
- 46 *Skrine (John Huntley)* What is Faith? A Hermit's Epistle to some that are Without. 337p. Longmans, 1907.
- [The author tells for what it may be worth the story of his own faith, and asks his readers to compare with this story their own.]
- 60 *Kempson (F. Claude)* The Future Life and Modern Difficulties. 373p. Pitman, 1907.
- [The difficulties are of two kinds: (a) those raised in the name of science, (b) those raised on ethical, or even sentimental, grounds against some particular system of Eschatology.]
- 81v *Turner (C. H.)* The Nicene Creed in the Codex Muratorianus. J. Th. St., Oct. 1907.
- 90 *Cunningham (W.)* The Confirmation and Defence of the Faith. J. Th. St., Oct. 1907.
- [Points out what the author believes to be the better way in Apologetics for these times.]
- Scott (E. F.)* The Apologetic of the New Testament. (Crown Theo. Lib.) 253p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.
- [Lectures delivered at the University of Glasgow, in accordance with the terms of the Alexander Robertson Trust. Review will follow.]
- E ETHICS.** 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics, 10 Theories, 20 Applied Ethics, Sociology, 23 Economics, 27 Education.*
- 10 *Belot (Gustave)* Études de morale positive. (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine.) 530p. Alcan, 1907.
- [An important book, in which an attempt is made to support social Utilitarianism with new arguments and to defend it from criticism.]
- Parodi (D.)* Morale et Raison. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1907.
- [In praise of G. Belot's *Études de Morale positive*. Objectively, morality is the observance of certain rules; subjectively, the whole of those rules which reason accepts. No morality is conceivable without rationality.]
- Bos (C.)* Études de philosophie positive. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4, 1907.
- [Discusses G. Belot's book.]
- Fouillée (A.)* Doit-on fonder la science morale et comment? Rev. Phil., Nov. 1907.
- [Extracts from introduction to forthcoming book, *Morale des idées-forces*. Morality must be based on our mental nature. The ends immanent in human nature must contribute to furnish the psychological basis of moral science.]
- Baylac (J.)* Deux systèmes récents de morale. Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1907.
- [Critiques the morality of solidarity and sociological morality.]
- Gauthier (J. de)* La dépendance de la morale et l'indépendance des mœurs. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1907.
- Truc (G.)* Les conséquences morales de l'effort. Rev. Phil., Sept. 1907.
- Sheldon (Walter L.)* Modern Classifications of Duties and Virtues. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.
- Pigou (A. C.)* Some Points of Ethical Controversy. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.
- [Discusses (a) the method by which ethical inquiry ought to be pursued, (b) the qualities which make up the goodness of any conscious being, (c) the way in which the goodness of one being is related to that of others.]
- Hoernlé (R. F. Alfred)* The Conception of Possibility in its Relation to Conduct. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.
- [We have no right to treat possibilities of will as if they were theoretical assertions. In the end we cannot explain will by any categories, except those which the volitional experience itself suggests.]
- Moisant (X.)* Le problème du Mal. Rev. de Phil., Nov. 1907.
- Joussain (André)* La genèse de la notion du droit dans l'âme individuelle. Rev. de Phil., Oct. 1907.
- 20 *Trotter (W. F.)* The Citizen and His Duties. (Social Problems Series.) 115p. Jack, 1907.
- [This book is intended as a general introduction to the series. It deals with such subjects as "the advancement of justice," "the promotion of the public welfare," "patriotism," "public morality," etc.]
- Fite (Warner)* The Theory of Democracy. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.
- [The democratic ideal is that of a society of perfectly intelligent and cultivated men. It is, in a word, the ideal of a society of gentlemen.]
- Deploige (Simon)* Le Conflit de la Morale et de la Sociologie. iv. La Genèse du Système de M. Durkheim. v. Le Réalisme Social (suite). Rev. Neo-Scol., Aug. 1907.
- Macdonald (J. Ramsay)* Socialism. (Soc. Problems Series.) 124p. Jack, 1907.
- Carpenter (Edward)* Morality under Socialism. Albany R., Sept. 1907.
- Roberty (E. de)* Le rôle civilisateur des abstractions du Totémisme au Socialisme. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1907.
- Brewer (David J.)* Law and Ethics. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.
- [The old idea that a lawyer must do all that his client wishes is passing away. He has no right to barter his own integrity.]
- 21 *Jones (Henry)* Idealism and Politics, i., ii. Cont. R., Nov., Dec. 1907.
- [Author replies to Hobhouse's objections to Idealism. Idealism cannot advocate cataclysmic changes. It would conserve most of our present institutions, but whilst preserving them, and our civic and international relations, it would moralise them.]
- Russell (Bertrand)* The Politics of a Biologist. Albany R., Oct. 1907.
- [Desirable parents should be wholly relieved of the expense of bringing up their children, not only by providing such things as education free, but by a direct payment from the State to the parents. Undesirable parents ought to be in every way encouraged to limit their families as the desirable parents do at present.]
- Jerrold (Laurence)* France and Socialism. Fort. R., Nov. 1907.
- 23 *Harty (J. M.)* The Living Wage: Its Ethical Conditions. Irish Th. Q., Oct. 1907.
- Ryan (J. A.)* The Fallacy of "Bettering One's Position." Catholic World, Nov. 1907.
- [We do not "better" ourselves by multiplying the means of material satisfaction.]
- 27 *Keatinge (M. W.)* Suggestion in Education. 202p. Black, 1907.
- [This book distinguishes between hypnotic

suggestion and suggestion in the waking state, analyses and describes the conditions upon which suggestion in the waking state depends, and discusses the proper place of suggestion among the other methods used by teachers.]

Vowinkel (Ernst) Determinism in der Erziehung.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4. 1907.

[Insists upon the importance of the idea of personality in any sound theory of education.]

Findlay (J. J.) The Parent and the School. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.

Wigram (Eirene) Firm Foundations: A Guide for Parents and Others to Religion and Religious Education. 323p.

Murray, 1907.

[Christians cannot set down anything as basal truth which is not supported by (a) the testimony of the human heart, (b) the testimony of tradition, (c) the testimony of the Bible, which is the Word of God.]

Anon. Children without Nurseries.

Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

[Deals with the problem of the right training of the more or less neglected children of the industrial classes.]

Rogers (C. F.) The Education Question: Foreign Parallels. Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

[Useful parallels, drawn from the Special Reports of the Board of Education. The conclusion is that for a settlement, the question needs to be kept free from party issues, and the rights of all must be recognised.]

Sadler (M. E.) The Influence of the State in English Education.

Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

Buquet (P.) L'Enseignement de la Morale et l'Histoire des Religions.

Cænobium, Sept. 1907.

[The subject of History of Religions cannot be taught without its leading to definite religious attitudes—those of Pascal or Renan or Voltaire.]

Bishop of Hereford. An Experiment in Rural Libraries for School and Home.

19th Cent., Nov. 1907.

Pradhan (V. G.) The Japan Women's University. Hindustan R., Aug. 1907.

28 *Perris (H. S.)* The Cult of the Rifle and the Cult of Peace. 61p.

Sealey Clark, 1907.

[Endeavours (a) to set forth the essential principle and object of the Peace Movement; (b) to bring out the real significance of current militarist propaganda; (c) to draw attention to need of a more efficient organisation of the movement in this country.]

29 *Anon.* The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia. A Brief Account of the Activity of the Lettish Social Democratic Workers' Party. Revised by Ernest O. F. Ames. (Socialist Lib.) 98p.

Indep. Lab. Party, 1907.

98 *Freeman (Frank N.)* The Ethics of Gambling. Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

1 *Forsyth (P. T.)* Positive Preaching and Modern Mind. The Lyman Beecher Lect. on Preaching, 1907. 374p.

Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Trevaskis (Dorothy J.), compiled by. Quotations for Pulpit Use. With Pref. by the Bishop of Southampton. 340p.

Elliot Stock, 1907.

2 *Caird (Edward)* Lay Sermons and

Addresses Delivered in the Hall of Balliol College, Oxford. 312p. MacLehose, 1907.

[See p. 464.]

Black (Hugh) Christ's Service of Love. 326p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

Campbell (R. J.) New Theology Sermons. 300p. Williams & Norgate, 1907.

[Twenty sermons, containing little or nothing of a directly controversial character, but which may serve as a practical demonstration of the way in which the principles of the New Theology find a homiletic application.]

Wilberforce (Basil) New (?) Theology: Thoughts on the Universality and Continuity of the Doctrine of the Immanence of God. 286p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

Inge (W. Ralph) All Saints' Sermons, 1905-7. 219p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Selection of sermons preached at All Saints' Church, Ennismore Gardens, as a memorial of a short ministry, 1905-7.]

Shepard (J. William) Light and Life. With Prefatory Memoir by Henry E. J. Bevan. 305p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Sermons selected and published by the wish of several friends and relatives.]

Kennett (Robert H.) In Our Tongues: Some Thoughts for Readers of the English Bible. 166p. Arnold, 1907.

[Essay on "Some Hebrew Idioms in the Old and New Testaments," followed by seven sermons, preached for the most part in Ely Cathedral.]

Kennett (R. H.) "Was not Esau Jacob's Brother?" saith the Lord: "Yet I loved Jacob and I hated Esau."

Interpreter, Oct. 1907.

Macgregor (W. Malcolm) Jesus Christ the Son of God. Sermons and Interpretations. 284p. Clark, 1907.

Morrison (G. H.) The Wings of the Morning: Addresses from a Glasgow Pulpit. 328p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[Aim has been to win the attention, in honourable ways, of some at least of that vast class of people who to-day sit so lightly to the Church.]

Horan (F. S.) A Call to Seamen, and other Sermons preached to Naval Cadets at the Royal Naval College, Osborne. 176p.

Murray, 1907.

Waggett (P. N.) Hope and Strength. 130p. Longmans, 1907.

Newbolt (W. C. E.) The Gospel Message. Sermons Preached in St Paul's Cathedral. 179p. Longmans, 1907.

Crothers (S. M.) The Understanding Heart. 187p. P Green, 1907.

Conway (Moncure D.) Lessons for the Day. 234p. Watts & Co., 1907.

[A selection of Addresses delivered twenty-five years ago at South Place, Finsbury.]

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

Skipton (H. P. K.) The Life and Times of Nicholas Ferrar. 206p. Mowbray, 1907.

2 *Lathbury (D. C.)* Mr Gladstone (Leaders of the Church, 1800-1900). 227p.

Mowbray, 1907.

Liberty (Stephen) Mr Gladstone's Place in Religious Thought. 19th Cent., Oct. 1907.

Benson (R. H.), Devas (B. W.), Phillimore (J. S.), and Cuthbert (Fr.) Reginald Balfour: Some Reminiscences.

Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

Bennett (J. R. Sterndale) The Life of William Sterndale Bennett. 484p.

Clay, 1907.

Jones (Francis A.) Thomas Alva Edison: Sixty Years of an Inventor's Life. 850p.

Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[An extremely interesting account of Edison's career, with numerous illustrations.]

Macmillan (D.) The Life of George Matheson, D.D., LL.D., F.R.S.E. 369p.

Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[A very sympathetic and interesting biography of the blind preacher.]

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Medieval R Modern 2 English.

Hopkins (R. V. Nind) The Life of Alexander Severus. (Camb. Hist. Essays, xiv.) 280p. Clay, 1907.

v *Teetgen (Ada B.)* The Life and Times of the Empress Pulcheria, A.D. 399-452. Ill. 292p. Sonnenschein, 1907.

[St Pulcheria was the eldest sister of Theodosius II., and virtual empress of the East Roman world from 414 to 453.]

C *De Genouillac (Henri)* L'Église Chrétienne au temps de Saint Ignace D'Antioche. 268p. Beauchesne, 1907.

[Christianity is treated here from the historical point of view, and discussed as a life and as worship, as a society, and as mystic thought and faith. The principal sources for this period are the letters of St Ignatius of Antioch, about the authenticity of which there is no longer any doubt.]

Thomas (A. Hermann) The Early Church. Its Orders and Institutions. (Manuals of Early Christian History.) 270p. Sunday School Assoc., 1907.

Nau (F.) La légende des saints Evêques Héraclide, Mnason et Rhodon, on l'apostolicité de l'Eglise de Chypre. Rev. de l'Orient chrét., tom. 2, No. 2, 1907.

[From an MSS. of which hitherto only fragments have been known. A summary, but not the text is given, except in the case of an apocryphal letter from Paul and Barnabas to the Cypriots.]

Nau (F.) Histoires des solitaires Égyptiens.

Rev. de l'Orient chrét., tom. 2, No. 2 1907. [Continuation of the Greek text of MS. Coislin, 126, fol. 167 sqq., with a translation.]

Ramsay (Sir W. M.) A Christian City in the Byzantine Age.

Expos., Sept., Oct., 1907.

[An account of the Anatolian town known popularly as Bin-Bir-Kilissee, and officially as Maden-Sheher.]

Ramsay (Sir W. M.) Notes on Christian History in Asia Minor.

Expos., Nov. 1907.

[1. The Persecution of Paul in Iconium and in Pisidian Antioch; 2. The Christian Cults of Iconium (as exhibited in present-day worship there); 3. St Paul's attitude towards the Emperors; 4. A Christian City in the Byzantine Age (Barata, or Bin-Bir-Kilissee).]

Zahn (T.) Missionary Methods in the Times of the Apostles. Expos., Nov. 1907. [Specially as exhibited in St Paul's work.]

M *Barry (W.)* The Papal Deposing Power. Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

[It was not the Albigensian or the Lollard that struck out a new line of development in the heart of the Middle Ages; it was the lawyer, dazzled and inspired by Justinian's Imperial

Code, that broke the Feudal System and took from the Pope his temporal jurisdiction.]

R *Anon.* Henry VIII. and the English Reformation. Edin. R., Oct. 1907.

Brauer (Karl) Die Unionstätigkeit John Duries unter dem Protektorat Cromwells: Ein Beitrag zur Kirchengeschichte des siebzehnten Jahrhunderts. 252p.

Elwert, 1907.

Nazelle (L. J.) Le Protestantisme en Saintonge sous le Regime de la Révocation, 1685-1789. 329p. Fischbacher, 1907.

[Author selected the province of Saintonge for his study of this important period, on account of the close bonds which connected him with the churches there.]

2 *Watson (John)* The Scot of the Eighteenth Century: His Religion and His Life. 345p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[The ten chapters are:—The Kirk as a Factor in Scots History, The Discipline of the Kirk, The Worship of the Church, William Carstairs, The Moderates, Evangelicals, The Theology of the Century, The Piety of the Century, The Scot in his Home, The Scot with his Books.]

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R.C. Church 3 Anglican.

Koch (H.) Zeit und Heimat des Liber de rebaptismate.

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1907.

[Probably written in Africa, and anonymously because of the overpowering influence of S. Cyprian. Date between the September synod of 256 and the outbreak of the Valerian persecution of 257.]

Oger (G.) Chronique des Églises étrangères. R. prat. d'Apologétique, Sept 1, 1907. [Giving specially full and useful information relating to the Russian Church.]

C *Warfield (B. B.)* Augustine's Doctrine of Knowledge and Authority.

Princeton Th. Rev., Oct. 1907.

Baur (C.) L'entrée littéraire de Saint Chrysostome dans le monde latin.

Rev. d'Hist. Eccles., April 1907.

["S. Jerome announced him, Arien the Pelagian introduced him, S. Augustin received and eulogised him."]

Chapman (J.) Papias on the Age of Our Lord. J. Th. St., Oct. 1907.

Conybeare (F. C.) Epiphanius on the Baptism.

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1907.

Dreus (P.) Der literarische Charakter der neuentdeckten Schrift des Irenäus "Zum Erweise der apostolischen Verkündigung."

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 3, 1907.

Turner (C. H.) Prolegomena to the "Testimonia" of St Cyprian, ii.

J. Th. St., Oct. 1907.

2 *Bishop of Ripon, ed.* Thomas & Kempis. (The Lib. of the Soul.) 156p. Jack, 1907.

Fairweather (W.), ed. Santa Teresa. (The Lib. of the Soul.) 154p. Jack, 1907.

Anon. The Prophet of Calabria: Joachim of Floris and the "Eternal Gospel."

Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

Morgan (H. T.) The Spirit of Port Royal. Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

Barry (D.) Our National Degeneracy and a forgotten Matrimonial Impediment. Irish Th. Q., Oct. 1907.

[The *Ecclesie Vetitum* is a prohibition which the priesthood might use, under direction, to prevent marriage in cases, e.g., of mental or physical infirmity.]

Baumgarten (P. M.) Das Original der Konstitution "Eternus ille celestium." Vom. I. März. 1590.

Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 4, 1907.

[Describes the original MS. of the Bull, and gives its textual differences from Cornely's edition.]

Donaucour (P.) Les premières interventions du Saint Siège relatives à l'Immaculée Conception (XII^e.-XIV^e. siècle).

Rev. d'Hist. Ecclés., April 1907.

[Concludes that up to 1315 or 1320 the festival does not appear in the liturgical Roman uses approved by the Pope. The article is to be continued.]

Dubois (F.) Chronique du mouvement théologique en France.

Rev. du Clergé français, Aug. 15, 1907.

[Giving special critical notice to Le Roy's "Dogme et Critique."]

Duway (J.) Propos d'un Solitaire.

Cenobium, July 1907.

[Satirises the indifference and ignorance of Catholics towards the deeper questions of faith and belief. The task of the Catholicism of tomorrow is to aid the restoration of the interior life, the life of spirit, will and heart.]

Pius X. The New Syllabus.

Catholic World, Sept. 1907.

[Under this title is given the Latin text and the English translation of the recent decree against Modernism.]

Pius X. Encyclique de S. S. Pie X. sur "Les Doctrines des Modernistes."

R. prat. d'Apologétique, Oct. 1 and 15, 1907.

[Gives the text of the Encyclical in French.]

Pius X. Two Important Decrees.

Irish Th. Q., Oct. 1907.

[I.e. the decree *Lamentabili sane* against Modernism, and the decree concerning espousals and marriage, both in the Latin text.]

Tooke (J. J.) The "Grammar of Assent" and the Old Philosophy.

Irish Th. Q., Oct. 1907.

[Finds there is not the fundamental opposition sometimes alleged between Newman's philosophy and scholasticism.]

- 4 *Preuss (H.)* Was bedeutet die Formel "Convictus testimonii scripturarum aut ratione evidente" in Luther's Ungehörter Antwort zu Worms?

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1908.

[Only one authority exists for Luther—the word of Scripture. "Ratio" is no more than power rightly to interpret scripture.]

Scholz (H.) Kirche und Gemeinde in Schleiermachers und Ritschls Erlösungslehre.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 1, 1908.

- 5 *Watson (E. W.)* Congregationalism Past and Present.

Church Q. R., Oct. 1907.

- 9 *Stephen (Caroline E.)* Quaker Strongholds. 4th ed. 172p.

Headley, 1907.

[The new edition of this little work ought to secure for it many readers who knew it not in its earlier form. "It is," says the writer, "a solemn and awful thought that, as the outward teaching of our Master becomes less and less precisely defined, His disciples are more and more thrown back upon the knowledge of Him as the Light, the Word of God, shining into our hearts and penetrating our lives."]

- L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

- 2 *Ward (A. W.)* and *Waller (A. R.)* The Cambridge History of English Literature.

Vol. i. From the Beginnings to the Cycles of Romance. 520p. Clay, 1907.

Brooke (Stopford A.) Studies in Poetry. 253p.

Duckworth, 1907.

[Contains essays on Blake, Scott, Shelley, Lyrics of Shelley, Epipsychidion, and Keats.]

Shorter (Clement) Immortal Memories.

283p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

[Addresses on Samuel Johnson, Cowper, George Borrow, Crabbe, Johnson's Ancestry, Lassalle, Lord Acton and the Hundred Best Books, Literary Associations of East Anglia.]

Spurgeon (Caroline F. E.) Mysticism in the English Poets.

Quar. R., Oct. 1907.

Collins (J. Churton) The Poetry of Crabbe.

Fort. R., Oct. 1907.

Irwin (Sidney T. Irwin) Oliver Goldsmith.

Quar. R., Oct. 1907.

Ward (Mrs Wilfred) The Realism of Dickens.

Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

- V *Goring (Katie M.)* The Friends of Living Creatures and John Ruskin, i, ii.

Fort. R., Sept., Oct. 1907.

- W *Swinburne (Algernon C.)* Memorial Verses on the Death of Karl Blind.

Fort. R., Sept. 1907.

Tynan (Katharine) A Catholic Poet.

Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

[A review of the work of Lionel Johnson.]

Henderson (M. Sturge) George Meredith: Novelist, Poet, Reformer. 324p.

Methuen, 1907.

Magnus (Laurie) The Succession of Mr Meredith.

Fort. R., Dec. 1907.

[Attempt to prove the succession of Mr Meredith in the line of advance of English poetry.]

Birmingham (George A.) The Literary Movement in Ireland.

Fort. R., Dec. 1907.

Knight (William), ed. Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar.

241p. Unwin, 1907.

[An interesting book on a very striking personality, containing several papers and lectures of Davidson.]

- 3 *Todhunter (John), trans.* Heine's Book of Songs. 279p.

Frowde, 1907.

- 4 *Crawford (Virginia M.)* Joris Karl Huysmans.

Catholic World, Nov. 1907.

Connolly (P. J.) The Trilogy of Joris Karl Huysmans.

Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

Thorold (Algar) Joris Karl Huysmans.

Albany R., Sept. 1907.

- 5 *Haythornthwaite (P.)* Dante and the Union in Italy.

Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

Pastore (A.) Sopra la Ragione filosofica della Poesia Contemporanea.

Cenobium, July 1907.

[An examination of G. Cena's poem *Homo*, "the only philosophical poem of contemporary Italian literature that furnishes a new revelation of the beautiful."]

- 6 *Hume (Martin)* The National Significance of "Don Quixote."

Fort. R., Oct. 1907.

- 7 *Knight (H. T.)* Tolstoi's "Religion."

Interpreter, Oct. 1907.

- w *Soissons (S. C. De)* Mereshkovskij on Materialism.

Cont. R., Dec. 1907.

[Discusses "The Threatening Boor."]

- 9 *Seymour (Thomas Day)* Life in the Homeric Age. 704p.

Macmillan, 1907.

Murray (Gilbert) The Rise of the Greek Epic. 283p.

Frowde, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Holland (Francis) Caius Mæcenas.

Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

[Mæcenas was a man of great intellect, of an exquisite taste in literature, and there was probably no affectation in his laughing disregard of all the old Roman conventions.]

Mayor (Joseph B.), Fowler (W. Warde), Conway (R. S.) Virgil's Messianic Eclogue: Its Meaning, Occasion, and Sources. With the Text of the Eclogue and a verse translation. 146p. Murray, 1907.

[Reprint of articles in *Expositor*, Apr. 1907, in *Harvard Classical Studies*, xiv. 1908, and in *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1907.]

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4

Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.

Frazer (J. G.) The Golden Bough. A Study in Magic and Religion. 3rd edition. Part iv. Adonis Attis Osiris. Studies in the History of Oriental Religion. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. 471p.

Macmillan, 1907.

[The 1st ed. was reviewed in *Hibbert Journal*, vol. v. p. 687.]

Thomas (N. W.), ed. Anthropological Essays, presented to E. B. Tylor on his 75th birthday, Oct. 2, 1907. 424p

Clarendon Press, 1907.

[Essays by Farnell, Frazer, Haddon, Rivers, and others. Review will follow.]

Reinach (A. J.) Pila Horatia et Pilumorum Popule.

Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May-June 1907.

Reinach (S.) Mercure Tricéphale.

Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1907.

[The three-headed images found in France are images of Mercury, i.e. of the native god that Cæsar identified with the Roman Mercury and considered as the supreme Gallic god.]

Anon. The Fountain-head of Religion.

Vedic Mag., vol. i., Nos. 3 and 4.

[No. 3, Chap. iii., Buddhism founded on Vedism. No. 4, Chap. iv., Judaism is based on Zoroastrianism.]

Paris (G.) Le conte du trésor du roi Rhampsinite. Étude de mythographie comparée.

Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., May-June 1907. [Second and concluding article, being a criticism of the narratives.]

4 *Bharadwaja (C.)* Puranic Apologists and their Vagaries.

Vedic Mag., vol. i., No. 4. [Denounces the Puranas as stupid and immoral.]

Oman (J. Campbell) The Brahmans, Theists, and Muslims of India: Studies of Goddess-Worship in Bengal, Caste, Brahmanism, and Social Reform, with descriptive Sketches of curious Festivals, Ceremonies, and Aquairs. Photos. and Drawings by W. C. Oman. 342p. Unwin, 1907.

Elwin (Edward F.) Indian Jottings from Ten Years' Experience in and around Poona City. Ill. 314p. Murray, 1907.

Bishop of Madras. Folklore and Deities of South India. 19th Cent., Nov. 1907.

5 *Eliot (Sir C.)* The Religions of the Far East. 1. China. Quar. R., Oct. 1907.

Deussen (Paul) Outlines of Indian Philosophy: With an Appendix on the Philosophy of the Vedānta in its Relations to Occidental Metaphysics. 70p. Curtius, 1907.

Narasu (P. Lakshmi) The Essence of Buddhism. 212p.

Madras: Varadachari, 1907.

7 *Weir (T. H.)* Arab and Hebrew Prose Writers. Cont. R., Sept. 1907.

Oesterley (W. O. E.), Box (G. H.) The Religion and Worship of the Synagogue: An Introduction to the Study of Judaism from the New Testament Period. 443p.

Pitman, 1907.

[Designed to promote among Christian readers a serious study of Judaism, and written in the belief that the failure of theologians to regard Judaism as a vital organism has been responsible for much defective exegesis.]

Ginsberg (L.) Geonic Responsa.

Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1907.

Hirsch (S. A.) Jewish Mystics: An Appreciation. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1907.

Margolouth (G.) Hebrew Illuminated MSS. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1907.

Poznański (S.) The Karaites Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon in the 12th and 13th centuries. Jewish Q. R., Oct. 1907.

8 *Ali (S. B.)* The Origin of the Moslem Renaissance in India.

Hindustan Rev., July 1907.

[Referring to the Educational work of the late Sir Sayed Ahmed Khan.]

Basset (R.) La Connaissance de l'Islam au moyen-âge.

Rev. de l'Hist. des Rel., July-Aug. 1907.

[1st art., showing Matthew Paris had reasonably exact documentary knowledge.]

Chattpadhyaya (N.) Christ in the Koran.

Hindustan Rev., Aug. 1907.

Guénard (A.) L'Évolution de l'Islam.

Cœnobium, Sept. 1907.

[In spite of symptoms of revival in Islamic countries, the future can only be secured by a resolute renunciation of much of the past of Islam.]

Cesaresco (Countess Martinengo) The Faith of Iran. Cont. R., Oct. 1907.

Cranmer-Byng (L.), Kapadia (S. A.), eds. Arabian Wisdom, by John Wortabet. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 75p.

Murray, 1907.

Cranmer-Byng (L.), Kapadia (S. A.), eds. The Sayings of Confucius. A New Translation of the Greater Part of the Confucian Analects. With Intro. and Notes by Lionel Giles. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 132p. Murray, 1907.

12 *De Bary (Richard)* The Spiritual Return of Christ within the Church: Papers on Christian Theism. 207p. Murray, 1907.

[An Essay in Christian Mysticism bearing marks of close kinship with the *Theologia Germanica*, but distinguished from it by the scientific basis of its metaphysics.]

Methhorn (Paul) Die Blütezeit der deutschen Mystik. (Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher, iv. 6.) 64p. Mohr, 1907. [Deals with Eckehart, Johann Tauler, Heinrich Sense, Ruysbroeck, etc.]

Scott (W. Major) Aspects of Christian Mysticism. 171p. Murray, 1907.

[Statements, partly expository, of certain elements of mystical teaching, intended to serve as an introduction to the study of the subject.]

M'Intyre (D. M.) The Cloud of Unknowing. Expos., Oct. 1907.

[A study of this book of mediæval mysticism, described as a treatise of contemplation in seventy-five chapters.]

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 · *Metaphysics*, 21
Epistemology, 33 · *Psychical Research*, 40 ·
Psychology, 60 · *Logic*, 70 · *Systems*, 90 ·
Philosophers.

Frischeisen-Köhler (Max) Die historische
Anarchie der philosophischen Systeme und
das Problem der Philosophie als Wissen-
schaft, i.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 1, 1907.

Dutoit (E.) Bericht über die Erscheinun-
gen der französischen philosophischen
Literatur im Jahre 1903.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 1, 1907.

[Largely concerned with Gaston Gaillard's
*L'Étude des Phénomènes au point de vue de leur
Problème particulier.*]

Ewald (Oskar) Die deutsche Philosophie
im Jahre 1906.

Kantstudien, xii. 3-4, Oct. 1907.

Lindsay (James) The Philosophy of
Spain. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4, 1907.

[Devoted largely to the 19th century representa-
tive of neo-Scholasticism which Spain furnished
in the metaphysician Balmez.]

10 *Bush (Wendell T.)* Sub Specie Eternitatis.

J. of Phil., Nov. 21, 1907.

Lloyd (Alfred H.) The Will to Doubt.
An Essay in Philosophy for the General
Thinker. (Ethical Library.) 296p.

Sonnenschein, 1907.

[Doubt is no mere negative of belief; rather it
is a very vital part of belief, it has a place in the
believer's experience and volition. The present
essay is an attempt to face and, so far as may be,
to solve the very general problem of doubt itself,
or simply the problem of whatever in general is
problematic.]

Norsström (Vitalis) Naives und wissen-
schaftliches Weltbild, i.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4, 1907.

12 *Russell (Hon. Bertrand)* The Study of
Mathematics. New Quar., Nov. 1907.

[Against that kind of scepticism which abandons
the pursuit of ideals because the road is arduous
and the goal not certainly attainable, mathematics,
within its own sphere, is a complete answer. Its
great edifice of truths stands unshakable and
inexpugnable to all the weapons of doubting
cynicism.]

Le Dantec (F.) L'ordre des Sciences (fin.).

Rev. Phil., Sept. 1907.

[Discusses the organs of sense and the question
of scale, and in a further section the conservation
of energy.]

13 *Haas (Arthur Erich)* Die Physik und
das kosmologische Problem.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4, 1907.

[The science of physics itself leaves open the
choice between Theism, Deism and Pantheism.
Only with Atheism can it not be reconciled, unless
it confines itself solely to the often misunderstood
propositions about the persistence of Force and
Matter, and leaves all other natural laws out of
account.]

Ljungström (Oscar) Entwicklungslehre.
Entwurf einer neuen Weltanschauung.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4, 1907.

[Man, on account of the special principle of
evolution that applies in his case, viz., the free
thinking capacity, belongs to a unique kingdom
in nature, that is as high above the animal
kingdom as this is above the vegetable.]

Thomson (J. J.) The Corpuscular Theory
of Matter. 178p. Constable, 1907.

[An expansion of lectures given at the Royal
Institution, 1906.]

Müller (Aloys) Ueber Atomismus und
Mechanismus.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 1, 1907.

[Atomism signifies solely the theory of the
theory of Continuity, and is an expression of the
discontinuity of matter. Atomism is a limited
point of view, (a) because of the relativity and
subjectivity of our spatial and temporal ideas of
quantity, and (b) because of the *a priori* character
of Space and Time perceptions.]

Rayleigh (Lord) How do we perceive the
direction of Sound? New Quar., Nov. 1907.

Strutt (Hon. H. J.) Can we detect our
drift through Space? New Quar., Nov. 1907.

Bose (J. Chunder) Comparative Electro-
Physiology: A Physico-Physiological Study.
760p. Longmans, 1907.

[In this work, a sequel to others previously
published, the attempt has been made to explain
responsive phenomena in general on the con-
sideration of that fundamental molecular reaction
which occurs even in inorganic matter.]

Windle (Bertram) Mendel and his Theory
of Heredity. Dub. R., Oct. 1907.

[Mendel's theories have opened out new lines
of investigation, and have, so far as one can see,
established new laws of relation between parents
and offspring.]

16 *Duhem (P.)* Le Mouvement absolu et le
mouvement relatif.

Rev. de Phil., Sept., Oct. 1907.

19 *Mally (Ernst)* Das Mass der Verschieden-
heit. Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi. 1, 1907.

[An important article supplementing author's
*Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie des Mes-
sens* in Meinong's recently published collection of
Essays from the Graz Institute.]

21 *Höfler (Alois)* Die unabhängigen Re-
alitäten. Kantstudien, xii. 3-4, Oct. 1907.

[A very thorough discussion of Meinong's *Ueber
die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* and
Oelzelt-Newin's article in Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit.
for June 1907.]

Fullerton (George S.) In what Sense two
Persons Perceive the Same Thing.

Phil. R., Sept. 1907.

[The world presents itself under different
aspects to different minds, and yet we are dealing
with the one world. For the experiences form a
system, and we may pass from one part of that
system to another.]

Hollands (Edmund H.) Possibility and
Reality. Phil. R., Nov. 1907.

[G. E. Moore's theory of the nature of judgment
essentially depends on separating existence from
the other relations or predicates asserted in
judging, and putting it in a class by itself. It
cannot avoid the self-contradiction which besets
all such distinctions of the essential from the
existential.]

Leighton (Joseph A.) The Objects of
Knowledge. Phil. R., Nov. 1907.

[Truth or specific knowledge, the result of
judgment, does not *exist* in the same sense in
which particular things exist. Truth does not
exist, but it nevertheless *is*, and existence is one
class of its objects.]

Fullerton (George S.) The Doctrine of
the Eject, i, ii, iii.

J. of Phil., Sept. 12, Oct. 10, Nov. 7, 1907.

[Defends the common-sense doctrine that our
knowledge of other minds rests upon an argu-
ment from analogy, that our own states are
known to us immediately, and we can know
other minds only through inference from our
own. Criticism of Taylor and Strong.]

Simmel (Georg) Die Probleme der
Geschichtsphilosophie: Eine Erkenntnis-
theoretische Studie. 3^{te} Aufl. 179p.

Duncker & Humblot, 1907.

[The problem that forms the subject of this book is:—How does there come to be formed out of the material of immediately experienced reality the theoretical representation which we call history? Author asks, in Kantian sense, How is history possible?]

Wernick (Georg) Der Wirklichkeitsgedanke, 5.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 3, 1907.

[Traces the way in which psychologically there comes to be recognised a subjective in contrast with an objective reality. Emphasises the influence of feeling and conation, also the importance of the body.]

Rey (A.) L'énergétique et le mécanisme au point de vue des conditions de la connaissance. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1907.

27 *Galloway (G.)* The Idea of Development and its Application to History.

Mind, Oct. 1907.

[Historical process has flexibility within the limits of continuity. Such process is not necessarily progress. Ultimate values to be realised must be conceived in terms of persons. The crucial difficulty arises in connection with the idea of time.]

Macgregor (D. H.) The Inductive Argument for Design. Mind, Oct. 1907.

[The more the inductive argument for design takes the method of demonstrating finite purposiveness, the more it will become dependent on some valid proof of the unity of the world. Otherwise the tendency is to disintegrate the conception of teleology, and substitute the conception of strife.]

28 *Gardair (J.)* L'infinité divine.

Rev. de Phil., Oct. 1907.

33 *Mitchell (T. W.)* The Appreciation of Time by Somnambules.

Proc. S. P. R., Oct. 1907.

Miles (C.) and *Ramsden (H.)* Experiments in Thought-transference.

Proc. S. P. R., Oct. 1907.

Johnson (Alice) Report on some recent Sittings for Physical Phenomena in America.

Proc. S. P. R., Oct. 1907.

Bottazzi (Philippe) The Unexplored Regions of Human Biology.

Annals of Psy. Sc., Sept., Oct., 1907.

Jankelevitch (Dr) La dissolution de la personnalité. Rev. Phil., Nov. 1907.

Tommasina (T.) Intorno all' Ignoto: Mediumismo oppure suggestione auto-suggestione e trucco? Cœnobium, July 1907. [Medium use a power of telepathic suggestion.]

40 *Franz (Shepherd I.)* Psychology of Two International Scientific Congresses.

J. of Phil., Nov. 21, 1907.

Kirkpatrick (E. A.) A Broader Basis for Psychology Necessary.

J. of Phil., Sept. 26, 1907.

Lipps (Theodor) Psychologische Untersuchungen, Band 1, Heft iv. 200p.

Engelmann, 1907.

[Contains articles by Lipps, entitled *Die Erscheinungen, Die physikalischen Beziehungen und die Einheit der Dinge, Zur Frage der Realität des Raumes, Das Ich und die Gefühle, Das Wissen von fremden Ichen.*]

42 *Hérilier (E.)* La Personnalité.

Rev. de Phil., Sept. 1907.

Melegari (Dora) Le Personnalisme.

Cœnobium, July 1907.

[By *personalism* is meant the morbid constant pre-occupation with one's self. Its symptoms and dangers are pointed out.]

Paulhan (J.) L'imitation dans l'idée du moi. Rev. Phil., Sept. 1907.

48 *Drummond (W. B.)* An Introduction to Child-Study. 348p. Arnold, 1907.

Boggs (Lucinda P.) The Psychology of the Learning Process.

J. of Phil., Aug. 29, 1907.

Hall (G. Stanley) Youth: Its Education, Regimen, and Hygiene. 379p.

Appleton, 1907.

Starbuck (E. D.) The Child-Mind and Child-Religion.

Biblical World, Aug.-Sept. 1907.

51 *Hughes (Percy)* Concrete Conceptual Synthesis. J. of Phil., Nov. 7, 1907.

[Maintains that there is a type of scientific conceptual synthesis radically distinct from that of generalisation.]

53 *Haynes (Rowland)* Attention Fatigue and the Concept of Infinity.

J. of Phil., Oct. 24, 1907.

54 *Dugas (L.)* La définition de la mémoire. Rev. Phil., Oct. 1907.

[Memory is a systematic association of images, as habit is a systematic association of acts. Memory and habit are equally and in the same degree processes of organisation or synthesis. Memory appears to take its place exactly between pure sensation and pure thought.]

55 *Davies (Arthur E.)* Imagination and Thought in Human Knowledge.

J. of Phil., Nov. 21, 1907.

[Emphasises the demand for an explicit consideration of the logical functions of the imagination.]

57 *Ribot (Th.)* Essai sur les passions. 192p. Alcan, 1907.

[Restricts the term "passion" to denote not unstable, excited states, but relatively permanent attitudes like sensuality, patriotism, religion. Emotions are brief and unstable. Passion is a fixed emotion, a prolonged intellectualised emotion. Children and savages are incapable of passion. They live in a world of emotions.]

Shand (A. F.) Ribot's Theory of the Passions. Mind, Oct. 1907.

[Ribot's theory fails to interpret the facts admitted by himself—(a) the difference between the passions and ordinary emotions as something more than a quantitative difference, (b) the difference between the passions and fixed emotions of sorrow, fear or anger.]

60 *Schwarz (Ernst)* Autologie und Logik. Eine erkenntnis-theoretische Grundlegung.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii. 4, 1907.

Turner (William) Mnemonic Verses in a Ninth Century MS. Phil. R., Sept. 1907. [A contribution to the history of Logic.]

61 *Pikler (Julius)* Beschreibung und Einschränkung.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 3, 1907.

[Maintains that not mere description but restriction of expectation is the function of natural science. Author differs from Mach, who does not regard *Einschränkung* as essentially distinguishable from description.]

71 *Wodehouse (Helen)* Fragments of a Statement of Idealism.

Inter. J. Eth., Oct. 1907.

[Idealism is the expression of a supreme faith in human nature. What a man *really* wants is to know what is true, to make what is beautiful, to endure pain and fear, to resist the allurements of pleasure, in the interests of some form of human society. And all this he wants only in subordination to his pursuit of the good of the universe.]

Hoernle (R. F. A.) Professor Baillie's
"Idealistic Construction of Experience."

Mind, Oct. 1907.

[The question what is real may mean: What exists? and in what sense does it exist? But it may also mean: What is the real nature of that which exists? In short, it is the old puzzle about *existence* and *essence* which thus meets us at the heart of Hegelian Idealism.]

72 *Von Aster (E.)* Der 7. Band der Berliner Kant-Ausgabe.

Kantstudien, xii, 3-4, Oct. 1907.

Fittbogen (Gottfried) Kants Lehre vom realkalen Bösen.

Kantstudien, xii, 3-4, Oct. 1907.

Kuberka (Felix) Sinnlichkeit und Denken, ein Beitrag zur Kantischen Erkenntnistheorie. Kantstudien, xii, 3-4, Oct. 1907.

Sänger (E.) Neue Darstellung und Deutung der Lehre Kants vom Glauben.

Kantstudien, xii, 3-4, Oct. 1907.

Aicher (Severin) Kants Begriff der Erkenntnis verglichen mit dem des Aristoteles. 149p. Reuther & Reichard, 1907.

O'Neill (J.) Kant as Apologist of Theism. Irish Th. Q., Oct. 1907.

[Kant attempted an impossible task in trying to separate truths of religion and of science into two great circles incapable of communication with each other.]

Lovejoy (Arthur O.) Kant's Classification of the Forms of Judgment.

Phil. R., Nov. 1907.

Sentrout (C.), Farges (A.) Le Subjectivisme Kantien. Rev. de Phil., Nov. 1907.

Reinecke (W.) Kant und Fries.

Kantstudien, xii, 3-4, Oct. 1907.

74 *Crespi (A.)* Il Problema religioso nella luce del Pragmatismo. Cœnobium, July 1907.

[To show how the principles of Pragmatism permit of an end being put to the so-called conflict of religion and science, or reason and faith.]

James (W.) The Absolute and the Strenuous Life. J. of Phil., Sept. 26, 1907.

Schiller (F. C. S.) Pragmatism versus Skepticism. J. of Phil., Aug. 29, 1907.

Russell (John E.) A Last Word to Dr Schiller. J. of Phil., Aug. 29, 1907.

Schiller (F. C. S.) Ultima Ratio?

J. of Phil., Aug. 29, 1907.

Talbot (Ellen Bliss) The Philosophy of Fichte in its Relation to Pragmatism.

Phil. R., Sept. 1907.

[Fichte's doctrine does not mean that our moral nature can establish for us theoretical propositions which the intellect is unable to establish. It means that certain propositions which we are wont to call "theoretical" are not theoretical, that doubt in regard to them is a disease of the will.]

76 *Harrison (Frederic)* The Philosophy of Common Sense. 433p. Macmillan, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

Marvin (F. S.) Positivism: Another View. Albany R., Nov. 1907.

[A defence of Positivism against Mr C. F. Keary's criticisms in the May number.]

79 *Boodin (John E.)* The New Realism.

J. of Phil., Sept. 26, 1907.

[The real is the intelligible or the noumenal; this reality is accessible only through conceptual construction or purposive will attitudes. But because reality can only be known conceptually, it does not follow that reality must be conceptual.]

Fullerton (G. Stuart) Realism and Infinite Divisibility. Mind, Oct. 1907.

[We know an objective and a subjective order of experience. We can ignore the subjective order and study the objective order. It may be absurd to speak of infinite divisibility of the subjective order, but not absurd so to speak of the objective order thus abstractly conceived.]

M'Gilvary (E. Bradley) The Physiological Argument against Realism.

J. of Phil., Oct. 24, 1907.

[Can the seen object be the same object as that which causes the physiological process on which the seeing of the object depends? Yes. If we distinguish between *sensum* and *sensire* and *sensibile*, there is here no difficulty. The *sensire* may be the effect of the physiological process, and yet the *sensum* may be the same as the *sensibile* which initiated the physiological process on which the *sensire* depends.]

80 *Wundt (Max)* Der Intellectualismus in der griechischen Ethik. 104p.

Engelmann, 1907.

84 *Watson (John)* Plato and Protagoras.

Phil. R., Sept. 1907.

[Plato's objections to Protagoras apply with equal force to the most recent forms of relativism. If there are no absolutely true judgments, what are called relatively true judgments cease to have competitors and become absolute.]

89 *Masson (John)* Lucretius, Epicurean and Post. 453p. Murray, 1907.

[Review will follow.]

90 *De Wulf (M.)* Scholasticism Old and New: An Introduction to Scholastic Philosophy, Medieval and Modern. Trans. by P. Coffey. 327p. Longmans, 1907.

91 *Wenzel (Alfred)* Die Weltanschauung Spinozas. 487p. Theil 1. Engelmann, 1907.

[A very exhaustive treatment. This first volume deals with Spinoza's doctrine of God and of human knowledge and of the existence of things. Author tries to develop a new explanation of Spinoza's idea of substance, akin to that advanced by Friedrich in his *Promotionsarbeit* of 1896. We hope to review Wenzel's book later with other works on Spinoza.]

94 *Batault (Georges)* Nietzsche négateur de sa philosophie.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiii, 4, 1907.

Falckenberg (Richard) Nachruf auf Ludwig Busse.

Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit., cxxxi, 1, 1907.

[Busse, who edited this *Zeitschrift*, died on Sept. 12, 1907. Falckenberg gives here an interesting account of his life and scientific work.]

W *Bauch (Bruno)* Kuno Fischer.

Kantstudien, xii, 3-4, Oct. 1907.

[Obituary Notice.]

Benrubi (J.) L'Activisme de Rodolphe Eucken. Cœnobium, July 1907.

V ART. 83 Sacred Music.

Cook (E. Wake) The Purpose of Art. Cont. R., Sept. 1907.

Hueffer (Ford Madox) The Pre-Raphaelite Brotherhood. A Critical Monograph. 174p. Duckworth, 1907.

Weale (W. H. James) Hubert and John Van Eyck: Their Life and Work. 41 photographure plates and 99 other ills. 333p. Lane, 1907.

[Result of prolonged researches among the archives of the Netherlands, etc.]

Phillipps (L. March) Gothic Architecture and the Gothic Race. Cont. R., Sept. 1907.

Miller (W.) Florentine Athens.

Quar. R., Oct. 1907.

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE DISTINCTIVE THING IN CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE.

THE REV. P. T. FORSYTH, M.A., D.D.,
Principal of Hackney College, Hampstead.

I.

OUR present Protestantism is historically composed from the union of two streams, which take their rise in two different sources. They still flow alongside with a fusion so far very incomplete, and they react on each other with an amount of irritation somewhat inexplicable till we perceive that the streams *are* two, distinct in their origin and direction. They are the Reformation and the Illumination: the Reformation from the sixteenth century, and the diversified movement which marked the eighteenth century, and which is compendiously known as the Illumination or the *Aufklärung*.¹ They are the old Protestantism and the new—the one resting on the object-

¹ For a full account of the situation we should really have to recognise three streams. We should have to distinguish within Protestantism the old objective tendency, resting on history as the authoritative source (in the Bible), and the newer subjective tendency, resting on Christian experience, originating in Anabaptism, revised in Pietism, and rewritten in Schleiermacher. The one represents classic Protestantism, the other romantic. But for the present purpose it will be better to confine our attention mainly to the two currents named in the text. Of course, the subjectivity of human nature, which I mention immediately, becomes in Pietism the subjectivity of Christianised human nature.

ivity of a given revelation, the other on the subjectivity of human nature or thought; the one finding its standard in a divine intervention, the other in immanent human reason more or less generously construed; the one emphasising a divine redemption, the other human goodness and its substantial sufficiency. The face of the one movement is towards the Church and the Bible, the face of the other is towards civilisation and culture. The one falls back upon historic humanity, upon the history and the revelation there; the other on intrinsic humanity and the revelation there. It is a distinction much more penetrating than the somewhat vulgar antithesis of Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy. It is not so much two theologies as two methods—if not two religions. And neither is pure. The one, the Reformation stream, carries down with it much of the débris of mediæval doctrine; because at its source, in the monk Luther, it was mainly a religious and ethical change rather than a theological. The other, the Illumination, carries with it much of the pagan débris of the older Renaissance and of classic ambiguity; since its element was not so much religion as thought, and its achievement is not faith but culture, and especially science. It was really directed at first not against religion, but against what it thought a false basis of religion. It sought to replace imagination by induction as the foundation of our conception of the world. It asserted the intrinsic divinity of nature, and it would make the spiritual life but the highest of natural phenomena. While, therefore, the direct legacy of the Reformation laid fundamental stress upon the sense of guilt, and the action of grace, the legacy of the Illumination laid stress on native goodness, the sense of rational sympathy, and the sufficiency of human love spiritualised. For the one, man was the lost thing in the universe, and the greatness of his ruin was the index of the dignity of his nature; for the other, man was the one saving thing in the universe, and the greatness of his success in subduing the world to his thought and will was the badge of his heroic divinity, soiled perhaps, but indelible. The one lived by redemption and

regeneration, the other by evolution and education. For the one forgiveness was essential, and it was identical with the new eternal life; it put life on a quite new track, it was a redemption, a revolution. For the other forgiveness was incidental, and simply removed obstacles or redressed lapses in man's developing career; it put the train on the old track, after some derailment by accident, or some loop-line by error. It was a restoration. The one cultivated theology and sanctity, the other science and sentiment, criticism and romance. The one saw the new Jerusalem descending from God, the other saw it rise "like an exhalation" from earth. The heaven of the one was in the blue sky, for the other it was in the growing grass. For the one the great matter was God's transcendence over the world, for the other it was His immanence in it. The one degenerated to Deism, the other to Pantheism. For the one the Incarnation was nothing but miracle, inexplicable but sure; for the other it was nothing but universal immanence. For the one redemption was an interference, for the other it was an evolution. For the one Christ was absolute, for the other He was but relative to the history from which He arose. For the one He closes the old series totally in the new creation of another, for the other He but mightily prolongs it. In the one case we believe *in* Christ, in the other we believe *like* Christ. For the one Christ is the object of our faith, for the other He is the Captain of our faith, its greatest instance. In the one we trust our whole selves to Christ for ever, in the other we imitate Him. In the one He is our God, in the other our brother. It is well that the issue should be clear, if our choice is to be as intelligent and effectual as a faith should be.

These are the two streams whose junction forms current Protestantism, and can you wonder that the situation is complicated and even confused? We should trivialise the whole subject if we saw in the serious religious differences of the day no more than orthodoxy and heterodoxy—the propriety of certain individuals on the one hand, faced by the perversity of certain others on the other. The conflicting views of

Messrs X and Y are but the points where old opposing forces for the moment emerge and meet.

And we must own each movement has its relative justification. The old Protestantism had come to have great need of the Illumination. It was becoming cumbrous, hard and shallow. It needed especially to be trimmed down and cleared up from the critical side of the Illumination, and to be deepened and humanised from its romantic side. In just the same way mediævalism had called for the Renaissance. But all the same it was not the Renaissance that really took Europe in hand at that crisis. It was no Paganism that could save Europe for the true Church, or the Church for Christianity. That was done by the self-recuperative power of Christianity itself. It was done by the self-reformation of the Church, by the restoration of faith, and not the renascence of culture. Remember, the Reformation was not something done *to* the Church, but *by* it, and therefore by its faith. And so to-day it is not to the Illumination, it is not to any culture, theological, æsthetic, or scientific, that we are to look for our salvation from the Protestant scholasticism which choked faith by orthodoxy in the seventeenth century and still survives in the popular levels. That deliverance can only come by a movement from the interior of faith itself. I know it would be untrue to say that all the liberalising influence in the Protestantism of to-day is due to the direct action of the Reformation spirit of faith or religion. In so far as that liberality is a correction of our views about God in the cosmos, it is due quite as much, if not more, to the Illumination, which was quite independent of the reformers and rose rather from the philosophers. But the real matter is not the correction of views but the correction of real religion, of practical relations between God and the soul. And that is due, not to the action of either reason or romance, but to the renovation of faith by the piety and genius of men like Spener, Francke, Schleiermacher, and Wesley.¹

¹ I do not forget the influence of the romantic movement on Schleiermacher, but it was perhaps upon his weaker and less permanent side.

It is not here a question whether each tendency must ban the other, for we need both; but it is a question which of them must be dominant for Christianity, and especially for original, essential Christianity. I mean for Christianity as first preached, the Christianity of the Bible and the apostle. In proportion as it ceases to be a *κήρυγμα*, Christianity ceases to be Christianity, whether it die in the direction of a sacramentalism or a humanism. It seems to me that this is constantly overlooked by the spokesmen of a Christianity which is liberal or nothing. They become as much the doctrinaire victims of a speculative theology as our forefathers were the victims of an orthodox theology. The experimental Gospel in each case ceases to be life, and evaporates to a *caput mortuum* of certain views broad or narrow. I read a criticism of a positive theologian by a Liberal of the academic stamp in which occurred this naïve saying: "It looks as if the problems of theology were here confused with the practical declaration of the Gospel by preacher or pastor." There is not one of the apostles that would not be hit by the remark. And it applies with even more force to our Lord Himself. Where are we to go for our Christian theology except to their practical declaration of the Gospel? The New Testament is no collection of theological loci. And how are we to test a theology at last but by its service for the purposes of the Gospel? Of course, if it is not a theology we are after but a theosophy, if our interest is in the philosophy or psychology of religion as a product of the human spirit, the case is altered. But with that the Gospel and the preacher have little directly to do. It is very interesting, but it is not vital. It belongs to the Schools, to the interpretive efforts of man upon the world; it has little to do with the Church and its interpretive message of man's destiny and its Gospel of God's reality in His redemptive work.

When the question is forced, therefore, whether the positive or the liberal movement must rule in a historic Gospel, we have no hesitation about our choice. We take the Reformation side of our Protestantism for a stand, and not the Illuminist.

We may even go so far, when the issue is forced, as to say that Illuminationism or Rationalism is not Protestantism. We find our charter in history, and not in human nature; in the Word, and not the world. The seat of revelation is in the cross, and not in the heart. The precious thing is something given, and not evolved. Our best goodness is presented to us rather than achieved by us. The Kingdom of God is not a final goal, but an initial boon. You will say, perhaps, the one does not exclude the other. But for the practical issue on which all turns (except to a doctrinaire intellectualism), for the last reality, it is more true at this juncture to press the antithesis than to slur it. The Gospel stands with the predominance of intervention, and it falls with the predominance of evolution. Grace is essentially miraculous. Christ is more precious to us by what distinguishes Him from us than by what identifies Him with us. The Gospel turns entirely upon redemptive forgiveness; and if evolution explain all, there is no sin, and therefore no forgiveness. The Gospel turns on the finality of Christ; but on an evolutionary idea there is no finality except at the close; it is therefore inaccessible, for the end is not yet. There can be no finality on that basis, in anyone who appeared in a middle point of the chain. So far, therefore, Christ is provisional and tentative till a greater arise. The positive Gospel, we say, is the dominant thing by which modern thought must be gauged and its permanence tested. We may take from the modern mind and its results so much only as is compatible with a real, historic, redeeming, final Gospel. That Gospel is the preamble, and the subsequent clauses that contradict it must go out.

We shall not be foolish enough, sectarian enough, to make a sweeping condemnation of modern thought in advance. For one thing, it is very hard to know what is meant by it. Does it mean the mental world of Kant, and Goethe, and Browning, or of Spencer, Fiske, and James, or of Nietzsche, Tolstoi, and Ibsen? Because they are in many respects as incompatible with each other, and hated by each other, as

they are opposed to evangelical Christianity. And, for another thing, we have already accepted many of the results of modern civilisation. It has thrust back the frontier of the Church, and given a mandate to the State to take up province after province which the Church used to control in art, science, philanthropy, education, and the like. Well, we largely agree. We accept the emancipation of these from religious dictation. Church discipline gives way to civic rights and police protection. The number of public subjects on which the preacher is entitled to a respectable opinion grows fewer, while at the same time there are more aspects than ever of his own subject opened to his study and demanding his official attention. We accept the modern repudiation of an external authority in the forms of belief and uniformity of confession. We accept the essential inwardness of faith even when we press its objective. We accept the modern freedom of the individual. We accept the modern passion for reality, which owes so much to science. We accept the methods of the Higher Criticism, and only differ as to its results. We accept the modern primacy of the moral, and the modern view of a positive moral destiny for the world. And we repudiate imagination, whether æsthetic or speculative, as the ruling factor in the religious life. We have assigned another place and function to the miraculous in connection with faith. We accept the modern place claimed for experience in connection with truth; we recognise that the real certainty of Christian truth can only come with the experience of personal salvation. In these and other respects we have already accepted much which would have scared even the stout reformers.

II.

I would single out for particular stress the place now given to experience in religion in consequence of the Reformation view of faith, co-operating with the inductive method of science—our experience of Christ especially. What Nature is to science, that is Christ to positive faith. I would direct notice

to the form of the great issue presented in the question: Are we to believe *in* Christ or *like* Christ? Are we to trust ourselves to Him, or to the type of religion He represents?

I am struck with the absence of any sign of an experience distinctively Christian in many of those who discuss the sanctuaries of the Christian faith—such as the nature of the Cross, or of the self-consciousness of Christ. To them Christ's first relation is to human power, or love, and not to sin. They cultivate not trust in Christ, but the "religion of Jesus." We are driven from pillar to post, and left with no rest for the sole of our foot. Can we rest on the Gospels? No. Criticism will not allow that. Can we on the Epistles? No. Protestantism will not allow that. It would be taking the external authority of an apostle for our base, and that ends in Rome. But is there no such thing any more as the *testimonium Sancti Spiritus*? No. These scholars, to judge from their writings alone, do not seem even so much as to have heard of a Holy Ghost. And they have a fatal dread of pietism, and methodism, and most forms of intensely personal evangelical faith. They are, like Haeckel, in their own way, the victims of an intellectualism which means spiritual atrophy to Christianity at last. No, they say, if you fall back on your experience, you may land anywhere.

But am I really forbidden to make any use of my personal experience of Christ for the purposes even of scientific theology? Should it make no difference to the evidence for Christ's resurrection that I have had personal dealings with the risen Christ as my Saviour, nearer and dearer than my own flesh and blood? Is His personal gift of forgiveness to me, in the central experience of my life, of no value in settling the objective value of His cross and person? My personal contact with Christ, our commerce together, may I found nothing on these? "No," it is said, "nothing of scientific objective value. These experiences may be of great personal value to you, but they give you no warrant for stepping outside your own feelings. They may be useful illusions in their place, but

you must outgrow them. You can never be quite sure that the Saviour you meet is a personal reality. You can never make it certain to any that He is a continuous personality with the historic Jesus. And it is even laid upon us to make it doubtful for yourself." "In your so-called communion with Christ you have no more real right," we are told, "to build on the objective personal reality of your *vis à vis* than the Roman Catholic girl had to believe in the real presence and speech of the Virgin at Lourdes. If it is Christ who visits you, it were the Virgin that visited her. Of so little worth is the fact of the experience in vouching for the content of experience. If you commune with Christ, do not gird at those who traffic with the saints."

Now, might I have leave to say that I had to meet that problem for myself several years ago! And the answer I thought satisfactory was twofold. First, it was personal; second, it was historical.

I take the first first. There is, and can be, nothing so certain to me as that which is involved in the most crucial and classic experience of my moral self, my conscience, my real, surest me. A vision might be a phantom, and a colloquy an hallucination. But if I am not to be an absolute Pyrrhonist, doubt everything, and renounce my own reality, I must find my practical certainty in that which founds my moral life, and especially my new moral life. The test of all philosophy is ethical conviction. That is where we touch reality—in moral action, (God as Spirit is God *in actu*), and especially in that action of the moral nature which renews it in Christ. Now, my contention is that my contact with Christ is not merely visionary, it is moral, personal and mutual. Nor is it merely personal, in the same sense in which I might have personal intercourse from time to time with a man in whom I am little concerned between whiles. Because what I have in Christ is not an impression, but a life change; not an impression of personal influence, which might evaporate, but a faith of central personal change. I do not merely feel changes; I am

changed. Another becomes my moral life. He has done more than deeply influence me. He has possessed me. I am not His loyal subject, but His absolute property. I have rights against King Edward, however loyal I am, but against Christ I have none. He has not merely passed into my life as even a wife might do, but He has given me a new life, a new moral self, a new consciousness of moral reality. In Him alone I have forgiveness, reconciliation, the grace of God and therefore the very God (since neither love nor grace is a mere attribute of God). There has been what I can only call a new creation, using the strongest word in my reach. I owe Him my total self. He has not merely healed me, in passing, of an old trouble, but He has given me eternal life. He has not only impressed me as a vision might—even one projected from my own interior—but He has done a permanent work on me at my moral centre. He has made a moral change in me which, for years and years, has worked outwards from the very core of my moral self, and subdued everything else to its obedience. In my inmost experience, tested by years of life, He has brought me God. It is not merely that He spoke to me of God or God's doings, but in Him God directly spoke to me; and more, He did in me, and for me, the thing that only God's real presence could do. Who can forgive sin but God only, against whom it was done? Thus the real Catholic analogy to His action on me and in me is not visions of the Virgin, or the ecstasies of saints, but it is the Sacraments. In the Catholic view these are objective and effective upon the inmost substantial self; so is Christ objective, effective, creative, upon my moral, my real self, upon me as a conscience, on sinful me. He is the author not of my piety merely but of my regeneration. My experience of Him is that of one who does a vital, revolutionary work in that moral region where the last certainty lies. And in that region it is an experience of a change so total that I could not bring it to pass by any resource of my own. Nor could any man effect it in me. And any faith I have at all is faith in Christ not merely as

its content nor merely as its point of origin, but as its creator. The Christ I believe in I believe in as the creator of the belief, and not merely its object. I know Him as the *author* as well as object of my faith. The great change was not a somersault I succeeded in turning, with some divine help; it was a revolution effected in me and by Him. The very fact that in its nature it was forgiveness and regeneration makes it a moral certainty, the kind of certainty that rises from contact with my Judge, with the last moral and personal reality, who has power even to break me, and with my Redeemer, who has power to remake me as His own.

If certainty do not lie there, where can it be found in life? If He is not real, moral reality has no meaning. There are hallucinations in religious experience, but not here. They might be connected with the affections but not with the conscience at its one life-crisis. They might be as impressive as a *revenant*, but not creative, redemptive. If you claim the right to challenge the validity of my experience, you must do it on the ground of some experience surer, deeper, getting nearer moral reality than mine. What is it? Does the last criterion lie in sense, or even in thought? Is it not in conscience? If life at its centre is moral, then the supreme certainty lies there. It must be associated, not with a feeling nor with a philosophic process, but with the last moral experience of life, which we find to be a life morally changed from the centre and for ever. To challenge that means rationalism, intellectualism, and the merest theosophy. Do not forget that philosophy is but a method, while faith, which is at the root of theology, presents us with a new datum, a new reality.

You refuse the mere dictum of an apostle. But if we may not rest upon the mere dictum of an apostle, may we not upon our own repetition of the apostolic experience, the experience which made them apostles? I say repetition, but might I not say prolongation? We rest on our own participation in the ageless action of the same redemption in the Cross as changed them, after many waverings, for good and all. Is it not the

same act, the same spirit, the same real personality acting on us both, in the same moral world? And, expanding my own experience by the aid of theirs, may I not say this: I am not saved by the apostle or his experience, nor by the Church and its experience, but by what saved the apostle and the Church. When Christ did for me what I have described, was it not the standing crisis of the moral macrocosm acting in its triumphant way at the centre of my microcosm? Was not the moral crisis of the race's destiny on Christ's cross not merely echoed but in some sense re-enacted at my moral centre, and the great conquest reached on the outpost scale of my single crisis? The experience has not only a moral nature, as a phase of conscience, but an objective moral content, as is shown by the absolute rest and decisive finality of its moral effect in my life and conduct. If it be not so, then we are asked to believe that men can produce in themselves these changes which permanently break the self in two, or can lift themselves to eternal moral heights by their own waistband. But, if so, what need is there for a God at all? Do not even the positivists likewise?

There is no *rational* certainty by which this *moral* certainty *could* be challenged; for there is no rational certainty more sure, or so sure, and none that goes where this goes, to the self-disposing centres of life. This moral certainty is the truly rational certainty. Christ approves Himself as a reality by His revolutionary causal creative action on that inmost reality whereby man is man. That centre from which I *act* (and therefore am real) meets, in a way decisive for all life, with Christ in His act on the Cross. If this contact represent no real activity on me, if it be but impressionist influence, then the whole and central activity of my life, whereby I confront it in kind, is unreal. If the Saviour be unreal and my communion an unreality, a mere mystic or moody mingling of being, then there is no reality, and everything is dissolved into cloud and darkness and vapour of smoke.

I do not wish to say anything disrespectful of these

academic critics to whom we owe so very much in the way of laboratory theology, but they are the second, not the first. A higher hand must make them mild. A deeper insight must enlarge their truth. And I much wish they had more of that ethical realism of Carlyle or Ibsen, only turning it upon the conscience at the Cross. But so often (just as a vast memory may impair the power of judgment) you find the finest critical faculty, and the most powerful scholarly apparatus, conjoined with a moral nature singularly naïve and beautifully simple and unequal to the actual world. Their experience of life and conscience has no record of lapse or shame. Their world is a study of still-life; it has not the drama, the fury, the pang, the tragedy, the crisis of the actual world at large, with its horrible guilt and its terror of judgment. It opens to them none of the crevasses where glow the nether fires. They inhabit, morally, the West End. They are in no touch with damned souls. They have lived in an unworldly purity, and have never been drawn from the jaws of hell, or taken from the fearful pit and its miry clay. They have been reared, many of them, in the sacred and pious atmosphere of the German manse, and cradled in the godliness of the most Christian of homes. The paradox is this, that if purity be the test of truth, and obedience the organ of theological knowledge, if that be the meaning of "will do, shall know" (as it is not), if they are as right in their views as they are of heart, then evangelical Christianity would be dying of its own moral success.

III.

The second part of my answer to the suggested analogy between communion with a saint and communion with Christ is this. It would enlarge what I have been saying to the scale of history. Christ has entered actual history, with piercing, crucial, moral effect, in a way the Virgin never has, nor any saint. He has entered it not only profoundly, but centrally and creatively; she is adjutorial at most. By His effect upon human experience He created that Church within

which the worship and contact of the Saints arose. The Church arose as a product of something which Christ produced. And it is not only the effect of Christ on the Church that I speak of, but, through the Church, His effect on history at large. Christ affects the moral springs of history as no saint has done. They but colour the stream; He struck from the rock. I make all allowance for the fact that, by the Church's fault, He has affected history less than He might have done. But it remains true that all we have and hope in the new humanity owes to Christ what it owes to no other. And it owes it to a Christ felt and believed to be generically different from every rival or every believer. What we owe to Christendom, or to great Christians, they owe to a Christ who owed Himself to no man. He has entered the history of the Church at least as He has entered my history—not as the mere postulate, nor even as the spring, but as the Creator of the new life, the new self, while He Himself needed no new self or new life. I make all allowance for the reasonable results of historic criticism, yet He stands in history as a defined consciousness and a creative person, who is powerful not in the degree in which He is appreciated by our experience, but in a way which creates experience and which can only be appreciated by something greater than our experience—by our faith. We know Him by faith to be much more than He has ever been to our experience. I know Him, and the Church knows Him, as a person of infinite power to create fresh experience of Himself. My contact with Him by faith is continually deepening my experience of Him. And as my experience deepens it brings home a Christ objective in history, and creative of the experience, and the life, and the deeds of a whole vast Church meant, and moving, to subdue mankind not to itself, but to the faith of the Gospel.

But how can an individual experience give an absolute truth? How can an experience (which is a thing personal to me in, say, my own forgiveness) assure me of the world? How can my experience, my forgiveness, assure me of the

world's redemption? How can it assure me of the final and absolute establishment of the Kingdom of God? I may experience my salvation, but how can I experience the salvation of the world—which is for all (and is so felt by some) a greater concern than their own?

The answer is this. My experienced salvation is not a passing impression but a life faith. It is not a subjective frame but an objective relation, and even transaction. The peace of God is not glassy calm but mighty confidence. My experience here is the consciousness not of an impression on me, but of an act in me, on me, and by me. It is not an afferent but an efferent consciousness, as the psychologists would say, like the muscular sense, the sense not of rheumatism but of energy. And, to go on, it is the sense not only of myself as acting in the experience called faith, but it is the sense that that act is not perfectly spontaneous but evoked, nay, created by its content. And, still to go on, it is the sense that it is created by another and parent act—which is the one eternal decisive act of an eternal person saving a world. I am forgiven and saved by an act which saves the world. For it not only gives me moral power to confront the whole world and surmount it, but it unites me in a new sympathy with all mankind, and it empowers me not only to face but to hail eternity. And this it does not for me, but for whosoever will. This is the report of my faith and of the Church's faith upon the act to which it owes its own existence as an act. Is it amenable to unfaith? *Actor sequitur forum rei*, said Roman law. The venue of criticism is in the court of the challenged faith. That is, the true and fruitful criticism is that within the believing Church. It is a part of that self-criticism of the Church whose classic case is the Reformation.

What Christ has done for me has become possible only by what He did even more powerfully for others whose faith and experience have been deeper and richer than mine, but who reflect my experience all the same, even while they diversify and enlarge it mightily. Standing over my ex-

perience is the experience of the whole evangelical succession. And standing over that is the historic fact of Christ's own person, and His consciousness of Himself ("All things are delivered to me of the Father") as Lord of the world, Lord of nature in miracle, of the soul in redemption, and of the future in judgment. When I meet Him in my inmost soul, I meet one whose own inmost soul felt itself to be that, and who has convinced the moral power of the race in the whole historic Church that He *is* what He *knew* Himself to be. And in that conviction the Church has become the mightiest power that ever entered and changed the course of history from its moral centre.

Our experience of Christ is therefore an absolutely different thing from our experience of saint or Virgin. In their case, granting it were actual, the visitation might be but my experience; in His case it is my faith, which concerns not a phase of me whereof I am conscious, but the whole of my moral self and destiny whereof I am but poorly conscious. We may respond to a saint, but to Christ we belong.

IV.

The third part of my answer would expand what I have touched on, a few words back, in regard to the consciousness of Christ.

I have referred to the individual experience, and to its expansion in the experience of the Church. But is this enough to give us the reality of a supernatural (or rather a superhistoric) Christ? If it were, then we should be in this difficulty, that the experience of believers would be the seat of God's revelation to us. And fresh difficulties arise out of that. If it be so, then do we not give the Church (as the collective experience) a prerogative which, even if it does not rise to the claim of Rome, yet puts the individual conscience too much at its mercy, and obtrudes the Church between it and Christ? And, again, if it be so, what was the seat of God's revelation to the very first

Church of all, to the first believers with no Church behind them? And what place is left for the Bible, the record, at all except a mere subsidiary one in support of the supreme experience of a Church? Whereas the Bible, no less than the Church, was a parallel result of the Gospel, and part of the revelatory purpose of God. The gift of the Spirit¹ to the Apostles was not simply to confirm personal faith but to equip them efficiently for their apostolic, preaching, witnessing work.

We must pass within the circle of the first Church's experience and testimony, and find a means of stepping off the last verge of its direct documentation on to sure moral ground where the documents cease. We must pass by faith from the field of the first faith certificated in the documents to the historic reality behind the wall of documents, and within the ring fence of the testifying Church.

And we are compelled to do so by the very nature of that faith and those documents themselves. If we are not to stultify the first Church and all its history, we must recognise a point on which critics so antagonistic to each other as Schaefer and Lobstein agree,² that the Gospel about Jesus in the first Church truly reflected Jesus' Gospel of Himself, and grew inevitably out of it. We could not speak of Jesus with any respect if His influence not only could not protect His first followers from idolatry in placing Him where they did—beside God in their worship—but actually promoted that idolatry. If *they* included Christ in His own Gospel, then *He* did. It was not in the teeth of Him that they made Him an object of faith and worship along with the Father. They could never have treated Him, those disciples who had been with Him, in a way which would have horrified Him as much as some apostles were horrified at the attempt to worship them at Lystra. If they found Him Saviour through

¹ The difficult question as to the relation between Christ and the Spirit (especially for St Paul) is too large for side treatment. I only note that our communion is not with the Spirit, but in the Spirit, with Father and Son.

² See *Die christliche Welt*, 1907, No. 19, Sp. 529.

death from sin, found Him the Son of God and the Eternal Christ, then He offered Himself as such.

Accordingly the question becomes one of the interpretation of His self-consciousness as the Gospels offer it upon the whole. We are borne onward by the experience of the Church upon the experience of Christ in so far as He revealed it. The Church's first thought of Him was substantially one with His own thought of Himself. What was that? Was it a thought which placed Him with men, facing God and moving towards God, or with God facing men and moving to them? Was He not always with men, but from beside God? Can our relation to Him, if we take His construction of it, be parallel to our relation to any apostle, saint, virgin, or hero? Into the self-consciousness of Christ I cannot here go. I can only refer to all the passages of the Gospels which have their focus in Matt. xi. 25 ff.,¹ and which reveal the sense of His complete mastery of the world of nature, of the soul, and of the future. He forgave the soul and claimed to judge it. He determined our eternal relation to God. And He used nature at will for the supreme purposes of grace and eternity.

But we must here take another step which replaces us where we set out, though on a higher plane. This power of which Jesus was so sure was not there simply to make a vast and placid self-consciousness. He was not there simply as a reservoir of moral power instead of its agent. If He had the power it was not as a miser of power, to enjoy the satisfaction of possessing it in self-poised and self-sufficient reserve, not to be a quiescent character reposing in God. He was there to exercise the power in historic action. And as it was moral power, it could only go out in moral achievement. He was there for a task in which the whole of it should be expended. He was there to do something which only His power could do. If He had power more than all the world's, it was to overcome the world in another than the individualist

¹ Surely the criticism which dissolves this passage leaves us with little but dissolving views of anything.

and ascetic sense. It was to subdue it to Himself. The Son was not only to affect it, but to regain it for the Father. He was not simply to rule, but to redeem. He was there for action; and it was action commensurate both with His person, and with the world, and with the world's moral extremity. He was there to do that which all the accounts declare was done in the Cross—to conquer for mankind their eternal life. It was not simply to fill men's souls at His as from a fountain, but to achieve for them and in them a victory whose prolonged action (and not mere echo) should be their eternal life. With all His power He was there for one vast eternal deed, which can only be described as the Redemption, the new Creation, of the race. Nothing less could afford scope for the exercise of such power as His, if it was a power that must work to an active head, and could not be held in mere benignant self-possession, in quiescent, massive, brimming Goethean calm. The moral personality must all be put into a corresponding deed. What is the deed which gives effect to the whole tremendous moral resource of Jesus? There is not one except His death. If we reduce that simply to His life's violent and premature close, then we are without any adequate expression in action of so vast a moral personality. And it becomes but an æsthetic quantity, an object of moral and spiritual admiration, and the source of profound religious influences and impressions, but not of living faith and of eternal life. It is a grand piece of still-life, spectacular but not dramatic, with spell but not power. It can refine but not regenerate, cultivate but not recreate. And had Jesus not found in His death the regenerative outlet for the infinite moral power in His person, He would have been rent with the unrest and distraction of prisoned genius. He would have been no expression of the peace that goes with the saving power of God, peace which He then could neither have nor give.

P. T. FORSYTH.

RELIGIOUS TRANSITION AND ETHICAL AWAKENING IN AMERICA.¹

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THREE recent American books which seem likely to be widely read—those of Professor Mathews, Professor Leighton, and Professor Rauschenbusch—get a certain enhancement of their significance from their almost simultaneous appearance. For all three declare with equal emphasis that the Christian Church is now confronted by a crisis of peculiar gravity and urgency. The cry of “crisis,” it is true, has been a tolerably familiar one for rather more than a century; and it has perhaps by this time lost something of its power to agitate. Yet it is just now being uttered by so many voices that even the most complacent can hardly fail to suspect that there must be something unusual about the present situation. And no open-eyed observer of affairs in either America or England is likely to deny that certain

¹ *The Church and the Changing Order.* By Shailer Mathews, Professor of Historical and Comparative Theology in the University of Chicago. Macmillan, 1907. Pp. viii + 255.

Jesus Christ and the Civilization of To-day. By Joseph Alexander Leighton, Professor of Philosophy in Hobart College. Macmillan, 1907. Pp. x + 248.

Christianity and the Social Crisis. By Walter Rauschenbusch, Professor of Church History in Rochester Theological Seminary. Macmillan, 1907. Pp. xv + 429.

Sin and Society. By Edward Alsworth Ross, Professor of Sociology in the University of Wisconsin. With a Letter from President Roosevelt. Houghton, Mifflin & Co., 1907. Pp. xi + 167.

intellectual, ethical, and social movements, by no means novel in themselves, have progressed of late with a rapid acceleration of momentum, and begin to disturb profoundly the general mass of the population. Fundamental moral presuppositions long unchallenged are now subject to bold questioning, in writings that everybody, and especially the rising generation, reads with avidity; the general view of the world, of man's origin and place in it, of the course of human history, with which most Christian theology has hitherto been implicated, promises to be almost unintelligible to the young people now passing through our schools and universities; and meanwhile the doubt concerning the moral defensibility of the existing order of society and the demand for social readjustment become steadily more widespread and insistent. These facts, the writers of the three books in question agree, mean that we have reached a transitional period big both with peril and with possibilities for the Church as well as for society; and all three intimate that the mass of religious people and their official leaders have thus far, for the most part, shown discouragingly little ability to discern the signs of the times.

The nature and seriousness of the present situation, as an actual historic phenomenon in America, are most vividly and tellingly presented by Mr Mathews, who writes in an emphatic, crisp, hurried, journalistic style that, though not too solicitous about precision of statement or the exact agreement of one page with another, brings out broad outlines with the maximum of effect. His book is well qualified to reach the general ear and to develop in the membership of the churches a faculty too seldom in evidence among them—what may be called an intensified and enlightened historical self-consciousness, a power to recognise the real “characteristics of the present age,” to appreciate the irresistible sweep of certain contemporary tendencies that are often apprehended by well-meaning people only in their accidental details. Especially grave, at once for the Church and for secular society, Mr Mathews points out, is the existing breach between the Church as an organised

body and most that is really *vital*, ardent, and triumphant in the intellectual and the moral life of the time. The Church has, in the main, lost touch with the intellectual movement of the period; for—in spite of many grudging concessions of detail, which have simply produced a widespread impression that the Church is sullenly letting itself be worried by “science” out of one position after another, in a retreat to which no definite limit seems assigned—the greater number of even Protestant religious bodies and of their clergy still keep up an attitude of hostility, or at least of suspicion, towards conclusions about the physical universe, and about the methods of historical inquiry, which in the universities and the very grammar schools pass for undebatable commonplaces. As a consequence of this, unless the Church can “establish a *modus vivendi*” with both physical and historical science, it is in danger of “cutting itself off from co-operation with the controlling intellectual force of to-day, and of making it certain that in the future it will embrace only by sufferance, if at all, the intellectual leaders of society; that it consequently will be composed exclusively of those who, however able as business men and above reproach as individuals, are not the moulders of public opinion or the makers of the new age.” Similarly, in spite of much amiable philanthropy and useful practical work, the churches and the ministry—with no inconsiderable number of honourable exceptions—must be said to be out of touch with the deepest and most characteristic moral—which is the social—movement of our time. In two increasingly important circles of society, in fact, the official spokesmen of the Church are, however unfairly, under a twofold suspicion which weakens not only their influence but the influence of religion itself: in the academic community you may hear their intellectual honesty often called in question; and, among the working class, their moral sincerity, the reality of their desire to put into practice the ethics of self-sacrifice, humility, and equal reverence for all the children of God, which they preach. Neither sort of critic, probably, does justice to the real difficulties of a historic institution (made up of many

sorts of very fallible mortals) in an epoch of transition. But, Mr Mathews urges, the tension has now reached a point at which the future of the Church is menaced, unless it will endeavour, by the abandonment of non-essentials, to adjust itself to the new intellectual situation and to the new social enthusiasms.

But what are to be the terms of the permanent *modus vivendi* between Christianity and modern science and philosophy? Mr Mathews' answer to this question is less convincing than his presentation of the need for an answer. For—unlike his colleague, the author of *The Finality of the Christian Religion*—he identifies that distinctive essence of Christianity which is under no conditions to be surrendered, not with “the moral ideal contained in the New Testament,” nor with any “philosophy of the universe,” nor even with “a philosophy of the divine love implied in the progress of the race,” but with a “gospel of facts,” that is, of historical occurrences. Some considerable part, indeed, of the evangelical history Mr Mathews appears ready to resign; just how much, he does not tell us, though explicitness upon the point would lend a greater force to the rest of his argument. But some residuum of “miracles,” as “unclassified exhibitions of divine power,” seems to be insisted upon; and, above all, the Resurrection. “Take away the historical, risen Jesus, and you take away the Gospel in its original sense.” But a faith that boasts of being based upon concrete and “objective” facts surely ought to be willing to say of what sort those facts are; and Mr Mathews hardly shows here the plainness of speech appropriate to his position. What resurrection does he mean? Is it the revivification of a dead physical organism and its reappearance “on the first Easter Day”? But this story is inextricably involved with, and is unintelligible apart from, the complementary story of the Ascension, with its crude scene of levitation; and this, in turn, is meaningless without the scheme of cosmic topography that places a heaven somewhere in space in a direction perpendicular to the earth's surface at the latitude and longitude of Bethany. Is the next generation likely to find anything

more completely expressive than this of "the world-view of a pre-scientific age"? If, however, Mr Mathews means by the Resurrection simply the occurrence of post-crucifixion visions, analogous to Paul's, he presents a historical hypothesis deserving of serious consideration. But can one honestly say that in such visions there is to be found that overwhelmingly objective, realistic sort of factual evidence which Mr Mathews seems to desiderate? In truth, despite this writer's constant denunciation of "practical materialism," there is much of a sort of materialism in his conception of religion and of Christianity. He has little confidence in religious experience alone, is unwilling to leave religion to spring perennially from human nature itself, its needs, its ideals, its sense of its own moral dignity, its central pulse of courage and faith, its rational reflection. It is in this temper that, in his zeal for the doctrine of immortality, Mr Mathews comes perilously near to the profoundly immoral assertion that there is no adequate motive for, or trustworthy source of, human goodness apart from the expectation of a future life. The Church, he declares, in admitting "that the doctrine of future rewards and punishments is to play no rôle in the region of motives, is making a fundamental mistake." "How is one to be sure that a man who, like Jesus, cultivates the spirit of love and self-sacrifice is not a weakling? How are we to be sure that self-restraint is better than self-indulgence unless we are assured that the lower self is not the eternal self?" If this were the ethical spirit of the Church—and there is, undeniably, much in the history of Christianity that is harmonious with this sort of materialism—one ought, surely, to wish rather for the speedy extinction than for the revival of the Church's moral influence upon society.

With the delineation of the contemporary situation in religion and ethics Mr Leighton is more briefly concerned; but he proposes to meet the needs of that situation by a restatement of the essential and the unique content of the Christian view of life and the world, and an exhibition of this

view as a final solvent for the doubts and perplexities of the time. What is most striking, perhaps, about his book is the way in which it exemplifies the confusing effect, upon the reflection of a serious mind, of the attempt to make the solution of the problems and the correction of the aberrations of modern culture depend upon the establishment of highly debatable historical hypotheses. To find the specifically Christian view of things "we must go back of the traditional Christian ethics, which is intermingled with many other elements, to the ethics of the founder." Thus Mr Leighton assumes a double task: he is to show that the moral and theological opinions (usually rather full of reminiscences of modern idealistic philosophy) which he advances are true, and adequate to the demands of the present crisis; and also that they are identical in substance with "the teachings of Jesus." In view of the existing state of New Testament criticism, one who assumes the latter task may naturally be expected to offer, as the very beginning of his argument, some analysis of the historical data available in the Gospels, and some objective canon for distinguishing the authentic utterances of Jesus from later accretions. But Mr Leighton promptly announces that he does "not consider such preliminary inquiry vital to the aim set before him in this work"; and that, in his opinion, apart from the external evidence of contemporary records, some systematic conception of Jesus' teaching and activity is the indispensable *forerequisite* to any sane and sober-minded discussion of the dates and historicity of the four Gospels. The principal justification offered for this surprising evasion of the responsibilities of this author's special position seems to lie in the remark that "Jesus is a *personality* who has exercised a continuous historical influence down to the present time," "a pre-eminent historical force" working in "the thoughts and lives of disciples to-day acting under his leadership and striving to live in accordance with his spirit."¹ The line of argument implied by this remark has just now a con-

¹ *Jesus Christ and the Civilization of To-day*, pp. 9, 11.

siderable currency in certain theological circles. Yet, I suppose, theological books are not necessarily exempt from the elementary obligations of common logic; and a profane logician would be likely to find in this argument an admirable example of the *petitio principii*—since the question at issue is precisely whether it is by the teaching of the first-century historical Jesus that these disciples of to-day live—and which of the jarring schools of them live by it the more truly. But from the observations cited, at all events, Mr Leighton apparently infers the legitimacy of a sort of *a priori* reasoning about the nature of primitive Christianity. The inference is something less than convincing; and in point of fact, upon several questions over which there is serious difference of critical opinion, the author's conclusions seem rather arbitrary. He does, indeed, often make copious use of proof texts—the book is largely what Mr Mathews has somewhere called “bescriptured philosophy,”—but these are employed with scarcely more historical sense, or respect for context, than might be found in a seventeenth-century book of school divinity. Upon the two principal controverted questions regarding the ethical teaching of Jesus, Mr Leighton gives very confident and positive answers; but his discussion of the evidence bearing upon these questions is unduly summary. Was the moral temper of the founder of Christianity essentially dualistic, ascetic, other-worldly, involving a radical antithesis between the spiritual and the natural life, unappreciative of the purely terrestrial sanctities of family and state? or did it find man's good in the full development of all the normal powers of human nature, and conceive the self-fulfilment of the individual to be inseparably knit up with the temporal bonds of social fellowship and the ordinary historic business of humanity? Mr Leighton pronounces for the latter interpretation, and probably most modern men would like to be sure that he is right in doing so. But, as everyone knows, there are some hard sayings in the Gospels which, if they represent any early tradition, point quite the other way;

and it is a historical fact that the Western world, with the New Testament in its hands for centuries, never did discover, and perhaps never would have discovered, the humanistic ideal, or the social conception of man, or the worth of the family and the state, but for the revival of certain Hellenic influences and the robust outbreking of certain characteristically Teutonic impulses and sentiments. Again (the two questions are closely connected), had Jesus any "evolutional" conception of the historic process—or was his preaching primarily apocalyptic and eschatological? Did he think of the coming of the Kingdom as something cataclysmic, a speedy and abrupt change that should usher in a final and unalterable order of things? If this latter be the correct account of the matter, Mr Leighton goes so far as to say that "the teachings of the Master have no bearing on the life of humane culture, and either we must leave the world or live in it in opposition to his spirit." To this important matter, therefore, a brief appendix is devoted. In the course of it the author undertakes incidentally to settle, in four pages, the immensely difficult and complicated problem of the term "Son of man." But the main issue does not seem to be so squarely met as one might expect from the observation just quoted. Partly, Mr Leighton contends that the eschatological element in the preaching of Jesus has of late been much exaggerated, and puts forward as a "sound" attitude on the subject a position of Professor Sanday's—which that scholar has since abandoned with the avowal: "I doubt if we have realised to what an extent our Lord conceived the kingdom of heaven as essentially future and essentially supernatural; I doubt if we have appreciated the preliminary or preparatory character of his mission." But even Mr Leighton recognises a large apocalyptic factor in the message of Jesus; he treats it, however, as if it were merely "a faith in the *ultimate* cosmic victory of the spiritual order." This would seem to be an evasion of the real point; the question to be answered is: Did not Jesus expect an *early* cosmic overturning, and was

not his ethics strongly coloured by this expectation? On the other hand, even if this question be answered in the affirmative, one must, I think, still agree with Mr Leighton that there are profound elements in Jesus' religious and ethical teaching which, though originally involved with, are now separable from, these eschatological anticipations. Considered as a contribution to contemporary theological and moral reflection, *Jesus Christ and the Civilization of To-day* contains much that is interesting and weighty; one must the more regret that the book as a whole so largely miscarries through the distracting influence of its twofold aim and the author's unhistorical treatment of the historical part of his undertaking.

It is, in the main, upon aspects of the prophetic and the early Christian ethics that can be fairly easily detached from Jewish messianism and Christian chiliasm that Mr Rauschenbusch rests his argument in his *Christianity and the Social Crisis*. His reasoning too, it is true, is vitiated by a comingling of historical interpretation with the presentation of a message to the present age. His social *parti pris* leads him to over-emphasise some aspects of primitive Christianity, and unwarrantably to ignore others. He, also, fails to face altogether fairly or to discuss adequately the question of the provisional and apocalyptic significance of the injunctions of Jesus and the communion of the early churches. But there is, after all, a broadly Christian moral temper — which, doubtless, owes nearly as much to the Jewish prophets as to the Gospels. "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" seems a characteristically, however little a uniquely, Christian maxim; the affirmation of the equal intrinsic value of every human soul, the thorough identification of religious duty with social righteousness, the unquenchable hope in *some* form of coming deliverance in which the despised and down-trodden of the earth shall come into their own: these can scarcely be denied to be deeply rooted in the Judæo-Christian ethical tradition. To the line of that tradition Mr Rauschenbusch

thoroughly belongs ; with that prophetic flame he has been genuinely enkindled. His book ought to have much influence in awakening the social conscience in the American churches ; it is significant that within a few months a second printing of it was called for. Unlike the two writers already considered, Mr Rauschenbusch does not hesitate to point to a socialistic reorganisation of the political and economic system as the ultimate aim. But he gives us more than an emotional and hortatory piece of Christian socialism.

The book shows an instructed understanding of economic phenomena, a large grasp of historical facts and a power to correlate them, a shrewd observation of contemporary conditions, and no small skill in expressing all these clearly and sometimes epigrammatically. In the last analysis, it is true, the issue is for the author an essentially simple ethical one ; the kernel of his argument lies in the conviction that nothing short of "a fraternal organisation of society," in industrial as well as all other relations, can express the full moral implications of Christianity, and that Christian ethics and a competitive economic system are contradictory terms. It is, I think, doubtful whether this incompatibility can be successfully denied ; even Mr Mathews, after proclaiming himself no socialist, makes such admissions as these : "In a competitive system a business man, by the very force of circumstances, is a warrior. He may be an industrial Bayard, without fear and without reproach, but he is none the less a warrior, and war in the very nature of the case is an enemy of love and a thoroughly Christian society." Even those who retain a child-like faith in the beneficent working of the natural "economic harmonies" will scarcely pretend that the economic struggle for life begets a feeling of social unity or is a means of inward and spiritual grace to those immersed in it. Yet as a scheme offered for actual and early adoption, the socialistic régime cannot be considered merely upon these abstractly moral grounds. No one speaks wholly to the point upon that scheme who does not imagine it once in operation and deduce in some

detail its probable workings, with the average human nature that is to determine those workings not greatly more unselfish nor more intelligent, nor less lazy, nor less self-indulgent than it is now found to be. Would the proposed outward change of social structure, under such conditions, produce an increase or decrease of human well-being, in both its spiritual and its material elements? This question Mr Rauschenbusch does not really answer. But his socialism seems fairly Fabian; and pending the ultimate issue, the Church has much to learn from such writings as this. Readers of the book are likely to be brought to realise clearly that a Christian Church's concern should be as much to feel and spread a deep discontent with the present condition of society as to make sure that the transition to a better and more fraternal order shall be by a steady evolution rather than by explosive violence; that, whatever be said about the practicability of a social-democratic State, a truly socialistic and honestly democratic spirit should inform the very atmosphere of a Church professedly Christian: that the prosperous and influential citizen, whom the pulpit has commonly been so sedulous both to conciliate and to exhort, requires less to have his conscience enlightened about the way to spend his money than about his way of making it—less to be exhorted to bestow of his superfluity to help his needy brother, and more to be urged to devote his ability and his zeal to the bringing in, by some means or other, of a system in which he shall not have the material superfluity to bestow nor his brother need of the bestowal. For the correct translation of the Golden Rule under modern conditions, and for the privileged minority of society, would seem to be something like this: Provide for the class of society to which ye do not belong, that social system and that mode of distribution of economic goods which ye would wish to prevail if ye belonged to that class.

A recent prescription by a layman—an economist and social psychologist—for what he conceives to be the peculiar distemper of our time, presents some interesting aspects of

contrast with these ethical appeals of theological writers, while it is at the same time a discussion of a topic that Mr Rauschenbusch presents in a single section of his book. The contrast lies in the method of approach to the problem of the advancement of social righteousness. Professor Ross, in his *Sin and Society*, conceived that it is not the moral aspirations of the individual so much as the moral reprobations of the mass that chiefly need purification and enlightenment. He seeks, "not to influence men in their conduct, but to influence them in their attitude towards the conduct of others"—in the conviction that it is by this means that conduct itself is most likely to be ultimately modified. In setting out from this conviction, Mr Ross brings usefully before the general attention what is certainly only a half-truth, but the half of the truth most easily overlooked by religious teachers, in their preoccupation with the deeper but the less constantly operative inner moral motives of the individual. The great majority of men, as Mill in a famous passage long ago pointed out, are most steadily, if not most profoundly, influenced in their behaviour, not by their ideal aspirations, not by the "religious sanctions," not even by the sympathies, but by some form of the force of public opinion; and rather by the habitual and settled condemnations of public opinion—above all, by its strong aversions and contempts, which their own own feelings inevitably come to repeat—than by its special commendations and applause. It is with the help of this constant atmospheric pressure of the collective judgment, by which his own judgment even of his own acts is informed and sustained, that the everyday morality of the decent citizen is kept alive. To shake this public opinion, to bring its reprobations to bear upon the evils that are the real foes of humane living and social order, is no small part of the task of the moral leader, and therefore of the religious teacher. But in so far as the churches and clergy have attempted thus to direct the aim of the current system of reprobations, they have, Mr Ross suggests, failed to point it

against its most proper objects, against the greater enemies of society. They have faithfully enough—at least within the limits of the religious community—maintained a vigorous reprobation of “vice,” that is, of undiscipline and physical intemperance. But they—and the current code, which the Church has done so much to form—have been far less aggressive against what Mr Ross, for contrast, prefers to call “sin”—that is, anti-social states of mind and modes of conduct. Certain obvious enemies of society, it is true, the pulpit has been wont to denounce vigorously enough; and the murderer, the thief, the adulterer, all the more violent sort of law-breakers, have been excluded from the blessings of even secular respectability. But these are largely the past modes of sin, the long-lingering survivals of sins that were great and threatening evils at an earlier stage of social evolution. But the up-to-date counterparts of these, the sins that are now on the fighting line, the evils that peculiarly menace us in this generation, are frequently overlooked by general public opinion, and still more commonly left uncondemned by the Church. This is perhaps due partly to a moral tardiness naturally characteristic of ecclesiastical and other highly organised institutions; partly to an unhappy entanglement of the temporal interests of the Church itself with these self-same sins; but chiefly to the actual elusiveness of the form which contemporary sin assumes. These disguises Mr Ross seeks to strip away; and within the limits of one important class of cases he does so most effectively. The characteristic trait of modern life, he points out, is the increased dependence of all parts of society upon all other parts—of those who exercise one specialised social function upon those who exercise the other functions. With this has gone a tendency to concentrate the power of control of this complex system—which involves in its network at once the economic, industrial, financial, and political activities of men—at a relatively small number of points, in certain groups of individuals who constitute the powerful nerve-centres of the social body.

It results from this that everyone is to an unprecedented degree at the mercy—for his estate, comfort, health, life itself—upon the fidelity to their trust of many persons whom he has never seen; and that those who, by reason of their energy or ability or good fortune, occupy focal points in this huge reticulated system of interdependence, may, if they will, gain profit for themselves at the expense of innumerable others who will never see them, and may do so through long, subtle, indirectly circuitous processes in which the responsibility of the primary agent easily becomes obscured. The great modern sin consists, then, in taking advantage for personal ends of the trust which the complexity of the modern social order makes it necessary for men to repose in one another; it consists in doing to others something other than you profess to be doing to them. Since the newer sin is long-range sin, the practiser of it may be admirable in all his dealings with those immediately about him, may be a good father and husband, a supporter of charities, a pillar of the Church. Indeed, he not only may, but must, be such; for since his advantage of position depends upon the confidence of others, his private virtues must serve as the very instrument to his public wrongdoing. Nor need he be himself conscious of wrongdoing, or have any unkindly feelings towards his victims—any more than the highwayman may be supposed to have had towards his. Crime has usually sprung as much from stupidity, lack of imagination, a pleasant blindness to the consequences of one's acts, as from malevolence. Thus the sinner *par excellence* of our time is no low-browed, black-hearted ruffian; he is “the respectable, exemplary, trusted personage who, strategically placed at the focus of a spider-web of fiduciary relationships, is able from his office chair to pick a thousand pockets, poison a thousand sick, pollute a thousand minds, or imperil a thousand lives.” But with this large-scale evil-doer go a multitude of petty ones; for it is essential to the system by which he subsists that he “intimidate the moulders of opinion, so as to confine the editor to the ‘news,’ the preacher to the ‘simple gospel,’ the public man

to the 'party issues,' the judge to his precedents, and the writer to the classic themes."

The principal moral phenomenon in the present decade of American history has been the discovery of this sort of sinner, the spread of a popular conviction that American life in society, business, politics is deeply cankered with this corruption, and the consequent growth of an essentially new and singularly encouraging movement of moral reform. All that is of serious significance in recent political affairs here has had to do with this movement. In it, even in its least political aspects, the pulpit can hardly be said to have taken a leading part; and the aloofness of many of the working class from the Church has seemingly been increased by a popular feeling that the ecclesiastical organisations have not been free from compromising entanglements with the typical modern sinner. Of this episode in American life Mr Ross's book seems to me the most striking literary expression. His remedy for the evil that he sets forth consists, not in a re-organisation of society, not in so unprecedented a thing as the actual practice of Christianity, but in the enforcement through public opinion of the gentleman's ordinary code of honourable dealing. "When idealists are dipping their brushes in the sunset for colours bright enough to paint the Utopias that might be if society were quite made over, one may be pardoned for dreaming of what would be possible, even on the plane of existing institutions, if only in this highly articulated society of ours everyone were required to act in good faith, and to do what he had deliberately led others to expect of him." The standard of righteousness of a community whose moral traditions come chiefly from Christianity and Jewish prophetism should doubtless demand a good deal more than this; but it can hardly long continue to be content with less.

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KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH.

G. LOWES DICKINSON.

[THIS paper was written before I had seen the article by Professor Wm. Adams Brown on "The Reasonableness of Christian Faith" which appeared in the January number of this Journal. I have dealt in my paper with the point raised by Professor Brown, and, as I hope, have sufficiently explained where I differ from him. Since, however, he refers specially to my position, it may be as well to say explicitly (1) that, while I do not, as he says, deny the possibility of knowledge about what has hitherto formed the subject-matter of religion, yet I hold that we do not, in fact, possess such knowledge; (2) that, with regard to what I call "Faith," as distinguished from knowledge, I do not think that any religion which ought properly to be called Christian can adequately represent the attitude of an intelligent and candid modern man; because, in my opinion, the very least that is involved in Christianity, if Christianity is to be anything specific at all, is a belief in the altogether exceptional and abnormal significance of Jesus Christ—a belief, in fact, that he was a divine being, in a sense in which no other man has been or can be divine. This I hold to be incompatible with a sound knowledge and judgment of history. I need hardly add that *a fortiori* Roman Catholic or Anglican theology is, in my judgment, incompatible with modern knowledge.]

In the course of the last half-century a change, curious, and to some minds disconcerting, appears to have come over the

leaders of freethought. They are, perhaps, not less but more sceptical than they were; but they seem also to be more believing. They question things that an earlier generation never thought of challenging; but they affirm what it would have regarded as superstitions or dreams. Mr George Meredith, for example, while rejecting God and immortality, demands our worship for what he calls "Earth." Mr Bernard Shaw, repudiating the whole structure of our morals and our science, announces a new religion of "Life-force." Even Nietzsche, after denying all sense to the words "good" and "true," propounds in the end a new ethics and a new cosmology. Our modern poets and prophets, it would seem, are at once sceptical and credulous. They have no sooner smashed the old idols than they set up new ones in their place. What are we to think of this attitude? What does it really mean? An attempt to answer this question may perhaps throw some light upon that most vexed and most interesting of questions, the future of religion.

To some minds, as suggested above, and these not the least strong and sincere, the tendency we are noticing is simply disconcerting. They feel it to be a sign of weakness or of disingenuousness. They hold that a final position was conquered by human thought in the course of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; that the method and limits of our knowledge were then definitely fixed; and that to go back upon, or to pretend to go beyond, that position is a kind of feebleness or treachery. The attitude they adopt is, in short, that of Positivism; and they hold this to be also the attitude of science. That, however, I believe to be an error, and an error which it is important to expose. Positivism is not science, it is philosophy—and philosophy as little established as any other. It takes the existing limits of human experience, or those which are conventionally accepted as such, and dogmatizes that they are ultimate and final; it takes the postulates which science finds it convenient and useful to employ—those of cause and effect, of space and time, and of

matter in space and time existing and moving independently of mind—and it dogmatizes that these are ultimate truths. Now, it only needs an extra dose of scepticism, or of imagination, to discredit all this. But to discredit it is not to discredit science, whose results, not its hypotheses, are its sufficient title to our respect. Within the limits of its applicability science works; but the limits are narrow, and the human spirit experiences or divines much that extends beyond them. What is more, even the subject-matter of science it apprehends in a way which is not that of science. While science is analysing and describing, it is feeling; while science is measuring, it is speculating; while science is observing, it is creating. That is no cause of quarrel with science; but it is cause of quarrel with Positivism, which is one method of speculation trying to smother all the others. Positivism claims to be reasonable, and so to have a right to coerce the intellect. It is nothing of the kind, and it has no such right; it is one of the religions of the world, and, like other religions, it has its rivals.

To some minds this statement may seem paradoxical; but I have not advanced it as a paradox. I believe it to be true, if not a truism, and I will not labour it further. I shall suppose it to be granted; but then, granting it, there remains a position more carefully chosen and equally hostile to imaginative prospects. Our knowledge, it may be admitted, is but a flickering lamp sheltered by a paper shade from the winds of infinite space; the postulates on which science rests are tentative hypotheses, possibly untrue, certainly inadequate; our experience is limited by our senses and by the structure of our mind; and we have no philosophy that is demonstrably true. Granting all that, what ought, at any moment, to be our attitude towards the unknown; towards all that part of our experience which science has not ordered; towards what may lie behind and be presupposed in what we touch and see and hear? It ought, says this position, to be an attitude of pure agnosticism. We do not know, therefore we must not

feel; we cannot prove, therefore we must not speculate. We must admit the great Beyond, and then leave it severely alone. There is no room in a true man's mind for feelings or conjectures, still less for great imaginative visions, cathedrals of the spirit throbbing with sound and intense with light. What we do not know, we do not know: that is the first and last word on the subject.

For this attitude, or at least for many of those who represent it, I have a profound respect. Only a very strong and a very sincere man can accept and adhere to it with all its implications, intellectual and emotional. If it gives no light or inspiration, neither does it foster superstitions or dreams. It is a shining brazen rampart against the tides of human credulity. Nevertheless, I hold that it is an attitude undesirable, if not impossible, not merely for the mass, but for the chosen spirits of mankind. And for this reason. As I read Man, he is a creature not finished, even approximately; not definitely and once for all fitted out with what we call human nature, with just these five senses we possess, and just this form of intellect. He is a being in process of creating himself. What he is not is more important than what he is; his divinations and guesses than his certainties; his imaginations than his facts. For him to tie himself down to what he knows and to ignore what he does not know, would be to commit a kind of suicide. He would cease to grow, and would ossify into his present monstrous and transitional shape; would become, at last, a mere shell, and an ugly shell at that, housing, not the living thing that built it, but a corpse. He has in him a principle of growth—what I will call Imagination, since some word one must use. And by this he stretches feelers into the dark, laying hold there of stuff, and building mythologies and poems, the palaces of splendid hopes and desires.

“What, then, do you suggest?” cries the impatient reader, and he has my fullest sympathies. “Do you suggest that everybody is to believe anything he likes about anything?”

Or anything that some Church tells him to believe?" No. These are exactly the positions I wish to avoid, and to distinguish from my own. And first, I would say that I do not think belief is the right word to apply to the attitude that I am describing. One believes what one knows; and in the region of which I am speaking one does not know. What I am driving at is rather a tentative apprehension, not caring much about the intellectual forms in which it finds expression, but caring very much about the substance with which it imagines it comes into contact. Its proper language, therefore, is not assertion but suggestion, not logic but passion, not prose but poetry. Poetry has been the raw material of all dogma; and such poetry is neither true nor false; it only becomes false or true, or both at once, at the moment when it is formulated as a creed. Whether such formulations have done more good than harm to the world is a large historical question on which I do not here enter. I am not defending dogmas and creeds; I am defending mythology. Only, what I mean by mythology is not mere fiction; it is a first apprehension of some reality. You may call it a dream; but then, as the poet says:

"The dream is an atmosphere;
A scale still ascending to knit
The clear to the loftier Clear.
'Tis Reason herself, tiptoe
At the ultimate bound of her wit,
On the verges of Night and Day.
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The dream is the thought in the ghost;
The thought sent flying for food;
Eyeless, but sprung of an aim
Supernal of Reason, to find
The great Over-Reason we name
Beneficence: mind seeking Mind.
Dream of the blossom of Good,
In its waver and current and curve."¹

This kind of "dream" it is, the *ὄρα*, that I am trying to indicate. Let me offer, as an example, the great lyric which closes Goethe's *Faust* :—

¹ From Mr George Meredith's poem, "A Faith on Trial."

“Alles Vergängliche,
Ist nur ein Gleichniss;
Das Unzulängliche,
Hier wird's Ereigniss;
Das Unbeschreibliche,
Hier ist's gethan;
Das Ewig-Weibliche,
Zieht uns hinan.”

Is this fiction? Is it dogma? No; it is something more than the one, and less than the other. And the attitude of the poet's mind when he wrote it, and of the reader's when he reads it with understanding, is the one I am trying to describe. What am I to call it? Another phrase of Goethe's helps me: “Ich bleibe beim gläubigen Orden,” “I adhere to the sect of the faithful.” And that word “faith,” for lack of a better, I shall adopt here, as I have adopted it elsewhere; only hoping that the reader will not insist that “faith” can only mean “believing what we know to be untrue,” and that he will endeavour to seize my idea rather than boggle at my terms.

I will say, then, returning to the point at which I started, that our modern freethinkers, as distinguished from those of fifty years ago, are constructing mythologies on a basis of faith. But then, it may be said, if they want a faith at all, why do they not accept the old one, which has at least the advantage that it embodies centuries of experience, is steeped in centuries of emotion, and is furnished with a ritual centuries old? It may be replied that some of them do; for some of them are members of Christian churches and are trying very sincerely to pour the new wine into the old bottles. I do not think, however, that the attempt is likely to be successful; and it is important for my purpose that I should give my reasons for that opinion. The task is not an easy one; for Christianity, though definite in the sense that it is a creed, is necessarily indefinite in the sense that it is a faith. It is easy to formulate its dogmas; but it is not easy to say what people in general understand or have understood by it, or what kind of appeal it makes, or has made, to their emotions. Christianity, in fact, as a faith is not one but many. So that it is hazardous, and to

some may seem presumptuous, to say anything at all about it. Still, after all, the many faiths must be determined somehow by the one creed. If they are all alike Christian, they must have something in common; and it is that common something at which I am driving. Why do many freethinkers, I am asking, find that Christianity, in any of the forms it assumes, is an inadequate vehicle of their faith? Not merely, I should say, because Christianity is also a creed, and consequently makes upon the intelligence rigid demands for which it cannot supply credentials. Nor merely because it is full of contradictions, and creates more difficulties than it solves. All that might conceivably be tolerated now, as it has been tolerated by great minds in the past, if it were not that the Christian teaching, in many important respects, no longer helps but hinders us in expressing our view of the world and of society. Let us try to see how. Christianity tells us that the world was created by an omnipotent and all-good God. I will not press the difficulty, so often urged and never answered, which arises from the admitted fact of Evil. But apart from this, the idea of creation has ceased to be credible; and, what is worse, has ceased to be interesting. It is the idea of process with which we are preoccupied. Is this process also a progress? If so, what are its laws? Whither does it tend? What is the relation of human life and human ideals to the universe? Is Man a temporary accident? Or is He, or something that is coming out of Him, the goal and meaning of the Whole? These are the kind of questions we are asking. And Christianity has either no answer to give, or answers that are felt to be absurd. But if that be so, Christianity cannot serve as an expression of our emotional reaction to the world. For such expression we have to turn elsewhere, and construct for ourselves, if we can, new myths.

Again, whatever the Power be that sustains the world, we cannot conceive it to be a person, even if we knew what a person meant. Still less can we identify it with the person of Jesus Christ, or feel that our attitude towards it has anything

in common with the sentimental, almost erotic character of most Christian hymns.

"Jesu, lover of my soul,
Let me to Thy bosom fly."

What! The Power that is supposed to have created the stars and the tiger, to be addressed by a pet name! Need I say any more on this subject? But can I say less?

Next, if we turn from cosmology to ethics, we are met with the same inadequacy. It is the essence of Christianity to dwell upon the idea of sin. In the original myth all men were damned because of Adam's sin. But I will not press that point; for I suppose most Christians now explain it away, or set it aside. The fact, however, remains, that the sense of sin is the centre of all Christian ethics. Now this, I believe, is an attitude becoming increasingly unreal to most serious men. They have, I suppose, many of them, a sense that they sin; but not that they are "miserable sinners." The general confession repeated every Sunday in our churches would seem, I believe, to most of the worshippers, if they really thought about it, quite absurdly untrue to their feelings. "There is no health in us." That, surely, is the last thing a healthy man or woman believes. And to repeat it every Sunday, with the knowledge that a week hence it will be repeated again, and be as much or as little true as before! There is surely something about all this that is quite out of focus. But it is something which must be admitted, I think, to be essential to Christianity. For Christianity insists upon the essential weakness of man. It allows him no strength save what is derived from somewhere else, from Jesus Christ. And here again is a point on which I must permit myself to speak frankly, though I hope not offensively. How many men are really aware of any such personal relation to Jesus Christ as the Christian religion presupposes? How many, if they told the honest truth, really hold him to be even the ideal man? I cannot accept the answer that that is merely because men are wicked. It is many, perhaps most, of the best men to

whom this whole conception of "miserable sinners" redeemed by the intervention, in the past and in the present, of Jesus Christ, is simply without any meaning at all. They may admire Jesus Christ as a beautiful personality. But they can never feel him to be a Power working mysteriously in them; at most they may feel him an inspiration or an example, as other men also may be. The real moral attitude of such men finds no expression in the forms of Christianity. And, once more, if they are to have a mythology they must go elsewhere.

I have thus barely indicated some of the many considerations which make it difficult, if not impossible, for modern men feeling the need of a religion to accept Christianity. I have tried to show, in a word, that the bottle is old; and, as I have said, I do not believe that it can be stretched to hold the new wine. I am interested rather in the question what the new wine is. What must be the content of any faith that is really to appeal to the best and the most intelligent modern men? This is a question upon which it would be impertinent to dogmatise; nor could it be decided by any one mind, even the greatest, nor by a single generation. Perhaps, however, I may venture upon some tentative suggestions, with a view to concentrating reflection upon the problem. I do not try to impose upon the reader my own view. I ask him only to come along with me, agreeing where he may, dissenting where he must, as we feel together in the dark, along this new road one day to be trodden by thousands and by millions.

In the first place, then, if men are to have a faith which will help them at all, it must be one which brings them into some kind of friendly relation to the universe, as, in the present condition of knowledge, they conceive it. They must feel, that is, that human life and human purposes are not merely indifferently produced by the cosmic process, and destined with equal indifference to disappear; but that they contribute to and express something of its essence, so that it has a significance which somehow is in harmony with our ideals. I express myself purposely in very vague and general terms;

but nevertheless I have already said something definite enough to rule out of the content of faith at least two important positions—one, that of pessimism, or the belief that the universe, on the whole, is bad, as judged by our standards; the other that of indifferentism, that it has nothing to do with our valuations, except to produce them and to destroy them. Neither of these positions, I believe, in the present state of knowledge, can be either established or refuted. But the impulse of faith is, I think, not indeed to deny them—that would be to dogmatise,—but to leave them on one side, and to let the imagination play round a more positive and hopeful vision. How that vision may shape itself in detail, I do not know; perhaps in many ways. But I am inclined to think it will tend rather to image the world dualistically, or pluralistically, than under the form of unity. And for this reason, that we seem to become increasingly conscious of Evil as a very real fact, and intolerant of the many religions and philosophies which try to explain it away as “mere appearance.” The contest with Evil, we feel, is the essence of our moral life. But then, on the other hand, this contest, our faith must suggest, is relevant to world-issues, somehow essential to the Whole. In fighting for Good we are assisting something real that is divine; in fighting against Evil we are resisting something real that is diabolic. That is the kind of mythology which seems likely to appeal to men; one which represents life as a fight, but a fight having cosmic significance, pointing to an end beyond, but analogous to, our best vision, an end which we are in process of discovering, as we are in process of realising it. Any hints at what this end may be, we shall thankfully receive; but we shall take them, if we are wise, as tentative and provisional, even though they be the utterance of genius, and shall guard ourselves against stereotyping prematurely the divine text.

Further, in this conflict, men, as I think and hope, will dwell less and less upon their weakness, and more and more upon their strength. So much has happened since first Chris-

tianity consecrated weakness and sin! We are no longer obsessed by the sense of supernatural beings among, below, and above us, many or most of them malignant, all of them willing and able to upset our surest expectations, and by sheer caprice of malice or favour interrupt, at any moment, by any kind of miracle, the normal course of things. We are no longer powerless in the face of nature; we have learnt, and are continually learning, how to adapt her processes to our ends. But to say this is to say that Science has an immense religious significance. It has taught us that not power but order is the essence of the world; that not caprice but reason is the attribute of the Divine; and that we ourselves must and can work out our own salvation without expecting or desiring supernatural intervention. It follows that to respect ourselves is a religious as well as a moral duty; or rather, to respect that in us which is fruitful, progressive, strong, and wise. We have not, or ought not to have, any longer time to consider whether we are "miserable sinners"; we ought to be too busy demonstrating in fact the contrary. The sense of original imperfection must indeed be always with us, for it is the obverse of the impulse to develop; but the sense of original sin should disappear, for it is an assertion of our essential worthlessness.

But then, on the other hand there is a fact which we shall be too honest and sincere to blink. In this contest which we accept, towards this end which we divine, we are sacrificed by hundreds, thousands, millions. The Evil against which we fight is always, on the face of it, conquering us. Many of us even do not know or guess against what or for what we are fighting. In any case, none of us enter into the promised land. This fact, it is true, for the mass of men, at most moments, does not present itself as a problem; they accept the struggle without reflection, and often enough enjoy it. But as soon as an ideal end is consciously conceived the question comes up, have individuals any relation to that end except to fight for it? What would our faith of the future have to say on this point?

It must be admitted, I think, that many men, and those perhaps the most strenuous and serious, are either averse from considering this question at all, or inclined to answer it offhand in the sceptical sense. And there are good reasons for their attitude. The strongest, perhaps, is that it seems to them morally ignoble to make the desirability or obligation of taking part in the battle dependent upon the soldier's participation in the victory. They do not want that issue raised for fear it should weaken men. This is a position which deserves respect; but it may be pointed out that it is one which has already assumed that the answer to the question must be discouraging; that individuals have, as a matter of obvious fact, no cosmic significance save as means to something or someone else. Now this is a dogma, and one that must be confronted with two questions. First, is it true? That question either cannot be answered at all, in which case there is no room for a dogma, but at most for an attitude of faith. Or it can only be answered by science; and in that case the only method to pursue is that which is being pursued, in the face of much discouragement from men of science, by the Society for Psychical Research. In fact, however, it will be generally admitted that we do not, as yet, know anything on the subject, and many people will add that we never shall know. If that be so, the matter is one, like everything connected with the unknown, which may be a proper object of faith. And that brings us to our second question: In default of knowledge, how might a faith of the future properly and fruitfully regard the relation of the individual to death? That is a question very hard to answer, for it seems clear that different men have very different feelings about it. There are some, like Comte for example, or Harriet Martineau, who feel life to be much more, not less, sublime and significant because they believe in the extinction of individuals at death. To this number, it would seem, Mr George Meredith belongs. All interest, even, in the question he regards as a sign

of weakness and egotism, and urges us again and again to identify ourselves with "Earth," and cease to look for any future save that of the race. On the other hand, there are men, like Frederic Myers, to whom the whole significance of the world depends upon personal immortality; who find life full of worth if individual souls survive death, and quite without worth if they do not. Such men, in default of knowledge, will require and may legitimately have faith. And their mythology, I think, will have as its essence the idea that the potentialities which men have not been able to realise here they will have a chance of realising elsewhere and elsewhen. As to the nature, in detail, of that elsewhere and elsewhen, they will, if they are wise, not be over-curious. The traditional conception of heaven and hell, with all that has come of it, is a warning against the attempt to convert faith into dogma, and to develop the dogma in detail. All that men of this temperament really want is the opening of a horizon; and for that it is enough to imagine that what we know as life is not the beginning and end of all experience, and that our efforts have reverberations more remote and issues more sublime than can be apprehended by our direct experience. Such an attitude, I think, is not really open to the objection often taken against the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, that it withdraws interest from life and work here to dreams of another world. Properly taken, it would rather add significance and importance to every interest here, because by our conduct we should conceive ourselves to be making or marring not only our transitory welfare, nor that, equally transitory, of future individuals, but that of a life indefinitely extended both in duration and in range of experience. It might, indeed, be urged that only some such faith is likely to be able, in the long run, to stand the strain of life, and inspire men to achieve the best that is in them. But I do not press that point, in view of the diversities of human feeling. Some, no doubt, will continue to be inspired by Comte or by Meredith; others by Browning or by Myers; or, let me rather

say, by Goethe. For he, my safest and surest example of what I mean by faith, while deprecating all undue preoccupation with the idea of another life, and insisting on the duty of disinterested activity in this one, yet needed and professed a faith in the continuance of life after death. "When a man is as old as I am," he said to Eckermann, "he is bound occasionally to think about death. In my case this thought leaves me in perfect peace; for I have a firm conviction that our spirit is a being indestructible by nature. It works on from eternity to eternity; it is like the sun which only seems to set, but in truth never sets but shines on unceasingly." Elsewhere he elaborates a whole mythology on the subject. But faith, as I have said, is best expressed in poetry. And I will rather quote, in conclusion, that lyric from the closing scene of *Faust* which sums up Goethe's whole moral and religious position as he built it up in an experience of eighty years. It is the chorus sung by the spirits who receive the soul of Faust after his long pilgrimage:

"Gerettet ist das edle Glied
Der Geisterwelt vom Bösen:
Wer immer strebend sich bemüht,
Den können wir erlösen;
Und hat an ihm die Liebe gar
Von oben Theil genommen
Begegnet ihm die selige Schaar
Mit herzlichem Willkommen."

These, then, are the suggestions I venture to put forward as to what may be the content of a reasonable faith. They are few and meagre; but it is more likely, I think, that I have said too much than too little. For, if I am right, it is poets and musicians, not philosophers and theologians, who alone can give to such apprehensions an expression that is at once adequate and elastic. All I have wished to do is to indicate the channel within which the sacred stream may flow. That channel, in my view, is determined by the limits of positive knowledge. For faith, as I conceive it, is not an antagonist of knowledge; it is at once its supplement and its

inspiration. In a state in which there should be perfect knowledge and perfect experience, there would be no room for faith; so that, in so far as faith works for knowledge, it may be said to work for its own destruction. It represents, to my mind, our first excursions into the Unknown, an airy citadel rising there as a symbol of occupation. Without it I doubt whether knowledge has ever advanced or ever will advance. Would there, for example, have been chemistry if there had not been alchemy? Or astronomy if there had not been astrology? Would there now be sociology if there were not a "Faith" in progress? On the other hand, the history of religion shows that faith hardening into dogma becomes an enemy to knowledge. So, it may be observed, does the knowledge of to-day to the knowledge of to-morrow. But that is no reason for abandoning either faith or knowledge. It is a reason for trying the harder to pursue both in the right spirit. This paper I might call an essay towards the proper holding of faith. I claim no finality for it. I only hope to have put a position that may provoke some fruitful reflection and discussion.

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THE WORLD VIEW OF A POET: GOETHE'S PHILOSOPHY.

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GERMAN thought of the eighteenth century glorified the human reason. It had full confidence in the capacity of the mind to solve all the riddles of the universe. For it there were no mysteries which the intellect properly trained could not fathom, no veil which it might not succeed in piercing. Everything was perfectly clear to the logical thinker; there was a rational explanation for everything, from the creation of the world to the ripening of cherries in summer instead of winter. The existence of God was proved to the times as satisfactorily as a proposition in Euclid, the divine nature was laid bare in all its phases and relations to the world, the inner essence and form of the universe were revealed, and the nature and future fate of the human soul were demonstrated to a happy and thankful public. Not a corner was left untouched by the searchlight of reason; the bats of bigotry and superstition were driven from their belfries, and everything shown forth in the clear light of day. The ideal of the age was enlightenment, illumination, *Aufklärung*.

The admiration which the century felt for man's reason naturally led it to attribute this wonderful function to God Himself: the age created Him after its own image. God was conceived as a rational being, as a philosopher, as an eighteenth-century *Aufklärer*. He was supposed to think and act like

a rational man, or rather like the popular conception of such a man. The rational man acts according to conscious design. Like the mechanic, God forms his plan and makes things according to this plan. He is the great architectonic intelligence, the architect of the universe. He fashions the objects of nature as the clock-maker makes his clocks. And as every part of the clock serves a purpose, the purpose in the mind of its maker, so every part of God's world serves the purpose of its maker: it is useful, teleological, and its usefulness is one of the proofs of the existence of an intelligent author. The fundamental purpose of the Deity coincides with the chief end of His most perfect creation: man is the final goal of the universe; for him everything is made, everything conduces to his welfare. But since happiness is not always realised here on earth, a life after death is needed in which the shortcomings of the present are removed and in which the ideal is completely attained.

There can of course be no room for pessimism in a world constructed as rationally as that of the *Aufklärung*, a world that pays annual dividends and guarantees a cash surrender value at the end. A cheerful optimism therefore characterises the times. Along with this goes a supreme self-confidence. It was for this reason that Goethe once called the eighteenth century *das selbstkluge Zeitalter*, the self-conceited age, the age wise in its own conceit. To be sure, why should not an age that can solve all the problems which have troubled the mind of man, for which there are no more riddles and mysteries, be proud of itself and look with pity upon the centuries still to come?

The general conceptions which I have just outlined were applied by the leading thinkers of this movement to the particular fields of knowledge. The microcosm was conceived after the manner of the macrocosm, and the same rationalistic explanations employed all along the line, in history, religion, morality, law, politics, language, literature, poetry, and art; the facts within these fields were all interpreted *à la mode*, as

products of conscious reason : Religion is a necessary product of the intellect ; its fundamental truths, such as the existence of God and the immortality of the soul, can be logically deduced from certain first principles or axioms, and are common to all religions, while its superstitions and perversions are the inventions of crafty priests or politicians, for the enslavement of mankind. The conviction of the *Aufklärung* that there is a germ of truth in all religions, accounts for the tolerance of the times with respect to the different forms of worship, and helps us to understand the spirit in which Frederick the Great permitted everyone in his kingdom to seek salvation, *nach seiner eignen Façon*, according to his own fashion. Frederick's freedom from bias, by the way, assumed so pronounced a turn that he compelled the pietistic professors at Halle to attend the theatre ; he was bound to have them tolerant whether or no ! The State, too, is the creation of reason, either of rational individuals who get together and establish the State because it is the sensible thing to do, or of tyrants who desire to rule their weaker brethren and discover that this can be best accomplished by organisation. If this is true, then only such institutions are justifiable as are reasonable ; whatever has outlived its reasonableness cannot stand. Hence, states which were originally founded on reason can be overthrown and improved by better reason, and new states can be formed in the same way. This conception accounts for the sympathy shown by the age for revolutionary movements and for the spread of democratic sentiment in Germany ; it also explains the growth of the cosmopolitan spirit and the decline of narrow sectionalism in politics, as well as the belief in an era of universal peace.

Language likewise is an invention of reason. An eighteenth-century professor offers an explanation of the origin of language which is so thoroughly in harmony with the *Zeitgeist* that it deserves to be preserved. Human beings, he says, at first lived in an animal state. This was inconvenient and burdensome. They desired a better mode of

life, which impelled them to unite; and thus there arose the need of communication. "Perhaps they first hit upon gestures. But it could not have been long before they saw the inadequacy of such a language. Then they observed that emotions expressed themselves in sounds. They also became aware that animals employed sounds with good results. What was more natural than that they should attempt to utilise the discovery and use sounds as the signs of their thoughts?" We see, these primitive men go about inventing society, the state, religion, and language in the same way in which we nowadays found universities or scientific associations or industrial corporations; we decide upon what we want, draft a constitution and by-laws, select the means for carrying out our purposes, and the thing is done.

Such periods of rationalism have not been uncommon in the history of thought. As in the case of the individual, the race passes through stages of development in which no limits are set to the possibilities of knowledge, in which the claims of the intellect to reach the truth go unchallenged, and in which the theoretical impulse reaches its climax. But these epochs are usually followed by periods of opposition in which the exaggerations of rationalistic thought are softened or utterly rejected. This is what happened toward the close of the eighteenth century in Germany. A reaction set in against the *Aufklärung*, and before the beginning of the new era the conceptions which had been so long in fashion were cast into the lumber-room of exploded errors. Kant led the attack from the philosophical side, while Lessing, Winckelmann, Hamann, Jacobi, Herder, and Goethe carried on the battle in the field of history, literature, and art. The old rationalism had outlived itself, the old explanations no longer explained, the old self-confidence and self-conceit disappeared, and with them went the cheerful optimism that usually goes with intellectual vanity. The world no longer appeared to be a simple problem in arithmetic, it ceased to be as transparent and self-evident as it seemed to the *Aufklärung*. The con-

ceptions which had done such good service and satisfied the needs of the times no longer sufficed; new thoughts took possession of the minds of men. The reign of reason came to an end, and the demands of the heart and will began to assert themselves. It dawned upon the younger generation that the phenomena of life could not be forced into the rubrics of reason, that things were not the result of conscious design, that they were not invented and manufactured, but grew as plants grow. Poetry, art, language, the political, social, and religious institutions of mankind, were not made to order; they were not the deliberate creations of the human logical reason; but, like organic bodies, they evolved more or less unconsciously from simple beginnings. Nor was man a mere incarnate intellect, a mere logic machine in which premises are thrown and conclusions ground out, but a living being with emotions, impulses, instincts, and cravings which do not always subordinate themselves to the cold calculations of thought, and which must be reckoned with nevertheless in every attempt to explain the world and man. The organic conception took the place of the mathematical logical conception which had dominated so many centuries, and the so-called irrational phases of man's nature came into their own.

Perhaps no one exerted so great an influence in spreading the new conception among the German people as the poet Goethe. He did not offer a ready-made system of his own, nor did he ever bind himself to any particular philosophical creed; indeed he was not very enthusiastic about metaphysics, sometimes holding that a separate philosophy was unnecessary, that philosophy was included in poetry and religion. Moreover, his versatile and constantly growing nature made it impossible for him to rest content for very long in any one mode of thinking. "As a poet and artist," he wrote to his friend Jacobi, "I am a polytheist; as a naturalist I am a pantheist; and one of these as decidedly as the other. When there is need of a God for my moral personality, he too is provided for. The heavenly and earthly things form so wide a realm that

the organs of all creatures together can alone comprehend them." But, although Goethe cannot be counted among the systematic philosophers, there are certain conceptions which found frequent expression, not only in his prose writings, but in his poetical creations. As these ideas were fundamental, and as they helped to influence the German people in their view of life, it may be of interest to consider them here.

The keynote of his thinking is his opposition to the logical mathematical rationalism of the *Aufklärung*, and the emphasis which he lays upon the organic interpretation of nature and man. He has no sympathy with a philosophy that exaggerates analysis, that cuts the world into pieces, and squeezes the life out of it, as it were. This passion for analysis seems to him to characterise the systems in vogue in his day, and he therefore pours out upon them his scorn. In the celebrated scene between Mephistopheles and the student in *Faust*, where Mephistopheles ridicules logic, Goethe's opinion of what he conceived to be the method and ideal of the prevailing rationalism is clearly expressed :

Wer will was Lebendiges erkennen und beschreiben,
Sucht erst den Geist heraus zu treiben,
Dann hat er die Theile in seiner Hand,
Fehlt, leider ! nur das geistige Band.
Encheiresin naturæ nennt's die Chemie,
Spottet ihrer selbst, und weiss nicht wie.¹

In order to understand life we must keep in view *das geistige Band*, the spiritual link, the synthetic principle, the tie that binds the parts together. Goethe conceives the organism as a union of form and content ; it is a complete and relatively independent whole in which the parts are subordinated to a principle, in which the parts can be grasped only in the whole and the whole in its parts. We cannot

¹ "He who would study organic existence,
First drives out the soul with rigid persistence,
Then the parts in his hand he may hold and class,
But the spiritual link is lost, alas !
Encheiresin naturæ, this chemistry names,
Nor knows herself she banters and blames !"

comprehend the living body by analysing it, by breaking it up into bits ; we must never lose sight of the formative principle in it, of the spiritual link. The analytic method alone will not give us truth, for nature is synthetic as well as analytic. "It is true," says the poet, "that a living thing can be separated into its elements, but we cannot again construct it out of these and give it life." Hence scientific thinkers have always endeavoured "to know the living forms as such, to comprehend their external and visible parts in their relations, to understand them as the expression of an inner principle, and thus to grasp the whole in the *Anschauung* or intuition, so to speak."

That is to say, in order to appreciate life we must be able to peer behind the parts and to see the idea or form or spiritual link that constitutes its essence. This conception also agrees with Goethe's æsthetic notions, with his interpretation of art. Art of the highest kind, like philosophy, aims at discovering the essence or form of things, the type that reveals itself in the particular, in the individual. The true work of art is like an organic product, a creation in which a form or purpose is realised, and in which all the parts subserve the end or purpose of the whole. With Kant the poet holds that the organism and the work of art please because of their inherent purposiveness, because the parts of each are related to the whole and to each other. Such a form as that produces in us a disinterested satisfaction. The difference is that in a work of art the harmony is due to its form, while in the natural object it is due to its inner constitution. The work of art, that is, has formal purposiveness, the natural object material purposiveness. According to Kant man reads the inner purposiveness into the things ; according to Goethe it lies in their very nature.

The true artist reproduces the essence of things. The highest function of every art is to create by illusion the semblance of a higher reality. Beauty and truth are therefore one ; both reveal the deepest forms of being. The poet and thinker both strive to penetrate to the idea or form or innermost cause of phenomena. But while the philosopher ex-

presses the type or idea in thought, in concepts, the artist and poet express it in concrete forms, so that it can be *angeschaut*, looked at, intuited, contemplated. "I am one of those," Goethe declares, "who spend their entire lives in the contemplation, admiration, and adoration of the wonderful temple of the goddess and in reproducing its mysterious forms." And indeed the beauty of Goethe's poetical creations lies in the fact that they resemble, not manufactured wares, but organic growths.

This organic conception seems to me to lie at the bottom of all Goethe's thinking: it is his touchstone of truth. His one great aim is to see the whole in its parts—unity in plurality, identity in diversity, the form in the content, the ideal in the real. He is not willing to pull these two phases of existence apart; to do so would be to mutilate the fulness of the object's reality, to tear asunder what God has put together. He applies this notion to the activity of the mind itself; knowledge is for him organised or organic sense-experience, the inseparable union of impression and idea. He loves to think concretely, to put his thoughts into sensuous form, to *image* them, to intuit them, to see them. It was for this reason that Schiller called him a rational empiricist. "In your correct intuition," Schiller once wrote to him, "everything is contained, and far more completely, than analysis laboriously seeks; and only because it all lies before you as a whole, is your own wealth of endowment concealed from you. . . . You search after the necessary in nature, but you seek it in the most difficult way. . . . You grasp nature as a whole in order to get light on the particular, you look for the individual in the universal." And this agrees with Goethe's own opinion of himself: "My thinking," he declared, "is intuition, *Anschaung*; it is concrete, and does not separate itself from objects." "The elements of the object, the percepts, enter into it and are most intimately interpenetrated by it; my perception is thinking, my thinking perception." This ability to peer right into the heart of things, to see the whole in its parts, the idea in the concrete reality,

he regarded as the poet's and thinker's pre-eminent gift. He called it an *aperçu*: it is intuitive knowledge, a direct perception of the genius, "a revelation flashing up out of the inner man and giving him a hint of his likeness to God. It is a synthesis of world and spirit, which gives us the happiest assurance of the eternal harmony of existence." It is this intuition which Faust craves:

Dass ich erkenne was die Welt
Im Innersten zusammenhält,
Schau' alle Wirkungskraft und Samen
Und thu' nicht mehr in Worten kramen.¹

And it is this gift that Mephistopheles sneers at as *die hohe Intuition*!

It was this search after forms or ideas, this Platonic vision, that gave direction to Goethe's work in biology. He was, as is well known, deeply interested in natural history, and wrote extensively on the Metamorphosis of Plants and Animals. Not only did he try to understand the particular plant or animal as the expression of an immanent form or idea, but he sought to reduce all plant forms and all animal forms to fundamental types. His quest was for the universal concept or idea of the plant, for the original or archetypal form, for the prototype, the *Urbild*, *Urtypus*, and he supposed that all plants were fashioned after this original pattern or *Urpflanze*, that this original form was contained in them all. "Alle Gestalten sind ähnlich und keine gleicht der andern." The differences in the forms are explained by the differences in the relations of the organism to its environment: that is, the changes which the pattern plant experiences are due to the changing conditions in the surroundings which it meets, and to which it seeks to adapt itself. He once drew for Schiller his symbolic plant, and when Schiller, looking at it carefully, said, "That is not an experience, that is an idea," he answered

¹ "That I may detect the inmost force
Which binds the world, and guides its course;
Its germs, productive powers explore,
And rummage in empty words no more!"

impatiently, "Well, then, I am very glad that I have ideas without knowing it, and can even see them with my eyes." And just as he attempted to reduce the manifold plant forms to a universal simple principle, he tried to find the *Urthier*. He was convinced that a universal form ran through the entire animal kingdom, and also suggested that perhaps both plants and animals were fashioned after a pattern common to both.

This same passion to view things organically attracted the great German poet to the pantheistic systems, to conceptions like Bruno's, Spinoza's, and Schelling's. For him the universe was really a great organism; we cannot understand it unless we conceive it as a unity, as an interrelated whole. Just as there is a guiding principle in the particular living body, a purpose or form immanent in it, so there is form or purpose immanent in the world. It is a living pulsating harmony, an indivisible whole. "Thus one always exists for all, all for one. However manifold Nature may seem, she is always one, a unity, and hence when she reveals herself in part, everything else must serve as a basis for this part, and the part must have connection with everything else."

Wie alles sich zum Ganzen webt!
Eins in dem andern wirkt und lebt!
Wie Himmelskräfte auf und nieder steigen
Und sich die goldnen Eimer reichen!
Mit segenduftenden Schwingen
Vom Himmel durch die Erde dringen,
Harmonisch all' das All durchklingen.¹

But with Goethe nature and God are not identical: God is nature plus an indefinable centre. Behind all the change and movement in the world he sees something eternal, a unifying principle, a grand synthesis. *Alles Vergängliche ist*

¹ "How each the whole its substance gives,
Each in each other works and lives!
Like heavenly forces rising and descending,
Their golden urns reciprocally lending,
With wings that winnow blessing
From heaven through earth I see them pressing,
Filling the All with harmony unceasing."

nur ein Gleichniss. "In contemplating the universe," he says, "we cannot get rid of the thought that an idea pervades the whole, according to which God eternally creates and acts in nature, and nature in God." Nature, in other words, is a revelation of God, the living garment of the Deity, *der Gottheit lebendiges Kleid*. God is in the world, not outside of it and acting upon it from without; He is immanent in it, its immanent first cause.

Was wär, ein Gott der nur von Aussen stiesse
Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse !
Ihm ziemt's die Welt im Innern zu bewegen,
Natur in Sich, Sich in Natur zu hegen,
So dass was in Ihm lebt und webt und ist,
Nie Seine Kraft, nie Seinen Geist vermisst.¹

This living godhead the intellect cannot grasp in its fulness : it can only get a glimpse of it, see it through a glass darkly. Existence divided by human reason leaves a remainder, there is a mystery in philosophy as well as in religion. "Truth which is identical with the Divine can never be directly known by us : we see it only in its reflection, in its manifestations, in its symbols, in particular and related phenomena ; we become aware of it as inconceivable life, and yet we cannot relinquish the desire to conceive it after all." This attitude towards God does not agree with the familiar, confident, rationalistic attitude of the *Aufklärung* ; it is mysticism, not the mysticism of the sceptic or agnostic or faith philosopher, but the mysticism of Plato, Spinoza, and Kant, a mysticism that begins where reason ends, a mysticism based on knowledge and reverent contemplation. It is in this spirit that the poet says : "The greatest happiness of the thinker is to explain what can be explained and silently to adore what cannot be fathomed."

¹ "What God would outwardly alone control,
And on His finger whirl the mighty Whole ?
He loves the inner world to move, to view
Nature in Him, Himself in nature too,
So that what in Him works, and is, and lives,
The measure of His strength, His spirit gives."

In unsres Busens Reine wogt ein Streben,
 Sich einem Höhern, Reinern, Unbekannten
 Aus Dankbarkeit freiwillig hinzugeben,
 Enträtzelnd sich den ewig Ungenannten :
 Wir heissen's : fromm sein.¹

His religion is a religion of the heart and not merely of the head ; he has no fondness for dogmatic formulæ and rationalistic demonstrations ; for him, too, God dwelleth in the light which no one can approach unto. His poetry breathes the spirit of humble reverence, devotion, gratitude, and love.

Goethe's antagonism to the eighteenth century teleology is based upon the same general organic conception. He has no patience with the view that God creates as the clock-maker makes his clocks, and that He fashions everything for the good of man. Man is in the habit of estimating things according to their utility, and since he cannot help regarding himself as the last product of creation, his vanity persuades him to look upon himself as its final goal as well. Because he uses and can use the objects around him, he concludes that they have been made for his special use. But things are not made for man. Every animal is a little world in itself which exists for its own sake. This notion that a living creature is produced for certain external purposes, and that it is the result of conscious design, has impeded our scientific progress. Do not ask why the ox has horns, but show rather how they have arisen. The utility-teachers are afraid they will lose their God unless they can believe that He gave the ox horns for purposes of defence. But why should not I be permitted to worship Him who placed into the world such productive power that if only a millionth part of it becomes alive, the earth will teem with creatures which neither war nor pestilence nor fire can destroy ? That is my God. "I do not ask whether this highest being has intellect or reason, but I feel that He is intellect, He is

¹ "In the pure bosom doth a yearning float,
 Unto a holier, purer, unknown being,
 Its grateful aspirations to devote,
 The ever nameless then unriddled seeing :
 We call it piety."

reason itself. All creatures are filled with it, and man has enough of it to know the highest in part." There is in the world an inner purposiveness which works from within outward, a *vis a tergo*; all its parts are related to the whole and with each other. It is a purposiveness without an external purpose. With Kant, Goethe calls it an immanent purposiveness, and finds it in nature as well as in the creations of art. The organic world, in other words, is not the result of conscious design in the sense that the Creator made each particular creature according to a preconceived plan, and continues to make them after this fashion. Organic products are not made, but grow; there is an unconscious purpose at work in the world, and the many thousand plant and animal forms are the work of the eternally active creative principle.

And just as the organism realises its purpose unconsciously, without knowing the end to be reached, so, too, much of man's action is unconscious in the sense that he does not always know the goal or purpose of his striving.

All unser redlichstes Bemühn
Glückt nur im unbewussten Momente.

Nobody is conscious of what he is doing when he is doing right. In every honest, serious act, even though its purpose and destiny at first seem doubtful, both are at last found clear and fulfilled. Every pure endeavour is a living reality, an end in itself; it furthers our well-being without having a conscious goal before it, it is useful in a way that could not have been foreseen.

Ein guter Mensch in seinem dunklen Drange,
Ist sich des rechten Weges wohl bewusst.¹

The same thing is true of poetical creation. The poetical gift is a natural endowment; poetry is an inner, necessary, involuntary operation—poetry cannot be made by rule, manufactured with, say, Gottsched's *Dichtkunst* at one's elbow. It rarely happens that a man of genius is conscious of his

¹ "A good man, through obscurest aspiration,
Has still an instinct of the one true way."

talents; there is always something unconscious about the genius, as Carlyle too held:

Ja das ist das rechte Gleis,
Dass man nicht weiss
Was man denkt,
Wenn man denkt,
Alles ist wie geschenkt.

Indeed, Goethe does not seem to have much faith in a rationalistic scheme of action. Here, again, he shows his opposition to the *Aufklärung*, for which reason and reflection meant so much and which tended to overlook the emotional and volitional phases of man's nature. He does not believe in overmuch self-reflection and self-analysis. "When man broods over his physical and moral nature he usually discovers that he is sick. To be a hypochondriac means nothing but to lose oneself in the subject." "I assert that no one can ever know himself, can ever look at himself purely as an object. Others know me better than I know myself. Only my relations to the external world can I know and learn to estimate at their true value, and we ought to limit ourselves to that. With all our striving after self-knowledge, about which the moral preachers are preaching, we do not get very far in life; we do not achieve our true, inward perfection in this way. It is our business to live, not to be looking at ourselves. Man knows himself only in so far as he knows the world; he becomes aware of it only in himself, and of himself only in it." "How can we learn to know ourselves? Never by thinking but always by doing. Try to do your duty, and you will know at once what is in you." "To cure the ills of the soul the intellect can do nothing, reason little, time much, decided action everything."

Yes, in life action is the main thing; enjoyment and suffering will take care of themselves. To act is man's first and foremost function. *Im Anfang war die That*. And man can do nothing without capacity, without an instinct that impels him to act. Poets are born, artists are born, yea, the most insignificant capacity is after all innate. The trouble with

our education is that it aims at the universal, it makes men uncertain of themselves, it arouses wishes where it should arouse impulses, and instead of bringing out instincts it turns our endeavours towards objects which are not suited to our natures. It is better to know one thing well and to do it than to have a bungling knowledge of hundreds of things. There is more true culture in that than in all your halfness.

Goethe would, therefore, rather have the youth make mistakes, provided they are the results of his own nature, than have him follow a path marked out for him by others, even if it be the right path. "Not to save the child from error is the duty of the educator, but to guide the erring one—yes, to let him drain the cup of error to the dregs, that is the wisdom of the teacher. He who merely sips at his error, keeps it for a long time, and rejoices in it as a choice pleasure; but he who gulps it right down to the last drop, must recognise it for what it is, if he be not a fool." He believed that the young man would have to learn from actual experience that the right was better than the wrong, and he had faith enough in human nature to think that the lesson would be learned.

Wenn sich der Most auch ganz absurd gebärdet,
Es giebt zuletzt doch noch 'nen Wein.¹

He was full of charity for those who made mistakes. "One need only grow old to become gentler in one's judgments. I see no fault committed which I could not have committed myself." He had little patience with "people who make no mistakes, because they never do anything worth doing."

For the same reason he was opposed to constant restrictions and prohibitions. "In the education of children as well as in the government of peoples," he asserted, "nothing is more awkward and barbarous than prohibitions, than prohibitive laws and regulations. Man is by nature an active being, and if he is properly directed he will go right ahead and accomplish something. I for my part would rather

¹ "The must may foam absurdly in the barrel,
Nathless it turns at last to wine."

patiently endure mistakes and faults in those about me than get rid of error without putting something better in its place. Men will gladly do the right and useful thing when they know what it is; they will do it in order to have something to do and waste no more time worrying over it than they do in worrying over the foolish pranks of idleness and *ennui*." "If older persons were only willing to follow the right pedagogical methods, they would not hinder a young man from doing what gives him pleasure, whatever it may be, without at the same time giving him something in place of it."

The philosophy of action is enthusiastically preached by Goethe, particularly in his *Wilhelm Meister*. And it really forms the clue to the escape of Faust from the toils of the devil. Faust tries in turn the different ideals of life. After living the life of reason and discovering that we can know nothing, he makes his pact with the devil, chooses pleasure as the highest good, and seeks happiness in sensuous enjoyment. He cannot quite conceive that such a mode of existence will ever satisfy him. But he tries it, with the usual disastrous results. At last he finds his peace in a life of useful action, and is saved.

Gerettet ist das edle Glied
Der Geisterwelt vom Bösen.¹

That is it—whoever continues to the last to strive toward perfection cannot be lost. In these verses, as Goethe himself declared to Eckermann, lies the key to Faust's salvation. "We discover in *Faust* a constantly higher and purer form of action to the end of his days, and eternal love is poured into him from above to aid him in his endeavours. This is in exact harmony with our religious idea that we are not saved by our own power alone, but by added divine grace."

The ideal here preached is what Professor Paulsen calls *energism*. It is really the old Greek ideal capped in *Faust* with the Christian doctrine of grace. Man is not mere reason;

¹ The passage is quoted at length by Mr Lowes Dickinson in the previous article; see p. 528.—EDITOR.

he is a feeling and willing being besides, and all the elements of his nature are worthy of development. Because the *Aufklärung* exaggerates the rational or intellectual phases, Goethe throws the emphasis on the active or impulsive aspect of man's being. But I do not understand him to advocate the elimination of the theoretical. With Aristotle, he would demand that the impulses be brought under the heel of reason, but with Aristotle, too, he would oppose the eradication of the so-called irrational elements of soul life. "Thought and action," he says, "action and thought, that is the sum of all wisdom. Both must for ever move back and forth in life-like inspiration and expiration in breathing. He who makes it his rule to test his action by his thought and his thought by his action cannot go far wrong, and in case he should err, he will soon find himself again upon the right path." He did not mean that we should abandon ourselves to the play of uncontrolled instincts and allow ourselves to become the slaves of passion. He knew perfectly well that no good could come out of that kind of life. "Every man must think after his own fashion; for on his own path he finds the truth which helps him through life. But he must not give himself the rein: mere naked instinct does not become him." "Uncontrolled action, whatever it may be, finally ends in bankruptcy." He tells us himself that what attracted him to Spinoza's system was the effect it produced upon him ethically. It quieted his passions, helped to bring order into his chaotic soul; it taught him the great lesson of heroic unselfishness, of unselfishness that can even keep right on loving God without expecting anything in return. It gave him peace. And though he regarded Kant's categorical imperative as an exaggeration—it sounded too harsh in his ears—he attributed to it the immortal merit of having delivered the times from the state of effeminacy into which they had fallen. The moral law loomed up larger and larger on the horizon of his soul as he grew older, for he himself had erred much and learned the lesson of life through struggle. At the same time he believed

in developing the personality, not in stunting it by all kinds of unnatural restrictions, in realising the native capacities of the individual, in letting him act out his nature, in letting him work out his own salvation by actual experience in the world. The purposes of the individual, he felt, would not contradict the whole, but would rather tend to preserve and promote it: "everyone must begin with himself and first look out for his own welfare; the welfare of the whole will necessarily follow from this at last." And it is futile to be constantly brooding over one's acts: "the important thing for a man of action is that he do the right; that the right be done need not concern him."

Hätte mich Gott anders gewollt,
 So hätt' er mich anders gebaut;
 Da er mir aber Talent gezollt,
 Hat er mir viel vertraut.
 Ich brauch' es zur Rechten und Linken,
 Weiss nicht was daraus kommt;
 Wenn's nicht mehr frommt,
 Wird er schon winken.

It was because our poet had faith in man, because he did not, with Kant, believe in his total depravity, that he was willing to trust his instincts. When asked how morality had come into the world, he answered: "Through God Himself, like everything good. It is not a product of human reflection, but a beautiful native gift. It is an original endowment of more or less all men, but belongs in the highest degree to certain particularly gifted natures. These have revealed the divine spark that is in them through great deeds and great teachings, and the beauty of the revelation has enkindled the love of men and has impelled them to admiration and imitation."

On this philosophy of action Goethe rests his belief in the immortality of the soul. "If I work unceasingly to the end," he said to Eckermann, "nature is in duty bound to assign to me another form of existence when my spirit can no longer endure the present." At the death of the poet Wieland he declared that such powers of mind as had marked his friend

could not possibly be lost, and that there was nothing in nature that could contradict immortality, so far as he could see. But only by being faithful and steadfast in the present state, he thought, could one become fit to take up the duties of a higher stage of existence. "I do not," he said, "doubt our continued existence after death, for nature cannot do without the entelechy. But we are not equally immortal; in order to manifest ourselves in the future state as great entelechies, we must become such entelechies." "The power to ennoble everything sensuous and to enliven even the most inert matter by union with the idea, is the fairest guarantee of our supersensible origin. However the earth may attract man with its thousands of phenomena, he yet turns his gaze inquiringly and longingly to the immeasurable arch of heaven above him, because he has the deep and clear conviction that he is a citizen of that spiritual kingdom, the belief in which we cannot give up. In this premonition lies the secret of our eternal striving after an unknown goal; it is the lever, so to speak, of our inquiries and reflections, the tender link between poetry and reality."

Doch ist es jedem eingeboren,
 Dass sein Gefühl hinauf und vorwärts dringt,
 Wenn über uns, im blauen Raum verloren,
 Ihr schmetternd Lied die Lerche singt,
 Wenn über schroffen Fichtenhöhen
 Der Adler ausgebreitet schwebt,
 Und über Flächen, über Seen
 Der Kranich nach der Heimath strebt.¹

FRANK THILLY.

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¹ "Yet in each soul is born the pleasure
 Of yearning onward, upward, and away,
 When o'er our heads, lost in the vaulted azure,
 The lark sends down his flickering lay,
 When over crags and piny highlands
 The poising eagle slowly soars,
 And over plains, and lakes, and islands
 The crane sails by to other shores."

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: WHAT IS IT?

RIGHT REV. MONSIGNOR JOHN S. CANON VAUGHAN.

“WHAT is the Catholic Church? By what notes may we recognise it? These are questions,” writes the Bishop of Carlisle, “of great interest and importance to all Christians who believe that the Church is as truly the body of Christ as He Himself is the Head.”

To these words of the Anglican Bishop we heartily subscribe. We believe, as he does, that the Church is the body of Christ. It is only when we come to his description of that body—a veritable monster of contradictions and of mutually repellent elements—that we feel it impossible to bind such a strange amorphous mass to a divine Head; or, indeed, to dignify it by the name of a body at all. The mystical body of which Christ is the Head is a perfect organic whole, closely knit together in all its parts, and in complete harmony with itself. In fact, if St Paul’s inspired words (1 Cor. xii.) carry any weight, its unity in the spiritual order must be as close and as harmonious as is the unity of a living human body in the physical order. The need of this note of unity, on the part of any society claiming to be the Church of Christ, is made apparent even by the figures under which it is represented in the New Testament.

The Bishop of Carlisle assures us of what everyone by this time must be aware, that “within the Church of England divisions are loudly rampant . . . and strong and obvious:

amounting at times to bitter hostility" (p. 285), which seems to us only a roundabout way of saying that the Church of England is not the Church of Christ; such divisions being altogether fatal to the claim.

Christ spoke of His Church as a kingdom, but a *united* kingdom, for it is He Himself who observes, "If a kingdom be divided against itself, that kingdom cannot stand" (Mark iii. 24), and the kingdom of Christ is to stand for ever. Christ also compared His Church to a House (1 Pet. ii. 5), but a *united* house, for again he declares that "if a house be divided against itself, it cannot stand" (Mark iii. 25).

But let us clear the ground a little, and start upon our investigation untrammelled by any preconceived notions and unhampered by the necessity of defending an impossible position.

We see Christ come down upon earth, clothed in human form, and we ask; Who is He, and why has He come? Men have compared Him with the founders of other religions; but this is a mistake, since there can be no comparison. He stands apart and is on a totally different footing, and must be judged by quite other canons. He is God, and therefore all-wise, all-powerful, and all-seeing. If He has a purpose, He knows how to accomplish it. If He lays down a polity or any particular system of government, He knows exactly how it will work and what the result will be, not merely a century hence, but to the end of time. He is no mere conjecturer or experimenter. He is incapable of making a mistake or an error of judgment. If He has an end in view, He is quite certain of reaching it. What He establishes as a cause is sure of producing the effect He intends. The means He chooses will be fully equal to the end in view. He is no novice, no bungler, no mere human workman, whose plans may be upset or whose work may fail. He is not one to whom the future is hidden or obscure, or who cannot provide for every contingency. In one word: He is no mere man, however sagacious and prudent, but the omniscient and

omnipotent God, exercising absolute sway throughout His own creation.

And what has He come to do? To establish a Church which is to teach (1) *His* doctrine, (2) to the *entire* world, (3) throughout *all time*: so much we gather from His own explicit and emphatic declarations.

It is true that men may listen or not—for He will not coerce them, nor interfere with their personal liberty; but His Church will remain, and will spread out in all directions, as a tree spreads its branches (Mark iv. 31), and will teach with authority, and admonish, and exhort, and bear perpetual witness to Himself.

And bear this well in mind: it is to teach *His* doctrine, therefore it must be *true*; it is true, and therefore it must be *one*; and thirdly, this oneness is to be a sign for all, and therefore it must be of a nature to appeal to all, and *to be seen by all*, even as a great city on a high mountain that “*cannot be hid*”¹ (Matt. v. 14). If it is His Church, it cannot possibly be local or national, or confined to any particular race or people, but world-wide and catholic. To correspond with the designs of its divine Founder, and to be of any practical use to the multitude, it must possess marks or characteristics by which not merely the learned and the leisured may recognise it, but the humble, the poor, the illiterate, and the great masses, who have neither time nor aptitude for deep study and research; for Christ is Lord of all, and has as much—indeed, we may say more—care for the lowly and the ignorant, than for the great and worldly-wise.

What are these signs? They are many. But we must confine ourselves to one, because it would be impossible to treat of more in the space at our disposal, and even of that one it is impossible to give more than the barest outline.

¹ The Bishop of Carlisle writes that even still, after nearly 2000 years, “its visibility on earth is vague and dim” (p. 289). From which we are left to infer that, like Nelson at the battle of Copenhagen, his lordship must be holding the glass to his blind eye. To us, the unity is as clear as the noonday sun.

The special sign or mark of God's Church, then, which we will now briefly consider, is Unity. The Bishop of Carlisle, if we understand him aright, admits the note of unity, but in his mind it has nothing to do with truth, since he tells us that persons teaching such utterly irreconcilable doctrines as Anglicans, "Presbyterians, Methodists, Quakers, Baptists, Congregationalists, and many others" (p. 288), may all be included. In short, the unity he describes at once suggests a sort of ecclesiastical Noah's Ark, or spiritual zoological garden, rather than anything else, in which all varieties of religious specimens and products, ancient and modern, are gathered together, and enclosed by some fanciful wall of charity and mutual regard! How any Christian with a spark of reverence in his composition can have the hardihood to affirm that such an *omnium gatherum* as that can be the body of which Christ, the God-man, is the Head, we must leave the sagacious reader to discover, for it is a task quite beyond us. However, our main difficulty in accepting such an extraordinary view is the utter impossibility of squaring it with the explicit teaching of Christ Himself.

It may be the only view left to one who represents a Church in which doctrinal unity has long since ceased to be anything more than a beautiful dream; but it is in open conflict with the most explicit assurances and promises of Him whose promises simply cannot fail. God's Church was not merely to teach the truth, but it was itself to be "the pillar and ground of truth" (1 Tim. iii. 15). Moreover, Christ promised to send His Holy Spirit, "the Spirit of truth," upon His Church, to "abide with it *for ever*" and to teach it all truth (*vide* John, chap. xiv.-xvi.).

Has Christ forgotten His promises, or has He been unable to fulfil them? To assert either of these propositions is to declare that He is not God at all, but merely an impostor. For if He be indeed God incarnate, then it follows that even if heaven and earth should pass away, His word shall never pass away.

Consequently, the zoological garden theory, with the wall of charity as the only bond of unity, will not answer. With the inspired words of divine truth before us, we must set it aside.

Putting ourselves in the position of a stranger pledged to no party, but merely looking out over the world for the actual realisation of Christ's divine promises, we find ourselves searching for a great organised society which shall (1) include men of "all nations"; which shall be (2) conspicuously visible, "as a city on a hill"; (3) essentially united in the profession of "one faith, one Lord, one baptism"; and which (4) shall be informed and held together by some enduring principle of unity—for unity among millions of independent men does not come about by chance.

To assert that Christ, who knows the fickleness of man's nature and his tendency to differ upon every point, would command unity, and yet make no adequate provision to secure and to maintain it, is to attribute foolishness to the All-wise.

Where shall we find this assembly or society of men, gathered from all nations, yet united in one faith? Nowhere except in that world-wide Church whose centre indeed is in Rome, but whose circumference is everywhere. Further, where shall we find a Church in full possession of a thoroughly adequate principle of unity, simple, practical, of easy application, and in full working order? Again we reply, in the Catholic Church, in communion with Rome.

It may be objected that these are mere statements. Then we will proceed to offer some proof.

Our divine Master compares His Church to a kingdom, a city, a house, a body, all of which figures suggest harmony and unity, and not "unhappy divisions." He also compares it to a tree (not a belt of trees or a forest, which would be required on the Bishop of Carlisle's theory), but a single tree which puts out great branches.

We will select this last figure and examine it somewhat more in detail. In the first place, then, a tree is a single

organic whole, and homogeneous throughout. Though it is made up of a great number of different parts, yet every one of these parts is in perfect harmony with the rest, and all are correlated. Further, the different parts are not only correlated, but they are disposed and arranged according to a special plan. The leaves are dependent upon the smaller branches, the smaller branches on the larger, and each of the larger depends upon one and the same trunk. Supposing the tree to be, *e.g.*, an oak, then every part will have the characteristics of the oak. The leaves may be innumerable; they may grow on a thousand different branches, but each will bear the unmistakable form and character of the oak. Search as we may, we shall never find so much as one beech or ash or maple leaf on any branch that grows out of the oaken stem. How is this uniformity secured? The answer is plain. They all draw their nourishment from the self-same source. Every twig and leaf, even the most remote, is fed by the sap rising from the one trunk.

Now this is the figure chosen—not by a human, but by a divine Person—by God incarnate to symbolise His Church. And what is more, a moment's reflection will suffice to show how admirable and how faithful a figure it is.

The leaves represent the Catholic laity throughout the entire world. They are in direct communion with their respective parish priests (the smaller branches of the mystical tree). The priests, in their turn, are in direct communion with their bishops (*i.e.* the larger branches). And all the bishops are in direct and constant communion with the Sovereign Pontiff, *i.e.* the trunk or stem of the entire tree.

What could be simpler, what could be more practical and efficacious?

In this way the least and humblest catechumen in Australia or China is as truly united with the great centre of authority at the Vatican, and as truly in touch with its decisions and its teaching, as the crowned heads of Spain or Italy, or indeed as the Archbishops of Paris or Westminster.

As a mere pressure on the button will send the electric fluid coursing from end to end of the most complicated electric system, so a mere command from the Vicar of Christ will send a decree or a definition into the ears and hearts of every Catholic from end to end of the entire world. All assent, because all acknowledge his right to decide, and because the declaration of our Lord, "He that heareth you, heareth Me," is not explained away, nor robbed of its natural meaning, but accepted and acted on as a fundamental truth.

A good deal has been written in *The Times* (*vide* Jan. and Feb.) concerning "lying clocks." It was suggested that all public clocks should be synchronised, by being put in communication with and under the control of one reliable central timepiece. Surely "lying clerks" are worse than "lying clocks," and stand in yet greater need of being controlled by some one supreme and reliable authority.

Hence Christ has provided that in His Church all shall be ruled and directed by one. As the sap of an ordinary tree passes up through a single stem, then courses along the great outstretching arms and through each of the lesser branches until it enters into and gives life and vigour to every individual leaf, so the divine sap of revealed truth passes from the lips of the one Supreme Pastor, and is communicated to the bishops, who in turn transmit it to the priests, who finally explain it and propose it to each individual member of the entire flock.

Now, whether an Anglican Bishop would care to admit unity in the Catholic Church or not, he must, at least, admit that we have all the machinery requisite to produce it. He must also grant that this machinery is of so simple and practical a character that, if put into motion, it must actually result in unity. In other Churches, on the other hand, and notably in the Anglican, there is not merely no doctrinal unity, but there is not even any great underlying principle of unity; nothing calculated to produce it, or even to maintain it, if produced.

With the Catholic Church it is far otherwise. If a Catholic

be residing in England or in Italy, in America or Australia, in the Sandwich Islands or at the Cape, or in other part of the world, he is in touch with the local clergy, the local clergy are in touch with their respective bishops, and the bishops with the Pope, whose word is final, and whom all obey.¹ So much being secured, but one thing more is needed, and that is, that the Pope should be guarded by God's Holy Spirit from teaching error—*i.e.* that at least, when he teaches the entire flock entrusted to him concerning matters of faith or morals, he should be infallible. Does he possess that prerogative? Is he, on those occasions, infallible? Our answer is: How could it be otherwise?

Before touching upon the actual proofs, we may point out certain circumstances that seem to render any other conclusion impossible.

1. The infallibility of the Visible Head of Christ's Church upon earth depends solely upon the will of Christ Himself, who, as God, is omnipotent.

2. It was Christ's will that His Church should be united, and that unity should be the very test of its truth; but without an infallible living authority to which all can appeal, unity is impossible. Therefore, etc.

3. Christ obliges us to hear His representatives "as Himself." "Who heareth you, heareth Me." He makes no distinction between His own and His delegated authority. Now, it is quite certain that we are *not* "hearing God" if we are hearing lies, errors, and false doctrines, no matter from whose lips they proceed. Therefore, etc.

4. Christ threatens the most appalling punishments to such as refuse to accept the doctrine taught by those to whom He has entrusted His message. He tells us that "it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the day of judgment" than for them (Matt. x. 15). Now we decline to believe that a God of infinite wisdom and justice and mercy

¹ *N.B.*—One who should refuse to accept an *ex cathedra* utterance ceases, by that very fact, to be a Catholic. *Ergo*, etc.

could command us, under such a sanction, to believe a teacher unless at the same time He undertakes to safeguard that teacher from all error.

These are a few of the circumstances which would lead an inquirer to suppose, even *a priori*, that our Lord would bestow the gift of infallibility in teaching on the supreme visible head of His Church. Granting this prerogative, the perfect unity He promised is secured ; without it, one necessary condition is still wanting.

To give a full and exhaustive proof that St Peter and each of his successors in turn receive this prerogative and teach the Church of God on earth *infallibly*, would require, not a few pages, but many volumes. The existing treatises on this subject would fill a library, so that all we can do at the end of a short article is to indicate, in a few words, the general line of argument.

One of the most significative acts on the part of our Lord, who did nothing without a purpose, and nothing in vain, was His changing the name of the apostle. If we study the dealings of God with His people, we shall find that on certain special occasions, and with a view of accentuating certain more than usually important events, it was His wont to change the names of His servants, and to bestow upon them some signal appellation indicative of the office or position they were called upon to fulfil. For example, when God made a special covenant with Abram, He changed his name, declaring that he should be no more called Abram, "but thou shalt be called Abraham, *because* I have made thee a father of many nations" (Gen. xvii. 5). We have another example, in the case of Jacob wrestling with the angel. The inspired writer tells us that the angel blessed Jacob and said, "Thy name shall be no longer Jacob, but Israel ; *because*, as a prince, thou hast power with God, and with men, and hast prevailed" (Gen. xxxiii. 28, 29).

Now a similar change of names was made in the case of the prince of the apostles. So soon as Jesus saw him, He

said: "Thou *art* Simon the son of Jona; [but] thou *shalt be* called Cephas,¹ which is interpreted Peter" (Jn. i. 42). Now this was a most exceptional thing to do, and would at once arrest attention. Naturally the question on every one's lips would be: Why does Christ, the infinite God, impose on Simon the name of Cephas, or Peter, or, in plain English, "Rock"? Obviously, if Christ changed his name from Simon into Rock (Peter), it must mean that, in some way or another, he was destined to occupy the position of a rock. The surmise becomes a certainty, so soon as we recall the fact that Christ was about to build a Church. The apostle writes: "You are God's building" (1 Cor. iii. 9). Now, for a material building a material foundation is needed; but His Church was not to be a material but a spiritual one, so it needed a spiritual foundation, that is to say, the stable, firm and persevering faith of its chief. In the 16th chapter of St Matthew Christ asks, "Whom do men say that the Son of man is?" After receiving the various answers, He continues: "And whom do you say that I am?" Simon at once replies: "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God." And Jesus answering said: "Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona, because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but My Father who is in heaven." Then continuing, He says: "And I say to thee, that thou art a rock, and upon this rock I will build my church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed also in heaven."

Here we perceive the full force of Simon's change of name into Rock or Peter. It was because the Church was to be built upon him. He was to be its support; to hold it together; to keep it from falling to pieces; to prevent

¹ Non-Catholics lay stress on the difference in the Greek between *πέτρος* and *πέτρα*, but Christ spoke Aramaic, and in that language the same word, *Kepha*, is used in both places.

“unhappy divisions,” not by virtue of his own innate strength, but by the power of God. “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not” (Luke xxii. 32).

In this, Christ proves Himself to be “the wise man,” whom He described on a previous occasion as having “built his house upon a rock; and the rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and they beat upon the house, and it fell not, because it was founded on a rock” (Matt. vii. 24, 25). The storm has been beating upon the Catholic Church for nearly two thousand years, even the Bishop of Carlisle has sent his little wavelet against it in his January article, but it is as firm as ever, for it is founded on the rock.

“The rock” is Simon, who henceforth is to be called Rock, because on him the Church is to be built. “Thou art a rock, and upon this rock [*i.e.* upon thee] I will build my church.”¹ It is not the apostles in general who are so addressed, but Simon only. Christ does not say, “upon you,” but “upon thee,” not “you are” a rock, but “thou art” a rock. It is Peter and his successors alone who are related to the Church of God, as a foundation is related to a building. It is he who keeps all the members together, who secures true unity throughout the ages, and who hands down the sacred deposit of the faith intact. If *this* is not the way in which Christ intended unity to be maintained, will the Bishop of Carlisle kindly tell us what is?

But further, Peter is not only the foundation, and the principle of union in the Church; he is also its supreme visible Pastor and Ruler. For Christ, who has all power, gives to Peter the keys. Not to James, not to John, not to any of the others, but to Peter only does He say: “To thee do I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven.” Now, what is the

¹ Pope Saint Leo the Great (fifth century) paraphrases our Lord’s words thus:—*Tu es Petrus*: id est, “cum ego sim inviolabilis petra, ego lapis angularis, qui facio utraque unum, ego fundamentum præter quod nemo potest aliud ponere: tamen, tu quoque petra es, *quid mea virtute solidaris*, ut, quæ mihi potestate sunt propria, sint tibi mecum participatione communia. Et super hanc petram,” etc.

force of those words? "The keys" is a thoroughly recognised Oriental expression, used to denote the chief power. Who holds "the keys" of a city has supreme control of the city. Hence the custom of handing over the keys to a conqueror. We have instances of its use both in the Old and in the New Testament. Thus when Eliacim is appointed over the palace instead of Sobna, we read: "I will lay the *key* of the house of David upon his shoulder, and he shall open, and none shall shut; and he shall shut, and none shall open" (Isa. xxii. 22). Nay more; even God Himself, when speaking of His own absolute authority and power, finds no better symbol under which to present it than the symbol of the keys. In the Book of Revelation (i. 18) we read: "I am the first and the last. . . . I have the *keys* of death and of hell." Now, Peter has the keys of the kingdom of heaven. How did he come by them? Christ entrusted them to him. "To thee [and to no other] will I give the keys of the kingdom of heaven." This is surely clear enough; but Christ saw how these words would be misinterpreted and strained from their proper meaning; so to make what is plain, plainer still, He drew out their meaning yet more fully, adding, "Whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth," etc.

When Peter speaks *ex cathedra*, he speaks with the infallible authority conferred on him by God. And Peter still lives and still speaks, in the person of his successor. What he binds on earth, is bound in heaven. If he defines a doctrine—let us say, the immaculate conception of the Blessed Virgin—what happens? So soon as he defines it, he binds it upon the consciences of all Catholics. They are obliged to accept it. But is it true? If the words of Christ are true, then it *must* be true, because "whatsoever thou, Peter, shalt bind upon earth, shall be bound in heaven." How can a definition be "bound in heaven"—*i.e.* approved, accepted, ratified, and acknowledged in heaven—by God, if it be false or in any sense out of harmony with truth?

The ready and docile obedience to one recognised infallible

teacher must necessarily produce unity. It does produce unity; and this unity exists to-day among the 265,000,000¹ of Catholics of every nation and tongue under heaven, more marked and more marvellous than ever, and is the divine sign promised, and actually given by God to all who in humility of heart are seeking His Church.

Time alone prevents us from setting this fact more fully before the reader. We must content ourselves by recalling, merely by way of illustration, just one event which many no doubt still remember. We mean the Vatican Council, held only thirty or forty years ago, when at the summons of one hoary-headed old man, Pope Pius IX., bishops and archbishops and cardinals and patriarchs from all parts of the world gathered together at the Vatican.

The London *Times* of that date (December 16, 1869) expresses itself thus:—"Over 700 bishops, more or less representing all Christendom, were seen gathered round one altar and one throne, partaking of the same divine mystery, and rendering homage by turns to the same spiritual authority and power. As they put on their mitres or took them off, and as they came to the steps of the altar or to the foot of the common spiritual Father, it was impossible [says this great Protestant journal] not to feel the *unity* and the power of the Church which they represented."

The Daily News of 14th December 1869 writes:—"No other but the Pope could have assembled such a body as met to-day in the Council Hall of St Peter's. . . . From the remotest quarters of the globe—from a land that was just heard of when the Council of Trent sat—from a land that was then wholly unknown—from Palestine and Syria, cradles of Christianity; from Persia, from China, from India, from Africa, from the Western Isles, as well as from the countries washed by the Mediterranean, men of various languages and of diverse origin, men of great learning and of great age, have come together to this famous city [of Rome] in obedience, voluntary

¹ The latest statistics, compiled by Streit, give this number.

and spiritual obedience, to the Pastor who claims to be the successor of St Peter and the Vicegerent of God upon earth."

Almost every other non-Catholic paper referred to the event in similar words. Indeed, the spectacle presented to the world by the Catholic Church is unique and without a parallel. It exhibits, as no other religious body, the mark by which Christ declared His Church should be known and recognised and distinguished from all others, and for which He prayed, saying: "Father, that they *all may be one*, as Thou art in Me, and I in Thee, that they also may be one in us, *that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me*" (John xvii. 21). Doctrinal unity is the touchstone of truth. Where there are differences, error has entered; and, alas! "the gates of hell" have prevailed.

The unity conceived by the Bishop of Carlisle is, he tells us, "unsearchable" and "unfathomable" and "vague and dim," and therefore about as serviceable a mark of the true Church as a London milestone would be if placed at the bottom of the sea.

Really, we feel it would be more logical to deny the divinity of Christ altogether, than to represent Him as unable to fulfil His promises or to redeem His clearest pledges. *The Times* is more reasonable, when it writes it is "impossible not to feel the unity and the power of the Church" whose centre is at Rome.

JOHN S. VAUGHAN.

SAN SILVESTRO IN CAPITE, ROME.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

PART II.

THE PERMANENCE OF PERSONALITY.¹

SIR OLIVER LODGE.

"After death the soul possesses self-consciousness, otherwise it would be the subject of spiritual death, which has already been disproved. With this self-consciousness necessarily remains personality and the consciousness of personal identity."—KANT, quoted by HEINZE.

IN an article in January, on "The Transitory and the Permanent," permanence was claimed for the essence, the intrinsic reality, the *soul* of anything; and transitoriness for its bodily presentment—that is, for all such things as special groupings, arrangements, systems, which are liable to break up into their constituent elements, and cease to cohere into a united and organised aggregate. The only real destruction known to us, in fact, is this disintegration or breaking up of an assemblage: things themselves never spring into or out of existence. All we can cause or can observe is variety of *motion*—never creation or annihilation. And even the motion is *transferred* from one body to another, and transformed in the process; it is not generated from nothing, nor can it be destroyed. Special groupings and appearances are transitory; it is their intrinsic and constructive essence which is permanent.

But then, what about personality, individuality, our own

¹ Second part of the Drew Lecture (1907), continued from January. The next article of the series will be by Professor Eucken of Jena.

character and self? Are these akin to the temporary groupings which shall be dissolved, or are they among the substantial realities that shall endure?

Let us see how to define the idea of personality or personal and individual character:—A memory, a consciousness, and a will, in so far as they form a consistent harmonious whole, constitute a personality; which thus has relations with the past, the present, and the future. And we shall argue that personality or individuality itself dominates and transcends all temporal modes of expression, and so is essentially eternal wherever it exists.

The life of an insect or a tree may in some sort—must, one would think, in some sort—persist, but surely not its personal character! Why not? Because, presumably, it has none. We can hardly imagine that such a thing has any individuality or personality: it appears to us to be merely one of a group, a mere unit in a world of being, without personality of its own. That is what I assume, though I do not dogmatise; nor do I consider it certain, for some of the higher animals. Anyhow we may at once admit that, for all those things which only share in a general life, the temporarily separated portion of that general life will return, undifferentiated and unidentified, to its central store: just as happens in the better-understood categories of matter and energy.

That is simple enough. But suppose that some individual character, some personality, *does* exist. Suppose that not only life, but intellect and emotion and consciousness and will are all associated with a certain physical organism; and suppose that these things have a real and undeniable existence—an existence strengthened and compacted by experience and suffering and joy, till it is no longer only a function of the material aggregate in which for a time it is embodied, but belongs to a universe of spirit closely related to immanent and transcendent Deity; what then? If all that really exists, in the highest sense, is immortal, we have only to ask whether our personality, our character, our self, is sufficiently indi-

vidual, sufficiently characteristic, sufficiently developed,—in a word, sufficiently *real*; for if it is, there can then be no doubt of its continuance. It may return, indeed, in some sense, to the central store, but not without identity; its individual character will be preserved.

Conservation of Value.

Professor Höffding of Copenhagen goes further than this. In his book on the Philosophy of Religion he teaches that what he calls the axiom of “the conservation of value” is the fundamental ingredient in all religions—the foundation without which none of them could stand. In his view, as a philosopher, agreeing therein with Browning and other poets, no real Value or Good is ever lost. The whole progress and course of evolution is to increase and intensify the Valuable—that which “avails” or is serviceable for highest purposes,—and it does so by bringing out that which was potential or latent, so as to make it actual and real. Real it was, no doubt, all the time in some sense, as an oak is implicit in an acorn or a flower in a bud, but in process of time it unfolds and adds to the realised Value of the universe.

To carry out this idea we might define immortality thus:—

Immortality is the persistence of the essential and the real: it applies to things which the universe has gained — things which, once acquired, cannot be let go. It is an example of the conservation of Value. The tendency of evolution is to increase the actuality of Value, converting it from a potential into an available form.

Value may, however, be something more than merely constant in quantity, according to Professor Höffding. Experience of evolution suggests that it must increase. Certainly it passes from latent to more patent forms; and though it sometimes swings back, yet, on the whole, progress seems upward. Is it not legitimate to conjecture that while Matter and Energy neither increase nor decrease, but only change in form; and while life too perhaps is constant in quantity, though alternating

into and out of incarnation according as material organisms are put together or worn out; yet that some of the higher attributes of existence,—love, shall we say, joy perhaps, what may be generalised as Good generally, or as availability or Value,—may actually increase: their apparent alternations being really the curves of an upward-tending spiral? It is an optimistic faith, but it is the faith of the poets and seers. Whatever evil days may fall upon an individual or a nation, or even sometimes on a whole planet, yet the material is subordinate to the spiritual; and if the spiritual persists, it cannot be stationary: it must surely rise in the scale of existence. For evil is that which retards or frustrates development, in any part of the universe subject to its sway, and, accordingly, its kingdom cannot stand: evil contains an essentially suicidal element, so that on the whole the realm of the good must tend to increase, the realm of the bad to diminish.

“No existing universe can tend on the whole towards contraction and decay; because that would foster annihilation, and so any incipient attempt would not have survived; consequently an actually existing and flowing universe must on the whole cherish development, expansion, growth: and so tend towards infinity rather than towards zero. The problem is therefore only a variant of the general problem of existence. Given existence, of a non-stagnant kind, and ultimate development must be its law. Good and evil can be defined in terms of development and decay respectively. This may be regarded as part of a revelation of the nature of God” (*The Substance of Faith*).

From this point of view the law of evolution is that Good shall on the whole increase in the universe with the process of the suns: that immortality itself is a special case of a more general Law, namely, that in the whole universe nothing really finally perishes that is worth keeping, that a thing once attained is not thrown away.

The general mutability and mortality in the world need not perturb us. The things we see perishing and dying are not of

the same kind as those which we hope will endure. Death and decay, as we know them, are interesting physical processes, which may be studied and understood ; they have seized the imagination of man, and govern his emotions, perhaps unduly, but there is nothing in them to suggest ultimate destruction, or the final triumph of ill ; they are necessary correlatives to conception and birth into a material world ; they do not really contradict an optimistic view of existence.

So far as we can tell, there need be no real waste, no real loss, no annihilation ; but everything sufficiently valuable, be it beauty, artistic achievement, knowledge, unselfish affection, may be thought of as enduring henceforth and for ever, if not with an individual and personal existence, yet as part of the eternal Being of God.

Permanent Element in Man.

And this carries with it the persistence of personality in all creatures who have risen to the attainment of God-like faculties, such as self-determination and other attributes which suggest kinship with Deity and make their possessor a member of the Divine family. For whether or not this incipient theory of the conservation of value stand the test of criticism, it is undeniable that, as in the quotation from Carlyle at the end of my last article, seers do not hesitate to attribute permanence and timeless existence to the essential element in man himself. They realise that he is one with the universe, that he may come to be in tune with the infinite, and that his spasmodic efforts towards a state wherein the average will rise to a level now attained by only the few, are part of the evolutionary travailing of the whole creation. "All omens," says Myers—

"All omens point towards the steady continuance of just such labour as has already taught us all we know. Perhaps, indeed, in this complex of interpenetrating spirits our own effort is no individual, no transitory, thing. That which lies at the root of each of us lies at the root of the Cosmos too. Our struggle is the struggle of the Universe itself ; and the very Godhead finds fulfilment through our upward-striving souls" (Myers, *Human Personality*, ii., p. 277).

To return to the problem of individual existence and to a more prosaic atmosphere. What we are claiming is no less than this—that, whereas it is certain that the present body cannot long exist without the soul, it is quite possible and indeed necessary for the soul to exist without the present body. We base this claim on the soul's manifest transcendence, on its genuine reality, and on the general law of the persistence of all real existence.

Recognition of the permanent element in man and of the probability of his individual survival,—that is to say, of the persistence of intelligence and memory after the destruction of the brain—if such recognition is to be of the greatest use to mankind, should be based on general considerations open and familiar to all, and be independent of special study with results verified by only a few. But if general arguments are insufficient, and if the reader has patience with a more specific line of investigation, then I submit that the question can also be studied by the aid of observation and experiment, and that a conviction of persistence of personality can be strengthened by the record and discovery of specific facts.

Expression of Thought in Terms of Motion.

The brain is definitely the link between the psychical and the physical, which in themselves belong to different orders of being. In the psychical region "thought" is the dominant reality; in the physical, "motion." The bodily organism mysteriously enables one to be translated in terms of the other. Without some connecting mechanism, such as that afforded by brain, nerve, and muscle, the things we call intelligence and will, however real, would be incapable of moving the smallest particle of matter. Now, since it is solely by moving matter that we can operate at all in the material world, or can make ourselves known to our fellows,—for in the last resort speech and writing and every action reduce themselves to muscular movement,—and since death inhibits this power, by breaking the link between soul and body, death naturally stops all mani-

festation, interrupts all intercourse, and so has been superficially thought to be the annihilation of the soul.

But such a conclusion is quite unwarranted. Existence need not make itself conspicuous: things are always difficult to discover when they make no impression on the senses: the human race is hardly yet aware, for instance, of the Ether of space; and there may be a multitude of other things towards which it is in the same predicament.

Superficially, nothing is easier than to claim that just as when the brain is damaged the memory fails, so when the brain is destroyed the memory ceases. The reasoning is so plausible and obvious, so within reach of the meanest capacity, that those who use it against adversaries of any but the lowest intelligence might surely assume that it had already occurred to them and exhibited its weak point. The weak point in the argument is its tacit assumption that what is non-manifest is non-existent; that smoothing out the traces of guilt is equivalent to annihilating a crime; and that by destroying the mechanism of interaction between the spiritual and the material aspects of existence you must necessarily be destroying one or other of those aspects themselves.

The brain is our present organ of thought. Granted; but it does not follow that brain controls and dominates thought, that inspiration is a physiological process, or that every thinking creature in the universe must possess a brain. Really we know too little about the way the brain thinks, if it can properly be said to think at all, to be able to make any such assertion as that. We terrestrial animals are all as it were one family, and *our* hereditary links with the psychical universe consist of the physiological mechanism called brain and nerve. But these most interesting material structures are our servants, not our masters: we have to train them to serve our purposes; and if one side of the brain is injured, the other side may be trained to act instead. Destroy certain parts of the brain completely, however, and connexion between

the psychic and the material regions is for us severed. True ; but cutting off or damaging communication is not the same as destroying or damaging the communicator : nor is smashing an organ equivalent to killing the organist. When the Atlantic cable broke, in 1858, intimate communication between England and America was destroyed ; but that fact did not involve the destruction of either America or England. It appears to be necessary to emphasise this elementary matter, because the contrary contention is supposed to cut straight at the root of every kind of general argument for survival hitherto adduced.

But after all, it may be said, the above contention proves nothing either way ; granted that breach of communication does not mean destruction of terminal stations, it leaves the question as to their persistence an open one. Yes, it does ; it leaves persistence to be sustained by general arguments, such as those of Part I., which were directed to establishing the priority in essence of the spiritual to the material, of idea to bodily presentation ; and to be supported by any kind of additional and special experience.

Argument from Telepathy.

First of all, then, we must ask, are we quite sure that the breach of intercourse is as clear and definite and complete as had been supposed ? We have no glimmering conception of the process by which mental activity operates on the matter of the brain ; so we cannot be sure that its influence is limited entirely to the brain material belonging to its own special organism. It may conceivably be able to affect other brains too, either directly, or indirectly through an immediate influence on the mind associated with them. Intelligent communication is normally carried on by means of conventional mechanical movements, calculated to set up special aerial or etherial tremors ; which have to be apprehended through sense organs and brain, and interpreted back again into thought. But we are constrained to contemplate the possibility of a more direct method, and to ask, is there ever any direct psychical

connexion between mind and mind, irrespective of intermediate physical processes? It is a definite though difficult question, to be answered by experience. And an affirmative answer would suggest, among other things, that though individuality is dependent upon brain for physical manifestation, it may not be dependent on brain for psychical existence.

Such independence is difficult to prove directly, in a way convincing to those who approach the subject without previous study, or with prejudices against it; because in the proof, or to produce any recordable impression, a bodily organ—such as brain or muscle—*must* be used. We are not, and cannot be, completely independent of the body, in this earth life: but we can bring forward facts which seem to indicate an activity specially and peculiarly psychical, and only slightly physical. Of physical modes of communication between mind and mind there are many varieties: none of which do we really understand, beyond a knowledge of their physical details, though we are well accustomed to them all; but we know of one which appears not to be physical, save at its terminals, and which has the *appearance* of being, in its mode of transmission, exclusively psychical. That is to say, it occurs as if one mind operated directly either on another brain or on another mind across a distance (if *distance* has any meaning in such a case); or as if one mind exerted its influence on another through the conscious intervention of a third mind acting as messenger; or as if mental intercourse were effected unconsciously, through a general *nexus* of communication—a universal world-mind. All these hypotheses have been suggested at different times by the phenomenon of telepathy; and which of them is nearest the truth it is difficult to say. There are some who think that all are true, and that different means are employed at different times.

What we can assert is this, that the facts of “telepathy,” and in a less degree of what is called “clairvoyance,” must be regarded as practically established, in the minds of those who have studied them. There may be, indeed there is, still much

doubt about the explanation to be attached to those facts; there is uncertainty as to their real meaning, and as to whether the idea half-suggested by the word "telepathy" is completely correct; but the facts themselves are too numerous and well authenticated to be doubted,—even if we except from our survey the directly experimental cases designed to test and bring to book this strange human faculty.

Thus telepathy opens a new chapter in science, and is of an importance that cannot be exaggerated. Even alone, it tends mightily to strengthen the argument for transcendence of mind over body, so that we may reasonably expect the one to be capable of existing independently and of surviving the other; though by itself, or in a discarnate condition, it is presumably unable to achieve anything directly on the physical plane. But telepathy is not all. Telepathy is indeed only the first link in a chain: there are further links, further stages on the road to scientific proof.

Arguments from Præternormal Psychology.

Have we no facts to go upon, only speculation, concerning the actual persistence of individual memory and consciousness,—of much that characterises a personality—apart from a bodily vehicle? Facts we have; but they are not generally known, nor are they universally accepted: they have still, many of them, to run the gauntlet of scientific criticism even among the few students who take the trouble to study them. Their theory has been worked at pertinaciously, but it is still in a rudimentary stage, and by the mass of scientific men the whole subject is at present ignored, because it seems an elusive and disappointing inquiry, and because there are other fields which are easier of cultivation and promise more immediate fertility.

The chief of the facts to which we can appeal belong to one of three marked regions:—

First, experiences connected with genius, vision, and dream, extending up to premonition and clairvoyance,—the specially *psychological* region.

Second, the singular modification of bodily faculty sometimes experienced,—ranging from unusual extension of sensory and muscular powers, such as hyperæsthesia and what is technically known as automatism, up to various grades of what has been described as materialisation;—all which great group of asserted and controverted phenomena may be said to belong to the *physiological* region.

Third, the at first sight disconcerting facts connected with apparent changes, dislocations and disintegrations, of personality—what we may call the *pathological* region.

Concerning all this mass of information, not only is the theory far from distinct, but many of the facts themselves are only sparsely known: they belong to a special branch of study, which, conducted under many difficulties, cannot be properly apprehended at second hand.

Suffice it therefore to say, that whereas it is quite clear that *manifestation* of memory and consciousness, in a form capable of being appreciated by or demonstrated to us, is evidently not possible without a material organism or body of some kind, yet—in the judgment of many students of the subject—a surviving memory or personality, even though disembodied, need not be utterly and completely prevented from still occasionally operating in our sphere.

For as it was possible for what, in Part I., we defined as “soul” to compose and employ an organ suited to itself, out of various kinds of nutriment, so also it appears to be possible, though not without difficulty and extraordinary trouble, for a disembodied entity or psychical unit occasionally to utilise a body constructed by some other similar “soul,” and to make an attempt at communication and manifestation through that. It has even been conjectured that by special exertion of psychical power a temporary organ of materialisation can be constructed, presumably of organic particles, sufficient to enable some interaction between spirit and matter, and even to display some personal characteristics, through the utilisation of a form partially

separate from, though also closely connected with, and as some think even borrowed from, the bodily organism of the auxiliary person known technically as the "medium" of communication, whose presence is certainly necessary. In favour of such an occurrence there is much evidence, some of it of a weak kind, some of it quite valueless; but again some of it is strong, evidenced by weighing, and vouched for by experienced naturalists and observers such as Dr A. R. Wallace and Sir W. Crookes, as well as by the eminent physiologist Professor Richet, and by Professors Schiaparelli, Lombroso, and other foreign men of science.

The idea here suggested is admittedly bizarre and at first sight absurd; nevertheless something of the kind has the appearance of being true, in spite of its having been discredited by much professional fraud exercised upon too willing dupes. The phenomenon on which it is based is at any rate a puzzling one, calling for further investigation: which must ultimately pursue it into a region quite apart from and beyond the obvious possibilities of fraud; that is to say, must not only establish it as a fact, if it be a fact, but must ascertain the laws which govern it.

Argument from Automatism.

More frequently, however, a simpler method, akin to telepathy and to what is commonly known as inspiration or "possession," is employed; whereby some portion of the brain of "the automatist" appears to be operated upon directly, so as to produce intelligible statements, in speech or writing, often of considerable length and occasionally in unknown languages;—these messages being, at least in the cases where they are not merely subjective and of little interest, apparently irrespective of the ordinary consciousness, and only slightly sophisticated by the normal mental activity, of the person by whom this organ is usually wielded, and to whom it nominally "belongs."

The body, in fact, or some part of the body, though usually controlled and directed by the particular psychical agent

which has composed and grown accustomed to it, can sometimes be found capable of responding to a foreign intelligence, acting either telepathically through the mind or telergically by a more direct process straight on the brain. Sometimes the controlling intelligence belongs to a living person, as in cases of hypnotism; more usually it is an influence emanating from what we must consider some portion of the automatist's own larger or subliminal self. Occasionally a person appears able to respond to thoughts or stimuli embedded, as it were, among psycho-physical surroundings in a manner at present ill understood and almost incredible;—as if strong emotions could be unconsciously recorded in matter, so that the deposit shall thereafter affect a sufficiently sensitive organism, and cause similar emotions to reproduce themselves in its subconsciousness, in a manner analogous to the customary conscious interpretation of photographic or phonographic records, and indeed of pictures or music and artistic embodiment generally. And lastly, there are people who seem able to respond to a psychical agency apparently related to the surviving portion of intelligences now discarnate, in such a way as to suggest that the said intelligences are picking up the thread of their old thoughts, and entering into something like their old surroundings and their old feelings—though often only in a more or less dreamy and semi-entranced condition—for the purpose of conveying hallucinatory or other impressions to those who are still in the completely embodied state.

It would be a great mistake to assume, without proof, that any given automatic message really emanates from the person to whom it is attributed; and such a generalisation applied to all so-called messages would be grotesquely untrue. But then neither should we be safe in maintaining that none of them have an authentic character, and that they are never in any degree what they purport to be. The elimination of the normal personality of the automatist, and the proof of the supposed communicator's identity, are singularly difficult; but in a few cases the evidence for identity is remarkably strong.

The substance of the message and the kind of memory displayed in these cases belong not at all to the brain of the automatist, but clearly to the intelligence of the asserted control: of whose identity and special knowledge they are sometimes strongly characteristic. As to the elimination of normal personality, however, it must be admitted that, in all cases, the manner and accidents or accessories of the message are liable to be modified by the material instrument or organ through which the thought or idea is for our information reproduced. The reproduction of a thought in our world appears to demand distinct effort on the part of a transcendental thinker, and it seems to be almost a matter of indifference, or so to speak of accident not determined by the thinker, whether it make its appearance here in the form of speech or of writing, or whether it take the form of a work of art, or of unusual spiritual illumination. This is surely true of orthodox inspiration, as well as of what we are now conjecturing may perhaps be an attempt at some additional method of arousing ideas in us. Moreover, in both cases, lucidity is only to be expected, and is only obtained, in flashes. The best of us only get flashes of genius now and then, and the experience is seldom unduly prolonged. Why should we expect it to be otherwise?

There is another aspect of the matter that may be mentioned too. For most of the difficulty of inter-communication we ourselves must be held responsible. Our normal immersion in mundane affairs may be very sensible and practical, and is probably essential to earthly progress until our civilisation is rather more consolidated and developed, but it can hardly facilitate communion with another order of existence. Nor is it likely that we should be able to appreciate the intimate concerns of that other order, even if it were feasible to convey a detailed account of them.

It is true that messages are often vague and disappointing even when apparently genuine; untrue that they are invariably futile and useless and inappropriate,—such an asser-

tion could only be made by people imperfectly acquainted with the facts. In certain cases it is quite clear that a bodily organism has been controlled by something other than its usual and normal intelligence, and in a few cases the identity of the control has been almost crucially established: though that is a matter to be dealt with more technically elsewhere.

Subliminal Faculty.

The extension of faculty exhibited during some trance states has suggested that a similar enlargement of memory and consciousness may follow or accompany our departure from this life, and is partly responsible for the notion of the existence of a subliminal or normally unconscious portion of our total personality. On this subject I can conveniently refer to the summary contained in Myers's chapters on "Disintegrations of Personality" and on "Genius," in vol. i. of his *Human Personality*. This doctrine—the theory of a larger and permanent personality of which the conscious self is only a fraction in process of individualisation, the fraction being greater or less according to the magnitude of the individual,—this doctrine, as a working hypothesis, illuminates many obscure facts, and serves as a thread through an otherwise bewildering labyrinth. It removes a number of elementary stumbling-blocks which otherwise obstruct an attempt to realise vividly the incipient stages of personal existence; it accounts for the extraordinary rapidity with which the development of an individual proceeds; and it eases the theory of ordinary birth and death. It achieves all this as well as the office for which it was originally designed, viz. the elucidation of unusual experiences, such as those associated with dreams, premonitions, and prodigies of genius. Many great and universally recognised thinkers, Plato, Virgil, Kant, I think,¹ and Wordsworth, all had room for an idea more or

¹ In justification of the inclusion of this name, the following may suffice as an example:—"For if we should see things and ourselves as they are, we would see ourselves in a world of spiritual natures with which our entire real relation neither began at birth nor ended with the body's death."—KANT, quoted by HEINZE.

less of this kind; which indeed, in some form, is almost necessitated by a consideration of our habitually unconscious performance of organic function. Whatever it is that controls our physiological mechanism, it is certainly not our own consciousness; nor is it any part of our recognised and obvious personality.

“We feel that we are greater than we know.”

Our present state may be likened to that of the hulls of ships submerged in a dim ocean among many strange beasts, propelled in a blind manner through space; proud perhaps of accumulating many barnacles as decoration; only recognising our destination by bumping against the dock wall. With no cognisance of the deck and the cabins, the spars and the sails; no thought of the sextant and the compass and the captain; no perception of the lookout on the mast, of the distant horizon; no vision of objects far ahead, dangers to be avoided, destinations to be reached, other ships to be spoken with by other means than bodily contact;—a region of sunshine and cloud, of space, of perception, and of intelligence, utterly inaccessible to the parts below the water-line.

To suppose that we know and understand the universe, to suppose that we have grasped its main outlines, that we realise pretty completely not only what is in it, but the still more stupendous problem of what is not and cannot be in it—as do some of our gnostic (self-styled “agnostic”) friends—is a presumptuous exercise of limited intelligence, only possible to a certain very practical and useful order of brain, which has good solid work of a commonplace kind to do in the world, and has been restricted in its outlook, let us say by Providence, in order that it may do that one thing and do it well.

And just as we fail to grasp the universe, so do we fail as yet to know ourselves: the part of which we have become aware, the part which manifestly governs our planetary life, is probably far from being the whole.¹ The assumption that the

¹ Such an admission is quite consistent with recognition of the momentous character of this present stage of existence, not only while it lasts, but as

true self is complex, and that a larger range of memory may ultimately be attained, is justified by the researches of alienists, and mental physicians generally, into those curious pathological cases of "strata of memory" or dislocations of personality, on which many medical books and papers are available for the student. In cases of multiple personality, the patients, when in the ordinary or normally conscious state, are usually ignorant of what has happened in the intervening periods when they were not in that state, and are not aware of what they have done when in one of the deeper states; but as soon as the personality has entered an ultra-normal condition, it is often found to be aware, not only of its previous actions when in that condition, but also of what was felt and known while at the ordinary grade of intelligence.

The analogy pointed to is that whereas we living men and women, while associated with this mortal organism, are ignorant of whatever experience our larger selves may have gone through in the past—yet when we wake out of this present materialised condition, and enter the region of larger consciousness, we may gradually realise in what a curious though legitimate condition of ignorance we now are; and may become aware of our fuller possession, with all that has happened here and now fully remembered and incorporated as an additional experience into the wide range of knowledge which that larger entity must have accumulated since its intelligence and memory began. The transition called death may thus be an awaking rather than a sleeping; it may be that we, still involved in mortal coil, are in the more dream-like and unreal condition:—

influencing, and contributing in every sense to, the future; the doctrine of the subliminal self throws no sort of contempt or discouragement on the things which really ought to interest us here and now. There is "danger of losing sight of the ideal in our immediate life, and thinking that it is to be found only in the past or in the future," says Professor Caird; whereas our little struggle is part of the great conflict of good and evil in the universe, and we should be encouraged were we to "realise that our life is not an aimless or meaningless vicissitude of events, but an essential step in the great process."

"Peace, peace ! he is not dead, he doth not sleep—
 He hath awakened from the dream of life—
 'Tis we who, lost in stormy visions, keep
 With phantoms an unprofitable strife."

(Shelley's *Adonais*.)

The ideas thus briefly indicated have been suggested by a mass of unfamiliar experience, upon which it is legitimate to speculate, though quite illegitimate to dogmatise ; but in case they seem too fanciful to serve as any part of a basis for human immortality, it may be well to show how clearly the possibility of a larger and fuller existence than the present is indicated by facts with which we are all familiar.

Argument from Genius.

It must be apparent how few of our faculties can really be accounted for by the need of sustenance and by the struggle for existence ; and how those necessary faculties and powers naturally assume an overweening importance here and now, from the fact that they are so specially fitted to our present surroundings. So that the less immediately practical mental and spiritual characteristics can be spoken of by anthropologists as if they were of the nature of sports and by-products, not in the direct line of evolutionary advance.

But, says Myers :—

"The faculties which befit the material environment have absolutely no primacy, unless it be of the merely chronological kind, over those faculties which science has often called *by-products*, because they have no manifest tendency to aid their possessor in the struggle for existence in a material world. The higher gifts of genius—poetry, the plastic arts, music, philosophy, pure mathematics—all of these are precisely as much in the central stream of evolution—are perceptions of new truth and powers of new action just as decisively predestined for the race of man—as the aboriginal Australian's faculty for throwing a boomerang or for swarming up a tree for grubs. There is, then, about those loftier interests nothing exotic, nothing accidental ; they are an intrinsic part of that ever-evolving response to our surroundings which forms not only the planetary but the cosmic history of all our race."

We can regard these higher faculties, these inspirations of genius and the like, not only as contributing to our best moments now, but as forecasts or indications of something still

more specially appropriate to our surroundings in the future—anticipations of worlds not realised—rudiments of what will develop more fully hereafter; so that their apparent incongruousness and occasional inconvenience, under present mundane conditions, are quite natural. Ultimately they may be found to be nearer to the heart of things than the attributes which are successful in the stage to which this world has at present attained; though they can only exhibit their full meaning and attain their full development in a higher condition of existence,—whether that be found by the race on this planet or by the individual in a life to come.

“An often-quoted analogy has here a closer application than is commonly apprehended. The grub comes from the egg laid by a winged insect, and a winged insect it must itself become; but meantime it must for the sake of its own nurture and preservation acquire certain larval characters—characters sometimes so complex that the observer may be excused for mistaking that larva for a perfect insect destined for no further change save death. Such larval characters, acquired to meet the risks of a temporary environment, I seem to see in man’s earthly strength and glory. In these I see the human analogues of the poisonous tufts which choke the captor—the attitudes of mimicry which suggest an absent sting—the ‘death’s head’ coloration which disconcerts a stronger foe.”

For the triumphs of natural selection, then, we must look not to the spiritual faculties and endowments of the race, but to the business-like masterfulness which makes one man a conqueror and another a millionaire. These we can regard as larval characters, of special service in the present stage of existence, but destined to be discarded, or modified almost out of recognition, in proportion as a higher state is attained. This I take to be the deep meaning of the Gospel sentence beginning “How hardly!”

But to continue Myers’ biological parable:—

“Meantime the adaptation to aerial life is going on; something of the imago or perfect insect is preformed within the grub; and in some species, even before they sink into their transitional slumber, the rudiments of wings still helpless protrude awkwardly beneath the larval skin. Those who call Shelley, for instance, ‘a beautiful but ineffectual angel beating his wings in the void,’ may adopt, if they choose, this homelier but exacter parallel. Shelley’s special gifts were no more by-products of Shelley’s digestive system than the wings are by-products of the grub” (Myers, i., p. 97). .

The meaning, you see, is that they *are* in the direct line of evolution, when the whole of existence is taken into account; and that similarly in the evolution of genius we are watching the emergence of unguessed potentialities from the primal germ,—the first revealings

“Of faculties, displayed in vain, but born
To prosper in some better sphere.”

(Browning's *Paracelsus*.)

Moreover, what is true for the individual must be true also in some measure for the race. Embryology teaches us that each organism rapidly recapitulates or epitomises, amid how different conditions, its ancestral past history. It is legitimate to extend the same idea to the future, and to regard the progress of the individual and the progress of the race as in some degree concurrent; since their potentialities are similar, though their surroundings will be different. This argument, so far as I know, is novel, but not undeserving of attention.

Argument from Mental Pathology.

And as to the disintegrations of personality,—the painful defects of will, the lapses of memory, the losses of sensation—such as are manifested by the hysteric patients of the Salpêtrière and other hospitals,—the lesson to be learnt from those pathological cases is not one of despair at the weaknesses and ghastly imperfections possible to humanity; rather, on this view, it is one of hope and inspiration. For they point to the possibility that our present condition may be as much below an attainable standard as the condition of these poor patients is below what by a natural convention we have agreed to regard as the “normal” state. We might indeed feel bound to regard it not only as normal but as ultimate, were it not that some specimens of our race have already transcended it, have shown that genius, almost superhuman, is possible to man, and have thereby foreshadowed the existence of a larger personality for us all. Nay, they have done more,—for in thus realising in the flesh some of the less accessible of human attributes, they

have become the first-fruits of a brotherhood higher than the human; we may hail them as the forerunners of a nobler race. Such a race, I venture to predict, will yet come into existence, not only in the vista of what may seem to some of us an unattractive and unsubstantial future, but here in the sunshine on this planet Earth.

"Prognostics told
Man's near approach; so in man's self arise
August anticipations, symbols, types
Of a dim splendour ever on before."

For as the hysteric stands in comparison with us ordinary men, so perhaps do we ordinary men stand in comparison with a not impossible ideal of faculty and of self-control. "Might not," says Myers,

"Might not all the historic tale be told, *mutato nomine*, of the whole race of mortal men? What assurance have we that from some point of higher vision we men are not as these shrunken and shadowed souls? Suppose that we had all been a community of hysterics, all of us together subject to these shifting losses of sensation, these inexplicable gaps of memory, these sudden defects and paralyses of movement and of will. Assuredly we should soon have argued that our actual powers were all with which the human organism was or could be endowed. . . . Nay, if we had been a populace of hysterics we should have acquiesced in our hysteria. We should have pushed aside as a fantastic enthusiast the fellow-sufferer who strove to tell us that this was not all that we were meant to be. As we now stand,—each one of us *totus, teres, atque rotundus* in his own esteem,—we see at least how cowardly would have been that contentment, how vast the ignored possibilities, the forgotten hope. Yet who assures us that even here and now we have developed into the full height and scope of our being? A moment comes when the most beclouded of these hysterics has a glimpse of the truth. A moment comes when, after a profound slumber, she wakes into an *instant clair*—a flash of full perception, which shows her as solid, vivid realities all that she has in her bewilderment been apprehending phantasmally as a dream. . . . Is there for us also any possibility of a like resurrection into reality and day? Is there for us any sleep so deep that waking from it after the likeness of perfect man we shall be satisfied; and shall see face to face; and shall know even as also we are known?"

Whatever may be the answer to this question, it is undoubtedly true now—and that it is true is largely owing to him and his co-workers—that "these disturbances of personality are no longer for us—as they were even for the last generation—mere empty marvels, which the old-fashioned

sceptic would often plume himself on refusing to believe. On the contrary, they are beginning to be recognised as psycho-pathological problems of the utmost interest;—no one of them exactly like another, and no one of them without some possible *aperçu* into the intimate structure of man.”

Religious Objections.

Whatever objections to the above argument may be adduced from the side of science—and there are sure to be many, for free criticism is its natural atmosphere,—there is one from the side of religion—more often felt than expressed perhaps—which I must in conclusion briefly notice:—

Objection is sometimes taken against any attempt being made gradually to arrive at what in process of time may come to be regarded as a scientific proof of such a thing as immortality; on the ground that it is an encroachment on the region of faith, a presumptuous interference with what ought to be treated as the territory of religion alone.

To meet these objectors on their own ground, they might be reminded of such texts as 2 Pet. i. 5, Prov. xxv. 2, as well as of the still more authoritative encouragement to investigation contained in Luke xi. 9 and in 1 John i. 5; the latter, or indeed both, being an expression of the basal postulate of the man of science, namely, the ultimate intelligibility of the Universe.

But, after all, an objection of this kind can only be felt, first by those who think that knowledge is the enemy of belief, instead of its strengthener and supporter, and second by those who unconsciously fear that the domain of religion is finite, and who therefore resent encroachments as diminishing its already too restricted area. It cannot be felt by people who realise that the dominion of religion is unlimited, and that there is infinite scope for faith, however far knowledge—real and accurate scientific knowledge—extends its boundaries. The enlargement of those boundaries is all gain; for thus the one area is increased while the other

is not diminished. Infinity cannot be diminished by subtraction. No such objection to the spread of knowledge was felt by that inspired writer who hoped for the time when "the earth shall be full of the *knowledge* of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea."

Whatever science *can* establish, that it has a right to establish: more than a right, it has a duty. Whatever science can examine into, that it has a right to examine into. If there be things which we are not intended to know, be assured that we shall never know them: we shall not know enough about them even to ask a question or start an inquiry. The intention of the universe is not going to be frustrated by the insignificant efforts of its own creatures. If we refrain from examination and inquiry, for no better reason than the fanciful notion that perhaps we may be trespassing on forbidden ground, such hesitation argues a pitiful lack of faith in the goodwill and friendliness and power of the forces that make for righteousness.

Let us study all the facts that are open to us, with a trusting and an open mind; with care and candour testing all our provisional hypotheses, and with slow and cautious verification making good our steps as we proceed. Thus may we hope to reach out further and ever further into the unknown; sure that as we grope in the darkness we shall encounter no clammy horror, but shall receive an assistance and sympathy which it is legitimate to symbolise as a clasp from the hand of Christ himself.

OLIVER LODGE.

AN AGNOSTIC'S CONSOLATION.

MRS H. F. PETERSEN.

CHRISTIANITY promises compensation for suffering and redress for wrongs in a future world; and, for such as are happy enough to believe in these promises, no better consolation, nor none in any way equal to it, can be offered. This essay is not addressed to these cheerful souls. Rather it appeals to those who, having no positive faith in personal immortality, and believing that such a faith too often results in a patient, even cowardly, acquiescence in this world's injustices, are passionately seeking for consolation from such other sources as may exist.

The forms of consolation offered to us by the Pyrrhonean writers of the day resolve themselves into what may be gathered from the rival philosophies of two current theories, "compensation" and "evolution." In the following pages it is proposed to criticise these consolations and to endeavour to point out some more fruitful source of inspiration.

Experience teaches us that the belief in compensation is found at every age, in every class. We must turn to literature, the expression of prevailing thought, to furnish examples. Literature of all times and countries shows traces of the consolatory hope that pain is balanced by joy, that good shines brighter by the shadow of evil, that sorrow endureth for a season, but joy cometh in the morning. In no literature is it more frequently and exquisitely expressed than in our own.

“Still where rosy pleasure leads,
See a kindred grief pursue;
Behind the steps that misery treads
Approaching comfort view,”

gently murmurs Gray. These beautiful stanzas are appropriate to console the short-lived sorrows of youth, the artificial cares or transient distress of after life; but they ignore the fact that, behind the steps which misery treads too terribly often, no comfort approaches. From age to age the wretched prostitute has died lonely and neglected in her garret, the leper has lingered in his loathsomeness, the prisoner agonised in his cell, and the wretch who long has tossed on his bed of pain has expired without mercy and without relief. The utmost truth contained in the verses amounts to the admission that there is no rose without a thorn; not, alas, that there is no thorn without a rose.

To suppose that Providence provides compensatory joys, say, to the victim of a miscarriage of justice or to the ill-used wife of a brutal, drunken labourer, or to a child worked to death in a Californian cotton mill, is a cruelly deceptive faith. That such as these may possibly have enjoyed an hour or two of brightness in their lives does not alter the fact that, compared with the lives of other human beings, their lives are a long-drawn-out tragedy.

The same transparently sincere note of optimism, characteristic of those who have never been submerged in life's sordid realities, rings vigorously through much of Browning's work.

“Why rushed the discords in but that harmony should be prized?”

he benignly smiles, forgetful that the analogy is of small comfort to the unfortunate beings who are conscious that the discord falls to their lot, the concord all to others. Elsewhere he complacently accounts for adversity and wrong:—

“ . . . When a soul has seen
By the means of Evil that Good is best,
And, through earth and its noise what is Heaven's serene,
When our faith in the same has stood the test—
Why, the child grown man, you burn the rod,
The uses of labour are surely done!”

The notion that "evil" is the head of the spiritual board of education can be suggested by nothing but the deplorable wastefulness and inefficiency with which, hitherto at any rate, it has fulfilled its functions.

As a last example we can take no better than Sterne's oft-quoted and familiar words: "God tempers the wind to the shorn lamb"; nor can there be a more melancholy and obtrusive fact than that God does not do so. When was the time in the world's history that an east wind spared a mother's darling and fate a child?

One of the most popular expositions of the compensation philosophy is Emerson's essay. Emerson prefaces his essay by urging that it is not true that in this life the wicked are often successful and the good unsuccessful. He maintains that the law of "compensation remedies now, in this world, apparent injustice. Justice is not postponed," he writes. ". . . The world looks like a multiplication table, or a mathematical equation, which, turn it how you will, balances itself. Take what figure you will, its exact value, not more nor less, still returns to you. Every secret is told, every virtue rewarded, every wrong redressed in silence and certainty."

When one thinks of all the hopeless tragedies and unmerited suffering that have been since the world began, what a pitiless view of life Compensationists seem to take! Have there been no scapegoats who have gone down to their graves bearing the punishment of another's sin? Did no wretches suffer under Nero and Caligula whose wrongs were not redressed? Were no secrets buried for ever in the gloomy vaults of the Bastille? Did a visionary write the *Newgate Calendar*? Is the Stock Exchange a myth, and do phantoms engineer trusts and corner wheat? To dwell in thought for a moment on the awful scroll of unredressed wrongs and unpunished crimes—ah! just God! no words can express the horror.

And yet there are those to be found, and many of them, who will tell us that a tribute of remorse, the few feeble pangs of conscience that afflict the wicked, have adjusted the moral

balance and made all things right and admirable. "Always pay," continues Emerson, "for first or last you must pay your entire debt."

Paid a debt must always be, but nature is indifferent as to who pays it. The poverty of his family pays for the pleasures of the prodigal. The shame of the innocent wipes out the crime of the guilty. The ruin of the honest follows the speculation of the dishonest. The sins of the father are visited on the children unto the third and fourth generation. That good conduct and success, wickedness and misery, have some correlation, is doubtless true, but calamity and misfortune draw no distinction between the sheep and the goats.

Compensationists freely admit that material prosperity is not equally distributed—but they strenuously maintain that spiritual conditions of the soul equalise the lot of man.

This gross but prevalent fallacy is as immoral in its consequences as any fallacy can be. The fallacy—and it is one shared by many who are not Compensationists—lies in the assumption that the happiness of each individual consists of the same things: yet we all know that, while the happiness of the maiden lady may be traced to "good works," that of the undergraduate will probably be found on the cricket field; and while the saint seeks it in contemplation, for the dipsomaniac it resides solely in the bottle.

The notion that as long as a man is morally true and pure he is happy, no matter what trials and afflictions he suffers, is true only of a rare and not very high type of character. The man who can turn away from all the sin and sorrow and suffering around him, and look up with the pious exclamation, "God's in His heaven, all's right with the world," is no follower of Christ—Christ died with despair on His lips.

"Thus do all things preach the indifference of circumstance. . . . The man is all . . . I learn to be content. . . . The radical tragedy of nature seems to be the distinction of more and less. . . . But see the facts nearly, and these mountainous inequalities vanish. The heart and soul of all

men being one, this bitterness of his and mine ceases. His is mine—I am my brother and my brother is me,” Emerson writes, and on the next page continues: “I learn the wisdom of St Bernard: ‘Nothing can work me damage except myself: the harm that I sustain I carry about with me, and never am a real sufferer but by my own fault.’” Both Emerson and St Bernard are here speaking the language of the mystic, which is often but a patois of the language of the insane. The only possible standard of sanity we can have is the correspondence of subjective ideas with objective phenomena. It is a standard to which none of us quite attain, but at any rate the majority of us approach it considerably nearer than does the mystic, who, on his own showing, takes no account of objective phenomena at all. Let any sane man move amongst the widows and orphans of a party of buried miners, and tell them: “All things preach the indifference of circumstance.” Let him watch by the death-bed of a man who is leaving his penniless wife and children to the care of Providence, and ask him to repeat to the agonised sufferer: “The man is all . . . I learn to be content!” Let him visit a lock-hospital and inquire of society’s martyrs if they agree with St Bernard: “Nothing can work me damage except myself!” Let him spend a few hours in a law-court, where some wretched clerk, who has embezzled £50, is awaiting his sentence, and seek to comfort him with the words: “The heart and soul of all men being one, this bitterness of his and mine ceases.”

Religious emotion, the essence of all things good, can lead terribly astray, for it is a spur and not a guide. Without knowledge and common sense, there is no more pernicious quality. Fixing the mind on the idea of a good and loving God produces a form of self-hypnotism; the heavens open, the world and life and time vanish away. It is a state familiar to everyone endowed with a religious nature. To those who are blest enough to retain through life sufficient faith in God to be capable of producing this state in their

minds, it is an unfailing source of a strength which nothing can overcome, whatever may be the physical nature of its origin. In this veritable peace of God the soul rests and rises refreshed to face life's dreary way. But sweet forgetfulness of pain becomes so pleasant a habit of mind, that weak natures indulge in it until an almost permanent unconsciousness of reality leads them to slight or deny the existence of evil: religion then degenerates from a sacred fighting force to contemptible emotional self-indulgence, and that which the mystic imagines to be a "union with God" is at best a delusion, and at times nothing but the dreaming bliss of an opium-eater. The subjective feelings of the mystic are no guide to those of the commonplace man who believes in and lives with sorrow and pain because he loves his wife and children, his country, and his fellow-men. The "indifference of circumstance" may be true to the former, who breathes in an atmosphere of selfish isolation and cares for the welfare of no soul but his own, but it can never be true to anyone who loves aught beyond himself; and it is an insult to real grief when some Simon Stylites, quite comfortable on his pillar, looks down on poor suffering mortals and invites them to step up, assuring them that in solitude and inaction their sorrows will vanish away, an assurance which, so far as it goes, is doubtless true.

Like most Compensationists, Emerson curiously intertwines with the idea of "individual" compensation the contradictory, but more plausible idea, that nature, ignoring individuals, redresses in large masses, during long periods, the balance of right and wrong.

Of all the contentions of Compensationists this last is the most difficult to account for. Let us grant for a moment that nature is a mathematical equation. Unless the balance of good and evil is so adjusted that every individual gets his equal share of them both, it is not possible to preach the doctrine of individual compensation; and what import can compensation, in the colossal terms of worlds and æons,

have for mortals if there is no compensation for these same mortals personally? None whatever. Could any man make amends to his neighbour for having done him an injury by being unduly kind and generous to another neighbour? Then "who can justify the ways of God to man?"

It is each individual who thinks and grieves and rejoices, it is each individual whose secret tragedy is the knowledge of his isolation, the knowledge that no thought or feeling of his can be fully known to any other human being: hence a law of compensation which keeps good and evil roughly balanced in society as a whole, but not between man and man, is, as regards men, no compensation at all, for they do not think and feel together as one body, one being, but each most forlornly and sadly alone

It would hardly be necessary to emphasise such an obvious fact were it not that many persons think, and speak, and write as though it will lessen a widow's grief at the loss of her only child to tell her that her neighbour has more children than she knows what to do with, and that so nature's balance is struck. What cruel blindness to imagine that we can assuage sorrow with demonstrations of nature's implacable arithmetic, and heal broken hearts with a doctrine of averages!

Let us now deal with the metaphysical subtlety which forms the philosophy on which the theory of compensation is based. There cannot be light without darkness, height without depth, heat without cold, male without female, and hence, by analogy, good without evil, runs the argument. Whether or no good can exist without evil is a metaphysical problem beyond the reach of the human intellect and impossible to solve. *Whichever view of the matter we are inclined to take is a hypothesis and nothing more.*

Long before the days of Heraclitus and ever since no unfortunate human being, afflicted with the malady of thought, has long escaped being confronted with the possible truth of Emerson's hypothesis: woe be to him who is in the clutches of its terrible despair. There is no greater depth of melan-

choly into which he can fall. From the blackness of that bottomless pit he gazes through a ghastly, cold, grey vista of unending ages and sees nothing but remorseless, purposeless, restless change. The mystery surrounding the wheel of Destiny lifts and dissolves. With a horrible clearness of vision he realises that before that indifferent mathematical equation, slowly grinding struggling good into struggling evil, and crushing evil only to turn it again to unstable good, he has no virtue, and cannot sin: duty, honour, courage (whose very essence lies in the belief in the power, supremacy, and ultimate purpose of good) all lose their meaning, and become no more than names for a beneficial form of stupidity enabling men to survive.

Emerson himself acknowledges that the doctrine of the conservation of evil is the very apotheosis of despair, and he seeks to avert the consequences of this tacit admission by saying: "The thoughtless say, on hearing these representations, 'What boots it to do well? There is one event to good and evil; if I gain any good I must pay for it; if I lose any good, I must gain some other; all actions are indifferent.' There is a deeper fact in the soul than compensation, to wit, its own nature. The soul is not a compensation but a life. The soul is." The apostle of "compensation" here admits that "compensation" does not "compensate." "Being" he considers is the fundamental compensation of life.

Mere "being" does not compensate for the world's evils and wrongs; does not compensate for a life blighted by shame, which death alone can wipe out; for failure, which death alone can end; for betrayal, which death alone forgets; or for any of the irrevocable and irredeemable cruelties of fate, which cry aloud for death's oblivion. The suggestion that it does shows a fatuous disregard of the fact that over 25,000 suicides occur annually in England alone, 239 annually, per million, in Switzerland, 180 per million in France, thousands and thousands every year all over the world; that in India even little girls—tiny, wretched little virgin widows—kill themselves

to escape an unbearable life, and, worst of all, that instances occur every year, in every quarter of the globe, of parents—not unkind parents, but passionately loving fathers and mothers—killing their own children, to save them from the misery of a future they foresee. The suggestion, by its inadequacy, its want of sincerity, is mockery itself.

To doubt the law of compensation means, at first, intolerable pain, inexpressible fear, but we are ready enough to hurry past all that is dreadful and dark in life without being supplied with a moral philosophy to justify our shame. “*Je mourrai seul,*” wrote Pascal. “*Le dernier acte est singulier quelque belle que soit la comédie en tout le reste.*” Surely in mature years we are able to face the burden of life, as we all face our inevitable sentence of death.

The whole spirit of the Compensationist's philosophy is the belief that piety best expresses itself in that immoral motto, “*Whatever is, is right.*” If the meaning of the words “right” and “wrong” does not vary with the subjects they qualify, can it be true that, while a beggar child who steals its brother's bit of bread is doing wrong, the Lord of suffering and injustice is doing right! Such a tenet leads directly from acknowledging evil, to tolerating it, from excusing evil, to justifying evil. It glorifies acquiescence with the name of resignation, and defeat with acclamations of victory. Anything is better than to say that evil is right, and ordained of God. Let us pray to God if we will or deny God if we will, but one thing is certain, that if there be a God at all who is loving and just, even to the extent that a good man or good woman is loving and just, that God cannot fail to place the rebellious atheist, who loves his fellow-men, high above the cowardly flatterer, the pious devotee, who accepts life's evil and injustice and cries: “*It is God's will.*” The world can only be saved by an undying, unquenchable, uncompromising hatred of evil, and an unshaken will to stamp it out. It is precisely this truth, the heart of all religion and all morality, that their theory hides from us or denies.

Only if we rid our minds of the notion of "compensation" can the full horror of injustice dawn on our understandings. Instead of ceaselessly urging us to look on misery, and to pity it, Compensationists tell us that in reality those whom we think miserable, enjoy consolations unknown to us. Our brethren have need of pity, and this thought makes us pitiless; they have need of sympathy, and it makes us cold; they have need of love, and it makes us indifferent.

To sum up, we find first that, except for the fact that there is a limit to both pain and joy, the theory of compensation to individuals is untrue. Secondly, that compensation on a grand scale in nature, if it be true, in no way consoles the individual for his suffering; thirdly, that when the theory of compensation develops, as it often does, into a belief in the conservation of evil, it becomes a paralysing idea, and immoral; fourthly, that while "compensation" offers little real comfort to sufferers, it supplies happy and comfortable people with a cloak for cowardice and indifference, and affords an admirable excuse for selfish toleration of every imaginable form of social wrong.

No reasonable being nowadays can doubt the truth of the theory of evolution, but whether the theory is an inspiring and consoling belief, and whether the principles of evolution are morally defensible, is a different thing. Let us first inquire: Does the belief in evolution succour, help, and comfort those in danger, necessity, and tribulation? Without the tender and compassionate consolations of Christianity how could a belief in both moral and physical evolution summed up as it always is in the formula "the ultimate good of a future race," console peasants dying of famine in India, villagers fleeing from the fiery rivers of Vesuvius, the inmates of our prisons, our asylums, our cancer hospitals? Could this belief comfort even solitary suffering? parents mourning a daughter's shame, or a son's disgrace? Could it cheer the commonest of human griefs, the sense of failure and loss of

hope? Could it heal or soothe any one of the real wounds of life? Of course it could not.

To talk of the happy goal to which mankind is crawling is no consolation for to-day. The joys of a future generation cannot atone for the wrongs of this generation. Dives does not require to be taught to approve of other's pain and call it a salutary ordinance of God. He does that already. Nor will Lazarus ever learn to derive comfort from the reminder that his misfortunes are an admirable contrivance of nature to eliminate the unfit.

But surely, it will be thought, there must be some element of consolation in a theory which has sufficed for the spiritual needs of men numbering some of the wisest and most eminent of our day. Emerson himself, while endeavouring to prove his doctrine of compensation, unconsciously described the only comfort to be derived from the theory of evolution. In a passage of great beauty and so profound a truth that for it we can forgive all the inconsistencies and inaccuracies through which he wanders in his opalescent mist of words, he writes: "The terror of cloudless noon, the emerald of Polycrates, the awe of prosperity, the instinct which leads every generous soul to impose on itself tasks of a noble asceticism and vicarious virtue, are the tremblings of the balance of Justice through the heart and mind of man." There is no evidence of Justice in external nature, and no good can come of paying her even a mock reverence or trivial flattery. But in the course of evolution through man is introduced a strange element of unknown origin into the material world we know—an avowed purpose to fight evil, mitigate pain, redress wrong. There, in the heart of man, burns a love which loathes evil and craves for justice, a love which, ever seeking and never finding either in heaven or on earth, "justice," "mercy," "compensation," cries with a voice which the universe cannot subdue: "There ought to be"; "there shall be." The origin of evil is shrouded in mystery, but wider and deeper is the mystery of love. Whatever love may be, it utterly condemns the indifferent

cynicism of nature's blind and cruel laws. Man's consciousness, like everything else, if language has any meaning, must be the effect of some cause. That cause is outside and beyond the phenomena we understand, but the nobility of the human soul argues that there is somewhere something better than is manifested by the unconscious universe.

We cannot name it or define it, although in this lies our only hope. The sublime dignity of the human soul, its power, its responsibility, its kinship to some spirit of good, was implicitly recognised by the evangelist who, in God's name, wrote: "Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his lord doeth, but I have called you friends." St John's saying is the central doctrine of agnostic ethics, and it is the one consolation which the contemplation of evolution can afford us. In the light of its most solemn and elevating thought once more a crown of thorns becomes a halo of glory. But a light so lit only deepens the surrounding darkness: it allows no palliation of evil, no pretence that black is white. That very spirit of justice in the heart of man, the only proof we have of any moral power in the universe at all, utterly condemns the cruelty of evolution.

I have twice said the cruelty of evolution, and I said it with intention. Ah! it may be exclaimed, you are contradicting all that you have just written. This great soul, this tender heart, this god-critic was not found in the arboreal ape. It has been evolved. How then can man condemn evolution, that power which has created all moral feeling, all human love?

Let us therefore inquire: Is the principle of evolution morally defensible? What is the essence of evolution, its guiding principle? It is the working from and through evil and imperfection to better things, with infinite sorrow, infinite pain, unspeakable wrong and prodigal waste. It is the universal teaching of the worst conceivable principle—doing evil that good may come of it. It is in vain for philosophers to remind us that evolution includes moral evolution as well as physical evolution. That is too evident to be disputed. But nothing

can alter the fact that no omnipotent power can be justified in evolving one saint at the cost of a million miserable sinners. If we attach any meaning whatsoever to the words "virtue" and "justice," there is neither virtue nor justice in creating some race of happy and moral beings at the cost of awful moral as well as physical suffering to myriads of their fore-runners; and this view is not, as some maintain, a mere selfish disregard of posterity. An aching pity for the poor dissected victims, thrown aside as having served their purpose, cannot be ignored or quenched by

"Vague dreams of man forgetting 'men,'
Nor in vast morrows losing the to-day."

The Bishop of London and Dr Wallace do not think that animals suffer as much as we imagine they do. That of course depends on what each of us imagines. Doubtless animals are spared the pangs of memory and all those sorrows of anticipation that assail mankind—the fear of shame, of parting, the workhouse, disease, death. But bodily pain and discomfort are prior to powers of reflection and foresight. The mouse automatically running away from a cat feels pain, although its movements are purely reflex. Fear of pain is the key which winds it up. Even in ourselves a reflex action that fails to accomplish its purpose causes pain. We blink automatically to protect our eyes, yet they smart if a fly gets in, and there is no reason to suppose that a sea-cucumber is unconscious of a disagreeably empty sensation when its automatic contractions secure no foolish foraminifera, however unintelligent an animal it may otherwise be. Perhaps we exaggerate the agony of a dying horse devoured by vultures while still alive. It is possible that the absence of foresight stills the senses of a child's pet starving forgotten in its cage. However this may be, societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals stand as an honourable witness to man's moral condemnation of nature, that mother who fails to protect her own.

And neither the scientist nor the divine can question the extent of the human animal's suffering. The bitter injustice

which called forth our greatest poet's prayer for restful death is here to-day, just as it was in the days of old, when the Psalmist cried, "How long, O Lord, how long!" Christ's idea of God was a God of love, a beautiful and inspiring ideal, for it directed aspiration towards a being it was possible to worship as morally perfect. The God His church subsequently erected, the God who decreed vicarious punishment, was deposed by scientists and critics, only to be replaced by their own equally anthropological deity. The idol these learned men have given us as a substitute for Christ's simple worship of a divine justice and a divine love is that of a benevolent professor practising vivisection in some celestial laboratory. But rabbits and frogs don't worship their vivisector: we, in regard to the God of evolution, are the rabbits and frogs. There is some excuse for a human vivisector. He is choosing between two forms of suffering, a lesser and a greater, and he chooses the lesser. But, to Omnipotence, vivisection is a luxury, an amusement, a crime. No Jesuit who ever stepped would adopt such infernal means, no matter to how great an end. It were far better for us to acknowledge no God at all rather than to bow down to such an embodiment of evil, such injustice made carnate.

If the principle of evolution were a moral principle, a principle to admire or worship, then our bounden duty is to imitate it; and if we imitate it we may do any pitiless, horrible wrong we please, if we think an unborn race will benefit by our crimes.

On the other hand, if the principle of evolution is an appallingly wicked principle, then, so far from imitating it, our duty is to abhor it, and our whole lives must be directed to transform the methods of evolution, as it has hitherto been manifested to us in the survival of the fittest, into the only moral process which the nature of things makes possible, "the fitting of all to survive."

And now we have got to the root of the matter. In condemning a means, a method, or a machine, we do not

necessarily condemn the product of that means, method, or machine, and it follows that to admire, nay, to worship, the good produced by means of evolution does not necessarily justify the methods or principles of evolution. This is the *impasse* to which all thought leads us. It brings us back to the old, old choice between the two fundamental hypotheses of every religion, every philosophy, that of denying the existence of evil or that of denying the omnipotence of good. Agnostics cannot logically assert the truth of either the one or the other of these hypotheses, since they hold that ultimate truths are not within the range of our finite understanding. But agnostics may confidently assert that in this world of phenomena the phenomenon of evil is apparent, and that the Christian and Zoroastrian assumption of a spirit of good in the universe, striving to overcome a spirit of evil, has better phenomenal results on the destiny of mankind than the alternative belief in omnipotent good. The former hypothesis leads men to defy evil, to struggle against sin, and fight against injustice, whereas the latter induces a fatal resignation under the supposition that evil is a delusion, imaginary, non-existent.

CONSOLATION.

We have seen that such consolations as can be derived from the theories of compensation and evolution are in no sense consolatory to the victims of fate, those poor wretches for whom consolation is the one bitter, crying, unsatisfied need. A philosophic faith in the majesty of the soul of man, as the only manifestation of divinity the world has seen, is a regenerating faith when it recalls men to a sense of their awful responsibility and power, but how can it appeal to the great host of lost women and hopeless men whom life has bereft of dignity and self-respect? It is of inestimable value for those who are working for the good of their fellow-creatures: it supplies them with the stimulus of hope in the future and of a belief in the efficacy of their exertions. But it is not these who stand in need of consolation. They that

are whole do not need the physician, but they that are sick. We cannot alleviate mortal agony with a reminder of the dim, uncertain traces of a divine spirit in the human heart.

“What, are we then to be left comfortless?” cry the chorus of Compensationists and Evolutionists, who offer their philosophic beliefs as religious consolations to the suffering. “Is there no consolation in religion or philosophy to support us in the day of trial and in the hour of death?”

Alas! if we take away the promises of Christianity, *there is none at all.*

In the presence of this thought, for a while all is dark with the blackness of night. But the dawn follows. Dimly through a growing light we can descry Sorrow and Pain, so terrible, so pitiful, standing desolate, forsaken and alone. Look! they no longer turn to heaven, they stretch their hands towards us. Does it not waken an awful sense of responsibility in our souls to think that in this home of tears there is no consolation for misery if we ourselves refuse it?

Sometimes we do refuse it. How dare we talk of “resignation” and “God’s will” while we leave undone that which no God has done, and which has been left for us to do? A conviction of sin is the prelude to every revival of religion and advent of a higher form of morality, and until we are convinced that no supernatural power has ever cured injustice or disease or grief, that on *us* is laid the duty of controlling evil and soothing sorrows, and that we are constantly failing in this respect—we remain contemptible sophists. And when that time arrives, Christ will have come unto His own.

Reliance on mankind, on his justice, his pity, his mercy, is the one true and only consolation that philosophy can offer humanity. It is more, so much more, than we ever think. Consider—a dying widow is tortured by the thought of leaving her helpless children to the mercy of the world. There is no consolation whatever for her in the ultimate good or the divine nature of the human race as long as she knows that a cruel fate awaits her cherished darlings. But suppose a good

Samaritan to make himself responsible for their future; would not that ease the mother's tormented soul with consolation real and true? It is within the power of us all to further means by which society can take in charge this duty, and so ensure that no wretched being, from lack of friends, can have the anguish of impotent terror and grief added to the cruel parting of an unmerciful death.

Or suppose some just man, broken down and crushed, with a shame brought on him by others. Talk to him of "compensation" and you mock his misery. But could we comfort him with the assurance that his son's moral delinquencies are looked on as a grave pathological affliction, for which the youth must suffer imprisonment, as a lunatic suffers detention in an asylum and a gentle woman the surgeon's knife, straightway the sting of his grief is removed. Were the theological conception of "free will" less obdurately opposed to the teaching of Christ and of Science; were we free to imagine the life of unrest and unsatisfied craving caused by moral deficiencies, and the unreasoning pain these deficiencies bring on their victims, a juster estimate of human failings would reign in society, and, while extending and perfecting the means of protecting society against evil-doers, would diminish in *inverse ratio* the shame of the innocent, and the suffering of the sinners whom Christ loved, and for whom He died.

Above all, far above all, for the grief which admits of no remedy and no hope, there remains the consolation of loving sympathy: a look, a kind pressure of the hand, a hint of tears in the voice, are worth all the philosophy that ever was written. No more pathetic instance of the healing power of sympathy can be found than one in that strange record of a powerful but unbalanced mind, struggling in the meshes of insane egotism, Oscar Wilde's *De Profundis*. He describes how, as he was led in the very extremity of shame and degradation between two policemen through a jeering crowd, a friend of his took off his hat to him and, with reverence, bowed before

his sorrow. "A man has gone to heaven," he writes, "for less than that."

Want of space forbids an enumeration of all the miseries which social organisation has in its power to cure or mitigate; but once admit that society can augment or diminish evil and pain, and there is no greater lesson we can learn than the corollary, that since society is made up of each one of us, on each one of us lies the responsibility of consoling the sorrows of the world. Directly, by personal help and sympathy to individuals; indirectly, by giving our support to every scheme enabling society to diminish suffering, want, and care.

No one can think unmoved of the vast record of neglected and un comforted misery. Whatever may be our views on free will, certain it is that motives are necessary to call the will into action. Certain it is also that pity is a motive force. To rouse to pity is to rouse to action.

In a fine passage of *Middlemarch* George Eliot touches on our deafness to the vast chorus of human anguish rising and falling around us. "If we had a keen vision and feeling of all ordinary human life, it would be," she adds, "like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart beat, and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side of silence."

We should not die. In this she was wrong. Did all the world hear that roar, this earth would be a kindlier dwelling-place than it is.

The heroic few who catch the strains of that sad, discordant music are spurred by the pity of it to almost superhuman efforts to still the crying: only those die to whom the sound comes suddenly, as a revelation, in a moment of personal despair, driving them to the supreme act of desperation.

Suffering is not a good in itself, as some contend, a proposition logically justifying the futile martyrdom of an Indian fakir or a Christian anchorite; yet there is no one of us to whom suffering is not a sacred teacher. Its merit lies solely in its power of awakening our imagination and

so extending our sympathy and help to fellow-sufferers. Imagination is the very heart and soul of sympathy, but the philosophic consolations of "compensation" and of "evolution" serve to distract the mind from imagining the actual to vague, unverifiable speculation. We do not require to be taught to forget evil and pain, but to remember them.

Hence we see that to disbelieve in the doctrine of "compensation," and to hate and despise the injustice of "evolution," does not necessarily leave us passive and bitter sceptics, but rather stern and saddened soldiers, armed with a vivid realisation of the outward world, animated with one burning desire to help and save.

It is said that agnosticism, by the very meaning of the word, can furnish no such positive creed. It is said that there is no sanction for morality in a faith which removes the fear of God, of punishment, of hell. This question, inextricably involved in the subject-matter of this essay, is of so profound an importance that it cannot adequately be dealt with in a few lines, as a side issue. Suffice it to say here that history proves that the grossest iniquity is quite compatible with the fear of God and a belief in hell; and further, that agnosticism possesses, in common with every faith, one sanction, most efficient of all—the knowledge of cause and effect, and of the mundane consequences of our actions.

For self-sacrifice and devotion *there is no sanction, and never has been*. Surely it is not an immoral attitude of mind to conjecture that these have some higher origin than cowardice and self-interest, that they rise spontaneously in the human heart from the divine source of love! Love is a mystery agnosticism does not presume to explain; yet for agnostics, as for all the world, it remains "the kindly light."

Where all is doubt, uncertainty, pain, the devout in heart, those who love much, seek for what truth lies nearest them now, humbly joining in the poignant words of Newman's hymn:—

"I do not ask to see
The distant scene—one step enough for me."

As for those who are not devout in heart, their morality varies a little with varying creeds, much with varying environment, and as a rule they do much better when policed by the actual and present penalties of social conventions than by far-off superstitious fears.

We have reached the conclusion that the one consolation remaining to the unfortunate is the help and sympathy which we ourselves can extend to our fellow-creatures. What terrible pessimism! many will exclaim. Is it? Facts cannot be altered by an opprobrious epithet. Truth is truth, whether we call it optimism or pessimism. Pause a while, reader, and reflect before you condemn truth as hopeless. There is the real pessimism, leading to the grave: pessimism which quenches that Promethean rage, without which evil cannot be overcome; pessimism which diverts the zeal of righteous men into the barren fields of emotional self-indulgence.

Truth, this goddess we adore, so sad, so stern, is she the cruel, bloodthirsty Kali we deem her to be? Truth unkind? Listen—here and now, if we will let her, she takes us by the hand with sorrowing eyes and descends into hell to shed her light on the darkness and bring hope to all. She pleads for the unfortunate with more than a mother's love; she stretches forth her hand to the diseased and maimed, and entreats our help for them; she holds her hand to stay us, lest we trample on the upturned faces of the fallen; she reads us the hearts of our enemies to teach us to forgive; she falls on her knees and begs for mercy for little children, for the lonely and for the old. "Look on all these," she cries, "there is no compensation for them, no comfort, no help, unless ye give it," and lo, straightway we become kind.

H. F. PETERSEN.

THE DUALISM OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.

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“MANICHÆISM may be disavowed in words,” said Sir Leslie Stephen; “it cannot be exiled from the actual belief of mankind.” If by that name he meant only the inevitable dualism of good and evil, of the thirst for happiness and the reality of suffering, he said no more than that faith and religion have their source in the unchangeable depths of human consciousness. But Manichæism, also, as the worship of two co-eternal powers, has its great and permanent historic interest. How indeed shall monotheism account for the discord of the world? On the one hand, you may accept the notion of an all-determining Governor, and forthwith you must shudder to behold the guilt of mankind laid at his feet. On the other hand, you may assume that man has been created free to choose, and you have the incredible fact (the *monstrum*, as Augustine called it) that he has deliberately elected his own damnation. There is no escape from the dilemma, however artfully the two terms may be juggled together; and system after system of theology has been shattered against this perplexity. The most dishonest solution is that ascription of supreme jesuitry to God, whereby he is supposed to create evil that good may come, the *velut officiosa mendacia* of the Church; the most stultifying that which complacently shuts its eyes to the existence of evil. The only apparent escape is the Godless religion of India, which rests frankly upon the dualism of reality and illusion.

Now Manichæism not only concealed the troublesome problem of the human conscience by transferring the dilemma to a vast spectacular division of nature, but, through its influence on St Augustine, serves as a bridge between the Orient and the Occident. It offers a middle term between the dualism of India and that of Europe, and in this way is the key to much that is otherwise obscure in our own religious history. Certainly the first step towards any right understanding of Augustine himself must come from a study of this heresy—as he would call it, though it was in reality an independent religion—from which, as his enemies taunted him, he never entirely shook himself free.

And there is no difficulty in understanding how he became entangled in those fantastic sophistries. It was the purpose of his *Confessions*, and history has commonly followed him in this, to emphasise the difference between his Christian and ante-Christian career; but a deeper, or less partial, reading of his life shows rather the unchanging temperament of the man through all his variations of creed. His mission was to convict the world of sin; his preaching might be summed up in the exclamation: “You have not yet considered how great is the burden of sin—*Nondum considerasti quanti ponderis sit peccatum!*” And this cry for regeneration was the voice of faith speaking within him. “Nothing have I but will,” he says in the *Soliloquies*; “I know nothing but this, that things fleeting and transitory should be spurned, that things certain and eternal should be sought.” Than this, I venture to assert, no better definition of elementary, universal faith has ever been enounced: *Nihil aliud habeo quam voluntatem; nihil aliud scio nisi fluxa et caduca spernenda esse, certa et æterna requirenda.* Or, as he develops the idea in one of the earliest of his letters:

“We are, I suppose, both agreed in maintaining that all things with which our bodily senses acquaint us are incapable of abiding unchanged for a single moment, but, on the contrary, are moving and in perpetual transition, and have no present reality, that is, to use the language of Latin philosophy, do not exist—*ut latine loquar, non esse.* Accordingly, the true and divine

philosophy admonishes us to check and subdue the love of these things as most dangerous and disastrous, in order that the mind, even while using this body, may be wholly occupied and warmly interested in those things which are ever the same, and which owe their attractive power to no transient charm."

The expression of the idea is here coloured by his newly acquired Platonism, but the dualism that underlies it runs like a cord through his life, making one the Pagan child and the Christian man. He was not reading his present into the past, but only explaining by clearer knowledge the blind uncertainties and searchings of his youth, when, looking back on those days, he wrote: "For this was my sin, that not in God himself, but in his creatures, in myself and others, I sought my pleasures, my exaltations, and my truths, and so fell into sorrows and confusions and errors." This constant preoccupation with the dualism of human experience was the master trait of his mind; but with it must be reckoned another trait almost, if not quite, equally predominant. He was intensely, even morbidly, self-conscious; all the relations of life assumed a vivid personal colour, and from this somewhat unstable union of abstract faith with a hungering personality sprang the poignancy of his emotions. Such a discord in harmony can be seen at work in his passionately cherished friendships; and some of his younger letters may almost bring tears to the reader's eyes for their mingling and conflict of human and divine love.

Such was the temperament of the young man who in his eighteenth year came to Carthage as a student of rhetoric, as it was then called; of the liberal arts, as we should say now. He had been born in the year 354 at Thagaste, a small town of Numidian Africa, some fifty miles inland from the Hippo which he afterwards was to make the centre of the religious world. Africa had been thoroughly Romanised, although the Punic language was still spoken by the lower orders; and indeed Augustine in one of his letters asks about the pronunciation of some of the commonest Latin words, and when in Milan suffered, as a teacher of rhetoric, from his provincial

accent. But Carthage, at least since its rebuilding, was like a lesser Rome, splendid with temples and palaces and baths, thronged with people whose occupation was to follow the Pagan ceremonies of worship, to watch the spectacle of the streets and theatres, to hear the rhetoricians, and to indulge in the unrestrained vices of the capital. And now at last the prophecy of Dido was to come true; her city was to see the avenger arise who should make good the failure of Hannibal and give laws to Rome.

The ambition of the young Augustine was stirred by the life of Carthage, but it does not appear that its vices offered any strong allurements to him. Rather it was at this time that the eager desire for the truth began to stir within him. He attributes this first conversion to the study of Cicero's lost book, *Hortensius*, but one is inclined to look for the cause in the impression upon his sensitive nature of the flaunting and gorgeous materialism that surrounded him. To one of his temper, coming from the country to the tumult of the city, this would be the natural result. For a brief moment the blood would be heated by the seductions of the senses, and then inevitably the feeling of contrast and conflict would be intensified between his spirit and the world. In his immature state he was a ready victim for a religious sect which should expand this combat within his mind into a mythological scheme of the universe. Carthage was one of the centres of the Manichæan propaganda, and Augustine was soon a convert. For nine years he called himself a disciple of the Babylonian; he never to the day of his death outlived the effects of this first surrender of his soul to a definite faith.

Several important histories of Manichæism have been published since Baur's *Manichäisches Religionssystem* gave a new aspect to the study, chief of them being Gustav Flügel's *Mani, seine Lehre und seine Schriften* (1862), which gives the text and translation, with notes, of a portion of the *Fihrist* of Muhammad ben Ishak, an encyclopædia of the sciences written, probably at Bagdad, in the tenth century. But it is to be

noted that neither Baur, who presents the Manichæism of the West, nor the later writers, who go to the Eastern sources, offer any clear view of the possible relation of this religion to the still further East of India. Now it would be rash to assert positively that Mani borrowed in any substantial way from Buddhism; a very little experience in the comparative study of religions ought to make one cautious in these seductive theories of derivation; but it is at least true that in many of its details the worship instituted by Mani forms a curious parallel to that of Buddha; and it is also true that in its essential doctrine Manichæism offers at once an instructive resemblance and contrast to the common faith of India.

This strange religion, which was promulgated by Mani, a Persian, in the third century of our era, and which spread rapidly from Babylon as far east as China and westward with the Roman Empire, is an admirable example of the syncretic method of thought of the age. It should appear to be the deliberate attempt of a reformer to fuse into a homogeneous system Zoroastrianism and Christianity, the two religions then struggling for supremacy on the borderland of the Persian Empire. It may be that the Zoroastrianism which forms the basis of the mixture is tinged with the old Semitic superstitions still prevalent in Assyria; certainly the Christian elements adopted are Gnostic rather than orthodox. The influence of India, if present at all, is more obscure; yet even here historic probability is not wanting. It is known from Chinese annals that the Buddhist propaganda was active in Bactria and Parthia in the early Christian centuries. It is further recorded in the *Fihrist* that Mani travelled for forty years, visiting the Hindus, the Chinese, and the inhabitants of Chorasán. Some tradition also of Buddhistic sources seems to have lingered in the memory of the early chroniclers; and, as so often happens, these abstract ideas became personified, and figure with fabulous names among the followers of the prophet.

When we pass from historical to internal evidence, the

parallel becomes, if not more certain, at least more instructive. It has been remarked that Hindu thought moves in cycles. Certainly, during the centuries just before and after our era, we see such a wave of thought sweep over India, changing the whole religious and intellectual life of the people. The Sāṅkhya philosophy, Buddhism, Jainism, and the Krishna cult apparently arose and developed side by side, being the various aspects of one great revolution. Their points of contact are numerous and essential; and doubtless, if the complete literature of the time were at our command, their origin and growth would show still more striking phases of resemblance. Now details of belief and worship may be detected in Manichæism which appear to be borrowed from one and another of these cults; but beyond this a yet deeper influence suggests itself, such as might be expected in the mind of a searcher after the truth who was brought into the circle of that tremendous moral and intellectual ferment.

His religion starts of course with the Zoroastrian myth of two co-eternal and hostile powers, of good and of evil, of light and of darkness. The contest between them comes about in this way: The *regnum lucis* is threatened with invasion by the *principes tenebrarum*, who from the dark abyss behold the upper light and become enamoured of its glory. Thereupon an emanation of God, called the *Primus Homo*, descends into the depths to combat them. The five gross elements of matter belong to the *regnum tenebrarum*, and to prepare himself to meet them he first arms himself with a panoply of the five finer elements representing their spiritual counterpart (*cf.* the Hindu *tanmātras* and *mahābhūtas*). For the time he is overwhelmed by Eblis, or Saclas, as the leader of the demons is sometimes called; part of his panoply is rent away from him, and out of the union of these finer elements, or soul, with the gross matter of the *regnum tenebrarum* arises the existing order of things, the soul being held by constraint in the bonds of matter, and giving to matter its form and life.

The process of redemption is the point of contact with Christianity, and from here on the heresy will be found Christian rather than Persian, although the modifying influence of the Persian Mithra cult still shows itself strongly. In other words, speaking broadly, Mani's system may be divided into two great periods—one of involution, or mingling of spirit and matter, adopted from Zoroastrian sources; and the second of evolution, or the separating of spirit and matter, borrowed chiefly from the Christian faith. But the Christianity followed has the colour rather of the Gnostic sect than of the orthodox confession. The common terminology and ritual are maintained, but the mission of the Christos is extended and, in a way, deepened. The labour of salvation is no longer confined to the action of a man or god-man living his life in Palestine, but becomes the cosmic struggle of the *Weltgeist* striving upward toward deliverance; and the incarnation is only one brief moment in the long struggle of the imprisoned *Primus Homo* for release. St Paul hinted at the same idea in his mystical words: "The whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together"; but he showed how far Christian orthodoxy stood from its rival when he added: "until now . . . waiting for the adoption, *to wit*, the redemption of our body." Here it seems not rash to see signs of influence from India's profounder religious sense; just as either directly from India or through the earlier Gnostic sects, the doctrine of Docetism was adapted from the Māyā, which plays so large a rôle in later Buddhism, and in the Krishna cult; unless, indeed, one cares to support such a paradox as that the notion of illusion was imported thither from the West.

So too the conception of sin as consisting in desire instead of disobedience, and the resulting system of ethics, point to India. The chief duty of man is to abstain from satisfaction of the desires of whatever sort, that he may not plunge the soul still deeper in the slough of sense. Marriage was abhorred as evil above all things, in contradiction to Persian and orthodox

Christian views. And after chastity, the highest virtue was a respect for life in all its forms, carried almost to the absurd extremities of the Jainist rule of *ahinsā* (from *a*, privative, and *hins*, to harm, kill).

It is not difficult to see how an immature youth of Augustine's temperament was drawn from the worldly pageantry of Carthage by this religion of Mani. Here was an easy solution of the mystery that weighed upon his mind, the *quanti ponderis sit peccatum*; here was an elaborate interpretation of that conflict between the *fluxa et caduca* and the *certa et æterna* which it was the labour of his life to explain. Nor is it difficult, on the other hand, to understand why the system failed to give him permanent comfort. With growing intelligence he became more and more repelled by the childish elements in Mani's mythology, and at the same time the mechanical dualism of the creed deceived for a while but could not long satisfy his real spiritual needs. The Hindu attributed the condition of good and evil to the upward or downward inclination of the whole character of a man, and in that faith if anywhere it might be said: Thou art thyself thy proper heaven and hell. The conflict may have been symbolised sometimes by the claims of spirit and matter, but essentially it pertained to the man's own will and intelligence, and upon himself alone lay the duty and responsibility of turning from his own lower desires to his higher liberty. Mani, indeed, had gone half way toward this conception of evil. In the Persian mythology from which he started, Ahriman opposed the god of light at every point, to be sure; yet creation was primarily good, and the evil works of Ahriman are a later corruption. Now the struggle between Mani's god of light and Eblis, whether from Hindu influences or not, becomes more intimate and far-reaching than this. The contest is no longer carried on in a neutral region as between two armies in battle array, but is waged in every particle of creation between the two natures contained within it. But he never quite reached the higher

meaning of this combat as seen by the Hindus; with him the symbol of spirit and flesh was the reality, and evil thus lost its intrinsic seriousness. Theoretically, and to a certain degree actually, the dualism of Mani, like that of the Hindu, was within man, but it took the form of a mechanical mixture of elements rather than of a conflict of tendencies involving the whole man. In effect the man himself was the spiritual element, and his end was merely to free himself, by more or less physical means, from the envelope of the body. It was this slurring over of the true nature of evil, by transferring it from the conscience to the imagination, that in the end repelled Augustine. "For up to this time," he says, speaking of his Manichæan days, "it seemed to me that not we ourselves committed sin, but I know not what alien nature within us; and it gratified my pride to be without blame."

In this state of mind, doubting the veracity of Manichæism, but without any settled belief to take its place, he sailed in his thirtieth year to Italy, for the purpose of bettering himself in his profession. He took with him his friend Alypius and the concubine with whom, almost to his conversion, he lived in good faith, and who was the mother of his son Adeodatus. He was joined later by his devoted mother. For a while he lived at Rome, and then went as a teacher of rhetoric to Milan, the seat of the great Bishop Ambrose.

Here the first enlightenment came to him from the neo-Platonic philosophy as it was interpreted in the works of Victorinus and other Latin writers. There is much in the *Enneads* of Plotinus to render the transition from Manichæism easy. In that mystic philosophy the soul of the world is portrayed as bound in the chains of the flesh and aspiring to escape; "our fatherland is there whence we have come, and our father is there," said Plotinus; and virtue is a flight from the prison of the world, from the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha = \sigma\eta\mu\alpha$. But in place of the crude antinomy of two equal independent powers, the deity now becomes the supreme being and evil is mere distance from him, an ever-lessening

participation in his infinite essence. It is Plato's theory of the one and the many, of *noumena* and *phenomena*, brought half-way, but only half-way, to a religious myth. And in what may be called his philosophy of religion Augustine never departed from these views; they may be found developed at length in his *De Civitate Dei*, written when his doctrine had stiffened into its final form. Since God, he there says, is essential being and immutable, to those things which he created *ex nihilo* he gave being, but not the highest being equal to his own. The dualism of nature is thus reduced to being and not-being, *esse* and *nihil*, and the world is, so to speak, a mixture of these two. Evil is a self-withdrawing from the supreme being toward not-being; the *summum bonum* is eternal life, the *summum malum* eternal death. Almost at times Augustine represents the punishment of the wicked as a gradual annihilation.

But with Augustine intellectual enlightenment was still something far removed from religious conviction. Now, as always throughout his life, substantially, if not temporarily, *fides præcedit intellectum*; and faith, having once abandoned him, was slow to return. This was his period of greatest mental anguish, while his spirit lay, as it were, groaning for the new birth. And the change came at last, as these changes are wont to come, instantly and miraculously. The story of his conversion is the most famous in Christendom after St Paul's, but his telling of it in the *Confessions* is for ever fresh. He had taken to reading the Scripture earnestly, but still hung back trembling from the abyss of self-surrender: "All my arguments were undone; there remained but a speechless terror, for my soul dreaded as death itself to be taken from its customary stream which was bearing it to death." In this mood he went one day with his faithful friend Alypius out into the garden, determined now or never to silence the cry in his heart.

"And behold, I heard a voice from a neighbouring house, as of a boy or a girl, I know not whether, saying in a singing note, and often repeating,

'*Tolle lege, tolle lege*—take up and read.' And presently my countenance being altered, I began to be very intent to consider whether in any kind of play children were wont to sing any such words. Nor could I call to mind that I had anywhere heard the like. Whereupon, the course of my tears being suppressed, I got up, interpreting it to be nothing less than a divine admonition that I should open the book and read the place I first lit upon. . . . Therefore I returned in haste to the place where Alypius was sitting, for there I had laid down the book of the apostle when I arose from thence. I caught it up, and opened it, and read in silence the place on which I first cast my eyes: 'Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ; and make not provision for the flesh, to fulfil the lusts thereof.' I would read no further, nor was there need. For with the end of this sentence, as if a light of confidence and security had streamed into my heart, all the darkness of my former hesitation was dispelled."

The first thought on reading this celebrated scene is likely to be a feeling of irrelevancy between the particular message found by Augustine and his moral condition. He was at that time as far removed from rioting and drunkenness as ever in his later days of saintliness; his whole strength was absorbed in spiritual conflict. Yet in a more general way the text did come home to his needs in the most striking manner. It summoned him from the intellectual consideration of evil as a negation of good to the conviction of sin as something for which he was morally and terribly responsible; while, at the same time, it presented the metaphysical theorem of being and not-being in the form of a concrete dualism, God and his own soul. Thus faith allied itself to the insatiable craving of his heart for a personal relation: God was still the supreme *being*, but being became identified emotionally, if not logically, with personal volition; evil was the deliberate setting up of the human will against the divine will, the voluntary separation of the soul from the source of life. About this time he wrote his *Soliloquies*, wherein his new conception of the inevitable dualism of life is summed up in the question and answer: "Deum et animam scire cupio.—Nihilne plus?—Nihil omnino." In this chasm between the human and the divine personalities his one hope of reconciliation sprang from the realisation of Christ as the mediator, for as here we see

God become man without losing his divinity, so there was hope that man might be lifted up with him to God, yet without losing his humanity. The idea is developed in a notable passage of the *De Civitate*:

"But because the mind itself, which naturally possesses reason and intelligence [for comprehending God], has been by certain dark and inveterate vices made incapable of dwelling joyously in the incommutable light or even of enduring that light, until by daily renewal and healing it becomes equal to so great felicity, therefore it was first to be imbued and purged with faith. And that in this faith it might more confidently journey toward the truth, the truth itself, God, the son of God, becoming man, yet not ceasing to be God, constituted and founded this faith, that there might be a way for man to God through the man-God. For such is the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus. For in this he is the mediator, in that he is man; and in this he is the way. Now if between the one who tends and that to which he tends there be a mediating way (*via media*), there is hope of arriving at the end; but if the way be lacking, or if we are ignorant how to go, what profits it to know whither we are to go? One only way is there entirely guarded against all errors, that the same person be God and man: whither we go, God; how we go, man."

All this he heard implicitly in the oracle that spoke to him through the words of St Paul in the garden at Milan: "Put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ." His philosophy was thus again made religion.

The period immediately following his conversion was, in appearance at least, the happiest of his life. He had found that peace of God after which his soul panted, and as yet his faith was a pure uplifting of the heart, untroubled by the fierce disputes with heresy that occupied his later years. For a while he retired with his mother and Alypius to the villa of a friend at Cassiciacum, where they passed the days in reading and writing and discussing endlessly the new-found truth. But already he was aflame "to rehearse the glory of the Psalms throughout the whole world, against the pride of the human race." Home and duty called to Africa, and thither he returned in the year 388. Three years later he was forcibly made a presbyter, and in 395 he became Bishop of Hippo. The remaining thirty-five years of his life fall into three overlapping periods, as he was engaged successively with the three

arch-enemies of orthodoxy. His first ambition was to smite the Manichæans, against whom he bore the grudge of a renegade. In the long treatises and letters and debates that he poured out against that religion one perceives how great was the danger escaped, and how the Christian world shook off the foe only by assimilating a good deal of its spirit. Then came the controversy with the Donatists, a dull-seeming question to-day, but important in Augustine's development as forcing him to crystallise his views in regard to the sacramentarian office of the Church. Out of it also arose his magnificent vision of the two contrasted cities of the world and of God. Not many scholars to-day have the time and patience to explore the immense book in which he unfolded that vision; it is, in fact, largely unrewarding to the reader. Yet its very conception shows how radical the sense of dualism was in Augustine's mind and how the Manichæan conception of two eternally hostile powers was carried over into the contrasted kingdoms of heaven and of earth. The book contains, also, strange hints of modern literature and philosophy, as in the famous anticipation (xl., 26) of the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum*; and here and there it rises to a peculiar eloquence, as in book xix., chapter 17, where the earthly peace and the celestial peace are defined, and where it is shown how the celestial city during its peregrination in this world makes use of the earthly peace (*utitur ergo etiam cœlestis civitas in hac sua peregrinatione pace terrena*).

The last contest with heresy is far the most important, for it was the creed of Augustine as defined and hardened by his debate with the Pelagians that formulated Christianity for the Middle Ages and, despite our protests, for us of to-day. That debate may seem academic, but in reality it touched the very quick of Augustine's faith. He had reached his present position by a series of steps which led him at last to a creed in harmony with the deepest instincts of his soul. Starting with an intense realisation of the division of life against itself, he had first fallen under the sway of Mani's imaginative

mythology. Mani had altered the Persian dualism of two external powers into a combat within man himself of two temporarily united but radically distinct natures. Seeing the mechanical insufficiency of this system, Augustine had passed to the Neo-Platonic idea of evil as a partial participation or negation of the supreme infinite good. But still the craving of his heart was not satisfied. Abstract ideas meant little to him; personal relationship was all in all. This was the point on which his conversion turned: God's will became the supreme being, man's will, in so far as it differentiated itself from God's, the voluntary inclination to not-being. He now had a dualism of two personalities, God and man; the tincture of Manichæism that remained with him, or more exactly, the imperative consciousness of sin that had made him a disciple of Manichæism, now came to array these two personalities against each other as completely hostile forces—God infinitely good, man totally depraved by the very definition of his finiteness, nay, rather infinitely evil as tending to absolute death. To be sure, his conception of God as all-responsible creator compelled him to believe that man was originally created a free will perfectly good in the image of God, and that the evil of his nature was to be explained by that *monstrum*, his voluntary secession from God. But this was, so to speak, the mythology of his creed, a matter of revelation and not of present consciousness. As he saw the actual world, it existed apart from God and lost in depravity; the very assumption of free will meant a division from this infinite will and consequently sin. The evil of man depends therefore not on particular deeds, but is the essence of his personality; he is totally depraved in so far as his personality is a total indivisible entity. To look upon a man's acts as partly good and partly evil is to disregard Augustine's fundamental conception of a dualism of personalities. Salvation cannot result from a mere predominance of good or from a gradual growth in virtue; but must spring from a total change of a man's nature into conformity to the

divine nature. It is a self-surrender which cannot be volitional, because volition is the essence of self and of sin. It must proceed from a miraculous power outside of man, by the outstretched arm of God. Conversion is the result of God's free Grace working miraculously upon the soul, and comes to us with no choice or foresight of our own.

Now just here entered the dispute with Pelagius. That Irish forefather of Jesuitism sought to comfort mankind by slurring over the gulf between the human and the divine. Evil does not pertain to the whole character of man, but to his separate acts, and salvation lies within the reach of all who choose to practise righteousness. Conversion is chiefly the work of man and not of God. Pelagianism thus pretends to save for man his freedom, but essentially it is a denial of free will, in so far as free will implies a radical separation from God. If the tenet of St Augustine, and of Calvinism, is in so far paradoxical as it holds at once to free will and absolute Grace, the position of Pelagius, it must be acknowledged, is utterly illogical. If the infinite, as with the Hindus, lies within man's own nature, then conversion may be a voluntary, however mysterious, act of the man himself by which his own infinite being frees itself from finite illusion. But if the division is between an infinite divine will and a finite human will, in what way shall the lower term raise itself to the higher? Augustine perceived that here was a denial of sin as something of vast moment, a denial, in effect, of that very consciousness of an absolute dualism of infinite and finite upon which the reality of religion rests. In the end it could mean only this, that humanity in its finite nature was to be made all-sufficient and the idea of an infinite God was to be lost from the world. Augustine saw this, and he saw the truth.

Yet a word in conclusion. Though there is this logical correctness in Augustine's main syllogism, one cannot read much in his works without discovering whole tracts of thought and exhortation that refuse to take their place in his system; one finds that in his practical doctrine he builds

upon what may be called the logic of emotions rather than upon pure reason, and constantly calls upon sinners to repent, as if salvation were in their own hands. Thereupon one begins to search for the fallacy that may be suspected to lie in his premises, and one seems to find it in that primary assumption of an infinite, personal God which was accepted by both St Augustine and Pelagius. For, after all, is there not an irreconcilable contradiction in the terms infinity and personality? Is not personality, as the expression of individual desire and choice, a negation of the infinite, whether in God or man? India had acknowledged this difficulty and had made the conversion of man to consist in the renunciation of personality as the last illusion of the mind. The Âtman, or Self, of the Hindu sage is known only then when all desires have become silent, when the self, conceived in our terms of personal individuality, has been put away. It is quite in accordance with Augustine's personal theology therefore that the choice should be not between the absence and the presence of desire, but between good and evil desire. "There is will," he says, "in all men: or rather, all men are nothing other than wills. For what is desire and joy, but a will of consent toward the things we wish? and what is fear and sadness but a will of dissent from the things we do not wish?" And as desire is thus the basis of our will and of our personality, so it is the cause of that division into the cities of good and of evil: "*Fecerunt itaque civitates duas amores duo*—thus are the two cities made by two loves; the earthly city by the love of self even to the contempt of God, the celestial by the love of God even to the contempt of self." The whole matter is summed up in that most beautiful of his aphorisms: "Unde mihi videtur, quod definitio brevis et vera virtutis, *Ordo est amoris*."

Such is the religion that St Augustine, like an avenger of the African queen, forced upon the unwilling Roman world, for Rome of herself inclined always to the Aristotelian and Pelagian compromise which shirked logic for virtuous ex-

pediency. And if we find at times in St Augustine a Kantian failure to harmonise his practical and rational theology, we must remember that the insoluble difficulty came to him from the very sources of Christianity. In the creation of dogma, indeed, he accomplished but little; this work was pretty well finished before his day. But the intensity of his emotional nature endued with living force what the Greek theologians had left as a somewhat scholastic theory. His dominant personality imposed itself naturally on a religion that was so purely personal in its character. Out of that sublime contrast of the soul of man set off against an infinite God arose what has been called the anguish of the Middle Ages, and also their rapture of joy. Neither is there for us, so far as we are Christians, any candid escape from the rigour of his orthodoxy. Grant this dualism of the human and the divine persons, call it, if you will, by the euphemistic title of the fatherhood of God,—and what else but this is Christianity?—and you identify true religion with the fervid uncompromising faith of the Bishop of Hippo. The last great crisis of Christianity was that revival of Augustine's battle with Pelagius in the contest between the Jansenists and the Jesuits. When the Pelagianism of the Jesuits won the day, it was in reality a fatal blow to the old faith; and the fall of Port Royal was the fall of the Church as a dominant power—*actum est*. We are all Pelagians to-day, and our end, unless some incalculable force changes the current, may be foreseen in the present tendency to substitute a so-called Christian sociology for theology. And sociology has no need of the hypothesis of a God; it has no care to go beyond the second commandment: Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. We are all Pelagians? Let us rather say, with the late Marquis of Salisbury: We are all Socialists.

PAUL ELMER MORE.

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WAS JESUS A "DIVINE MAN" AND NOTHING MORE ?

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THE uniqueness of the Person known in history as Jesus of Nazareth is a fact the acknowledgment of which is by no means confined to the Christianity of the creeds and the Churches. The peculiarity of that Christianity is, not that it recognises His uniqueness, but that it regards this uniqueness as absolute. That is to say, it regards Jesus as none other than the eternal and only-begotten Son of God become Man, the Word made flesh. Thus He constituted a species by Himself: He was essentially what other men are not. Those who, while dissenting from this view, yet acknowledge the uniqueness of Jesus, regard this uniqueness as relative. That is to say, they regard Him as differing from other men, not in kind, but merely in degree. He was nothing which other men are not: at least, He was nothing which other men may not become. Those who take this view, again, differ among themselves as to the extent of the boundary which separates Jesus from other men. There are those to whom He is the ideal Man, though nothing more—the as yet solitary instance of a Man who was *in esse* what others are merely *in posse*. And there are those to whom He is not even this—in whose estimation even He has not completely realised the ideal, although they will admit that He stands conspicuously nearer to its realisation than any other human being whom the world has ever seen. But whether

He is regarded as "very God of very God," or as the one sinless and ideal Man, or even merely as the closest approximation to sinlessness among multitudes of sinful human beings, there is a general consensus of opinion that He was a Person without parallel in the annals of the human race. This uniqueness, taken at even the very lowest estimate, is a fact which requires explanation. And the explanation must cover two points. It must account for the appearance of such a Person on the stage of this world; and it must assign to Him, in the drama of human history, a place befitting the magnitude of His personality. Does any theory which stops short of the recognition of the eternal and absolute Deity of Jesus satisfy this twofold requirement? Do we need the theological doctrine of His Deity to explain the historical fact of His uniqueness? This is the question which it is the aim of this article to answer. The only alternative theory with which it is proposed to deal is that which regards Jesus as the one sinless and ideal Man. Attention is confined to this for the reason that, of all humanistic theories of His Person, it is at once the most plausible and the most typical. For our present purpose, then, to dispose of this theory is to dispose also of all other views which unite with it in negating the accepted belief of the Christian Church concerning the Person of its Founder.

The advocates of this theory have fixed upon the term "Divine Man" (in contradistinction to "God-Man") as the proper designation for Jesus. To understand this designation we may compare it with two other epithets, viz. (a) "sinless" man, and (b) "complete" or "ideal" man. We avoid the use of the words "perfect" and "perfection" because of their ambiguity. Sometimes the term "perfect man" is used synonymously with "sinless man"; at other times it is used to denote what may be called a "complete" man, one who realises to the full the ideal of manhood. Now the designation "Divine Man" involves these two conceptions of sinlessness and ideality, together with some-

thing else which transcends both. First of all comes the idea of sinlessness. The Divine Man, whatever else he may or may not be, must at least be absolutely free from sin. Further, he must be an ideal man: he must combine in himself all the ingredients which go to make up a complete manhood. Obviously this conception of ideality is an advance upon the conception of mere sinlessness. Ideal manhood is a positive, not a negative, thing: it involves more, and much more, than the absence of sin. Nevertheless, sinlessness is not only essential to, but also an unfailing symptom of, this ideality. No one can be an ideal man without being sinless; but the converse proposition also holds good, that no man can be sinless without being also "ideal," without possessing the positive constituents of a complete manhood. But even yet we have not exhausted the contents of the epithet "Divine Man." In addition to the notions of sinlessness and ideality, it comprises the further notion of resemblance to God based on intimacy with Him. Here then is another advance. To be a Divine Man involves more than to be a complete or ideal man. And yet, in this instance as in the former, the two conceptions cannot be separated. The higher includes the lower, while the lower in its turn is a sure symptom of the higher. An "ideal man" cut off, in whole or in part, from intercourse with God is inconceivable: a man who enjoys uninterrupted communion with God, but who yet does not exhibit in his own person the total fulness of the human ideal, is equally inconceivable. A sinless man, a complete man, a Divine Man—these three designations, though not verbally synonymous, must practically denote one and the same person. In order to be either, one must be each, of the three. Does, then, this view of Jesus as the one Divine Man satisfy our two conditions? Can the very appearance on earth of such a Man be satisfactorily accounted for? And, granting this, can any function befitting His superior personality be assigned to Him in the economy of human history?

One advantage claimed for this theory over the accepted doctrine of the Christian Church is its alleged clearness and simplicity. A God-Man, it is said, would be, if not absolutely an absurdity, at least a being unthinkable by us: a Divine Man, on the other hand, is a being whom, if we cannot resemble, we yet can perfectly understand. Upon this it is to be observed, in the first place, that, even if this contention were valid in point of fact, its value as an argument would remain doubtful. Simplicity is not an infallible test of truth. The clearest view is not necessarily the most correct, especially when the object dealt with belongs to the domain of the Infinite and the Divine. We may go even further. Where the Infinite is, there must be mystery. Therefore, when any theory dealing with the Infinite stands distinguished by its clearness and simplicity, that theory at once becomes, from the standpoint of the Christian theologian, an object of grave suspicion. When, for instance, in opposition to the doctrine of the Virgin Birth, the view that Jesus was the son of Joseph is advocated on the ground that it is "simple and natural," such a plea, far from settling the question once for all, does not necessarily amount even to a recommendation. But, in the second place, whatever this meed of clearness and simplicity may be worth, is the theory in question, as a matter of fact, entitled to claim it? Does the view that Jesus was a Divine Man and nothing more, after all, remove all difficulties and make everything plain? By no means. It merely substitutes one group of difficulties for another. For Jesus remains, even on this hypothesis, the one great Exception among the children of men. If it be said that His exceptional pre-eminence is only temporary—that what He was, others (or, according to some, all) are destined one day to be—not yet does the difficulty vanish. The exception, whether temporary or permanent, demands explanation. How came it to pass that the human family succeeded in producing a Divine Man? And how comes it to pass that, having produced one such Man, it has never produced another?

How does it happen that from a tree, not distinguished in general by beauty of fruit or flower, one branch of such surpassing loveliness has sprung? How did one member of the human family succeed in escaping perils to which all the other members have succumbed, and in attaining heights of which all the others have fallen miserably short? How did this Person reach the ideal at a single bound, while others reach it (if at all) only after many a sorrow, many a labour, many a tear? It may be said that this difference was due to exceptional self-consecration on His part. This, however, is to paraphrase the question, not to answer it. For this unique self-consecration is the very fact to be explained. How was Jesus enabled to assume and to maintain such an attitude? It may be answered, that He was enabled to do so by a special Divine interposition in His favour. That is to say, the Almighty, by a special fiat, decreed that, among all the children of men, this one Person should be prevented from being or becoming a sinner. The question thus arises, Could sin, after it had once made its appearance within the human family, be arrested in its progress by a simple fiat of this kind? The Christian theologian maintains that it could not; that even God Himself could not, without an infinite act of self-sacrifice, stop the course of sin after it had once come into existence; and that Jesus, far from being one of those for whose benefit the progress of sin was to be arrested, was the very Son of God who came down from heaven to arrest it. If, however, this view is rejected, and Jesus regarded as merely a Divine Man, we are landed on the horns of a dilemma. Either the progress of sin within the human family can, or it cannot, be stopped by a mere Divine fiat. If it cannot, the impossibility is as great in the case of Jesus as in the case of any other human being. If it can, the possibility is as great in the case of any other human being as in the case of Jesus. Thus we are confronted with the question, How came this special favour to be limited to one solitary member of the human race? How comes it to pass that the history of man-

kind, even in these latter and peculiarly favoured days, does not teem with characters similar to Jesus? It might have been expected that the human family, having once produced a Divine Man, would go on producing such men in ever-increasing numbers. But no; the world, endowed though it has been with the example of Jesus for nearly two thousand years, is not yet able to produce His equal. Did the power of God exhaust itself in the production of one such Man? Admittedly not; for it is a part of the theory under consideration that other men (or, according to some, all) are to become "Divine" in the slow course of time. But why not accelerate the process? Why not, in fact, make all human beings "Divine" at a single bound? Are we to say that the power of God has indeed exhausted itself temporarily, though not permanently? If not, are we to say that the Almighty, possessing the power to make the entire human race "Divine" by a simple fiat, deliberately refrained from exercising this power except in the case of one favoured individual, choosing rather that the rest of mankind should attain "Divinity" by a slow evolution extending across ages and involving untold sufferings? The position is this: the uniqueness of Jesus as the one Divine Man known to history must be due to one of two causes. Either God could not, within the time that has elapsed since human history began, have produced another such Man—or else He could, but would not. To adopt the former alternative is to impugn His power: to adopt the latter is to impugn His wisdom and His love.

The foregoing considerations make it evident that this view of Jesus as a Divine Man and nothing more, far from removing all difficulties, introduces difficulties of its own. If the idea of a God-Man is fraught with mystery, so also is the idea of a Divine Man. We are shut up to a choice of mysteries; and the theologian may well adopt it as his rule, of two mysteries to choose the greater. There is a strong presumption that the greater is the more genuinely Divine. Moreover, the greater may comprehend and explain the

smaller, while the smaller cannot explain itself. Jesus the Son of God—that is the greater mystery: Jesus the unique and Divine Man—that is the smaller. Admit the former, and the latter is explained: reject the former, and the latter remains an insoluble enigma.

If the validity of the foregoing argument be granted, the theory under consideration, in its attempt to account for the appearance of a Divine Man within the human family, must be pronounced a failure. Is it more successful in its estimate of the part which this Person was designed to play in the economy of the world's history? We start with the axiom that such a phenomenon as a Divine Man must have been intended to serve some purpose corresponding in importance to the magnitude of the phenomenon itself. The uniqueness of His function must be proportionate to the uniqueness of His personality. But what purpose could the appearance of a Divine Man have been calculated to serve? It may be said that He serves as an example and an inspiration to others, and that from His example and inspiration mankind has derived, and will derive, inestimable advantages. But here again it may be asked, Why only *one* Divine Man? If His appearance was such a boon, why has the boon not been repeated? If the example and inspiration of one such Man is so valuable an endowment to mankind, would not the multiplication of such men have proportionally increased the value of the endowment? If the whole of the meal was to be leavened, would not the leaven have done its work more speedily by being applied repeatedly? Whatever the advantage which mankind may derive from witnessing the phenomenon of a Divine Man, the solitariness of the phenomenon reduces the advantage to a minimum. But, again, does the theory under consideration indicate the necessity for the appearance of such a Man at all? Assuredly not; for, in order that mankind may realise its ideal, the example of a Divine Man is, from the standpoint of this theory, clearly unnecessary. How did Jesus Himself succeed in realising

the ideal? He had not the aid of a prior example. If, guided and sustained by no example, one Man, not differing essentially from his brethren, has yet reached the summit, why may not others reach it in like manner? But more: the theory in question, in the hands at least of some of its advocates, asserts that ultimately every human being, without exception, will become the equal in every respect of the Man Jesus. If so,—if the ultimate salvation and perfection of the entire human race has been established that it cannot be moved; if, at the last, one and the same prospect awaits alike the vilest reprobate and the holiest saint; if sin itself is but a milestone in the direction of the ideal, a stage in the quest for God;—then the presence or absence of a Divine Man makes little if any difference. From the standpoint, then, of this very theory the Divine Man becomes a superfluous object. He is a mere ornament of history—an ornament, moreover, so entirely out of harmony with His surroundings as to convey to the onlooker the impression of a stupendous waste.

From the standpoint of the ordinary Christian theology, however, the utter uselessness of a Divine Man is intensified a thousandfold. If the teaching of this theology with reference to sin holds good,—if the guilt of sin is so enormous that every sinful act, however trivial in appearance, incurs everlasting punishment; if the strength of sin is so formidable that not only the power of man at its best, but mere power on the part even of God, is utterly unable to cope with it; if, before sin could be vanquished, it was necessary that God's own Son should die; and if, in some cases, the sin of man is capable of holding out against the appeal even of the Cross:—then a Divine Man, as a Saviour from sin, must be pronounced a deplorable failure. If sin is indeed the formidable evil that Christian theology has always held it to be, it is at least extremely improbable that such a Man, planted in a world so full of sin as ours, would have succeeded in preserving his own integrity. But granted that his own virtue would have

proved equal to the test, even the most stainless virtue on his part would not have availed in the least for the benefit of his fallen brethren. He would have had no merit to spare. He would have been his own Saviour, but the Saviour of none other. We may go even further. If the ordinary Christian theology is correct in its estimate of the "exceeding sinfulness" of sin, the appearance of a Divine Man in such a world as ours would have been the greatest of calamities. Powerless as a Saviour, as a destroyer such a Person would have been powerful indeed. To a sinful world, unable to redeem itself, what could have been more harrowing than the spectacle of such a Man? The better section of mankind would have been plunged into despondency, the worse inflamed to madness, by the sight of him. If Jesus was but a Divine Man, it would have been better for the world never to have seen Him. Better that fallen mankind had never set eyes upon such a marvel of immaculate holiness, if the marvel is to remain the envy and despair of the ages. It were better to have been without Jesus as an Example if He were not also a Redeemer—better to have been without Him as a Divine Man if He were not also the Son of God. A Divine Man would have served only to *reveal* the world's misery: the God-Man *removes* it. A Divine Man would have driven all other men in terror from himself: the God-Man draws men unto Himself.

To sum up:—Either sinful men can, or they cannot, work out their own salvation. If they can, a Divine Man is superfluous: if they cannot, a Divine Man is powerless to help them, and can only discourage them. Mankind is either above or below any benefit that such a Man could bestow.

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BRITISH EXPONENTS OF PRAGMATISM.

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JUST a decade ago, Pragmatism, twenty-odd years old, was introduced into the world of philosophical debate with much pomp and circumstance by Professor William James. It was a genial youth whom we then first learned to know, breathing peace and goodwill. But little do we forecast what our children may become; and the mildest-mannered lad may soon turn fighter, especially if he be bullied a little too roughly. The lust of battle is aroused, and if in this critical stage of his growth he should chance to be placed in a new environment where his behaviour may seem somewhat outlandish, he may develop even a chronic berserker rage. In some such way as this the British absolutists have permanently spoiled the temper of American pragmatism imported into England. Instead of allying itself with those who might have been its friends, pragmatism has hit out right and left, wherever a head appeared. Over here, there is a current belief that those who behave thus in England do not have long to wait before finding themselves attacked on all sides with right goodwill. If this belief be true, it may not be difficult to account for the difference between the careers of pragmatism on the two sides of the water.

Our American Absolute, thoroughly anti-imperialistic, is an irenic sort of being, and, like the Yankee whom he tries to federate, he is withal quite practical himself. His will is an

organic part of his constitution. He has his Purposes projected albeit fulfilled. He has his Plan of Action. He inhabits an Eternity within whose specious present there is room for all the time any pragmatist needs for his urgent purposes. His Individuality is so admirably elastic that it can stretch itself to envelop all finite individualities without squeezing a drop of individuality out of them. Against such a generous and voluntaristic Absolute what could the pragmatist have to say, save that even pragmatism may be carried to extremes? Professor Royce's Absolute, while it cannot help being superior, refuses to be supercilious; and the prophet of this Absolute, carrying himself with the calm dignity which becomes his lord, is not one to evoke such mad antagonism as Dr Schiller shows toward Mr Bradley and his "Mad Absolute." Professor James may occasionally touch his Harvard colleague with satire, and even puncture him with epithet, but it is always in friendly duel; and when he has had his bout, he shows that his swordsmanship is only excelled by his charity; with his own hands he rubs pragmatic balm into the wounds he has made, and sends his opponent back to his study, rejoicing and not humiliated. Not so with Dr Schiller. He fights without quarter, he slashes without ruth. The devil himself could not pronounce a title more hateful to his ear than that of Absolute, and he finds the Absolute everywhere in British logic.

Under such circumstances it is clear that, while we may accept Dr Schiller's definition of pragmatism, we may not safely follow him in refusing to find any traces of a pure pragmatic spirit among his countrymen. Part of the task of this paper will be to show that, accepting the formulations of pragmatism Dr Schiller has himself given, we may discover that even in Great Britain pragmatism is not a stranger in a strange land. Dr Schiller, in calling the roll of pragmatists, finds only a few names among the British, and even these are marked, as it were, with a star as showing that they are pragmatists of a "critical rather than constructive" utility.¹ Mr

¹ *Studies in Humanism*, p. x. It is interesting to note that not one of his

Henry Sturt, Captain H. V. Knox, and Mr Alfred Sidgwick are mentioned as in the forefront of this critical movement, but in true Homeric fashion the rank and file are completely ignored. Dr Schiller is too modest to name himself, but of course everyone knows that he is the greatest professed English pragmatist, constructive as well as devastatingly destructive. But let us see whether he has not overlooked many a man who has fought valiantly to bring about the fall of—I had said Troy, but I recall that the city under siege is Jericho.¹

But what is pragmatism? Only a pragmatist can define it, and when we ask him for a definition, we get not one, but at least a score. This is as it should be; for we must remember that in Great Britain pragmatism is not merely a method, as it was till very recently in America; nor is it a set of dogmas, although sometimes it does seem to be a trifle dogmatic. Pragmatism is a spirit, and the best that definitions of it can do is to indicate, not Athanasian tenets, but general attitudes toward philosophical problems and toward life. Attitudes must not be fixed in the hysteric rigidity of some single formula. A formula represents merely a thin cross-section, not the whole length and breadth of the pragmatic faith. Let us therefore take these formulas² in this generous way, and by their aid see what pragmatism is, and who are pragmatists. It should not be surprising if we should find that the line between pragmatists and non-pragmatists is not a hard and fast line. The genial nature of pragmatism cannot be better appreciated than in the discovery that it is not the philosophic cult of one or two, but the spirit of many.

If we say that pragmatism lays stress on the fact that “the truth of an assertion depends on its application,” or that

collaborators in *Personal Idealism* receives mention in this connection. All my later references to Dr Schiller's writings are to the *Studies*, except when otherwise specified.

¹ *Op. cit.*; see Index under “Jericho,” where its sevenfold mention is perhaps intended as a delicate prompting to Mr Bradley's memory.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 8–11. In quoting these formulas I romanise the italics and omit the numerals.

"the meaning of a rule lies in its application," there is such sweet reasonableness in pragmatism that, were it not in the blindness of combat, who could deny the truth of pragmatism? What Mr Alfred Sidgwick has recently written on this subject¹ is eminently orthodox. If abstraction is made from the "application" of judgment as Mr Sidgwick calls it, or from the "extension" of a name as Professor Bosanquet following traditional usage prefers to call it, our troubles begin. But we have had many logics lately that refuse to make such abstractions. Professor Bosanquet, for instance, expressly states that extension and intension cannot be separated;² and except when someone tries to construct a metaphysic by the *application* of the abstract principle of contradiction to all experience, and finds as the result that all experience is contradictory, there are no logicians in Great Britain who are not pragmatists, according to our present definitions. Although Mr F. H. Bradley has sinned most grievously against this pragmatic principle in his well-known metaphysical work, *Appearance and Reality*, as Captain Knox has triumphantly shown,³ still in a recent article in which he deals with contradiction logically,⁴ Mr Bradley contends that the law of contradiction does not decide anything about the nature of reality at large. "The self-contradictory, as it anywhere qualifies the real, is taken so far not to contradict itself. Incompatibles, such as round and square, if you connect them in another world are *not* taken as simply united in one subject. And, apart from such a union, they are no longer incompatible." This is as outright an admission that no law has any meaning apart from its specific application as any pragmatist could wish. In fact, taking the present definition of pragmatism, I should be tempted to say that two of the leading exponents of pragmatism in the

¹ Especially in "Applied Axioms," *Mind*, N.S., No. 53 (1905).

² *Logic*, vol. i. pp. 46 ff.

³ "Mr Bradley's 'Absolute Criterion,'" *Mind*, N.S., No. 54 (1905).

⁴ "On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary," *Mind*, N.S., No. 60 (1906).

The quotation is from pp. 455-6, footnote.

pages of *Mind* are Mr Bradley and Mr R. F. A. Hoernlé,¹ and that they deserve to rank with Professors Ward and Stout and Mr Sidgwick as representing the quintessence of pragmatism in Great Britain.

If we should "state the pragmatic character of truth still more incisively by laying it down that ultimately all meaning depends on purpose," and if "purpose may be conceived as a concentration of interest,"² we should be puzzled to find any pragmatists anywhere, for I suppose that everybody would say that there *is* meaning without concentration of interest. Such a meaning would be vague, but may not our meanings be vague? Even the pragmatist has his instincts immature and purposes unsure, that weigh not as his work in general estimation. "All I could never be, all men ignored in me—this, I was worth to Logic," seems sometimes to be his plaint. But if purpose be defined as interest, concentrated or not, then he would be a daring man who should assert that there are any non-pragmatists in Britain, at least till someone should explicitly declare that such a comfortable shoe does not fit his foot. Except for the remarkable development of our knowledge about sensation, perhaps there is nothing so characteristic of recent psychology as the emphasis laid on attention and interest; but this emphasis was observable long before any of us had ever heard of pragmatism. Mr Bradley's *Principles of Logic*, written a quarter of a century ago, can hardly be blamed for not being strictly up to date; but even in that work only an obstinate refusal to seek will result in not finding some traces of the present kind of pragmatism. Professor Bosanquet's *Logic*, published five years later, mentions attention only occasionally, but it cannot be understood unless interpreted as presupposing interest and attention in all the logical processes subjected to detailed examination. Mr Hobhouse, writing on "General

¹ "Image, Idea, and Meaning," *Mind*, N.S., No. 61 (1907). The present writer regards that paper as the best thing he has seen on the subject.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 82.

Characteristics of Apprehension,"¹ devotes three pages out of six to the subject of attention, and brings out elsewhere its importance in logical matters. Within the last ten years it would be hard to find any representative and original treatment of logical matters which ignores or minimises the vital significance of attention and interest. It may be that the logical text-books used in England have lagged behind the movement of logical investigation; and if such be the case, pragmatism in its aggressive form will undoubtedly do good service in bringing them abreast of modern thought.

If "the most essential feature of pragmatism may well seem its insistence on the fact that all mental life is purposive," and if we still keep to the definition of purpose as a concentration of interest, again there is no pragmatist in the British Isles, for again there seems to be no one who does not recognise that mental life is at times distracted. In the context from which this formulation of the essence of pragmatism is taken,² "purpose" seems to be used "biologically speaking," and we are told that "the whole mind, of which the intellect forms part, may be conceived as a typically human instrument for effecting adaptations, which has survived and developed by showing itself possessed of an efficacy superior to the devices adopted by other animals." I am ignorant of any denial of this biological doctrine anywhere in strictly philosophic circles, and believe that it is accepted quite widely in theological circles as well. But of course when I say this I am referring to the doctrine "biologically speaking."

If pragmatism "must constitute itself into a systematic protest against all ignoring of the purposiveness of actual knowing," and if we take knowledge not as coextensive with experience, but as experience more or less intelligently organised, perhaps pragmatism will find its banners waving merrily over a practically united host of British logicians and psychologists, and the only question that could be asked is,

¹ *Theory of Knowledge* (1896), pp. 16-22.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 10.

Against whom shall the army march? The only enemy in sight seems to be the kind of metaphysician who, ignoring the purposiveness of human knowing which he recognises in logic, riddles knowledge with contradictions that can be permanently located only in the Absolute, and which when laid to rest there melt away into ineffable harmony. The enthusiasm of a campaign against such enemies of human knowledge seems to be aglow throughout philosophic Britain, and the absolutists of this type must find themselves somewhat embarrassed when they reflect that their worst foes are those of their own house.

The above five formulations seem to state, as we have seen, not the contention of any one school of thought, but generally recognised first principles of all present-day logic. Pragmatism sticks in its thumb and pulls out a plum, and says, What a great boy am I! No doubt a plum is a delectable sight—worthy to be held aloft for adoring contemplation; but is not this rather an easy way to achieve philosophic greatness?

Let us next take a formulation of the pragmatic principle which, we are told, "takes us straight into the heart of Pragmatism,"¹ namely, "that in all actual knowing the question whether an assertion is 'true' or 'false' is decided uniformly and very simply. It is decided, that is, by its consequences."² I intentionally omit the remainder of the formula for the present, for it is in something like this mutilated shape that pragmatism has been interpreted by many of its critics. That such an interpretation was premature, even if not entirely unwarranted by some sweeping statements sometimes made by the most spirited pragmatists, I admit. A doctrine should be interpreted in as liberal a way as possible, consistently with its expressed enunciations, especially if these happen to be extreme and yet to evince such extremity by incorporation in a controversial context. If pragmatism is going to live and give life, it will be by its spirit and not by any magic contained in an isolated pragmatic dictum. However, it is not

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 154.

surprising, even if it be deemed unpardonable, that those whom some pragmatists have attacked so unsparingly have used the same principles of exegesis upon pragmatism as pragmatism has used against them. Those who draw the sword of hostile and carping criticism should not cry murder if in the scrimmage they should be cut by a similar blade.

But let us return to the question, Who are the British exponents of pragmatism, if pragmatism be formulated as the doctrine that the truth of an assertion is decided by its consequences? Even after reading what Mr Bradley has written lately on pragmatism,¹ I do not believe that he would deny the doctrine that the truth of any assertion depends on its consequences, if by consequences be meant theoretical consequences, namely, the effects of the claim made in any assertion upon the whole body of already established truths. This seems to be one way in which Dr Schiller takes the formula. "The validation of such claims proceeds, we hold, by the pragmatic test, *i.e.* by experience of their effect upon the bodies of established truth which they affect."² Then why did Mr Bradley repudiate pragmatism so scornfully? May it not have been because he read in pragmatic writ such sentences as these? "As regards the objects valued as 'true,' Truth is that manipulation of them which turns out upon trial to be useful, primarily for any human end, but ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration."³ Now, if truth is thus relative to *any* human end, it is hard to see how truth differs from moral goodness or from beauty, or even from conduciveness to the attainment of any base end. The statement just quoted seems to obliterate all distinctions between "true" and other adjectives applicable to human values. There are many other statements of like import in earlier pragmatic writings, and if they are to be taken at their face-value as defining the essence of pragmatism, there is no unswerving pragmatist, for it is only in one of Dr Schiller's

¹ "On Truth and Practice," *Mind*, N.S., No. 51 (1904).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 157-158.

³ Schiller, *Humanism*, p. 61.

moods that even he writes this way. Elsewhere he says: "The 'true' is what forwards and the 'false' is what thwarts a human purpose (*primarily logical*). Or in other words, 'true' and 'false' are forms of logical value."¹ If the pragmatist will consent to drop "primarily" in the passage just quoted, I believe that he will not have to wait twenty years to find that pragmatism has prevailed. It has prevailed for as many centuries. There is one strange passage in the essay, "The Ambiguity of Truth," which seems to show that sometimes the author is willing to drop "primarily." "In a sense, therefore, the predications of 'good' and 'bad,' 'true' and 'false,' etc., may take rank with the experiences of 'sweet,' 'red,' 'loud,' 'hard,' etc., as ultimate facts which need be analysed no further." Our habits of judging experiences as "true" and "false" may be "just as distinctive and *ultimate features of mental process* as are the ultimate facts of our perception."² Now, when Dr Schiller speaks in this way, he has evidently consented to give his opponents all that they have ever asked.

Dr Schiller seems to think that when philosophers reject the definition of truth as "what is useful ultimately for that perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration" it is because they are engaged in "the quixotic attempt to conceive the sphere of each valuation as independent and as *wholly severed* from the rest."³ Surely he has mistaken his opponents' motives. Whenever anybody objects to Dr Schiller's statement, it is not because such an objection rests on the belief that if anything—whether static or dynamic, whether eternally now or eternally by and by—ever completely fulfils all purposes, that consummate good is *not true*. The opposition is rather due to the desire to keep purposes distinct, even though they may be harmoniously fulfilled together. If

¹ "Pragmatism and Pseudo-Pragmatism," *Mind*, N.S., No. 59 (1906), p. 389 (italics mine).

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 143-4 (italics mine). We may add to the "materialistic prejudices" that, in Dr Schiller's opinion, stand in the way of the recognition of this psychological truth, certain pragmatic prejudices also.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 153 (italics mine).

truth is a logical value now,¹ and if words are to keep definite meanings, then the opponent merely insists that truth shall always remain a logical value. If identity be only a postulate, proved to be useful for untold generations, we have a right to postulate the identity of truth wherever found, and by this we merely mean that we demand some sort of identity of *meaning or interest* whereby truth may be distinguished from other values, and we think that the interest useful for this purpose is "dispassionate, and yet persistent, curiosity."² There is an obstinate dislike, even outside professedly pragmatic circles, of having words change meanings when transferred from a definite relative sense to an indefinite absolute sense. When some pragmatists insist upon putting the chaplet of truth upon the brow of the Good, because it is so very good, it looks like trying to make a Nobel award for science mean that its recipient is a kind of Jack of all trades and good at none. If he is really good at all trades, this fact may be somewhat more clearly brought out than by saying that his knowledge and his virtue and his artistic excellence, his literary ability and his service in the interests of peace are all one, and that one thing is goodness, in which his knowledge is swallowed up. While, therefore, "sober and clear-headed thought will not be intolerant nor disposed to treat such oppositions" as Truth and Happiness and Art "as final and absolute,"³ still the same clear-headed thought may without intolerance insist that the recognition of final distinctions should not be treated as the recognition of final incompatibilities. When a pragmatist lays down the rule that truth is a logical value, and then proceeds to make it any sort of value whatever, it looks as if he considered his rule more honoured in its breach than in its observance. Truth can hardly be a logical *value*, without being a *logical* value.

¹ The insistence on this fact forms the basis of the first definition of pragmatism given by Dr Schiller in his latest book.

² *Humanism*, p. 249.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

The issue as to the meaning of truth is still further confused by such a statement as this—and now I supply the suppressed terms of the formulation with which we began our investigation of this particular phase of pragmatism: “The question whether an assertion is ‘true’ or ‘false’ is decided . . . by its consequences, by its bearing on the *interest which prompted to the assertion*, by its relation to the *purpose which put the question*.”¹ And again, “the predication of ‘truth’ will refer thus widely to *any* purpose anyone may entertain in a cognitive operation.”¹ An example will show why such statements are unacceptable to most thinkers. A friend tells me that a certain object is in his house. I dispute his assertion, but wishing to prove him wrong, I tell him to get it. He reaches for his hat, and sees the object under *my* hat-rack. Now, the interest which prompted to his assertion was, say, the interest in a piece of music, and the purpose which put the question where the score was, was the purpose to play a duet with another friend. The purpose which put the question and the purpose to validate his claim led my friend to perform an action which *fulfilled the former purpose but defeated the latter*. Was his assertion proved true, although the claim it made was thus invalidated; and so proved true just because the purpose which put the question was fulfilled, and because the interest which prompted the assertion can now pursue its course unimpeded? I wonder what “sober and clear-headed thought” would answer? I know what paradoxical thought has said, a thought which hates confusion except when it is *purposes* which are confounded together in a chaotic jumble called the “perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration.” But this very same paradoxical thought sometimes gets sober and clear-headed, and then it expresses itself thus: “It follows that the nature of the *purpose* which is pursued in a science will yield the deepest insight into its nature; for *what we want to know* in the science will *determine the standing of the*

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 154, 155 (italics mine).

answers we attain.”¹ If the acknowledgment of the truth of this statement is made the test of the pragmatist, we shall find in England alone a great multitude of pragmatists whose names, if recorded in the preface to a work on pragmatism, would make that preface itself the biggest work on pragmatism ever published. But when pragmatism, in determining the truth of any claim, refers at one time to the purpose which put the question, then to any purpose anyone may entertain in any cognitive operation, then to the perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration, and finally fetches up with the purpose which is involved in the claim itself, its very lack of concentration of interest, its very distraction of meaning, its very vagueness of purpose, makes pragmatism as elusive as the proverbial flea. Evidently under such circumstances it is impossible to get any reliable statistics on the pragmatic population of Great Britain. Many persons would like to be pragmatists, I take it, if it is something honourable and distinctive and courageous to be such, as they learn it is. The idea of being such a paragon in the logical world is enough to stir anyone’s youthful blood; but really a good many of these same persons would like to know *what* they would be if they *were* pragmatists. I sometimes wonder that the question does not once in a while rise in some pragmatists’ minds, which made a certain congressman in our own country famous: he wanted to know, “Where am I at?”

Our last formulation—or rather the four different formulations that somehow were thought to be one—brings us to another position that has characterised pragmatism. Pragmatism has ordinarily been thought to be the doctrine which represents theory as subordinated to practice. All knowing is with a view to doing. But in the preface to *Studies in Humanism* Dr Schiller speaks of “the ultra-pragmatic followers of Professor Bergson,” and contrasts them with Professor Poincaré (whose “weighty support” of pragmatism

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 152 (italics mine, except the first).

he had already noted), because the latter "imposes some *slight* limitations on the pragmatic treatment of knowledge, on the ground that *knowledge may be conceived as an end* to which action is a means."¹ If this is not one of those remarks which Dr Schiller facetiously characterises in his polemic against Mr Bradley as put in the preface because they will not fit into the body of the book, we judge that, whether one subordinates theory to practice or practice to theory, one is still a pragmatist. Nothing is said about those who do neither; but as they stand as it were half way between the left and the right wings of pragmatism, they can be refused admission to pragmatism only on the principle of the excluded middle. Now, whether this application of such an abstract principle is impertinent or not, can be determined only when we ascertain the purpose of the application. If that purpose is to find any non-pragmatists in Great Britain, then the axiom should be applied, and we get an interesting alignment of philosophers pro and con, the details of which may be left to the imagination. Otherwise, we discover that pragmatists are those who subordinate theory to practice, and those who differ slightly from the former on the ground that theory may be conceived as an end to which practice is a means, and also those who do neither. Anybody who has any views on this subject or who never thought about the matter is a pragmatist, and to be a pragmatist becomes a distinction without a difference.

Pragmatism might perhaps be defined as the doctrine that "the making of 'truth' is necessarily and *ipso facto* also a making of reality."² So defined, pragmatism can claim a numerous following in Great Britain, although among these followers there are of course radical differences—no more radical, however, than is the difference between Dr Schiller and Professor Dewey, for example, on many points.³

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. xi. (*italics mine*).

² *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

³ See *Philosophical Review*, vol. xi. p. 398, footnote. Professor Dewey says of one of Professor Royce's views, which Dr Schiller shares: "To be frank, I do not believe that such speculative constructions, with no further basis than certain vague analogies, . . . do anything but bring philosophy into disrepute."

Professor Karl Pearson's doctrine as to the making of reality is well known, and entitles him to be considered as a pragmatist of the purest water. Professor Bosanquet and Professor Hobhouse are also pragmatists, the former of an idealistic and the latter of a realistic species. Dr Schiller himself has recently effected a higher synthesis of pragmatic idealism and pragmatic realism, in conceiving "the true Ideal, in which experience has become divine without ceasing to be human, because it has wholly harmonised itself, and achieved a perfect and eternal union with a perfected Reality."¹ If we had the time, it would be interesting to examine in detail Dr Schiller's development of the doctrine that the making of truth and the making of reality are fundamentally one, and to see how, when he is led by his argument to a vast abyss, he thrusts "Plato's δεξαμένη and the creation stories of all the religious mythologies from the book of Genesis downwards" into the gulf which threatens to swallow him, and then turns his back on ugly Chaos to pursue reality into the region of primitive hylozoism and animism.² Especially effective is his appeal to the æsthetic sensibilities, while his adoption of a cunctatorial policy displays the immense resources that pragmatism has at its command in dealing with difficulties it has itself created. "And the first 'something' would probably seem something despicable or disgusting. It would very likely look to us like the primordial irruption into the world we now have of that taint of corruption, evil, or imperfection 'which philosophers have tried so often to *think*, and so rarely to *do*, away.'" Let us not soil our hands by dabbling in that revolting slime that gave birth to experience. Let us adopt the Christian Endeavourer's maxim of looking forward and not backward, upward and not downward; and if we take no anxious thought of yesterday,

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 483-6. The sentence quoted is taken from the last page of the book.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 434 ff. Empedoclean verse would be the only fitting medium of expression for the results obtained.

to-morrow will bring us good. "We can conceive ourselves, therefore, as getting an answer to the question about the beginning of the world-process only at the end. And it will be no wonder if by that time we should have grown too wise and too well satisfied to want to raise the question. . . . When Perfection has been attained, the universe, having at last become harmonious and truly *one*, will perforce forget its past in order to forget its sufferings."¹ This is an interesting variant of the exhortation: "Let age speak the truth and give us peace at last."

Professor James, in his delightful lectures on pragmatism, has laid emphasis on the fact that "all our conceptions are what the Germans call *Denkmittel*, means by which we handle facts by thinking them. Experience merely as such doesn't come ticketed and labelled, we have first to discover what it is."² Our categories are *postulates* which have had to be confirmed by ages of experience, before they could be accepted as axioms. This is without doubt a most important truth, but British logicians have not shown themselves very slow in finding it out, at least not since Darwin has made the conception of evolution so fundamental in all the historical sciences. Professor Bosanquet devotes the last chapter of his great work on logic to the statement and development of this thesis, as applied to the laws of identity, contradiction, excluded middle, sufficient reason, and causation. "As reflective conceptions, then, they [axioms] are postulates, *i.e.* principles which we use *because we need them*. . . . They cannot therefore be taken in a definite form as hypotheses or axioms *antecedent to experience*. Experience may be said to begin with the certainty that 'there is somewhat'; and the postulates of knowledge do but express in abstract form the *progressive definition* of this 'somewhat.'"³ Professor Hobhouse, in the valuable work already referred to, makes it very clear that likewise for him axioms are postulates. His theory, he admits, in frank pragmatic spirit,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 436.

² *Pragmatism*, pp. 171-2.

³ *Logic*, vol. ii. p. 206 (*italics mine*).

“may form an incorrect conception of some or all the several *postulates* involved in the various methods which thought uses. It may assume some that are not necessary, or leave out of account some that are essential. . . . The position, then, of the preceding chapters has been that the validity of an axiom depends on the fact that it is logically implied by some activity of thought, the results of which are not contradicted by experience; that is to say, that *if the axiom be true, that activity will give good results*, and if not, not.”¹ The doctrine, then, that axioms are postulates, made because they are needed, has been held by British logicians for at least twenty years. An essay, however, in which this doctrine was put forth again six years ago as rather a novel theory which was to confound the dry-as-dust logicians living among the cobwebs of long-past centuries, met with much criticism; this may have been because in the course of that essay the term “useful” was used with reference to almost any purpose that came along, and thus confusion was introduced among logicians—the same confusion we discussed some time ago. The paper was also made the object of some ridicule for its literary form. The long “myth of Edwin and Angelina,”² which reminds its author—by way of Plato and his *ἀνάμνησις*—of the myth of *Grumps*, but which suggests to some readers that in another story the personæ should be represented as plucking axioms from the tree of postulation of true and false—this myth indicated a purpose to revive a philosophical device for stating truths, not familiar these days when Plato remains on the shelves. And besides, the British public has not the delicate literary sense of the Athenians or of the nursery, and hence classic grace in philosophical prose has seemed to some to be undignified insipidity.

We have now closed our discussion of what seem to be

¹ *Theory of Knowledge*, pp. 479–80 (italics mine). This last sentence sounds almost as if it were taken at random from Professor James’s recent writings.

² Schiller, “Axioms as Postulates,” in *Personal Idealism*, pp. 98–104.

the fundamental logical doctrines and attitudes of pragmatism. We have found that, so far as professed British pragmatism stands by its formulations and makes them explicit and unambiguous, it is a reassertion of long-recognised truths, and that it gets a specious appearance of originality by playing fast and loose with definite meanings; and if we had the time to look further, we should also see that it manages to confirm this impression of novelty by treating the logic of its predecessors as the equivocation of a fiend that lies like truth. The pragmatic method itself is, without doubt, a very valuable method, and it could ill be spared in logic or in metaphysic, not to emphasise its necessity in science; but if it is to keep its value, it must be used with a concentration of interest in the prosecution of distinguished and not perplexed purposes.

We have now to look at pragmatism in its attitude toward the ethical question of Freedom. Ethically considered, pragmatism might perhaps be defined as the doctrine that consciousness affirms "the existence of real alternatives, and of real choices between them," and that "philosophy ought not prematurely to commit itself to a static view of Reality, and that it is not an ineluctable necessity of thought, but a metaphysical prejudice, to believe that Reality is complete and rigid and unimprovable, and that real change is therefore impossible."¹ Professor James has been preaching this doctrine for years as part of the pragmatic gospel. Taking this, then, as expressing the pragmatic spirit, we ask, Who are the British pragmatists? Everyone knows who was such a pragmatist in the last generation; the joy which Dr Martineau found in postulating freedom, and the zeal he showed in making his postulate good, must remain a heartening memory in everyone who came under the influence of his noble personality. But we must not forget those who, to a superficial observer, might appear to be prophets of inexorable fate; for the heart has reasons which other heads do not know. Who, in passing sentence merely on the vulgar mass called work, would

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 401, 427.

intolerantly refuse to write down the names of Thomas Hill Green, Principal Caird, and any one of a thousand others, as loyal pragmatists? For we must remember that any indeterminist who attempts to represent determinism as asserting that all things are "irredeemably swept along on one vast inhuman flow of Fate,"¹ is—to use a phrase of Dr Schiller's when he repudiates a travesty of his own cherished libertarianism—stooping to sheer calumny. Have not stern and great-hearted Calvinists somehow managed to effect a reconciliation between their predestination and their freedom? And we must also remember to the credit of pragmatism that it is not a "logic-chopping" philosophy, nor is it a metaphysic of truths behind the veil. It maintains that it is by the fruits of theory that we must judge the truth of theory. Even Dr Schiller, when he gets down to the pragmatic business in hand, speaks of "the charming agreement which obtains between determinists, libertarians, and ordinary folk, in their practical behaviour." He tells us that "the theoretic divergences, therefore, in our views will make no practical difference."² Why then in the sacred name of pragmatism move heaven and earth to make the determinist out to be a pragmatic fool? The only reason seems to be that really we should judge a tree not by the fruits it actually bears, but by the fruits which some abstract and classificatory botanist declares that it should logically have borne. If men do gather grapes of thorns, so much the worse for the thorns: cut them down and cast them into the fire, for they cumber the ground which logical consistency alone should occupy. I do not care to debate the question of logical consistency here. I merely wish to discuss the question on the pragmatist's own ground. Is not the pragmatist who hunts determinists running with the hares and coursing with the hounds?³ Either pragmatism is frigidly formalistic in its method of discussing vital issues, and then the dispute between determinism and indeterminism must, on the pragmatist's own showing, be

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 395.² *Op. cit.*, p. 406.³ *Op. cit.*, p. 100, footnote 2.

carried on for ever on the dreary plane that has characterised the debate for ages. Or pragmatism is the doctrine that philosophical questions must be settled by first asking what difference in men's conduct the alternative answers to these questions make,¹ and then the dispute between determinism and indeterminism is shown to be meaningless on the practical plane of life to men whose native hue of resolution is not sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought. Experience has shown that Occidental determinists have never in large measure been irresolute in dealing with "bad men," and that their views have not incapacitated them from telling "bad men" that they are moral "lepers," and it seems that it is this achievement alone that in Dr Schiller's eyes marks out the indeterminist's head as fit to wear the philosophic crown.²

The last definition of pragmatism that this paper will examine is also the last given by Dr Schiller in his introductory chapter.³ Pragmatism may be described "as a conscious application to epistemology (or logic) of a teleological psychology, which implies, ultimately, a voluntaristic metaphysic." It is the metaphysic alone that will concern us here, together with certain religious implications of this metaphysic. We have seen that pragmatism is itself a spirit; but its "spirit is a bigger thing, which may fitly be denominated Humanism."³ What that spirit is, it would take another paper to exhibit, and only the reading of Dr Schiller's writings can bring one into vital communion with it. That it is humble, modest, and peaceable; that it is genial, courageous, and magnanimous (especially among, but not toward, university professors); that it avoids insincere phrasemongering, ineffectual aspiration, unworkable conceptions, verbal quibblings, and dead formulas; that it is tentative, uncertain, candid, open to revision, and

¹ James, *Philosophical Conception and Practical Results* (Univ. of California Press, 1898), p. 7. "The ultimate test for us of what a truth means is indeed the conduct it dictates or inspires."

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 400-1.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 12. Here again I have romanised the italics.

able to retreat, if worst should come to worst, into the strong fortress of the pragmatic method; that it has faith, hope, and charity (with malice only towards Mr Bradley); that it is idealistic and realistic; that it is human and yet divine — to say all this is only to paint the lily white. Above all, this metaphysic loves ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσις,¹ and eschews the Absolute. But what is ἐνέργεια ἀκινήσις? In two words, it is “Heaven and Eternity.”² There are two ways of getting there. In *Humanism*, that day only gradually dawns when time shall be no more, and the dawning is brought about by our pushing might and main upon the wheels that make the world go round. In *Studies in Humanism* we do not work our way into heaven but wake into it. “Paradise cannot be found by travelling north, south, east, west, however far” — “it is vain to search the satellites of more resplendent suns for more harmonious conditions of existence. We must pass out of our ‘real’ space altogether, even as we pass out of a dream-space on awaking. In short, we may confidently claim that to pass from a world of lower into one of higher reality, would be like waking from an evil dream; to pass from a higher into a lower world would be like lapsing into nightmare.”³ Of course, these two paths may be regarded as one if we view our present efforts as dreams to be forgotten when we awake after death into the likeness of the Perfect. Dr Schiller suggests this identity of the two paths; it is “possible that every individual soul may some day ‘awake’ to find the reality of its world *with all its works abolished for it overnight*” — alas, poor pragmatism! — and that if this happens “the fault lies, not in our theory, but in the actual facts.”⁴ Now, Dr Schiller states that the belief in an external world and in other minds is only the expression of a purpose to

¹ *Humanism*, pp. 204–227 and 95–109.

² *Humanism*, p. 212.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 475. See also HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1904.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 484 (italics of course mine).

extrude unwelcome incidents whose intrusion we resent.¹ When we awake in Paradise it will be to find no help meet for us; no "I" will disown any part of it.² But "if pleasure and pain (*or even pain alone*) were eliminated from our experience, should we retain self-consciousness enough to frame the antithesis of 'self' and 'world'?"³ In Heaven, therefore, we shall have the theoretically interesting solipsistic state of affairs that Dr Schiller so graphically describes as involved in Mr Bradley's Absolute Experience. Each "I" will think that "I am all that is,"⁴ and yet no "I" will think "I am" at all. No wonder that this coming event casts its blurring shadow on all present distinctions of good and beautiful and true. An experience without time-consciousness, because "the conditions which engender time-consciousness" are precluded;⁵ an experience without self-consciousness, because the past with its sufferings, which alone can give rise to the antithesis between self and world, has been forgotten; an experience without any categories as working conceptions, because it has no work to do; an experience which abolishes the reality of this world with all its works, leaving itself alone with the Alone—what is such an experience else than Mr Bradley's abhorred Absolute Experience, with the saving (?) difference that the one is the unpragmatically pragmatic postulate of a humanist, and the other an illogically logical Reality of one who is willing to be called an absolutist? If Dr Schiller were to examine his own ultimate Ideal as thoroughly as he has examined Mr Bradley's *bête noire*, I am sure that he would disown it, since he has assured us that he finds in himself no traces of the idiosyncratic desire to become the Absolute.⁶ The trail of the serpent is manifest all over Dr Schiller's ideal, but he is too intent on tracing the reptile to its hiding-place in Mr Bradley's book, to notice its presence in his own.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 473-4.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 471 (*italics mine*).

⁵ *Humanism*, p. 212.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 486.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 263.

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 257.

But there is a difference even in Absolutes. Mr Bradley's Absolute, in keeping state, somehow manages to be careless of mankind and leaves us to our devices: for this we should be thankful. No matter if it does for its own transcendent uses transmute our experiences into something other than they are for us, when after all and all the time it leaves these experiences what they are for us. We surely should not begrudge it this power of transubstantiation if after the miracle it leaves the bread and the wine fit for all human uses. But Dr Schiller's Absolute takes its stand right in the path of our lives, giving them a termination more forlorn than Hades with its gloomy meads of asphodel, or Sheol where there is no wisdom and no device. Those abodes of the dead had at least distinct even if spectral inhabitants. As between Mr Bradley's Absolute and Dr Schiller's we'll take the one above us rather than the one ahead of us. The best interpretation the prospective Absolute can help us put on our lives is that they are dreams, and the dearest hope it holds out to us is that when we awake we shall find ourselves to be the lonely Absolute itself. If there is anywhere a "cosmic nightmare," it is such an ideal of "a perfect harmony of our whole life which forms our final aspiration." If this be Paradise, and if we may not travel north, south, east, west, to get away from it, or turning upward may not search the satellites of more resplendent suns for a place of escape, let us make the choice of Aucassin and go downwards, where at least there is a goodly fellowship.

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“LAW”

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IN a recent number of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL¹ the Dean of Clogher, when discussing the problem of “The Forgiveness of Sin,” raised the question of the meaning of the term “law,” by treating sin as, in one aspect, a breach of God’s moral law, “analogous to a violation of physical law.” In the following issue of the JOURNAL I wrote pointing out that the word “law” in physics is used in a sense so radically different from that in which it is employed in morals that the suggested analogy is an entirely false one. In doing so I was, of course, merely stating what has long been a commonplace of both jurisprudence and natural science; but since the Dean admits² that he continues to “fail to understand” the essential and fundamental distinction, and as the matter is of some practical importance owing to its close association with such problems of personal religion as the consequences of human action and the penalties of transgression, I venture to treat it more systematically than was possible in a mere critical review.

I. THE TERM “LAW.”

“There are very few words,” said the late Duke of Argyll, “which are used more ambiguously and therefore more injuriously than the word ‘law.’”³ It is—like the kindred terms *jus* in Latin, *droit* in French, and *recht* in German—one of those words *ancipitis usus* which have been more fruitful

¹ April 1907.

² HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1907.

³ *The Reign of Law*, 18th ed., p. 63.

sources of error and mental confusion than any other words whatever. It was of this very term “law” that John Austin, with an unwonted departure from the serenity of the philosophical jurist, wrote when he said that through its “misapplication . . . has the field of jurisprudence and morals been deluged with muddy speculation.”¹

Its origin is doubtful,² but it came into use in those primitive, pre-scientific days when the phenomena of human conduct and the phenomena of irrational and inanimate nature were regarded as of one and the same order—when the sun was looked upon as a chariot driven in a race, and the thunderbolt as the hammer of a god. On the one hand were seen commands addressed to the human will, and resulting in an ordered uniformity of behaviour; on the other hand were perceived certain ordered uniformities of nature which were attributed to the commands of superhuman wills. There appeared to be no essential difference between the two types of phenomena. Nevertheless, in the case of human conduct the feature which most struck the eye was the *force* or authority of the command which caused the uniformity of behaviour, while in the case of the phenomena of nature it was the resultant *order* or uniformity which was the striking aspect, the causal command being merely inferable by analogy. Hence from the first the connotation of the term “law” tended to bifurcate, one branch monopolising the idea of the causal force and going off in the direction of jurisprudence, the other monopolising the idea of the resultant order and going off in the direction of natural science.³

But most unfortunately this bifurcation of ideas did not culminate in logical separation of ideas, and the consequence was the rise and perpetuation of one of the most appalling and persistent muddles which the history of thought has

¹ *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., p. 88.

² Cf. *Oxford Eng. Dict.*, s.v. *Law*. Also Salmond, *Jurisprudence*, App. I.

³ Cf. Holland, *Jurisprudence*, 7th ed., pp. 14–18, and Austin, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., p. 207.

to show. Jurists on the one hand complicated the rules of human conduct, which were their proper subject, with visionary "laws of nature"; men of science on the other hand mixed up their inductive generalisations with speculations proper to moralists and theologians. Take Blackstone as an example of a befogged eighteenth-century jurist: he "advances to his proper subject, municipal laws, through (1) the laws of inanimate matter; (2) the laws of animal nutrition, digestion, etc.; (3) the laws of nature, which are the rules imposed by God on men and discoverable by reason alone; and (4) the revealed or divine law, which is part of the law of nature directly expounded by God." All of these are connected, in his view, by this common element, that they are "rules of action dictated by some superior being."¹

Take Montesquieu as a type of a confused eighteenth-century man of science. He begins his famous *Esprit des Lois* with the remark: "Les lois, dans la signification la plus étendue, sont les rapports nécessaires qui dérivent de la nature des choses, et dans ce sens tous les êtres ont leur lois. La Divinité a ses lois, le monde matériel a ses lois, les intelligences supérieures à l'homme ont leurs lois, les bêtes ont leur lois, l'homme a ses lois." Austin quite justly observes respecting this definition that its terms are "incomparably more obscure than the term which it affects to expound."²

No advance whatever was possible either in the theory of jurisprudence or in the philosophy of nature so long as a term so vital to each as the term "law" lay thus shrouded in the mists of ambiguity. It was one of the most notable achievements of nineteenth-century jurists and natural philosophers that, aided by logicians,³ they delimited their respective

¹ Cf. Prof. E. Robertson, *Encyclo. Brit.*, 9th ed., article *Law*.

² Austin, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., p. 211. Austin's observation might with equal justice be applied to the dissertation "Concerning Laws and their Several Kinds," to which Book I. of Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity* is devoted.

³ See, for example, Whately, *Elements of Logic*, Appendix I. (on Ambiguous Terms); Jevons, *Principles of Science*; Keynes, *Formal Logic*; Ritchie, *Philosophical Studies*. pp. 136, 236, 270.

spheres of influence and came to an agreement as to the precise and exact sense in which each would employ the common term. The natural philosophers admitted that the jurists had the prior claim to the term, and that “in all cases as applied to science it is a metaphor.”¹ They agreed to use it in the sense, and only in the sense, which they had made peculiarly their own, the sense connoting *order* or *uniformity of sequence*, so that a law in scientific terminology should always be a mental concept, a generalisation, “the abstract idea of the observed relations of phenomena, be those relations instances of causation or of mere succession and co-existence.”²

The jurists, on the other hand, appropriated the primary connotation of *force* or *authority*, and agreed to employ the term “law” only in the sense of “a general rule of human action.”³ This necessary logical delimitation, of course, does not mean that jurists ceased to pay any regard to the uniformity of conduct engendered by authoritative commands, still less that they denied that such uniformity did as a matter of fact result. It merely means that they ceased to regard the idea of resultant uniformity as being connoted by the term “law” as they used it. Similarly this logical delimitation does not mean that men of science ceased to consider the causes which led to the resultant uniformities of nature, still less that by restricting the connotation of the term to phenomena they denied the existence either of secondary causes or of a great First Cause by whose fiat the established uniformity had been instituted. It merely means that they ceased to regard the idea of causal authority as being connoted by the term “law” as they used it.⁴

Thus the ground was cleared and boundaries were fixed,

¹ *Reign of Law*, 18th ed., p. 63. ² Holland, *Jurisprudence*, 7th ed., p. 17.

³ Holland, *Jurisprudence*, 7th ed., pp. 21 and 37. Cf. also Argyll, *Reign of Law*, 18th ed., p. 64: “In its primary signification a law is the authoritative expression of human will enforced by power.”

⁴ It seems necessary to emphasise this point very strongly, because the Dean of Clogher, without a shadow of warrant, says of my criticism of his article: “Professor Hearnshaw seems to me to argue on the presupposition that there is no moral or spiritual meaning in the world at large. I argue on the opposite supposition.” HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. vi., p. 194.

and both jurists and men of science were able to set to work with success to develop their several regions of research.

II. LAW AS COMMAND.

Of law as command there is no need to say much here. Jurisprudence and its kindred sciences have their own problems and controversies, but most of these are not directly relevant to the present inquiry. One, however, must be mentioned. As to the *scope* of jurisprudence, Austin holds that the three marks of a law proper are (1) a wish emanating from (2) a determinate source, and enforceable by (3) a sanction or conditional evil to be incurred in case of disobedience. Thus he defines a law "in the most general and comprehensive acceptation in which the term, in its literal meaning, is employed" as "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him."¹ Now the requirement of a determinate source rules out completely customary rules and the precepts of so-called international law, and allows the injunctions of morality to have a place only under the guise of laws of God indirectly revealed. Holland therefore, in order to include these important bodies of rules of human action, relaxes the terms of admission, and merely demands of a law that it shall be "(1) expressible as a distinct proposition, (2) addressed to the will of a rational being, and (3) enforceable by a sanction."²

Jurists who accept the wider view, as stated by Holland, include within the scope of the sciences which deal with the rules of human action, first, *Divine Law*—that is, "the body of commandments which express the will of God with regard to the conduct of His intelligent creatures," whether these commandments are expressly revealed or are indirectly made known through the conscience; secondly, *Positive Law*—that is, the body of commandments imposed upon human inferiors by human superiors, by far the most important part of which are the commands of sovereign to subject; thirdly, *Law of*

¹ Austin, *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., p. 86.

² Holland, *Jurisprudence*, p. 21.

Opinion—the distinctive characteristic of which (especially as contrasted with the unrevealed law of God) is that it has no determinate source. It includes rules of human action so diverse as “laws of honour,” “laws of fashion,” “customary law,” and “international law.”

III. LAW AS GENERALISATION.

The idea of law as command is not at all difficult to comprehend: it is as obvious to the man who reads as is a policeman (who in one branch represents it) to the man who runs. But it is otherwise with the idea of law as generalisation. This is a subtler conception, and one more liable to be confounded with associated ideas. The fact that it has been misapprehended, or at least misstated, not only by crowds of minor writers, but even now and again by men of acknowledged intellectual eminence, shows that in stating it there is need to pay the most careful attention both to thought and to expression in order to escape from error. I therefore make no apology for collecting on this page from the writings of various distinguished thinkers a somewhat unusually large number of authoritative definitions of “law” as the term is used in science. I want to have them behind me as supports when I venture to criticise the terminological inexactitudes of some other scarcely less distinguished men. I have already quoted, but I will make bold to repeat, Professor Holland’s admirably lucid statement. He defines law as used in the theoretical sciences—that is, as used in such sciences as physics or biology—as “the abstract idea of the observed relations of phenomena, be those relations instances of causation or of mere succession and co-existence.” This definition brings out prominently the essential point. Law in the scientific sense is an *abstract idea*. It is capable of expression—that is, of formulation and communication as a statement; nay, more, it must necessarily be formulated as a statement; but it has no existence save in the mind that frames it and the mind that receives it. It is a *general conception* of a supposed universal

truth which the mind forms from the contemplation of a necessarily limited number of phenomena in which it is verifiable. Lotze emphasises this same essential point, viz., that law in the scientific sense is purely subjective, when he says that, "Stated in its complete logical form a law is always a *universal hypothetical judgment*, which states that whenever A is or holds good, B is or holds good."¹ So, too, agrees the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which defines law, "in the sciences of observation," as "*a theoretical principle deduced from particular facts, applicable to a defined group or class of phenomena, and expressible by the statement that a particular phenomenon always occurs if certain conditions be present.*" Since then it is a general proposition based upon the observations of a limited (however large) number of facts, a law of science can never to any finite mind attain any higher position than that of a provisional hypothesis.² There is always the possibility (however remote) that new facts will come to light which will not fit in with the hypothesis. For example, until recently no generalisation of physics was more firmly held to be universally true than the so-called "law of the conservation of energy." But the phenomena of radio-activity appear to conflict with it: heat and light seem to emanate from radium without the occurrence of any corresponding loss. Physicists are extremely, and properly, loth to admit these phenomena to be the first great exception to a proposition which hitherto has in countless cases unvaryingly proved to be true. But they are compelled to hold judgment in reserve. So that when Sir Oliver Lodge says that "natural philosophers will not be prepared to tolerate any the least departure from the law of the conservation of energy,"³ all he can possibly mean is that they have found by experience

¹ Lotze, *Metaphysics* (Eng. trans., 1884), p. 333.

² Cf. James, *Pragmatism*, p. 57: "As the sciences have developed . . . the notion has gained ground that most, perhaps all, our laws are only approximations. . . . Their great use is to summarise old facts and to lead to new ones. They are a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand (as someone calls them) in which we write our reports of nature."

³ *Nature*, April 23, 1907, quoted HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. vi., p. 194.

that the principle which they have formulated has in the past proved so consistently and without exception to be true that they will require demonstration of a peculiarly convincing kind before they will be prepared to modify it.

The remaining definitions of law in the scientific sense of the word I will add without comment. They are not all equally good, and if space allowed I should be prepared to criticise some of them. They all, however, serve to iterate the point, which needs so much driving home, viz., that law in this sense is a mere abstract idea, having an existence only in the mind, expressible as a statement or proposition—that, and nothing more than that. Professor Henry Drummond writes: “The laws of nature are simply statements of the orderly condition of things in nature; what is found in nature by a sufficient number of competent observers. . . . They [the laws of nature] may have no more absolute existence than parallels of latitude.”¹ Professor W. B. Carpenter states that scientific laws are “nothing but comprehensive expressions of aggregates of particular facts, giving no rationale of them whatsoever.”² Von Helmholtz uses similar language when he says that “law is nothing more than the general conception in which a series of similarly recurring natural processes may be embraced.”³ Thomas Reid expresses essentially the same view in his statement that “the laws of nature are nothing else but the most general facts relating to the operations of nature.”⁴ Mr Herbert Spencer remarks that “familiarity with uniformities has generated the abstract conception of uniformity, the idea of law”;⁵ and again, that “the accepted conception of law is that of an established order to which the manifestations of a power or force conform.”⁶ Finally, Professor Huxley⁷ gives a popular statement of the case in the words: “Law means a rule which we have always found to hold good, and which we expect always will hold good.”⁸

¹ *Nat. Law Spir. World*, 21st ed., pp. 5-6. ² *Prin. of Ment. Phys.*, p. 693.

³ *Pop. Lect. Scient. Subjects*, p. 370. ⁴ *Inquiry into Human Mind*, vi., p. 13.

⁵ *First Principles*, p. 142. ⁶ *Stud. Sociol.* ii., p. 42. ⁷ *Lay Sermons*, p. 340.

⁸ Even the Dean of Clogher is almost correct when in one passing remark

It is surely not necessary for me to labour the point any more. But perhaps I may be permitted to give one example of law as generalisation, and to choose as that example the "law of gravitation," the precise nature of which the Dean of Clogher "fails to understand." The law of gravitation is that abstract general conception, derived from the discovery and observation of certain particular uniformities, which had its rise in the mind of Newton, and which he embodied in the general proposition, "Every particle of matter in the universe attracts every other particle with a force whose direction is that of the straight line joining the two, and whose magnitude is proportional directly as the product of their masses, and inversely as the square of their mutual distance." Now, having thus seen what the law of gravitation is, let us see what it is *not*. First, it is *not* the uniform sequences themselves, which Newton discovered and observed: he observed, comparatively speaking, but a few; his conception, derived inductively from his observations, extends to "every particle of matter in the universe"—obviously a provisional hypothesis only. Moreover, it is *not* the sum total of all such uniform sequences. Each one of these is merely an isolated phenomenon of nature. The idea which comprehends and unifies them is the "law." Secondly, it is *not* the force of gravity, whose uniform operation produced those sequences from observations of which Newton inferred the principle which he embodied in his "law." Yet few expressions are commoner in popular parlance than such totally erroneous statements as that the "law of gravitation" (instead of the "force of gravity") causes a body to fall to the ground. Thirdly and finally, it is *not* the creative fiat, the divine command, according to which the force of gravity began to operate and still operates with unvarying uniformity. Newton firmly believed

he defines "physical law" as "a description of a fact that the forces of nature act with uniformity" (HIBBERT JOURNAL, vi. 194). But if he accepts his own definition that physical law is a *description*, what becomes of all his other statements? For example, is "the violation of a physical law" the violation of a *description*? And what is a description's "ruthless penalty"?

in the reality of the divine fiat, but he made no reference to it, direct or indirect, in his “law.” Now, in my criticism of the Dean of Clogher’s article on “The Forgiveness of Sin,” I stated the correct scientific view of the law of gravitation, when I said: “This law [that is, this abstract general conception] did not exist till Newton formulated it. It was by him derived inductively from observations. It is liable at any moment to be proved to be false by further observations.”¹ Yet the Dean of Clogher comments thus: “These are, certainly, remarkable statements. It raises one’s opinion of human intelligence to learn that Newton did not only discover the law of gravitation, but made it. I fail to understand how a law could be derived ‘inductively from observations’ before it began to exist. The planet Neptune was discovered through the inductive observations of Leverrier and Adams; but it existed long before they, noticing the disturbance in the movements of Uranus, the former asked Dr Calle of Berlin to look for it.”² Is it possible to imagine a more complete agglomeration and confusion of things disparate than is exemplified in this “remarkable” criticism? First, in the phrase “discovered the law of gravitation,” the law is confused with the observed uniformities from which it was derived. Newton did not “discover” the law; he discovered or observed certain facts of nature, and, reasoning from them, he *conceived* and *formulated* the law. Secondly, in the phrase (used, of course, ironically), “Newton . . . made it,” the law of gravitation is confused with the force of gravity! Thirdly, the concluding parallel, if it means anything at all, means that the law of gravitation is somewhat of the nature of a planet! One is irresistibly reminded of those “most gross and scarcely credible errors,” of which Austin gave some horrid examples in his day.³

Confusions of this kind, though very rarely quite so complex and varied as the one just quoted, are to be met with very commonly in theological, in philosophical, and even

¹ HIBBERT JOURNAL, v. 911. ² *Ibid.*, vi. 193. ³ *Jurisprudence*, 5th ed., p. 209.

in scientific writings. It will be found, I think, that in every case where writers, having escaped what may be termed the vulgar error of confounding law as command with law as generalisation, have yet gone wrong, they have done so by confusing law as an abstract mental conception with one or more of the following closely associated things:—(1) The uniformities, ordered sequences of events, or modes of operation of natural forces from the discovery or observation of which the law was inferred, or by the further observation of which it continues to be exemplified; or (2) the natural forces themselves whose uniform working produced the phenomena from the discovery or observation of which the law was inferred, etc.; or (3) the mind or will behind these forces—the fiat which is conceived of as having created them and as maintaining them in their eternal regularity of operation. I have before me as I write a choice collection of some dozens of examples of errors in the use of the term “law” in its scientific sense. I must, however, restrict myself to the giving of one specimen of each of the above-mentioned sources of confusion. (1) *Law erroneously regarded as a uniformity.* No less eminent a thinker than John Stuart Mill is guilty of the misstatement, unpardonable in a logician, that “the expression ‘the laws of nature’ means nothing but the uniformities that exist among natural phenomena.”¹ The definitions given above make it clear that he should have said “the abstract conception derived from the observation of the uniformities,” etc. (2) *Law erroneously regarded as a force.* The Rev. William Arthur says: “A person who throws himself over a precipice is as perfectly under command of the law of gravitation as one who lies on a sofa. The man is broken, but the law was never for a moment deprived of its control.”² Here, of course, “the law of gravitation” simply stands for “the

¹ *Logic*, i., p. 365.

² *On the Difference between Physical and Moral Law*, p. 139, compare also the Dean of Clogher: “When a man ignores physical law he suffers for his act.” —HIBBERT JOURNAL, vi. 194. Here for “law” read “force.”

force of gravity.”¹ (3) *Law erroneously regarded as established by a power behind natural forces.* Sir William Blackstone, in the opening part of his *Commentaries*, already alluded to, writes that when God “put matter into motion He established certain laws of motion to which all movable matter must conform.” Professor Robertson having quoted this passage, remarks that “nonsense like this so exasperated Austin that he never fails to stigmatise the use of the term ‘natural laws’ in the sense of scientific facts as improper or metaphorical.”² Austin, of course, never dreamed of denying that either *matter* or *force* was created by God: his piety was as conspicuous as the lucidity of his thought and the heaviness of his style. But he protested with all the energy of which he was capable against the hopeless confusion engendered by calling either force or the creative word which brought it into being and sustained it by the name of “natural law.”

IV. THE MEETING-PLACE OF THE MEANINGS.

If science had to do solely with external nature, inorganic and organic, then, since the subject-matter of jurisprudence and ethics lies wholly within the region of the human will, there would be a probability that speedily the idea of law as command would be completely disentangled from the idea of law as generalisation. But there are mental and moral as well as natural sciences, and in such of them as deal with the human will, *i.e.* investigate and generalise concerning that very sphere within which law as command has its field of operation, it is some-

¹ “Perfectly under command” is inexact, since other forces than gravity are also in operation; moreover, the word “command” is open to the objection that it trenches on the province of jurisprudence.

² *Encyclo. Brit.*, 9th ed., s.v. *Law*. It may be mentioned in passing that “nonsense like this” is profusely scattered throughout Rev. William Arthur’s Fernley Lecture, *On the Difference between Physical and Moral Law* (1883). Instance the statement “moral law represents two wills, physical law represents but one” (p. 122), and the definition of physical laws as “the provisions by which order . . . is preserved in the realms of physics” (p. 18). What would Austin have said and done if he had been present when these utterances were delivered?

times extremely difficult (though it is pre-eminently necessary) to keep the generalisations of the sciences clear of the subject-matter of which they treat. The sciences to which I specially refer are, of course, jurisprudence, ethics, and theology.¹

Jurisprudence is the abstract science of positive law, and its proper subject-matter is law as set by sovereign to subject. The generalisations of the science of jurisprudence are therefore laws concerning laws. The same may be said of generalisations of ethics concerning the phenomena of the moral law, and of the generalisations of theology concerning the operations of the divine law. The expression "moral law" cannot be claimed exclusively by either philosophers or preachers of righteousness. St Paul promulgated a moral law of the juridical type when he wrote "Pray without ceasing." Mrs Besant formulated a moral law of the scientific type when she said in her autobiography (I quote from memory), "God fades out of the lives of those who cease from prayer." In the moral world, that is to say, we find both uniform sequences of cause and effect, and commands enforced by sanctions. Within this sphere, then, we come to the meeting-place of the two meanings of the term law, and it is sometimes hard to say on which side of the boundary we stand. To take one instance: "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Is that a threat, equivalent to a negative command, Thou shalt not sin, for if thou sinnest thou shalt die? Or is it a mere statement of a universal truth; the abstract conception of an unvarying sequence of cause and effect, in the spiritual world; the scientific law of sin and death? It may equally be one or the other, or even both at the same time. For it may be universally true as a statement because it is unvaryingly enforced as a threat. The consideration of this solitary example will be sufficient to show how exceptionally careful philosophers and theologians have need to be when they employ the term "law"; for unless they dis-

¹ There is another science of a kindred group, political economy, the laws of which have been a subject of much controversy, but to discuss them would lead me too far afield.

criminate with the nicest caution they almost inevitably let loose the floodgates of nonsense, and (to repeat Austin's expressive metaphor) deluge the field of jurisprudence and morals with muddy speculation.

V. SOME DOUBTFUL PHRASES.

My space is more than exhausted ; but had I been able to condense the preceding parts of my article into smaller compass, I should have liked to round off my treatment of the term “law” by analysing some popular phrases in which it is loosely or erroneously employed. In every case, save one, however, I must be content simply to mention the phrase in question, merely expressing the hope that I have succeeded in making the distinction between law as command and law as generalisation sufficiently clear to my readers to enable them, even if they were in some uncertainty on the matter before, to apply the touchstone of exact definition and detect by its aid the element of error. The phrases I refer to are: (1) “*the reign of law*,” as employed by the late Duke of Argyll in the title of his book ; (2) “*creation, by law*,” as used by Mr Alfred Russell Wallace as the title of an article in the *Journal of Science*, October 1867 ; (3) “*the prevalence of law*” and “*the operation of law*,” as found in Dr Salmon's utterances quoted in the HIBBERT JOURNAL (vi. p. 194) ; (4) “*the dominion of law*,” as it is employed by Professor Tyndall in his Belfast Addresses ; (5) “*governed by invariable law*,” as used by John Stuart Mill in his statement, amazingly inexact in its phraseology, of the leading article of the Positivist creed.¹ All these phrases I pass by without comment. To those who have laid hold of the true ideas of the two essentially different kinds of laws their inexactitude lies upon their face : they all confuse the juridical and the scientific senses of the term.

¹ Mill, *Auguste Comte and Positivism*, 2nd ed., p. 12 : “All phenomena without exception are governed by invariable laws with which no volitions either human or superhuman interfere.” The Duke of Argyll would seem to

But I must beg leave to deal in my closing words more at length with a phrase which one hears incessantly from pulpits, the phrase which was peculiarly at issue between myself and the Dean of Clogher in our previous discussion—I mean the phrase “*a violation of physical law.*” The Dean enunciated the principle that “sin against God may be regarded . . . as a breach of His moral law analogous to a violation of physical law”; he developed the supposed analogy thus: “We know for certain that there is no such thing as forgiveness of an offence committed against physical law,” and he gave as an illustration: “Whether a man who cannot swim falls into deep water because he neglected to keep his balance, or because he stumbled over an obstacle, or whether he throws himself in on purpose, in each case the result is the same. The water has no forgiveness,” etc., etc.¹ Now, with respect to this illustration, it may be granted that a person who *deliberately* throws himself into deep water and drowns himself violates some kind of law. But, need it be said, it is not in any admissible, or even intelligible, sense *physical* law. It is the law of God, the law of the land, the law of positive morality, or some similar general command which enjoins him not to injure or destroy himself. It is evident, however, that those who in a case of this kind use the phrase “a violation of physical law” have in their minds some idea beyond this, which they are seeking by the phrase to express. They seek, it would seem, to express the idea of the remorseless uniformity of the operation of the physical forces which caused the suicide’s destruction. If that is the case, it must be remarked that they use a mode of expression condensed to absurdity. To attain to accuracy, or even to meaning, the abbreviation “a violation of physical law” must be expanded into some such

have had this ill-conceived and loosely-worded generalisation in his mind as he wrote: “When, therefore, scientific men talk, as they often do, of all phenomena being governed by invariable law, they use language which is ambiguous, and in most cases they use it in a sense which covers an erroneous idea of the facts.”—*Reign of Law*, 18th ed., p. 98. The objectionable words are, of course, “governed” and “invariable.”

¹ HIBBERT JOURNAL, v. p. 589.

ponderous form as “*a violation of the commands, human or divine, which forbid a man to kill himself by misemploying those forces of nature whose uniformity of operation is predicated in those generalisations which are termed physical law.*” It will be seen that a good deal of heavy extraneous matter, by no means implied in the phrase, has to be packed between its two ends if it is to be made to fit the requirements of accurate definition. So much for the case in which a man *deliberately* drowns himself. But what of the case in which *by sheer accident and mischance*, “because he stumbled over an obstacle,” he falls in and loses his life? What kind of law, physical or other, is violated either by him, or in his case? The unfortunate man lies a corpse at the bottom of the water, but he has disobeyed no command, human or divine; the forces of nature have operated with their accustomed uniformity; the generalisations of Newton and other men of science have received another sad exemplification and confirmation. That is all. Again I ask, and I specially ask the Dean of Clogher, what law, of any kind whatsoever, is violated by, or in the case of, a man who “because he stumbled over an obstacle” falls into deep water and is drowned? My own answer to the question of course is, *absolutely none whatever*, and I hold that in this case the phrase “a violation of physical law” is not only, as it stands, meaningless, but that it cannot by any conceivable expansion or interpretation be made to have a meaning. If I am right, what pernicious errors have flowed from the idea that such an unhappy victim of incalculable Fate, or act of God, is, though innocent of all offence, paying the penalty of a violated law which knows no forgiveness! What countless false analogies have been drawn from the mechanically regular operations of natural forces to the operations of wills, human and divine, which *can* impose commands and remove them, *can* punish the disobedient and pardon those who repent.

F. J. C. HEARNshaw.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—Ed.

CHRISTIAN MORALITY.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1908, p. 430.)

MR JAKUES's criticism of my article in the *Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, contains certain fundamental misconceptions which it is desirable to correct. (1) In speaking of the "preoccupation" of Christ with the religious problem, I did not, of course, mean to suggest that his teaching did not "express his normal opinions," but simply that religion was for him "the essential and all-important element in the life of man—the essential and all-important, but not, therefore, the exclusive interest of that life." Indeed, to call religion the supremely important element is an inadequate statement of the place assigned to it in his thought, as if it were only one among the other elements, *primus inter pares*; it is rather the life itself, of which all other interests are the elements or materials. On the other hand, the subordination of the other interests to the religious interest does not imply the mere "acquiescence" of the religious man in these interests. Such an external and mechanical interpretation of the subordination in question is entirely inadequate to the relation. So far from killing all other enthusiasms, the Christian "enthusiasm of humanity" ought to inform and inspire them all. Though subordinated to the religious, the intellectual and artistic life is, in Mr Jaques's own words, "inextricably bound up and interlocked with the religious. . . . One is as necessary as the other. Together they form the expression of a man's character, his total relation to his experience." To the contention that "no system of human conduct can be complete, or even altogether beneficial, which does not take account of these things [civilisation, culture, work and industry] as such," it must be replied that Christianity is not, and does not profess to be, a "system of human conduct," but a unifying principle, a gospel or inspiration for human life, the application and detailed significance of which the individual must discover for himself, under the guidance of his growing experience. While I admit, then, that Christian

morality, not merely "as taught by Christ," but as interpreted by ourselves, "is to some extent both negative and ascetic," and would insist upon the permanent truth of this aspect of it, I cannot admit that it was for him or is for us merely negative or ascetic, or that "in its relation to certain fundamental phases of man's mind it does tend to destroy self-respect."

(2) It follows that "modern Christianity need not coincide with Christianity as deliberately taught by Christ," if by "deliberately" is meant "explicitly." We have undoubtedly discovered a new religious significance in phases of human life, industrial, æsthetic, and intellectual, as well as social and political, which seem to have contained no such significance for the Founder of Christianity or for the early Christians. The real question at issue here is as to the meaning of "development" in morality. Mr Jaques says, somewhat enigmatically, that "Christ's teaching is capable of being developed, perhaps, along its own lines, but if we *put in* something, the germ of which was not there originally, we cannot call the product Christianity." The question, of course, is whether the "germ" of so-called modern Christianity is to be found in the Christianity of the Gospels; but to refuse to recognise the presence of that which is not present in fully developed and explicit form is to contradict the idea of development. What precisely does Mr Jaques mean by saying that the development of Christ's teaching must be "along its own lines"? If he means "along the lines of its own essential spirit," we must agree with this limitation of the idea of development; if he means "along the lines of its own explicit applications," we must contend that it is in the discovery of new applications and implications that the development of its true significance is to be sought.

(3) While I admit that when it is handled in this way the teaching of Christ loses the "authority" which has been traditionally attributed to it, I cannot admit that it loses "the authority which must characterise such a teaching if it is to be treated seriously." The admission that the insight of Christ was limited in many inevitable ways does not imply any derogation from his authority as a spiritual teacher.

JAMES SETH.

EDINBURGH.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH: WHAT IS IT?

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1908, p. 281.)

In this article, the object of the Bishop of Carlisle seems to be to reduce the idea of the Catholic Church to the mere abstract characteristics of Love, Faith, and Hope. But is it not confusing the real issues at stake to argue that since Catholicity cannot be found in universal agreement of doctrine, or harmony of practice, it is only to be discovered in the exercise of Christian virtues? History is, indeed, variously inter-

preted, and the interpretation placed upon it by the Bishop of Carlisle is, to say the least of it, extraordinary. He begins by stating that the different emphasis laid upon different points of doctrine or discipline by different Apostles is an argument against Catholicity, and then proceeds to regard the religious strife of the fifth and following centuries as the direct result of œcumenical councils, ignoring the logical proposition *post hoc non ergo propter hoc*.

The rise of the Papacy is regarded as an incident which is the outcome of the personal ambition of individual popes, and not, as historians, such as Creighton and Wakeman, demonstrate, the inevitable outcome of the break-up of the religious, social, and political systems of Europe. There is here an obvious failure to recognise the extent to which Christianity fell under the influence of a decaying paganism, and to which also during the Middle Ages, and indeed later, the religion of Europe was really only a paganised Christianity, or a Christianised paganism. The same dimness of vision is surely noticeable in the way in which the English Church is regarded. The Bishop seems to ignore the great truth of diversity in unity when he describes as a terrible inaccuracy the statement contained in the two well-known hymn lines :

“ We are not divided, all one body we,
One in hope and doctrine, one in charity.”

So far as Christianity itself is concerned, and that is what the hymn deals with, its *one* hope is the Lord Jesus Christ, its *one* doctrine His divinity, its *one* charity the brotherhood of man ; and this unity of hope, doctrine, charity, is the hall-mark of the Christian in every part of the globe. But within this unity there is surely room for almost endless variety ; and in that variety resides the very principle of Life itself, of which our conception of God, One in Three, forms an obvious illustration.

The Bishop asks for some definition of Anglo-Catholicism, and follows with a string of questions tending to prove that there is no such thing at all. But surely Catholicism, as well as Catholicity, is to be found in the maintenance of fundamental doctrine, rather than in the necessary development or expression of that doctrine to suit the particular mental attitude produced by varying national life and circumstance ? The Bishop seems to think that Catholicism resides only in the practice of Faith, Hope, and Love ; but each of these virtues must have some definite object which is Catholic in order to give it a Christian direction, and it is no difficult matter to cut our way through the growth of centuries to the bed-rock of the Christian Faith.

In every country, and in whatever manner Christianity may be taught, its fundamental doctrine must surely be the Divinity of Christ, whether that Divinity is described as homoousion or homoiousion. Grouped with it must be the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God and the Divine Personality of the Holy Ghost, apart altogether from the question of double or single Procession. So much for the residence of Catholicity in doctrine.

The question of Episcopacy is one of Church government. When we find that from sub-apostolic times until recent date the universal method of Church government was the Episcopal, we are justified in saying that so far as government is concerned, apart altogether from doctrine, Episcopacy is a mark in this respect of Catholicity. This is not to deny the blessing of the Holy Spirit to Nonconformity any more than it is to deny that same blessing to whatever of truth may be found in what we call the Pagan systems of religion. The unity of the Church must be cemented by the exercise of Christian virtues, but it cannot be said wholly to reside in them. "Wisdom is justified of all her children," but the fact that a pear-tree bears a fine crop of fruit does not make it an apple-tree. The definition of the Church as given in our Articles "as a congregation of men where the pure Word of God is preached and the Sacraments '*duly*' administered," will surely provide a sufficient basis for discovery of the meaning of the term Catholic; and so far as the Anglican branch of the Catholic Church is concerned, the words and teaching of the Catechism will supply all that is necessary in the way of doctrine, while the verdict of Church history as to the simple government of the Church by bishops, apart altogether from the worldly ambitions of Episcopacy influenced by paganism, is sufficient to indicate where Catholicity in Church government is to be found. To go beyond this and emphasise the differences which have arisen and which always must exist in the teaching of different sections of the Christian community as disproving the existence of Catholicity at all, is to confuse the great issue at stake and possibly to obscure the unity of the Church as the one body owning allegiance to One Head—even Christ.

F. L. H. MILLARD.

WHAT AND WHERE IS THE SOUL?

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1908, p. 432.)

MR CYRIL H. FOX HARVEY's criticism in the January issue of the *Hibbert Journal* demands a brief reply.

Undoubtedly, my definition of the *soul* as "that which *feels*" leads to the conclusion that *some* of the lower animals have souls; but I cannot quite see how it leads to the conclusion that *all* the lower animals have souls. Mr Harvey overlooks that, in the very first paragraph of my paper, I draw a sharp line of demarcation between *sensation* and *life*. My words are as follows:—

"By express definition, therefore, the *soul* alone *feels*, has *sensation*, and is *conscious*; and anything that never feels, that is always insensible or unconscious, is not entitled to the name of *soul*. Like the plant or animal body, it may be spoken of as *alive* or *dead*, but not as *soul*."

Mr Harvey does not believe that an amœba has a soul. Neither do I.

But then I do not believe that an amœba ever *feels*. Mr Harvey apparently thinks it does ; but on what grounds ? Has it a brain and nervous system ? My definition leads, on the one hand, to the conclusion that all *sentient* animals have souls—or rather, that a soul (wherever situated) may feel through the instrumentality of an animal's nervous system. On the other hand, my definition leads to the conclusion that *non-sentient* animals have no souls, because they have no brain or nervous system through which sensation can be transmitted.

I did not speak of my hypothesis, that “the material body, including the brain and the whole nervous system, is a mere medium or instrument of sensory transmission, and is itself as insensible as the material apparatus in wireless telegraphy,” as an hypothesis “capable of proof.” On the contrary, as Mr Harvey admits in his opening sentence, but forgets in his last, I spoke of it as “at present unprovable, but also unrefutable.” That is my opinion still, after a careful perusal of Mr Harvey's attempted refutation.

HUGH MACCOLL.

BOULOGNE-SUR-MER.

CONGREGATIONALISM AND UNITARIANISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1908, pp. 307–8.)

IN his article on “The Religion of Sensible Scotsmen,” Dr Wallace asserts that it is “almost self-evident that the more militant and progressive Congregationalism on both sides of the Tweed is passing, not slowly but swiftly, into Unitarianism of the kind which is exemplified in the teaching of Mr Stopford Brooke.” I submit that, so far as Congregational ministers in Scotland are concerned, this statement is not according to fact. Without discussing the precise difference between the Unitarianism of Mr Brooke and that of the body of ministers and churches known under that designation, it may be sufficient to state that Congregational ministers and churches in Scotland, with very few exceptions, belong to a body called the “Congregational Union of Scotland,” whose members profess to hold that Jesus Christ is “God Incarnate,” and that through “His Person and work and the saving and sanctifying grace of God the Holy Spirit, God the Father, in His love, has made provision for and is seeking the salvation of all men.” I do not know that words could more specifically indicate the difference between this view of the Person of Christ and that of Unitarians of any type, and Dr Wallace could not, I believe, have been aware of this declaration when he penned the words I have quoted.

JAMES ROSS, D.D.

GLASGOW.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

(Hibbert Journal, January 1908, p. 291.)

THERE is a certain amount of confusion, and novelty as compared with ordinary philosophic use, *e.g.* in the statement, "*Soul* appears to be the link between '*spirit*' and '*matter*.'" Again, there seems an unjustifiable distinction between "*form*" and "*matter*." It is not, however, these points I wish to discuss. Sir Oliver Lodge would, no doubt, agree that there are limits to the extent to which we can trace back "the history of material aggregates," so that science *qua* science cannot say that there is an infinite regress of "material aggregates" in this history. The scientists can only say that, so far as they can go, they find such "material aggregates." How is it, then, that "never in physical science . . . do we state that they vanish into nothingness, nor do we ever conjecture that they rose from nothing"? It is simply because *ex nihilo nihil fit* or *causa æquat effectum* is a necessity of thought. This, however, gives no ground for saying that there is an infinite regress of "material aggregates." The so-called "material aggregates" may have begun as the effect of pre-existing mind. This would account for the facts we know, and would quite satisfy the necessity of thought quoted above—*ex nihilo nihil fit*. Again, I am not so sure that "we must be speaking truly" when we say that "Nature is an aspect of the Divine Being." *Perhaps* we may say that "Nature is one of the effects produced in our minds by the Divine Being." But this does not, as the writer says, "strengthen our argument as to *its* (*i.e.* *Nature's*) durability and permanence"; for God might conceivably cease to produce *this* effect we call Nature upon us and might produce some totally different effect. We must agree, through the necessity of thought quoted above, that "no really existing thing (?) perishes." But when the writer goes on to imply, as he seems to do, that "matter and energy" or "ether and motion" never perish *as such*, then I would say that physical science has no ground—except, perhaps, a methodological one, for "teaching this." It is only an assumption, then, that "aqueous vapour persists (eternally, I suppose, in whatever sense that word is used) an intrinsically imperishable substance *with all the properties* which enabled it to condense into drop or cloud." We might just as well assume immortality itself as try to base it on an analogy with this assumption.

Suppose, however, we granted the eternal persistence of "matter and energy" or "ether and motion." We accept, as is implied in the article, that the "self" is a unity, not composite. The "self" or "soul," therefore, has not come into existence as a certain aggregate which might possibly be broken up and the "parts" formed into a new aggregate. This being the case, on the analogy used by Sir Oliver Lodge we get an eternally persisting self or soul, *i.e.* we have pre-existence as well as immortality.

A. G. WIDGERY.

REVIEWS

The Philosophical Basis of Religion: A Series of Lectures.—By John Watson, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada.—James MacLehose & Sons, Glasgow, 1907.—Pp. xxvi + 485.

THE series of seventeen lectures of which this book is composed constitutes a most valuable complement to the two series of Gifford Lectures delivered by Dr Edward Caird. By taking them together the reflective reader will discover what manner of message the speculative Idealists have to convey to a time like ours, marked by the confusion and unrest which have invaded its religious life; and he will desire no higher praise of Dr Watson's *Philosophical Basis of Religion* than that it is worthy to complement the *Evolution of Religion* and the *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* of Dr Edward Caird. Dr Caird defines his own position in his *Evolution of Religion* by making a critical use of the doctrines of Mr Herbert Spencer and Professor Max Müller. Dr Watson makes a similar use of the views of Newman, Dr Wilfrid Ward, the Abbé Loisy, Harnack, the "New Realists," and the "Personal Idealists." In his *Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers* Dr Caird deals specially with the doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Philo, and Plotinus, and his treatment of these philosophers, in its reference to his own particular purpose, is quite unrivalled in our literature. Dr Watson, in the historical portion of his book, gives a fuller account of Philo and the Gnostic Theology, and, in addition, of Augustine's Phases of Faith and Theology, of Mediæval Theology, and of Leibniz and Protestant Theology.

Dr Watson's own view is adumbrated throughout the critical and historical portions of the book. But, in the last two lectures, he gives in a summary way a direct exposition of the main principles which he holds, and of the results he has reached by that "complete revision of current theological ideas," "nothing short of which can bring permanent satisfaction to our highly reflective age." Dr Watson is well known to philosophic readers for the precision of his language and the clearness of his thought. Critics who may not sympathise either with his method or with his results will acknowledge that he makes his doctrine so plain that it requires a

perverse mind to misinterpret it. And he does not incite perversity in his critics. On the contrary, in his statement of their views what comes first is his acknowledgment of the elements of truth which they contain; and the whole spirit of his dealings with them is placid and just.

"The decisive battles of theology," said Mr Balfour in one of his telling phrases, "are fought beyond its frontiers. It is not over purely religious controversies that the cause of Religion is lost or won. The judgments we shall form upon its special problems are commonly settled for us by our general mode of looking at the Universe."¹ For Dr Watson the relation of theology and philosophy is still more intimate. He is "convinced that the theology of the future must take the form of a philosophy of religion." Such language as this is significant in the mouth of an Idealist of the school of Dr Watson. It implies a profound departure from the ordinary methods of theology. It challenges the critics of Idealism all along the line; and they cannot accept the philosophical substitute, without what Professor James would regard as "a change of heart." Philosophy will appear to them to lack the secure foundations that they desire for theology, and to be meagre and indefinite in its results.

There is a sense in which their refusal will be just. For philosophy, to the Idealist who knows his business as Dr Watson does, is a process. "The Philosophy of Religion is a systematic formulation of the rational principle which differentiates itself in all experience and makes it a coherent whole, not a thing of shreds and patches. This idea of a self-differentiating principle is the central thought of the whole course of lectures," "the whole inquiry culminating in the concrete idea of God." But if the philosophy of religion is to be a true reflection of a process, of the process of a single principle which differentiates itself, and which differentiates itself "in *all* experience," the very conception of "fixed foundations" or of "final results" is inept and misleading. And the question arises naturally whether the religious thought of any age will prefer to commit itself to the movement of a self-enriching reconstruction rather than to definite, but changing, dogmata. The philosophy of religion may never "take the place of theology," except for philosophers. Philosophy in becoming a theology must betray its own character, unless theology changes its attitude so profoundly as not to desire any fixed dogmata.

So far we have not arrived at this stage. There is, it is true, no lack of "unrest and confusion" in our modern religious thought. But escape from the "unrest and confusion" is still sought in firm and changeless "foundations" and final results. Appeal is still made to authority, that is, to something, either within or without — and it matters little which,—that shall prescribe dogmatic contents of faith, and override or ignore the testimony of reason. It is also true that the idea of evolution is being applied to religion and theology, as it is to all other departments of experience; but it is not either in character or in scope the evolution which a philosophy of religion demands. It is

¹ Preface to *The Foundations of Belief*.

not the evolution of the principle of *the whole* of experience; but something or other is held back, and reserved as a fixed core that shall be changeless. And that fixed core is dogmatically accepted: it is some pin-point rock to which the mind would cling amidst the flux of opinions. But philosophy would have us commit ourselves to the waves. It lives *in* the process. It does not begin its constructive work till scepticism has finished its work, and destroyed every vestige of reliance upon any *particular* revelation, or any *particular* dogma, or any *particular* subjective need, or impulse, or idea native to the individual spirit. It presumes that it must begin with the whole if it is to explain the whole; and the whole with which it begins is nothing but a problem—a problem *assumed* to be soluble (which is the condition of its being a problem), and therefore a whole which is *presumed* to be rational. This point of view is as alien to ordinary thought when it is applied to religion as it is natural to ordinary thought when it is applied to morality. It is acknowledged generally that the moral life is a process, and that the process is inspired by a conception of the Good which articulates itself as it is embodied in experience. The justification of the moral principle lies in the organising power it manifests in a growing moral life, which makes that life throb more and more in unison with the nature of things and with the principle of all reality, which is God. But we have not as yet learnt to treat truth—and, least of all, theological truth—as we treat goodness, nor turned our backs upon static categories.

These are the considerations, it seems to me, which constitute the background or the inmost spirit of Dr Watson's whole endeavour. They also bind the critical, the historical, and the constructive parts of his work into one consistent and luminous whole. From beginning to end he is observing the process by which "the religious consciousness is gradually clarified and enriched," by which its idea of God becomes more concrete, as "the principle which differentiates itself in all experience."

The contrast between his doctrine and that of Newman, and his whole attack upon the religion of "Authority," serves to illuminate Dr Watson's own position. For the development of religion as conceived by Newman was "a mere enlargement of features present from the first, rather than a genuine evolution." Within the process there was a dogmatic element that could suffer no change and which the Church had to guard by its authority. The dogma was not a living principle growing in its application to, or rather its realisation within, the life of the world, but an accretion of symbols—symbols to which faith might cling, but whose truth the mind cannot grasp.

The same fallacious use of the idea of evolution, and the same ultimate separation of religious life and religious dogma, of living faith and of theoretic knowledge, of the "heart" and the "intellect," is found by Dr Watson in the doctrine of Harnack. And, adds Dr Watson, "it cannot be denied that there is much in this view of Harnack which commends itself to the educated man of to-day. The dogmas of the Church, in their traditional form, he has outgrown, and he is apt to look with suspicion

on the attempts of recent thinkers to reconstruct them in the light of modern thought. It is therefore with peculiar satisfaction that he hears a scholar of the first rank, who has written one of the best histories of Christian dogma, say that, no matter what the results of Biblical criticism and historical investigation may be, or in what vagaries of speculation metaphysicians may indulge, Christianity, as essentially life in the Eternal, cannot be affected by the changing fashions of the age." But this is evolution with the intellect left out; and it is a large omission, even though it is true that faith is wider than explicit knowledge and life richer than abstract thought. "Without thought there can be no religion; for, though religion cannot be resolved into thought, it necessarily includes thought." The concrete religious experience, "involving the response of the whole nature to the divine," is rightly distinguished from the conception of it which is the result of reflection. But it is a grave, as well as a common error, to represent reflection as impoverishing experience. Reflection in religion reveals the universal implied in it, as science discovers the laws of nature; and a reflective religious experience may be as much richer in content than ordinary religious experience as is natural science than the plain man's opinions of the natural world. "We cannot grant that there is an unchangeable kernel of religion; for, as man develops, his whole nature develops, and therefore the religious consciousness becomes ever more complex. While its principle is, no doubt, ever the same, it is not a dead, unchanging identity, but continually grows by the very energy which enables it to assimilate new forms of experience."

I pass by the account Dr Watson gives of the process by which the new cosmogony arose—of the Copernican change by which man's attempt at explaining nature ceased to be anthropocentric and became cosmocentric, and Kant's application of the new method to the problem of man's life as spirit. There is a lower and a higher, a psychological and a metaphysical, interpretation of Kant; and both are in a manner justified, for psychology and metaphysics were both present and at war in Kant's own work. The latter interpretation, which alone accounts for the significance of Kant and his influence on subsequent thought, was probably never summarised more luminously than by Dr Watson in these pages. The literal results of the critical philosophy are to substitute for the dualism of subject and object—which it destroyed—a new dualism of knowledge and faith, of theoretical and practical reason, assigning priority to the last. But if these results are themselves to be interpreted by that which issued out of them, then the faith that is opposed to knowledge develops into knowledge, "for it is reason not aware of itself as reason"; it is a hypothesis in process of being demonstrated. "Theoretical reason," again, is not a separate and independent faculty, but simply that aspect of the single self-conscious intelligence in which it contemplates its own unconscious work; while 'practical reason' is the same intelligence when it contemplates itself in the actual process of expressing itself in particular acts. To set up the one against the other, assigning a superiority to

either, is to set up the intelligence against itself. What sort of theoretical reason would that be which did not express itself in an objective world, but remained for ever self-enclosed? And what sort of practical reason could there be, which did not comprehend the objective world, but ruled itself by fictions of its own creation? The former would have nothing real to know, and the latter nothing real to will. Reason is a seamless whole, and as such it must be conceived as knowing in its action, and active in its knowledge."

With the acknowledgment of this truth the modified agnosticism of the critical philosophy falls away. "It follows that there is no need to seek for God afar off"; He is "in our mouths and in our hearts." "Here and now we live in a spiritual realm, and may hold communion with the Eternal Spirit." Were it not so, religion would be impotent to elevate and idealise life. A God who is fabled to dwell in a region beyond "the flaming walls" of the universe is not only impossible of demonstration, but would be for us nothing, even if his existence could be demonstrated. The only God in whom we can believe is a God who constitutes the rational structure of nature, and is most clearly revealed in our own hearts and minds; a God whose infinite perfection our intelligence comprehends in principle, to whom our aspirations go out, who forms the ever-growing ideal which we can never completely realise, and "in whose will," as Dante says, "is our peace."

"Partly through the influence of Lotze and partly from the surviving influence of Empiricism, a number of writers, English and American, have preferred various compromises to the thorough-going Idealism thus outlined." But the only attack upon speculative Idealism which is at present worthy of consideration comes, according to Dr Watson, from those who call themselves Personal Idealists, and from those who represent the New Realism. Dr Watson finds elements of truth in both. Personal Idealism accentuates man's freedom and personality, but it separates individuals from each other and from God, whose power it limits. The New Realism denies that reality can be reduced to individual experiences, thus directly opposing the main tenet of Personal Idealism, but it falls into the error of "affirming the separate and independent existence of individual objects." In this manner it endorses the mistake of its opponent, for it separates the real and the ideal; and it also overlooks the spiritual nature of reality. It is with reluctance that I pass over so summarily Dr Watson's critical exposition of these theories, and omit his account of Professor William James's attempt "to defend the legitimacy of religious faith." But I have some excuse, over and above that of the limits of space. It is that some of the results reached by these schools of thought are so unexpected—as, for instance, that God is a finite being, *primus inter pares*, and no more; and some of their methods are so new in philosophy—as, for instance, the pragmatic method; and some of their attacks upon the regnant Idealism are so vivacious and express so skilfully the objections to that theory which are entertained by the plain man, that

all interested in philosophy will naturally desire to follow the controversy at first hand.

I have undertaken to deal with Pragmatism in a future number of this Journal. In the meantime I am tempted to make one remark which is not without its bearing upon Professor Watson's book. It seems to me that these modern schools, and especially Pragmatism, draw their life from the Idealism which they attack. Their own positive contribution to philosophical doctrine is not significant; but their attacks on Idealism are. Not that they can either withstand the criticisms of Idealism when directed against themselves, or overturn the ultimate principles on which Idealism rests; but that they indicate with convincing clearness the need of the further articulation of these principles and of their application in greater detail to actual experience. There is truth, and a most serious truth, in the complaint that Idealism is slow to advance from its central positions; or, in other words, that its results are "general," and lack definiteness. Can Idealism justify its optimism? Can Idealism furnish a definite view of God? Can it articulate the phrase for ever on its lips that "God manifests Himself in the world," or that He is "the unity of subject and object"? What is the meaning of the "self-differentiation of the principle of all experience," or of "the self-alienating process of the Divine"? What does Idealism mean by sin and evil? Is God Himself involved in the process of overcoming them? If He is, is He not finite? If He is not, are sin and evil more than appearances?

These and numberless other problems, which, it is true, those who urge them do not themselves solve, are legitimate problems, even though they may rest on unjustifiable presuppositions. Dr Watson has done something to answer some of them, especially in his two concluding chapters. But, on the whole—and this is the only serious criticism I should advance against Dr Watson—matters are not advanced in a convincing manner beyond the stage already reached, especially by Dr Watson's master (and mine), namely, the late Master of Balliol, Dr Edward Caird. Dr Watson's exposition of truths already attained is masterly. The perusal of his work cannot fail to convince the thoughtful reader that only in the direction of his main conceptions lies the hope of a view of human experience that is at once devout and free. But, in spite of the scant courtesy, nay, of the passionate perversity, shown towards Idealism by some of its recent critics, and especially by the Pragmatists, one cannot but be grateful for their mission. They may sting the Idealists to move. Professor Watson may be induced to expand the constructive concluding chapters of this book, in which, once more, we have only "a summary" of the idealistic view of experience; for he is, by his scholarly equipment, by his power of clear thought and pellucid expression, and by his complete devotion to the idealistic view of the world,—which, if true, is certainly of all views the best worth entertaining,—one of those on whom our hopes rest for further advance. Meantime, by his present work he has laid both the students of religious philosophy and those whose main interest lies in

the history of the evolution of dogma under an obligation which is not easily measured; for he has written a wise book upon a subject whose importance in these days outrivals all other interests.

HENRY JONES.

THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.

What is Religion?—By Wilhelm Bousset, Professor in the University of Göttingen. Translated by F. B. Low.—Fisher Unwin, 1907.

THERE is in Germany a band of brilliant scholars, with Harnack at the head, belonging to the Religious-Historical school, some of whom are seeking to make critical results popular. *What is Religion?* follows Harnack's *What is Christianity?* in this respect, but takes, of course, a wider sweep. Professor Bousset is well equipped for his task, and writes here, as always, in a limpidly clear and graphic manner, enabling the reader to see a century in a sentence. He approaches his task sympathetically, which cannot be said of all students of religion. He has a strong belief in the superiority of Christianity, but also eyes to see that it is only one amongst many faiths; the flower at the top of the stem from which grow many branches. There are several forces at work urging thought in this direction. The exploration and unification of the whole earth by means of modern inventions and appliances have brought us into close contact with its inhabitants and their history. The uncovering of buried cities has opened the door into a vast and hoary religious past. The study of psychology, laying bare the structure and working of the human mind; the modern emphasis laid upon the doctrine of Divine Immanence, insisting that God is alike everywhere; and the scientific method of inquiry, enforcing the study of problems historically, have led to the conclusion that religions other than Christianity are not mere superstitions. Our author in his inquiry follows the historical method. He does not start with a theory of the origin and history of religion, gathering material to support it; nor does he approach the subject metaphysically, breaking up the mind as a chemist disintegrates a substance, and then saying, "This is religion," but goes out into the fields of history and observation and asks, "What are the facts?" His work cannot be called a study in Comparative Religion in the technical sense, nor a History of Religion, but a number of portraits of great Religions and Religious Leaders, grouping them, not according to nation, age, or race, but according to their essential characteristics and relationships; yet so arranged as to manifest the development that has really taken place. "We must seize the essential and permanent in the phenomena as they pass before our eyes, recognise the laws of evolution, and connect the past with the present and the future" (p. 30).

As to the origin of religion, it has its roots in the normal faculties of the ego, and is not a single, separate faculty. But our author does not

discuss the question, which might have been expected, as to which of these faculties it most specifically belongs; whether with Max Müller it has its basis in Thought, or with Kant in Conscience, or with Schleiermacher in Feeling, or with Fairbairn in all three. But wherever residing, it is a very real endowment—"a fundamental element in the life of mankind"—and not an illusion or relic of a past superstition, for man does not leave it behind him as he has left the rude implements of his earlier civilisation; it is as much a part of his being as reason, and just as he must think, so must he worship. Religion arises from two causes. It is primarily a "striving after life"—goods, possessions; and a "belief in higher powers—spirits, demons, gods, God." In adding the second cause Bousset shows himself to be wiser than his master Ritschl, who makes religion to arise out of the conflict that exists between man and nature. Man finds himself in the midst of forces that he cannot conquer, so he is driven to seek and rely upon powers outside nature. But such a conception, as Kaftan points out, is altogether too subjective and utilitarian, for God cannot be conceived as a means towards man's end, but rather as an end of which man is a means. This difficulty our author foresees, and avoids, making his ellipse complete by the addition of a second focus. But does not the addition jeopardise his naturalistic principle? The impression it makes is something like that of a premise slipped in after the argument is set out. From whence the idea of spirit, demon, god, which leads on to worship? To say that it originates in wonder is only to put the difficulty a step further back, for why should wonder lead on to worship? Is not this second focus the author's concession to the orthodox explanation, that religion has had a supernatural origin, or an origin that cannot yet be explained without the use of that term?

Naturally, the reader's attention is first drawn to the religion of savages. This is traced from its lowest form, fetichism, through the diversified phenomena of magic, up to the worship of the dead. Almost every object of nature becomes in turn a fetich, with the tendency of a tribe to fix on some one object as being more sacred than the rest, by which the idea of a tribal deity is born. In those tribes where the idea became fixed the deity's relationship was close. The relationship, however, was often strained or broken, but could be restored by a blood-potation; an idea which is more fully expressed in later sacrificial systems, and persists up to the present in the ordinance of the Mass. This sketch is both graphic and feasible, but the underlying assumption is that the religion of primitive man was that of the present-day savage. "The religious life of the latter (savages) reflects the religion of mankind in the earlier days" (p. 30). But what proof is there of this? The savage, as we now know him, must be regarded as an arrested development; a branch of the tree that has failed to aspire—so cannot be compared to his ancestor who was the parent of progressive civilisation—and, like all arrested growths, as indeed Bousset admits later, is less potential, virile, and strong. To speak of primitive man as represented by the savage of to-day is a hasty generalisation. Of

course, when we cannot investigate we can only speculate; so, as Dr Fairbairn says, "all inquiries into the origin of early beliefs and institutions are really philosophical, . . . but it does not follow that the anthropology which is an accurate description of man in his savage state is a good philosophy of religion."

In "national religions" a distinct advance is made on the religion of savages. Polytheism is their chief characteristic, but the gods here have distinct personalities, with definite names and forms. Hence the prevalence of images (which are not the Deity, but his representation), ranging from a rude stone, as in the case of Jacob at Bethel, to the beautiful statues of Jupiter and Apollo. The image by and by had his house or temple, and his caretaker or priest. His supposed exploits gave rise to myths, and his increasing superiority tended to weaken belief in minor spirits (superstition). The typical national religions are the Babylonian and Greek. Recent excavations reveal the people of Babylonia to have been seriously religious, some of their laws and songs bearing striking likeness to those of Israel. Bousset thinks that Israel owed much to Babylon, especially in its accounts of the history of the earth and man, and that, later, it greatly influenced Jewish eschatology; but he very emphatically points out that there is much in the religion of Israel which cannot be referred to Babylonian influence. The Greeks, too, were religious. The gods met the people at every turn and affected every department of national life. The effect was not always elevating; many base elements entered into their worship; nevertheless rays of the true Light shone through the darkness.

National religion gives place to something still higher under the influence of the Prophet. The prophet rises from the midst of the people, is independent of priest and nation, and speaks from an intense conviction the supposed will of his God. In his utterance there is the note of eternity; hence religion under his influence tends to become Monotheistic and Universal. Zarathustra, Plato, and the Hebrew prophets are noted as illustrations. In the latter, Prophetism came to its flower, and it is the prophet who changes the Israelitish religion from monolatry to monotheism; Jehovah is no longer a tribal God, but the God of all nations.

"Religions of the Law" are the next subsequent stage, but they can scarcely be called an advance. Judaism, Zoroastrianism, and Islamism are outstanding types of these. Their characteristics are—limitation to specific nations, an increase in the number of religious observances, the development of a creed and sacred writings, the rise of a new order of teachers (scribes, magi), and a tendency to make the idea of judgment central. These, while acting as conservators of religion, also, by rendering it inelastic and hard, tended to destroy it as a living force. In opposition to these stand the religions of Redemption, of which Buddhism and Platonism are the chosen examples.

Brahminism, with its two principles of re-incarnation and the unity of subject and object in religion, was the soil into which Buddhism was planted, and the difference between them can only be accounted for by

Buddha's great personal influence and the simplicity of his message. He taught that all life was suffering, the cause being desire for existence, and that deliverance came only by killing desire. This could be accomplished and Nirvana reached by practising the eight rules he laid down. To associate Platonism with Buddhism seems, on the surface, strange, but upon deeper knowledge they are found to be similar. For Plato the real world was that of ideas, and religious inspiration the power to lift men into it. He alone, who fixes his exclusive attention on these, *i.e.* the philosopher, is freed from the turmoil of successive births. Christianity also is a religion of Redemption, but, inasmuch as it contains a moral element absent from the other two, and because of its importance, our author gives to it a separate treatment. Christ's doctrine of God who is Father, and of Man who is Son, introduces and assures this deeper moral factor. The paternal and filial relationship is the nexus by which religion and morality are united, for it is the relation of a person to a person, and the essence of morality in Christ's teaching is doing the Father's will. But in his effort to do right man is conscious of weakness and failure, to meet which Christ proclaims His Gospel of Redemption—the forgiving love of God. This was the marrow of His message, uttered in glowing word and exemplified in a fascinating and unique personality. Bousset has great respect for Paul, but thinks he has done much to complicate the simple Gospel of Christ by introducing views of His person and work that were not present in the mind of the Master.

But perhaps the section which is at once the most interesting and thought-provoking is that on the future of Christianity. The starting-point for this outlook is the Reformation, for our author regards Protestantism, being a released and simplified faith, as alone having the promise and potency of continuance. That Christianity has a future appears certain, because it overthrows the national element; its doctrine of God is pure and free; it gives the individual his true place; ethicises religion; is redemptive in the best sense, and has sympathy with civilisation. That no established religion is comparable with it is a matter of knowledge; and a new rival is not likely to arise, for the history of religion testifies how difficult it is to build up a new faith, no great religion having been established since Mohammedanism in the sixth century. The Christianity of the future, however, must be willing to adapt itself to the new culture that has arisen outside and independent of the Church. And our author thinks the Church must simplify its doctrine of Redemption, must cease to insist on the Deity of Jesus, and give up its belief in Miracles. Scholarly theology has already acceded to the first demand, for man is no longer regarded as a being wholly bad, nor the work of Christ as substitutionary in the sense of an innocent person being made to suffer for a guilty one—the new Ethic demands this. But on the Person of Jesus there need be no such concession; culture does not demand that His essential Divinity be relinquished. It might be conceded “that Jesus was not absolutely different from ourselves” (p. 279), if difference of kind is

meant, for Jesus was really man. But what about degree? Was not the distance here so great as to constitute a real difference? It has been recently put thus:—"If Shakespeare entered the room we should all rise, but if that other One came we should fall on our knees." Religious thought to-day regards God and man as essentially one in nature, yet so different in degree as to compel it to put them into two categories of thought. It is true that Jesus speaks of Himself as trusting in God, of God only as good; but such expressions do not destroy His essential Divinity any more than a child's trust in and reverence for its father breaks their essential unity. The solution of the problem must be sought, not in lowering the divinity of Jesus, but in recognising more fully the divinity of Man. When it is recognised that man is divine and that God is human, and the distinction one of degree, modern culture will not refuse to say of Jesus—"Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God." Not that Bousset is disloyal to Christ; the very opposite is true. "His figure is the noblest, the most perfect that has been granted to humanity, the Guide of our souls to God; the Way, the Truth, and the Life" (pp. 280, 298). There are passages in his book which throb with a devotion as deep as that of an Athanasius, Augustine, or a Luther, and present a picture of Jesus so grandly human that we are compelled to call Him divine.

W. JONES-DAVIES.

STOCKPORT.

St Paul: The Man and his Work.—By Professor Weinel. Translated by Rev. G. A. Bienemann, M.A. Edited by Rev. W. D. Morrison, LL.D.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1906.

The Fifth Gospel.—By the Author of *The Faith of a Christian*.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1907.

Paul the Mystic.—By James M. Campbell, D.D.—London: Andrew Melrose, 1907.

THE first of these volumes is a book to be read rather than studied. The author himself says as much in the Preface. Merely to state its contents would be to go over the familiar ground traversed by most books on Paul, and could give no impression of the author's spirit. It would be difficult to find a more vivid portraiture of "the man and his work," and one can hardly doubt that the author's wish to make people "understand and love Paul" will be realised. With this end in view, Weinel is anxious to set free the individual spirit of the Apostle from the traditional elements of thought and life which he shared with his time; he is convinced there is an old-worldishness about the Paul of the New Testament, which not only inhibits sympathy, but irritates the modern mind, and makes men like Nietzsche dance with hate. Weinel, therefore, brings us back to the Apostle's early days, and gives glimpses of the atmosphere in which he

was brought up. An interesting contrast is drawn between the wholesome outlook of Jesus on nature and the darker perspective of Paul: the one breathes the free charm of the country, the other the busy weariness of the town. For Paul, the world is a stage whose play is played out; hence his almost morbid doctrines of Sin, Flesh, and Death. Weinel even goes the length of saying that "Paul seriously conceives God under the image of a man as distinct from a woman." This is based on 1 Cor. xi. 7, and is taken as an instance of the anthropomorphism which Paul inherited. But surely it does not require a rabbinical training to be guilty of so common an error as this?

To the "Day of Damascus" Weinel attributes an importance that will satisfy a strict, if reasonable, orthodoxy. He does not even seek to explain away the blindness which overcame Paul as the exaggerated representation of a momentous occurrence; we know the hair whitens with sudden fright, and must not forget that "the eye may be disorganised by a psychical commotion." And though Paul's supposed physical malady—Weinel thinks it was hysteria—may have had something to do with the manner of his conversion, the experience itself was essentially moral, an affair of heart and soul, not of nerves, "a serious struggle with his conscience."

We then follow Paul fairly started on his missionary enterprise, beginning at Antioch and ending at Rome, a stretch of conquest which may be compared to the conquests of Alexander the Great, "only in the opposite direction." There is a strong feeling against official Priesthood throughout the book, and the outstanding impression Weinel gives of the Missionary is that of the originator of the Protestant religion. It is the religion which takes as its boldest hope the making of each man a law unto himself, free from the casuistry of Legalism and the exonerating of conscience which Priesthood involves. It is not a new law Paul seeks to give, but "a new moral sense."

To refer to a point in criticism, Weinel discredits the statement in Acts xxi. 26 that Paul had his head shorn to conciliate the authorities at Jerusalem. This, he thinks, if true, would be an unpardonable inconsistency. It seems to be assumed that Paul must square his doings with his statement in Gal. ii. 5, which Weinel renders in the usual way—"Paul did not give way to the false brethren for a single moment" (p. 226). But even though this rendering be accepted, is there any reason why Paul's insistence on *one* occasion should be made the rule for every emergency? We should, however, prefer to omit *οἱ οὐδὲ*; for though this reading has not strong support, the context almost compels the omission. The sense of the passage seems to be this:—Things went all right at Jerusalem: for, mark you, not even Titus, a pagan, was compelled to be circumcised; but on account of the false brethren smuggled in, men with whom it were useless to reason, and who might damage any cause, we gave way for the moment, that the truth of the Gospel might continue with you. Weinel, however, refuses to believe the record of Acts in this connection, and also throws overboard Acts xv. on the same critical ground.

The method pursued has the advantage, by its very precision, of impaling all difficulties on the dividing-line between Paul the Jew and Paul the Christian. It remains, then, to ask if the method does not itself need justification. One may easily mistake for Jewish what are really permanent elements in religious experience. I think Weinel goes too much on the assumption that what Paul gives us is not theology at all, but psychology. This is a useful antithesis, but it can readily be misunderstood. Thus, when our author says it was "his soul of goodness in the shape of a bad conscience" that gave Paul the victory, he seems to think that though Paul protests that it is his conscience which is bad, you are not to think that this was so. Paul's confession of enmity against God is only psychological, what he is aware of as taking place in experience, while the real state of things may be otherwise. True, so far; but if it is a characteristic in religious experience so to feel, if *everyone* having Paul's faith has also his feeling of guilt, then the psychological fact has a general significance, and is of the nature of a doctrine; it is not mere appearance, not, to use Mr Bradley's phrase, simply an illustration of latent qualities, but an expression of ultimate reality. Since the publication of Pfeiderer's *Paulinism*, a clean-cut treatment of this kind has become familiar. Yet it is not likely that Paul would thank this school for simplifying his theology in this sense. It was not thus simple to him, nor is it, I think, still, to the more cautious theologian. We are not, indeed, unmindful of the laudable maxim which guides the author, namely, that Paul did not think it needful to modify these inherited beliefs,—"**a plain proof**," we are told, "that neither this conception of the universe nor any other has anything to do with Faith." Weinel has given us a brilliant narrative, full of suggestion in every page, the work of a highly gifted and original mind, which should be of great value for homiletical purposes. The translation, too, is extremely readable.

In *The Fifth Gospel* we have a more conservative treatment of the Apostle's evangel. This little book is a real contribution to Christian Apologetic, in view of present difficulties. Its success does not lie in well-arranged arguments, but in the strength of its thought, which finds full expression in a masculine, straightforward style. The writer has carefully assimilated what he has read, and in consequence presents in some two hundred small pages a line of thought more persuasive than is sometimes developed in many volumes of inordinate length on the same theme. There is a pleasing absence of quotation. Rather than make the reader pay toll at every signpost of inverted commas, he weaves the words of Paul or others freely into his own phraseology. His book thus becomes one continuous piece of literature—what one seldom meets with in theological writings.

The valuable lead of modified Ritschlianism is followed in directing attention to "the subjective element" in the Gospel. This is done in the first chapter, which is perhaps the freshest and most suggestive chapter of

the book. Over and above the acts and sayings of Jesus, emphasis is laid upon His Personality, and His Personality is just what cannot be adequately conveyed by records. Are we to believe, the author asks, what the eyes and ears of the New Testament writers tell us, and not also what their mind and heart reveal? It would seem as if Jesus had purposed His disciples to be the living and only medium of His Spirit, for He left no written statement of His evangel. The author remarks on the implicit faith of the Master in His followers to be the adequate and faithful reflection of His Personality. What is called the subjective element lies behind the narrative, and it is the discovery of the original impression which the disciples received of Christ. But where, then, are we to draw the line between the Christ of History and the Christ of Experience, between the natural and the supernatural, the supernatural being just that element which cannot be made convincing to one who has not known the Christ of Experience? The author replies with the apt illustration, that though we cannot tell where sea ends and sky begins, yet we do not think clouds are mere waves of the sea. The precise point of demarcation, when required, may safely be entrusted to the Christian mind; or, as the author puts it, our only standard for truly estimating the picture presented of Jesus' personality is "the standard of harmony." This sounds Ritschlian, and may be considered dangerous. But the truth that is in Ritschlianism is so true as never really to have been doubted; the judgment of "selbstgefühl" is surely harmless in the hands of one who, like the author, accepts the historical facts of Christianity, as, for instance, in his treatment of the Resurrection? I should like to know by what other method than this same "feeling of smoothness" dogmatic theologians have given that somewhat suspicious symmetry and polish to their blocks.

The value of Paul to us consists pre-eminently in the directness of his impression of Christ. The Evangelists have shown Christ more as He appeared to others; in Paul the impression upon himself is what lies uppermost. Though the fifth in order, Paul's gospel is the first that was preached; it is the first total, individual, impression of Jesus, for which he was dependent on no source outside his own experience. The supreme origin of this experience was the resurrection of Christ. Paul's was a *real* vision. To ask whether it was subjective or objective determines nothing. Whether he saw an actual, physical, body, or only imagined it, is not to the point. The point is—were there two, Paul and Christ, or only one, Paul alone with his fancies? That there were two is evident from the answer, "Who art thou, Lord?"—strange words to use if Paul were addressing himself.

This establishes the originality of Paul's gospel. It would just be as true to say that Luther's Reformation is the natural evolution of the mediæval church, as to say that Paul is the simple product of Jewish tradition. His theology is not a deduction from inherited beliefs, but an induction from observation of facts at first-hand. The author lays stress on the importance of Induction, and urges that theology would be less unfruitful if it more frequently employed this method. That may be true;

but I think it misleading to say, as he does, that Paul arrived at his gospel wholly by a *posteriori* means. Inductive inference only takes place when one is dealing with limited, particular, facts; but when the fact of observation is one of universal significance, as was the Resurrection for Paul, when it is itself the keystone, then it is analysis rather than synthesis which chiefly characterises our reasoning. Paul's doctrine of the universality of Sin is established *a priori*; for he argues, if Christ died for all, then, *a priori*, all are conceived under sin: if the grace of Christ establishes the only true righteousness, then all righteousness which does not recognise this grace is unrighteousness. A separate note is added on the resurrection of Christ, and special attention directed to it throughout. The sum of the argument is that nothing less than a real, physical, resurrection can account for the origin of that Christian consciousness which now is ours, at a time when, not life from the dead, but extinction of all hope was the dominant mood,—an argument which will always have weight.

In *Paul the Mystic*, the "subjective element" is considered under the head of Mysticism. Even those who do not like Mysticism will scarcely find any violence done to the Apostle here: Paul the Mystic is Paul at his best. In this respect I think Dr Campbell's book is to be welcomed; it awakens distrust of those rationalistic accounts of the Apostle's character, in which everything really divine in his life and doctrine is relegated to the irresponsible void of religious fancy, where anything may happen. The gist of Dr Campbell's treatment consists in the attempt to show, that a true mystic is not one who lets his fancy run riot, but one who is led by his faith. The mysticism of Paul denotes the inwardness of a religion which is already sufficiently able to warrant its own validity; it does not denote the inwardness of religious emotion in general. Pantheistic mysticism is the undisciplined growth of that subjectivity which forms a permanent factor in all true religion. The mysticism of Eckart is pantheistic, the mysticism of Ruysbroeck is theistic. Thus there is illustrated the distinction which Dr Campbell seeks to constitute. The former expresses the relation between God and man as a union of identity, the latter as a union of grace. Ruysbroeck's is a reciprocal unity: "the exercise of love between God and us," he says, "is as the passing and repassing of flashes of lightning." (Ullmann, *Reformers before the Reformation*, vol. ii. p. 42.) Here, then, is approximately determined the mysticism which the author ascribes to Paul; it is a commerce of the divine Promise with individual faith. And so Paul is presented to us in all his concreteness, and loses nothing which might be ascribed to him under more common modes of description: Paul is the "evangelical" as well as the "religious" mystic; Paul is the "practical" as well as the "rational" mystic. Mysticism is not an undue excess in feeling, to the exclusion of thinking; it is rather what Fénelon calls Faith, "the highest act of Reason." Nowhere is there revealed more clearly than in the call of Paul that "the vision of Christ is always accompanied with a vision of duty."

Put in another way, the author explains Pauline Mysticism by distinguishing between the soul and the body of Truth. He means just what the Reformers meant by their distinction between the "Word of God" and "Scripture,"—a distinction, however, which does not cast adrift the body of Truth as something contingent, but retains it in organic relation with the invisible "Word of God." Dr Campbell has also the reverence of the Reformers for Scripture; just because of its intimate connection with the "Soul of Truth," we must hold it sacred, and not handle it arbitrarily. Throughout the book, Paul's mysticism is shown to be the vital, originative, principle in religious experience; it is, in fact, the highest expression of his faith. Incidentally, the author remarks that, in spite of extravagances, such extraneous movements as Christian Science and Theosophy are largely "reactions" against the soulless systems of church doctrine, and, in their origin at least, represent the "soul of truth," the impulse to come into touch with the real thing in religious experience,—a suggestion, we think, not to be dismissed lightly.

In contending for the union of heart and mind in religious experience, Dr Campbell comes into contact with the Critical Philosophy, and blames Kant for "incalculable harm" in separating Knowledge and Faith. The charge may well be laid at the door of the Kantian interpreters, but in reference to Kant himself it is hardly fair. If we remember how limited a thing knowledge was for Kant, his distinction loses its sting. All he denies to religion in the knowledge of its objects is that kind of objectivity with which we are concerned in sense-perception. Extend the significance of the term "Knowledge," and the Kantian argument does not apply.

Perhaps it is a matter of regret that Dr Campbell has not left himself more room for the development of his own views, instead of devoting so much space to quotations from others. Readers, however, will thank him for introducing them to so wide a field of literature. He shows a varied knowledge of books, especially of those on the subject with which he deals, and has a sound grasp of the principles of critical exegesis.

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The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.—By Kirsopp Lake, M.A. (Oxon.), Professor of New Testament Exegesis and Early Christian Literature in the University of Leiden.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1907. Crown Theological Library.

The Appearances of Our Lord After the Passion: A Study in the Earliest Christian Tradition.—By Henry Barclay Swete, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1907.

AKIN to one another in subject, these books differ widely in aim and method. Both being by priests of the Church of England, the difference

may be expressed thus :—The fourth of the Thirty-nine Articles asserts that “Christ did truly rise again from death, and took again his body with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man’s nature : wherewith he ascended into heaven. . . .” I do not remember that direct reference is made to the Article by either writer, but implicitly the latter part of it is denied by Dr Swete, the whole of it (except the first clause) by Mr Lake. Three brief quotations will indicate Dr Swete’s attitude with regard to the Ascension. Writing of the “Appearance of our Lord to the Ten and Others,” he says: “Even the Resurrection had not completed the change which was passing over Him. . . . His body was not yet wholly spiritual.” Describing the “Appearance to the Seven by the Lake,” he says: “Some kind of change perhaps had passed over the features; the beginning of the final change which transforms the natural body into the spiritual.” While of the Ascension itself he says: “This fact was the symbol of a great and vital Christian truth, which is also a fact, but in the spiritual world. The risen Lord has crowned His victory over death by passing in His spiritual body into the invisible order.” Thus Dr Swete is seen to hold that at the moment of disappearing from his disciples’ eyes, the body of Christ ceased to be material, and became spiritual. Although in contradiction to the words of the Article, this view is not opposed to its spirit, for it is surely conceivable that “the perfection of man’s nature” may be more truly realised when he is “delivered from the burden of the flesh” than when he has flesh and bones. Is not this Browning’s teaching in “Rabbi Ben Ezra”—

“Thence [viz. from old age] shall I pass, approved

A man, for aye removed

From the developed brute; a god though in the germ”?

If the Cambridge professor believes that the Lord’s ascension was purely spiritual, the Leiden professor believes this also of his resurrection. There is, of course, nothing novel in this view, which commends itself to an increasing number of thoughtful people. It has been proclaimed from the pulpit of Westminster Abbey in a sermon which has been printed by the preacher, Archdeacon Wilberforce, in a published volume: “It is, I think, profitable to emphasise that the Bible speaks nowhere of the resurrection of the body, or the resurrection of the flesh. The actual resurrection of the Lord was not from Joseph of Arimathea’s sepulchre, but from the body which He left hanging on the cross.” That is also Mr Lake’s position, and he arrives at it by an extraordinarily minute and careful examination of the extant evidence. In order rightly to estimate this it is necessary, as he points out, to go back not merely to the Gospels, but to the sources of the Gospels; and when this has been done the earliest tradition must be reconstructed, and an attempt made to account for the other traditions. Beginning with the account given by St Paul, he argues that from the apostle’s doctrine of the general resurrection we may deduce what he held about the resurrection of Jesus, and as he plainly taught that the former is spiritual (for, “Flesh and blood cannot inherit

the kingdom of God"), it may be inferred that this was also his belief concerning the latter. At the same time, he undoubtedly believed in the empty tomb, holding that the body was spiritualised. When Professor Lake comes to the more immediate sources of the Gospels he finds the Marcan tradition the one to be most closely followed. The original Mark probably did not determine whether the resurrection were physical or no. In his last chapter Mr Lake seeks to set forth "The Facts which are behind the Earliest Tradition." That the tomb was empty he maintains is only an inference drawn from the fact of the appearances, and was not expressly verified. He offers "a suggestion of what might possibly have happened." "The women came in the early morning to a tomb which they thought was the one in which they had seen the Lord buried. They expected to see a closed tomb, but they found an open one; and a young man who was in the entrance, guessing their errand, tried to tell them that they had made a mistake in the place. 'He is not here,' said he; 'see the place where they laid him,' and probably pointed to the next tomb. But the women were frightened at the detection of their errand, and fled, only imperfectly or not at all understanding what they heard. It was only later on, when they knew that the Lord was risen, and—on their view—that his tomb must be empty, that they came to believe that the young man was something more than they had seen; that he was not telling them of their mistake, but announcing the Resurrection, and that his intention was to give them a message for the disciples." This theory is so tentative that it would be unfair to tie its author down to it, and the present reviewer finds it difficult to take it more seriously than Renan's idea of an hallucination on the part of Mary Magdalene. It must not be understood from this quotation that Professor Lake does not believe in Christ's resurrection. He believes in it thoroughly, but in a spiritual sense. The appearances to the disciples were real, though the body was still in the grave. "What we mean by resurrection is not resuscitation of the material body, but the unbroken survival of personal life." In the appearances there was an objective presence of the Lord; but, "assume the possibility of an absolutely non-material object communicating its presence to a man, and the impression made on the latter must be an appearance conditioned by the terms of his own human nature and so far subjective." In the space at my disposal it has been impossible to do more than indicate in outline the argument and conclusion of this searching investigation. Even those who are unable to follow the author in all his criticisms and exegesis must admit the force of his reasoning, and the reverence with which it is presented.

Dr Swete's work is of a different character. It was written, he tells us, "in the hope that a simple narrative of the appearances of the risen Lord, based on a study of the documents, might be welcome to readers of the English New Testament, and especially to those who undertake the responsible work of imparting Biblical knowledge in schools or to classes of adults." It is therefore popular in character, aiming at edification rather

than criticism. This is not to say that criticism is absent. Like Mr Lake, he distinguishes between sources, esteeming one more trustworthy than another, and looks back to "the original tradition." To speak of the theological learning in the book would be an impertinence. It is by Dr Swete. Believing in the physical resurrection of Christ, he deals in nine short chapters or sections with the "Appearances During the Forty Days," and in three others with the "Appearances After the Ascension," *i.e.* to Stephen, to Saul, and to John. Then there is a "Postscript," principally on the second coming of the Lord and the resurrection of the dead. "What is meant by resurrection in this sense? Not resuscitation, as many of the teachers of the ancient Church supposed, but as S. Paul teaches, the clothing of the spirit with a spiritual body." These words would express not inadequately Mr Lake's view of the resurrection of Christ. A remark on p. 3 about the removal of the stone from the grave suggests a caution which critics would do well to bear in mind: "Here the first Gospel again interposes a statement which is not in the others: there had been a great earthquake, which had rolled it away." If this statement had been met with in an early Christian writer we should be assured that it is good evidence of the probable existence of a text which said nothing about the angel, and then this result would become a basis for further argument. There are several misprints in the footnotes.

G. E. FRENCH.

WEST HATCH.

The Rise of the Greek Epic: Being a Course of Lectures delivered at Harvard University.—By Gilbert Murray, M.A., LL.D.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

DR GILBERT MURRAY publishes in this volume a series of lectures written for delivery at Harvard University. Those who are acquainted with his previous work, especially with his translations of Euripides, will not need to be told that they are in a very high degree interesting and stimulating. They are not primarily addressed to scholars, and are likely to appeal particularly to younger students and to those who do not approach the subject from the standpoint of specialists. But those whose studies have led them rather more deeply into the perplexities of the Homeric question and kindred subjects will find much that is suggestive in this work, and will appreciate Dr Murray's faculty of vivid and imaginative writing, which enables him to find occasion for illuminating comment in what has often been regarded as rather unpromising material.

The lectures form, Dr Murray explains, "the first part of an attempt to study the growth of Greek poetry from a particular point of view, namely as a force and the embodiment of a force making for the progress of the human race": and later in the introductory chapter, "as embodying

the spirit of progress, that is of both feeling the value and wonder of life, and being desirous to make it a better thing: and further, with that purpose in view, as combining a spirit of intense enjoyment with a tempering wisdom, going into seas of experience guided by Sophrosyne." In development of this idea he surveys the growth of humanising influences among the Greeks, as reflected both in their life and their poetry. As the Homeric poems, whatever view be taken of their composition, may be said to look both before and after, that is, may be used to interpret the conditions from which they were developed as well as those of the age which followed, this consecutive method has much to recommend it. In Dr Murray's hand we get the effect of a continuous narrative in which the story of the early *Ægean* civilisation, the times of the migrations, and the transition to the more settled times of recorded history is illustrated by many happy quotations from literature. Occasionally he seems to take rather a limited view of the progress for which he is looking. When he writes, "I think human progress may be just as much a true inspiration to a poet as the lust of the eye or the pride of life. Of course it is not so to all poets: there is very little of it in the final stages of Homer, little in Pindar and Sophocles, just as there is little in Shakespeare and Chaucer. On the other hand, it is the very breath of life to *Æschylus*, *Euripides* and *Plato*, as it is to *Shelley* or *Tolstoy*," we feel he is looking for something didactic or moralising. There is perhaps a little too much of this element in Dr Murray's own work, which contains a good deal of general ethical and literary criticism. He seems a little too ready to draw lessons from particular observances or isolated passages in Greek literature. Thus in his observations on "Our Brother the Ox" and the treatment of domestic animals as exemplified in *Homer* and *Hesiod* he is a little subtle in his deduction of the humanity they illustrate. Probably an explanation of this impression which we get from Dr Murray's book may be found in the fact that he has obviously been greatly influenced by the work of Miss Jane E. Harrison, to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness. Miss Harrison, as is well known, has made an admirable study of the "Chthonian," as opposed to the Olympian, element in Greek worship, and has developed a line of research which has been fruitful in producing a better understanding of what may be styled the darker side of Greek religion. But it may be doubted whether there is not a tendency on the part of scholars at present to attempt to explain too much on these lines. A theory which undoubtedly explains some things is made to explain everything. There is a danger of arguing too much from survivals of certain grosser and more primitive forms of belief or observance. It may be suggested that just now the really important thing, as it is also an extremely difficult thing, is to attempt to place this element in its proper setting, to see how far, and at what period, such influences were operative factors in Greek life. Dr Murray, we think, makes rather too much of the grim and dark environment in which the Greek spirit sought and achieved purification, and rather over-emphasises both the barbarous and super-

stitious practices which pressed hard on Greek civilisation, and the intensity of the struggle of the Greeks against them. When he says of some such evil that Homer "will have none of it," and speaks of the "cleansing" of the Homeric poems, we feel that we are dealing with a too consciously reforming Homer, and that Dr Murray is making too much of spiritual victories. He emphasises the point that in Homer a sharp and clear dividing line is drawn between men and gods, an achievement of the Greek intellect "which needed such clearness of insight, such daring, such humanity." But the effect of this is rather discounted by a consideration of the actual part the gods play in the *Iliad*, though it is fair to add that the more obtrusively sceptical spirit in which the gods are treated in some parts is attributed by Dr Murray to the later Ionian bards. Is not, however, a simpler view of the whole matter suggested by Monro, in contrasting the treatment of the gods in the *Odyssey* with that of the *Iliad*? "Apparently the fall of Troy has put an end to the strife which divided immortals as well as mortals into two opposite camps. There is now an Olympian concert which carries on something like a moral government of the world. It is very different in the *Iliad*, where the gods are only moved by caprice, and neither gods nor men show any real sense of the moral weakness of Agamemnon and Achilles, or of the moral superiority of Hector." It is, of course, undeniable that there is much in Greek poetry which represents a refinement of older material, but we have ventured to suggest that there is a danger of over-insistence on this point. It is a danger which is particularly to be feared in the case of criticism of the Homeric poems, since the alleged process of deliberate purification has so often been taken as a means of dating the poems.

With regard to the Homeric question, Dr Murray holds the view, as the title of the book itself indicates, that the Homeric poems represent a gradual growth. He thinks that the recent reaction against advanced views has been largely due to inadequate understanding of what the "advanced" critics really mean. It is a pity that Dr Murray did not have the opportunity of considering more closely Mr Andrew Lang's recent work, *Homer and His Age*, before publishing his own book. Mr Lang argues with much force and spirit in support of the theory of the unity of the poems, and returns to the charge in *Blackwood's Magazine* (for January), with a criticism of Dr Murray's views. The question of authorship, in so far as it is argued on *a priori* lines of probability, perhaps hardly admits of a satisfactory answer. Where Dr Murray touches on the subject in this way he writes persuasively, even if the nature of the matter does not allow that he should write convincingly. But, we must add, we have the same impression after reading Mr Lang. Whether a great poem can be achieved by many men in different times through "intensity of imagination," as Dr Murray holds, or whether, as Mr Lang contends, only by the genius of one man, is a question to which we feel we can only have a reply when we have ascertained from other grounds, if we are ever to ascertain, the truth about the authorship of the Homeric poems. But on the whole we can only

feel grateful to Dr Murray for his avoidance of the more controversial aspects of the question. He states that among English scholars he agrees most closely with Dr Leaf. Dr Leaf may perhaps be said, in his edition of the *Iliad*, "to shatter it to bits and then" (as his followers would at least contend) "remould it nearer to the heart's desire." Dr Murray's method is rather to assume as antecedently probable the conclusions arrived at by Dr Leaf, and to trace the circumstances of the growth of the poems. His wide reading and his interest in all study and research that have a bearing on the subject secure a very effective performance of the task. It is no easy one. In the case of some of the difficulties in the interpretation of the Homeric poems, notably the question of Homeric armour and the use of metals, recent discoveries seem only to have made confusion worse confounded, though perhaps it is the argument for the unity theory that is most affected. As Professor R. M. Burrows points out in his lately published work on the discoveries in Crete: "Of the three chief living defenders of the unity of the poems, two believe that the Homeric swords and spears were all of bronze, and the other that they were all of iron. The fact is that on the unity theory either of these is possible: the one view that is impossible is just what *ex hypothesi* ought to be suggested by the East Cretan tombs, namely that they were sometimes of the one material and sometimes of the other."

Dr Murray does not enter into controversy on these questions, but adopting, as has been said, the evolutionary theory, he has a very instructive chapter on "unconscious changes of custom" evidenced by the Homeric poems. His observations on these and kindred subjects seem too to be most in accordance with the nature of the evidence put before us by Professor Burrows. There is a certain amount of what, in relation to our present knowledge, may be called less useful hypothesis. Thus Dr Murray's description of the growth of an ancient book, the Old Testament parallels which he introduces, and the particulars of the recitations of the Homeric poems seem hardly justified by the evidence we have, or, at least, call us back to the perplexities of the Homeric question. But it is the great merit of Dr Murray's work that the matters of most interest lie outside this controversial region. In explaining, and illustrating from the poems, the nature of the early *Ægean* civilisation, the circumstances of its fall, and the distribution of the Greek peoples, he has done an admirable piece of work. It is by study such as this, and that to be found in Monro's valuable appendices to his edition of the *Odyssey*, which it recalls, that we get most insight into the really significant aspects of the Homeric question.

L. SOLOMON.

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Naturalism and Religion.—By Dr Rudolf Otto. Translated by J. A. and M. R. Thomson. Pp. 374+xi.—Williams & Norgate, 1907.

DR W. D. MORRISON, who supplies a brief introduction to this volume, tells us that its author is “well known on the Continent as a thinker who possesses the rare merit of combining a high philosophic discipline with an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the science of organic nature.” It is perhaps a pity that the introduction was not written by the translators (who have produced a singularly readable translation). For the work is mainly a criticism of the principal scientific theories of the day; and one of the translators is a well-known zoologist. It would have been interesting to know how far Professor J. A. Thomson is prepared to endorse his author’s criticisms of Darwin and Weismann; what he thinks of “Vitalism”; what opinion he has of De Vries and Eimer. Dr Otto’s views on these and other subjects are, I fancy, not those of the more competent English scientists of to-day; and it might have been worth while to say this in the introduction to a work intended for the general reader.

That the book is well written, clever, and telling; that the author is widely read in German scientific literature, and that he has some faculty of exposition; that he has a solid backbone of prejudice—all these qualities may be conceded to him. In philosophy he belongs to the school of what may be called “puffy” Idealism. He delights to edify, and he exercises this irritating and not difficult art in quite masterly fashion. In philosophic accomplishment he is no better and no worse than most apologists, and in scientific learning he is superior to some of them. If his book does not have a considerable vogue in England it will be our fault. The number of persons in England who like to be soothed and reassured is legion, and no book could be more soothing and reassuring than Dr Otto’s.

Dr Otto begins by pointing out how impossible it is for religion to stand wholly aloof from scientific debate. The religious man must be taken by the scruff of his neck and made to join issue with Naturalism, *i.e.* with that “independent system of world-interpretation” which, “if valid, would make religion impossible.” There are two kinds of Naturalism—the “enthusiastic” and the “indifferent.” Dr Otto likes neither; but of the two he, whimsically enough, prefers the latter. He will have no nonsense. A man is either a naturalist or not a naturalist. An enthusiastic naturalist, *i.e.* one who quotes Goethe or plays with pantheistic conceptions, is a contradiction in terms and an insult to Dr Otto. In fact, Dr Otto cannot trust himself to speak of the “enthusiastic” Naturalism; and he confines himself wholly to the “indifferent” species—to the Naturalism whose motto is “Thorough,” whose apostles or conspirators-in-chief are Darwin and Weismann. Indifferent Naturalism has two departments: “the theory of the evolution of the organic world, and the mechanistic theory of life.” Chapters iv.–vii. treat of the former, chapters viii.–ix. of the latter. In iv.–vii. Natural Selection is smashed. In viii.–ix. the horn of “Vitalism” is exalted. But though either of these

results is in itself rather depressing, this portion of Dr Otto's book is none the less deserving of praise. Dr Otto makes a survey of the more notable biological literature of Germany; and the clearness with which he presents to the lay reader theorisings of considerable intricacy, the skill with which he interrelates the different theories with which he deals, is praiseworthy. The biological chapters suggest to an Englishman rather melancholy reflections. There can be little doubt that the Germans to-day are ahead of us in biology. Not only have they Weismann, but they have countless students and professors of biology producing every year valuable literature. We are utterly outnumbered. There exists, moreover, in Germany, as there does not exist in England, a large intellectual proletariat which keeps these studies going. Darwin apart, Dr Otto refers to not more than three English scientific writers—Herbert Spencer, Mr Lloyd Morgan, Mr C. C. Coe—and to these only casually. That is partly Dr Otto's fault, as the three names selected show, but in large part it is ours.

Of the chapters which deal with the evolution of organic life, far and away the best is the fourth—"Darwinism in General"—"The Theory of Descent." In exposition it is better than any other outline of Darwinism, and in its results it is inoffensive. Yet the greater part of the chapter has the effect, so far as I can judge, merely of retarding the general argument of the book. The theory of Descent is left standing—of course it is. But why in that case waste so much time on criticisms of it which do not affect its validity? Why all this hesitancy? It was not worth Dr Otto's while to throw a cloud about the theory of Descent in order that his readers might come to "Natural Selection" and its alternatives (chapter vi.) with the mist in their eyes. The chapter on "Natural Selection" is more relevant to the argument as a whole, and in results edifying. It will probably convert an enormous number of theological students. I am not competent to judge it as science. But I think I can guess what opinion, let us say, Mr Ray Lankester or Mr Goodrich would have of its conclusions. One of Dr Otto's philosophic arguments against "Natural Selection" may be commended to the notice of the Pragmatists. "If it is really 'utility' that rules the world and things, there can be no certainty and objectivity of knowledge, no guarantee of truth" (p. 155). There are evidently "young and strong and virile" schools of philosophy of which Dr Otto has never heard. Yet he might be expected to have looked into Eucken. But I rather suspect that in philosophy he began with Kant, and ended with the of late half-resuscitated Fries.

That portion of Dr Otto's book which deals with the mechanistic theory of life is rather negative in character. Here, as elsewhere, Dr Otto pursues the method of allowing the different scientists to refute one another. But he carries this method to a point where it is rather difficult to discover what his own view is. "L'homme machine" is abhorrent to him. That is clear, and we could have guessed it if it had not been. But it is easier to discover what he thinks false than what he holds to be true.

It is one thing to reject "Mechanismus," another to accept "Vitalismus." Dr Otto nowhere definitely gives his adherence to the Vitalistic reaction. But he wastes forty pages on expounding the views of various Vitalists, and presumably he knows what he is doing. This much, however, he concedes to the Mechanists: they "are undoubtedly right in this, that 'entelechy,' 'the idea of the whole,' 'co-operation,' 'guidance,' 'physical factors,' and the like, are only names for riddles, and do not in themselves constitute knowledge" (p. 275). But with regard to all theories of life, "unquestionably the most important fact in connection with them is the fresh revelation of the depth of things and of appearance, the increased recognition that our knowledge is only leading us to mystery" (*ib.*). This is piously said and unexceptionable, and has indeed been said before. Mystery is one of the three things for which Dr Otto is always hunting. The other two are Dependence and Purpose (chapter iii.). A real mystery is almost as good as a downright antinomy (p. 275; for the antinomies *cf.* pp. 69-74); save that an antinomy usually consists of a good argument side by side with a bad one, *i.e.* reason by the side of apologetics. With regard to Purpose, Dr Otto is dissatisfied with the Lotzian view which would confine religion to the recognition of ends. And we can sympathise with his desire to keep religion still "within the realm of the emotional life and of history."

This book is perhaps worth reading. But it should be read, as it was, I think, written, with a good deal of prejudice. It is direct and stimulating, and, save perhaps in chapter iii., it is plausible. It is not a notable contribution to philosophy, but even the philosophy is, of its kind, respectable stuff. The scientific knowledge of the author is evidently considerable (though his judgment of different scientific theories is worthless—even silly), and, as I have said more than once, he has a very telling gift of exposition. If he sometimes appears just a trifle disingenuous, that is an accident to which apologetic disputation is always liable. For myself, I have read the book with constant dissent. But there is, I am sure, a vast number of theological students who will give a full and hearty assent to almost everything in it. And most persons will allow that it exhibits learning, ability, and ingenuity.

On p. 254 it would be interesting to know whether the author, or the translator, or the printer is responsible for the allusion to the Venus of *Melos*.

H. W. GARROD.

OXFORD.

The Founders of the New Devotion. The Chronicles of Mt. St Agnes.—
By Thomas à Kempis. Translated into English by J. P. Arthur.—
London: Kegan Paul, 1907.

READERS of devotional literature, those at any rate who connect à Kempis with the *Imitation*, will peruse these other works from his hand with eager

interest. We say "will" advisedly, for with but few exceptions they will not have done so already, the works in their entirety never having been rendered into English before. They will be found to throw light on the author's spiritual history as well as on one of the most remarkable movements of the Pre-Reformation period.

The first of the two volumes, *The Founders of the New Devotion*, consists of biographies of some of the Brothers of the Common Life, the name given to the members of certain semi-religious societies which arose towards the end of the fourteenth century under the influence of Gerard Groote (Gerard the Great). Born in the Lower Netherlands in 1340, the son of wealthy parents, this remarkable man seemed intended both by his training and social position for the highest ecclesiastical preferment; yet at the call of a Carthusian monk—"Among the Carthusians," says Thomas, "the heavenly light remained though hidden"—he turned away from the dreams of pomp and power, and after five years of prayer and spiritual conflict, began to labour in good earnest for the conversion of the world. In the rough garb of a wandering preacher he travelled through Holland and Gelderland, and bore the message of a Church invisible, a kingdom within, to a society steeped in sin and bloodshed, where religion meant ritual, and its ministers did the work not of God, but of his enemies. Yet sensible as he was of the abuses in Church and state, Groote, unlike Luther or our Wyclif, did not openly attack them; what he aimed at was to substitute good for evil, to arouse in the hearts of his countrymen a Christianity too fervent to leave room for wickedness and corruption. With this in view he strove to bring education within the reach of the poorest, spending his great wealth either on the support of schools already in existence or on the foundation of new ones. His labours were strikingly successful, crowds flocking to hear him, and though in 1383 his enemies drove him from the pulpit, they were powerless to check his influence; the Pope's inhibition came too late, the reformer no longer stood alone. He had only preached five years, but in that space he had called into existence throughout the diocese of Utrecht little congregations of earnest Christians, who supplied him with disciples, some lay, some clerical, to carry on his work. These men, some of whom he educated at his own expense, were gradually formed into bands, the original Brotherhoods of the Common Life, and pledged themselves to purity, poverty, and strenuous labour, without, however, taking any religious vows. They were at first maintained by Groote, but a short time before his death they began to be self-supporting. While adhering to the rule of life he drew up for them, these new communities did not look to him for help, but depended for their livelihood on the copying-work of some of their members. The first was founded at Groote's birth-place, Deventer, at the suggestion of his first disciple, Florentius Radewin, and as long as he lived he was closely associated with it. There followed, not long after, the formation of a sisterhood on the same lines also at Deventer and another brotherhood at Zwolle, and as years went on the movement

spread to every part of Germany. Yet, encouraged as he must have been by the development of these communities, Groote feared the dangers that might befall them, from the malice of their enemies or the disaffection of their members, and after consultation with John Ruysbrock, he formed the idea of founding a monastery of the order of Canons Regular of St Augustine to serve the brotherhoods and sisterhoods as a governing body and a spiritual centre. The bequest of Lambert Steuerman, who died of the plague in 1384, put the means within his grasp, but after nursing his friend, he succumbed to the disease himself, and did not live to see the carrying out of his project. It was not till some years later, owing mainly to the exertions of Florentius, and with the approval of the Bishop of Utrecht, that the first monastery was opened at Windesem, a desolate spot between Zwolle and Deventer. The canons regular were drawn from among the most spiritually-minded of the members of the brotherhoods, and except for their taking religious vows and being withdrawn from the world, their rule of life differed little if at all from that of these communities. In a few years the monastery began to send out branches; in Thomas' words, "Daughters began to be born to her," and the number increased so steadily, that before Thomas' death in 1477 we hear of eighty houses of men and women as against a hundred and fifty brotherhoods and sisterhoods.

All these communities exercised great influence in the Pre-Reformation period, and it would be interesting to follow their history. Here, however, we are only concerned with two of them—those to which these present volumes chiefly relate and with which Thomas was personally connected, the original brother-house at Deventer where he stayed for some time after leaving the town school, and the monastery of Mt. St Agnes, where, with but few intervals, he spent the last fifty years of his long life.

What he has to tell of his surroundings, and the men who helped to mould him, cannot fail to interest and charm. Every page of these writings breathes love and single-hearted devotion, the religion of the mystic at its best. The reader will be dull indeed if he is not impressed and touched by their simplicity and sincerity and the beauty of their language. This, however, does not mean that they will satisfy his expectations in all respects. On the contrary, from the merely human standpoint they may appear to some to leave much to be desired. The period was wild and restless, Church and state were rent with discord, great struggles were being fought out, great events were coming to the birth; wherever men turned to look, war and upheaval met their gaze. Recluse as Thomas was, he might still, so some would think, have thrown some little light on this stirring age; he might have given us his opinion, not perhaps of Joan of Arc, but of events as vital to the Church as the healing of the Schism, the trial of John Hus, and the Bohemian religious war; or yet of the disaster which all Christendom bewailed, the fall of Constantinople. So far, however, from satisfying such demands, he often passes over in silence, or with a scanty mention, matters not of merely general interest, but

intimately affecting his own community. The year 1414 saw the assembling of the Council of Constance, and among those who were present at it was the then Prior of Windesem, John of Huesden, and others of the brethren. Thomas says nothing of this, although on that occasion the very existence of the brotherhoods was endangered, and Charlier de Gerson risked his reputation to defend them. The one event on which he lingers is the evacuation of Mount St Agnes and others of the monasteries in the year of the interdict (1429). Even in this case he might well have told us more; we should like to have heard how Rodolph came to be acknowledged Bishop of Utrecht, and to have read at greater length of the homecoming of the monks.

Yet this indifference, while we may regret it, need not excite our wonder; it is, after all, entirely in accordance with the mystic's point of view. Gerard had looked above and beyond this world, and this attitude of detachment was cultivated of set purpose by his followers. The monks at Windesem, so says their chronicler, sedulously avoided inquiring into the deeds of petty chieftains, the changes expected in the country, the tidings of wars and tumults or other secular affairs, lest by so doing they should turn their thoughts from the welfare of their souls. Our monk at Mt. St Agnes did not yield to any of them in fervour or in absorption; that he is chary of contemporary allusions, that his picture is, so to speak, without a background, is the reverse of surprising. We are no less sure of disappointment if we expect his descriptions of the members of his own circle to abound in personal touches. The lives of the brothers whom he knew do not seem to stand out more vividly than that of Gerard Groote, with which he was only familiar by hearsay. The latter, if anything, impresses us more, owing, no doubt, to its greater variety. We do not mean to suggest that the human interest does not sometimes make itself felt, as, for instance, in the account of Thomas' own relations with Florentius, of Lutert Berner and his father, or of John Ketel, the cook, but more often than not it is subsidiary, passages such as these being intended almost always to point a moral. The brothers, as Thomas saw them, were, before all, the founders of his devotion; he wrote of them in reply to importunities and for the common good; their feet touched earth but their hearts were in heaven; they were in the world but not of it. What he dwells on are the details of their conversion and their religious experience, their humility and love and self-denial, their edifying deaths and pious rules of life. Among the latter, those of Gerard Groote seem to us the most interesting; they are not so practical as, *e.g.*, those of St Bridget of Sweden, but their asceticism is still within limits.

What has just been said applies with equal truth to his records of Mt. St Agnes. As in the former volume, so in this we look in vain for that love of local colour, that keen appreciation of character which atone in many cases for the neglect of the political interest, and which make Ekkehard's *Memoirs of St Gall* so intensely vivid. The "three inseparables," the eavesdropping Sindolf, could not have been sketched by Thomas,

even if they could have existed in a community where in very truth each strove for the lowest place, and sought humiliation not for his neighbour but for himself. It is true that, in the *Chronicle*, a good deal of space is devoted to household affairs, and we are delighted to read how the monks built their house and laid out their grounds, how they were put to it to replenish their larder, and to be even with their enemies the mice. But Thomas' heart is clearly not in these things; here, as before, the topics in which his interest centres are the topics of religious experience; these were the only realities, beside these all human concerns, all human relations seemed trivial and fleeting. Of his brother John, the first prior of the monastery, who died in his arms in 1432, he speaks with the dry impartiality of a stranger. It was not that he was wanting in feeling—the attachment of the two is well known—but that he was set on other things. For the same reason he speaks of himself as rarely as possible; the longest reference to him in the *Chronicle* is the notice of his death by the brother who continued the work.

We have made these criticisms as they occurred to us in no carping or ungrateful spirit. On the contrary, when all has been said, we hold that what he has withheld from us counts for little beside what he has given us. We could dispense with historical information and personal details; we should be sorry indeed to part with these radiant pictures of true devotion, these loving utterances of a soul unspotted from the world. They will make their way to the hearts of many, they will be valued by all as memorials of mediæval Christianity in its purest form. For Mr Arthur's rendering we have nothing but praise; without sacrificing literal correctness he has preserved for us the well-nigh pathetic simplicity, the unconscious humour, the old-world fragrance of the original. We are also indebted to him for two excellent introductions.

M. RHYS.

OXFORD.

Die Christenkatastrophe unter Nero, nach ihren Quellen insbesondere nach Tac. ann. xv. 44 von neuem untersucht.—Durch E. Theodor Klette.
—Tübingen : J. C. B. Mohr, 1907.

It is nearly twenty years since Dr Franklin Arnold published his incisive study of the Neronian persecution, and Dr Klette has done a serviceable piece of work in this fresh investigation of the problem. Recent research, alike from the side of Roman history and from that of the primitive Christian church, has re-set several of the details. Dr Klette is abreast of these discussions. Now and then he fails to notice an English work, such as Mr B. W. Henderson's biography of Nero, but he has taken into account the snowstorm of Italian pamphlets, occasioned by Carlo Pascal's essay, in particular; the various sources are carefully, even minutely, scrutinised; and the essay is a thoroughgoing piece of historical analysis and reconstruction.

His views of the Tacitus-passage are in some respects peculiar. With most scholars, he sharply refuses to believe Dr Schiller's theory that the mention of Christians is an unhistorical confusion on the historian's part. There was a "coercitio" of some Christians, as Christians. But then the problem rises—Why did Nero select them as his scapegoats? What was it, in their conduct or beliefs, that marked them out as suitable objects on which to divert the popular hatred? Klette (pp. 95 f.) will not admit Pascal's contention that extravagant or loose language about the final conflagration of the world can have been the reason, and that the offenders were arrested for revolutionary ambitions. But his grounds for this dissent are not convincing. The core of Christian eschatology was indeed the return of Christ, but this was often set in a framework of picturesque and realistic details, which would bulk largely in the minds especially of the uneducated. One cannot lightly dismiss a Millenarian belief in eschatological fire as a possible trait in some circles of the Roman Christians simply because it ought to have been secondary in their doctrine, much less because it was common to Jews and Christians alike. It never had the hold of the Jewish imagination at this period that it had of primitive Christianity. Besides, it would fit in with the charge of hatred to the human race.¹ Klette, however, prefers to think that the Christians were selected for punishment on account of their general bad repute for superstition, etc. Their supposed *flagitia* were their danger. He agrees (pp. 10, 106 f.) with Arnold (pp. 19 f.), Schiller, Duruy, and Henderson that *correpti qui fatebantur* means a confession of arson, not of the Christian faith. But he cannot accept any of the ordinary explanations of this remarkable statement. The confession was not extracted by means of torture, he holds, differing from Arnold at this point. Nor does *correpti* mean, as Mr E. G. Hardy argued, mere sectaries who gave false incriminating witness, *δὲν ἑὸς*, against the church. Who were they, then? Fanatical enthusiasts, or traitors to the Christian cause? No; the only adequate hypothesis, to Klette's mind, is to suppose that Tacitus attributed such a confession erroneously to the primitive Christians. His source spoke of them confessing simply their Christianity (pp. 116 f.). But his prejudice against them and his desire to suggest Nero's responsibility for the fire led him to specify, not in so many words, but by the context, arson as the charge to which they must have pled guilty. This confession led (*indicio eorum*) to the further arrest (pp. 142 f.) of an *ingens multitudo*, who were condemned mainly on the general charge of *odium humanis generis*. Klette adopts (pp. 142 f.) Arnold's emendation of *adfixi, aut flammandi, atque*, into *adfixi sunt flammandi, utque*, in preference to Halm's *aut flammausti, alique* or Pöhlmann's *aut flammati atque*; while, in the preceding sentence, he prefers Halm's conjectural reading *convicti* (i.e. as opposed to

¹ Wild talk about the final burning of the world, or even more sober anticipations, might easily serve to stir up, in an atmosphere of suspicion and hostile misinterpretation, the same desire to retaliate as actuated the Sultan of Turkey in his jealous attack on Armenian Christians who sang martial hymns.

the voluntary *fatebantur* of the earlier legal process) to the *conjuncti* of the manuscript (so Boissier, Ramsay, Henderson, Hofbauer, and Weis), which would mean "were associated with the former, not in the charge of incendiarism, but in the accusation of the *odium*."

The previous sections of the essay discuss exhaustively the allusions to Nero's outburst in the early Christian writers, especially Clement of Rome, Melito, and Tertullian. From this the following results emerge. (i) Klette has no doubt whatever that the distinction between Jews and Christians was well known to the Roman authorities in the seventh decade of the first century. Suspicions of this have often been ventilated, but the evidence led here puts the matter finally beyond all question. (ii) The Christians were condemned as Christians. Klette is at one with Mr H. B. Workman (*Persecution in the Early Church*, p. 54) on this point, only he tries to clinch his proof by getting behind Tacitus to his supposed source. The association of the Christians with arson was due to the anti-Neronian bias of Tacitus himself, not to the source. (iii) The dramatic publicity of the punishment must have spread the name of Christian *urbi et orbi*, far and wide over the empire (pp. 40-41, 65). The provincials would soon hear of it, and would readily desire a repetition of such scenic pageants at the expense of the Christians. All that was needed was a proconsul to gratify their wishes, and some outstanding Christian, like Antipas or Polycarp, as a victim. In the light of this, passages like 1 Pet. iv. 14, 16 become quite intelligible. (iv) Such passages, together with those in Hebrews and the Apocalypse, imply that the new name¹ of Χριστιανός had acquired dangerous and compromising associations, and that these must have been excited by some imperial action² in the matter (pp. 54 f.), which is to be referred not to Domitian but to Nero. (v) Nero's attack on the Christians was incited by the influence (pp. 25 f.) of Jews and Jewish proselytes in his entourage, such as Aliturus and Poppæa. The ζήλος or spiteful malice to which Clement of Rome traces the distress of Christians under Nero, refers, in Klette's judgment, to this Semitic malice.

The distinctive feature of the essay is thus the preference given to the Christian evidence when combined with that of Suetonius (who does not connect the persecution with the fire), rather than to the statement of Tacitus, as well as the ingenious attempt made to read the latter's language in the light of conclusions reached from the former, so that the difficulty of the above connection disappears entirely for the historian of to-day. The process of distinguishing between Tacitus and his source at this point will not appear conclusive to some readers. It is doubtful if it is even

¹ Klette accepts too easily the doubtful Pompeian inscription, however (p. 17).

² This practice of legal "coercitio," he argues (pp. 50 f.), must have stamped the name "Christian" by the time 1 Pet. iv. 16 was written. The term ἀλλοτριοεπίσκοπος Klette regards as almost parallel to it, meaning a spy who got into some other cult or religious fellowship (e.g. the synagogue). "Ebenso möglich ist aber auch, dass der Verfasser selbst nur lebhaft einen solchen Fall denkt und seinen Lesern warnend vormalt."

necessary to Dr Klette's main position. But the monograph affords ample data for correcting or modifying its own arguments, and for this alone it is to be welcomed heartily.

JAMES MOFFATT.

BROUGHTY FERRY, N.B.

The Church and Modern Men.—By Wm. Scott Palmer.—Longmans, 1907. Pp. viii+166 8vo.

MR W. S. PALMER, in a little volume called *An Agnostic's Progress*, has already traced for us the path which led him twenty years ago from Agnosticism to Anglicanism. Meantime he has not drowsed after his labours, but has been a keen and critical observer of the Church and the Modern Man—of the nature of the religious supply and demand. At last he has broken silence, to the irritation of some and the satisfaction of others. His two essays (here reprinted from the *Church Times*)—*Towards the New Beginning*—appeal less for a new pulpit apologetic than for a frank abandonment of the old, with its presupposition of the “intellectualist” value of revelation. Then follow six essays, which exhibit a quite unusually discerning apprehension of the “modernist” movement against mediævalism in the Roman Church—a movement towards which no dogmatic religion can afford to be indifferent. The term Modernism is used loosely and most unfairly in the encyclical *Pascendi* to cover every possible attitude taken by Roman Catholics in the face of the results of historical and philosophical criticism—even the attitude of those who reject and assail both the modernist and the mediævalist synthesis in favour of wholesale anti-dogmatism. Mr Palmer is not misled by this sophistry. Modernism, he sees, is the courageous attempt to find room for the freest scientific criticism, not by a shallower and thinner but by a deeper and richer interpretation of dogmatic Christianity. If one dogma has to go, or to be impoverished in its value, the attempt has failed. Disintegration begins where development ends.

Then follow six essays or attempts on the part of the educated but of course untheological layman to break the hard ice of the surface-sense and get to the underlying depths of certain traditional beliefs. This lay presumption can scarcely escape clerical censure. Yet these are strange times, in which the panic-stricken shepherds huddle in the fold while the flock is scattered abroad; and the bleatings of the lost sheep may at least indicate where they have got to, and how much courage and venture would be entailed in their recovery. These pages, therefore, may be cordially commended both to shepherds and sheep.

G. TYRRELL.

LONDON.

Platen - Atlas tot opheldering van Bijbelsche Oudheden.—Door H. Oort & G. Wildeboer.—Amsterdam : Kampen & Zoon, 1907.

THIS is not a book, but a portfolio. The authors, both of them well-known Biblical scholars, have aimed at giving help to more elementary students of the Bible, and especially to those who have to teach Bible classes. Anyone who has engaged in such work knows the need of good pictures; and such a teacher usually finds that he has to search in books of travel, encyclopædias, and the like for what he wants, and is not always in a position to do so.

The authors have had the happy idea to collect from various sources the latest and best illustrations suitable to their purpose, and to have these engraved on a series of separate sheets, the whole being contained in a portfolio, and accompanied by a few pages of explanatory notes and references to books. The teacher can take with him into class just the particular sheets which he needs. The idea is a good one, and it is to be hoped that some publishing house in this country will take it up. The authors have taken much trouble to ransack recent archæological works for suitable material; and, besides pictures of actual objects or places, they give reconstructions from plans or measurements, often highly interesting. As in many cases it was impossible to present pictures of contemporary Hebrew objects, they have availed themselves of the help of Egyptian or Babylonian sculptures. In short, they have spared no pains to put within the reach of the reader of the Bible the results of the latest researches in the field of Biblical Archæology, and that, too, for a very modest price. The only criticism we should make would be that the quality of the pictures could be much improved. Most of them appear to be engravings from sketches, or reproductions of other engravings. A very few are reproductions of photographs, and these last make the rest look very poor by comparison. It is possible that the question of expense may have deterred the authors from making greater use of photography; and if that be so, then we admit that it was well to keep the price down, for the benefit of those for whom the work was especially intended. But even on the plan adopted, the drawing of some of the pictures strikes us as rather poor, and one or two reproductions of pencil sketches are far from pleasing. Plate IIIa. is a copy of a copy of a picture in Palmer's "*Desert of the Exodus*," and it is curious to compare it with its original. Various details in Palmer's drawing are evidently not understood by the last copyist, whose sketch is accordingly unconvincing and hesitating. However, the main purpose of the work is but slightly hindered by these small defects. On the whole it is well done, and should be of great service to those who try to read the Bible with the eyes of their mind open.

R. T. HERFORD.

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- ^C *Scott (E. F.)* "The Kingdom of Heaven suffereth Violence": An Exposition of Matt. xi. 12, 13. Bibl. World, Dec. 1907.
[Christ believed the purpose of God could be hastened by men, and is urging them to action towards realising the Kingdom.]
- ^F *D'Alviella (G.)* Le prologue du quatrième Évangile et la philosophie de l'évolution. Cenobium, Nov. 1907.
- Hitchcock (F. R. M.)* The Baptist and the Fourth Gospel. Expos., Dec. 1907.
[Finds evidence of the great influence of the Baptist on the writer—enough to prove the author an intimate disciple of the Baptist.]
- Kelly (William)* An Exposition of the Gospel of John. Ed. by E. E. Whitfield. 2nd ed. 552p. Elliot Stock, 1908.
- Clark (Henry W.)* The Gospel according to St John. Authorised Version. With Intro. and Notes. (The Westminster New Testament.) 259p. Melrose, 1908.
[Opening a new series of small volumes, edited by Principal Garvie, of commentaries on N.T., specially intended to be practically useful for teachers, lay preachers, etc.]
- Pratt (D. B.)* The Gospel of John from the Standpoint of Greek Tragedy. Bibl. World, Dec. 1907.
[There is a close parallelism of form and method between the Gospel and the great Greek tragedies.]
- Strachan (R. H.)* The Personality of the Fourth Evangelist. Expos., Feb. 1908.
[In its bearings on the problem of the Fourth Gospel.]
- ^G *MacRory (J.)* Recent Criticism and the Authorship of the Fourth Gospel. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1908.
- Schütz (R.)* Zum ersten Teil des Johannesevangeliums. Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1907.
[Discusses the difficulties connected with the three journeys to the feast.]
- Soltau (W.)* Die Entstehung des vierten Evangeliums. Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1908.
[Presents a *Protevangelium of John* consisting approximately of ch. i.-vi. and xviii.-xx., the gap in which the Evangelist filled up from legendary material and from a speech-source.]
- ^H *Barns (T.)* A Study in St John xxi. Expos., Dec. 1907.
[Argues that the chapter is an appendix, of Montanist origin.]
- ^N *Holtzmann (H. J.)* Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu: ein Beitrag zur Leben-Jesu-Forschung. 100p. Mohr, 1907.
- ^P *Findlay (G. G.)* The Parable of the Pearl-Merchant. Expos., Feb. 1908.
[An exposition.]
- ^R *Orr (J.)* The Resurrection of Jesus. Expos., Jan., Feb. 1908.
[An apologetic: (1) The Present State of the Question. (2) Its Nature as Miracle.]
- ^W *Denney (J.)* Speaking against the Son of Man and Blaspheming the Spirit. Expos., Dec. 1907.
[Exegesis.]
- ^{7A} *Steinmann (A.)* Jerusalem und Antiochien. Zwei bedeutungsvolle Tage in der alten Kirche. Bibl. Ztschr., Heft 1, 1908.
- ^B *Ramsay (Sir W. M.)* The Cities of St Paul: Their Influence on his Life and Thought. (The Dale Memorial Lectures.) 452p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.
[Review will follow.]
- Chadwick (W. Edward)* The Pastoral Teaching of St Paul: His Ministerial Ideas. 394p. Clark, 1907.
[An attempt to show St Paul at work as a Christian minister, and to make clear how rich in pastoral guidance and inspiration St Paul's life and teaching are.]
- Pratt (F.)* La Théologie de Saint Paul, première partie. 604p. Beauchesne, 1908.
[Written from the Roman Catholic point of view, and with the imprimatur of the Church authorities.]
- Ménégoz (E.)* Pardon et Justice: le pardon gratuit selon Jésus-Christ et la justice imputée selon Saint Paul. 18p. Fischbacher, 1907.
[Reprinted from the *Revue Chrétienne*.]
- Milligan (George)* St Paul's Epistles to

the Thessalonians: The Greek Text, with Introduction and Notes. 195p.

Macmillan, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

D *Strömman (C.)* Röm. 9, 5.

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1907.

[If the passage $\delta \omega \nu$. . . $\delta \omega \nu$ be not deleted as a marginal gloss, then read $\delta \omega \nu$ for $\delta \omega \nu$.]

H *Burton (E. D.)* Redemption from the Curse of the Law: An Exposition of Gal. iii. 13, 14. Amer. J. of Th., Oct. 1907.

Z *Crafer (T. W.)* The Connection between St Jude and the Magnificat.

Interpreter, Jan. 1908.

[Argues for the dependence of Jude 24, 25 on the Virgin's hymn.]

8 *Müller (M. W.)* Die apokalyptischen Reiter.

Ztschr. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1907.

[Treated from the standpoint of comparative mythology.]

9 *Porter (F. C.)* The Pre-existence of the Soul in the Book of Wisdom and in the Rabbinical Writings.

Amer. J. of Th., Jan. 1908.

[Full and valuable investigation into the teaching of *Wisdom* and of the Rabbis, to show that the doctrine grew from the native Hebrew stock and not by adoption of Stoic and Platonic elements.]

C CHURCH 14.. *Social Problems*, 20 .. *Polity*, 42 .. *Liturgical*, 50 .. *Sacraments*, 60 *Missions*.

1 *Willmore (Edward)* The Bond of Truth (A Recast of Theology showing the Conditions of an Ideal Church). 28p.

Atkins, 1908.

4 *Henson (H. Hensley)* The National Church: Essays on its History and Constitution and Criticisms of its Present Administration. With Intro. by J. Llewelyn Davies. 440p. Macmillan, 1908.

[The general purport of these Essays is to protest against the ecclesiastical assumptions which are tending to make the Church of England less national than it has been and still professes to be. The feeling encouraged through its pages is that of a godly English patriotism.]

15 "A Twentieth Century Christian." The Christ of Faith and Reason. 66p.

Pritchard, 1908.

[Calls for a new interpretation of the Scriptures in the light of Faith and Reason.]

25 *The Bishop of St Albans.* The Lambeth Conference and the Pan-Anglican Congress. Church Q. R., Jan. 1908.

27 *Anon.* The Law of the Church and the Law of the State.

Church Q. R., Jan. 1908.

53 *Réville (J.)* Les origines de l'Eucharistie (2^e article).

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Sept. 1907.

[Sets forth and appraises the New Testament evidence.]

60 *Fox (F. W.), Macalister (Alexander), Simpson (Sir Alex. R.)* Christian Missions in China: A Report. Cont. R., Feb. 1908.

Myline (Louis George) Missions to Hindus: A Contribution to the Study of Missionary Methods. 189p.

Longmans, 1908.

[Object of book to promote the study of missionary methods by assisting in the compilation of a body of principles, generalised from actual experience.]

Knox (G. W.) What Modifications in Western Christianity may be expected from Contact with Oriental Religions on the Mission Field? Amer. J. of Th., Oct. 1907.

D DOCTRINE 10 .. *God*, 22 .. *Christ*, 60 .. *Eschatology*, 70 .. *Faith*, 80 *Apologetics*.

Jones (Ven. Archdeacon) Ideals, not Ideas: An Impeachment of Dogmatism. 24p. Elliot Stock, 1907.

Hodge (C. W.) The Idea of Dogmatic Theology. Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1908.

Macintosh (D. C.) The Function of History in Theology.

Amer. J. of Th., Oct. 1907.

[Discussed in connection with Lovejoy's article in *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1907, on "The Entangling Alliance between History and Religion."]

h *Drummond (James)* Studies in Christian Doctrine. 559p. Green, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

Hastings (James), ed. A Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels. Vol. ii. Labour-Zion. With Appendix and Indexes. 912p. Clark, 1908.

[We hope soon to review this work as a whole.]

Forsyth (P. T.) The Love of Liberty and the Love of Truth. Cont. R., Feb. 1908.

[A creedless church, in the sense of a church without a formula of subscription, will be found by Christendom a bane or a boon according as its motive is an indifference to definite belief or a concern for a rich variety of belief definite and positive.]

Hogg (Walter) The New Theology and the Ordinary Man. West. R., Mar. 1908.

2 *Loisy (Alfred)* Simples Réflexions sur le Décret du Saint-Office, "Lamentabili Sane Exitu," et sur l'Encyclique, "Pascendi Dominici Gregis." 277p. Chez l'auteur, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

Lepin (M.) Christologie: Commentaire des Propositions xxvii.-xxxviii. du Décret du Saint-Office "Lamentabili." 118p.

Beauchesne, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

Anon. The Programme of Modernism: A Reply to the Encyclical of Pius X., "Pascendi Dominici Gregis." Trans. from the Italian. With Intro. by A. L. Lilley. 290p. Unwin, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

Lilley (A. Leslie) Modernism: A Record and Review. 277p. Pitman, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

Toner (P. J.) The Encyclical on Modernism. Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1908.

[An exposition of the main critical and philosophical principles of the Modernist movement.]

Burns (C. Delisle) Modernism: i. Its Historical Connections; ii. Its Arguments.

Albany R., Dec. 1907 and Feb. 1908.

[Deals with Modernism from the standpoint of scientific knowledge. So viewed, Modernism is an apologetic. The effort to find a shelter for scientific knowledge under traditional formulas is praiseworthy, but it is patchwork philosophy.]

Corrance (Henry C.) A Vindication of Modernism. 19th Cent., Feb. 1908.

Carli (Filippo) Il Personalismo e la Chiesa: L'attuale conflitto dal punto di vista della filosofia della storia. 31p.

Tessitori, 1907.

[Refers chiefly to G. Tyrrell as one of the most representative exponents of the conflict in Cath-

olicism, and is written by one who is outside the movement and considers it from a simply *unreligious* point of view.]

Prezzolini (Giuseppe) Il Cattolismo Rosso: Studio sul presente movimento di riforma nel Cattolismo. 348p.

Ricciardi, 1908.

[This book is the result of several years' independent study; it does not treat of persons, but of the ideas of the new Catholics. It is the author's hope that his work may induce both Catholic parties to make an effort to clear up their position.]

Anon. The Encyclical "Pascendi."

Dub. R., Jan. 1908.

[Repels the idea that the summary of "Modernism" in the Encyclical is a summary of Newman's teaching or that Newman's teaching is in any way hit by the Encyclical.]

Petre (M. D.) Catholicism and Independence: Studies in Spiritual Liberty. 174p.

Longmans, 1907.

[A thoughtful little volume. "The greater things of life cannot be done for us, but must be done by ourselves. We must render to Pope and Cæsar that which belongs to Pope and Cæsar, but to God and our own soul that which is their due."]

Anon. The Papacy in the Nineteenth Century. Church Q.R., Jan. 1908.

M'Kenna (P.) Absolution from Reserved Sins, II. Irish Tr. Quar., Jan. 1908.

3 *Adderley (James)* The Catholicism of the Church of England. 112p.

Griffiths, 1908.

4 *Bohatec (J.)* Die Methode der reformierten Dogmatik.

Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1908.

Loofs (F.) Das Evangelium der Reformation und die Gegenwart.

Theol. St. u. Krit., Heft 2, 1908.

Ménégos (E.) La valeur religieuse des principes de la théologie évangélique moderne. Rev. chrét., Feb. 1908.

20 *Marshall (William)* The Nature of Christ, or The Christology of the Scriptures and of Christ. 3rd ed., revised. 237p.

Elliot Stock, 1908.

[“The subject of this book is the Nature of Christ, in his pre-Incarnate, Incarnate, and Glorified states.”]

65 *Slattery (Charles L.)* Life beyond Life: A Study of Immortality. 138p.

Longmans, 1907.

[Written from the standpoint of a Christian believer, whose chief interest is in theology. Contains a chapter on the possible contribution of psychical research.]

E ETHICS. 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics*, 10 *Theories*, 20 *Applied Ethics, Sociology*, 23 *Economics*, 27 *Education*.

6 *Scullard (H. H.)* Early Christian Ethics in the West. From Clement to Ambrose. 294p.

Williams & Norgate, 1907.

[For the substance of this book the London University conferred upon the author its D.D. degree. An attempt is made to trace the first presentation and development of Christian ethical reflection after its liberation from apostolic guidance, and on Greco-Roman soil.]

10 *Holcombe (C.)* Oriental Ethics compared with Western Systems.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1908.

Paulhan (F.) La contradiction de l'homme. i. L'homme comme individu

égoïste et comme élément social. ii. Le rôle de la morale. Rev. Phil., Jan., Feb. 1908.

[*Raison d'être* of all morality is the opposition between the social and the egoistic elements in man.]

Urban (Wilbur) What is the Function of a General Theory of Value?

Phil. R., Jan. 1908.

[The chief problem for "axiology" as for epistemology, is bound up with the distinction between subjective and objective, a distinction important in dealing with judgments of value as well as judgments of knowledge.]

Lessing (Theodor) Studien zur Wertaxiomatik. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 1, 1908.

Koppelman (Wilhelm) Die Ethik Kants: Entwurf zu einem Neubau auf Grund einer kritik des kantischen Moralprinzips. 92p. Reuther & Reichard, 1907.

[Moral principles are developed from *a priori* conditions of a spiritual community, and are the same for all rational beings and known with absolute certainty. But Kant's formula of the moral law is unfruitful and leads to erroneous consequences.]

Super (C. W.) Motive in Conduct.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1908.

Schiller (F. C. S.) Freedom and Responsibility. Oxf. and Camb. R., 2, 1907. [Criticism of Robert Blatchford's pamphlet *Not Guilty*.]

20 *Mill (John Stuart)* On Social Freedom.

Oxf. and Camb. R., 2, 1907.

[Concluding portion of the hitherto unpublished essay, the opening chapters of which were given in the previous number.]

Read (Carveth) A Posthumous Chapter by J. S. Mill. Mind, Jan. 1908.

[The essay on *Social Freedom* was never finished by the author for publication; and the propriety of publishing fragments and other unrevised remains, without the author's sanction, is extremely questionable.]

Barth (Paul) Die Soziologie Albert Schäffles.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 4, 1907.

[Schäffle's main error was in regarding "Sachgüter" as part of the subject-matter of sociology.]

Howerth (J. W.) The Social Ideal.

Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1908.

Hayes (F. L.) The Ethical Factor in Politics. Biblioth. Sac., Jan. 1908.

Viollier (W.) L'art social à Genève.

R. du Christianisme social, Jan. 1908.

[Describes the work of a society which aims at providing good art for the people.]

Hobhouse (L. T.) Editorial.

Sociological R., Jan. 1908.

[Explaining object of the new periodical. The main problem of sociology at the present day is to build up the great comparative science which alone can put the theory of social evolution on a firm basis.]

Fisher (H. A. L.) The Sociological View of History. Sociological R., Jan. 1908.

Walpole (Sir Spencer) The Growth of the World. Cont. R., Feb. 1908.

Wallace (Alfred Russel) Evolution and Character. Fort. R., Jan. 1908.

[The general idea that our advance in science and command over nature serve as demonstrations of our mental superiority to the men of earlier ages is wholly unfounded. The supposed great mental inferiority of savages is equally unfounded.]

Balfour (Hon. A. J.) Decadence. (Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture.) 62p.

Clay, 1908.

Chapman (S. J.) Work and Wages. (In continuation of Lord Brassey's "Work and Wages" and "Foreign Work and English Wages.") Part ii. Wages and Employment. Introd. by Lord Brassey. 516p. Longmans, 1908.

[Deals with trades unions here and elsewhere, principles of industrial peace, unemployment and workmen's insurance and old-age pensions.]

Beveridge (W. H.) Settlements and Social Reform. Oxf. and Camb. R., 2, 1907.

Borrell (P.) L'idée de démocratie.

Rev. de Phil., Feb. 1908.

[Democracy is the condition of a people that determine themselves by reason.]

O'Connor (A. J.) The Socialist Movement in England. The Month, Jan. 1908.

[Forecasting the social consequences of the adoption of the English socialist programme.]

Headlam (D. Stewart) and others, Socialism and Religion. *Carpenter (Edward) and others,* Socialism and Agriculture. *Webb (Sidney) and others,* Socialism and Individualism. *Webb (Sidney) and the Fabian Society,* The Basis and Policy of Socialism. (Fabian Socialist Series, 1 to 4.) 87, 94, 102, 95p. Fiffeld, 1908.

Villiers (Brougham) The Socialist Movement in England. 340p. Unwin, 1908. [Defends the central aim of Socialism, while advocating the utmost freedom in methods.]

Barker (J. Ellis) British Socialism: An Examination of its Doctrines, Policy, Aims, and Practical Proposals. 522p.

Smith, Elder, 1908.

[Vigorously attacks the teaching of modern Socialism.]

Egerton (Hakluyt) Socialism and Reform.

Church Q.R., Jan. 1908.

[Examination of philosophical and economic conceptions in current Socialism. These conceptions are vitiated by a radical misinterpretation of facts, and cannot therefore be profitably used as instruments of social reform.]

Mallock (W. H.) A Critical Examination of Socialism. 326p. Murray, 1908.

Crozier (J. Beattie) A Challenge to Socialism. Fort. R., Jan. 1908.

Blatchford (Robert) A Socialist's Answer to Dr Crozier's Challenge.

Fort. R., Feb. 1908.

Hoare (H. W.) The Impotence of Socialism. 19th Cent., Feb. 1908.

Macdonald (J. Ramsay) The Impotence of Socialism: A Reply.

19th Cent., Mar. 1908.

[Reply to Hoare.]

Anon. The Fallacies of Socialism.

Edin. R., Jan. 1908.

21 *Free (Richard)* Settlements or Unsettlements? 19th Cent., Mar. 1908.

Newman (A. E.) Small Holdings: An Object Lesson. Albany R., Jan. 1908.

[Results of an experiment started thirty years ago in a small village in Bucks by the present Bishop of Truro.]

Anon. The Right to Work.

Quar. R., Jan. 1908.

[Maintains the moral obligation of everyone to work to the best of his ability.]

Masterman (C. F. G.) Causes and Cures of Poverty. Albany R., Feb. 1908.

Penty (A. J.) The Fallacy of Collectivism. Albany R., Jan. 1908.

Gray (the late B. Kirkman) Abbe's Theory of Industry. Albany R., Jan. 1908.

Champeaux (Dr) Une critique des langues conventionnelles. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1908.

[An artificial language cannot be that of literary men or scholars; commerce alone may gain some advantage from it.]

23 *McDonald (W.)* The Living Wage.

Irish Th. Quar., Jan. 1908.

[Discusses the ethical presuppositions.]

26 *Sommer (Friedrich)* Grundzüge einer Sozialaristokratie.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 1, 1908.

Ryan (J. A.) Is Stock Watering Immoral? Inter J. Eth., Jan. 1908.

[Stock watering, or over-capitalisation, is essentially an attempt to get excessive and unjust profits on capital.]

27 *Emonet (B.)* La formation sociale des jeunes gens.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Jan. 1, 1908.

[Indicates ways of social service open to Catholic youth.]

Rees (W. G. Edwards) Education and Crime. Church Q.R., Jan. 1908.

Bishop of Southwark. The Education Question. Cont. R., Feb. 1908.

[Suggestions towards a peaceful solution.]

Spooner (W. A.) Oxford University Reform: Is a Commission Necessary?

Church Q.R., Jan. 1908.

Collins (J. Churton) The Universities and a School of Journalism.

19th Cent., Feb. 1908.

28 *Balmforth (R.)* The Moral Development of the Native Races in South Africa.

Inter J. Eth., Jan. 1908.

98 *Morrison (W. D.)* The Criminal Problem. Sociological R., Jan. 1908.

Westermarck (E.) Suicide: A Chapter in Comparative Ethics.

Sociological R., Jan. 1908.

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

Moffatt (J.) Materials for the Preacher.

Expos., Jan. and Feb. 1908.

Anon. The Best Religion to Live and Die in: A few Plain Notes by an Old Hospital Chaplain. 74p. Parker, 1908.

Levy (J. H.) A Funeral Service. Music by C. B. Mabon. Nelson, 1905.

[The address here printed is that of an agnostic, in Huxley's sense of the term, over the grave of two of his dearest friends. The words of the anthem are an attempt to put into English verse the aphorism of Seneca: *Homines quidem pereunt, ipsa humanitas . . . permanet.*]

1 *Adams (John)* Sermons in Syntax, or Studies in the Hebrew Text. 228p.

Clark, 1908.

[A supplementary volume to the author's former treatise on Hebrew Accentuation. "As a mine of homiletical suggestion, the accentual system cannot compare for a moment with the ever-varying light and shade of Hebrew Syntax."]

2 *Tolstoy (Leo)* "Love one Another."

Fort. R., Jan. 1908.

[Address to peasants.]

Mytne (R. S.) The True Ground of Faith. With Pref. by Canon Benham. Cheap reissue. 90p. Elliot Stock, 1908.

[Five sermons preached in Bangor Cathedral.]

Whitworth (William Allen) The Sanctuary of God, and Other Sermons. 230p. Macmillan, 1908.

Pusey (E. B.) Eleven Addresses during a Retreat of the Companions of the Love of Jesus, engaged in Perpetual Intercession for the Conversion of Sinners. New ed. Pref. by Viscount Halifax. 152p.

Parker, 1908.

Fallot (T.) La Religion de la Solidarité. 360p.

[Sermons and addresses delivered between 1883 and 1900.] Fischbacher, 1907.

Thom (John Hamilton) A Spiritual Faith. 2nd (abridged) ed. 206p.

P. Green, 1908.

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

2 *Mackintosh (W. L.)* Life of William Laud (Great Churchmen Series). 268p.

Masters, 1907.

Keating (J.) Some After-Christians.

The Month, Jan. 1908.

[Referring to the religious views of Tennyson, Carlyle, etc., as they appear in W. Allingham's Diary.]

Simpson (J. G.) The Teaching of Edward Irving. Expos., Jan. 1908.

Rey (L.) John Stuart Mill au point de vue religieux. Rev. chrét., Jan. 1908.

[This friend of Mill—pastor at Avignon—gives his recollections. There was in him "a growing tendency towards faith," and should Dr Gurney have been deceived in affirming that Mill died a Christian, he was only half deceived.]

Ramsay (Sir W.) Lord Kelvin.]

Nat. R., Mar. 1908.

Wright (T.) Newman and Campion: A Comparison and a Contrast.

The Month, Jan. and Feb. 1908.

Cooper (Astley) James Anthony Froude. 81p.

Elliot Stock, 1907.

[Lecture delivered at the Richmond Athenæum, on Nov. 18, 1907.]

Tyrrell (R. J.) Sir Richard Jebb.

Albany R., Jan. 1908.

Barnardo (Mrs) and Marchant (James) Memoirs of the Late Dr Barnardo. 427p.

Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Medieval R Modern 2 English.

Ward (A. W.) and others, eds. The Cambridge Modern History. Vol. V. The Age of Louis XIV. 1003p. Clay, 1908.

[Contains, *inter alia*, "French 17th-century Literature and its European Influence," by E. Faguet; "Gallican Church," by Viscount St Cyres; "Literature of the English Restoration, including Milton," by H. H. Child; "Religious Toleration in England," by H. M. Gwatkin; "European Science in 17th Century," by W. W. R. Ball and Sir M. Foster, and "Latitudinarianism," by M. Kaufmann.]

Acton (Lord) The History of Freedom, and other Essays. Edited with Introd. by J. N. Figgis and R. Vere Laurence. 677p.

Macmillan, 1908.

[The two first essays on the history of freedom in antiquity and in Christianity are of extreme interest. All the papers are of great value.]

1 *Acton (Lord)* Historical Essays and Studies. Edited with Introd. by J. N. Figgis and R. Vere Laurence. 544p.

Macmillan, 1908.

Schubert (Hans von) Outlines of Church History. Trans. from 8rd German ed. by Maurice A. Canney. Supplementary chap.

by Alice Gardner. (Theo. Trans. Lib.) 399p.

Williams & Norgate, 1907.

[Professor Schubert's *Lectures*, of which this book is a translation, were intended for the general reader, to whom his larger *Lehrbuch* would be inaccessible. Miss Gardner's supplement is on "Religious Thought and Life in England during the 19th century."]

Smith (A. L.) Frederic William Maitland: Two Lectures and a Bibliography. 71p.

Clarendon Press, 1908.

[A very sympathetic and appreciative estimate of Maitland as legal historian. History advances since it has adopted the new method of following up (a) analytic by (b) constructive treatment, as in Maitland's work.]

C *Lebreton (J.)* L'étude des origines chrétiennes.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Dec. 1, 1907.

[Introductory to a course of lessons on the subject. The need and advantage of the study for Catholics are set forth, and dogmatic engagements do not preclude honest investigation.]

M *Delehaye (H.)* Le pèlerinage de Laurent de Pászthó au Purgatoire de S. Patrice.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvii., fasc. 1.

Dunn (J.) A Legendary Life of St Patrick. Catholic World, Jan. 1908.

[According to Breton and Spanish versions.]

Kurtz (E.) Einige kritische Bemerkungen zur Vita des Hl. Demetrianos.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvii., fasc. 1.

Moretus (H.) La légende de S. Béat, apôtre de Suisse.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvi., fasc. 4.

Poncelet (A.) La vie et les œuvres de Thiery de Fleury.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvii., fasc. 1.

Savio (F.) Sur un épisode peu connu de la vie de S. Bassien de Lodi.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvii., fasc. 1.

Vervaeck (L.) Les reliques de S. Albert de Louvain, Evêque de Liège.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvi., fasc. 4.

[Report of the medical examination of the relics, with consequent correction of errors that biographers have made in the saint's life.]

Arber (Edward), ed. A Brief Discourse of the Troubles at Frankfort 1554-1558, attributed to William Whittingham, Dean of Durham, 1575. (Christian Lib. Series.) 260p.

Elliot Stock, 1908.

R *Cheetham (S.)* A History of the Christian Church since the Reformation. 474p.

Macmillan, 1907.

[Archdeacon Cheetham has intended this to form with his own *History of the Early Church* and Hardwick's histories of the Middle Age and of the Reformation, a complete history of the Christian Church on a small scale, but written with constant reference to original authorities.]

Berbig (G.) Spalatiniiana.

Theol. St. u. Knt., Heft 2, 1908.

Russell (E.) John Knox as Statesman.

Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1908.

Barnes (A. Stapylton) The Religion of Charles II.

Dub. R., Jan. 1908.

[Disposes of the notion that Charles II. was a sceptic.]

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C Fathers 2 R.C. Church 3 Anglican.

Miller (E. W.) Some Distinctive Features of Russian Christianity.

Amer. J. of Th., Oct. 1907.

- C *Glaue (P.)* Zur Echtheit von Cyprians 3 Buch der Testimonia.

Ztschr. f. neuest. Wiss., Heft 4, 1907.

- 2 *Hebermann (Charles G.) and others, eds.* The Catholic Encyclopedia: An International Work of Reference on the Constitution, Doctrine, Discipline, and History of the Catholic Church. Vol. ii. 804p.

Caxton Pub. Co., 1907.

Bacchus (Francis) The Roman Church down to the Neronian Persecution.

Dub. R., Jan., 1908.

Rome (Étienne) Le "Dualisme" Pascalien. Rev. de Phil., Feb. 1908.

[Reviews and praises *La Philosophie et l'Apologétique de Pascal*, by E. Janssens. The book treats of Pascal the physician, the geometrician, and the philosophic thinker.]

Heitz (T.) La Philosophie et la Foi dans l'œuvre d'Abélard.

R. d. sciences philos. et théol., Oct. 1907.

Jacqueri (M.) Le néo-platonisme de Jean Scot.

R. d. sciences philos. et théol., Oct. 1907.

Garrigon-Lagrange (R.) Intellectualisme et liberté chez Saint Thomas.

R. d. sciences philos. et théol., Oct. 1907.
Sinnetterre (R.) Sur les condamnations d'Aristote et de Saint Thomas au xiii^e siècle. R. prat. d'Apologét., Jan. 1, 1908.

Poncelet (A.) Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum latinorum bibliothecarum Romanarum præter quam Vaticanæ. X. Codices bibliothecæ Vallicellanæ.

Anal. Boll., tom. xxvi., fasc. 4.

Thurston (H.) Saint Bénézet and his Biographer. Catholic World, Dec. 1907.
[The saint is the "Patron of Engineers." The biographer is the late M. de Saint-Venant, the eminent mathematical physicist who sought to extend devotion to the saint among his confrères.]

Thurston (H.) Stipends for Masses.

The Month, Jan. 1908.

Clifford (C.) The Priest in Caricature and Idea. Catholic World, Feb. 1908.

Gilligan (E. A.) A Crusade of the Catechism. Catholic World, Jan. 1908.

[Describing the remarkable system of Sunday religious teaching to the young in the parish of S. Sulpice, Paris.]

P. A Plea for Catholic Social Action.

The Month, Feb. 1908.

Thurston (H.) The English Catholic Calendar since the Reformation. Part I.

The Month, Feb. 1908.

Anstruther (G. E.) The "Ransomers": A Catholic Forward Movement.

Catholic World, Feb. 1908.

[Describes the English Roman Catholic organization, the Guild of Ransom.]

Ward (Wilfred) Father Ignatius Ryder: A Reminiscence. Dub. R., Jan. 1908.

[Gives extracts from Father Ryder's letters and poems.]

- 3 *Paget (Francis)* An Introduction to the Fifth Book of Hooker's Treatise of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity. 2nd ed. 385p.

Frowde, 1907.

[Bishop Paget's *Introduction* is now reissued with some added references and an index.]

Williams (T. H.) Mozley and Morals.

West. R., Mar. 1908.

[St Augustine and Mozley, in the forlorn

attempt to vindicate the very letter of the Bible, have been obliged to make God a moral monster.]

Anon. Bishop Gore and the Church of England. Edin. R., Jan. 1908.

[This remarkable man is one of the most powerful spiritual forces in our generation. It is the more to be regretted that in certain points he seems to be hampered by false presuppositions and misled by unattainable ideals.]

- 4 *Lehr (Henry)* Les Protestants d'autrefois: sur mer et outre mer. 402p.

Fischbacher, 1907.

[La Rochelle, as a great Huguenot port, has been chosen as the central point around which to group the scattered facts of this study.]

Éricout (J.) Les Églises réformées de France: Scissions récentes.

R. du clergé français, Jan. 15, Feb. 1, 1908.

[Recounts the events which, following on the Separation Law, have ruptured French Protestantism.]

Stauffer (E.) Lettres sur la situation ecclésiastique des réformés français. iii.

L'orientation nouvelle de la théologie protestante. Rev. chrét., Dec. 1907, Feb. 1908.

[The French Protestants should have maintained the Confession of La Rochelle—not as a creed but as a flag, allowing full liberty of interpretation. Thus, following the example of the Lutherans, they would have avoided their present divisions.]

- 7 *Simpson (J. G.)* Methodism and Reunion. Church Q. R., Jan. 1908.

L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

Anon. Religion in Literature.

Edin. R., Jan. 1908.

[Sophocles, Marlowe, Shakespeare, Goethe, Tolstoi, Shorthouse, and Fogazzaro.]

Vaughan (G. E.) Types of Tragic Drama. 275p. Macmillan, 1908.

[Popular lectures by the Professor of English Literature in the University of Leeds. The types include the Greek dramatists, Shakespeare, Goethe, Browning, and Ibsen.]

Dromard (G.) Les droits du pathologique dans la littérature et dans l'art.

Cœnobium, Nov. 1907.

- 2 *Statham (H. Heathcote)* The Morality of Shakespeare. 19th Cent., Feb. 1908.

Collins (Churton) Poetry and Symbolism: A Study of "The Tempest."

Cont. R., Jan. 1908.

Collins (J. Churton) Dr Johnson's "Lives of the Poets."

Quar. R., Jan. 1908.

[With all its limitations, a great work. The note of a classic.]

Ward (A. W.) A New Edition of Evelyn's "Diary."

Church Q. R., Jan. 1908.

Coleridge (S. T.) Biographia Literaria. Edited, with his Aesthetical Essays, by J. Shawcross. 2 vols. 272 + 234p.

Frowde, 1907.

[An accurate reprint of the edition of 1817, to which is appended a reprint of the strictly æsthetical writings, notes elucidatory of the text, and an introductory essay dealing with Coleridge's theory of the imagination.]

Knight (W.), ed. Letters of the Wordsworth Family: from 1787 to 1855. 3 vols. 575, 538, 529p. Ginn, 1908.

Bradley (A. C.) Shelley's View of Poetry. Albany R., Feb. 1908.

[The moral virtue of Shelley's poetry lay, not in his doctrines about the past and future of man, but in an intuition, which was the substance of his soul, of the unique value of love.]

Brooke (Stopford A.) Four Poets : Clough, Arnold, Rossetti, Morris. 260p. Pitman, 1908.

Moore (T. Sturge) William Blake, Poet and Painter. Quar. R., Jan. 1908.

[The occasion of all Blake's wrestling with vision was his perception that the human spirit had dared to condemn nature as an inhumane mechanism. This fact neither philosophy nor science can explain; for the pious it is God.]

Bliss (G.) Francis Thompson and Richard Crashaw. The Month, Jan. 1908.

Cuthbert (Father) Francis Thompson. Catholic World, Jan. 1908.

[Appreciation of his poetical work; the Catholic spirit is nowhere else so truly expressed.]

Gerrard (T. J.) Francis Thompson, Poet. Catholic World, Feb. 1908.

Meynell (Alice) Some Memories of Francis Thompson. Dub. R., Jan. 1908.

Curle (Richard H. P.) Aspects of George Meredith. 309p. Routledge, 1908.

[A very enthusiastic appreciation of Meredith both as poet and novelist.]

Anon. The Poetry of Mr Alfred Austin. Quar. R., Jan. 1908.

Hardy (Thomas) The Dynasts. Part iii. 355p. Macmillan, 1908.

Gribble (Francis) John Greenleaf Whittier. Fort. R., Jan. 1908.

3 *Anon.* Heinrich Heine: Emotion and Irony. Edin. R., Jan. 1908.

8 *Gosse (Edmund)* Ibsen. (Lit. Lives Series.) 266p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

9 *Grenfell (B. P.) and Hunt (A. S.), eds.* The Oxyrhynchus Papyri. Part v. (Egypt Exploration Fund, Græco-Roman Branch.) 342p. Kegan Paul, 1907.

[Portion of the lost Pæans of Pindar and portions of a lost work of a Greek historian Theopompus, dealing with Greek events in 396-5 B.C.]

Harrison (Jane) The Greek Epic. Albany R., Jan. 1908.

[Concerning Gilbert Murray's book.]

Crueickshank (A. H.) Schools of Hellas. Church Q.R., Jan. 1908.

[Discusses K. J. Freeman's book and indicates some of the ways in which Greek education can help us.]

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.

Marett (R. R.) A Sociological View of Comparative Religion.

Sociological R., Jan. 1908.

[Method of comparative religion should be primarily that of a social psychology.]

Le Roy (Mgr.) Introduction générale à l'histoire de la religion des primitifs.

R. prat. d'Apologét., Jan. 1, 1908.

[Introductory to a course on the History of Religions at the Catholic Institute of Paris. The writer was formerly a missionary in Africa.]

Sweet (L. M.) Heathen Wonder Births and the Birth of Christ.

Princeton Th. Rev., Jan. 1908.

[Examines, with special reference to Hartland's *Legend of Perseus*, a large range of alleged cases of virgin births, and finds none affording a parallel to the birth of Christ.]

Université St Joseph, Beyrouth. Mélanges de la Faculté Orientale.

Beyrouth, Imprimerie Catholique, 1906. [Nine essays by various Semitic scholars.]

Spence (Lewis) Mythologies of Ancient Mexico and Peru. (Religions, Ancient and Modern.) 80p. Constable, 1907.

[An able little book, dealing with (i.) Origin of American Religion; (ii.) Mexican Mythology; (iii.) Priesthood and Ritual of Ancient Mexicans; (iv.) Religion of Ancient Peruvians; (v.) Peruvian Ritual and Worship; and (vi.) Foreign Influence.]

Raynaud (G.) Ilaloc, dieu mexicain des monts et des eaux.

R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Nov. 1907.

Ferrand (G.) Textes magiques malgaches. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Sept. 1907.

G. P. The Fountain-Head of Religion. IV. Judaism is based on Zoroastrianism.

Vedic Mag., vol. i. Nos. 5 and 6.

Ottolenghi (R.) Il Cristianesimo è un Buddismo rinnovato?

Cœnobium, Nov. 1907.

[At the base of both are common conceptions—the religious expression of the Aryan genius.]

1 *Haigh (Agnes P.)* The Religions of Greece and Rome. Cont. R., Jan. 1908.

[A comparison of the pantheons and the rituals of the two nations.]

Bosanquet (R. C.) Greek Temples and Early Religion. Quar. R., Jan. 1908.

4 *Anesaki-Masahar* Cœnobio laico nell'estremo Oriente. Cœnobium, Nov. 1907.

[Account of Buddhist lay associations and communities.]

Dhar (S. K.) Life and Times of Dayananda Saraswati.

Vedic Mag., vol. i. Nos. 5, 6, and 7.

Ram (G.) The Bhagawad Gita and the Arya Samaj. Vedic Mag., vol. i. No. 7.

Roussel (A.) La théologie Brahmanique d'après le Bhâgavata Purâna.

R. d. sciences philos. et théol., Oct. 1907.

5 *Anon.* Transformed Hinduism: The Monotheistic Religion of Beauty. 2 vols. 255+262p. Welby, 1908.

[Vol. i. is an account of the sacred scriptures of India; vol. ii. of the Hindu philosophical systems and epics.]

Hall (H. Fielding) The Inward Light. 252p. Macmillan, 1908.

[Author's object "to explain as clearly as may be that conception of the world, man's life, the past, the present, and the future, which finds its latest, not its last, expression in Buddhism." He uses the Burmese as illustrations "because they alone of modern people retain the spirit of Buddhism as it was understood."] *Elvot (Sir C.)* The Religions of the Far East: ii. Japan. Quar. R., Jan. 1908.

[Japanese not likely to adopt Christianity in any form implying an admission of European superiority in thought, but are likely to adopt and refashion parts of it.]

Cowell (E. B.), ed. The Jâtaka, or Stories of the Buddha's Former Births. Trans. from the Pâli by Various Hands. Vol. vi. trans. by E. B. Cowell and W. H. D. Rouse. 314p. Clay, 1907.

Guru (Sri Agamya) The Land of Eternity: Amar Bhumika Discourses. 126p. Efield, 1908.

[Agamya Guru has left India to bring to Western peoples the ancient Wisdom of the East. This little volume contains some of the main principles of his teaching.]

- Cranmer-Byng (L.), Kapadia (S. A.), eds.*
 Brahma - Knowledge: An Outline of the Philosophy of the Vedānta as set forth by the Upanishads and by Sankara. By L. D. Barnett. (Wisdom of the East Series.) 113p. Murray, 1907.
 [Sketch of the most important elements in the series of ideas which, under the general name of *Vedānta*, have been, in one form or another, the basis of all Indian thought worthy of the name.]
Çāṇḍīdeva. Bodhicaryāvatara. Introduction à la pratique des futurs Bouddhas. Trans. from the Sanskrit by Louis de la Vallée Poussin. 144p. Luzac, 1907.
- 6 *Cranmer-Byng (L.), Kapadia (S. A.), eds.*
 The Conduct of Life, or The Universal Order of Confucius. A Translation of one of the four Confucian Books, hitherto known as the Doctrine of the Mean, by Ku Hung Ming. 60p. Murray, 1908.
- 7 *Elbogen (J.)* Studien zur Geschichte des jüdischen Gottesdienstes (Schriften der Lehranstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judenthums.) Bd. i. Heft 1, 2. 192p.
 Mayer & Müller, 1907.
Abrahams (I.) Some Rabbinic Ideas on Prayer. Jewish Q.R., Jan. 1908.
Marx (A.) The Expulsion of the Jews from Spain. Jewish Q.R., Jan. 1908.
 [According to two contemporary Hebrew texts, which are here printed with their translations.]
Porges (N.) Eine Geniza-Studie. Jewish Q.R., Jan. 1908.
 [Study of the Genizah fragment which appeared under the title "The Oldest Collection of Bible Difficulties by a Jew," in J.Q.R., xiii. 358-69.]
Poznański (S.) The Karaites Literary Opponents of Saadiah Gaon in the 14th to 19th Centuries. Jewish Q.R., Jan. 1908.
Worman (E. J.) The Exilarch Bustāni. Jewish Q.R., Jan. 1908.
 [Arabic text in Hebrew characters of one of the Taylor-Schechter fragments which refers to the Bustāni legends.]
Hart (J. H. A.) Philo of Alexandria, IV. Jewish Q.R., Jan. 1908.
 [Further translation.]
- 8 *Mangenot (E.)* Le livre d'Hénoch. R. du clergé français, Dec. 15, 1907.
 [Review of the edition of Professor Martin, of the Catholic Institute of Paris. The writer summarises the Introduction.]
- 12 *Sturge (M. Carta)* The Truth and Error of Christian Science. 2nd ed. 185p. Murray, 1908.
 [The outcome of a genuine effort to understand and appreciate Christian Science made through the course of several years.]
- P PHILOSOPHY.** 10 *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 *Psychical Research*, 40 *Psychology*, 60 *Logic*, 70 *Systems*, 90 *Philosophers*.
- Stumpf (Carl)* Die Wiedergeburt der Philosophie. 38p. Barth, 1908.
 [Professor Stumpf's address as Rector of the Berlin University. An able plea for the necessity of a training in the methods of physical and mental science for the student of metaphysics. Philosophy, like science, will cease in the future to be divided into schools and dogmatic systems.]
Koigen (David) Jahresbericht über die Literatur zur Metaphysik (Fortsetzung). Arch. f. system. Phil. xiv., 1, 1908.
 [Discusses *Systematische Philosophie*, by Dilthey, Wundt, and others (in Hinneberg's series, *Kultur der Gegenwart*), and the *Festschrift* for Kuno Fischer, both published last year.]
- 10 *Steel (Richard)* Metaphysics of a Business Man. 23p. 1907.
 [A paper read before the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool. Maintains that an active function, or principle of imitation, exists and asserts itself through the whole range of so much of the natural world as is in the philosophic sense known to us.]
- 13 *Lenoble (E.)* Chronique philosophique. R. du clergé français, Jan. 15, 1908.
 [Elaborate review of Bergson's *L'Evolution créatrice*.]
Duhem (P.) Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif. Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1907, Feb. 1908.
Campbell (N. R.) The Electron Theory of Matter. Albany R., Feb. 1908.
Lodge (Sir O.) Modern Views of Electricity. 3rd ed., Revised. 540p. Macmillan, 1907.
 [There is an addition of six new lectures.]
Burke (J. Butler) Haeckel and Haeckelism. Oxf. and Camb. R., 2, 1907.
Darbishire (A. D.) Mendelism. Science Progress, Jan. 1908.
 [Exposition and defence.]
Macdonald (J. S.) The Propagation of Physiological Change. Science Progress, Jan. 1908.
Halliburton (W. D.) The Repair of a Nerve. Science Progress, Jan. 1908.
- 14 *Schwartzkopff (Paul)* Die Räumlichkeit als objektive Empfindungsverband. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 1, 1908.
 [The subject expresses through spatial extension an objective relation of things. Not, however, as these are, in themselves, but as they appear to him in visual sensation.]
- 15 *Overstreet (H. A.)* The Ground of the Time-Illusion. Phil. R., Jan. 1908.
 [Time is a form or mode of conscious life. The time-illusion is the expression of the imperfect character of human interest, the imperfection residing in the fact that human interest is of multiple degrees of intensity.]
- 17 *Keary (C. F.)* Matter in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. Phil. R., Jan. 1908.
 [An essay on the Aristotelian distinction of matter and form.]
- 21 *Stout (G. F.)* Immediacy, Mediacy and Coherence. Mind, Jan. 1908.
 [An important article. The test of truth is complex, involving both coherence and immediacy as its essentially correlated aspects, neither of them being workable apart from the other. The immediate element in knowledge is of two kinds: (i.) that exemplified by self-evident propositions in so far as they are self-evident; (ii.) that belonging to pleasures, pains, emotion, desires, in so far as they are actually felt by someone, and to sensations in so far as they are actually being "sensed" by someone.]
Foston (Hubert) Non-Phenomenality and Otherness. Mind, Jan. 1908.
 [Emphasises the importance of dropping inadequate quasi-phenomenal notions of feeling, and entering into its hyper-phenomenal character, if we would set ourselves free to realise for theoretical purposes the singular specific energy which our belief in otherness naturally acquires.]
Frischsen-Köhler (Max) Naturwissenschaft und Wirklichkeitserkenntnis. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 1, 1908.
 [We must relinquish the contrast between the empirical world as experienced in its wealth of colour and vitality on the one hand, and the conceptual representation of physical science as

a mere thought-product on the other. Rather must we regard this so-called empirical world as of one piece with the physical nature brought to light by the analysis of natural science.]

Wernick (Georg) Der Wirklichkeitsgedanken, 6.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi., 4, 1907.

[Conclusion of this series of articles. Discusses (i.) the way in which we come to the apprehension of other psychical states than our own, and (ii.) the relation of the two judgments, "I believe X to be real," and "X is real."]

Tonquédec (J. de) La Notion de Vérité dans la "Philosophie Nouvelle," 149p.

Bauchesne, 1908.

[The "new philosophy" is that represented by M. Bergson and his disciples Le Roy, Wilbois, etc. An exposition of what truth is for the new philosophy is first given, with numerous quotations from the works of these writers, and is followed by a detailed criticism.]

26 *Burnett (C. T.)* A Fundamental Test for Determinism. Inter. J. Eth., Jan. 1908.

[The Test is: What is the effect upon the validity of the reasoning process by which determinism arrives at its conclusions, if we acknowledge that those conclusions are true?]

33 *Bottazzi (Philippe)* The Unexplored Regions of Human Biology: Observations and Experiments with Eusapia Paladino.

Annals of Psy. Sc., Dec. 1907.

Richet (Charles) "Metapsychism" or "Occultism"?

Annals of Psy. Sc., Dec. 1907.

40 *Calkins (Mary Whiton)* Psychology: What is it about? J. of Phil., Dec. 5, 1907.

[The idea is immediately experience as idea of a self; this self may be scientifically studied; accordingly, psychology is inadequately conceived as science of ideas.]

Calkins (Mary Whiton) Psychology as Science of Self: i. Is the Self Body or Has it Body? ii. The Nature of the Self.

J. of Phil., Jan. 2, 30, 1908.

Michotte (A.) A propos de la "Méthode d'Introspection" dans la Psychologie expérimentale. Rev. Néo Scol., Nov. 1907.

[Defence of introspection as under certain conditions a real experimental method and capable of furnishing scientific results.]

43 *Surbled (Georges)* Le Sous-Moi. 153p.

Maloiné, 1907.

[Author has tried to fill a regrettable gap in the field of science, by taking into account the ordinary facts of common life with reference to the self and subconscious states, without thereby disputing the strange facts which sleep, dreams, somnambulism, hysteria, etc., reveal.]

Prince (Morton) Professor Pierce's Version of the late "Symposium on the Subconscious." J. of Phil., Jan. 30, 1908.

49 *Hicks (G. Davies)* and *Rivers (W. H. R.)* The Illusion of Compared Horizontal and Vertical Lines.

Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1908.

[Experimental investigation with momentary and prolonged exposure. Illusion the same in both cases. Conclusion: movement factors not involved.]

Lewis (E. O.) The Effect of Practice on the Perception of the Müller-Lyer Illusion.

Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1908.

[Uses method of Hicks and Rivers, and confirms their result as to movement factors.]

Fraser (James) A New Visual Illusion of Direction. Brit. J. of Psychol., Jan. 1908.

[Some very striking visual illusions.]

Van Biersliet (J. J.) La psychologie

quantitative: iii. Psychologie expérimentale. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1907, Jan. 1908.

[Defence of psycho-physics and physiological psychology.]

53 *Pillsbury (W. B.)* Attention. (Muirhead's Library of Philosophy.) 356p.

Sonnenschein, 1908.

[This work appeared in French in 1906. Here chapters have been added upon measurements of attention, upon the relations of attention to the feelings and the self, and on the educational applications of some of the conclusions. The book contains much useful material, but can scarcely be said to be a satisfactory treatment of the nature and conditions of the process called Attention. No mention is made of Ward's articles.]

Milloud (M.) Essai sur l'histoire naturelle des idées. Rev. Phil., Feb. 1908.

[Deals with the questions: (i.) How does an idea operate in the mind? (ii.) How is an idea propagated from one mind to another?]

Vailati (Giovanni) The Attack on Distinctions. J. of Phil., Dec. 19, 1907.

54 *Ribot (Th.)* La mémoire affective: Nouvelles remarques. Rev. Phil., Dec. 1907.

[Author's "only object to establish by fresh proofs the existence of this form of memory against the psychologists who persist in denying it."]

Peillaube (E.) L'organisation de la mémoire: i. La fixation des impressions; ii. Vie latente des souvenirs.

Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1907, Jan. 1908.

57 *Dromard (G.)* Les éléments moteurs de l'émotion esthétique.

Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1908.

[Motor factors form the substratum of all our aesthetic emotions.]

60 *Baldwin (James Mark)* Thought and Things: A Study of the Development and Meaning of Thought or Genetic Logic. Vol. ii. Experimental Logic, or Genetic Theory of Thought. 436p. Sonnenschein, 1908.

[Experimental logic is that inquiry which, pursuing genetic and functional methods, investigates thinking with a view to tracing the derivation, development, and embodiments of beliefs.]

72 *Meyerhof (Otto)* Der Streit um die psychologische Vernunftkritik: Die Fries'sche Schule und ihre Gegner.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 4, 1907.

[Explains the "critical method" as developed by Leonard Nelson, and defends the new school of Fries as against the "misunderstandings" of Ernst Cassirer.]

Cassirer (Ernst) Zur Frage nach der Methode der Erkenntniskritik: Eine Entgegnung.

Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxi. 4, 1907.

[Reply to Meyerhof.]

73 *Schelling (F. W. J. von)* Werke, Auswahl in drei Bänden. Mit drei Portraits Schellings und einem Geleitwort von Prof. Dr. Arthur Drews, herausgegeben von Otto Weiss. 978, 682, 934p. Eckardt, 1907.

[A beautiful edition, containing all the chief works of Schelling, that have been long out of print, and a very full and interesting account of his life and philosophy by the editor.]

74 *James (William)* The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstandings. Phil. R., Jan. 1908.

[Discusses eight misunderstandings: (i.) Pragmatism is only a re-editing of positivism, (ii.) it is primarily an appeal to action, (iii.) it cuts off the right to believe in effective realities, (iv.) it is irreconcilable with realism, (v.) what pragmatists

say is inconsistent with their saying so, (vi.) it explains not what truth is, but only how it is arrived at, (vii.) it ignores the theoretic interest, (viii.) it is shut up to solipsism.]

Russell (Hon. Bertrand) Transatlantic "Truth." Albany R., Jan. 1908.

[An able criticism of James's *Pragmatism*. If, to avoid disputes about words, we agree to accept the pragmatic definition of the word "truth," we find that the belief that A exists may be "true" even when A does not exist. This shows that the conclusions arrived at by pragmatism in the sphere of religion do not have the meaning they appear to have.]

Dewey (John) What does Pragmatism mean by Practical?

J. of Phil., Feb. 13, 1908.

[Reviews James's book. "Not even pragmatism can prove an existence from desirable consequences which themselves exist only when and if that other existence is there."]

Stein (Ludwig) Der Pragmatismus: Ein neuer Name für alte Denkmethode, i.

Arch. f. system. Phil. xiv. 1, 1908.

[With reference to James's book, an account is given of the pragmatist propaganda chiefly in America. A critical examination is promised in a future number.]

Lovejoy (Arthur O.) The Thirteen Pragmatisms, i., ii. J. of Phil., Jan. 2, 16, 1908.

[Attempts to differentiate the separate pragmatist assertions and tendencies.]

Lalande (A.) Pragmatisme, Humanisme et Vérité. Rev. Phil., Jan. 1908.

[Criticism, on the whole sympathetic, of James and Schiller.]

Duprat (E.) L'attitude pragmatiste. Cœnobium, Nov. 1907.

[An exposition.]

Foster (G. B.) Pragmatism and Knowledge. Amer. J. of Th., Oct. 1907.

["The total humanisation of reality is an audacious and unwarrantable proposition."]

79 McGilvary (Evander Bradley) Realism and the Physical World.

J. of Phil., Dec. 5, 1907.

[Some of the qualities perceived are numerically identical with, and some numerically different from, actual qualities in the physical world. The criteria for distinguishing these are not far to seek, and are invariably applied in everyday experience.]

80 Dobbs (A. E.) Philosophy and Popular Morals in Ancient Greece. 282p.

Simpkin, 1907.

[Hare Prize Essay. Part I. traces the rise of moral philosophy in Greece and its development through the criticism and absorption of popular ideas. Part II. considers the reflex influence of moral philosophy on popular thought and conduct.]

84 Williams (Marie V.) Six Essays on the Platonic Theory of Knowledge, as expounded in the later Dialogues and reviewed by Aristotle. 133p. Clay, 1908.

[Written during tenure of a studentship at Newnham College, from the point of view of the school that sees in the later work of Plato a fuller development of the ideal scheme at first but vaguely sketched.]

Wood (Mary H.) Plato's Psychology in its Bearing on the Development of Will. 62p. Frowde, 1907.

[A careful study of the passages bearing on the subject.]

85 Smith (J. A.), Ross (W. D.), eds. The Works of Aristotle. Trans. into English. Part i. The *Parva Naturalia*; De Sensu et Sensibili; De Memoria et Reminiscencia; De Somno; De Somniis; De Divinatione Per Somnum, by J. I. Beare; De Longitudine et Brevitate Vitæ; De Juventute et Senectute; De Vita et Morte; De Respiratione, by G. R. T. Ross.

Clarendon Press, 1908.

[The first part of a complete English translation of the works of Aristotle, rendered possible by a bequest of the late Professor Jowett.]

Hicks (R. D.) Aristotle's *De Anima*, with Translation, Introduction, and Notes. 709p. Cambridge University Press, 1908.

[A very elaborate and scholarly work. The fresh materials of Biehl and the Berlin Academy commentaries have been made use of. The notes are full and exhaustive, and the introduction is of great value. Altogether indispensable for the student of Aristotle.]

89 Burnier (C.) La morale de Sénèque et le néo-stoïcisme.

R. de Théol. et de Phil., Nov. 1907.

94 Alexander (Archibald B. D.) Kuno Fischer: An Estimate of his Life and Work. J. of Phil., Jan. 30, 1908.

Meunier (R.) La psychologie et la philosophie de N. Vaschide.

Rev. de Phil., Dec. 1907.

[Reviews and appreciates Vaschide's work, prematurely cut short by his death.]

V ART. 83 Sacred Music.

Lee (Vernon) La sympathie esthétique.

Rev. Phil., Dec. 1907.

[Discusses Lipps' recent work with special reference to his theory of *Einfühlung*, with which author cannot entirely agree.]

De Wulf (M.) Première leçon d'Esthétique. Rev. Néo-Scol., Nov. 1807.

Martin (Abbé J.) Une histoire des idées esthétiques. Rev. de Phil., Jan. 1908.

Cust (R. H. Hobart) Botticelli. (Miniature Series of Painters.) 101p. Bell, 1908.

Konody (P. G.) The Brothers van Eyck. (Miniature Series of Painters.) 71p.

Bell, 1908.

Phythian (J. E.) Fifty Years of Modern Painting, Corot to Sargent. Ill. 391p.

Grant Richards, 1908.

23 Randolph (W.) Some Gothic Revivalists. The Month, Feb. 1908.

[Describing the work of some Victorian church architects.]

Anon. The Origin and Prospects of Gothic Architecture. Edin. R., Jan. 1908.

[It is probable that the Gothic revival will, ere long, have been played out, and that the main current of design will in the future run in a more or less classical direction.]

82 Wallace (William) The Threshold of Music: An Inquiry into the Development of the Musical Sense. 287p.

Macmillan, 1908.

[Discusses the Art of Music in relation to other phases of thought, and traces, through its history, the cerebral processes which are concerned in its development.]

[NOTE.—For an explanation of the system of classification adopted in the Bibliography readers are referred to HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. i. p. 630 *sqq.*]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

PLURALISM AND RELIGION.¹

PROFESSOR WILLIAM JAMES.

I THINK it may be asserted that there are religious experiences of a specific nature, not deducible by analogy or psychological reasoning from our other sorts of experience, which point with reasonable probability to the continuity of our consciousness with a wider spiritual environment from which the ordinary prudential man (who is the only man that scientific psychology, so called, takes cognisance of) is shut off.

Briefly, the facts I mean can be described as experiences of an unexpected life succeeding upon death. By this I do not mean immortality, or the death of the body. I mean the deathlike termination of certain mental processes within the individual's experience, processes that run to failure, and, in some individuals at least, eventuate in despair. Just as romantic love seems a comparatively recent literary invention, so these experiences of a life that supervenes upon despair seem to have played no great part in official theology till Luther's time; and the best way to indicate their character will possibly be to point to a certain contrast between the inner life of ourselves and of the ancient Greeks and Romans.

¹ The present article will be followed by a series of three, from the same author, bearing the general title "Three Philosophical Types." These articles will deal with (1) Hegel, (2) Fechner, (3) Bergson, and will appear successively in the October (1908), January and April (1909) issues respectively.

Mr Chesterton says somewhere, I think, that the Greeks and Romans, in all that concerned their moral life, were an extraordinarily solemn set of folks. The Athenians thought that the very gods must admire the rectitude of Phocion and Aristides; and those gentlemen themselves were apparently of much the same opinion. Cato's veracity was so impeccable that the extremest incredulity a Roman could express of anything was to say, "I wouldn't believe it even if Cato told me." Good was good, and bad was bad, for these people. Hypocrisy, which Church Christianity brought in, hardly existed; the naturalistic system held firm; its values showed no hollowness and brooked no irony. The individual, if virtuous enough, could meet all possible requirements. The pagan pride had never crumbled. Luther was the first moralist who broke with any effectiveness through the crust of all this naturalistic self-sufficiency, thinking (and possibly he was right) that St Paul had done it already. Religious experience of the Lutheran type brings all our naturalistic standards to bankruptcy. You are strong only by being weak, it shows. You cannot live on pride or self-sufficingness. There is a light in which all the naturally founded and currently accepted distinctions, excellences, and safeguards of our characters appear as absolute childishness. Sincerely to give up one's conceit of being good, is the only door to the universe's deeper reaches.

These deeper reaches are familiar to evangelical Christianity and to what is nowadays known as "mind-cure" religion or "new-thought." The phenomenon is that of new ranges of life succeeding on our most despairing moments. There are resources in us that naturalism, with its literal and legal virtues, never reckons of—possibilities that take our breath away, of another kind of happiness and power, based on giving up our own will and letting something higher work for us; and these seem to show a world wider than either physics or philistine ethics can imagine. Here is a world in which all is well, in spite of certain forms of death, indeed *because* of certain forms

of death—death of hope, death of strength, death of responsibility, of fear and worry, death of everything that paganism, naturalism, and legalism pin their faith on, and tie their trust to.

Reason, operating on our other experiences, even our psychological experiences, would never have inferred these specifically religious experiences in advance of their actual coming. She could not suspect their existence, for they are discontinuous with “natural” experiences and invert their values. But as they actually come and are given to us, our possibilities widen to our view. We suspect that our natural experience, so called, our strictly moralistic and prudential or legal experience, may only be a fragment of reality. The new experiences soften nature’s outlines and open out the strangest possibilities and perspectives.

This is why it seems to me that the logical understanding, working in abstraction from such specifically religious experiences, will always omit something, and fail to reach completely adequate conclusions. Death and failure, it will always say, are death and failure pure and simple, and can nevermore be one with an ulterior life. So religious experience, peculiarly so called, needs, in my opinion, to be carefully considered by everyone who aspires to reason out a more complete philosophy.

The sort of belief that religious experience of this type naturally engenders in those who have it, is fully in accord with Fechner’s theory of successively larger enveloping spheres of conscious life. To quote words which I have used elsewhere, the believer finds that the tenderer parts of his personal life are continuous with a *more* of the same quality which is operative in the universe outside of him, and which he can keep in working touch with, and in a fashion get on board of and save himself, when all his lower being has gone to pieces in the wreck. In a word, the believer is continuous, to his own consciousness at any rate, with a wider self from which saving experiences flow in. Those who have such experiences distinctly enough and often enough to live in the light of them remain quite unmoved by criticism, from

whatever quarter it may come, be it academic or scientific, or be it merely the voice of logical common sense. They have had their vision and they *know*—that is enough—that we inhabit an invisible spiritual environment from which help comes, our soul being mysteriously one with a larger soul whose instruments we are.

One may therefore plead, I think, that Fechner's ideas (of which a future article will give some account) are not without direct empirical verification. There is at any rate one side of life which would be perfectly explained if those ideas were true, but of which there appears no clear explanation so long as we assume either with naturalism that human consciousness is the highest consciousness there is, or with dualistic theism that there is a higher mind in the cosmos, but that it is discontinuous with our own. It has always been a matter of surprise with me that philosophers of the absolute should have shown so little interest in this department of life, and so seldom put its phenomena in evidence, even when it seemed obvious that personal experience of some kind must have strengthened their confidence in their own vision. The logician's bias has always been too strong for them. They have preferred the thinner to the thicker method, dialectical abstraction being so much more dignified and academic than the confused and unwholesome facts of personal biography.

In spite of rationalism's disdain for the particular, the personal, and the unwholesome, the drift of all the evidence we have seems to me to sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious. We may be in the universe as dogs and cats are in our libraries, seeing the books and hearing the conversation, but having no inkling that there is any meaning in it all. The intellectualist difficulties fall away when the authority of intellectualist logic is undermined by criticism, and then the positive empirical evidence remains. The analogies with ordinary psychology, with certain facts of pathology, with those of psychical research, so called, and with those of religious

experience, establish, when taken together, a decidedly *formidable* probability in favour of a general view of the world almost identical with Fechner's. The outlines of the superhuman consciousness thus made probable must remain, however, very vague, and the number of functionally distinct "selves" it comports and carries has to be left entirely problematic. It may be polytheistically, or it may be monotheistically conceived of. Fechner, with his distinct earth-soul functioning as our guardian angel, seems to me clearly polytheistic; but the word polytheism usually gives offence, so perhaps it is better not to use it. Only one thing is certain, and that is the result of recent criticisms of the absolute: the only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a consistently thought-out monistic universe suffers from as from a species of auto-intoxication (the mystery of the "fall" namely, of reality lapsing into appearance, truth into error, perfection into imperfection—of evil, in short; the mystery of universal determinism, of the block-universe, eternal and without a history): the only way of escape, I say, from all this is to be frankly pluralistic and assume that the superhuman consciousness, however vast it may be, *has* itself an external environment, and consequently is *finite*. Present-day monism carefully repudiates complicity with Spinozistic monism. In that, it explains, the many get dissolved in the One and lost, whereas in the improved idealistic form they get preserved in all their manyness as the One's eternal object. The absolute itself is thus represented as having a pluralistic object. But if the very absolute itself would have to be a pluralist if it existed, why should *we* hesitate to be pluralists out and out? Why not straightway adopt the absolute's form of vision on our own account, and refuse to envelop our many in the One that brings the poison in its train?

The line of least resistance, then, as it seems to me, both in theology and in philosophy, is to accept, along with the superhuman consciousness, the notion that it is not all-embracing—the notion, in other words, that there *is* a God, but

that he is finite, either in power or knowledge, or in both at once. These, I need hardly say, are the terms in which common men have usually carried on their active commerce with God; and the monistic perfections that make the notion of him so paradoxical practically and morally are the colder additions of remote professorial minds operating *in distans* upon conceptual substitutes for him alone.

Why cannot "experience" and "reason" meet on this common ground? Why cannot they compromise? May not the godlessness usually but needlessly associated with the philosophy of immediate experience give way to a theism now seen to follow directly from that experience more widely taken? and may not rationalism, satisfied with seeing her *a priori* proofs of God so effectively replaced by empirical evidence, abate something of her absolutist claims? Let God but have the least infinitesimal *other* of *any* kind beside him, and empiricism and rationalism might strike hands in a lasting treaty of peace. Both might then leave abstract thinness behind them, and seek together, as scientific men seek, by using all the analogies and data within reach, to build up the most probable approximate idea of what the divine consciousness concretely may be like. I venture to beg our younger idealists to consider seriously this alternative. Few men are as qualified by their intellectual gifts as certain of our present monistic philosophers to reap the harvests that seem certain to anyone who, like Fechner and Bergson, will leave the thinner for the thicker path.

Compromise and mediation are inseparable from the pluralistic philosophy. Only monistic dogmatism can say of any of its hypotheses, "It is either that or nothing; take it or leave it just as it stands." The type of monism prevalent at the universities has kept this steep and brittle attitude, partly through the proverbial academic preference for thin and elegant logical solutions, partly from a mistaken notion that the only solidly grounded basis for religion was along those lines. If neo-Kantian philosophers could be ignorant of

anything, it might almost seem that they had remained ignorant of the great empirical movement towards a pluralistic pan-psychic view of the universe into which our own generation has been drawn, and which menaces to short-circuit their methods entirely and become their religious rival, unless they are willing to make themselves its allies. Yet, wedded as many of them seem to be to the logical machinery and technical apparatus of absolutism, I cannot but believe that their fidelity to the religious ideal in general is deeper still. Especially do I find it hard to believe that the more clerical adherents of the school would hold so fast to its particular machinery if only they could be made to think that religion could be secured in some other way. Let empiricism once become associated with religion, as hitherto, through some strange misunderstanding, it has been associated with irreligion, and I believe that a new era of religion as well as of philosophy will be ready to begin. That great awakening of a fresh popular interest in philosophy, which is so striking a phenomenon at the present day in all countries, is undoubtedly due in part to religious demands. As the authority of past tradition tends more and more to crumble, men naturally turn a wistful ear to the authority of reason or to the evidence of present fact. They will assuredly not be disappointed if they open their minds to what the thicker and more radical empiricism has to say. I fully believe that such an empiricism is a more natural ally than dialectics ever were, or can be, of the religious life. It is true that superstitions and wild-growing over-beliefs of all sorts will undoubtedly begin to abound if the notion of higher consciousnesses enveloping ours, of Fechnerian earth-souls and the like, grows orthodox and fashionable; still more will they superabound if science ever puts her approving stamp on the phenomena of which Frederic Myers so earnestly advocated the scientific recognition, the phenomena of psychic research so called—and I myself firmly believe that most of these phenomena are rooted in reality—but ought one seriously to allow such a

timid consideration as that to deter one from following the evident path of greatest religious promise? Since when, in this mixed world, was any good thing given us in purest outline and isolation? One of the chief characteristics of life is life's redundancy. The sole condition of our having *anything*, no matter what, is that we should have so much of it that we are fortunate if we do not grow sick of the sight and sound of it altogether. Everything is smothered in the litter that is fated to accompany it. Without *too much* you cannot have *enough*, of anything. Lots of inferior books, lots of bad statues, lots of dull speeches, of tenth-rate men and women, as a condition of the few precious specimens in either kind being realised! The gold dust comes to birth with the quartz-sand all around it, and this is as much a condition of religion as of any other excellent possession. There must be extrication, there must be competition, for survival; but the clay matrix and the noble gem must first come into being unsifted. Once extricated, the gem can be examined separately, conceptualised, defined, and insulated. But the process of extrication cannot be short-circuited—or if it is, you get the thin, inferior abstractions—either the hollow, unreal God of scholastic theology, or the unintelligible pantheistic absolutist monster, instead of the more living divine reality with which we may hope that empirical methods will more and more connect our imagination as the folds and reaches of life get more fully explored.

WILLIAM JAMES.

CIVILISATION IN DANGER.

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CIVILISED humanity at the present moment is undergoing profound transformations. Hardly fifty years ago it was composed of a certain number of groups that were easily recognised and possessed strongly marked characteristics: national groups to begin with, and local groups at a later stage. Each population, attached to its own soil, had its own clearly cut features, both physical and intellectual. Further, within the limits of every community, the various social classes, sharply differentiated from one another and clearly subordinated in their ranks, mingled but little, and were kept apart by their mode of life, education, and even dress.

All this is now tending to disappear. Little by little, democratic pressure on the one hand, material progress on the other, are tending to reduce the intervals. More and more nations and classes are mingling together.

What will issue from this chaos, and what will be the civilised humanity of the future? It is too early to offer a prediction, though it is possible to indicate certain changes which have even now begun.

What I here propose to sketch is the process of social levelling and its consequences. By social levelling is meant the gradual disappearance of human inequalities. I suggest that this process is to-day equally apparent from the material, the intellectual, and the moral point of view. The advantages to be expected from such a transformation are so plain that it

would be superfluous to point them out. But, on the other hand, dangers are involved which, though perhaps more remote and less clearly discerned, are none the less extremely serious.

In brief, there is reason to fear that the process of social levelling may have for its result a state of universal mediocrity. And this would mean the ruin of our civilisation.

The object of the present article is to call attention to this peril, and then to indicate the reasons for hoping that we shall be able to escape it.

I. SOCIAL UNIFORMITY.

A. *Material*.—A stranger arriving in Europe for the first time would surely be unable to distinguish, among the crowds which throng our streets on Sunday, masters from servants, rulers from ruled. Diversity of costume, which once served to indicate diversity of condition, and made it possible to distinguish at a glance, for example, the soldier from the lawyer, the peasant from the bourgeois, is almost completely effaced. All classes of society are clothed indiscriminately in garments of one type, and even in the remoter country districts, where, until recently, the costumes of the past still survived, the uniform dress of the modern man has reduced originality and diversity to the rank of a souvenir.

In another direction, the low price of manufactures makes it possible to introduce, even into poor homes, almost all the articles of furniture formerly reserved for the houses of the privileged classes. There is no essential difference of composition between the furnishing of an artisan's parlour and that of a financier. Many working men, both English and American, have drawing-rooms exactly modelled, with piano included, upon the drawing-rooms of well-to-do citizens.

Evidence of the same levelling process is displayed in the forms of amusement. In former times, with the exception of public spectacles, processions, shows, or such like, each class in society had its own forms of amusement; the pleasures of the court were not those of the city, while theatrical per-

formances and musical entertainments were still confined in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to a very limited public, which sufficed to fill the narrow spaces provided for their accommodation.

To-day there are no public entertainments save those which are intended for the world at large. Whether the entertainment provided takes the form of the drama, music, or sport, the crowd is invited, and its presence is indispensable for both financial and moral success.

It may therefore be said with truth that, from a material point of view, uniformity has succeeded to the variety of the past. Outwardly at least, man has become impersonal. The man whom we are going to meet round the next turning is no longer soldier, magistrate, artisan, but, quite simply, the man of to-day.

B. Intellectual. — In the intellectual sphere the same phenomenon of uniformity stands revealed. Go back a century and a half and you find that instruction, even of an elementary kind, was reserved for a select few. A man who could read and write, a clerk, could gain his living as a public writer by conducting the correspondence of the illiterate for a payment in return. To-day, on the contrary, instruction is compulsory in most countries of Europe, and will doubtless become so before long in all of them. Further, all young people who are not compelled to earn their living at once pass through colleges, gymnasia, or other institutions of secondary education. Even the universities, thanks among other things to the system of grants in usage everywhere, are widely open to all and have ceased to be the preserves of an aristocracy. It follows from this that the possession of knowledge is no longer a mark of superiority. Henceforth it is the possession, if not of all, at least of most.

Education having ceased to be a mark of superiority, has ceased also to be a weapon in the daily struggle for existence. The state of not being ignorant, or even that of possessing a moderate endowment of general knowledge, is a minor advan-

tage in the gaining of a livelihood. It avails no longer to be acquainted with many things; it is more advantageous to know only one, but to know it thoroughly and to concentrate upon it. In other words, specialisation is necessary.

Specialisation arises, on the one hand, from the new extension of human knowledge, and on the other from the needs of the economic struggle. Not only are our brains hopelessly incapable of absorbing the accumulated gains of science, but the necessity of remunerative work prevents even those who desire to do so from paying attention to that which lies outside the particular business by which they live. Specialisation therefore will increase in exact proportion to the further growth of human knowledge.

It is easily foreseen that what remains of that general culture which has no direct utility, in the curriculum of institutions for secondary and even higher education, is destined to disappear. The programme of the "humanities" is nothing more than a mongrel compromise between the old ideal of encyclopædic knowledge, extending to all things human, and the practical necessities of the hour. What sense is there in designating "*classe de poésie*," "*classe de rhétorique*" as the *higher* college classes, on leaving which young men are supposed to be equipped for the battle in a community which cares next to nothing for poetry and fine diction? The study of Latin and Greek as it is understood nowadays—one may deplore the fact but not disguise it—would have been suppressed already if, in these matters as in so many others, the public authorities were not following the movement instead of guiding it.

The result of these conditions is the following. As instruction spreads, culture diminishes.

A cultivated man is one who, whether or no he has made a special study of one branch of knowledge, is not entirely ignorant of any. He is a man to whom no expression of human intelligence or feeling is a matter of indifference, because his mind is opened wide enough to comprehend its bearings and to appreciate the effort involved. He is the

man to whom, according to the saying of a Latin writer, "Nothing human is alien."

To produce such men was the object of the education of the past.

English education, which remains in its essential outlines an education of luxury and privilege, intended to form statesmen and a brilliant élite rather than practical men, still keeps close to this ancient ideal. The English ideal is not embodied in the engineer, the savant, the specialist, but in the man who is good all round, equally distinguished by his physical development and by the vigour of his intellect. Thus it is the degree of *Master of Arts* which marks the goal of his studies. Formerly it was the one and only degree conferring upon its possessor the investiture of encyclopædic knowledge; it is still the principal degree which gives access to responsible positions both in the Church and in education.

In Belgium and in France all that remains of this earlier type of education, as we have seen, is a number of ill-constructed programmes and phrases which have lost their meaning—"humanités, rhétorique, baccalauréat."

In Germany the remnant is even smaller. The programme of education is already developed in accordance with the needs of the economic strife, and the term "*Realschulen*," applied to an important class of educational institutions, indicates with sufficient clearness that in them the brain of youth is not fed on dreams nor adorned with superfluous ideas.

Speaking generally, it may therefore be said that the cultivated man, as he has been described, is disappearing. In proportion as the individual develops along the path he has chosen as the means to his end, the level of general knowledge descends through sheer want of opportunity. Henceforth culture is to be a luxury; even the intellectual toilers no longer possess the leisure demanded by culture, which they sometimes despise. Even the graduates of universities, outside their own special subject, are often deficient in intellectual curiosity and the power of comprehension. And for this reason they, like

their servants and the neighbouring shopkeepers, are slaves to their daily paper.

For the great majority of modern men, if we except certain professional occupations, the daily paper is the only reading and the guide of opinion.

The daily paper is doubtless a kind of food easily digested by the mind, but of inferior nutritive power. Newspapers are indeed commercial enterprises first and foremost. Their success depends on pleasing the crowd, and to please the crowd you must needs put yourself at its level, which is of course the level of mediocrity.

It follows that the newspaper, outside of the general news which it is intended to spread, is frequently a deplorable display of banality if not of stupidity. The editor keeps an open shop for convenient impersonal opinions which will agree with everybody and be accepted without shock or effort by minds so seemingly different as that of a working man, of a university graduate, or of a landed proprietor.

The newspaper plays in the world of ideas a part analogous to that of a great ready-made clothing establishment in the world of material things. Just as garments, boots, and hats are turned out in tens of thousands of uniformly repeated copies for the nameless crowd, so the Press is an industry for manufacturing opinions all complete at the average measure of the brains for which it works.

It is therefore an accurate statement that, alongside of the levelling process in things material, our age is producing an intellectual uniformity by substituting an instruction freely distributed among all in place of the culture reserved for a minority.

C. Moral Uniformity.—The man of to-day is deliberately living in the present. The influence of religions, which formerly detached so many minds from their immediate cares, is gradually diminishing. Even those whose emotional sensibility demands the consolations which religion offers, do not allow their convictions to interfere with their practical

life. They also feel obscurely that before hoping for a better existence we must adapt ourselves to that of the present. To live the life of the present, to hold that it has no end beyond itself, that it is an end and not a means—such, at least in practice if not in theory, is the attitude of to-day.

It is good indeed to love life, and the whole of life. One ought indeed to fulfil life with such intensity as not to leave it without exhausting its emotions. The desire to be happy is the strongest incentive to our activity. And a purely human ethic in exalting that desire becomes fertile.

Unfortunately, in a time like the present, when, as we have seen, everybody has his share of education, everybody pretends to have opinions, and upon every subject. It follows that opinions run wild in the streets and get plentifully soiled by their dirt.

This is what has happened to the theory which is based upon the merely human ideal.

For the crowds the idea of happiness never extends beyond a limited circle of immediate and tangible satisfactions which can be bought with money. Since the fight for happiness is necessary and legitimate, they have drawn the inevitable conclusion that, in order to succeed, all means are justified, and success is the sole measure of the value of actions. Success under its most brutal form, which is monetary success, has almost become the exclusive object of universal endeavour. The modern ideal, instead of being merely human, has become utilitarian.

This mode of feeling is not new: mediocrity is eternal. But perhaps it has never been so nearly universal, and certainly it is the first time in history that utilitarianism has transformed itself into a dogma and become dominant everywhere.

To-day, indeed, utilitarian interests are not merely the foundation of the conduct of individuals; they rule even the politics of nations. These fight no longer for territory but for markets. They are less anxious to subjugate new countries to their power than to find in them a mart for their productions. Up-to-date monarchs look for their inspiration to the bank rather than to the army. Wars arise from the economic

rivalries of peoples and not from the ambitious rivalries of kings. The collective ideal is therefore the same as the individual ideal—to get rich as soon as possible, and by every available means.

An example will show how this new conception is generalised. As in private life admiration and respect are accorded to those who have succeeded financially, so a kind of unanimous agreement has proclaimed the United States and Germany to be the first nations of the world. England and Belgium still hold an honourable place in the prize-lists of this competition. France, on the contrary, is regarded as irremediably fallen, and certain of her own writers have been the first to announce her decadence. This is significant; for the United States and Germany are the nations which, before all others, are making money. In the society of nations they are *parvenus*, and it is precisely this which wins for them universal admiration.

It may therefore be fairly said that utilitarian interests are on the eve of causing all that lies beyond them to be forgotten. In the collective life the principal elements which compose the greatness of a people, which uphold the level of its civilisation and confer value on its intellectual and artistic work, are being neglected. In the individual life nobody troubles to ask himself whether, in a civilisation turned exclusively in the direction of wealth, there remains any longer a place for art or beauty, or even for happiness. Men deliberately forget that the gratification of material wants does not achieve the happiness of a being who is really civilised, and that the Greeks, who held the first place among the peoples for intelligence and for art, were probably also the happiest of them all.

It is just here that the influence of this intellectual and moral uniformity which I have tried to describe is most plainly revealed. To offer resistance to the general tendency would be indeed the task of an aristocracy, since disinterested thought is a luxury, and because, further, the leisure and

freedom of mind which material independence confers are almost indispensable for its cultivation.

Under the influence of this levelling process the so-called governing classes have ceased to be *higher* classes. They seem to have renounced the speech which becomes an *élite* in order that they may follow the example of the crowd.

Since the crowd has become the dominant social power the attitude of these classes towards it may be summed up in two words—Abdication and Toadyism. Their politics, in presence of the claims of the masses, which every day become more and more explicit, bear a strange resemblance to that of those members of the Convention who, under the Reign of Terror, in voting against their own convictions for the condemnation of Louis XVI., unwittingly signed their own sentence of death. If the social uniformity towards which we are advancing with ever swifter steps should one day be fully attained, it will owe its realisation to the suicide of the old aristocracies.

What remains of these old aristocracies, indeed, has but little concern in maintaining its intellectual supremacy, or in constituting itself as a social force and setting an effective example. The only effective aristocracy that survives is that of money, and it cares for nothing save augmenting its wealth or spending it without intelligence. The highest class to-day is a mere plutocracy.

To sum up, we may say that, in material respects, the levelling of society is especially evident in the slow ascent of the masses to better conditions. In moral and intellectual respects, on the contrary, it is being realised by the lowering of the *élite* to a uniform level with all the rest.

II. THE CONSEQUENCES.

The consequence of what has been described is the possible disappearance, after a relatively short interval, of every kind of social superiority. Indeed, a governing class never abases itself with impunity: an aristocracy, whose sole superiority to the masses which it professes to lead is that of money, is doomed,

Bankruptcy such as this would be no subject for regret were it not to be feared that the slough of equality, in reducing the inequalities of fortune, may at the same time swallow up art and culture, which are civilisation itself.

This fear is not illusory, and it may even be asserted that the movement has begun. The origin of the movement is the decay of general culture caused by increasing specialisation. Democratic pressure accelerates its progress. It is indeed strictly logical that the passion for uniformity should assail not only superiority of fortune or position, but every kind of superiority whatsoever. The outcome is seen in the pretence of democratising thought, literature, and art. People are coming to regard elegance and refinement as marks of degeneration, and luxury, even when intelligent, as a crime against the masses. Not only has the name of aristocrat become a term of reproach, but "intellectual" is equally discredited. Even beauty, to have an excuse, must be collective, and it has become the fashion to treat the beauty of woman as a means to that of the race.

And yet every great achievement in civilisation is the work of higher individuals rather than of masses, and genius is of all things the most anti-democratic.

If the actual tendency increases, humanity will probably pass through a stage of sordid ugliness. An age of vulgarity is the logical outcome of an age of uniformity, and universal mediocrity is but another name for the levelling of society.

To get a foretaste of this reign of universal mediocrity towards which our civilisation is drifting, it will suffice to take a walk any Sunday afternoon in certain districts on the outskirts of London. Here are to be seen interminable streets bordered by little houses built on the same model, with the identical bow-window and the same miniature garden indefinitely repeated. Here one meets, not working men, but frequent and similar groups of unpretending and respectable bourgeois, all dressed in precisely the same manner. Nothing disturbs the ennui of these streets—no shop, no public-house ;

for these neighbourhoods are absolutely peaceful. And one reflects that nothing will ever break the grey monotony of the existence which keeps its even tenor in such surroundings. The vision rises of lives perfectly regulated, exempt from surprises, well protected from catastrophe, but hopelessly closed against the entry of great emotions. One feels on all sides the presence of small intelligences, honourable and upright and furnished with practical common sense, but absolutely impervious to every great idea and to the highest type of culture.

No doubt such an impression is superficial, but it serves to suggest clearly enough what civilisation would be were all social inequalities abolished, and the level attained of that material, intellectual, and moral equality the first signs of which have just been indicated.

III. MEANS OF DEFENCE.

One cannot but conclude that such uniformity would be fatal to human happiness. And on that account means must be sought to resist its coming.

Material uniformity is perhaps inevitable; perhaps it is even desirable, on condition that it comes about by raising the condition of the masses, and not by the abasement of those who govern them. One could contemplate without regret an age when wealth would be unknown, provided that distress were unknown also.

Nevertheless it is essential to preserve an aristocracy. A civilisation without aristocracy is of inferior type; it is the civilisation of bees or ants, not of human beings. For the more mankind realises the perfection of its capacities the more complex it becomes and the more highly individualised and differentiated. To suppress inequalities is therefore to revert to lower forms. It is as though, in the manifold efflorescence of human nature, one were to replace the complexity and variety of the rose—result of the patient efforts of many generations—by the simple uniformity of the primitive eglantine.

But, in order to survive, the aristocracy of the future must

support its claims on superiority of talent and of character rather than on the privilege of birth or on money. It must deliberately endeavour to be, before all else, an aristocracy of the intellect.

The aristocracy of the intellect exists already, but it lacks cohesion and is unconscious of the necessity of fighting to avoid being submerged by the democratic flood. It fails to see that the prerogatives of talent and merit being left undefended are slowly approaching the verge of extinction. It is almost always silent, even when it would be fitting to make itself heard.

It is not too late to establish a strong combination of forces in opposition to universal mediocrity. In this endeavour the help of writers and artists would be essential, but upon one condition—they must be men of culture rather than specialists.

Just as, in the world of business, there exist machines for making money—Octave Mirbeau has immortalised this type in Isidore Lechat¹—so there exist also machines for making books and machines for painting. From them no help can be derived.

But for genuine artists who live in the work which they create, an active part may be reserved. For the diverse activities of man must be understood and appreciated before the attempt can be made to guide them. In this respect it is more important to judge wisely than to have learnt much, and therefore culture is of more value than information—in particular, the specialised information of to-day. The aristocracy of the future, if it would survive, must be an aristocracy of feeling and of manners as much as, and more than, an aristocracy of intellect.

From this point of view it is obvious that women will be able to render valuable assistance in defending the rights of culture in the midst of our utilitarian civilisation. Distinctly inferior to man in point of intelligence, woman is probably his superior in respect of feeling and the fineness of her perceptions. Ignorance is natural to her, but equally natural is the gift of rapid assimilation. She easily acquires what Molière

¹ *Les affaires sont les affaires.*

has justly called *clartés de tout*; and this enables her to discuss with charm even those matters of which she has no exact knowledge.

The culture she can claim, somewhat superficial though it may be, answers to certain deep needs of her nature. She is ill-content with a shabby environment and the lack of wide horizon. Even when circumstances impose such limitations upon her, she seeks to escape from them by means of the imagination. Her dream is often commonplace and sometimes dangerous, like that of Mme. Bovary; but none the less it lifts her beyond herself, and equally beyond her male companion, whom she far surpasses by her illimitable craving for the ideal.

Hence it comes to pass that every form of activity which answers to this need of the ideal, and which is derived from it, finds in woman an ally and a sympathiser. For this reason art and literature, in particular, have in women their most attentive public and their firmest friends.

Notwithstanding this, woman has not herself produced any work of the first eminence. But she is the inspirer of it in others, and, in the deepest sense, it is for her that man does his work. She understands, or rather she feels, that each endeavour to refine and perfect the sensitiveness of our nature draws us nearer to herself and expands her empire; and therefore her suffrages are instinctively given to all who succeed in that attempt.

The more perfect the social state becomes, and the more human nature is enriched on its sensitive side, the more will the influence of woman increase. Woman, who in inferior states of civilisation is a slave, has raised herself little by little to the position of greatest power in contemporary society.¹

¹ It is a remarkable fact that, at the very moment when woman has attained a social status to which she has never before even approached, she begins to complain of her lot. The reforms which she demands, while conferring upon her a theoretical equality with man, would make her his victim, since she is weaker than he. But women refuse to recognise that the barriers which surround them are far more of a protection than a disability. Launched into life, how soon would her wings be broken!

Woman has therefore a direct interest in resisting the ruin of art and culture, of which she is the chief benefactress. For, in a civilisation purely utilitarian, positive and uniform, whence luxury and leisure had alike been banished, she would be hopelessly condemned by her economic inferiority to a subordinate position.

The aristocracy of the intellect, artists, women—such are the social forces which may combine for the defence of the menaced culture of mankind. The time has not yet come to despair of the future of civilisation. Art and beauty, which constitute its essence, have still too many lovers to be regarded as the objects of a fatal threat. None the less we need to be on our guard ; for the perils here indicated are very real, and they increase from day to day.

Civilisations are more apt to perish by slow decadence than by sudden catastrophes, as the civilisations of Arabia and China bear witness. An analogous fate is perhaps reserved for our own. Our civilisation is being sustained by the rapid advance of science, which continually opens new realms for our aspirations. But let the day arrive when social inequalities shall have disappeared, and individual initiative will forthwith come to an end. Science herself will be arrested. This would mean a gradual stagnation, until the day when some fresh wave of life propelled from without would come to revive our dying energies and rouse them to fresh dreams.

To find a new dream ! The world has grown so old and become so cramped in spirit that the task is difficult. Were it not better to save from dying the flame we have kept burning even till now, and which, if tended by pious hands, may yet give forth a beauteous light ? ¹

RENÉ-L. GÉRARD.

LIÈGE.

¹ The above article has also appeared, in French, in *La Belgique*, March 1908.

SCIENCE AND THE PURPOSE OF LIFE.¹

DR FRIDTJOF NANSEN.

IF we look back upon the history of religious, ethical, and scientific thought, there are two things which will especially strike us.

On the one side, it is apparent how religious as well as ethical ideas have been dependent on the development of human thought, *i.e.* science, during all ages.

In the beginning of history men were groping in spiritual darkness. In their hard struggle with the forces of nature, they took refuge in grotesque superstitions adapted to their childish ideas in order to give them consolation in their feeling of weakness ; and they gradually learned some crude moralities in their struggle for existence. But as understanding grew—very slowly in the beginning — many of the grotesque and childish superstitions were gradually put away, and more developed and dignified ethical ideas were attained. This development, or purification one may call it, has gone on and is still going on. It would, indeed, be very conceited to think that we had now reached maturity. We are only in what might be called youth, and are still a long way from manhood. We could say with Emerson, that the religion of one age is, as a rule, the literary entertainment of the next.

On the other hand, it may strike us that, while the grotesque superstitions of childhood and the religious dogmas of every

¹ Presidential Address delivered to the Social and Political Education League, 1907.

age have been continually changing with the growth of human thought, ethical ideas have early reached a comparatively high level ; and certain leading principles, at any rate, laid down at an early time, have changed comparatively little, although even they cannot avoid being influenced and much modified by science. I give as examples the ethical ideas of the Greek religion, of Buddhism, and of Christianity. It cannot be denied that these religions, as far as dogmas or superstitions go, differ widely ; but if we look at their ethical views, we must admit that they are more or less alike.

The explanation of this fact is evident. Our ethical ideas are based upon the fundamental laws regulating the development of the organic world, whilst religious dogmas belong to an entirely different sphere, something outside this world. Men took refuge in the first grotesque religious superstition, and the belief in supernatural powers, in their desire to live and in their fear to die. In the feeling of their own weakness and the irresistible power of surrounding nature, the belief in the special support of supernatural forces was a relief which gave confidence and comfort in their difficult struggle. It should, therefore, be clearly understood that these are two separate spheres of ideas, and this ought, in my opinion, to have been realised long ago in the education of young people.

Here we have to look at the matter from a social and political education point of view. It is evident that, for the community and the State, the ethical ideas of the citizens are of the very greatest importance, whilst a man's religious dogmas should be entirely his private concern.

It is therefore for the State to demand that whatever his religious views may be, every citizen should be given good, sound, ethical ideas, fit to make him a useful and skilful member of the community ; and they should be given him in such a way that they will last him for life, not to be shaken by whatever doubts his religious faith may have to encounter. As to how this should be best attained, there might be differences of opinion ; but I believe that many will agree that the

present system of education is, in this respect, not a satisfactory one, and involves great dangers for the future.

My view is, therefore, that this is a subject of vital importance for humanity, and which cannot be discussed too often and too seriously. We must try to find the right way and then take it without hesitation. We cannot remain indifferent where such vital interests are at stake. Confucius said long ago that "to see what is right and not to do it, is want of courage." Many might do well in taking those words to heart. Nobody who has children, or who has had anything to do with the education of young people, can have avoided realising in what a difficult and dangerous period of transition young people are now living. We are in the beginning of a new century in more than one sense. This is chiefly, I think, for two reasons. Life is becoming too complicated. We have not been able to follow the material development, which has gone so fast that our brain has not accommodated itself to the new arrangement of things. Life has become so much of a rush that our chief energy is spent in trying to avoid being left behind. We get little time for contemplation. And I believe the result is a certain lack, in our days, of personality, of sincerity, and of originality. If we look back a hundred years, life was much easier to live than it is to-day. Everybody had plenty of time to go deep into his subject, to be really solid and sincere, and to find himself and the various phases of his own personality.

But there are other and perhaps still greater dangers in the future. It is a time when old and new creeds fight. The old creeds have to encounter the new views and ideas of science. It seems as if those who are responsible for the education of young people have not hitherto sufficiently considered how to meet these difficulties, and I believe the result is that in our day there is more pessimism than is really necessary. This is a serious danger that certainly is not reduced by pretending not to see it. Democritus has said: "There is only one way of making great evils small, by looking them straight in the face." We who have gone

through many of these dangers, do not wish that our children should necessarily be exposed to the same dangers. We wish to take away those stumbling-blocks which we know can be removed. There are people who think that the right remedy is to fight against the new views of science. How little those people have learned from history! It is the same story repeated over and over again. No truth lives for ever, and every truth has its time; but when its time has come, it is as futile to fight against it as to uphold it after its time has passed.

Galileo and the Papal world is a good example. The priesthood wished to stop the movement of the earth because they thought it was dangerous for their doctrines, and they made Galileo swear that the earth did not move. But the earth was not stopped. Only the priesthood ran their heads against a wall, and they had to alter all their doctrines in order to climb that wall afterwards. So it always was. It is idle to blame science for its assertions. It has gone on, and will go on undisturbed on its way in search of truth, even if it may upset ever so many of our illusions or smash them all to pieces, and leave many of us maimed and hopeless behind.

The right thing is to let our ideas and doctrines be tested and purified by the new light. This, I mean, is now more necessary than ever before, especially as the new ideas of science are going to spread in the future to a much greater part of the people than hitherto; and there are ideas in the view of existence and of the universe held by modern science which are apt to become very dangerous if you are not prepared to receive them.

Ethical ideas, as well as those about life and its values, have at all times, as I said, been greatly influenced by the development of science, but this influence has been steadily increasing in late centuries, especially with the great development of natural sciences. The present state of affairs actually had its beginning in the days of Copernicus, when he shook the centre of the universe and flung the earth out on its journey round the sun and through space. What an enormous differ-

ence did that mean for the world of thought! In mediæval times the earth and humanity were the centre of the universe. Now we became only a small, insignificant link in the circulation. The difference is as that between two poles. The one pole was that of the conceited child, where we ourselves, with all our ideas, were the centre, and the universe was created for our benefit. But development has carried us towards the other pole—the state of melancholy youth in which we, humanity, and our whole world of ideas, are simply passing forms.

“For in and out, above, about, below,
 ’Tis nothing but a Magic Shadow-show,
 Play’d in a Box whose Candle is the Sun,
 Round which we Phantom Figures come and go”

in the eternal circulation that has no end and no beginning.

The first view of things, that of ourselves as a centre, was easy, and fit to please the child’s vanity and make him feel happy. It reminds me of the fly sitting on a carriage, that shook its wings, thinking that it was his own little person that raised the cloud of dust which it saw behind the carriage.

The latter view of things is more dangerous and difficult. It is apt to create much despair and pessimism in minds that are not sufficiently educated and prepared to accept it; and here perhaps lies the greatest danger of the present day, and perhaps still more of the future.

How ought we to meet it? There are those who say, as I mentioned before, that the only remedy is to fight with all the weapons at our disposal against such a miserable view of things. They might just as well try to turn the running river and teach the water to run up hill. All they will attain is that they dam up the water, and sooner or later the river will break down their dykes and do much damage with its rushing floods.

A wiser plan is to avoid those futile attempts, and instead try to prepare the land to receive the water in order that it may flow gently and irrigate and fertilise the fields instead of destroying them.

We certainly ought to apply here, if ever, what we have

learnt from our doctrine of the survival of the fittest. We should use the energy at our disposal to accommodate the organism to the surroundings, and not waste it in trying to make the surroundings fit the organism.

It would be impossible in the space to point out the many stepping-stones, some small and some great, and often also stumbling-blocks, which mark the road of development from the one pole I mentioned to the other which began in its last phase with Copernicus. I shall only mention one and perhaps the greatest discovery of last century, perhaps of all centuries, which has actually revolutionised human thought more than any other. This is the discovery of the law of *the conservation of energy*. It seems almost incomprehensible that thinkers did not always know this fundamental law, and still it is only fifty years since Robert Mayer was considered, at least by some people, more or less a crank when he first published his theory. Nevertheless there had been discovered, fifty years earlier, the law of the *indestructibility of matter*, which actually means the same thing, although this was not then understood.

This discovery in connection with the doctrine that nothing happens without a cause has formed a new foundation for human thought. Formerly it was considered logical that all things must have had a beginning and must have an end. We now see that really nothing we behold has a beginning or an end; and that therefore the only logical view of the universe, based upon our own experiences, is that it is infinite in time and space. It has always existed, and will go on for ever. It has no limits, but extends infinitely in all directions.

It is inevitable that such a conception, when it is thoroughly grasped, must entirely change our views of life and our ideas of its ethical values. Instead of belonging to a favoured class of a different and better origin than the rest of nature, we have become a part of the whole. It is, in a sense, a movement from individualism towards socialism.

I will summarise what science now teaches about the circulation of the universe. We know, from direct observa-

tion, that the sun continually radiates immense quantities of heat, that is energy, into space, and we can measure the amount. It has done so, we are tolerably certain, for at least a thousand million years and probably much longer, and it will go on for thousands of millions of years doing the same thing. But it means anyhow a continual loss of energy, and although the source of energy—that is, the quantity of heat contained in the sun—is very great, still it is not endless, and consequently we come to the certain conclusion that the sun must gradually be cooled, though slowly, during millions and millions of years. But when the sun has been cooled to a certain extent, the conditions for life on the earth's surface will become highly unfavourable, and life will have to cope with greater and greater difficulties of existence until it finally entirely disappears. What will the so-called evolution be then? It will go in an opposite direction. The possibilities of existence will become gradually less and less favourable for the complicated and highly developed animals, whilst the simple, low organisms will probably be those that will live longest, until even they disappear. Finally, all water on the earth's surface freezes; the oceans are transformed into ice to the bottom. Some time later, the carbonic acid of the atmosphere begins to fall down on the surface of the earth in the form of snow, and some time after that again the temperature on the surface will have reached about 330 degrees below zero Fahrenheit; then new oceans will be formed by the atmosphere being turned into liquid, and the atmosphere of that future earth will be only hydrogen and helium.

The sun will go through the same process. The sun will gradually be covered with a crust, and will become what we call a dark star; but as a dark star will continue on his way through space, accompanied by the planets.

That this must be the future history of our solar system has been known for a long time—and certainly scientifically it cannot be denied—but to a great many people, who wish to have a beginning and to have an end, it has been a kind of

comfort to think that by the radiation of heat into space the suns are gradually cooled whilst the temperature of space is raised, and at last a certain state must be attained in which the temperature will be uniformly distributed through the universe and through all its bodies. This would mean perfect death to all movement—what is called the heat-death. If this view were correct, the dead state of uniform temperature must be attained in a limited space of time, and it must consequently have been attained long, long ago, if the universe had existed for ever. But the fact that this state has not been reached, was thought a proof that there has been a beginning, and consequently must be an end. The idea seemed comforting, especially because man and his little world then became a more important part of existence, and were not reduced merely to passing forms in an eternal circulation.

It is sad for those who cling to such comforting ideas that science cannot recognise them. Our observations and logic lead with inexorable certainty to the assumption of an eternal circulation; and discoveries of recent time give us some indication of the manner in which the circulation may possibly take place.

The sun and our whole solar system is moving through the universe towards the constellation of Hercules, with a velocity of thirteen miles per second. The sun will also, after becoming a dark star, continue this movement through space undisturbed, until some time, sooner or later, it must meet with another star. How soon this will happen is difficult to calculate, as we do not know how numerous the stars are. We can only see the luminous ones, but there are certainly many, many more dark stars which cannot be seen. Let us assume that there are at least one hundred dark stars for each luminous one, rushing through space, then the probability is that, with its present diameter and a velocity of thirteen miles per second, the sun will collide with another star of about the same size, in less than a thousand billion years. And what a glorious collision will that be!

A dark star is protected by its crust against loss of energy to a remarkable degree. You may consider it as an enormous bomb filled with the highest explosives; and when two such stars collide, it means a tremendous explosion blowing up the two bodies and transforming them into a nebula. Some years ago we did actually witness an occurrence of this kind. It was on 22nd February 1901, when a new bright star was suddenly seen in the constellation of Perseus, at a place where no star had been observed only a day before. On the following day it shone with a light brighter than all other stars except Sirius, but after four days it had again decreased to a star of the second order, and after twenty-four days to that of the fourth order, and later it gradually faded to a star of the twelfth order, which is hardly visible with a good telescope. There is every reason to believe that what was seen on that occasion was actually an explosion produced by the collision of two dark stars, which had not even been visible before, and a new nebula was formed by the process just mentioned. The nebulae thus formed expand to enormous dimensions, and their diameters are many times that of our solar system as measured by the orbit of Neptune. By the expansion of their very thin gases—chiefly hydrogen and helium—the temperature of the nebulae, especially their outer parts, becomes extremely low, and lower than the surrounding space. The nebulae thus become places where enormous quantities of energy, radiated into space from the other stars, are gradually again collected, and help to form new solar systems. After a certain development during immeasurable periods, the nebulae will again begin to contract, and on their journey through space they will meet with other stars, dark or luminous, which, if they are sufficiently great, will simply pass through them undisturbed, but if they are comparatively small these will be attracted and arrested by the nebulae, where they will form nuclei for contraction and help to form the suns and planets of the new solar systems.

We cannot go into detail here, but what has been said

might be sufficient to show how the circulation of the universe is continually going on from eternity and into eternity. This is the lesson which modern science teaches us with regard to existence. The life of a solar system lasts only for a second compared with eternity, and will again be dissolved into new systems.

Mankind, with its history of struggles, attainments, and aspirations, its joys and its sorrows, will be wiped out like a dream of the past.

This may seem a sad and hopeless view of things, and the one dangerous and despairing question that will probably force itself upon the young man when he begins to see it, is the question of *purpose*. To what purpose then all this suffering of life, the endless struggle towards higher aims?—only illusions, the whole show only to disappear in the end like phantom shadows? He will say: I am willing to fight, but it must be with a purpose. He presents his cheque on life, and demands it to be honoured. Ah! it is a risky thing to give young people cheques which you are not quite certain that life afterwards will honour. And the idea of purpose is perhaps just such a difficult cheque.

Most people are certainly brought up to the idea that everything in life has a purpose, and they will, as a rule, have a ready answer when asked what the purposes are, although perhaps not always quite satisfactory. As, for instance, when a friend of mine, a Norwegian professor of zoology, asked a young lady student who was passing her examination in natural history the question: "Why do the birds sing?" After some consideration the lady answered: "In order to praise God"; but the answer was not considered a satisfactory one. Sometimes there might be serious disagreement as to what the correct answer would actually be. For instance, if I asked my readers what is the purpose of clothes, I hope most of them would answer: "Their object is to protect the body," though I am afraid that many, especially the ladies, would say it is rather to decorate the body. And still dealing

with the body, if you asked what is the purpose of jewellery, many people would probably say decoration and ornament, whilst others might hold it to be the exhibition of wealth. But anyhow, we all admit that there is an answer to such questions, although we may disagree in some cases what the purpose is.

But it is a striking fact that if suddenly the question were sprung upon you: What is the purpose of life? most people would get puzzled and would not know exactly what to say. We have a ready answer for every trifle the purpose of which is to sustain life or to fill it, but for life as a whole many of us would have to consider what to say before we could give an answer; and I believe that it would be very difficult to find two people who would give exactly the same. The explanation is evidently that *purpose* is an idea which entirely belongs to the organic world. It is a leading principle in the struggle for existence and in the law of the survival of the fittest. Every organ has a purpose, and when a zoologist discovers a new organ in an animal, his first desire is to find out what the purpose of that organ may be.

But this is not a principle that can be applied to *energy*, and life itself is a form of energy. To ask, therefore, what is the purpose of life, or what is the purpose of the organic world, is a question of very much the same kind as if one were to ask what is the purpose of the rotation of the earth.

I believe it is of great importance that young people, when they are old enough to understand it, should learn to see this, and how to draw the line, in order that they may not fall victims to the temptation to despair and pessimism. They should learn to understand that when they ask for the purpose of life, or even the purpose of the universe, they ask a question to which science gives no answer. They have left the world of experience and gone into the world of faith. It is not my opinion that men should live without faith: on the contrary, most people need it. But a sound system of ethical education should be based upon the view of things attained by

experience, that is, by observation, in order that it may be able under all circumstances to stand the test of life, and not be seriously shaken by possible changes in faith and dogmas, which life must inevitably bring. The mixing in education of religious dogmas with ethical ideas, the one dependent on the other, involves a serious danger; nor is it, I fear, fit to give sincerity, if young people are taught the ethical ideas simply as commandments, in which they have to believe, whether they find it reasonable or not, and if they do not learn to understand how deeply the ethical ideas are rooted in their own nature, and how they are in harmony with the fundamental laws regulating the development of the organic world.

I once witnessed a discussion between a very prominent and intelligent clergyman and an agnostic. The clergyman asked the agnostic whether he really did not believe in a life after death. The agnostic answered that he did not. The clergyman said that he could not understand such a thing, and still less could he understand why the agnostic led a moral life. If he, the clergyman, did not believe in a life and a reward after death, he could not see the purpose of a moral life, and he would certainly take all the enjoyment of its pleasures that life could give him. The agnostic answered that he feared their tastes did not quite agree. He saw his happiness in harmony, and such a life would hardly bring harmony into his existence. This agnostic had been educated in the same faith as the clergyman, and had gone through many struggles before he learnt to draw the line between ethics and religious doctrines.

The search of truth should not be only a phrase, it has to be *sincere*. However disconcerting and distressing the view of existence arrived at by science may seem to some people, it cannot therefore be doomed. Where was it written that truth is not allowed to be disconsolate? Ah! you weak minds, you will trifle with truth in the distance; but when you meet her on the narrow path, where there is no room to pass outside, then you run away. But you ought to understand

that she is not to be trifled with. We either seek the truth and take the consequences, or we do not seek her. There is room for no compromise here. Would it be sincerity if, in order to please our vanity and conceitedness, we were to deny the logical conclusions of our own observations, even though they may seem hopeless to some? It is indeed essential, and far more important, that young people should learn from the very beginning that *sincerity* is the one virtue which is at the basis of all ethics. They might also remember Carlyle's words: "Sincerity, a deep, great, genuine sincerity, is the first characteristic of all men in any way heroic."

Another virtue of fundamental importance, especially for modern life, is *true modesty*. A serious objection to the ethical doctrines of many religions is, in my opinion, that they show a certain lack of modesty, which may be fatal to young people. The average Christian, for instance, will speak a great deal about modesty and humility as true Christian virtues; but this does not prevent him from believing that he belongs to the few selected ones, or from considering his own doctrines as alone true and saving. He is also quite ready to judge others. This is hardly modesty. The views of modern science may teach a more wholesome lesson. By the contemplation of space on a starlit night a young man may learn more modesty than by years of training in the doctrines of the kind just mentioned, as he may learn to understand what an insignificant part of the universe we ourselves and our little world really are. He should, therefore, from early youth learn to kneel at the feet of Eternity, to listen to the silence of illimitable space, and to say truly:

"Upon such a shrine
What are our petty griefs?
I dare not mention mine."

No lesson is better able to lift us above the troubles of the day, and to broaden the mind and make men greater. The star-spangled heavens is a true friend; always there, always giving peace, always reminding you that all your

troubles, your doubts, your worries, are passing trifles. Our views, our struggles, our sufferings, they are not so very important and unique after all.

“The Eternal Saki from that Bowl has pour’d
Millions of Bubbles like us, and will pour.
When you and I behind the veil have passed ;
Ah, but the long, long while the world shall last !”

Those who think this a depressing view of things, fit to make people pessimists, should consider whether the fault may not be in their own education, which has inflated them with a fatal overestimation of the importance of humanity and themselves. Had they learnt real modesty from the beginning, there would be no danger. They are like men who are not accustomed to live on great heights : they turn giddy and fall into the abyss, whilst those who have grown up with the heights cannot even understand such a feeling.

Philosophers of antiquity held similar views of existence without despairing. Lucretius points out that an inevitable end is not a sad thing : it is a blessing, a relief, an emancipation ; the certain knowledge that man has this one life is the crowning truth of science which makes him fit to live it.

It is essential for the community and State that each citizen should be brought up to fully understand that his one duty towards himself and others is to make the most out of *this* life, to develop in himself the possibilities nature has given him, and be as happy as possible. In this way he contributes most to the happiness of others. Let it be fully understood that melancholy and pessimism, though possibly attractive, are sins if they lead to inactivity—as serious as any sin in the world. They have to be avoided by strict self-control. Life is in itself rich, beautiful, and full of possibilities : let the young man learn to see that, and not pine for what is not. He should learn the deep truth of King Alfred’s maxim :

“He who is virtuous is wise ;
And he who is wise is good ;
And he who is good is happy.”

Let the desire be to do everything as well as possible, and the satisfaction to feel that we have done so. But let it also be impressed upon the young men never, when there is a choice, to do anything which can be done equally well or better by someone else. How many wasted lives would then be spared, how much reduced the rush for doing the same thing, if each individual tried to find his own line! What an economy of energy for the community!

This maxim may be considered as being in poor harmony with the true modesty I mentioned before. But to consider yourself fit for something is not the same thing as to consider yourself very important.

Finally, it should be always remembered that it is not the views that a man holds or the dogmas he believes in that are of importance for his fellow-creatures: it is his acts. Even the loftiest dreams above the clouds are of but little avail if they do not lead to action.

"A man is his own star;
Our acts our angels are,
For good or ill."

FRIDTJOF NANSEN.

LYSAKER, NORWAY.

THE RELIGIONIST AND THE SCIENTIST :

A CHRISTIAN MINISTER'S VIEW OF THEIR RELATION.¹

THE REV. G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS, M.A.,
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THE task of defining the relations of science and religion and of attempting to draw the lines of their reconciliation should be undertaken only by men who know both science and religion, and know each by the methods and kind of knowledge appropriate to each: science by patient and first-hand investigation of phenomena, and religion by intimate self-disciplined experience of its power.

No such position would I for a moment dare or consent to occupy; I speak only as a Christian minister, whose ministry proceeds upon a certain conception of the relation between the religionist and the scientist. I shall try to state simply what that conception is: beyond personal testimony I cannot go.

I conceive, then, of my relation as a Christian minister to my brother the student and exponent of science under four aspects:—

I. INDEPENDENCE.—I think the fundamental feeling I have about the work of my fellow-student whose field is science is this: that if he has his mass of facts and realities to deal with, to rationalise and explain, so, emphatically, have I, as a religionist, mine. There are certain popular conceptions

¹ Notes of an inaugural address to the Glasgow University Society of St Ninian, 4th November 1907.

which broadly and roughly distinguish the two spheres. The scientist's facts are "external": mine internal. The scientist's facts are "natural": mine moral. He speaks of his facts in the language of mechanism: I of mine in the language of freedom. He deals with courses and sequences of phenomena: I with origins, purpose, and destiny. I do not claim that the two spheres are unrelated, nor assert that they do not interpenetrate one another. I believe, on the contrary, that we are only at the beginning of the science of their mutual interpenetration.

But I do claim that my facts are at least as real as the scientist's facts: that is (to borrow a clever illustration), if the scientific man says, "This room was swept with a broom," I as religionist am saying as real a thing when I say, "This room was swept with a purpose"; or again, that if a man commits a murder, his guilty conscience is as real as the corpse of the person he has murdered.

Further, if the scientist has any reason to believe that the mass of facts with which he deals, and which he sees about him in an alluring disorder, are really, behind all, an ordered cosmos,—I also have as good reason to believe that my world of moral facts is (if only I could arrive at it), behind all, an ordered cosmos, which it is my business to try to reach.

You may try to bewilder me by questions as to the validity of knowledge, and the nature of reality, and the absurdities of dualism; but to the idea that the scientist is dealing with things more real than I, I will yield, no, not for an hour.

"We are coming," someone has said, "to see increasingly the value and the claim of the *primâ facie* view of life"; and that *primâ facie* view shows me that the materials of religion are real, as real as the stuff of which the world is made. The student of nature comes close to them, yet the most real of them all he never, *quâ* student of nature, quite touches; yet they are there, dislocating or repairing our life. I am a religious man, because the facts are there: I am a religious agent, because they press on me with a pressure which I

interpret as a vocation specially to deal with them: I am a Christian religious agent, because Christianity deals so adequately, so drastically with them, with such a volume of intellectual and moral power.

II. COMRADESHIP.—But now let me hasten to supplement this view of the two spheres as distinct by the conception of comradeship. I lift my eyes from my study of the facts of religion, those facts whose reality I have been claiming, and I look over to my friend who is studying the phenomena of nature, and mentally say we are comrades.

(1) *Comrades in Work*.—I think of us both as working at an unfinished problem: he on his section, I on mine. I do not hope that either he or I will live in this world to see the work finished. I believe there will be a finish, a solution of the “riddle of this painful earth,” and that the examination of nature and the study of spirit will both come home and attain a harmonious unity in that day of completion. Misunderstandings will then be impossible, but meanwhile as incidents of progress they are almost inevitable; for each, the scientist and the religionist, sees, when he looks across at the other, only unfinished work, and he may not know how very unfinished it is. But it needs just the recollection of the fact that the work is unfinished to dispel the misunderstanding and replace it by patient comradeship.

I lay stress on this, because I cannot but feel that here the religionist has often been sadly deserving of blame. He has not been frank enough about the unfinished character of his work. He has been tempted to regard religion and the explanation of moral phenomena as a completed thing, an ordered, rounded system of thought, needing only to be announced and illustrated. He is learning more slowly than the scientist to discard *a priori* theories, and go to school to the facts and proceed cautiously to generalisations.

And this forgetfulness of the fact that, while experience grows, and ever larger and fuller bodies of experience are coming into view, theology can never be anything but an

unfinished and progressive science—this has made the religionist sometimes imperious, and lordly, and impatient, and dogmatic. And the scientist too, in the earlier stages of *his* attendance at the school of experience, showed sometimes that he had, unhappily, caught the trick of dogmatism and of the arrogance of the man who makes haste to regard his work as finished.

The danger is, I think, less to-day than it has ever been. Before the religionist no less than before the scientist new areas of fact and experience are opening up, with regard to which the student has to orientate himself; and where the vastness of these areas is most appreciated, there a modest sense of being but a beginner makes directly toward a sense of kindly collaboration with beginners in other vast fields of research. And this comradeship in work gives also the sense of

(2) *Comradeship in Discipline*.—Both of us (the student of religion and the student of science) can see that we are simultaneously being taught humility and patience by many failures, and the foolishness of intellectual pride by the supersession and superannuation of much that once was counted vital and final. Both of us are simultaneously being educated in the school of awe and wonder at the vastness and complexity of the universe: both of us feel on our brows the breath of a morning of high hope; for the more we know of the universe, the more numerous become the suggestions of order, and the more excitingly near do we seem to come to a satisfactory demonstration that the whole system is one rational unity.

Subjected, then, to one common discipline, yet sustained by one common hope, we may well look across at one another, not with hostility or fear, but with the level, earnest eyes of mutual respect and of the expectation of useful suggestion.

But there is more than comradeship: on the religionist's side there is profound and far-reaching

III. *DEBTORSHIP*.—The religionist of to-day is deep in the debt of his brethren, the students of science. Theological

readjustment—changes for the better in the presentation of religion—owe far more to natural science than either to philosophy or criticism.

I have neither the space nor the ability to enumerate all the items of that debt; but I should like to mention three ways in which the scientist's emphasis on the uniformity of nature has reacted advantageously on the religious mind of to-day. I remind myself of these three items of my debt by three words that represent three new emphases in religion: *Unity, Law, Progress*.

(1) *Unity*.—John Morley says somewhere that “unseen and thin as fine filaments of air are the threads that draw opinion to opinion”: and in many ways the scientist's emphasis on uniformity will be found to account for the frequency with which the word “unity” is now heard on the theologian's lips.

The theologian has begun, for instance, to think once more, and fruitfully, on a subject which had been thought empty and desiccated like one of Euclid's axioms, viz. the unity of God.

Let me put in Dr Gwatkin's words the link between science and this truth of religion:—

“What we mean by saying that the physical universe is governed by general laws is that knowledge is impossible unless the whole system is at least a rational unity, whatever else it may be. And this means that if force be its moving power, there must be one force and no more: and if God, there must be one God and no more.”

It is to that last sentence I desire to draw attention. Science has proclaimed aloud its monodynamism: theology has overheard, and has been startled into a new understanding of its own monotheism.

And there was nothing that theology needed more than this new emphasis on the truth that there is only one God, only one source of truth, only one source of goodness, only one source of life.

For there would seem to have descended from past ages an inveterate provincialism in the theological mind.

Theology has been content to be departmental, notoriously, in its view of the sphere and method of the working of God. The whole conception of God was impoverished and withered by ecclesiasticism; and regions of His working, where the theologian should have bowed in reverence before the sacraments of God's patient direction of men, were passed coldly by as secular, and outside the Divine pale. God's universe was thus made a house divided against itself, and monotheism emptied of much of its power and value.

Happily, now, owing to the emphasis laid by science on the unity in things visible, we have gained a conception of God's working that is at once wider, more comprehensive, and more thorough and intimate. A God who is an absentee from any part of the universe, who hates, despises, or forgets anything that He has made, is now an impossibility for theology: we have been rebuked by science, not for introducing the idea of God at all, but for being unfaithful to our monotheism, and for not introducing Him far enough, and for not thinking with sufficient definiteness of His presence and agency as universal.

And with this new emphasis on the unity of God has come also, through the gospel of science, a new sense of the unity and solidarity of the human race—a truth without which, as Mazzini said, there is no religion.

I must not attempt to set forth in any detail the ways in which this new emphasis on the oneness of humanity has reacted on the thought of our time; but the least observant amongst us must have noticed how, under its pressure, false, artificial, and mischievous distinctions in place and privilege amongst the individuals and races of the earth (distinctions which an over-confident thought in earlier generations traced even up to the eternal counsels of God) have been driven into obscurity, and how the newer conception of man, and of the unity of his life, has made for kindlier international relationships, saner and more intelligent views of the responsibility for Christian missions, wider appreciation of the value and responsibilities of grouped lives, and especially (that which so

ministers to-day to hope in the sphere of theology) an expectant and docile observation of developments of thought and life in the Far East.

These are some of the ways in which the scientific emphasis on unity has reacted on the theological mind. Take another item of debt :

(2) *Law*.—The emphasis upon law may almost be called the *differentia* of science, as the emphasis on freedom is the *differentia* of religion.

Religion, dealing with moral acts and their consequences, has staked, and rightly staked, her whole existence on the possibility of forgiveness and repair.

Science, dealing with facts and consequences in the natural sphere, has necessarily emphasised retribution.

Now, I am not going to be so foolish as to attempt a harmonisation of these two voices (my business is, as I said, to testify and not to expound). And my testimony is this, that at least in evangelical circles the popular conception of forgiveness sadly needed the counter-emphasis of science on retribution and the inviolability of law. Mark you, I do not for a moment say that religion now needs to utter her message of forgiveness with bated breath or uncertain tone ; but I do mean to say that she needed (and has been compelled) to re-examine her definition of forgiveness that it might be brought once more into line with the facts of life. I assert that there were whole vast areas of evangelical religion where a conception of forgiveness was prevalent, which simply would not square with the facts of life, and where for need of such a corrective as science has furnished there was the most appalling blindness to these facts of life, with the inevitable stream of consequences to public morality. To-day the stern reminders which science has sent us of the divinity of law have most healthily affected our gospel message and made it more virile and robust. Far more confidently than ever may we say that God loves us : but it is good that we have been reminded that all is law, if all is love, and law is the way God loves us.

(3) *Progress*.—And then if we on the side of religion have learned from science's emphasis on unity and on law, what have we not learned from her emphasis on ordered progress?

"We are all," the saying is, "evolutionists now." That means, I take it, not that we claim to be scientists, nor even wholly to understand the theory of evolution and the part played in it by the principle of natural selection, but that the evolutionary idea has coloured our thinking on nearly everything. It has revolutionised the presentation of the Christian religion. It has almost fundamentally altered our view of Holy Scripture, of the history it contains, and of the doctrines it unfolds. It has, I believe, had a very close connection with the revival of historical studies, and has even for the least religious mind suffused history, if I may so speak, with the Providential idea. It has opened out to the religious man a new view of the relations between what his fathers called secular history, and the sacred history in the Scriptures. And, above all, it has set Christ in a new light. Confined within human limits, He is the stultification of the calculations of evolutionists; viewed as our moral natures direct us to view him, He is the goal and crown of the evolutionary process in the history of man.

As one surveys the field of our indebtedness as religionists to that discipline of natural inquiry (in the triumphs of which we recognise a special manifestation of the Holy Ghost), our sense of debtorship to science passes into a sense of debtorship to God, and gratitude to man passes into a thankful worship of God. If our brethren who study natural science do not all as yet join us in this transmutation of gratefulness into worship, we shall not lose hope that ultimately they will do this too; for if there is one portion of the universe more than another in which evidences of evolutionary design are manifest, it is in the marvellous growth of the school of science itself, and it is the best and humblest pupils in that school who will most certainly recognise that

behind themselves and their work is a power, not themselves, that makes for knowledge and truth.

(4) *Benefactorship*.—And now as I close I must mention one other aspect in which I, as an agent of religion, look upon my friend who works in the laboratory of science.

It is not enough to claim an equal right with him or an equal status as a student of realities; nor to feel that his work and one's own in a very real sense constitute a collaboration; nor even to express one's debt to science. One must do more: one must claim that religion has something to give the man of science. It is good that one should own to debtorship; but one must claim, in the name of one's message, benefactorship as well.

I said at the beginning that the facts with which the scientist deals have to do with successions of phenomena, with processes and sequences; while religion deals with origins, with purpose, and with destiny.

Yes; but the scientist cannot escape from the fact that he possesses certain moral experiences which continually impinge upon questions of origin, purpose, and destiny; and (*quâ* scientist) he has no faculty and no materials for dealing with these moral experiences.

But the exponent of religion has that material, and the exponent of the Christian religion has it in unrivalled richness.

The scientist needs religion not only when shaken by storms of sorrow or remorse: he needs religion to relieve the malaise of spiritual hunger and discontent, to hearten him in the midst of these nameless faintings of *faith in life* which come to the believer and unbeliever alike; to quiet, if not to explain, turbulent moods of the spirit, which, in all, tend to upset the balance of self-poise in the face of life's troubles; to nourish and respond to aspirations, without the uplift of which life were a poor and jejune thing; to fortify and prepare, not so much for death as for judgment, of which last the unbeliever has as definite an instinct as the Christian has;

and, finally, to transmute into a glad certainty, through Jesus Christ, his hopeful guesses about immortality.

Unless I had messages like these to give them, I, for one, could not dare to preach week after week to men who know so much more than I of the works of God; but possessing messages like these, it would not be modesty, it would be cowardly treason to the affluence of Christ's evangel, if I said that, having received much from science, I had not, as a herald of religion, far, far more to give.

Much has yet to be done in the patient pursuit of knowledge, in the sharp conflict of argument, and in the experience of discipline, before science and religion understand one another. In particular, the scientific temper (as Father Waggett calls it) is needed in religion, as the religious temper is in science. But the tempers are not really two, but one. In both spheres, men need patience, fidelity to their ignorance, freedom from pride and prejudice, sacrificial love of truth the spirit of adventure, and the spirit of reverence.

That temper the Holy Spirit is diffusing widely to-day before our very eyes: it is only discredited pseudo-science that is arrogant and blasphemous, as it is pseudo-religion that is proud, obscurantist, and narrow. And the diffusion of that Christian temper alike over both these great spheres of inquiry I take to be a significant and hopeful omen of the coming of the time when (to adapt the memorable words of Cardinal Newman) "the whole mind of the world will be absorbed into the Philosophy of the Cross, as the element in which it lives, and the form upon which it is moulded."

G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS.

“AN APPEAL TO THOSE AT THE TOP”—AND SOMETHING MORE.

SIR EDWARD RUSSELL.

A BOOK has lately been published by Messrs Smith, Elder & Co. with the rather extraordinary title, *Human Justice for those at the Bottom: an Appeal to those at the Top*. The author is Mr C. C. Cotterill, held in the highest estimation by all who know him. The book will not be regarded as practically efficacious. Indeed, it might be described as wild. But it may be scanned with advantage. It renders partially articulate an inarticulate protest always being made against things as they are in poor neighbourhoods. While this inarticulate protest, as a constant impulsive cry, should at the least be recognised as existing, any approach to an articulate enunciation of whatever reason may be at the back of it calls for, and should call forth, such a formulation as can be arrived at of what ought to be done. Mr Cotterill has treated with unprecedented heat the ever-present, ever-pressing subject upon which he has been impelled to speak. We may all share his almost angry emotion, even if we cannot participate in his optimist hope. At all events, we should try to approach for purposes of inquiry the terrible social conditions which exist, with a view to ultimate action, instead of going on knocking our philanthropical heads against a stone wall.

That is what Mr Cotterill and such as he are doing. Of course, one may qualify the censure by acknowledging that many at various times have seemed to be knocking their heads

against stone walls who, often sooner than later, effected great achievements. The earliest Christians seemed to be running their heads against stone walls. But the stone walls fell to ruins, and over them Christianity advanced to great and eternal victory. The Romans themselves had seemed to be running their heads against stone walls in many parts of their world. But they had faith comparable with Christian faith. Obstacles insensibly, or otherwise, dissolved in their presence. Colonisation, civilisation, justice to aborigines, general amelioration and progress, became world-wide. Let us never, therefore, be too contemptuous towards those who butt against any sort of evil.

What to do with "stone walls" is the greatest of social problems. The old way was to leave them to the disintegration of time—that is to say, to moral influences. It is still a moot point whether that more chemical method—the method of hoping all things and doing nothing direct—should be abandoned in favour of a more dynamic plan directly applied to the destruction of those stone walls against which enraged enthusiasm dashes its cranium. That most surprising House of Commons in history which now exists came the other day to the amazing resolution that—of course, if the Peers would graciously permit it—the wages of "sweaters" should be supervised and brought up and kept up to living point by a public authority. Upon this cue and that of the Scottish Land Bills came Lord Wemyss upon the scene, with a jeremiad on "Our present political state." He could see nothing in such legislation but vote-hunting. Our proper national condition, he said, was to be free, not to be bureaucratically ridden. He would have, as we used to have, a Government only protecting life, liberty, and property. In those days he had been persuaded, with Walter Bagehot—and I have heard Mr Bright in private say the same thing—that there would soon be no need of legislation, because all restrictions had been by wise *laissez faire* legislation done away with. But now the prevalent policy is for Government to interfere in everything. In his

lordship's judgment, liberty—to be starved, for instance—will be lost by legislation; public policy will be made an apology for private and class plunder.

Here we have a cry from the obsolete. That it is so is a comforting assurance that the social conscience is to a certain extent awakened. Whether we should run our heads against the stone wall wildly, or use our heads wisely to pull it down, may still be doubtful; but we shall never again turn our backs upon it, walk away from it ignoring it, or trust altogether for its demolition to the unassisted moral forces that may or may not act.

There is no walking away or ignoring on the part of Mr Cotterill. He is aflame about the unfairness, the injustice, of the condition of the very poor. He believes that if the upper classes fully realised it they would be impelled to remedy it, and that if they were impelled they could do it. Such is in brief the purport of his book, and it is almost infinitely iterated with very little variation of detail.

An assumption that "those at the top" can remedy the ills of "those at the bottom," especially if asserted with passion, is little more than running your head against the proverbial stone wall. Some would call it chimerical fatuity. Let us call it heroic impatience. Some might even call it, by way of settling their minds, divine impatience. Is it divine? Contrast the sentiment of the sonnet on Hamilton Thom by the younger Roscoe:—

Winter o'er autumn-scattered wheat doth fling
A white oblivion that keeps warm the seed;
And wisest thought needs deepest burying
Before its ripe effect begins to breed.
Therefore, O spiritual seedsman, cast
With unregretful hand thy rich grain forth,
Nor think thy word's regenerating birth
Dead, that so long lies locked in human breast.
Time, slow to foster things of lesser worth,
Broods o'er thy work, and God permits no waste.

A prose writer has said of this same Mr Thom that "there was in him, as in many pietists and thinkers of his type, a

placidity, a quietism, a *con amore* acquiescence in the leisurely movement of God's mysterious ways.”

Quietist satisfactions, however, are sound and right in the meditative gaze of the pious observer which are defective from the point of view of diligently doing God's work or co-operating with it. A Christian should carry in his heart the conscience of Christianity. A citizen, in action and public voice, should express the enlightened conscience of citizenship. Though the enlightenment should be careful, it should not cool the enthusiasm which the conscience should cherish. And the enthusiasm should be intense, since failure in duty may mean the commission or permission of social cruelty, whether wilful or of automatic social imposition.

At this point we may come to some feasible programme of philanthropic action, which may commend itself as not only practical but capable of somewhat rapid and large effect. Or we may resign ourselves to prayerful resignation. Or we may pass into a mood of chronic lament, as who should cry, “How long, O Lord, how long?” Now Mr Cotterill is in this vein; but with a difference. The passion is consuming. The protest is furious. But the apostrophe is not, “How long, O Lord, how long?” but, “How long, O fellow-men?” and especially, “How long, O well-off fellow-men, how long?” Such an exclamation can only be just on an assumption of human capability, and especially upper-class capability, to cure at will the great mass of social evil.

An exact understanding of the right mood in this matter is the more required, and the study of the point is the more interesting, because, as I gather, there is even more notably in America, where it is new, than in England, where it has long been customary, an eager sense among serious persons of the vast proportions and profound gravity of the social evils attached to actual poverty. So far, discussions in the United States do not appear to have got much beyond the perceptive and idealist stage, and the disposition up to now has been to exact from the better-off and better-charactered community

those moral influences and evangelisings upon which it is assumed the redemption of the poor must depend. In many great affairs, however, the people of the great Republic are capable of, and have recourse to, sudden and searching action. It would not surprise close observers if at some future time the legislatures and executives of the States were to concur in a gigantic exercise of State power in several directions.

The doctrine of Mr Cotterill, the absoluteness of which cannot be realised without actually reading what he has written—the doctrine that the people “at the top,” namely, the well-off, would and could remove the ill conditions of the people at the bottom if they only apprehended and appreciated them—lies midway between the doctrine that cure must be left to moral influences and the doctrine that cure should be applied by the State. I regard with scepticism the supposition that either moral effort or even the best-guided material action of the well-off could suffice; which scepticism, I think, ought to be general, though it cannot warrant any abandonment or slackening of endeavour. The right residuum of the anxious study obligatory on Christians and citizens must be to determine whether the community is neglecting to do anything that it might do, or to ascertain anything that it might ascertain. In the late debate in the House of Commons on the Sweating Bill—one of the most creditable debates, by the way, that ever took place, and, as to parties, equally creditable all round—Mr Alden rather strikingly said that modern industrialism in all civilised countries had gone beyond the moral sense; and that millions of comparatively poor, in all the great cities of the world, were the measure of our failure to develop the moral sense. Let us essay to develop it for our own guidance as far as we can be guided. Ought we to regard what exists as Mr Cotterill regards it? Now, what is the tenor of Mr Cotterill?

He calls the superfluities of the rich shocking. Why, if they have been honestly got? He regards the deficiency of means among the poor as not only pitiful but shameful. This

needs to be ascertained and differentiated. He says that to regard great inequalities in income, and to hold deficiency impossible to remedy, proclaims bankruptcy of the human mind. He desires that "those at the top" should undertake remedy and transact it swiftly. His energy and asseverations do not bring such a proposal within practical range. Yet he will not entertain the idea of delay or of mere alleviation. The remedy—which, he will have it, is easy to obtain, if only "those at the top are willing"—must be "complete and final." He expects everything to be put to rights by a spontaneous ebullition of upper-class sympathy and beneficence—sure to come when the upper classes really see the facts, and equally sure, it seems, to inspire effectual methods, and perseverance therein. He alleges, but does not attempt to prove, that the rich are mainly responsible for the poverty of the poor. This is not true in any sense apparent to common daily intelligence. Mr Cotterill indeed attributes all possible poverty to the modern industrial and commercial system. Assertions under this head may deserve scrutiny. There may be some degree, though surely only some degree, of truth in them. But there is at present no such obvious or evident provableness in them as can make them effective in motive—even in the motive of the ardently humane or willingly just.

Persons who in good conscience have thriven by the mercantile and manufacturing system will not easily be convinced that that system is—not in proved but in unstated colossal particulars—unjust to the earners of wages. Indignant eloquence is fluent. "The people at the top" are often taunted that they "are never under but always above"; that "it is their turn yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow"; that "they are the dogs that have their day every day"; that "they have arrived and they remain."

Even so, no amount of observation, even if there is observation, of the horrible conditions of the poor at the East End will bring home to successful honest men, who have done well in the money way, that they have done ill as to moral

economics in their well-conducted businesses. What is worst is that, though Mr Cotterill sets out again and again to prove his case, he never really essays to do so. Even if extreme social inequality, with abounding incidents of cruel labour and destitution, outrages *the sense* of human justice, the sense of human justice may only be a vague idea that "it cannot be right"; which, however true, to be of practical or even benevolent utility, must be analytically substantiated.

Mr Cotterill lauds the expression "fair play." In sport its meaning is obvious. In business, with custom to define it, it is commonly intelligible. But its bearing on the commercial system, as a matter of science and ethics, needs to be elucidated by long discussions between the Fabian Society and standard economists, and therefore is not yet available for summary moral and humanitarian purposes. The outraged humanitarian desires to bring average well-off men to growl, "It's a damned shame!" But that is not a sufficiently elucidatory expletive. There is gruesome pathos in the question, "Has it ever occurred to you to ask whether it is the children who die or those who survive that are more deserving of your sympathy?" But the responsibility cannot often be brought home to individual pockets, and while the philanthropist pleads, without science, from indigence on the one side to opulence on the other, we get no forwarder.

Then one has to notice an assertion that party in politics blights Parliament men, in reference to economical humanities. Neither in the nature of things nor in observed facts is there any justification for this charge, so often lightly made. If ever the evils of poverty be cured and its perils obviated by influences not purely spiritual—most probably by legislation which will combine enforced or assisted morals with experimental socialised political economy—it will be through the wholesome rivalry of political parties to meet the civic needs of industrial and labouring citizens, and those of their widows and orphans.

What is greatly lacking in the book which has provoked these criticisms is explicit proof that the "human justice"

which I more than agree ought to be accorded to “those at the bottom” is called for through specific “injustice” now suffered. It is one thing to assert that they would be more justly treated if they were put into possession of more opportunity, or protected from depraving habits, or saved from insufficient emolument. It is another thing to assert that their present conditions, resulting partly from economic causes and partly from habits prevalent in their class, are intrinsically unjust in their incidence.

The author of *Human Justice for those at the Bottom* takes note of the cessation of the feudal system, which, he reminds us, was in considerable force within middle-aged memory. Good. The less feudalism, the more ameliorative opportunity for Government and Parliament. To the creation of sources of improvement, or even of economic revolution, should “those at the top” look, and look effectively, if, as we are told, there is among them increasing disquiet of conscience as to the injustice with which those at the bottom are treated. But the quickest and the best way will be, not to sigh, or to clamour, for a moving of the spirit on the face of the waters, but to influence Parliamentary opinion and administrative measures.

Mr Cotterill takes note with satisfaction of the presumable results of compulsory education. It was established, however, by earnest professional statesmen, members of party governments: not by any vaguely moved and vaguely moving upper classes, to whom, as to the destined and only redressers of wrongs, impassioned petition is made. One of its effects is to make labourers better prompters of, and fellow-workers with, “those at the top.” The effective milieu of co-operation is that of constitutional citizenship. Education not of the primary school sort is labelled exclusive by Mr Cotterill. It may, as he says, hinder the understanding of “those at the bottom” by “those at the top.” But those who are exclusively educated *are* educated. Such books as this are addressed to their educated minds, and ought to overcome any vicious or

obscuring effect of those minds having received in education an exclusive bias. This should be only a question of time. Much has already been done. Any important misconceptions of the poor by the richer, is a call for inquiry and exposition, both of which ought to be in charge of Government, enlightened by philanthropic statements and appeals, but not moved by them to the point of letting its social reform duty pass into the hands of "those at the top," as a loosely associated, not even conglomerated class.

Always useful are descriptions of the work and pay and life of the Have-nots. This class of service to the public no writer can overdo. We probably owe to such pictures an important event of the present session. The House of Commons on a private members' day accepted a wage authority for sweated industries. This might well suggest as a practical reform, in the interest of social amelioration, the provision of Parliamentary facilities for carrying measures scarcely controversial, generally approved in their early stages, but in present conditions of business at St Stephen's scarcely ever able to be further promoted in the same session.

A philanthropist who curiously combines pessimism and optimism may think that if everyone could see what he has seen the matter would be as good as ended. There is no prospect of any such sentimental, non-administrative miracle. The new observers would stare blankly at the stone wall.

If the upper classes were more wisely aroused—the common people aroused—the whole nation enlightened—there should be an early and declared ascertainment of what is curable and preventible, a rapid though discreet adoption by the nation of wise preventions and cures; a frank and bold adoption even of doubtful (such as extreme temperance) experiments, if they have in them any feasible suggestion of utility, direct or indirect.

Now, it is a curious thing that Mr Cotterill leaves unnoticed the great complication of British poverty—evils by drink. True, all researches into this subject tend towards despair;

because drink is responsible for an untold and untellable proportion of privation, degradation, and misery; and there is no apparent hope of changing the habits of those who, in the very purlieus of starvation, spend far more on liquor than does any other class. But the facts *must* be material, and their bearings are tragical. Not only must we think of the idle and dissolute ways by which men are brought to unemployment—of the physical deterioration by which they are brought to early death. We have to remember the excess of trouble which the father's drinking adds to the difficulties incident to a family's extreme poverty—the pinched resources, the uncleansable squalor, the bad upbringing of children, the wearing out of the wife (terrible preparation for the widowhood almost always entailed), and the sinking of the poor ruined woman either into vice as repulsive as that which has brought her husband to the grave, or, at best, to frightful extremes of ill-paid, scarcely paid at all, excessive labour. I will not say that if the well-off could see these consequences of drinking there would soon be an end of it; but I do say there would soon be an end of a state of politics in which one of the great parties in the State is as eager to protect the liquor trade as it is to secure the instruction of poor children in the niceties of Anglicanism.

The resources of civilisation are not worth much if law cannot greatly affect drinking habits of the people which, by a concatenation of moral and immoral circumstances, have been brought for centuries under special control of public authority.

It will be useful to state categorically, as leading to a contrasted practical programme and action, what in the book is most definitely proposed:—Brotherhood; combination, instead of competition, of parties; such State largess as would exceed by many annual millions the expected nucleus for old-age pensions; the withdrawing from party emulation of all social reform; the pooh-poohing of Free Trade, without considering its social importance; the demand that not even for a single year shall neediness be permitted which national pensions can alleviate;

the insistence that there shall be no tone of exclusiveness in public schools and universities ; the comprehensive proposal that somehow or other, at once, "as a united body," the Haves should make up the deficiencies of the Have-nots ; the suggestion that the said supposed united body of "those at the top" shall give themselves to "those at the bottom" in personal service ; the canny idea that only thus can the property which makes the "top" topheavy be rendered secure ; the doing away with classes. These things, and such as these, may be magnificent, but they are not practical war on tangible evils of poverty.

What *would* be ? First, the giving up of our old, bad, time-dishonoured habit of assuming that such things as exist in the domain of poverty *must be*. Secondly, the settlement, as far as possible, by expert inquiry upon experiential evidence, how far evil conditions of poverty are attributable to misconduct of the very poor, directly or indirectly operative. Thirdly, the enforced discussion by statesmen in office—and statesmen out of office would not long be aloof from the debate—whether effective legislation dealing with misconduct and its causes is practicable. Fourthly, they should argue out how much of existing evil, that ought to be intolerable, is owing to economic causes. Fifthly, whether such economic factors can be evaded or varied. Sixthly, to ascertain what sound humanity justifies in the recognition of extreme cases of hardship, and in enactments to obviate them. Seventhly, the prompt introduction of ameliorative measures for which is established, either by general or majority Parliamentary assent, a *prima facie* case.

"Those at the top" are capable of greatly altering their own manners and customs—for example, they have largely changed within a curiously short time the usage of their lives as to the domestic and festive consumption of alcohol ; they have revolutionised their way of spending from Friday to Monday ; they have returned by Bridge to the card habits of the eighteenth century. They make such changes with but

little collective and overt resolution. They make them with a sort of fortuitous subtlety but with clear concrete effect. A few sporadic instances begin. These individuals “at the top” scarcely know whether they are setting a fashion or following one. What happens amounts to both. When the fashion is thoroughly set it fixes the habits of society and affects the moral temperament of the comfortable classes either advantageously or disadvantageously for a long period. But it is not conceivable, nor is there any precedent to lead one towards supposing, that “those at the top” could, even if they were so moved, redeem the condition of the poor.

How could they set about it? The mere putting of such a question answers it, with an irrefragable *non possumus*. Happily, the *non possumus* does not cashier, or even discount, the missionary and materially helpful endeavours of many “at the top”; and every morsel of good so done is a rescue, so far as it goes, from the jaws of wretchedness and evil. But if you come to desire any great vital improvement of the prevailing lot of “those at the bottom,” it *may* be doubted whether such a redemption can be wrought by legislation and discipline of authority: there can be *no* doubt that *nothing else* will serve.

It is natural that Christian men and women should summon to the lessening or benign extinction of despair a vision of invincible faith. They may well strive to foresee a breaking of such blackness as Amyas Leigh fought in when he could not see his own hand between him and the midnight sky—an advent of clear moonlight passing into the light of perfect day. They hear wistfully in their hearts the Isaian pæan: “The people that walked in darkness have seen a great light; they that dwell in the shadow of death, upon them has the light shined.” But, alas! there is no irrefragable ground for the great expectation or for the anticipation of any one line of transcendent providential action. Nor is the fulfilment of any “transcendent” hope deserved by mere faith, however devout. The country cannot claim anything as its due from Providence so long as means are not taken, so long as no effort

is made definitely by the State to devise and execute the methods most hopeful for the vast redemptory process. Thus, and not in loud acclaim of sympathy with "those at the bottom" and stern, even angered beseechings to "those at the top," is perceivable the only glint of promise beyond the consolatory but feeble glimmer of detailed philanthropy.

The siege of Jericho was successful. Not because the stone walls were weak. Not because the besiegers were strong. But because Divine power intervened—ordaining trivial and irrelevant means—teaching thereby a lesson for all time (difficult indeed to interpret, but positive in tenor), a lesson of faith and obedience. That was an age, or at all events that was a story, of miracle. And in all history or legend or myth of miracle, whatever else there is, there is symbolical instruction and homily. In the present case, let us modernise. In our social state a valorous, sedulous siege is always going on, and scarcely slackens. The evil fortification besieged consists, not of picturesque embattlements, but of one ugly, monstrous, solid, rough stone wall: futility, hopelessness. The attacking philanthropists, with varying energy and inspiration, but with uniform discouragement, knock their heads against it, in the intervals of their vain labours in the trenches. These, indeed, are guaranteed by Divine assurance at least to *mitigate* dark sorrow and suffering. They are sure to restrain, by subjective reflex influence, the pardonable impatience of overwrought fatuity. But what the time is counselling is more systematic and scientific siege-tactics.

To this a pessimist-optimist might reply: "So spake a sceptical Israelite before Jericho. 'How nonsensical!' sneered the sceptic. What is this new-fangled artillery, all sound and fury, of ram's-horn trumpetings and circumvallatory paradings? And, for the matter of that,' he will have gone on, 'I have sappings and minings of my own, quite as potent as any eloquent dirge that this Joshua can compose, and that his rams' horns can perform.'" To which sarcasm I rejoin that the rough music of impetuous protest will do good, if only by

showing the effect on a compassionate mind of the state of town poor—their hunger, their cold, their virulent and ineradicable sicknesses, their miserable pittances of cruel pay, the squalor of vice among them, the wallowing debauchery which is nearly their only joy.

Jericho fell, and great was the fall of its stone walls. And greater will be the fall—other times, other manners—of callous inhumanity and crass indifference, in our own days, if, from the pitiful pleadings of philanthropists, are learnt the lessons which they do not teach: namely, the duty of searching investigation and the obligation of State action, suggested by the results of investigation, and guided thereafter by the fruits of drastic experiment.

EDWARD RUSSELL.

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THE RIGHT TO CONSTRAIN MEN FOR THEIR OWN GOOD.

PROFESSOR W. M. FLINDERS PETRIE.

IT is always more satisfactory to view the various workings of one general principle than to discuss the merits of separate cases apart from principle and merely by opportunism. Not only can the bearing of considerations be better followed when illustrated by cognate subjects, but also it is often the case that one widely-spread wave of feeling will affect conclusions of the public similarly on various matters. For instance, at present there is a general wave of national isolation, shown in the restrictions on the movements of all coloured races and of the poor of white races, and in the protective tariffs in force or in prospect. This is probably a reaction against the cosmopolitanism which resulted from the sudden facilities for travel in the last fifty years.

The right of constraint is a large question of principle which affects many subjects at present debated, and it may be well to look at it as a whole, so as to gain a more detached point of view of each of them. It is a very large part of practical ethics, especially where public action is concerned. So far as constraint is exercised in the interests of others, it is the fundamental principle of all government, the corrective to innate selfishness; and it has in this direction been fully threshed over for centuries past by acute legal minds, cornered between the differing claims of justice and equity; and laws of nations ancient and modern are the result. But, in our

own country at least, the right of constraint over a person's actions in his own interest is scarcely, if at all, recognised in the law; it has not been legally explored and mapped out, and has only been touched by special opportunist laws without any principle. Therefore, we may well try to review the various ways in which constraint is exercised on individuals or on groups in their own interest, apart from their action on others.

This right of constraint in the interest of the constrained is practically unknown to the English law, except in recent developments. If no one else was wronged, any man could do as he liked; and that a man should wrong himself was as unthinkable to the legal mind as it was to Aristotle. But of late there has been an ever-increasing movement to limit the acts of a person or of a group, in cases where no external party was concerned; to intervene between a man's intentions and himself; and to become "keeper of the conscience" to the world in general. It will make these interferences easier to consider and compare if we divide them into three degrees, as follows:—

- (A) Where constraint is demonstrably for the best, so far as our very limited imaginations and experiences enable us to foresee.
- (B) Where constraint may be for the best on an immediate and short-sighted view, but where we can already perceive some countervailing forces.
- (C) Where constraint is merely to enforce a unity or a conformity, supposed to be beneficial, but really deleterious.

Before considering these degrees of constraint, which deal with such different subjects as suttee, autonomous government, drink, and education, we must clear the ground of thought by pointing out some fallacies.

Continual confusion is made between ethics of a race and of an individual. It is often assumed that the right conduct of the individual must be made the test of right conduct of a

government and a race, and that what is wrong in detail cannot be right in the whole. This assumption is so often true that it has come to be applied by some theorists as a law overruling all other considerations. But each case must stand on its own merits, and there is no general law to decide such questions. For instance, it is wrong for a man to commit suicide, as an individual; yet it is not only right, but it is counted the highest virtue, for him to do so if he can thus save the lives of others, as in a railway accident or a coal-mine explosion. His wrong course as an individual is a right course as a member of a race. On the other hand, it is right for an individual to be forgiving and to keep from violence; yet a race must collectively punish the wrong-doer, if it is not to lapse into anarchy. The right course for an individual is here a wrong course for the race as a whole.

Another assumption, which is often taken as an infallible guide, is that our moral sense is the test of right. Here again a general guide has been falsely made into a universal arbiter. The moral sense is only a guide among the race or the group of persons who acknowledge it. It is a base of action necessary for intercourse, but is not absolute truth. For instance, the sense of personal decency must certainly rank high as a branch of moral sense. The enormous world of Islam has a keen moral sense about the exposure of a woman's face or person; yet we not only ignore their moral sense, but trample on it without the least consideration. We have a moral sense about bigamy; yet that is at the basis of social life in Islam, openly proclaimed by the fact that two or more wives share even the same house and room. We cannot therefore apply a moral sense to the acts of those who do not own it. If we did, we must obey in England all the limitations imposed by the moral sense of every other race. Or, if we were to say that our moral sense is a universal rule, and no one else's counts at all, that would be Pharisaism raised to an infinite power.

Another common error is the idea that absolute certainty as to the accuracy of our views constitutes in itself a right to

interfere with the views of others. For if we were once to grant that our dogmatic certainties could authorise our interference with the views or wishes of others, we should be granting all that was needful for the foundation of the Inquisition. The Holy Office was the perfection of beneficence if we once grant that a sense of certainty is the only thing necessary to confer the right of constraint. We should have a Holy Office established in England to-day if the wishes of some enthusiasts were carried to their logical conclusion.

Now, first, to consider the use of constraint in cases where it clearly seems beneficial. The Factory Acts scarcely enter into this class, as they were, in the most important points, for the protection of children against those who would exploit them, and so they belong to the category of constraint for the sake of others. Similarly, Acts limiting the work of mothers are really passed in the interests of their children. And Acts for the limitation of the hours of labour are in some cases to secure the worker from pressure by employers. So far as limitations of labour are in trades where the workers are quite capable of judging and acting for themselves, it is doubtful how far constraint can be legitimate. It is pleasant to be generous or punctilious at the expense of other people; but this sort of policy is always affected by those legislators who have no practical knowledge as workers or as employers, and hence have very little right to interfere.

In other countries we give scope to our sense of right by repressing some horrible practices, such as the Benin massacres; and cruelty exercised from a superstitious motive is perhaps the safest subject for constraint. This, however, belongs, after all, to the governmental duty of the protection of one man from the selfishness of another. One of the laws which we perhaps pride ourselves on most is that for the abolition of suttee. But the status of the widow must be improved, or it is a very doubtful matter whether it is worse for the widows to suffer years of ignominy in the home or in degrading temple service, rather than five minutes' suffocation in the wildest

excitement of the funeral pyre, with the victim usually drugged beyond feeling or reflection: and whether, so far as the family is concerned, it is worse to have a household drudge to bully and scorn for long years, or to have the memory of a brief horror in the past. Our present indignation at the status of Indian widows is only the suttee question translated; and if legal honours had been given to widows and fit employment found for them, the subject would have solved itself so that suttee would not have needed to be formally abolished. So easy is it for our feelings to outrun our judgment. The abolition of slavery and of the *corvée* are both matters of protection of one class from maltreatment by another, and have nothing to do with constraint of the person against his own acts. It is, then, doubtful if we can find a case in which constraint of the individual from self-injury is certainly beneficial.

Regarding the intermediate cases, where the benefit of constraint is questionable, we may see it in matters so wide apart as the compelling or refusing of popular government in countries connected with us, in the drink question, and in the harrying of disreputable characters. In Ireland, in Egypt, and in India we assert the right to constrain, to dictate the form of government, with little regard to what the natives of each of those lands may feel about the question. At first sight it seems to some as if we ought to regard those feelings and give up constraint; or, in the view of others, it would seem that here at least constraint is right and just. Both parties overlook the practical accidents of the various cases, which really enforce the present position in each country. If no other nations existed, we should doubtless let each of these linked countries follow their own wishes without any constraint. But the practical accidents are that in Ireland we cannot risk seeing a foreign enemy established so close to us; in India we cannot leave the field clear to be seized by another power who might close our markets; and we cannot leave Egypt and its canal open to be held by any adverse power. In each case it is the risk of appropriation by our enemies that compels us to

stay as we are ; and in each case we can, with clear conscience, believe that the last state of each country would be worse than the present state if we left it to itself and other powers.

Regarding other countries where we desire to settle, and occupy the land for our own uses, constraint has been used universally, and in many places remorselessly. We, and other of the more advanced nations, ignore the fact that each country is usually fully occupied up to the level of ability of its inhabitants. If they can only catch fish, and we hedge them off the shore, they die of starvation, like the Tasmanians. If they can only hunt, and we kill off all their food supply, they starve, or are servile hangers-on, like the Red man in the United States, after the immense crime of the destruction of the buffalo. It is, however, obvious to some minds that it is eventually the best result that a land should support the millions who make full use of it, rather than ten thousand who do not know how to maintain a larger population. Following this same principle, on which we justify our action, it is equally right for another race to occupy our land if they can grow a much larger population in comfort upon it. The Chinese could do so.

The treatment by us of the earlier and less capable populations of various countries has usually been infamous. We have, however, records of some reasonably just treatment, such as that of the Canadian Indians, who are so content with their conditions that an Englishman is perfectly safe amongst them, even in the midst of a war without quarter in the United States. That so much discrimination should be shown by the Red men proves their keen sense of honour and of justice. The system of constraint, which can be reasonably accepted from an ethical point of view, is the allotment of large, inalienable reservations of land for natives, and the giving of a rent for the lands we occupy, in the form of food and clothing, equal to the produce previously obtained from those lands. As we can usually grow from a given area from ten to more than a hundred times the amount which

the savage raised before, we can honestly compensate him by a tax of one to ten per cent. on our produce. But a strong hand of government is needed to restrain individual trespass on both sides, and to save the native so far as possible from our various diseases, to which he is not yet resistant. Thus these instances of a just treatment are really the constraint of a people in their own interests, though they may not at all relish the process and the transformation at the time. The other question, of the compulsory adoption of our customs and modes of life, comes into the last category, that of harmful constraint.

The most generally interesting questions of constraint are those dealing with faults and follies of our own people at home. How far is it justifiable to prevent a man from self-injury? How far shall we do more harm than good to his character by shielding and guiding him? Here we have to remember several elements of the question, and not to allow our appreciation of one side to blind us to the other sides. In any course of constraint we need to consider (1) the direct immediate benefit of preventing folly, in the interest of the man, and (2) the same in the interest of his family and the public; and these benefits there is no gainsaying. But constraint will also tend to (3) the destruction of self-reliance, by making a man lean on the decisions of others; and in the extreme case he would grow incapable of decision, and thus be easily swayed by influence, so that when once adrift out of care he would be wrecked. Again, constraint tends (4) to weakening of character by precluding temptation; so in the extreme we might have a nation like those ignorant of alcohol, who would exceed all bounds when they once obtained "fire-water." Further, constraint tends (5) to the growth of deceit and lawlessness, as seen in prohibitionist states. We must also consider (6) the probability of more injurious substitutes, or more infamous vices, replacing those we attack, as Shah Abbas found that his prohibition of alcohol had to be annulled, because it led to so much injury from the use of opium. Also, in a wide

view, we must include (7) the certain weeding out by excess of the worst of the population, who now die early and do not transmit their evil tendencies ; thus, at present, more opening is left for the spread of better stocks. Lastly, there is (8) the difficulty of saying who is to set the standard, and by whom we are to be judged. Probably the standard would be imperfect, perhaps as wrong in its effects as the evils it attacks, while it would be impossible to say what burdens might not be imposed, ever fluctuating with the views of those who might happen to be in power. In the past, Buddhism and Christianity (or a certain phase of Christianity) ran the risk of entire extinction ; the celibacy advocated—with the devoutest of purpose—would have proved fatal had it been universally practised.

The various proposals of the present time, for dealing with the undoubted evils of drink, may be perhaps tested first by inquiring what will promote lawlessness and deceit. Now, any attack on the public sale will naturally increase the private sale in clubs, and an attack on clubs will increase the drinking at home. It is hopeless to establish the inquisition in every house and every club. Moreover, if it were attempted on an effective scale, it would certainly lead to such a gigantic system of blackmail and bribery, that the army of corrupt inspectors would outdo the delators of Tiberius. Moreover, it would need a conscience of stalwart Pharisaism to attack the essentially private acts of a large part of the population by domiciliary inspection of associations or families.

This leads to the question, How far can interference with private acts, which do not injure another person, ever be justified ? To take an actual case, not uncommon. A group of men agree to retire to a remote valley with some gallons of whisky per head, and there to spend some days living on the borders of capacity for taking more. No women are there to be mauled, no children to be corrupted. It may be foolish and wrong from every point of view, but what possible right has the law to say that a man shall not drink, provided he does not commit any offence on others ? Can we insist on

dry-nursing grown-up men? And, if we do so, are they any more likely to learn temperance and self-restraint? I cannot see that any rule, short of an inquisition, can regulate private lives that do not give open offence. Exactly the same reasoning applies to clubs, where drinking is done in private. It is not our wishes, it is not our dogmatic certainty that our judgment is right, that can give the authority for interference. It is only so soon as a man is incapable on his way home, or kicks his wife on getting there, that the law can touch him. The penalty cannot be on the act of drinking, but the penalty for offences committed when drunken may well be greatly increased. If a man knew that he was to be run in for months, for doing when drunk what would only cost him a week's imprisonment sober, he would learn the severe need of self-restraint in his drink.

The safer and more honest course is to make drinking more open, more public, and the abuse of it more condemned. The great mass of the lower classes legitimately need a common meeting-ground, where they can exchange talk and do business. The public-house should fulfil that function in a decent and honest manner. To expect a man to forego his pint of beer when he is there, is quite unreasonable when we look at the amount of alcohol taken by well-educated and intelligent men of irreproachable morals. It is impossible for a minority who dislike alcohol (myself included) to force their preferences or convictions on a majority who only take enough to deteriorate them, without open offence to others. The compulsory provision of food and tea or coffee would do more to raise the tone of public-houses than anything else. If, in short, we could replace the ordinary drink-shop by the restaurant of humble type, more good would be done than by any kind of repression. Give something better, something that will bring in a class who do not drink alcohol, and the barrier will be broken down which at present keeps out those who would make an influence for good. Compare the far better tone of the country inn, where all classes of travellers

meet and call for what food and drink they like, with that of the town public-house. The economic questions of the possibility of this amelioration, the effect of giving profits only on supplies outside of alcohol, the penalties for allowing too much alcohol, the black list, and all the other technical methods for lessening the evils, are beyond the limits that we can deal with here.

The practical courses which seem the more likely to be beneficial, with due regard to the various ethical questions of character and conduct noted above, are (1) to improve the tone and conditions of licensed victualling; (2) to reduce facilities for getting drink, while not promoting private drinking; (3) to teach the bad effects of alcohol; (4) to impose more severe penalties for offences committed when drunk than when sober; (5) to enforce the supply of clean water in all workshops, schools, and establishments, and teach the importance of drinking it freely; and to encourage all large employers—regardless of the Truck Act—to supply non-alcoholic drinks, hot and cold, on their premises. Let a man get well filled with wholesome fluid, always at hand, and he will not have the need of getting an injurious supply during or after his work.

While the right of constraint would probably do more harm than good applied to the bulk of alcohol drinkers, yet we must recognise a class of those who have lost all self-control in the matter. These, as being practically insane in that respect, need restraint like other insane persons; and they are more likely to regain self-control while segregated for a time in regular work and in bright surroundings. We need remedial labour colonies, where there should be compulsory labour, training in intensive work, to get the most done in a given time, and cheerful interests and amusements out of hours. The whole tone should be brisk and energetic, with a few good teachers who can hustle. Such training would break up the hopeless dull round of hard times and habitual drinking, and give men a chance of starting fair.

To some extent the same principles, of assisting self-control rather than suppressing it by constraint, must apply to the evils associated with smoking and other drug habits, gambling, and gross vice. No one but those experienced in reformatory work are fitted to dogmatise on this saddest of subjects; but blind intolerance does not lead to any useful control or real improvement. And yet we must not lose sight of the probability that much of the self-restraint of the present has been gained by the past relegation of the worst of both sexes to a childless life, as the result of their own evils.

We now turn to the last class of constraint, where it is used to enforce a uniformity that is injurious. This is most seen at present in "education," which ought to educe the latent qualities, whereas the ideal system of many might rather be called truncation, or cutting off whatever they disapprove. The evils of a system which represses variety are seen in the deadness of general interests and useful curiosity among "educated" (or truncated) people. And it is precisely this interest in nature and in things which would be the best remedy against the seeking of excitement in gambling or in stimulants. By truncating natural interests, in order to enforce bookwork, we lead direct to the social evils which we deplore. It is well known how some of those whose minds have proved most fruitful, were dull or even dunces at school. Slow development saved them by arming them with impenetrability, so that the system could not constrain them to regulation type. We must give freedom and latitude to the teacher in choosing methods and applying them, to the parents of the taught in choice of schools and teachers. We are somewhat saved from the deadly uniformity of a great department by the independence of religious types. Could we encourage even more differences between types of schools, we should gain rather than lose. There is no gain in any way by ensuring that children should be uniformly taught in every county, nor in insisting that all the schools side by side shall be exactly alike. On the contrary, there is most serious loss of

the real educating of natures, and of the supply of a variety of adaptable characters. The injury to the teachers by curtailing their best scope of influence bears bitter fruit in the deadness of the teaching and its lack of grip on the taught. Better by far have enthusiastic teachers with strong convictions than lifeless implements of a mechanical system. Happily, after a whole generation of hard system, we have begun to wake up to the value of things as a basis for ideas, to the value of growth being greater than the value of mere conformity. And the recent endeavour to stamp out different types of school is a serious step backward from the enlightened movement of those who really study and promote education. The whole subject is too wide to deal with as a mere illustration of the evils of constraint, but it shows painfully how a supposed right of constraint may be abused.

In other ways constraint, as applied to various races, has been very harmful. We need always to remember that, as a whole, the working system of life, and the laws that have been evolved, are what are needful for the conditions of a people in a given grade of intellect in a given country. We cannot abstract from or add to those laws or customs without upsetting the balance of affairs; and heaven only knows where the balance will settle when we upset it. Even if what strikes us as flagrant cruelty or immorality is attacked and constrained to our ideas, we seldom begin at the right end of suppressing the cause, but we leave some uncontrolled sources to work out evil in another direction. The suppression of suttee, in place of elevating the Indian widow, is an instance which we have noticed before. To see the causes or the utilities of customs is the necessary education that we should give ourselves before attempting to meddle with them. For instance, group marriage or limited promiscuity in Australia was a necessity for a very scattered people living on extremely scanty supplies, where a man and woman, when searching for food, might drift apart in the bush and not meet again for years. It was only evolved in conditions where it was

needed. Again, polygamy is a benefit in a low condition of intellect: the number of women being limited, it ensures that the ablest men have most children and the incapable have none. Until a certain level of individuality and personal value is reached, polygamy is in most conditions more beneficial than monogamy. When character has become raised so as to gain by true mental marriage, then monogamy becomes needful. It is therefore requisite to raise the character and the intellectual and moral abilities before we can expect polygamy to disappear; and to repress it by constraint, without previous mental adaptation, is surely the way to promote worse evils. Excellent and capable men in a polygamic stage seem to have no sense of what we call love—a temporary affection is all they know. Until they rise to an enduring affection, monogamy would be a farce.

Much more inexcusable is the constraint, intentional or imitative, of enforcing customs of our own on the natives of other lands. For instance, the amount of a people's clothing has no relation to their morals, but is entirely the product of climate and love of display: therefore this is not a fit subject for too drastic alteration. The nature of the food and drink used in a given country is determined by what long experience has shown to be fitted to the climate; to push the use of other aliments—such as meat and alcohol—in a hot climate, is imitative constraint which we should avoid. Similarly, the extent and kind of mental training in an individual has imperative relation to the bodily development and fitness for the conditions of his life. If a man needs a highly resistant stomach, incapable of infection, he cannot also grow a highly organised brain. To constrain the teaching of a people out of proportion to their physical requirements, is to injure them, if not to exterminate them, as is seen in actual instances.

Our general review of the supposed right of constraint, apart from the repression of selfish action on others, seems to leave but little ground for safely dealing with the acts of an individual on himself. Even where constraint is apparently

beneficial, by exercising it we may risk evils as great or greater than those we try to suppress. And we give scope to a blind Pharisaism and inquisitorial dogmatism which is a curse to those who exercise it and a terror to those who endure it. In theological terms, people are trying to overcome the Fall by abolishing Free Will: and they forget that compulsory virtue is no virtue at all, but merely incapacity. A free will which solely worked one way, and never let a man down, would be only a supreme prize-giving with no blanks, fit for plaster princesses in a world of sugar-plums. For living men and women, for endurance of the flesh and restraint of the blood, for strength of will and force of action, for hardy courage and free affection, the more we are trained to carve our own destinies, and the more we suffer for our faults and triumph in our successes, the higher the result and the nobler the characters that will be produced.

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RELIGION AND OUR SCHOOLS.

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I.

A LEARNED and self-conscious generation has fittingly discovered religion to be a universal tendency of human nature. Through its learning, anthropology, psychology, and comparative religion have been summoned to give this testimony. But because of its self-consciousness the generation is uneasy. As it surveys itself it is fearful lest, solitary among the ages, it should not be religious. The self-same learning which has made it aware that other times have had their life permeated with religious faith is part of the conditions which have rendered the religions of those periods impossible. The dilemma is striking and perplexing. Shall the very circumstances which convince us that religion is necessary also make it impossible? Shall the evidence that it is a universal tendency make those who are aware of this tendency the flagrant exception to its universality? We have learned so much about religious "instincts": shall we therefore lose them?

It indeed seems hard that a generation which has accumulated not only material wealth, but intellectual riches, to the extent that it is compelled to pull down its barns—its systems of philosophy and doctrine—and build greater, should be lacking in just that grace and sanction of life which ignorant and poor people have possessed as matter of course. But our learnedly self-conscious generation is also mechanical. It has

a tool for everything, and almost everything has become for it a tool. Why, then, should we longer suffer from deficiency of religion? We have discovered our lack: let us set the machinery in motion which will supply it. We have mastered the elements of physical well-being; we can make light and heat to order, and can command the means of transportation. Let us now put a similar energy, goodwill, and thoughtfulness into the control of the things of the spiritual life. Having got so far as to search for proper machinery, the next step is easy. Education is the modern universal purveyor, and upon the schools shall rest the responsibility for seeing to it that we recover our threatened religious heritage.

I cannot expect that those who are now especially concerned with the maintenance and the spread of conscious and explicit religious instruction (for the time being one must use this question-begging epithet) will recognise their attitude or intention in what I have just said. And it has no application to those who are already committed to special dogmas of religion which are the monopoly of special ecclesiastic institutions. With respect to them, the fight for special agencies and peculiar materials and methods of education in religion is a natural part of their business: just as, however, it is the business of those who do not believe that religion is a monopoly or a protected industry to contend, in the interest both of education and of religion, for keeping the schools free from what they must regard as a false bias. Those who believe that human nature without special divine assistance is lost, who believe that they have in their charge the special channels through which the needed assistance is conveyed, must, naturally, be strenuous in keeping open these channels to the minds of men. But when the arguments for special religious education at special times and places by special means proceed from philosophic sources—from those whose primary premiss is denial of any breach between man and the world and God, then a sense of unreality comes over me. The arguments perforce translate themselves ironically.

They seem to say that, since religion is a universal function of life, we must particularly safeguard it lest it disappear; that since religion is the consciousness of the spiritual import of experience, we must find mechanical appliances for developing it.

Those who approach religion and education from the side of unconstrained reflection, not from the side of tradition, are of necessity aware of the tremendous transformation of intellectual attitude effected by the systematic denial of the supernatural; they are aware of the changes it imports not merely in special dogma and rites, but in the interpretation of the world, and in the projection of social, and, hence, moral life. It testifies to the current unreality of philosophy (itself probably a product of that forced idealism in which modern thought has taken refuge) that philosophers should seem to think that great intellectual generalisations may be, as it were, plastered over life to label its contents, and not imply profound practical alterations within life itself. In no other way is it easy to account for the attitude of those who are convinced of the final departure of the supernatural interpretation of the world and of man, and who yet think that agencies like the church and the school must not be thoroughly reconstructed before they can be fit organs for nurturing types of religious feeling and thought which are consistent with modern democracy and modern science.

That science has the same spiritual import as supernaturalism; that democracy translates into the same religious attitude as did feudalism; that it is only a matter of slight changes of phraseology, a development of old symbolisms into new shades of meaning—such beliefs testify to that torpor of imagination which is the uniform effect of dogmatic belief. The reconstruction of the Church is a matter which concerns, indeed, the whole community so far as its outcome is concerned; while the responsibility for its initiation belongs primarily to those within the churches. The burden of conducting the development, the reconstruction, of other

educational agencies belongs, however, primarily to the community as a whole. With respect to its intellectual aspect, its philosophy, it belongs especially to those who, having become conscious in some degree of the modern ideas of nature, of man and society, are best able to forecast the direction which social changes are taking. It is lucidity, sincerity, and the sense of reality which demand that, until the non-supernatural view is more completely elaborated in all its implications and is more completely in possession of the machinery of education, the schools shall keep hands off and shall do as little as possible. This is indeed a *laissez-faire* policy. It is frankly, avowedly so. And, doubtless, *laissez-faire* policies are not in favour in self-conscious and mechanical days. One of the further ironies of our time is that, having discovered the part played by unconscious, organic, collective forces in the processes of human development, we are possessed by a great eagerness, a great uneasiness, consciously to foster and to guide these forces. We need, however, to accept the responsibilities of living in an age marked by the greatest intellectual readjustment history records. There is undoubted loss of joy, of consolation, of some types of strength, and of some sources of inspiration in the change. There is a manifest increase of uncertainty; there is some paralysis of energy, and much excessive application of energy in materialistic directions. Yet nothing is gained by deliberate effort to return to ideas which have become incredible, and to symbols which have been emptied of their content of obvious meaning. Nothing can be gained by moves which will increase confusion and obscurity, which tend to an emotional hypocrisy and to a phrasemongering of formulæ which seem to mean one thing and really import the opposite. Bearing the losses and inconveniences of our time as best we may, it is the part of men to labour persistently and patiently for the clarification and development of the positive creed of life implicit in democracy and in science, and to work for the transformation of all practical instrumentalities of education till they are in harmony with these ideas.

Till these ends are further along than we can honestly claim them to be at present, it is better that our schools should do nothing than that they should do wrong things. It is better for them to confine themselves to their obviously urgent tasks than that they should, under the name of spiritual culture, form habits of mind which are at war with the habits of mind congruous with democracy and with science. It is not laziness nor cynicism which calls for the *laissez-faire* policy; it is honesty, courage, sobriety, and faith.

If one inquires why the American tradition is so strong against any connection of state and church, why it dreads even the rudiments of religious teaching in state-maintained schools, the immediate and superficial answer is not far to seek. The cause was not, mainly, religious indifference, much less hostility to Christianity, although the eighteenth century deism played an important rôle. The cause lay largely in the diversity and vitality of the various denominations, each fairly sure that, with a fair field and no favour, it could make its own way; and each animated by a jealous fear that, if any connection of state and church were permitted, some rival denomination would get an unfair advantage. But there was a deeper and by no means wholly unconscious influence at work. The United States became a nation late enough in the history of the world to profit by the growth of that modern (although Greek) thing—the state consciousness. This nation was born under conditions which enabled it to share in and to appropriate the idea that the state life, the vitality of the social whole, is of more importance than the flourishing of any segment or class. So far as church institutions were concerned, the doctrine of popular sovereignty was a reality, not a literary or legal fiction. Upon the economic side, the nation was born too soon to learn the full force of the state idea as against the class idea. Our fathers naïvely dreamed of the continuation of pioneer conditions and the free opportunity of every individual, and took none of the precautions to maintain the supremacy of the state over that of the class which newer

commonwealths are taking. For that lack of foresight we are paying dearly, and are like to pay more dearly. But the lesson of the two and a half centuries lying between the Protestant revolt and the formation of the nation was well learned as respected the necessity of maintaining the integrity of the state as against all divisive ecclesiastical divisions. Doubtless many of our ancestors would have been somewhat shocked to realise the full logic of their own attitude with respect to the subordination of churches to the state (falsely termed the *separation* of church and state); but the state idea was inherently of such vitality and constructive force as to carry the practical result, with or without conscious perception of its philosophy. And any general agitation in the United States of the question of religious instruction in the schools could have but one explanation. It would mean that, from economic segregation and unassimilated immigration, the state-consciousness of the country had been sapped by the growth of social factions. I write, then, from the standpoint of that country with whose traditions and tendencies I am directly acquainted. But so far as it is true that circumstances have permitted the United States merely to travel a certain course more rapidly than other contemporary nations (save France), what is based upon American conditions must apply, in its measure, to the conditions of education in other countries.

II.

As I recall, some of the Platonic dialogues discuss the question whether virtue can be taught, and all of them contain overtones or reminiscences of the topic. For the discussion led a long way. What is virtue? That is not an altogether easy question; and since to answer it we must know virtue and not merely have opinions about it, it will be well to find out what knowledge is. Moreover, teaching implies learning, and learning is coming to know, or knowledge in process of learning. What then is the connection of the becoming of knowledge with the being of knowledge?

And since the teaching of virtue means, not getting knowledge "about" virtue, but the conversion of character to the good, what, after all, is the relation between becoming good and that becoming wise which is the result of learning?

Somehow, I am more aware that Plato discusses all these questions than I am certain of any final answer to the question whether virtue may be taught. Yet I seem to recall some hypothetical suggestions for an answer. If, as we have reason to believe, the soul of man is naturally akin to good—if, indeed, it truly *is* only through participation in the good—then may various objects, also in their measure expressions of good, serve to remind the soul of its own or original nature. If these various reminders may be organised into a comprehensive scheme, continuous and continual in operation—if, in other words, there may be found a state organised in righteousness—then may the soul be finally brought to the apprehension of its own being or good; and this coming to know and to be we may term learning. But, if I remember rightly, Plato always classed endeavours to teach virtue apart from an accompanying thorough reorganisation of social life and of science as a piece of confused and self-contradictory thinking—as a case, that is, of sophistic.

Have we any reason for taking the present problem of teaching religion to be simpler in conception or easier in execution? The contemporary problem appears, indeed, to be more intricate and difficult. Varied and conflicting as were the views of Plato's Greek contemporaries as to what things should be included and taught under the head of virtues, the question of just what concretely comes under the caption of religion to-day is as much harder to decide as our social life is more heterogeneous in origin and composition than was the Athenian. We certainly cannot teach religion as an abstract essence. We have got to teach *something* as religion, and that means practically *some* religion. Which? In America, at least, the answer cannot be summarily given even as Christianity in general. Our Jewish fellow-citizens

not only have the same "hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions" as the Christians, but, like them, they pay taxes, vote, and serve on school boards. But we should not be very much better off even if it were a question of Christianity alone. *Which* Christianity? Oriental in its origin, it has been since Latinised and Germanised, and there are even those who have dreamed of humanising it.

The problem of to-day is more complex as respects also the process of learning, of coming to know. In the day of Plato, art and science, skilled practice and theory, were only beginning to be separated. Just as a man learned shoemaking in process of becoming a shoemaker, so might a man learn virtue in becoming a member of a good state—if such a thing could be found. To-day knowledge is something specialised, and learning does not consist in intelligent mastery of an activity, but in acquiring a diversity of information about things, and control over technical methods for instituting symbolic references to things. Knowledge to Plato was the sort of thing that the forefathers of some of us called "getting religion." It was a personal experiencing and a vital realisation. But what shall knowledge of religion as an outcome of instruction mean to-day? Shall it mean the conversion of character into spirituality? Shall it mean the accumulation of information *about* religion? Or are there those who still believe in some magic power resident in memorised words, phrases, and facts of transmuting themselves into personal insight, the development of fundamental mood and the formation of permanent attitudes towards experience?

When we consider knowledge from the side of its method and from the standpoint of what it takes to get something really worthy to be called knowledge, the problem increases in difficulty. As yet, the standpoint of science, its spirit, has not of course leavened very adequately our methods of teaching. From the standpoint of those methods of inquiry and testing which we call science, much, perhaps most, of what passes for knowledge is in reality what Plato called opinion. Our science

is still an outward garb more or less awkwardly worn rather than a habit of mind. But none the less the scientific norm of mental activity presses daily more close upon life and upon the schools. We are getting daily further away from the conditions in which one subject more or less taught by dogmatic, catechetical and memoriter methods was of slight consequence. We are becoming aware of the absurdity implied in calling things which happen to be studied and learned in school "knowledge," when they have been acquired by methods frequently at odds with those necessary to give science. Can those who take the philosophic and historic view of religion as a flower and fruition of the human spirit in a congenial atmosphere tolerate the incongruity involved in "teaching" such an intimate and originally vital matter by external and formal methods? And can those who hold that true religion is something externally imported tolerate any other methods? Is it not confusion to seek a reconciliation of two such disparate ideas?

Already the spirit of our schooling is permeated with the feeling that every subject, every topic, every fact, every professed truth must submit to a certain publicity and impartiality. All proffered samples of learning must go to the same assay-room and be subjected to common tests. It is the essence of all dogmatic faiths to hold that any such "show-down" is sacrilegious and perverse. The characteristic of religion, from their point of view, is that it is—intellectually—secret, not public; peculiarly revealed, not generally known; authoritatively declared, not communicated and tested in ordinary ways. What is to be done about this increasing antinomy between the standard for coming to know in other subjects of the school, and coming to know in religious matters? I am far from saying that the antinomy is an inherent one, or that the day may not come when religion will be so thoroughly naturalised in the hearts and minds of men that it can be considered publicly, openly, and by common tests, even among religious people. But it is pertinent to

point out that, as long as religion is conceived as it now is conceived by the great majority of professed religionists, there is something self-contradictory in speaking of education in religion in the same sense in which we speak of education in topics where the method of free inquiry has made its way. The "religious" would be the last to be willing that either the history or the content of religion should be taught in this spirit; while those to whom the scientific standpoint is not a merely technical device, but is the embodiment of integrity of mind, must protest against its being taught in any other spirit.

As Plato brought out with reference to the teaching of virtue, there is one other factor in coming to know—the teachers. Plato was quite sure that, whether or no virtue might be taught, it might not be taught by its professed teachers—the sophists. I express my appreciation of Plato rather than my lack of appreciation of the professional teachers of our own day, when I say that if Plato were to return to take part in the current discussion, he would raise questions about those who were to teach religion analogous to those he brought up about the teachers of his own time. It is not that those into whose hands the giving of instruction would fall are so irreligious or so non-religious as to be unfitted for the task. The sophists were doubtless superior rather than inferior in personal virtues to their average neighbour. It is one thing to be fairly or even exceptionally virtuous; it is another thing to command the conditions and the qualifications for successful importation of virtue to others. Where are the experts in religion? and where are the authoritative teachers? There are theologians: do we want theology taught? There are historians, but I fear the day has not come when the history of religion can be taught as history. Here precisely is one of those fields of clarification and criticism where much labour needs to be done, and where the professional religionist is one of the most serious obstacles to reckon with, since a wider and deeper historic knowledge would overthrow his traditional basis.

There are preachers and catechists, but, unless we are com-

mitted to some peculiar faith or institution, it is not exhortation or discipline of this sort that constitutes religious instruction. There are psychologists : but is introspection our aim ? There remains, indeed, the corps of faithful, more or less well-prepared, hard-working and hard-worked teachers. This brings us to the crux of the whole matter. Is religion a thing so specialised, so technical, so "informational" that, like geography or history or grammar, it may be taught at special hours, times, and places by those who have properly "got it up," and been approved as persons of fit character and adequate professional training ?

This question of the mode, time, and stuff of specific instruction trenches indeed upon a question in which national temper and tradition count for much. I am quite aware that upon this subject it is almost impossible for an Englishman and an American whose actual intellectual attitude in general is very much the same to understand each other. Nothing, I think, struck the American who followed the debates on the last English Educational Bill with more emphasis than the fact that even the more radical upon the Liberal side disclaimed, almost with horror, any intention of bringing about the state of things which we, upon this side, precisely take for granted as normal—all of us except Lutherans and Roman Catholics. I have no right to suppose that these protests and disclaimers were discreet concessions to political expediency. We must assume a profound difference of attitude and conviction. Consequently what I have now to say is conceived so definitely from the American point of view that it may not be intelligible in a different situation. But we do not find it feasible or desirable to put upon the regular teachers the burden of teaching a subject which has the nature of religion. The alternative plan of parcelling out pupils among religious teachers drawn from their respective churches and denominations brings us up against exactly the matter which has done most to discredit the churches, and to discredit the cause, not perhaps of religion, but of organised and institutional religion : the multiplication of rival and competing religious bodies, each with its private inspiration and

outlook. Our schools, in bringing together those of different nationalities, languages, traditions, and creeds, in assimilating them together upon the basis of what is common and public in endeavour and achievement, are performing an infinitely significant religious work. They are promoting the social unity out of which in the end genuine religious unity must grow. Shall we interfere with this work? shall we run the risk of undoing it by introducing into education a subject which can be taught only by segregating pupils and turning them over at special hours to separate representatives of rival faiths? This would be deliberately to adopt a scheme which is predicated upon the maintenance of social divisions in just the matter, religion, which is empty and futile save as it expresses the basic unities of life. An acute English critic has recently called us, with much truth, a "nation of villagers." But in this matter of education at least we have no intention or desire of letting go our hard-won state-consciousness in order to relapse into divisive provinciality. We are far, indeed, from having attained an explicit and articulated consciousness of the religious significance of democracy in education, and of education in democracy. But some underlying convictions get ingrained in unconscious habit and find expression in obscure intimation and intense labour, long before they receive consistent theoretic formulation. In such dim, blind, but effective way the American people is conscious that its schools serve best the cause of religion in serving the cause of social unification; and that under certain conditions schools are more religious in substance and in promise without any of the conventional badges and machinery of religious instruction than they could be in cultivating these forms at the expense of a state-consciousness.

We may indeed question whether it is true that in any relative sense this is a peculiarly irreligious age. Absolutely speaking, it doubtless is so; but have superficiality, flippancy, and externality of life been such uniformly absent traits of past ages? Our historic imagination is at best slightly

developed. We generalise and idealise the past egregiously. We set up little toys to stand as symbols for long centuries and the complicated lives of countless individuals. And we are still, even those who have nominally surrendered supernatural dogma, largely under the dominion of the ideas of those who have succeeded in identifying religion with the rites, symbols, and emotions associated with these dogmatic beliefs. As we see the latter disappearing, we think we are growing irreligious. For all we know, the integrity of mind which is loosening the hold of these things is potentially much more religious than all that it is displacing. It is increased knowledge of nature which has made supra-nature incredible, or at least difficult of belief. We measure the change from the standpoint of the supranatural and we call it irreligious. Possibly if we measured it from the standpoint of the natural piety it is fostering, the sense of the permanent and inevitable implication of nature and man in a common career and destiny, it would appear as the growth of religion. We take note of the decay of cohesion and influence among the religiously organised bodies of the familiar historic type, and again we conventionally judge religion to be on the decrease. But it may be that their decadence is the fruit of a broader and more catholic principle of human intercourse and association which is too religious to tolerate these pretensions to monopolise truth and to make private possessions of spiritual insight and aspiration.

It may be so; it may be that the symptoms of religious ebb as conventionally interpreted are symptoms of the coming of a fuller and deeper religion. I do not claim to know. But of one thing I am quite sure: our ordinary opinions about the rise and falling off of religion are highly conventional, based mostly upon the acceptance of a standard of religion which is the product of just those things in historic religions which are ceasing to be credible. So far as education is concerned, those who believe in religion as a natural expression of human experience must devote themselves to the develop-

ment of the ideas of life which lie implicit in our still new science and our still newer democracy. They must interest themselves in the transformation of those institutions which still bear the dogmatic and the feudal stamp (and which do not?) till they are in accord with these ideas. In performing this service, it is their business to do what they can to prevent all public educational agencies from being employed in ways which inevitably impede the recognition of the spiritual import of science and of democracy, and hence of that type of religion which will be the fine flower of the modern spirit's achievement.

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ENLIGHTENED ACTION THE TRUE BASIS OF MORALITY.

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IT has seemed to me at this time to be well worth while to make a statement of what appears to be the true basis of morality. Yet, before entering directly upon this task, I would offer a remark or two upon the nature of the subject itself. Very often, before doing some particular thing, it is wise to recognise clearly just what sort of a thing one is undertaking.

In general to raise the question of the true basis of anything is to enter the region of theory, and in particular to raise the question of the true basis of morality is to enter the region of ethics. As terms are used, morality is a matter of actual conduct, while ethics is theory, more or less critical, about conduct. Thus, when we speak or hear of the morality of a person or a people, we understand that the reference is to the actual life as expressed in customs, institutions, and overt acts of all sorts, and these customs, institutions, and acts may be good or bad, high or low, according to the standards by which they are measured ; but when we speak or hear of ethics, we understand that theory has supplanted practice—at least so far as the direct interest is concerned ; that a traditional or customary morality is in question, and that man as a single person or as a whole people, having turned sceptical and reflective about his practice and its accepted standards, would find out what morality really and truly is.

Thus inquiry about the true basis of morality belongs to the field of ethics. Moreover, just because it is inquiry, it must imply sense of past error. Indeed, whoever fails to catch in ethics this discordant note, is simply hard of hearing. The discord, too, becomes even more insistent as we remember that ethical inquiry in some form and degree is as old as the hills, or at least as man's struggle to surmount the hills. We have to pause, then, as we catch this discord. There is shock for us, as we recognise, whether for the first time or for the hundredth time, not only that practice never measures up to theory, that actual life has never accorded with the true or the ideal life, but also that somehow, as we have to feel, it never will and never can. The plain confession of error and the boundless age, or the eternal youth, of ethical interest, when taken together, seem to mean that we are tied fast to the wheel of inquiry; that we are condemned forever to be in the wrong practically and to be reflectively and theoretically putting the same old question, seemingly as futile as it is old: What is truth? How idle must have been the æons of the past, if now anyone, at least anyone who has had a Christian training, can be seriously interested in a discussion of the true basis of morality, or if I can consent, as manifestly I have consented, to be a party to such pessimism!

And yet, is it pessimism? Is the perpetual revolution of that old, old question: What is the true? as idle as outwardly it may seem? The wheel of inquiry—of the sort of inquiry that is always discrediting practice—does indeed carry us all, as it has carried mankind from the beginning; but in addition to the comfort which the companionship of all the centuries, past or future, may, or must, impart to our supposed misery, there is deeper and far more substantial comfort to be had. Is it not evident that a thing eternally inquired about must be very real or very deeply rooted in what is real; that always there is at least as much reverence in honest inquiry as in definite and positive assertion; that faith and worth are served quite as loyally by him who seeks as by him who has? What one has

is finite ; what one seeks is infinite. What one definitely asserts is only relative ; what one always questions is absolute.

Let me not get emotional and mystical just when I would think clearly and invite others to think clearly with me ; but, to reduce what I have been trying to say to a simple sum, honest questioning has in it all the deep reverence that belongs to prayer, and if men at large would only see in it, however rationalistic and scientific it may at times become, not necessarily the conventional, but the essential attitude of prayer, as if the questioner should actually say : " Let me but do the will of whatever is true and real," the splendid vision would dispel at least some of the clouds that have darkened human life and would remove in particular all but the superficial reasons for pessimism in a life of inquiry. He is perhaps a bold man who says to either churchman or scientist that rational research and reverent prayer are worshippers at the same shrine ; but as regards the churchman, unless I have read between the lines much too freely, the religious press and the pulpit in many recent utterances have saved me from the danger of such boldness by saying for me in so many words that even modern scientific research, not to mention less intellectual or less rationalistic inquiry, instead of being at best only secular and spiritually impertinent, is in meaning and effect a vital part of the prayerful reverence, not always, and perhaps, indeed, not often of the organised Churches, but certainly of the real religious life, suppose I say of the invisible Church, of the present day. As regards the scientist, I quote from a recent discussion of " The Future Religion," in which the author says that in certain conspicuous instances " men of science are themselves taking the lead in acknowledging the religious value and significance of the new concepts of nature and the soul of man," and follows this assertion with positive illustrations of religious interest in the agnostic circles of France, Germany, England, and America.¹ In other words, the men of

¹ The discussion is by Dr Rodolphe Broda in *The International* (London) for March 1908.

science are "getting religion"; they are "joining the Church"—at least the invisible Church; and this invisible Church, in spite of its disguise, recognised by churchman and scientist alike, would seem to be destined to become a manifest rival of the visible.

But, whatever the future may have in store, it is evident that now, even after nineteen centuries of Christianity, to say nothing of the unnumbered centuries before Christianity, an old, old question may be asked without pessimism, with serious interest, and to a useful purpose. In a spirit at once scientific and optimistic or religiously reverent we may inquire even into the *true* basis of morality. Indeed, just what this suggests, namely, that inquiry itself is not immoral, but on the contrary is a condition of morality, is the chief contention of the present article. Directly and positively, the true basis of morality is enlightened action.

Now, in what has been said already, and especially in the bold association of science, or thoughtful inquiry in general, with prayer, some of the reasons that might be offered in support of this thesis will be easily detected. Waiving any of these reasons, however, save for the reminder that the truth—the clearer it be the better—always sets us free, the defence of the thesis must take a different direction. Having founded morality on enlightened action and having done this definitely with an emphasis designed to be not less on the enlightenment than on the activity, or with a meaning that would make a truly substantial morality intellectual as well as emotional and volitional, a matter of the reason as well as of feeling and will, I am at once confronted with a host of protesting questions.

What right have I to neglect, as I seem to neglect, the Great Moral Facts, commonly supposed to be independent of intellect, of Duty and Conscience? What account would I give of the Moral Principle of Happiness? Or of Action for the Blessed Sake of the Right? Or the Virtue that is Its own Splendid Reward? Or the Good Will that can be taken for the Deed? What of Unselfishness? And the Unen-

lightened or Unintellectual—are they, though so often wearied with patient, earnest labour, immoral? Enlightenment, too, without practical activity—is this also immoral? Above all, the following question will be asked: Can morality be so sharply cut loose from religion? For does not the treatment of morality as merely enlightened action make it more practical than moral, more worldly than righteous, more concerned with reason and prudence and policy than with conscience and right and God, or more calculating and utilitarian than spiritual? Morality should be such a spiritual thing!

Yes, morality should be such a spiritual thing! But also, and not less surely, it should be *such a substantial thing*! Can the spiritual, of all things in heaven and earth, afford to be unsubstantial? Or, which is no better, in so-called worldly affairs to figure as a vaporous visitor from another world? Of course, time and again men have seemed to suppose so. But I repeat, if truly spiritual, morality must be substantial, and substantial with the substance of life here and now. To found morality, then, on enlightened action implies no disrespect at all to the great spiritual facts of Duty, Conscience, and God; it can discredit not one of the time-honoured moral sentiments; it means only that Duty or Conscience or God is the call—a very spiritual call—upon man always to strive to make his present action conform with his understanding, and to express such understanding as is possible to him in positive action. A substantial morality, in the first place, must do as well as just feel or will; and, in the second place, in order to do anything *efficiently* must be informed or enlightened. Then, as for the religious character of morality, if there be any truth at all, literal or figurative, in the Biblical story of creation, *all* efficient action is creative. If I might presume to translate the old story—for every old question there seems to be an old story—Garden of Eden and all, into the language of modern thought, I should say this: God's creative life is whatever any of the creatures of any age or any garden do *efficiently*.

But two of the protesting questions have so far been neglected, and yet, in view of my emphasis on the need of an intellectual morality, seem to me to require special consideration. Thus, once more, is action, however patient and industrious, without enlightenment moral — if indeed morality be enlightened action? And is enlightenment, however satisfying æsthetically or intellectually, without active application also immoral? To each of these two questions only an unqualified affirmative answer seems possible, and yet such an answer is too much at variance with common observation to go unchallenged. Commonly we are given to thinking that the very bulwark of morality is in the life and character of those who are not the best informed or the most enlightened. Even among the very ignorant, although crime and vice are also prevalent, we find, and in a way not wholly sentimental we rely upon, a certain sterling though stolid worth, a stability of character, a persistent loyalty to simple standards, and often an inspiring readiness for sacrifice, that must somehow, to say the very least, have a real and significant part in the morality of a people. Nor, on the other side, are we any more ready to exclude from participation in a positive morality those in society who are sophisticated, being deeply informed about life and having a thoroughly up-to-date knowledge, who are, many of them, our most scientific investigators, but who often waive all practical responsibilities and yet at the same time themselves esteem their pure intellectualism morally worthy even to the point of a very manifest sense of self-righteousness. So, plainly, the assertion that morality is enlightened action has to expect a vigorous protest; but, vigorous as it is and just as it also is, this protest can be easily met. With a little careful thinking the presented difficulty, though it seems so real, can be overcome and, I am convinced, overcome fairly for all sides. It can be overcome in a way, too, that will only deepen the meaning of the conception of morality here asserted.

Thus, it is a fact, easily overlooked, that no distinction of

social classes, like this of the enlightened and the unenlightened, ever represents fairly and exhaustively the worth and character of the individuals whom the distinct classes comprise. Of course constantly men do judge individuals by the company they keep, and such judgment can never be without some warrant; but also it is always only a portion of the truth. It may also show what the individuals are socially or publicly, or, as I like also to say, professionally, but it does not show all that they are. Of course, too, the social distinctions must always represent special attainment in the characteristic activities of the distinct classes. They must show human life, not only written large or drawn to an heroic scale, but also highly developed in its quality, each class exhibiting an institutional or professional elaboration of some one essential human interest. But, in spite of the heroic scale and the high quality pertaining to the narrow and special and expert life of his class, no individual has ever been without some small and modest portion of all that belongs within what I will call the real unity of a man's life, or the whole gamut of a man's experience. Moreover, this being true, the life of human society, viewed now from the standpoint of the ordinary individual and now from the standpoint of the expert class, would appear to be on two planes or on two scales, one being modest and commonplace and the other being heroic, and to involve—so we must certainly conclude—an unceasing conflict, in which every individual has to feel and take some part, between the two.

Society, to give a somewhat trite example, is made up institutionally or professionally of thieves and honest men; but even in face of the wide chasm that separates these expert social classes, there always has been and always will be honour—just common, ordinary, unheroic, and unprofessional human honour—among thieves; and, in like manner, if we must confess it, or if certain disclosures and exposures may save us the trouble of confessing it, there always is and presumptively there always will be dishonour—just common, ordinary,

unheroic, and unprofessional dishonour—among the reputably honest, among those who are publicly law-abiding and respectable—at least, until found out ! And, this being true, human life must be the scene of a conflict, in which every person, whether publicly honest or dishonest, must feel and take some part, between honour and dishonour. The same would be true, furthermore, of course with the necessary change of terms, for society as divided in any other way : into orthodox and heretical, conservative and radical, or even rich and poor.

But, to pass now to the illustration that specially concerns this discussion, society is made up, first, of the unenlightened, who, as members of a class, act largely under the guidance of social custom and conventional standards, and seem to be without intellectual life or interest—as, indeed, professionally or institutionally or publicly they certainly are ; and, secondly, of the enlightened, whose disposition, being socially one of leisure from any direct part in practical life, makes them stand either partly or wholly aloof from the public affairs of State or Church, of industry or social welfare. But here, as in the case of the thieves and the honest men, the class life does not exclude a common, ordinary, unheroic, and unprofessional intellectual interest among the unenlightened, or a common, ordinary, unheroic, and unprofessional practical activity among the enlightened. Always enlightenment has had what we might style its own private or domestic practical activities—am I thinking of the boiling and washing and cooking that go on in certain laboratories, or of the awkward ways and acts with which the learned and reflective do constantly manage to touch common life?—and ignorance, in its turn, has never been without its own simple and private intellectualism—to be observed, of course, in the household economy, the family council, the local literary society or reading club or dramatic circle, even the thimble tea, and the universal habit of political argument or theological controversy.

The social distinction, then, between the enlightened and the unenlightened is never adequate or exhaustive individually

or personally, and although, consistently with the idea that morality is enlightened action, the morality of the members of either of the two classes can be in general only common and ordinary, being held down to this plane either by a low degree of practical interest and efficiency on one side or by a low degree of attainment in knowledge and understanding on the other, nevertheless it is real and substantial. Simply, on either side there is some meeting, or union, of action and enlightenment, and this union, although obviously one-sided or not well balanced, is morality fundamentally ; a commonplace, unheroic morality, it is true, but certainly all the more substantial for being so commonplace, for being something in which every individual, whatever his class, feels and has at least a modest part.

Moreover, there is that inevitable conflict between the commonplace and the heroic—a conflict in which also every individual, whatever his class, feels and has some part, and which must even be an essential element or condition of what we have been calling a commonplace morality. Indeed, as life goes, as human society is organised, the commonplace can never be unmixed. It is, and always it seems peculiarly fitted to be, the substance from which the heroic, even to the proportions of the marvellous and the miraculous, has sprung into being. Perhaps the fact that the commonplace, being always coterminous with the life of the separate social classes, is consequently always one-sided or unbalanced, and so restless and unstable, is what, more than anything else, has fitted it for this important office ; but, whatever the explanation, the commonplace is never purely or hopelessly so. Whatever our class morally and commonly, whether we be professionally enlightened or unenlightened, leisured or practically and publicly active, even in the midst of our moral littleness and commonplaceness, we are all of us under the challenge of the heroic. Our commonplace morality may be substantial, but it is also unstable in that naturally it seeks wholeness and balance.

And is not every distinction of social classes, such as the distinction of conservative and radical, religious and irreligious, rich and poor, or even—except that I shall now be accused of mysticism—living and dead, a challenge of the heroic to every person in every class? Distinctions, too, like those of patriot and alien, Greek and Barbarian, Jew and Gentile, should also be included in the question. In the special case before us the call for expert practical action on the one hand and for profound understanding on the other has always been in the past, and must be now, an earnest or prophecy of great moral leadership. The challenge is too real and too general not to ensure, as the phrase goes, in the fulness of time the rise, from among the commonplace crowd, of the moral hero, who is able to make incarnate, to express, not in phrase or formula, but in positive achievement, the best intellectual vision of his time.

But I cannot dwell here upon this challenge of the heroic, nor upon its great importance in human history or in the personal life of individuals. Probably I do not need to dwell upon it. Enough, if it succeeds in deepening the conception of morality, upon which I have been insisting, as enlightened action.

Nor can I discuss at length the place and part of the moral sentiments in the conflict that is always waging between the commonplace life and the heroic life; the one holding each of us to a special class and routine, as has been shown, and the other urging us to rise above what we commonly are. Yet here, too, there may be no need of my saying anything. Suffice it to remark that the conflict is quick, with all the sentiments of duty and pleasure or unselfishness and selfishness; of both of these as pitted against each other, and of each one of them as never certain of itself.

There remain, however, to be considered here two other important phases of morality as enlightened action. As to the first, when we recall how theory is always at variance with practice, or how enlightenment, whether expert and special and possessing all the prestige of a social class, or only ordinary,

is always out of accord with habit or tradition, we infer that a true morality must depend on conflict, and especially on what results from conflict, growth; that a people or a person is moral truly and substantially only as its or his manner and form of conduct are constantly changing in response to new ideas, to increasing knowledge and understanding. At every turn, in other words, a moral character must be reforming, the peculiar value of the reformation depending on the information that determines it.

Whence evidently morality does not mean rigidity, but requires, not that life be just rigid—quite the contrary,—but that the required variations from rigidity be well informed, not blindly impulsive. There is a well-worn couplet that I venture to repeat:

“Count that day lost whose low descending sun
Views by thy hand no worthy action done.”

And the worthy action called for is pre-eminently such action as shows a practical application of some new insight—perhaps of one's last walk into the morning. Days of no such walks or insights and of no such successes—days in which one's view of life has not deepened and one's overt acts have given no expression to the deeper view are wasted morally.

Furthermore, to this idea of morally worthy action as action that is always watchful and always learning anew and always reforming, there is a most interesting corollary of far-reaching consequences. If true morality depends on the daily doing of some new sort of thing in response to some new insight, then a moral being is by nature, though in what I should call an enlightened and responsible way, a breaker of the law. Of course all reformation is bound to do violence to the law, fulfilling it even by breaking it; and of course, too, as is often said, but not always understood, there is no law not sometimes sanctioned or justified, morally and spiritually sanctioned or justified, in the breach. The law, as has also been frequently remarked, is for man, not man for the law. And so the moral being, in the sense now indicated a lawless being,

is specially fitted, perhaps through the peculiar sympathy made possible to him by his own lawlessness, to overcome an unrighteous or immoral, an uninformed or impulsive lawlessness. Certainly such victory has never come, nor can I see how it ever could come, to the formal law or to those who are concerned only with a rigid compliance with the formal law.

There is an old saying: "It takes a rogue to catch a rogue," and in this lies a deal of truth; but its best truth is well beneath the surface. I venture, then, greatly to enhance the truth of it, as usually understood, by the following paraphrase. It takes a reformer, at once lawless himself and so broadly and vitally sympathetic, to save a malefactor. Moreover, any moral creature, as should be constantly held in mind, is always either in the small or in the large, either simply and commonly or heroically, a natural reformer—in the missionary sense,—and to this idea it should be added from above that, in view of the organisation of society involving distinct social classes and high attainment and constant conflict between the simple or common and the highly developed, no moral being, however small or common, however confined to the simple life of his own class, can ever be without some sense for the challenge of the heroic. History has heroic missionary reformers that challenge us all by their examples, but in the deepest sense the past lives only in the present. The heroic, then, moves abroad in the complex, highly developed life of to-day with a challenge neither uncertain nor exclusive. The heroic never has been and never will be a respecter of persons.

But, finally, there was a second special phase of morality as enlightened action that was to be considered here, and this, as it happens, brings us back once more to the relation of morality to religion. Already we have seen, as bearing on this relation, that all honest inquiry, and particularly that ethical inquiry, even when highly rationalistic, may be associated with prayer. Often, bringing enlightenment as it does, it is very efficacious prayer. We have seen, too, that all efficient action

might be identified with the creative life of God. And in what has been said of the heroic, of the moral hero or leader, of the constant challenge to heroic action in the life of every individual member of human society, there was more than once at least a hint of a close intimacy between the moral and the religious. Possibly this hint was strongest in the assertion that only a reformer could save a malefactor, for in this assertion at least every Christian mind must have caught the intended reference to that profound moral heroism which has made Christianity. In so many ways, then, morality is already before us as having a religious background or atmosphere, as implying the religious attitude. But now, in closing, we shall do well in still another way, in a way related to the foregoing, but having its special significance, to observe how the religious attaches to the moral.

Thus, it quite accords with what has been said about the dependence of all-efficient life on enlightenment to add now that there is no life so enlightened, no activity so well informed, that it can ever be wholly sure of itself, anticipating all its consequences, meeting in advance either all possible opposition or all possible assistance. There is no action that does not build beyond its knowledge. For good or for ill, as declared here so often, theory and practice, enlightenment and positive conduct, are always at variance. Indeed, were there agreement between them, were human action sure of itself, the growth and the persistent reform, so essential to morality, would be destroyed, for uncertainty is an indispensable ingredient of the food that nourishes growth. No action, then, however enlightened, is ever wholly free from chance or from other forms, helpful or obstructive, of outside influence. Even the investigator in a laboratory, where conditions are very much under control, has to be on the watch for the unexpected, for the happenings of chance, and the ordinary man very often shows such a watchfulness even to the point of superstition. At least in his case men have called it superstition. But, not to indulge in hard names, there can be

no doubt about the watchfulness ; there can be no doubt that the enlightened and the unenlightened alike have to wait on chance. And just this waiting on chance is what makes moral action also religious or religiously dependent—dependent so far as the chance is just chance, blind and brute—and religious so far as the chance and whatever it brings are accepted and idealised, being taken up into one's own life and will, and being viewed or sensed as in some way contributing to the worth of life.

Nor is the term chance as used here so ill-advised as many may hastily decide. The recognition of chance, which, if unkind, is often known as ruthless and cruel fate ; if kind, as divine providence or miracle, is very much like fear, being at least a beginning of religion. Chance, too, is never necessarily unkind or evil, nor can it ever be wholly so. Men forget quite too easily both how large a part chance plays in life, how much the character of the game belongs to whatever they do, and how much of positive value just this character of the game adds to life. Still, though they easily forget, a word to them is always sufficient, and their memory returns to a power that resides in things and that acts blindly, or at least never with the clear vision of their eyes. And, if ever anyone has carefully planned out some line of action, studying closely all its conditions and incidents, actually manifest or conceivably possible, and then, as he has proceeded to act, has said aloud or to himself, it matters not which : “ Well, here goes, come what will,” he knows exactly what that memory is. Moreover, who has not done those things and said those words ? In just those words, however, in that common, ordinary, unheroic, and unprofessional “ Here goes,” universal feeling, if not universal speech, as it surely is, with a manifest dependence on what is clearly known, and at the same time a real appeal to what is unknown, morality as based on enlightened action, and religion as based on the uncertainty of action, have their very sure place of meeting. Some men, when about to act, may speak more in the accepted language of religion, more in conformity with the

religious life and manner of a class or an institution, exclaiming as they act, not commonly: "Here goes," but with a public reverence: "God help me now"; but no man ever did anything without thus bringing morality and religion together.

Here, however, we come to what is especially important and critical. Morality as based on enlightened action can never entertain an absolutely blind religion. No religion of external fate or destiny, of sheer chance or mere arbitrary miracle, can ever satisfy it. The natural and persistent association of intelligence and efficiency requires quite a different feeling for the seeming chance or mischance in things from that which such a religion would and could only permit. The very successes attending enlightened action may often be slight, but they are such as to make the chance which also attends it only a name, not for what is wholly blind, but for the consequences of imperfect enlightenment and at the same time an incentive for renewed observation and reflection, for a confident straining of the vision into the future. Again, those successes, however qualified or limited, simply make it possible for the will—if I may repeat from above—to take up into itself whatever results of chance it confronts, or for the conscious actor to view whatever may transpire as in some way, as yet only dimly or only fantastically seen, contributing to the worth of life. The will in the case seems to have by nature even a Stoical hospitality, being able to adopt anything, good or ill, that the mere course of events brings forth, and the vision into the future is never without some imagery and some confidence.

Kipling—at least so I seem to remember—has somewhere described the light and shadow, the half-clear, half-weird imagery that move on before the engineer, as his locomotive rushes into the night; he has pictured the mysterious penetration into the always on-coming yet always receding darkness, the strange confusion of shapeless fancy and definite reality, the constant changing of one of these into the other, and the perfectly mingled power and danger, free action and

fateful chance, that must always belong to the night run ; and in his picture there is a fine suggestion of the way in which the religion of an enlightened morality is not blind but sees. But also in that more ordinary "Here goes, come what will," which in spirit if not in letter accompanies all human action, there is the same picture ; the same mingling of efficiency and chance, of certainty and mystery, of a present view clear and liberative and a vision straining to catch the weird shadows or half-shaped images of the future.

Briefly, then, and more conventionally, action, all truly forward action, enlightened and reforming action, requires not only understanding but imagination. In fact morality and religion are related to each other, and to human conduct, as understanding and imagination ; as the clear truth that sets free and the equally true if not equally clear vision that strains fear into confidence : in a word, as prose and poetry. Only, primarily, morality and religion are the prose and the poetry, not of life as merely reflective and self-conscious, as abstractly intellectual and sentimentally æsthetic. They are the prose and the poetry of life rendered incarnate in human character ; unheroically, in any character that daily achieves some new sort of thing in response to some new understanding of things ; heroically, in the character of the moral genius, the great moral leader, who understands and, understanding, reforms an era.

As for religious belief, in face of so much chance and mystery, with human action as dependent on imagination as on understanding, on poetry as on prose, is it not plain that this, that religious belief, can be only an achievement, a product of persistent effort, like other things at all worth while ? Think of the engineer, every moment willing and striving to believe. Think of the obstinacy of religion through all history.

A. H. LLOYD.

THE ROMANTIC ELEMENT IN THE ETHICS OF CHRIST.

STANLEY GERALD DUNN.

GEORGE GISSING once defined art as "an expression, satisfying and abiding, of the zest of life"; and this definition will serve for religion as well. For the two cannot be separated, the one being an expression in form or colour, and the other an expression in that still more fluid material, action.

Art has sometimes been spoken of as the handmaid of religion, but we should rather call it the wife. Never have the two been divorced without disastrous consequences to both of them.

Just as in art there are two schools, so are there two schools in religion. The human mind seems destined to think in antithesis. In religion, as in art, there is the great antithesis of the romantic and the conventional. These two are eternally separated both in religion and in art, and can never understand one another. And yet in their combination lies perfection: that perhaps is why perfection seems so unattainable to most of us!

For the creed of the conventional is the supremacy of rule; it is definite, dogmatic, categorical in its imperative. It only takes account of the individual in regard to his value as an exponent of rule and method. It is based on an unalterable pessimism, the belief in the hopeless bad taste of the majority of men. In religion it relies on the doctrine of original sin.

But the romantic recognises that no rule can exist without its exceptions. If it could, it would be worthless. The beauty of the world is due to its variations from type, its exceptions to rules; to the force of its individuals. The individual alone has value. That which is due to itself alone is supreme in art.

There is no doubt on which side of the controversy Science speaks. The study of evolution has shown us how it is the happy variation that survives. Variety is the indispensable element of progress.

Thus it is not surprising that each romantic epoch in art has started with a "return to nature." The two most romantic schools of art that the world has seen have been characterised by a close study of nature and a love for natural forms. The Mycenæan art of Crete, as reborn for our eyes in the wall-paintings of Cnossos and the pottery of Minos' palace, is full of the most realistic renderings of flowers, leaves, and human bodies—the most beautiful things in nature. Modern Japanese art is minute in its faithful delineation of natural forms—things as they are actually seen by the eye, not as they are conventionally conceived.

Now it is obvious at once that we can only gain this knowledge of nature that is requisite for true art by looking at it. "The light of the body is the eye." But a man may look at a landscape for years and not perceive the elements of beauty in it. Something too is required of the eye that sees. We know now that the whole world of colour and form, light and shade, is constituted by the mind. "The world arises in consciousness"; it is "of imagination all compact." This is not to deny the existence of matter; the thinking part of us could not exist without a brain of some kind or other. The one is just as indispensable as the other; they are the two sides of reality.

The value, then, of matter, of phenomena, lies in their relation to mind. "Their being is to be perceived."

To recognise the value of phenomena, to be open to the

subtle influence of matter, to be receptive of all the natural movements around one, to surrender oneself to the mood of the moment, is to live in the true romantic spirit. For such a man the world is full of wonder and freshness; for such a man life does indeed become, each hour of it, a new birth, a veritable renaissance. Each man lives in a separate world. You may object that all have the same environment in a certain broad way; that certain elemental happenings affect us all; that certain emotions are common to all mankind. But all these are balanced by the differences in inherited structure, in habits and instincts, acquired and inherited, in powers of reaction. Place two men in what we call the same situation, and observe how differently they act. They are different men. True. But it is equally true to say that the situation is not the same. To recognise this, the essentially individual character of each man's world, is the first step on the path to peace. Most men are restless and discontented because they are always trying to get into someone else's world—to live by others' standards or persuade others to live by theirs. That is why people say it is so hard to understand human nature—the thoughts and actions of other men. It is hard, nay, it is impossible—in that way! To understand we must accept.

But, say the conventional, this is dangerous; what will become of morality if all men do as they like? Unless they do, we answer, there can be no morality at all! An action that is not "liked" by its doer may be meritorious, but cannot be called moral. The whole mistake lies in mixing up morality with social expediency.

Society, to maintain itself, frames certain rules of conduct, and to these its members must conform. This is but reasonable, and the man who breaks the rules of society is a fool if he complains when punished by that society. But he is quite justified in complaining if society, not content with punishment, brands him also as immoral. He may indeed be a martyr in the cause of morality, for not seldom are the rules

of society themselves immoral. So quickly do social conditions change that laws cannot always be adjusted fast enough; and so great is the majesty of custom that a law is often upheld long after it has ceased to be necessary for the welfare of the state, or even expedient.

People often wonder at the violent opposition that Christ encountered from what we should, no doubt, have called the best men of His time. In all probability they would have acted in the same way themselves. He said and did many dangerous things. If that tradition about His action when they brought up a woman taken in adultery be true (and there seems no reason to doubt it), what have they to say to that? Now, of course, we see how right it was, how absolutely wise, as all He did. But what would they have said then, living in that society, with all their interests bound up with the maintenance of law and order as then established? If they be frank with themselves, I doubt not of their answer!

Then, too, all the teaching about wealth—what dangerous doctrine it is, from the point of view of a society founded on wealth! Christ indeed was no anarchist, nor even, perhaps, a Socialist; He attempted no redistribution of materials and opportunities; He started no active revolution. He just went about saying startling things; telling the truth; opening the eyes of the blind.

And the authorities recognised His power and the danger. Society, so far as it is bent on maintaining its existing organisation, has no room for the good genius. It will tolerate the good man who is no genius and the genius who is not a good man, but as soon as a man shows the combination of these qualities it will have none of him. For society, when not evolving higher forms of justice, is necessarily unjust. It is as well to drop all cant and face facts. There is no end to the deception men may practise on themselves in politics. Aristotle could talk with the calm voice of philosophy about the state existing "for the good life" (*τοῦ εὖ ζῆν ἐνεκα*), and yet contemplate with equanimity the existence of an enormous

slave population working and suffering that the citizens might have leisure for virtuous living !

So now society involves the sacrifice of two-thirds of its members that the rest may enjoy the liberty and luxury a highly organised civilisation can give.

But the good genius sees that there is no reason why one class more than another should sacrifice itself. He sees, too, that the sacrifice is often fruitless, for the rich are really (Christ is quite emphatic about that) more to be pitied than the poor. As a rule it is the wrong people who are rich, the people who have no capacity for real pleasure ; they have " no joy, only amusements ; no object in life, only an office ; no work, only business." The man who ought to be rich is the man who does not care what he wears or eats, so long as he can lie in the sun and just look at the world. For it does not matter what a man possesses ; the rich fool is a fool still, though his riches may secure the publication of his folly and the advertisement of his fashions.

Then, too, the rich man is tied to his possessions. He is fearful of losing them ; he becomes the slave of luxurious habits ; he would be miserable without his servants. He is always relying on other people ; he never lives a man's life at all. Even in the tortures of hell the rich man cannot cast off the habits of a lifetime : " Send Lazarus ! " he pleads.

He has all the means of life, but he never really lives at all. " For a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the goods that he possesseth." He is not free to follow impulse ; he fears to go out at the call of adventure ; he dare not leave all that he has and give himself up to the destinies of God. Above all, his delicate life has bred in him a fear of suffering, and so he misses the revelation that comes from suffering alone.

But if Christ has pity for the rich man and contempt for his riches, He is no less stern in His denunciation of unequal and idle wealth. In the ideal world it is the beggar who is comforted and sits at Abraham's side at the great feast ; it is the rich man who is tormented. He had never done much

good with his wealth; he had never thought much of the poor. Probably he had never enjoyed it much himself; his purple and fine linen were, no doubt, the fashion, not the outcome of his own taste. Now when his wealth is gone and he is alone with only the soul he starved, he is in torment.

There is nothing wrong about riches themselves, Christ would say; the danger lies in the attitude of mind towards them. Too often the rich man is not the possessor of his riches, but possessed by them. After all, living is the object of life. It may be a fine thing to become a great lawyer or a famous financier, but what is the use of that, if, to do so, you must give up your life? "What can it profit a man to gain the whole world and forfeit his own life?" (for that is how we should translate the Greek *ψυχὴν*). Riches are but the means, not the end; and yet how many people give up the real joys of life to amass wealth or make a position in the world!

"There's the wind on the heath, brother: if I could only feel that, I would gladly live for ever." One cannot imagine a rich man saying that!

There is the romantic spirit in all Christ's treatment of riches, things, possessions. He blessed the woman who came and brake the alabaster box of ointment, very precious, over His feet as He sat in the house of the rich man. The conventional thought it a waste; they looked on the ointment as a valuable thing in itself; they failed to see that it was only the beautiful use of it that justified its existence at all. "It might have been sold and the money given to the poor." What good would that have done? Christ would have none of these charitable doles, this manufacture of paupers. It is of no use to condemn half the population to poverty by your social system, and then tinker with schemes for relieving their distress. Go to the root of the matter; alter the system. You cannot make injustice any less unjust by being generous.

It is against this tyranny of things that Christ is always

warning us. Just as we are to find the value of riches in the use we make of them, so, Christ tells us, it is not the things that happen to a man that really matter. Just as the body takes into itself food of all kinds, some of it revolting and rotten, and transforms it by some wonderful energy of life into blood and bone and beauty, so the soul may find nourishment in things ugly and even evil in themselves. Nothing from without can defile a man. The soul of man is the real philosopher's stone, and can by subtle alchemy transform all baser substances to purest gold. We talk much of environment and its influences: a window-box blossoming in some London slum, the beautiful face of a child seen in some squalid court, the unerring grace of some uncultured mind, refute our theories with irrefragable evidence. Life itself is more potent than all its conditions; "the spirit bloweth whithersoever it listeth," and we cannot tell from what dunghill may spring up the lily of a lovely life.

Religion is not a ritual; it is not even a creed. Rather let us call it, if we must find a name for what is nameless and felt rather than defined, a mental attitude. It is not a ritual. The conventional world made it so. The Pharisees regarded life as a business. "Do this, and you will get this or that," they asserted; and they had their reward, as Christ said. The act with them was the important thing—to get it done somehow or other. They were the practical people of the world; they looked at conduct rather than character, manners rather than motives, respectability rather than righteousness. They believed absolutely in law and custom; they failed to see that law and custom exist to aid life and not to hamper it, to save life, not to kill it. They had no imagination, only maxims.

Their rage against Christ was the rage of the conventional against the romantic. He taught the importance of being unpractical. He showed how a man who sets out in life with one object gains what he aims at and no more; life should be treated as a great adventure; one must not be careful and calculating all the chances; there are risks to be taken, and

sacrifices to be made. One must indeed lose one's life to gain it. To make compromises is to become commonplace; to allow oneself to get stereotyped is to fail in life. The will must be alive all the time. When once an action has become merely habitual, it ceases to have any value.

The conventional in religion hold firmly to the efficacy of certain actions, the repetition of certain words, the peculiar influence of certain places. Christ showed how in all these, acts, words, places, it is not the things that matter, but the underlying feelings with which we approach them. He chose the commonest objects to symbolise the spiritual—the bread and the wine, the flowers and the corn. All places were alike to Him: "Neither at Jerusalem nor on this mountain," He says to those who are in doubt as to the right surroundings for worship. He loved the clear air of the hills and the salt sting of the sea-shore, and in all His words are the same qualities of freedom and freshness.

Neither is religion a creed. Put an idea into words, and it becomes less real, for language is inadequate to the full expression of reality. Words are a fluid material; they have different meanings to different minds. If we try to fix them, to cast them in some set form, they become for us words only, beautiful it may be in sound and rhythm, but as vehicles of idea dead and obsolete.

All intellectual knowledge demands as its condition a strict process of abstraction; a science of arithmetic can only deal with persons in their numerical aspect. Try to apply this abstract knowledge to life in the concrete, and you have such absurd formulas as "The greatest happiness of the greatest number" for your ethical ideal!

For life in the concrete one must have more than intellectual knowledge; one must use the whole personality. Aristotle saw that in questions of life and human conduct one cannot depend on formulas, definitions, creeds. In defining virtue as a condition of the will, lying in a relative mean, he is obliged to add that this mean is determined by reason, and

that reason $\phi\acute{\iota}\ \alpha\upsilon\ \delta\ \phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\iota\mu\omicron\varsigma\ \delta\rho\acute{\iota}\sigma\epsilon\iota\upsilon\epsilon\nu$ (as the wise man would determine it).

Define as we will, we are always thrown back on the feeling of humanity, that instinct for truth, that subtle power of sympathy, by which we transcend all experience and act on theories which we have never been able, and most probably never shall be able, to prove. Call it reason, or human feeling, or the spirit of adventure, or indomitable life, or simply faith, as Christ called it, it is still the mainspring of all enduring action, the source of all sound theory, the condition of all real progress.

The predominance of convention has been responsible for the misuse of this old word, faith; it means for most men a facile acquiescence in a form of words, or a belief in a particular theory, rather than a conviction of the power of the human heart and the reality of man's help from God.

That blind man who was healed on the Sabbath day went to the root of the whole matter. The man was a religious genius; that was why they cast him out of the synagogue. Asked, "Dost thou believe on the Son of God?" he answered, "And who is he?" In a flash he laid bare the necessity and the value of the Incarnation; he saw that an idea is of no value until it becomes incarnate. To personality alone can men give love, and to love alone can they pay worship.

Even our love for inanimate things, for our mountains and rivers and our homes, is inextricably bound up with human associations.

Ruskin describes a wonderful scene "near time of sunset" on the Jura in springtime, and then goes on to say how, "more strictly to arrive at the sources of its impressiveness," he tried to imagine it a scene in some aboriginal forest of a new continent. "The flowers in an instant lost their light; the river its music; the hills became oppressively desolate; a heaviness in the boughs of the darkened forest showed how much of their former power had been dependent upon a life which was not theirs, how much of the glory of the imperish-

able, or continually renewed, creation is reflected from things more precious in their memories than it, in its renewing."

In all romantic literature and in all romantic lives recurs the same note. It is in Dante and Shakespeare and Shelley; it is in the life of Francis of Assisi, with his love for his little sisters the birds, and his brother the wind. Most perfectly expressed is it in the life of Christ. He took the world for His home, the wonderful world of sun and rain, of mountains and seas and cities, and all who did the will of God and lived natural lives as His brothers and sisters. Only, of all who went about with Him and shared that delightful companionship He asked in return belief in Himself, which is indeed belief in human nature itself at its highest.

They were few then, as they are few now, who were bold enough to trust the greatness of the claim asserted; who were unconventional enough to go against authority and rule, and defy the tyranny of things; who were enough in love with life and human nature to lose for it all that most men deem makes life worth living. Yet "whosoever loveth heareth the cry of that voice," and love was alive then, as now, in the most unlikely places—in the lust-tortured body of the harlot, and the shrewd head of the business man who took toll by the sea.

"And Jesus turned and beheld them following and saith unto them, What seek ye? And they said unto him, Master, where abidest thou? He saith unto them, Come, and ye shall see." There is nothing like that in all the literature of the whole world for pure romance.

STANLEY GERALD DUNN.

LLANDOVERY, S. WALES.

THE PROBLEM OF IMMORTALITY.

PROFESSOR RUDOLF EUCKEN.

THE attitude of modern and present-day reflection towards the problem of immortality is prevailingly a sceptical, even a negative, attitude. To an affirmative solution of the problem there stands, in the first place, the opposition of science. For science is developing a positivistic and agnostic mode of thought, according to which experience is treated as a closed circle, and every contention which transcends this circle is rejected as unscientific. Science, no doubt, may be ready to admit that the impossibility of an immortality cannot be conclusively proved, but for the belief and life of man that admission amounts to little. Practically, to keep open an indefinite possibility of that kind operates scarcely otherwise than as a direct denial. Moreover, such hesitation and denial find support from the view, continually growing, of the dependence of all mental processes, down to the smallest details, upon specific bodily conditions, in consequence of which the mental life seems to be so closely bound up with the natural organisation that the thought of its being released from that connection meets with constantly increasing resistance.

Again, the characteristically religious movements and ideas of modern times are not adapted to strengthen the belief in a continued existence of the individual. For those movements tend towards a pantheism, in accordance with which the Divine is conceived as a world-pervading life, and there is demanded from the individual complete surrender to this universal life,

an infinite renunciation. Even though a pantheism of this sort recognises an eternal element in human life, it cannot guarantee immortality to the human being as a whole. It is this, however, that the soul craves, when it strives after immortality.

That the science and religion of modern times are concerned so much with the present life and are so sceptically disposed to all that is beyond, has, indeed, its ultimate ground in an essentially changed estimate of the reality which surrounds us. The time in which Christianity arose and struck root was at variance with this reality. An old civilisation had outlived itself, and a new one had not yet appeared. If life was to retain power and joy, if it were anyhow to be confirmed it must take its place in a world of belief and hope, this world must become the true home of man, and be for him of all things nearest and most certain. Thus in truth it happened. Even at the height of the Middle Ages, in the writings, for example, of Thomas Aquinas, the Beyond is called straightway the fatherland (*patria*). In such circumstances there was, of course, not the smallest doubt about man's immortality; no laborious chain of proof was necessary. In modern times, however, the whole attitude of man towards visible reality has essentially shifted, and with it the presuppositions of the older beliefs have been shaken even to the ground. New peoples have arisen and entered with fresh vigour into the spiritual movement. The world that surrounds us has indicated a host of important problems and opened out for our work fruitful points of approach; we have won the confidence of being able by our own exertion to shape reality according to the demands of reason, and to make our existence here constantly richer and more worth living. Since, then, the present life offers so much to strive for and to achieve, it has become more and more the main centre of our activity; the Beyond has retired more and more into the background; we have needed it less and less, we have become more and more exclusively occupied with the life of the present. Thus the belief in immortality has gradually

lost its firm roots in the soul of the modern man ; in fact, the constantly increasing, the constantly more intense, restless work of modern life, with all its anxiety and excitement, might well produce the feeling that after all such work a complete vanishing away of life would mean transportation into a position of peace, and as such was only to be welcomed. How is it possible that in a mental condition of this kind proofs of immortality can secure any force of conviction ?

All this constitutes a powerful tendency of the age ; it may even be said to occupy the whole of its outside surface. But it is not the whole of the age ; more and more from within there rise up changes which lead back to the old questions. In modern earthly civilisation, with its eye upon man and its hope of guiding him through political and social work to greater happiness, we perceive problems of constantly increasing difficulty. That such a civilisation has for the time being drawn humanity so powerfully to itself and has seemed to satisfy it so completely, is largely to be explained by the fact that upon the visible world there lay as yet the light which an invisible world had cast upon it, that we have seen in it the scene of action, if not of the Divine, yet at any rate of an all-pervading reason ; the more the culture of reality has progressed, the more has it chased away that light as a mere illusion, but the more also has it destroyed its own foundation. For when entirely thrown back upon its own limitations, the present loses all inner connection and all soul, and work for it cannot possibly satisfy the inner being of man. Life in that case would be a mere sustaining of external relations ; all inner relation to the whole of the world, any wrestling of the individual with the Infinite, would cease ; man would become more and more a mere piece of working mechanism. That his whole soul is thereby troubled, that in all our activity and ingenuity of work we have fewer and fewer characteristic and striking personalities, that the inner *niveau* of our mental life is on the decline,—this we can to-day less and less deny. Again, the development of mankind to greater power and to greater

happiness does not proceed so smoothly and propitiously as was formerly assumed, obstinate contradictions and unholy passions break out, often there seems to be a want of moral force; we cannot escape the feeling that human existence contains many more problems than the culture of this world can satisfy, and that the aim of this world, even were it fully within our reach, would not satisfy the deepest longings of the soul. Thus doubts and misgivings spread, they extend also into the very being of the individual and lead him to ask whether, in its entire restriction to the visible world, his life still retains any meaning and worth, whether such a restriction does not reduce it to an unbearable contradiction.

Such experiences and impressions give once more to the problem of immortality a greater potency than in the time which immediately preceded our own. But no sooner do we enter upon a more exact treatment and inquire into the possibility of a proof, than we feel strongly how greatly the intellectual and the whole mental situation has altered relatively to the times in which the belief in immortality stood with more assured authority; we cannot fall back upon earlier proofs, but must handle the problem in our own way, and, in doing so, are obliged to keep steadily in view the experiences and changes of the times.

Whoever maintains a continuance of the human soul beyond the present life is thereby maintaining a fact, and a fact which can either be immediately exhibited or demonstrated through means of other facts. A direct perception seemed to earlier times perfectly possible, even easy; to an older mode of thought a world of spirits seemed to be working unceasingly upon visible reality, seemed indeed so completely to have grown up with, and to have been intertwined with, this world, that the same kind of evidence could be furnished of the one as of the other. Not only amongst rude, primitive tribes, but amongst nations that had reached a high degree of culture, was this the case. The further progress of civilisation, however, repressed and shattered this belief, the spirits degenerated into

shadows and ghosts; what had formerly been the sacred belief of pious souls became a mere superstition of the multitude. At the present day, the belief in an immediate intercourse with a spiritual world has been revived in spiritualism and has won the convictions of many. But judge as one will about that belief, its mode of proof bears a strongly subjective character; it has not that general validity which a scientific method demands, and consequently attains not to assured conclusions. If only a single instance of the influence of a spirit world upon our existence were incontestably established, the problem of immortality would enter upon a new phase. When, however, in order to win power of conviction, the fact requires certain persuasions and suppositions, the decision rests with these, not with the alleged fact itself.

Finally, the belief in the bodily resurrection of Christ is still closely bound up with the religious views of numbers of people. What, however, they believe in this case to apprehend as a certain fact, seems to them at the same time to guarantee a continuance of life for all men. But, once more, the doubt arises whether what seems incontrovertible in a certain context of convictions can be regarded as an assured fact where those convictions do not prevail and for all. To be willing to rest the whole of his convictions upon a single alleged historical fact is, for a man of the present day, a matter of great and many difficulties. For he knows how strongly the subjective sentiments of the observer enter into the representation of the facts, especially where strong mental excitement, such as crises of the religious life are apt to engender, prevails. Historical criticism, too, has taught him, over and over again, how difficult it is to reconstruct the picture of earlier times from the point of view of later. He cannot, therefore, unhesitatingly accept as scientifically made out the fact vouched for by religion; his decision will be mainly determined by the convictions with which he approaches the said fact. It comes, then, everywhere to this, that we have to decide the problem not so much through direct perception as through considera-

tions of a wider bearing ; we have to prove that the statement stands in close connection with assured facts, with a network of facts, and these cannot possibly be dispensed with.

But we cannot enter upon this path without at once recognising the peculiar difficulties of the situation. Proof is easy, where that upon which it depends falls into line with indisputable facts, when the point that is sought for fills up a gap in a chain of evidence, or when this special problem can be looked upon as an instance of a general truth which is already certain. In reference to our problem all this, however, is not the case ; here it is a question about something for which we can furnish no analogies, something that is unique, and the solution of which seems wholly to transcend the capacity of our knowledge. So much is certain : it is here a question about something that is entirely axiomatic, and the answer lies not in special lines of thought, but in the whole structure of our intellectual world. We are fighting here not about a single point, we are fighting about the meaning and direction of the whole.

The proofs offered of immortality have generally been of a twofold kind : on the one hand, the point of departure has been the universal nature of the soul's life ; on the other, the specific content or meaning of human life. Formerly one used to seek out qualities of the soul's life which seemed to prove the impossibility of destruction, and in this way the unity and indivisibility of the soul were specially established. Since Plato the thought has constantly found adherents that we need only keep in view the nature of all decay and the character of the soul to be sure of the soul's imperishability. For decay is nothing else than a dissolution of a composite thing into its elements ; but the soul, for whose unity the fact of consciousness vouches, cannot in any way be decomposed ; it is an original element of reality, and cannot, therefore, possibly perish. From the standpoint of modern times there is offered indeed, as ground of proof, the thought that, as in the universe all energy is conserved, and none can be destroyed,

and as the soul is undoubtedly a unique form of energy, it cannot possibly undergo annihilation. Thoughts of this kind will always find adherents, but they do not decide the question; not only are they in the highest degree controvertible, but they prove, even when they are admitted, not what they were intended to prove. We have become to-day exceedingly mistrustful of such abstract considerations; we do not feel by any means certain that what appears to us within the sphere of experience to be simple and indestructible must be acknowledged to be so outside the sphere of experience; it is always a leap from the relative to the absolute. But, granted that a certain indestructibility of the soul were admissible, that upon which, beyond all else, everything depends, in the question of immortality, would by no means have been won—a moral identity, a unity of connection between the various life-stages, a continuance of the life-work. What profit is there in a persistence of force or of unity if out of it something quite different can be made, if it can be used in a totally different manner from what happens now, if with it the life falls entirely asunder? Against this attempt at a solution the suspicion will also be aroused that such a defence must hold good for all souls, that even in regard to the lowest animals a similar indestructibility could be maintained. Clearly, therefore, we do not get from this kind of proof that upon which, for man, everything depends.

Consequently, it is upon the peculiar nature of the human soul and human life that the assurance of immortality must be based; and, in truth, not only have thinkers for the most part turned their attention to this point, but also for wider circles it is what has been here discovered, what has been here experienced, that has become of decisive importance. But this attitude is involved by the very necessity of the case in the opposition and struggle of *Weltanschauungen*; for it needs a *Weltanschauung* of a special kind to find something unique in our souls, and from this uniqueness to effect a transformation of the superficial view of reality.

First of all then, there can be, of course, no question about a meaning of soul-life that points in this direction when a naturalistic and materialistic theory holds the field. For, according to this way of thinking, there is nothing more in the soul-life even of man than a product of the life of nature which has arisen under certain conditions and which must, after the ceasing of these conditions, again perish ; whatever phenomena may be manifested by the human soul, they are regarded, from this point of view, as a mere development of the animal soul ; the former can offer no independent point of departure, and open out no new depths of reality ; so that here the thought of any immortality entirely vanishes.

Wherever belief rises above naturalism, something unique, something superior to nature will be recognised in the soul of man ; and, as this can only be understood as the effect of a new order of things, it may not then seem impossible to construct from human life theories which reach beyond experience. Now, in this direction we see a rich and variedly ramifying work being taken up ; peoples, times, civilisations are reflected in the way in which they regard the essence of the soul and try to deduce from it the necessity for its continuation. We may clearly distinguish here different tendencies. Sometimes it is the universal nature of a being endowed with reason which seems to carry with it the guarantee of a continued existence ; sometimes, the special moral nature and aim which certifies a future life for man. According to the ancient mode of thinking, which tended to put on the same level spirit and intelligence, what distinguished the human soul and lifted it above mere time appeared to be the power of thinking enduring, imperishable truths, for that which participates in the eternal must itself have a certain eternity. As in modern time the thought of eternity has generally been allowed to recede before that of endlessness, it has been pre-eminently the endlessly operating desire of life from which leading minds have drawn the assurance of immortality. It seems impossible that nature should have

implanted in a being so constraining a desire for an endless life and the movement towards it, only to break it off just as it is beginning. Goethe, for example, was filled with this conviction, especially in his later years. If it is here a question of the universal nature of a reasonable being on which the belief in immortality is based, the matter receives a more precise setting when we turn to the moral faculty of man. With the moral problem, a high ideal has been set before us which, in this short span of life, we can scarcely approach even by a few steps; were this the whole of our being, an impossible problem would be placed before us, and the knowledge of this impossibility could not fail to paralyse all moral effort. Without a hope of being able to become perfect, man cannot strive with all his might for moral perfection. It was this conviction that made immortality seem to no less a thinker than Kant an indispensable postulate of the practical reason. Still more forcibly in this direction has the desire for a moral order, for an equalising justice, worked upon a wide circle. An unbiassed examination of our lot often reveals a sharp contrast between the moral conduct of man and his fortune in life; the good man has often to fight against the severest obstacles, his work is not seldom destroyed and he himself exposed to ruin, whilst the bad man attains the victory and remains in possession even to his end without being so much as disturbed by inward reproaches. Thus morality, whilst it comes to man as a supreme command and requires of him laborious work and great sacrifice, appears powerless in face of the world's machinery; experience of this life shows no ethical order. Yet it does not seem possible to renounce such an ethical order, for what is valued, and necessarily valued, by us as of the greatest worth, must finally be the victor and determine our fate. If this does not happen in the present life, then it must happen in a future life, and so that life we may confidently expect. The more detailed elaboration of this conception has struck out different paths. One such was the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, another

that of a final world judgment. But the placing of an inward necessity before all apparent experience was a general characteristic; the moral demand appeared as that which must rule the world at last. If man is placed between the choice, either of letting the moral problem sink down to a weak illusion, or of remodelling his ideas of the world, the latter way will seem to be imperatively called for wherever the moral problem has been seriously taken up.

These different trains of thought could hardly have had the great effect upon humanity they have had, unless there were some truth in them; but that conviction ought not to lead us to overlook the many weaknesses which cling to such modes of proof. He who is satisfied that there is something indestructible in our soul, has not thereby proved a personal immortality. For example, Aristotle, with all his defence of an indestructible faculty of thought, never doubted the extinction of individuality. By other modes of thought it is assumed that what has begun in the course of the world will in some way also attain completion. But such an inference presupposes the rational character of reality, and this would first have to be proved. The chief question, however, is this, whether it is possible, from the experiences and needs of a specific being, to infer a new condition of the universe, as the assertion of immortality really takes upon itself to do. Must we not first of all have attained some certainty that man is more than a specific being; that, in his sphere, world movements are completed and experiences of the universe revealed? Only thus could what takes place in him validate convictions concerning the whole, and at the same time throw light upon his own position and problem in the whole. But in order here to see our way, we must cast a glance at what is peculiar to human life as contrasted with animal life. We are accustomed to call this peculiarity "spiritual"; but what is the characteristic of this spirituality? It does not add a single quality to nature, but it introduces an entirely new life; it effects a complete change in reality. For, on the level of

nature, reality appears as an aggregation of single elements ; in the mutual relations of these elements life proceeds ; what happens at single points is always turned outward and is dependent upon the outward ; whatever soul-life is developed here is nothing more than a concomitant of natural processes ; in all the boundless movement of nature there is nothing that experiences what takes place as its own, finds itself in it and gains through it. To the whole all being for self is lacking. Being for self, however, begins at the stage of the spiritual life, and gives to spiritual life its distinguishing characteristic. For here the inward gains self-dependence, here it strives to absorb, to subject to its own laws, to convert into its own possession, everything that comes into relation with itself ; here life rises in consequence to a life of self, and reality becomes an inner world. First of all, before meanings and values can be formed, a complete transformation must be effected. As, however, this movement does not form a closed circle, but is turned upon the whole of reality, it can never be understood as pertaining to man alone. As such, it would not only lose all its truth, it would be utterly incomprehensible how it could ever arise from man alone and yet attain to any power. The movement must proceed from the universe itself ; it cannot otherwise be understood than that there is to be found in it a depth of reality ; and human striving must be produced and sustained by this movement of the whole.

Now, this depth of reality introduces fresh forms of life. Since here life does not proceed in relations from point to point, but is lived in the whole, and, moreover, always sets the individual in relation with the whole, it has also a different relationship with time and time events. Spinoza's assertion that all true knowledge takes place *sub specie æternitatis* holds good not only in respect of knowledge but of the whole of the spiritual life. Spiritual life is not a flowing away with time, not an adapting of itself to changing temporal conditions, but whatever it develops of meaning and worth is raised above time, is not for to-day or to-morrow, but is independent of all time.

Spiritual life and aspiration stretches indeed into time and forms a history there, but in this history of a spiritual kind life seeks a more finished organisation of itself, and abides therefore always in itself; the kernel of the history is here a rising out of mere time to lasting truth and possession, and the kernel of life, although entering into time, remains here superior to mere time. Human life, however, so far as it is of a spiritual character, seems thus to be placed between time and eternity; so far as its deepest depths are concerned, it must be rooted in an order raised above time; yet it can only reach its more inner meaning through work in time and the experiences of time. Owing to this transformation, time no longer appears as the central fact of life which eternity only encompasses, but eternity gives the true standpoint and time recedes into the second rank. That such a change sets the immortality problem in quite another light is plain without further discussion.

The question only is,—to what extent has man a share in this spiritual order? For it is, in this connection, clear that man cannot be immortal either as a mere creature of nature or with all his equipments, but only as regards his spiritual position. If man could only bring forth some productions of a spiritual kind, a knowledge, for example, of eternal truths, in them something eternal might operate. But he himself would have gained no eternity, so that the denial of personal immortality by Aristotle was logical enough. There can only be a question of immortality when man has formed a central core of spiritual life of his own, when he has become an independent bearer of spiritual life. Now he is not this at the start, but the possibility of it lies within him, and this very possibility itself announces a greater depth in his nature. This spiritual growth of man in individuality shows itself in what we call personality, when that word is understood in its full and proper sense. For personality implies that man recognises the whole of the spiritual world as his own life and being, and that he endeavours with all his might to develop it.

A new stage of life then appears which transcends mere spiritual work ; in the recognition of personality there grows up an ethical and personal idealism which is clearly distinguished from the more indefinite kinds of idealism. Now, it is the conviction of that ethical idealism that all spiritual life only reaches its complete fulness when it not only proceeds in man and works in him as a natural impulse, but when it is laid hold upon as his own being and transmuted into his own action. For that, however, free choice is necessary,—a choice which cannot be accomplished in any single moment, but which must go on through life as a whole, and thereby transform the whole. Thus man becomes a fellow-worker in a spiritual order, a life-centre of spiritual energy, a sharer in the whole of the spiritual world. In so far as he is this, he must, in his innermost being, be supreme over mere time.

Such a superiority to time is not grounded on this single point alone, it is grounded on the whole of the spiritual life. A serious contradiction would be introduced into the whole of spiritual life were it to undertake what is superior to time and then be entirely sacrificed to the destroying power of time ; the whole opening out of the spiritual life in humanity, with the deepening of individual life and with the mighty labour of the world history, would be in vain, if all the individual forms swept by like fugitive shadows and forthwith sank into the abyss of complete nothingness, just as every event in time sinks down into ghost-like delusion when it is not sustained by, and cannot serve, an eternal order. Hence it is the belief in the independence of a spiritual life superior to time, and in the immediate presence of that spiritual life in the soul of man, on which faith in his immortality rests. Man cannot become aware of himself as a member of the spiritual world, and as such shape his effort, without being convinced of an immortality. His life-work does not demand a continuation in time ; it bears in itself from the beginning a superiority over time. In this thought we are in agreement with Augustine, the greatest thinker of the Christian world, when he says, " What

does not perish for God, cannot perish for itself" (*Quod Deo non perit, sibi non perit*).

We believe, then, that through all this involved argument we have found at last a positive conclusion. Nor do we deceive ourselves in regard to the difference of this conclusion from that which is usually understood by immortality. By personal immortality is generally understood the unlimited conservation of natural individuality with all its interests and relations—a continuance of man with flesh and blood. If, on the other hand, we maintain the time superiority of a spiritual germ in man, if we hold that a spiritual unity of life in man rather than man himself is imperishable, we can fully recognise that, on our view, that imperishability is bound up in the closest way with a natural and temporal form of existence, that this form of existence dominates, indeed, our whole idea of the world. So to defend immortality, as the immortality of that human core that belongs to the spirit world, means, at the same time, to rule out any representation of the exact mode of continuance. In this respect we can fully accept what modern science teaches concerning the dependence of human soul-life upon bodily conditions, and also what it has shown in reference to the manifold states and arrests of consciousness. This need not lead us to materialism. It only warns us to be cautious in admitting these special life-forms to be the only possible ones and in demanding just their continuance. In order to avoid a pantheistic evaporation of the soul-life, we ought not to let ourselves be driven into an obstinate dogmatism as to the particular mode of life at present existing; we have reverently to respect the secret which lies over these things and understand that all which is asserted about the indoor details of the future life can be nothing more than mere image and simile.

Further, the consideration must make itself felt that an absolute retention of the given nature with all its particularity, limitation, and contingency would be a very doubtful good. The ordinary stress of life is maintained on such a retention of the present form of being because it will not relinquish

the "sweet habit of existence" (Goethe), and at the same time thinks only of the near future. But our thought should be of wider scope: we should think of the unlimited flow of time, and ask ourselves whether man is always to be tied to what he has done here, whether he is always to look back, or always to pursue the road selected here, whether a Kant is always to philosophise, a Goethe always to compose poetry? As against an absolute binding of man to such special kind of life-work, is there not valid ground for the thought that this particular mode of life is only one of the various possibilities implanted in the spiritual core of man, and that consequently the future is left open? However this may be, we must emphatically insist upon the following. It is not well that the thought of the future should dominate and control thought and sense in such a way as inevitably to drive away care for the present. We have enough surely in this life to do. Not only does there lie around us a boundless field for unwearying exertion and effort. In ourselves there lies the hardest of all problems,—the problem of fashioning a spiritual personality, a spiritual individuality. Pondering and meditating over the future may easily lead to lowering our working energy for this endeavour; sighing and yearning for a better time may easily prevent man from making the best of the time that encompasses him. That his life should be lived in the present, and be entirely filled by it, is the best we can desire for him, provided only we understand the present aright; if it does not mean for us a passing moment, which is no sooner born than it passes away, but is grounded and based on an eternal order and is thereby raised to a genuine present.

Overwhelming concern for the future brings with it a further danger. It easily pushes into the foreground the question of recompense for actions, the anxiety for reward or punishment. Let the demand for a moral order be ever so imperative, yet if this thought dominates the reflection of the individual, and is made the chief motive power of his action, damage to the purity of his motive is scarcely to be avoided.

It is well known that Plato in his chief work put his doctrine of immortality only at the end, after he had shown that the Good contained in its own essence, in its own beauty, the impulse to action, and did not need to lean upon faith in immortality. In his case also the importance of the belief in immortality lay not so much in pointing man to the future as in making the present great and rich for him in content. From a too great troubling about the future we are, however, especially protected, if we keep clearly in view our complete ignorance of its character. And as, in this respect, we are in harmony with the greatest thinker of antiquity, so are we also in harmony with the greatest thinker in modern times. In a passage of the *Critique of the Practical Reason*, which has not received much notice, Kant expresses himself on this point with great clearness (Part I., Book 2, section ix.). At first sight, so he thinks, nature seems on this important matter to have provided for us only in a stepmotherly fashion. But suppose it had been otherwise, and we knew more of the things that are beyond, it might even be that "God and eternity, with their awful majesty, would stand ceaselessly before our eyes." Yet would not man, constituted as he is now, be always troubling himself about the happiness there to be hoped for, instead of acting from the pure thought of duty and with unselfish disposition? And therewith would not just that be taken away from him in which his highest worth consists? After having, in contrast to this, made clear the advantage of our ignorance so that "there is room for true moral disposition, entirely devoted to the law, to come about," Kant concludes with these words: "Thus what the study of nature and of man teaches us sufficiently elsewhere may well be true here also, that the unsearchable wisdom by which we exist is not less worthy of admiration in what it has denied than in what it has granted."¹

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¹ Previous articles on this subject will be found in the HIBBERT JOURNAL for July 1904, by Dr Mellone; July 1907, by Professor Royce; January and April 1908, by Sir Oliver Lodge.—ED.

THE RELIGION OF THE SENSIBLE AMERICAN.

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THE writer of this article did not choose the title, and the title itself shuts out the possibility of a personal confession of faith, even were such a confession acceptable. He has chosen to set forth the attitude and belief of one, no longer living, whom he claimed within the inner circle of his friendship, one whose religion was justified in a rare power of swaying the lives of American men and women toward high thoughts and sturdy righteousness.

My friend showed his religion more in deeds than in words, more in life than in precept. But the power of speech was his also ; and after his untimely death in 1898, various memoranda of his notes and talks were saved and brought together by his friends. To these fragments, privately printed, they gave the title which tells the whole of his religion in four clear words, "In Terms of Life." From these notes and from my own recollections I venture to reconstruct the religion of a "sensible American," a religion which, however incomplete, is not far from the ideal toward which the average sensible American of to-day is clearly tending.

In the first place, on the positive side, the sensible American believes that this is God's world, none other more so. "The God of things as they are" must have his throne within the confines of his creation, and no condition of life and no place or

time can lie outside his presence. But whatever the extent of space and time, two things are real with us men—here and now. This is our day, and here is the spot where our life must be made to count. In history, other men have had their other days, but yesterday is already numbered with the rest of man's "seven thousand years," or seventy million, if we choose the larger figure. Yesterday has passed away, to-morrow is unborn and may never belong to us. We have to-day, and no day was ever so inspiring, so glorious, so worshipful. This is our time to act, the hour for us to play our part. Let the part be large or small, it is a part of action. It is for us to do our best, not our second best; to do it with good cheer and with perfect confidence that in God's economy no good life is ever wasted. "God's errands never fail." It is not for us to cringe or whine, nor need we cry for any special recompense for days of doubt or despair or discomfort. Our part is a part of love and helpfulness of love as translated into terms of helping our neighbour.

I ask for nothing, let the balance fall :
 All that I am or know or may confess
 But swells the weight of mine indebtedness.
 Burden and sorrow are transfigured all,
 Thy hand's rude buffet turns to a caress ;
 For Love, with all the rest, Thou gavest me here,
 And Love is Heaven's very atmosphere.
 Lo, I have dwelt with Thee, Lord ; let me die :
 I could no more, through all eternity.

In brief, the positive phase of this religion is the feeling of being at home in God's universe. This is no alien world. Our fathers were born here and our fathers' fathers, and the same Hand has led them on from the primordial sandstones of Quebec to the foundations of our own republic. The pledge of the future is adequate. We are links in an eternal chain, and the little part assigned to us is the conquest of *Here* and *Now*. Wisdom is knowing what one ought to do next; virtue is doing it; and religion is the feeling or attitude which braces us up to our duty when it is easier to stand aside or to let the part assigned to us slip by through default. This may

not matter in the long-run—the ages are patient and the evasion of man is no novelty; but it means everything in the make-up of our own conduct of life, and that is the main thing with us. For “the world is upheld by the presence of good men. They make the earth wholesome.”

In the notes of my friend I find these words:

“It is a great event in a boy’s life when he can say, ‘I and my father are one.’ It is greater when a man finds that he can keep step with God; that he wants to do, and can do, the things that God is doing.

“When men search with so much heartache for faith in order that they may believe, they think they are groping in the darkness to find God. They think if they can only find him, they will get faith from him. It is not faith in God that they need, but faith in themselves. God will do his part. They have perfect confidence that he will run the universe without falter. It is self-confidence that men need, belief that they can do their part. No man ever falls away from God and loses confidence in him until he has first warped and twisted his life by falling away from himself. Faith does not depend upon anything God does or may do, in answer to our prayers, but upon us—upon our training, our experience, our knowledge.

“Faith in self—faith that links God and man, and is the key to all the riches of heaven—is the result of experience, and is to be won, like any other power, by persistent and constant exercise. You, and you alone, hold the key to your heaven.”

My friend used the word God freely in his talks to young men and women. With him God was not a mere abstraction, but a very potent element in the trend of events, the great First Cause, and the Last Cause of things as they are.

His God was not anthropomorphic, not “made in the image of men,” nor should it justify Haeckel’s sneer at worship of “a gaseous vertebrate.” It is only in mythology and poetry that God appears as angry, jealous, benevolent, a judge, a tyrant, a king, a huge hoary-bearded giant.

To my friend God is immanent, *numen adest*, in the fine words of Linnæus. His will is that which is permanent in time and space, in a universe in which, using Huxley's words, "nothing endures save the flow of energy and the rational intelligence that pervades it." His is that rush of force; his is that rational intelligence.

The sensible American finds that good men through the ages have cherished an ideal of love and service, wavering at the best and often obscured by war and controversy, serving God through building up stronger, purer, happier units of humanity. He finds that this ideal and many others of like import, the dream of "lives made beautiful and sweet by self-devotion and by self-restraint," had their origin, or at least their first connected promulgation, in the words of Jesus the Jew. The records show that this young man, who "spake as never man spake," was born at Bethlehem in Judæa nearly twenty centuries ago, that he taught among men and ministered unto men for a few years with a few disciples, and that he came to a cruel death. He finds that the teachings of Jesus are reported in fragments only, in a tongue not his own, and with many variants and perhaps additions, their essential spirit strong and clear in every version of his language.

He finds that these words, thus fragmentary, bear their own witness. All the wisdom of the wise ages as to the conduct of life cannot add much to them. Even were every syllable he has spoken lost to-day, his teachings could be restored and retraced in the history of civilisation, for they rise above everything else in history: above the pomp and splendour of empire, the hideous orgies of holy war, the ferocity of religious persecution and the bitterness of theological disputation.

The sensible American recognises no antagonism between the words of Jesus and the teachings of human experience, which, tested and set in order, we call Science. He finds no conflict with the highest ideals, the most repaying experiences in the conduct of life.

And he finds that the words of Jesus are words of truth

as tested by any analysis he can give them. He concludes that they have always been true, that they are part of God's work of creation, of which the conduct of human life is the crowning feature, the most lofty, the most imperfect, and for the same exalted reason. These words are true, he will say, not because Jesus said them. Jesus said them because they were true. And as in this sense, his words, "I and my Father are one," have a definite and human meaning. My friend was not disposed to measure the relation to Divinity on the part of the Prophet of Nazareth. Whether Jesus be one with God, or one with man, or both, is, after all, not his most vital question. This he may leave the theologian to settle if he can through tradition, text, or syllogism. It is enough for the sensible American that he has the word and the spirit. The word is divine because it is true, and one name of Divinity is the Perfect Truth. In the religion of Jesus the end of truth is service, and religion finds its function and justification in the conduct of life.

The sensible American notes a contrast between the subjects which aroused the interest of Jesus, as recorded by his disciples, and the subjects which have filled the history of the Christian Church. The simple life of the teacher who had no place to lay his head has little in common with the complex struggles of those who in his name established a holy empire. "In this sign conquer," was the symbol of empire. It was in every respect the antithesis of the words of Jesus, as the life of Constantine, maker of this phrase, stood at the opposite pole from the life of him who suffered under Pontius Pilate.

To go into details, the historic Church has interested itself in war and conquest, in pomp and pageantry, in dominion over men and lands, in temporal rulership as well as spiritual control.

None of these matters entered into the ambitions of Jesus. To him these were far-away affairs, evils to be endured it may be, as the tribute-money was rendered unto Cæsar, but forming no part of the ideals of rational religious life.

The historic Church has, almost from the first, been entangled in a warfare of creeds. The creed as we know it to-day is a historic battle-cry of a contending host. It belongs to the war of words which succeeded the clash of spears and lances. To the average American the creeds are mostly harmless. They will not injure us if we do not read them. Without their historic background we can hardly understand them. It is not well to revise them too often. Their galvanised life may work injury to our spirits. "Since I read the Apostles' Creed," says Mr Dunne, "it seems less convincing than when I heard it and did not understand it." As Dr Holmes said once of old errors, "They die, not because they are refuted; they fade out because they are neglected." Their place is in psychology and history, not in the religion of Jesus. The single word, *Credo, I believe*, is surely adequate. It implies faith in the universe, in man, and in all the forces inside or outside ourselves which shall make for righteousness.

As his religion is not regulated by intellectual assent to any proposition in metaphysics, spiritual or biographical, the average sensible American is not alarmed over the results of the Higher Criticism. Enough that is genuine and beyond question goes back to the teachings of Jesus. That devout enthusiasts have interpolated here and there an illustration, a bit of philosophy or a bit of imagination, or that chapter or epistle may have been attributed to the wrong man, does not disturb his spiritual consciousness. These matters are interesting from the scientific side, but they do not touch bottom in their relation to religion. Neither is he concerned because wine is not turned into water in our day, not even by the faith that moves mountains. The old story of Cana may not be true. It may be poetry, or parable, or error of record, or even pure falsehood. It is no aid to his faith, but it does not disturb it. In the face of the greatest marvel in human history, the influence of him who spake as never man spake, and who will draw all men to him, he will leave to each expert in Oriental imagery such theory of physical miracle as may

seem to him best. He can understand that the parables and fancies of Hebrew poets, like those of English poets, interpret spiritual rather than literal or historical fact. Therefore he is not distressed over the narrowness of the whale's gullet, or the adjustment of the days of creation, nor of the fact that the prayers of good men will not wring rain from a steel blue Australian sky. Neither is his faith impaired by the certainty that the ancestry of man runs close to that of the animals which are likest him, and in whose image, anatomically, he is made. He rejoices that the world is far older and the universe far broader than his fathers had thought; that "Time is as long as space is wide," for infinite detail of preparation even in the processes of creation is the best guarantee of ineffable achievement.

As he who "believes in Jove the highest God may despise all the lesser gods in silence," so may he whose spirit is filled with the greater faith turn away from all the lesser creeds and marvels.

As with the phases of belief, so with the symbolism in which they find expression. "Do this in memory of me" was a simple and natural ceremony so long as it bore witness to the living reality in the hearts of men. But when the Eucharist became the signal of wordy or even bloody warfare, *Homoiousion versus* *Homoousion*, it is no longer a pledge of his memory. It is a weapon in the hands of ambition, though, among simple folk, it holds its primal associations. Its meaning is forgotten in the seats of the mighty. The baptism in the Jordan had a significance with a clear river in a dusty land, that may be lost in costly covered fonts, or cruelly burlesqued by holes cut through the winter ice. The Sabbath exists for man, not man for the Sabbath. It is neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem that men are to worship. They are to worship the Lord in spirit and in truth.

It is clear to the sensible American that the religion of Jesus has no necessary connection with church or state, except as church or state may be permeated with its spirit. It has

no necessary connection with creed or ceremony, with litany or liturgy, with priest or preacher, with symbol or miracle, with sacrament or baptism, with pious action or with pious refraining. These have been associates of religion—sometimes its servants, but the reality behind all is the individual man, his relation to his fellows and to his individual duty.

My friend, whose religion is here, in scanty fashion, set forth, tells this parable.

“In the old days a father built a home for his family. It was complete in every part, but the altar around which they gathered in prayer was not yet set in. The mother wished it in the kitchen: there she was perplexed with her many cares. The father wished it in his study: God seemed nearer to him among his books. The son wished it in the room where guests were received, that the stranger entering might see that they worshipped God. At last they agreed to leave the matter to the youngest, who was a little child. Now, the altar was a shaft of polished wood, very fragrant, and the child, who loved most of all to sit before the great fire and see beautiful forms in the flames, said, ‘See, the fire log is gone; put the altar there.’ So because one would not yield to the other, they obeyed, and the altar was consumed, while its sweet odours filled the whole house—the kitchen, the study, and the guest hall—and the child saw beautiful forms in the flames.” Doubtless the others came to see them also, as the non-essentials passed out of their religious life.

“Many fathers and mothers say to me,” continues my friend, who was a teacher of science in a university, “‘If my boy will only hold on to the *fundamentals*.’ They are afraid that the business of the university is to overthrow fundamentals. As if fundamentals could be overthrown. What they mean by fundamentals is their own conception of the truth, the basis of their own belief. They want their boys to wear their clothes—not the same style of garments, but the identical clothes—with all the creases and wrinkles and patches in place. Now, the wrinkles and creases represent

experience and testing, and the patches are the scars—honourable scars of victory. And I have no patience with the sophomoric spirit which vaunts its reason and throws into the rag-bag everything that the fathers believed. We should not be here to-day if our fathers had not believed very close to the truth. However far afield we may go in our young and callow days, most of us will be found revamping the old beliefs of our fathers and mothers when we go to work in the world. Eighty-five per cent. of our students take up their old practices again when their real living finds expression. A little bit of real living brings back the enthusiasm and the emotion, and no one can be faithful and true to his ideals without finding God displacing them with himself.

“Calvinism and Arminianism are trifling matters compared with the fact that God is and that we may call Him our Father. Unitarianism, Trinitarianism, are mere word-quibbles compared with the fact that the spirit of Jesus is in the world, saving it. These things are not fundamentals. They are only *terms*, forged by human intellects to express one phase of the truth as it appeared to them. Jesus cared for none of these things except as they hampered and hindered those who believed them instead of believing him,—who worshipped them instead of using them to serve their neighbours.

“The time comes more than once in a man’s life when he must know what he believes, when the truth that is in his own heart is all that he can find. But no truth is ours until we first live it, until it enters into our lives and we become it.”

We may therefore say that no man can accept or embrace the religion of another. It must become his own first, or else he cannot receive it. If he takes it from another without change, it is not a religion; it is some statement of opinion, some type of ceremonial or some collection of words, from which the life has long since faded away.

The religious philosophy of the sensible American has long tended in the direction now ticketed by philosophers as Pragmatism. Whatever will work in the conduct of life,

strengthening it, enriching it, giving it a higher trend, must, so far as it goes, have elements of truth. If it were not true, it would not work. But these human theories or conceptions are never simple or pure. Error is always mixed with the truth, and error cannot be made "to work." It is the business of science and of philosophy, the logic of science, to purify these concepts, to find out of the many, the elements which can be wrought into a sound and helpful life.

In emotionalism as such my American friend finds no necessary attribute of religion. Love is not love unless it contains the impulse of renewed life. It must purify itself by action. "If thou lovest me, feed my lambs." There is no other evidence. There is no other way in which emotion can impinge on religion. "Sensations," says my friend, "are within the reach of all." Preachers deal with them sometimes. Our rituals and our choirs give them. There are books that pile up great waves of emotion in us, almost as real as if we had earned them. I have read of battles so vividly portrayed that my cold blood grew hot and I felt like a hero. I cooled down, a little more weary than before; that was all. I have listened to great preachers who talked so familiarly of holy things and made them so real that earth has seemed dreary when I touched it again. Emotions are dangerous things unless they find an outlet in action. We can so narcotise ourselves with holy things that our senses will lie to us. We can meditate on holy things until we feel that we are holy too. But periods of rude awakening come. We find we have been hearing and not doing; saying Lord! Lord! and not doing God's will.

"Exercise the angel; do not try to exorcise the devil. No animal lives for itself, or is allowed to live for itself. Nature executes drones. Until a man has learned to give and to train himself for giving, to work for others, to plan and study for others, to live for others and spend himself for others, and save nothing for himself, nature exacts pound after pound of flesh until only enough remains to make a fossil. Men groan

over a tenth. The God of nature exacts all. Our nature exacts all. Use it, or lose it. All your learning, achievement, discovery, your good times, your blessed experiences, have not found the reason for their existence until you touch the heart of humanity. Our hands may lose all we give—our hearts lose nothing.”

My friend once quoted to his students, from some source not indicated, this parable of the Holy Shadow:—

“Long, long ago there lived a saint so good that the astonished angels came down from heaven to see how a mortal could be so godly. He simply went about his daily life, diffusing virtue as the star diffuses light and the flower perfume, without even being aware of it. Two words summed up his day: he gave, he forgave. Yet these words never fell from his lips; they were expressed in his ready smile, in his kindness, forbearance and charity.

“The angels said to God, ‘O Lord, grant him the gift of miracles!’ God replied, ‘I consent; ask him what he wishes.’

“So they said to the saint: ‘Should you like the touch of your hands to heal the sick?’ ‘No,’ answered the saint; ‘I would rather God should do that.’ ‘Should you like to convert guilty souls, and bring back wandering hearts to the right path?’ ‘No; that is the mission of angels. I pray; I do not convert.’ ‘Should you like to become a model of patience, attracting men by the lustre of your virtues and thus glorifying God?’ ‘No,’ replied the saint; ‘if men should be attached to me, they would become estranged from God. The Lord has other means of glorifying himself.’ ‘What do you desire then?’ cried the angels. ‘What can I wish for?’ asked the saint, smiling. ‘That God gives me his grace; with that shall I not have everything?’

“But the angels insisted: ‘You must ask for a miracle, or one will be forced upon you.’ ‘Very well,’ said the saint; ‘that I may do a great deal of good without ever knowing it!’

“The angels were greatly perplexed. They took counsel together, and resolved upon this plan. Every time the saint’s

shadow should fall behind him or at either side, so that he could not see it, it should have the power to cure disease, soothe pain and comfort sorrow.

“And so it came to pass. When the saint walked along, his shadow, thrown on the ground on either side or behind him, made arid paths green, caused withered plants to bloom, gave clear water to dried-up brooks, fresh colour to pale little children, and joy to unhappy mothers.

“But the saint simply went about his daily life, diffusing virtue as the star diffuses light and the flower perfume, without ever being aware of it. And the people, respecting his humility, followed him silently, never speaking to him about his miracles. Little by little, they even came to forget his name, and called him only ‘The Holy Shadow.’”

It is a noble sentence of the litany, “Whose service is perfect freedom.” This is perhaps the finest test of religion. To do the one thing best worth doing from day to day, is to make constantly better things possible. It is to make us daily more and more free. It is wrong-doing which ties up a man, doing each day the second best, the third best, the worst possible thing for him to do. It is truth which makes free. It is righteousness that enlarges our borders, that widens our coasts.

As to this, I heard my friend tell this story—a part of his experience as a naturalist in Mexico.

“I stood one sunny day on a coral reef in the harbour of Vera Cruz. The hazy blue air was full of sunshine and the healthy odours of the sea. Birds were tumbling about overhead in the perfect abandon of strength and room and tropical comfort. The white rocks and blue sea were mixing in a line of fleecy foam until the coral seemed to flow away on the wave crests. It was a perfect day, such as God sends us often when he lets heaven down to rest on earth for a little while. At my feet was a square hole cut out of the rock. Across it were bars of iron. I put my face down, and when my eyes became accustomed to the darkness below, I could see human forms

there, men in chains, standing in water ankle deep, with the ocean ceaselessly pounding overhead, its hoarse laugh reminding them that they would be thrown to the sharks when they were dead. I could see their haggard faces turned up toward the little barred square of light, which was all of the great free outside world they could see. Since that day that Mexican prison has been the background against which I have set my ideal of freedom. Chained hand and foot, inclosed by rocky walls, dependent upon their masters for food and drink and air and life, these men were slaves.

“And yet not all slaves are in chains or behind prison bars. Standing beside me in the group that looked into that dismal hole was a young American. He seemed free. He could go where he pleased. He could gratify his appetites and desires. He was on his way to his Northern home to wed a pure-hearted girl who was waiting for him there. He read me from one of her letters, and one could see that he was her ideal of manhood. Yet the night before he spent in a Vera Cruz brothel. The purity he was taking home to his betrothed was only acted. His manhood was only on the surface. The truth was not in him. He was afraid lest he should seem to be what he was. He was chained by his sins and imprisoned by the wall of falsehood he had built around himself until he walked the paths of truth only in great fear lest the rattle of his secret chains would reveal his captivity.

“A man is not always free when he seems to do as he pleases. It depends on what he pleases to do. Nor are outward chains the only badge of slavery. It is true that wherever Jesus has gone, emancipation has followed. ‘Imperialism has given way to democracy, and slavery to free labour.’ Peter slept in prison, and an angel came and set him free; but this is not the way the freemen of Jesus are liberated. No angel touches the sleeping prisoner that the chains may drop from his galled wrists, but a divine strength has been imparted to the bondman until, like Samson, he has risen

from his slumber and shaken himself, and his withes have parted like tow in the flames. The reformation of Jesus has been peculiar in this. It has reformed men by making them strong enough to reform themselves. The angel came in the night and touched Peter, and his chains fell off and he was free. This is the old way of liberating. The spirit of Christ Jesus in Paul made him victor over his own baser nature and set him free from the despotism of his own folly and the mastership of the Evil One. That is Jesus' way. His reformation is from the inside out. Man becomes a partner in the process."

And therefore the sensible American is persuaded that the religion of Jesus still survives, that never in the history of the world was it more alive or more potent, and that every movement of civilization, from the study of the lilies, the care for little children, the healing of the sick, and the casting out of devils from church and state has been along lines laid down by him, by the devotion of men for those things for which he cared.

With all this what shall we say of immortality? The idea of eternal life as well as that of life unblemished is in the teachings of Jesus. It is everywhere taken for granted. Our American does not ask for immortality as a debt due him from the Creator. In this good world he has had his rewards and punishments, each sufficient for the day thereof. He asks no final compensation for dreary and dispiriting service. He has known no such service. His "times are in God's hands," the same God that each day instantly and constantly reneweth the work of creation. He is sure of personal immortality if in the economy of the universe that phase of eternal life for him be worth while. If immortality is not inevitable, it is no part of his religion to crave it or to demand it. He realises the futility of an appeal to Science. Science can have no answer to this question. Science is human experience tested and set in order. We who are mortal have had no experience of immortality to which any of our mechanical tests can apply.

Nor can we rely on the arguments of Philosophy. The only philosophy which can be trusted has its roots in science. We know no truth save that which arises from human experience, and this truth is, at best, seen only in part as "through a glass darkly." The outlines in this "dimly lighted room" of human consciousness, philosophy endeavours to restore. She would see the phenomena about us, not with the partial and subjective vision of man, but as with the eye of the Infinite Being. She would know things as they really are, but she cannot—because only through our imperfect senses, the basis of science, can we know objective things at all. Outside the field of knowledge and of reason, outside of science and of philosophy, lies the belief in immortality.

Let us listen to our friend as he gives us the basis of his belief. "No fact is actually *known* unless it is stated in mathematical terms, and with questions such as this no demonstration is possible. Attempts to demonstrate degrade the truth. Before you can prove it, you must first bring it down out of the region where things require no proof to the level of common things that can be proved. You may *know* a stone, or a bit of metal; you will never weigh love.

"Immortality is not proved by Nature. Nature is full of suggestions and analogies, but analogies prove nothing. Homologies prove. If we can trace a fundamental identity between any element of our character and the nature of God, if we can find in the beneficent heart of God a homology to the heart of man, we have commenced to build the demonstration of the fact of immortality.

"So if I appear to destroy the heaven of your dreams, let me try to show you that in its place may be put a heaven which knows no present or future.

"If man is ever to be an immortal being, he is such when he begins to live his divinity. If you have risen to that height where you feel sure that you know God in this world and in your life and in the lives of your fellows, be very sure that you know your own immortality. How did Jesus view

this question? He offers no proof of immortality, but simply assumes it. He talks much about love, faith, obedience, prayer. He might have shown that each presupposes immortality, but he did not. Life was so real to him, that the thought of its ending never occurred to him. He was alive, and that meant alive for ever. Death was only an incident connected with man's body, and to Jesus man was not a body, but a soul—using matter for awhile, but not identified with it. If his life had been to any extent identified with matter, we might have expected him to fear death; for we know perfectly that death will separate us from material things. But he loved things in men that death could not touch; and he lived and worked with characters, not bodies. So he wasted no time in reasoning about things that are not to be settled by reason. He assumed God, and God is. To demonstrate immortality would have been to him irrelevant. He was alive, for ever, self-evident. He assumed it and built his whole teaching on that assumption.

“Do you say that assumption is no proof? It is a statement of conviction. The biologist is convinced that there is such a thing as life; he assumes it, and works upon that assumption. So Jesus assumes that man is *un*-mortal. He does not speak of life hereafter; life is now—now and for ever. Life and eternal life are the same. The important thing with him was not that man might through much suffering and trial weather the storms of life, and then have an easy course through all eternity. The vital point with him was that man should not postpone his life until after his own funeral, but should begin his eternity now.

“So he sought to give meaning to life. Not knowledge, nor power, nor riches, nor position, but character. And then life begins to be true; it announces itself as eternal to the mind. When a man begins to live—love, deny himself, serve—he understands what life is, and knows that death cannot touch it. But all these activities are what may be called spiritual activities. When the spiritual nature is brought

into exercise, it generates not only faith in eternal life, but reasons for it.

“In proportion as man’s life is identified with things that change and decay is his faith weakened. But if one’s ideals are in the realm of character, death is not one of their attributes. Faith has a wonderful assimilating power; we are like what we believe. By this principle Jesus unites himself to men. Fellowship brings likeness, and likeness means that we take ourselves his attitude toward life. What was his attitude? Love. To the lawyer who tempted him, Jesus answered, ‘Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. This do, and thou shalt live.’ This is another way of saying life is love, and love is life eternal. Only he who loves lives. Wisdom is vain unless our knowledge is turned into love.

“Love for men—and this soon passes into love for God—lifts man above the physical where death is, into the spiritual life everlasting.”

The religion of the sensible American is, therefore, not one of creed or ceremony or emotion, not one primarily of the intellect, but a religion of faith and love and action—a confidence that the universe of matter and of spirit is a reality, that its functions are in wise hands, for the time being our own hands as well as the hand of God, and our part is to help our brother organisms to more abounding life.¹

DAVID STARR JORDAN.

¹ Cf. with the above article that on “The Religion of Sensible Scotsmen,” by William Wallace, LL.D., HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1908. Other articles under similar titles will follow.—ED.

THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND AND ITS FORMULA.

THE REV. A. J. CAMPBELL,
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AT the last General Assembly of the Church of Scotland the report of a special committee brought on a debate which closed with a resolution to alter the Church's formula. It may be explained, for the benefit of those who are not familiar with the customs of the Scottish Church, that the formula is a legal document, which every clergyman must sign, stating his personal relation to the Church's constitution and doctrinal standards. The decision of the Assembly, before it can become a law of the Church, must win the explicit approval of a majority of the eighty-four Presbyteries of the Church, and of another General Assembly. In one or other of these Presbyteries every beneficed clergyman has a seat, as well as an elder from each parish. An opportunity is thus given in the interval between the meetings of Assembly for the discussion by the whole Church of a momentous question. We call it momentous advisedly: for it will be easily seen that far more is at stake than the accurate phrasing of a legal document. The whole relation of the Church to the Westminster Confession is ultimately involved; and the problem, which has taken this particular form in the Scottish Church, is but one phase of a movement which can be felt throughout all Protestant Christendom. So far as the Church of Scotland is concerned, it is admitted on all hands that it is no longer

possible to demand the rigid acceptance of the Westminster Confession, which seemed essential in 1693, when the present formula was framed; and the point of debate is whether it is possible to find room in the Confession for the numerous varieties of thought and temperament which have gained a footing in the Church, or whether a more excellent way must be devised than the rewriting of the formula.

The Church of Scotland works at present under a constitution which was defined by the Scottish Parliament in 1690. By the Act then passed, Presbytery was restored, and final legislative sanction was given to the Westminster Confession. In 1693 a further measure required every preacher and minister to sign the Confession, and prescribed the terms of the formula. In 1694 the General Assembly framed a formula in accordance with the Act. With some slight verbal alterations it remains to this day, and is as follows:—

“I declare the Confession of Faith, approved by former General Assemblies of this Church, and ratified by law in the year 1690, to be the confession of my faith, and I own the doctrine therein contained to be the true doctrine, which I will constantly adhere to.”

Two other paragraphs deal with Church government and worship; but they are not at present under discussion. In 1905 liberty was obtained to alter the part of the formula quoted, which remains henceforth under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church. As, however, the Act of 1690 is unaffected, the Church still remains bound to the Confession, and has liberty of movement only within its limits.

The Westminster Confession was adopted by the General Assembly in 1647 as “being most agreeable to the Word of God, and in nothing contrary to the received doctrine, worship, discipline and government of this Church.” In this statement we note specially the careful reference to the older doctrinal standard—the Scottish Confession of 1560. The Westminster Confession was accepted with some reluctance as an act of homage to a bright dream which then lightened the eyes of the dominant party in the Church. They hoped

to see the union of the British kingdoms in one pure reformed Church; and in loyalty to this ideal they laid aside their national confession and national liturgies, and accepted in their place a creed, a catechism, and a directory of public worship drawn up in England. Nevertheless, in discussing the relation between the Scottish Church and the Westminster Confession, we must keep in mind the appeal to the "received doctrine." The change of standard involved no change in identity. The new Confession was accepted, not as an improved statement of Christian doctrine, but simply as an alternative version of the doctrine which the Church had itself formulated at an earlier date. In the minds of the leaders of 1647 the Westminster Confession did not and could not have the effect of annulling any statement or principle of the Scottish Confession, which still remained the doctrinal charter of the Scottish Church. How this point bears on the present discussion will be clear later.

Meanwhile it is well to remark that at the time of its adoption the Westminster Confession was a sufficiently accurate statement of the living faith of the Church. Its theology is frankly and unequivocally Calvinistic; but no other could have secured the favour of Scotland at that period. Fierce and acrimonious as were the quarrels of the seventeenth century, they never hinged on theological questions. It was a generally accepted principle, also, that rigidity and uniformity were essential in doctrinal matters, and that the slightest deviation from the prescribed path of belief would lead only to the ruin of the Church and of the individual. But human nature is stronger than theory. The native liberty of the soul cannot be bound permanently. From the early days of the Reformed Church in Scotland there had always been a liberal and progressive party, inclined to moderation and leniency, and often suspected, not unreasonably, of a covert affection for such dangerous heresies as Arminianism. Had the Restoration not brought with it a period of confusion in the

Church, which entailed the severe persecution of the Presbyterian party,—for that matter, had the perversity of Laud not exasperated the Scots, accentuated their divisions, and opened the flood-gates of irreconcilable controversy,—the seventeenth century might have seen at its close a great modification of Scottish Calvinism. As it was, the sufferings of the Presbyterians only stiffened their allegiance to the Calvinistic theology, a theology which appeals with remarkable force to men fighting against desperate odds. It was therefore no marvel that, when Presbytery returned to its own, the Westminster Confession should receive legislative sanction, that it should be regarded with the love and reverence due to a companion in tribulations, and that every precaution should be taken in order to bind its phylacteries for ever to the forehead of the Church.

A comparatively short period was sufficient to restore the balance. The liberal school emerged from obscurity and rose to predominance; and the eighteenth century is remembered as the century of the Moderates. The Calvinism of the wilderness, which, with all its rigour, had been a real source of inspiration to the Covenanters, degenerated quickly into a fantastic devil-worship. It was strong enough to bring to the bar Professor Simson of Glasgow, one of the fathers of constructive liberalism in Scotland; but the progressive party was strong enough to secure that his sentence should be only suspension from teaching, and not deposition from the ministry. On the other hand, the *Marrow of Modern Divinity*, a book which appealed strongly to such men as Thomas Boston, but which revealed a marked tendency to antinomianism, was condemned as heretical in spite of Calvinistic protests. As the century wore on, the tide of Moderatism rose to the full. The doctrines of Boston and Ebenezer Erskine might retain their hold of an uneducated and superstitious populace, and produce such orgies of fanaticism as the “Cambuslang Wark”; but the best men of the Church were counted with the Moderates. Hutcheson and Leechman revolutionised the teaching of philosophy and theology at Glasgow. “Jupiter”

Carlyle fought the battle of the theatre, and broke the spell of Puritan austerity in social life. Hugh Blair became the great preacher of Edinburgh. Greatest of all, David Hume set forth a philosophy which made the temple of orthodoxy rock to its foundations. Though not himself a Churchman, he was the intimate friend of the Moderate leaders, and his philosophy was a natural product of a Moderate environment. Here at last the fundamental questions were squarely faced by a man who was not afraid to set forth his views or accept their conclusions. What had lurked as an uneasy suspicion in a thousand minds came forth to the light of day. How great a victory had been won might have been seen when a reply came from Thomas Reid, himself a minister of the Church. Here there was no attempt to call down fire from heaven upon the presumptuous infidel, or to take refuge from his heavy artillery behind ecclesiastical authority or supernatural revelation. Hume's teaching might be right or wrong: Reid's reply might be conclusive or inadequate. These were small points compared to the great positive result which had been gained, that argument should be met by argument and not by ecclesiastical denunciation, and that religious and philosophical problems were to be solved, not by the timely intervention of a *deus ex machina*, still less by the free employment of anathemas, but only by the resolute and conscientious use of the reason and the judgment. The work done by Hume among the learned was done after a different fashion among the people by Burns, whose tremendous satires shattered the complacency of a vituperative fanaticism, and whose poetry revealed the grandeur and sacredness of a world stigmatised by the zealots as vile. When we observe how the tendencies of Scottish thought and feeling produced a Hume and a Burns, the wonder is, not that a movement began in the Church to get rid of the Confession of Faith, but that, having begun, it was allowed to fade away and come to nothing.

One reason for this was perhaps the lack of a leader.

Moderatism had its conservative wing, and most of its great Assembly leaders belonged to it. From the conservative school of Moderatism sprang, for example, Principal Hill, who made one of the few contributions of the Scottish Church to dogmatic theology; and no one reading his *Lectures on Divinity* would suspect him of being unnecessarily restless under the yoke of the Confession. Another reason was that Moderatism was at last producing the inevitable reaction. From about 1780 onwards, the talent of the Church is found more and more in an Evangelical party, marked by great religious fervour and dogmatic severity, and led by such men as Andrew Thomson and Thomas Chalmers. Its ascendancy was seen in 1831, when a unanimous vote deposed John Macleod Campbell. In 1843 the Evangelical party carried through the Disruption, and went out to form the Free Church. The fact that it was compelled to secede almost in the heyday of its vigour was perhaps a proof that, in spite of its power and energy, it had not the sure grip of the Scottish Church which Moderatism had in the day of its power. However that may be, the Free Church remained for thirty years the citadel of the hottest and most intolerant Evangelicalism. The Westminster Confession was believed and enforced to the letter; and this remained the condition of affairs until the Robertson Smith case fell like a thunderbolt upon the chosen home of orthodoxy.

After the Disruption the Church of Scotland was in a sad plight. But she had secured one great advantage, which was almost sufficient compensation for all her troubles. The Moderates were free from Evangelical opposition, and might return to the point at which their development had been arrested. The new influences in thought and literature forced their way into the ecclesiastical enclosures, and in a very short period from the Disruption it was seen that the most vigorous school of thought in the Church of Scotland was not likely to hold closely to Confessional doctrine. The deposition of Macleod Campbell was openly described as

a crime. His doctrines were freely preached, and other doctrines, still more foreign to the Confession, began to lift their voice in class-room and pulpit. Norman Macleod, Robert Lee, Robert Wallace, Principals Tulloch, Cunningham, Caird, and Story—these are but the outstanding names in a party which recalled the great days of the Moderates, and utterly changed the face of the Church of Scotland. On two occasions a conservative section sought to check the inroads of the new spirit. In the Greyfriars case (1866) the storm raged round a question of ritual; but the combatants understood that deeper issues were involved, and that they were engaged in a real trial of strength. In 1880 a band of liberal thinkers published the *Scotch Sermons*, which brought on a case in the General Assembly. The result was perfectly satisfactory to the ecclesiastical mind, which is always apt to fancy that the ingenious wording of a motion has an ultimate spiritual value; but it did not check the cause of progress for an instant. Since that time words have been freely spoken within and without the General Assembly which, at a date not so remote, would have moved some to pour forth vials of wrath. The Confession of Faith has been arraigned as if in its own home it must plead for mercy. The progressive school of Scottish Churchmanship has entirely vindicated its claims. There can no longer be any doubt that it is entitled to a place in the Church. It is not an intruder to be regarded with toleration; it is not even to be counted as a welcome guest; it claims and it has the rank of a child of the house. It goes further even than this. It maintains that one of the deductions from the history of the Scottish Church is that the progressive party, and not the party of rigid uniformity, represents the main stream of Scottish religious thought. Ecclesiastical repressiveness, however natural an instinct in Calvin or Knox, has no place in true Protestantism, and ought in these days to receive scant mercy. Comprehensiveness, not exclusiveness, must be the characteristic note of a national Church. Its principle of unity must

be sought in something deeper and more vital than a dogmatic symbol. Whatever settlement may be reached at last, the Church must proceed towards it on the assumption that parties of apparently divergent sympathies have equal rights within the fellowship of the Church. Room must certainly be found for those whose instincts are mainly conservative; but room must also be found for inquiry, for advance, for readjustment of beliefs, for the free movements of the Spirit of Truth.

It is lawful in this connection to hark back to early days in order to show that a departure from the Westminster Confession involves no breach with the historic traditions of the Church. The mere fact that a change was made in 1647 is itself a proof that the men of that day were not afraid to alter their standards, if an alteration seemed necessary and advisable. We have already mentioned their pointed allusion to the Confession of 1560; and if one of the most remarkable statements in that document means anything, it claims for the Church an inherent right and duty to alter its subordinate standards upon just cause shown, in order to bring them into closer harmony with Scripture. Says the Scottish Confession:—

“We conjure you, that if any man will note in this our Confession any article or sentence repugnant to God’s Holy Word, that it would please him of his gentleness, for Christian charity’s sake, to admonish us of the same in writing; and we, upon our honour and fidelity, do promise him satisfaction from the Holy Scriptures, or due reformation of that which he shall prove to be amiss.”

In most creeds and confessions the design seems to be to set up a barrier rather than to open a way, to check the free motions of the mind rather than to stimulate its energies. “Without doubt whosoever does not believe this shall perish everlastingly,” says the Athanasian creed. “Let him be anathema,” is the perpetual burden of Trent. To the Scottish Reformers it was given to show a better way. It is true that no instance is known in which they acknowledged themselves in the wrong; but men who had taken the bold step of

parting company with Rome might be pardoned if they were unable to do much more. It is true that they and their descendants were ready to persecute and condemn: but it is not so easy to outgrow habits of thought ingrained by many generations of Catholicism. Nevertheless, their great saying remains, a magnificent challenge to their successors to make full proof of their spiritual rights. To be the heirs of the Reformers means, not that we are to mumble their formulas for ever and to read twentieth-century interpretations into their phrases, but that we are to use the keys of the kingdom of heaven to unlock the doors of truth. The Church was never meant—and the Reformers had some understanding of this—to be the timid and reluctant slave of religious thought, following brave men at a great distance, but to go boldly forward as the leader and inspirer of thought, exhibiting by its sincerity and courage its title to be hailed as the “pillar and ground of the truth.”

The fact is, the Westminster Confession has long ceased to express even approximately the living faith of the Church. That all honour should be paid to the memorial of a great period and the handiwork of a strong generation is admitted freely by all; but it is one thing to respect a monument, another to worship a fetish. It is impossible to suppose that, if it were now brought forward for the first time, many would rise to press its adoption. Its real position is revealed by the fate which has befallen one of its most notable companions. For more than two centuries the Shorter Catechism was the great popular manual of religious instruction in home and church and school. At a recent date it was a common thing in pious households to spend the Sunday evenings over the Catechism; to-day religious men, who were brought up in this way, leave their children untaught rather than fill their minds with the teaching of the Catechism. It is not long since the Catechism was taught in the enormous majority of the public schools: in how many is it now valued chiefly as a not too useful discipline for the memory? Even in many Sunday

schools the Catechism has disappeared. All this has come to pass within the memory of men still in their prime. Even the ecclesiastics are beginning to realise the situation. During the past year a committee, consisting of representatives of various Scottish Churches, has issued a new catechism for use in schools. Whatever be its positive value,—and it is not great,—the significant fact is that it has been issued. The Shorter Catechism and the Confession stand or fall together. If the one has lost its hold upon popular affection and respect, the other cannot long retain even the formal allegiance of the clergy. If the time has come for the euthanasia of the Catechism, it is a surer sign than almost anything else that the sands are running out for the Confession. In the very channels where the tide of Calvinism once ran with amazing and magnificent strength, it is now ebbing rapidly. Indeed, it would seem that there are only two options for the leaders of the Church: either to admit the facts frankly and put boldly out to sea, or by the continuance of the old methods of repression to precipitate for Confessionalism a sudden and overwhelming catastrophe.

What is wrong with the Confession? Simply this, that, being in entire harmony with the thought of its day, it is for that reason out of harmony with the thought of these days. It is said, not without some show of reason, that the prevailing ideas of our time are identical with the great ideas of Calvinism, though dressed in a scientific rather than a theological garb. Still, it is significant that the change of raiment has been made. Since the days of the Westminster Assembly changes too vast for easy description have taken place in world and Church. We look out on a different landscape; we breathe a different atmosphere. Darwinism has revolutionised our mental habits. Travel and missionary effort have opened the long vistas of comparative religion. Philosophy has learned a new tongue since the days of Hume and Kant. Theology, once confined to one or two well-marked types, is now the most Protean of the sciences. An enormous mass of new knowledge has given

us a new Bible, which we read, not as an encyclopædia of proof-texts, edited in heaven, but as the most intensely human of all literatures. Above all, there is this great change: in the minds of the men who framed and accepted the Westminster Confession, it was almost a first principle in religious thought and life that God and man could come into contact only by a suspension of the laws of nature: we have been taught by the scientists to pull a wry face at the word "miracle." To our fathers the keynote of religion was Revelation: to us it is Discovery. All these and many other things show how wide a gulf is fixed between the days of the Westminster Confession and the days of THE HIBBERT JOURNAL.

The great practical difficulty, of course, apart from questions of legislation and the like, is the matter of a substitute. In the present welter of theological opinions, how can any statement of doctrine be drawn out to express the mind of the Church? Would it not be better to hold by the Confession, that, if we have not uniformity of belief, we may at least have uniformity of make-believe? Most, no doubt, would be content with the Nicene or the Apostles' Creed; others would ask why a Hellenic excrescence on the Gospel is to be put in the place of the Gospel itself. Where much is doubtful, and much is confused, two things seem to be quite clear. One is that the Westminster Confession has passed its period of usefulness. The other is that, whatever issue be found, the Church must recover and assert its right to freedom of speech and thought. This does not mean, as many of the orthodox fear, that the Church would be tossed about with every wind of doctrine: the Church of Scotland works far too slowly for that. Orthodoxy often denies the claim for liberty on the plea that the door is thus opened for pernicious heresy. It might be replied that nothing parallel to this has happened in the domains of science and philosophy. But let us grant, for the sake of argument, that there is such a thing as a pernicious heresy. Let it be granted that it is possible for the eternal interests of humanity to hang on an

intricate problem of metaphysics or a recondite historical investigation. The question still suggests itself, Is the Catholic faith such a weakling that it cannot take care of itself on the battlefield of thought? Is it safe only when doubly and trebly surrounded with ramparts of creeds and legal documents? The long story of Christian doctrine teaches that no creed or law-book can hinder the march of thought, that every weapon of persecution and intolerance has only rebounded on those who employed it, and that the only path of safety and progress is the path of truth and freedom. We make no suggestion as to the ultimate solution in the Scottish Church. But is it a vain thing to hope that one branch of the Church has at last learned the lesson taught by centuries of ecclesiasticism? Is the cry for freedom never to be heard? We are entitled to claim that the Church shall in the end put herself in a position where it will be impossible to repeat the folly of the ecclesiastics who persecuted Galileo or burned Huss, who executed Aikenhead and deposed Macleod Campbell. Romanism confines Divine Truth to an ecclesiastical organisation. The Reformers confined it to a set form of words. The new Protestantism denies utterly the right of Church or creed to set limits to the liberty of the sons of God. It asks for faith, not for belief, for moral enthusiasm rather than for intellectual assent, for a kindled imagination and a living hope in place of correct phraseology and wire-drawn definitions. From Christianity it appeals to the personality of Christ. Never had a Church a more magnificent opportunity than the Church of Scotland has at present of emancipating its people by one brave act from the mephitic influences of rigid Confessionalism, and standing forth as the herald of liberty, with reliance only on "faith beyond the forms of faith" and on the purifying and inspiring power of the eternal Spirit of Truth.

Unfortunately, another path has been chosen. All that is possible under the statute is the alteration of the formula, and with this in the meantime some are marvellously content.

After much discussion the following form of words was at last hammered out:—

“I hereby subscribe the Confession of Faith, the public and avowed Confession of this Church, approved by former General Assemblies as most agreeable to the Word of God, and ratified by Parliament in the year 1690, declaring that I believe the reformed faith therein set forth, to which I will adhere.”

This is almost as bad a formula as could be desired. It is simply the old formula in slightly different garb, without the historical associations that have gathered round it. The old formula could after all be read, as a civil statute can be read, in the light of a long series of judicial decisions. If the statement be allowed, it could also be read in the light of cases that were never brought and decisions that were never made. Simson was censured, Macleod Campbell was deposed: these are historical facts. Norman Macleod, John Caird, John Service were never even brought to trial: these also are historical facts. Robinson of Kilmun was driven forth: Story, when he uttered burning words against the Confession on the floor of the Assembly, was applauded to the echo. If it is still required that the Church shall bind herself to a Confession which is no longer the statement of her living faith, there can be no objection to reading the formula in the light of such facts as these. But the new formula has no such associations. Is it to be interpreted strictly? Or is it to be a mere form? When it speaks of the Reformed Faith, does it speak of Calvinism as opposed to Lutheranism or Anglicanism, or does it speak of Protestantism as against Catholicism? Is the new document to bind us to every jot and tittle of the Confession? If not, why does it not say so? What are those major or more essential doctrines from which dissent is not permissible? What are those minor doctrines which a man may hold or not as he pleases? Is the doctrine of election a major or a minor doctrine? If major, is the Church seriously asked to preach a doctrine that no one will accept in the form which it bears in the Confession of Faith? If minor, what manner of formula is this, which allows a man to accept a

Confession, while denying its central idea? In fact, the more we examine the formula, the more we find ourselves in an intellectual maze; and the only conclusion is that here we have the latest instance of Protestant scholasticism, from whose dreary and meaningless teaching we may well pray to be delivered. It is well for the Church that so many of the Presbyteries have thrown the new formula out.

One thing is absolutely certain. No formula will check the movement of thought. The experience of the Church of Scotland runs parallel with the experience of the United Free Church, and, for that matter, of all Protestantism. We seem to be rapidly approaching an epoch—if indeed it has not already opened—when men will seek the unity of Christendom not in the details of an organisation, still less in the phraseology of a confession, but in freedom of inquiry and strenuousness of Christian service. The Church can live only by the exercise of the liberty which is her birthright. To stifle the cry for freedom, to bind the conscience by inelastic formulas, can have only one result in the Scottish Church. It will hasten a movement, not for an amended formula, but for the rejection of the Confession of Faith. This has to come some day, we have no doubt. But, if it were demanded at present, it could be granted only by the repeal of the Act of 1690: and what that means in the present state of Scotland it is not necessary to set forth here.¹

A. J. CAMPBELL.

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¹ The above article was in type before the Assembly met in May; but its main contention is not affected by the decision of the Assembly. The real problem is the whole relation between the Church and a Confession which lies far astern of her life and thought; and tinkering at a formula, or deliberating in what way it will be best to set about tinkering, is of no final value at all.

THE BURDEN OF LANGUAGE IN RELIGION, AND AUTHORITY AS THE MEANS OF RELEASE:

A CATHOLIC STUDY.

W. J. WILLIAMS.

THE problem that is set us by the word religion may be said to be, How best a man may put himself into relation with what is called God and worshipped? The history of religion may be considered as the history of man's attempt to do this in full accordance with the demands and necessities of his nature and from the greatest depth of his being. And this attempt he has made in two ways: on the one hand, through historical and social religions, and on the other, as far as possible, by personal initiative and through personal experience and on personal judgment. And sometimes he has attempted to unite both methods for the attainment of his end.

Now all will allow what the special difficulties incidental to these methods are. Institutional and social religions have had a tendency to regard man's relation to God as something once for all revealed in such a sense as to be fixed and final, and to leave no room for further progress or personal initiative. The danger of the individualistic method, on the other hand, has been that it has had a tendency to encourage fanaticism or eccentricity and has induced him that follows it to fall either into such agnosticism as not to be able to start on any religion at all, or into such dogmatism as to isolate him

from the rest of men and incur the loss, in his religion, which follows from isolation. In other words, authority, at its worst, destroys personal religion altogether, or turns it into mere superstition; individualistic religion, at its worst, falls into scepticism or fanaticism, according to the temperament of the man who is making the attempt. In both cases it is personality which suffers, and suffers in a manner which may externally appear very much the same. The individualistic thinker may despair of all beginnings, and so fail to make up his mind to start in any religious direction at all; the superstitious man considers that a beginning has been made for him, and therefore fails to make a beginning for himself.

The question with which I shall deal in this paper is not whether there is a God or what God is, for those questions are too large for immediate discussion. Nor do I inquire whether there is such a thing as religion—for that is a historical fact which needs no discussion—but only, how best man may deal with religion and what is the best attitude to take with regard to it. For this is a question in which all men, late or soon, inevitably take a part. It is thus that I interpret Pascal's saying, "This is a game in which all must play." For when Voltaire answers that he does not see the necessity, what he does not see, in fact, is the point of the remark. Our part in the game is the attitude we adopt with regard to religion; and an attitude of contempt, of indifference, of refusal to play, is as much a part of the game as any other attitude. The question then, as to what attitude man is to assume with regard to religion, is a question which man always answers at last, even though he answers it by silence. The necessity of answering it is a burden which is laid upon us whether we will or no. It is one of the common burdens of mankind, whether men will bear it onwards or stand still with it. It is a burden from which we cannot escape, and there is no longer any question whether we can lay it aside, but only how best we may bear it.

Many and manifold indeed are the burdens which man is

compelled to bear from the days of his youth even until the end. Some of these are a part of his very being, and he begins to bear them as soon as he begins to live ; others are laid upon him, one by one, as he goes forth into life, and the more of them he bears, the more of a man he is. But there is one burden especially characteristic of man, in his present condition, a burden which is handed on from man to man, very much as the burden of traditional religion is handed on, and that is the burden of language. By calling it a burden I do not mean that it is nothing else, any more than by calling the question about religion a burden I mean that it is nothing else. I only mean that, in the first place, it is something imposed upon man from without and something which he is compelled to bear.

Language, then, like religion, is a burden which all mankind are obliged to bear. Like religion, it comes to us by a long tradition from without ; and like religion it calls forth some inevitable response from within. We cannot hold intercourse with others unless we use it, and therefore it is of essential importance to our practical and external life. We cannot properly be said to think for ourselves without it, and so it is of essential importance to our internal and mental life. It has had a part in the formation of all the instruments of our thought, and stands at the very fountain of our intellectual being. It is a burden that is imposed upon our thought, and yet it is the very condition of our thinking. It is a crude and cumbersome load to the swift action and lightning rapidity of our feelings, yet it is the only satisfying mode of their expression. For we have feeling and even a sort of inchoate thought before we think in language, and feeling, and what may pass for inchoate religion, before we consciously take any part in bearing the common burden of religion.

In language every word is revelation of our thought and feeling to others, and of the thought and feeling of others to ourselves, and of our thought and feeling to ourselves. And the greatest language is that which best reveals our own per-

sonality to others, the personality of others to ourselves, and lastly, ourselves to ourselves. But, for this purpose, and in order that this revelation may be truly made and for excellence in language or what is called style, we are obliged to be continually reconciling two quite opposite things, and our success in all speech must depend upon our success in this reconciliation. In order to express any thought or desire at all, we are obliged to reconcile the normal and the personal, the conventional and the original, the traditional and the particular, the great tradition of language and the special necessities of our thought.

But for any great success in language we have to keep reconciling these opposites in a supreme degree. We must be sufficiently normal in style to be clear, but so personal as to be original. In order that style should be great, it must be intensely characteristic without being eccentric, original without becoming grotesque, of our own race and time, and even province, without becoming provincial, and yet of universal significance without falling into cosmopolitan indistinction. In other words, we find that in order to deal in the best way possible with the burden of language, we are compelled to illustrate the two great sayings, "Bear ye one another's burdens," and "Every man shall bear his own burden."

I have taken the great tradition of human language as a parallel to the great religious tradition, in order that we may find, from considering how we actually deal with language, whether we may not gain a hint how best to deal with religion and man's relation to God. In language we have a practical adjustment of those opposites which we meet with again in religion. Law and freedom, tradition and the individual, authority and private judgment, the cosmopolitan and the truly universal, the universal and the national, the universal and the particular, all these opposites find some kind of practical reconciliation and adjustment in every great literary achievement that has ever yet been considered, in the highest sense, classical and permanent. As in the case of language,

the truest freedom, that is, the fullest expression of personality, becomes possible, not by going outside the laws and tradition of language, but by finding the best and strictest tradition and expressing ourselves from within that; so it may turn out to be with the tradition of religion. As, again, the tradition of language is both from within and from without, and the future of language is ever begotten by the mingling of personality with tradition at its fullest and richest, the deep that is without calling unto the deep that is within, so it may turn out to be with religion.

Nor is this all: for there is a cause for this resemblance between the traditions of language and religion, and this cause lies far deeper than the results. The cause of the resemblance is that the process and evolution of language has a similar end to the process and evolution of religion in the world, and, as through language man gains self-consciousness for himself as well as self-expression as a unit in humanity, so through religion he is attempting to gain self-consciousness for humanity as a unit in the universe—that is, his relation to the order of the universe, and so his relation to God. This would be that perfect law of liberty which changes not, but is the law of all movement. Gaining by strictest obedience to tradition the fullest expression of his personality, man would gain full self-expression for his race, and attain to that service which is perfect freedom, and that obedience which is to reign.

When the individual has gained for himself full consciousness and full self-expression, he has gained freedom, and in this freedom is his true relation to God. But full consciousness and full self-expression imply, in the first place, consciousness of his relation to his race and consciousness of his race as a unit in the universe. The spiritual freedom of the individual can never be complete until the race also, of which he forms a part, is spiritually free. In strict and conscious relation with his race must he labour, then, if he would himself be free, not casting aside in religion, any more than he does in language, the idiom, the tradition, the authority in which religion has

hitherto expressed itself, but giving all these (if it be possible) a deeper meaning and a wider scope and a truer vitality. For the deeper meaning (if it be truly deep) will be but the true meaning of his race; the wider scope, the scope his ancestors had been looking to; the truer vitality but the fuller realisation of their desire. In him, then, will his race find fuller consciousness and fuller self-expression, and he both his own freedom and that of his people.

But the immediate and primary value of language is not that it gives full expression to personality or makes the revelations we have described or solves any problems. Its primary value consists in presenting the problems to be solved, and in being the medium through which their solution becomes possible.

And so we come at once into contact with what seems a fundamental difference between the tradition of language and the tradition of religion. Religion usually comes to us not as the medium through which a problem is to be solved or a full expression of personality becomes possible, but as the final solution of a problem, and a means of limiting personality; as if it said to speculation and to thought: "Thus far shalt thou come and no further"; as if it set limits to all advance and was itself the first and last revelation—a revelation once delivered to certain saints. So that if we do not find the solution satisfactory or the revelation final, or the saints trustworthy, we naturally consider we can bear no part in the religion. In this manner the very notion of a religious revelation seems to take away all significance from the parallel between language and religion. Traditional religion is represented, not as a medium through which the solution of a problem becomes possible, but as if it cut the Gordian knot and as if it prevented every attempt to solve the mystery of life both by limiting all human faculty and presumptuously insisting on a mystery of its own.

But this representation of the claims of religion, though often made both by its friends and its enemies, we have come

slowly to perceive to be historically and fundamentally false. The modern reading of history shows us, ever more clearly, that if we look at any great human movement and find an absolute finality in it, the fault lies with us rather than with the movement. And this kind of error is deeper and more fatal in regard to Christianity than in regard to any other expression of the human spirit.

The beginning of an opposite conception is to be found not only in Tertullian as a Montanist, in Origen and in St Augustine, but in the greatest dogmatists that ever lived, in the Schoolmen. Their error was not that they denied any kind of progress (for their position compelled them to recognise its necessity), but that they thought they had sufficiently described the laws in accordance with which progress must be made; not that they forbade speculation, but that they insisted on speculating only in one way. And when we consider the conception that the Fathers and the Schoolmen after them formed of the Revelation itself, which they all declare to be final and once for all delivered to the Saints, not only does St Augustine declare it to be in itself progressive, but the liberty given to interpretation by the mystical meaning and all the seven different ways in which a text can be explained, reduced finality to something very like what all might now admit—the kind of finality which denies that the same event can happen twice, and affirms that some of the laws of man's spiritual development were, once for all, discovered by Christianity. Indeed it has been truly said that, on the speculative side, traditional Christianity gave to Aristotle and Plotinus an authority equal to the Gospel; and on the institutional side, to Roman law and the Imperial idea an authority which seems scarcely in accordance with the Gospel. In both respects, far from making the Gospel final, the Church may be said, much more plausibly, to contradict the spirit of the Gospel.

The fact, however, surely is that Christianity is not, in the first place, a dogmatic or speculative solution of all the prob-

lems of government and speculation, but a liberating spirit—a spirit that liberates all true and vigorous personality whether it expresses itself in Roman law or in Greek speculation; and the very idea of the Kingdom of Christ must be expressed in accordance with all human aspiration (beginning at the plainest perhaps in the crudest form) till it finds, at last, the form that fits it best and makes it free. Thus, in Christianity, man has been on his way to find his true relation to God, but does not really conceive himself to have found it, but only to have found the way. Christianity, then, is not really regarded, even by the Church or in dogma, as a solution of the problem, but as a medium through which the solution of a problem becomes possible, and as the highest and deepest expression of the problem to be solved.

Christianity is a revelation of man to himself, reaching its climax in the person of Jesus Christ, and not, in the first place, a final and absolute revelation of God: a statement of man's consciousness with regard to his relation to God, ever becoming fuller and deeper and expressing itself under ever new aspects (both deep and superficial), and not, in the first place, a statement of God's relation to man.

To what an extent criticism has contributed to this conception of Revelation, both in the Old Testament and in the New, it is hardly necessary for me to say. But if we look at the Old Testament for a moment, we shall find on the face of it that the relation of man toward God is not considered as a thing finally revealed from on high. "Can man by searching find out God?" is a sentence which may be found in the same varied literature of revelation in which it is said, "Seek me early and ye shall find me." "Is it anything to the Lord that thou art righteous?" is a question which occurs amid the sacred writings which, in so many places, declare that by righteousness man pleases God.

And, in the deep religious experience herein revealed, there seems, at first, quite as much reason for despair as for hope, and no writings in the world express these alternate

passions of man with a more relentless vigour. "Spare me a little before I go hence and be no more seen," and "Wherefore hast thou made all men for nought?" are words which occur in the same sacred writings which say, "Though I fall I shall not be cast away, for the Lord upholdeth me with his hand." "I am a stranger with thee and a sojourner, as all my fathers were," says one. "The Lord is very near thee, even in thy heart and in thy mind," says another. But such quotations might be multiplied indefinitely. Here, then, there is no revelation of an absolute and final attitude towards God or of one kind of religious consciousness alone, but a revelation of the ever-changing consciousness experienced by humanity—a revelation of its ancient despair as well as of its age-long hope. And so it is, as is well known with religious writers since the New Testament. "Verily thou art a God that hidest thyself"—quotes Pascal at one time. "Surely I have known Him that I have believed," at another.

If, then, the Christian religion has not been held to be absolute and final quite in the sense it is supposed to have been; if, on the whole, it is but claimed for it that it has discovered some of the main laws of development and is the medium through which that development may best be made and the religious consciousness of man be expressed,—the parallel between language and religion, for our immediate and practical purpose, holds good, and we may regard one tradition very much in the same way as we regard the other.

But it is said that even if this be true of the tradition of Christianity taken thus loosely, as it is found in the changing words and minds of individuals, this cannot at any rate be pretended of religious authority, least of all of institutional Christianity. Here, it is said, teaching has been changed into law, and poetry into dogma; and from using the institutional part of the Christian tradition, we are prevented by the institution itself, whatever form the institution takes.

Now, I answer: Institutions were made for man, and not man for institutions; authority was made for man, and not

man for authority ; dogma was made for man, and not man for dogma. I do not attempt to advocate any inherent rights of authority ; I insist upon its necessity to man ; as, on the other hand, in the presence of authority, I do not advocate the rights of conscience, but insist upon the necessity of conscience to any religion whatever. Now the necessity of authority to us, if we are to gain for humanity its full religious consciousness and so its true relation to God, consists in the fact that authority alone puts us into conscious and living contact with the continuous religious tradition. I have said that, in language, if we are to gain full expression, we are compelled to be ever reconciling the normal and the personal, and that, to gain freedom, we must begin with the strictest obedience to its tradition. But authority is the only means by which we can get conscious contact with the tradition of religion ; and therefore, even if it seems but to hinder progress and to draw us backward, it does but hinder and draw us back on behalf of religious tradition by going into the grounds of which alone, and not by going outside it (any more than, in the case of language, we can go outside the laws of it), we can gain for ourselves and for humanity the full and free expression of our place as a unit in the universe. Authority is, and cannot help being, an expression of the normal, the conventional, and the general in religion ; and some such expression is a necessity for us, if we are ever to gain for ourselves that kind of freedom—the only real freedom—which comes by a struggle with the obstacles to it. There is no other kind of freedom, either for institutions, for individuals, or for the human race. To go out into the desert or back to the noble savage is not to gain freedom for the institutions or the nation, from which we escape, nor is it to gain freedom for ourselves. Only by working from within the law as it is, do we come, whether as nations or as individuals, to stand above the law.

And if authority seeks to impose some superstition upon us, either in opposition to patent facts, or what we cannot but know to be the deeper spirit in that consciousness, we have

the necessity of our conscience as units in that consciousness to proclaim aloud the deeper meaning of the superstition—and by that deeper meaning we must abide, come of it what may. Only, then, by putting ourselves into direct contact with what man has already conceived to be his relation to God, can we gain for ourselves the best attitude and relation to all that we call God and worship. Only by taking up the common burden of religion in humanity where it is largest can we be enabled to bear what is truly our own burden or lighten the burden for the rest of mankind.

For it is only in what is called authority that we can find the ground in which the struggle between past and present, between authority and the individual, between the general and the particular, between the normal and the personal, is carried out to the utmost point. It is only thus that we can make ourselves directly conscious of the great human consciousness, and only thus that we can add to that consciousness in such sense as to gain for it full and true expression and the liberty of the Sons of God. For even if the religious consciousness of a large part of the human race be but superstition, yet still it is the race to which we belong; and as it never can gain freedom without us, so we cannot gain the true depth of our own nature without it. It is the parent of our whole spiritual, religious, and intellectual life, and even though it be filled with superstition—superstition, as Thackeray puts it, often represents the deepest part of man's nature.

Thus only can we, as a race, slowly discover or surely approach our true relation to all that is called God and worshipped. Authority, I repeat, was made for the sake of man, and not man for the sake of authority; and therefore only on its necessity and use to man can any argument in its favour be founded. Why, then, and in what sense is it useful or necessary to man in his religion? For the same reason that the authority of tradition is useful or necessary to man in language. Because it is only by contact with the strongest and fullest expression of the normal that the personal comes to

perfection. Because it is not by any kind of isolation or retreat from the great streams of human feeling in religion, that personality comes to full expression or can attain its true freedom. Because it is not by contempt even for the conventional, that we best overcome, both for ourselves and for others, the paralysis of convention. Because the individual can only become a free person when he has realised himself as a unit in a greater whole; and institutions can only become free when they become consciously representative of the great mass and variety of free persons within them.

I say, then, that it is necessary both for us as individuals, and for the race to which we belong, that we should bear the burden where it is heaviest, join the struggle where it is hottest, and claim the use of authority for humanity where authority seems most to claim to use humanity for ends of its own.

And for this purpose, no isolated, no individualistic religion, nay, not even Christianity itself in its largest and deepest form, is sufficient—but a religion which is ever consciously and avowedly attempting to realise universality as its true end, how little soever it may at any moment have succeeded; a religion, therefore, which in its idea excludes neither ancient religion nor modern thought, neither Greek speculation nor Roman law, neither dogmatic nor undogmatic expressions of the religious spirit, and consequently a religion which does not exclude the institutional, historic, social, and authoritative expression of that spirit—if only that religion be used by us as our servant to gain for humanity its true relation towards God and not as our master to hide that relation from us.

W. J. WILLIAMS.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the “Hibbert Journal.” Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the *Journal*. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

THE UNIVERSE AS PHILOSOPHER. THE ALCHEMY OF THOUGHT.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, January 1908.)

CONSIDERING these articles separately, God is the theme of the first; the second treats of human attempts to construct a theory of the universe. Blending the two together, the argument, which assumes the truth of monism, maintains that God, the Whole, thinks of Himself in the thoughts of human philosophers. The old saying, that we think God's thoughts after Him, is ignored, and in its stead we find the theory that men's thinking is God's thinking of Himself. Let me try to illustrate the view offered to us, by imagining the universe as one continuous, unbroken, endless web woven by innumerable tiny spiders, each fashioning from within himself his little web without concert with his neighbours: nevertheless all the small webs join together and make the one vast web. In this picture we do not descry a colossal spider, spinning from his internal substance an infinite web of which the little webs are portions. If we did, monism would be excluded: there would be two universes, and no interpretation of their relation to each other: indeed, the assumption that either of the two is conscious of the existence of the other would be unjustifiable. Adhering to the monistic view that the actually existing thoughts of human minds are God's thoughts, and that He has no other thoughts than these, a critic might object that the theory has no room for the concept of God; that, in fact, it is bald atheism. The author's belief is diametrically opposed to this. According to his conception of the tendency of his argument, it leads up to, and finds its highest expression in, religion. The only objection to which he feels the need of replying is the awkward fact that human philosophies contradict each other.

Looking now at the argument of the first article by itself, its main thesis seems to be incontrovertible: interpretations of the universe are existing elements in the universe, and the true interpretation must account

for their presence in it. These diverse interpretations by human intellects are actual phenomena which demand explanation as imperatively as suns and planets, trees and animals, houses and books, motor cars and electric trams, demand it. So far we must agree with the author. But what is *his* explanation? I cannot discover that he so much as attempts to give one. He blames others for their failure to perceive that an explanation is wanted; and finds fault with the dualism of possession and being. But he does not indicate any ground or reason for the interpretations. Yet to common sense and in religion, an adequate explanation is ready to hand. Men first of all interpret to the best of their ability the portions of their experience which involve pleasure and pain; they learn how to get food, and escape dangers. Since we can never tell exactly what is coming next, it is natural and reasonable to observe and try to understand everything that presents itself to us. So by degrees arts and sciences, ethics and religions, are evolved, and are still in process of evolution. This is not a *philosophical* interpretation; but then, the vital point is just this, that all the philosophies, ancient and modern, are equally destitute of an interpretation. The use and value of philosophising do not appear in any positive acquisitions of knowledge, but in the conviction it produces that the finite mind of man is incapable of comprehending the universe.

The second article seems to evade the difficulty in the presence of which the first stops short. How can contradictory interpretations be God's thoughts? Instead of getting some attempt to answer the question, or to show that it is a question which ought not to be put, the author diverts our attention to another matter, most important and instructive indeed, but which leaves the opposing philosophies just where they were before. Human thinking, says the author, has an active energy which transforms the objects it interprets. This is true in some cases and to some extent; but it is true relatively, not absolutely. To say that a man's interpretation of his world makes it what it is, overshoots the mark. It suffices to say that by a right interpretation of our environment we may learn how in some cases to adapt ourselves to it, or it to ourselves. More important still is the fact that we ourselves are not rigid, cast-iron things, but can, by right appreciation of facts, external and internal, correct and develop our own moral character. This is the author's own selected illustration to support his theory. It makes an immense difference whether a man regards the world as a blind mechanism totally unconscious of what is and happens, or as the work of an omniscient and benevolent Deity. And every sane mind recognises that man contributes to the formation of his own character, and also of his relations to his fellows, and to the whole universe, by his wise or foolish, right or wrong, choices. These are commonplaces of morality and religion, but what have they to do with philosophy? Philosophy originally meant the love of wisdom, which is the love of virtue; and in that sense it is a synonym for religion. But philosophy in the technical meaning of an intellectual endeavour to interpret the Whole of Being is not affected by its diverse interpretations: it

remains now what it always was and will be, an ineffectual endeavour, a Sisyphus ever rolling the stone uphill, never reaching the top. Philosophy is not interpretation.

Only in one way, which John Stuart Mill and others seemed disposed to follow, can this theory of the interpretation creating the universe lead to a positive result. We may erase from our notion of God, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, moral perfection, and conceive Him as a finite Being, greater than man, but in nature like man, learning by experience, by trial and error, undergoing a process of evolution, the end of which even He does not foresee. To Mill this concept was an appeal to human beings to aid the Divine Being in the evolution of His world. There are obvious objections to this view. The finite Deity requires to be accounted for. Being finite, He must have had a beginning. He could not be the First Being, because He is the interpreter; which presupposes something to be interpreted. But the world being created by the creative interpretation, could not exist before the interpretation. If men existed first, the danger of falling into atheism reappears. The hypothesis of a finite Deity seems to have nothing to recommend it.

The Christian interpretation, like all the other interpretations, must be accounted for by the true interpretation. Its conception of God accounts for the whole universe, except the evil, physical and moral, which exists therein. This tremendous exception the Christian consciousness meets with its confession of the incomprehensibility of the Deity by finite intellects. This incomprehensibility is not a positive attribute of the Deity, who surely must be conceived as perfectly comprehending Himself: it is an acknowledgment by man of his impotence to conceive the Absolute Being.

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EAST GRINSTEAD.

KNOWLEDGE AND FAITH.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 515.)

I.

"I do not think that any religion which ought properly to be called Christian can adequately represent the attitude of an intelligent and candid modern man." This sentence in the preface of Mr Dickinson's article at once arouses a suspicion of prejudice. Such a judgment passed upon men of the stamp of Professor Adams Brown, and many others who find an explanation of the final moral and spiritual purpose of humanity, and even of the universe, not in what is "exceptional and abnormal" in Jesus Christ, but in what is most congruous with the self-evidencing divine intention, is hasty if not harsh. With Mr Dickinson's valuation of Positivism I can easily agree. But not so with what he has to say about

Christianity. It is evident from the general trend of his remarks that he estimates Christianity by reference to the doctrinal or dogmatic tenets of "Roman Catholic or Anglican theology." But these are not the only theologies that are worthy the name of Christian. Mr Dickinson is surely aware that Christian theologians differ widely about the idea of Creation, to which he refers. And those of them who have been influenced especially by Hegel find no difficulty in substituting "process" for "creation," nor any great difficulty in reconciling the idea of immanence with the Incarnation. On the contrary, it appears to some that the Incarnation is one of the reasonable results of the immanential process, and that what seemed to be exceptional and abnormal, from the point of view of the older theology, has been placed in a new softening light, through the rise of more modern conceptions of the relation of God to the universe. Surely it is incorrect to say that Christianity has no answer but an absurd one to give to questions concerning man's place in the cosmos, and the goal of the cosmos itself, in view of the fact that natural evolution, in the opinion of many devout and learned interpreters of Scripture, who are far from being obscurantists, is supplemented and carried up to its highest possible achievement in the great purpose of Christ as set forth, say, in the Fourth Gospel, and in many places by St Paul.

Turning from cosmology to ethics, Mr Dickinson informs us that "the essence of Christianity is to dwell upon the idea of sin." It is extremely doubtful if any system of Christian theology, let alone Christianity, can be so defined. Augustinianism and its cognates made much of sin; but we must decline to identify either Augustine or Calvin with Christ, in their view of sin. The fact is that Christ said something about sin, as every serious moral teacher must. But surely Mr Dickinson does not require to be reminded that Christ said much more about righteousness, and love, and life, than about sin. In view of our Lord's teaching about the Fatherhood of God, the development of a new Kingdom, the fulfilling of the Law, and, in the Fourth Gospel, about the development of the spiritual side of humanity, it will be sufficient meanwhile simply to assert that it is not the essence of Christianity to dwell upon sin. The purpose of Christianity is to lead men to repentance, as a stage in the process of up-building a new life of grace and power. But in this matter Mr Dickinson has been misled by the seductive habit of textual quotation, not from the Scripture, but from the Anglican Prayer Book—an admirable book in many ways, but a very insufficient manual of theology. Equally misleading are those strictures which Mr Dickinson passes upon the supposed Christian view of man's weakness. But who can doubt that human weakness is a fact? Christianity does not maintain that man has absolutely no strength. It maintains that his strength is insufficient. And in so doing Christianity is true not only to the most patent facts of human nature, but is true also to the great analogies by which the world itself is indebted to the providential support of those cosmic forces that make it, and keep it what it is, that

sustain life and action of every kind, and that, in their higher and more spiritual reaches, sustain man's life at its best. In opposition, therefore, to Mr Dickinson's contention, I maintain that the Pauline idea of grace, and the Johannine one of a gift of life through the spirit of Christ, are simply in line with the analogy of all life and its sustenance, so far as we know it in the world around us.

But does not Mr Dickinson give away his case when he allows that man needs a mythology to carry him on? After all, he is to take courage from the supposition that in fighting evil he is helping to realise a cosmic intention, and to trust "that somehow good will be the final goal of ill." Such is to be the first sustaining element in the new mythology. But what about the goal of life? Some, Mr Dickinson contends, will be satisfied with death as the "end all." But others, as we can well imagine (*e.g.* Frederic Myers and Sir Oliver Lodge), will not be so easily satisfied. Well, let the latter add the idea of immortality to their mythology. It does not appear to the present writer that these are very promising substitutes for what Christianity professes to give us here and now, as well as hereafter. And, moreover, they seem to be of that supernatural order with which man, in thinking of his own strength, must endeavour, as Mr Dickinson maintains, to dispense. In one sense—the sense of the miraculous here and now—modern Christianity need not insist upon the supernatural. But if by the supernatural Mr Dickinson means the spiritual, he has not proved his case; and perhaps his argument will remind his reader of the man who contended that eating was an unnecessary if not a bad habit, and experimented upon his horse, with what results we all know.

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II.

MR G. LOWES DICKINSON states that "in the original myth," *i.e.* of the fall of man, "all men were damned because of Adam's sin" (vol. vi. p. 522). The original myth, of course, means the story as it is told in Genesis, at least that is what it ought to mean, but any one who read the second and third chapters of Genesis for the first time would be amazed at such an interpretation of the narrative. Three, possibly four, results are mentioned as the penalty of the guilty pair. In the first place, the woman, as the tempter, is henceforth to be under the rule of the man; she is, in the second place, also to suffer the pangs of childbirth (Gen. iii. 16). In the third place, the man, for having yielded to temptation, has to exchange the easy and pleasant occupation of tending an orchard for the arduous labour of agriculture; his home was to be no longer a garden, but a world where the ground was cursed; that is, where it brought forth thorns and thistles, and food was not gained without much exertion (Gen. iii. 17-19). In short, the disadvantages of life for men and women

as we know them now are in this story traced to the disobedience of the first man and woman. It is not clear whether we ought to add to this that an endless life on earth was also sacrificed; here the narrative is incoherent and apparently mutilated. One does not see why the original pair had not already tasted the fruit of the tree of life, nor whether, in her answer to the serpent (iii. 2, 3), Eve is referring to both trees or only to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for she speaks only of "the tree which is in the midst of the garden," a description true of both.

But however we interpret this somewhat clumsy appendix, we can get nothing from the original myth in Genesis but an attempted explanation of the origin of the evils of the world we see around us. Women suffer in becoming mothers because the first woman tempted the first man to disobey the command of his Creator. Men suffer in cultivating the ground because the first man yielded to temptation, and grasped the only fruit not freely granted to desire. Both sexes find that "brief life is here their portion" because of this common disobedience.

We have an attempt to account for the obvious, unquestionable disadvantages of the world about us by supposing an original rebellion against the Creator which set the framework of life awry. We may call the explanation unsatisfactory, but the facts to be explained are what we see and hear and feel every day: there is no controversy as to their reality. As to any theory of man's destiny when this short and imperfect life is over which would suppose the penalty for Adam's sin to darken the existence of his descendants through eternity, there is not a trace of it. Indeed, such a view is implicitly excluded as we turn the page supposed to record it. The very first victim of the new order, the tiller of the ground, who brings an offering to the Lord, is thus addressed by Him (Gen. iv. 7, margin): "Why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doest well, shall it not be lifted up? and if thou doest not well, sin (*i.e.* the tempter) coucheth at the door. And unto thee is its (the tempter's) desire, but thou shouldest rule over it." This is not the address of a judge to the member of a doomed race; far rather I should say that of an indulgent father to an estranged son. The subject of original sin does not recur through the whole of the Old Testament. The earliest reference to it is in a letter of Paul of Tarsus, seven or eight hundred years later than these chapters of Genesis. It would be interesting to inquire what he meant by his reference, but I want to point out only what is unquestionable.

The mistake is a curious instance of the careless way in which people—even scholars—read, or perhaps I should say cite, the Bible. They think of Milton, and they refer to Genesis. To read *Paradise Lost* is at least possible. To read Genesis seems as unnecessary as it is felt tedious. And I do not pretend that it would affect such arguments as Mr Dickinson's; he might have omitted his reference to original sin and left his case against Christianity just where it is now. Still I cannot but protest

against such interpolation of late opinion in the documents of the Hebrew race. It poisons the purest springs of religion, and raises a cloud of dust before some of the finest monuments of literature that are the inheritance of the human race.

JULIA WEDGWOOD.

AN AGNOSTIC'S CONSOLATION.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 586.)

Is not Mrs Petersen's article, "An Agnostic's Consolation," a restatement of the old question, much agitated a few years ago, "Is life worth living?" Like Mr Herbert Spencer in his *Data of Ethics*, Mrs Petersen appears to regard this as equivalent to the question whether, for this or that individual, life on the whole yields more of pleasure than of pain. But pleasure and pain, as Spencer himself admits, are incommensurable quantities, and if we are to make our answer to the question depend on striking a balance between them, the question will never be answered. Life can only be worth living because it is life.

But, says Mrs Petersen, thousands and thousands of men and women seek "death's oblivion" by suicide every year, thus showing that they at least do not believe life itself to be a compensation for all its ills. But is oblivion really what they seek? How many of them really believe that their lives go out at death like the flame of the candle? Is not the motive of suicide rather a vague hope of escape from intolerable conditions in this world to conditions which, it is felt, cannot at any rate be worse elsewhere? I am not going into the ethics of the question; but I think the above is the true analysis of the usual motives of suicide.

Without striking any balance between pleasure and pain, it is only too certain that, on the plane of human life, though not below it, the world holds a vast amount of pain and of vice; and there is no conceivable kind of "consolation" which will enable us to think them out of existence. The great question is whether, in the face of all this misery, a man or woman who realises it can hold an attitude of reverence and of joyful acceptance towards life and the Power behind its phenomena.

Now this question is an affair of philosophy, or of its sub-department, theology. But there is another question too, the question how one can make this sense of reconciliation (supposing one able to ground it in a rational conception of the universe) practically effective in the case of a fellow-man who lies crushed under a load of shame or sorrow. I submit that these are distinct questions, though Mrs Petersen confuses them. The suffering soul does not usually suffer in any quarter which the consolations of philosophy can reach. Nor, on the other hand, can the mind harassed and clouded with intellectual doubts be reached by the influences so finely described by Mrs Petersen as capable of reconciling the stricken soul with life.

And yet between the sphere of thinking and the sphere of feeling there is a true organic connection. Love does not spring from philosophy (thank heaven); but to despair of the universe, to picture it as a "ghastly cold grey vista of unending ages" in which there is nothing to be seen but "remorseless, purposeless, restless change," is to depress the whole vitality of man, and, above all, that of the nobler passions.

What is the significance of the consolation which love and sympathy afford to the wretched? Is it not that they are made to feel at one with life—no longer *alone*, with everything around them black and hostile? Is it not in conscious union with a being, a power, greater and higher than ourselves, that we find our peace, and strength to endure? With this being, for most of us, the links of relation are our fellow-men. Love and sympathy are valued because they are dimly felt to flow from some profounder source, of which he who bears them to us is the channel. And truly, as Mrs Petersen points out, there is need and scope for a vast expansion and organisation of this priesthood of common men to common men. But philosophy must inquire about the conception which it all depends on. For to say that philosophy cannot itself console the sufferer is true, but it is also true that it may arm, or disarm, those who can. The essential aim of philosophy, I take it, is to discover a principle of unity in the phenomena of life; or rather, since it seems obvious (*pace* the Pluralists) that such a principle must exist or life would fall to pieces at once, to express it in terms which will cover the facts, leaving none in a state of hostility or contradiction. The difficult facts in relation to any hopeful or "consoling" scheme of philosophy are vice and misery. But in considering what the universe would be like if there were no vice and no misery, we are at once struck by the fact that if they were to disappear what we know as goodness (in the ethical sense) would largely if not entirely disappear with them. Mrs Petersen thus comments upon this "metaphysical subtlety," as she calls it:—

"There cannot be light without darkness, height without depth, heat without cold, male without female, and hence, by analogy, good without evil, runs the argument. Whether or no good can exist without evil is a metaphysical problem beyond the reach of the human intellect and impossible to solve. Whichever view of the matter we are inclined to take is a hypothesis and nothing more."

I do not think that Mrs Petersen has here understood the philosophic position she assails. "No good without evil" is not a case of "analogy," it flows directly from the nature of (ethical) good as we find it in experience. Again, the question whether good can *exist* without evil may or may not be an insoluble metaphysical problem, but it is not the problem we are concerned with. There can be no question at all that most of what we recognise and reverence as good could never have *come into action* without evil. To address this by way of consolation to a soul in agony would indeed be a callous impertinence, but that does not alter the fact that it is true, nor diminish the philosophic significance of the truth. And its

significance is just this—that the existence of evil in the universe is in itself no proof that the essential meaning and purpose of the universe is not what we can recognise as good ; unless, of course, on the hypothesis, for which nature gives no grounds, that the universe is the purposeful and conscious creation of an omnipotent personal Being who could have made everything smooth and everybody happy at a bound.

How exactly we ought to conceive the essential meaning and purpose of the universe is a question which cannot be entered upon with any fulness in this discussion, but let me urge just this : Suppose we conceive the universe (as we see it in Time) to be intent simply on life, we can, in consonance with this view, interpret the higher ethical energies of man as being a means of promoting life in others and also as embodying in themselves an exalted kind of living not attainable without the existence of an element of evil. Yet this situation is not “designed,” except in so far as all the parts of the Whole must be considered as organically related. It is the result of the development of the Ego with its rapacious egotisms. When the egotisms of the Ego are harmonised with the Whole, evil and good must both disappear in a higher and as yet unimaginable synthesis. And, as regards the sufferings of individuals, whatever we may think of the immortality of the soul and the prospect of personal compensations for personal pains, we may at least feel sure that no suffering is wasted, for everything helps in the development of the World-soul of which each and all are parts. Is that cold comfort for the sufferer ? No, not for him who gives it no mere formal assent, but accepts it with vital realisation. “Father, not my will, but Thine, be done,” is a profound spiritual philosophy speaking in the accents of religion. To talk of personal compensations to a mind in this mood would not be a comfort, but a degradation.

T. W. ROLLESTON.

GLENEALY, Co. WICKLOW.

BRITISH EXPONENTS OF PRAGMATISM.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 632.)

NOTHING renders philosophers more incomprehensible to each other than differences in their sense of humour. Now I thought that Professor M'Gilvary's article on British Pragmatists in the April issue of this *Journal* was meant merely as a gay and festive skit. But the Editor assures me that he never admits intentional jokes into the *HIBBERT JOURNAL*, that Professor M'Gilvary is a serious-minded man, and that his article was intended as a serious contribution to the great Pragmatic Controversy and must be treated as such. It is probable, therefore, that I have failed to understand Professor M'Gilvary. It is certain that he has utterly failed to understand me. How hard he has tried to do so

it is not easy to say; but he was possibly aware that in the event of his failure it would be impossible in this Journal to expose all his misapprehensions and misrepresentations, and this may have buoyed him up with the hope that some of them would escape confutation. Now it is quite true that adequate correction of his account of the matter would be a task much too long, much too technical, and much too dull for this Journal. It would severely try the patience even of the readers of *Mind*. It would be superfluous for those who know the facts at first hand, it would bore those who are capable of judging for themselves, and it is very doubtful even whether it would enlighten Professor M'Gilvary.

I must, therefore, restrict myself to a few remarks on philosophic criticism in general, with illustrations from Professor M'Gilvary's curious methods of exegesis. (1) The meaning of any philosopher's statements depends very largely on their context and their connection with his other views. If, therefore, the connections are left out and the context is ignored, and isolated doctrines, sentences, and even clauses, of one compared with similarly selected excerpts from another, anything may be made to mean anything else, and any one may be compared with and assimilated to any one else. But so fallacious a method naturally leads to grotesque results. It is essentially garbling, even where it is verbally exact. (2) If you look for "traces" of pragmatism, they may be found anywhere, even as traces of gold may be found in sea-water, and traces of common sense in most philosophers. (3) Many pragmatists (including myself) have carefully studied the *amount* of pragmatic intention and implication in a number of important philosophies from the days of Protagoras downwards. Professor M'Gilvary wholly ignores these researches. Nor does he so much as hint that the fundamental issue is as to the relations of logic to psychology.

In detail, the value of Professor M'Gilvary's labours may be gauged by the following specimens of his procedure. (1) His accuracy and competence are displayed in a "definition" of truth he thrice attributes to me and argues about it for a page or so (p. 641). He makes me say that truth is "a logical value." This differs from the authentic form only by the insertion of the indefinite article: but the extra word not only ruins the definition and the argument leading up to it, but also shows that Professor M'Gilvary has no conception of the Humanist doctrine of values. (2) His ingenuity in selecting passages so as to obscure the meaning they plainly bear *in situ* is illustrated by another "definition" foisted upon me on p. 644. Who would suspect from Professor M'Gilvary that the connection between the "making" of truth and of reality, the completeness of which his (incomplete) quotation would seem to attest, is *in the very same sentence declared to be incomplete*, and that in the immediate context the sense of the assertion is restricted and specified under three distinct heads?

(3) However, quite the most astonishing of Professor M'Gilvary's feats is that of accusing me of secretly cherishing an "Absolute" (pp. 651-3). This he achieves by affecting to confuse "getting to Heaven" with "becom-

ing God." In the light of his own past this is very remarkable. For Professor M'Gilvary has, I believe, successively professed himself a Christian missionary, a Hegelian idealist, a realist, and even a sort of pragmatist. Now, though the "traces" of the first and last of these positions are not very apparent in his article, he must at one time have had some conception of "Heaven," some inkling of what it means for the ordinary Christian, and of why it is considered preferable to "Hell." He may even have tried to expound all this to the heathen. In his present remarks, however, I can find no perception of any of this, any more than of the fact that the conception I was philosophically upholding was just the "naive" Christian conception of "Heaven," which surely is ancient and respectable enough, and not specifically pragmatist.¹ However, I can assure Professor M'Gilvary that there was nothing about my suggestions that need interfere with his somewhat piquant preference of "Hell" to "Heaven," or prevent him from going "downwards, where at least there is a goodly fellowship," or, in fact, wherever he thinks he is most likely to find congenial company. I believed myself to have made it clear that the exquisite toleration of the humanist doctrine of truth leaves all such personal preferences about ultimate metaphysical issues essentially matters of taste.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD.

THE DUALISM OF ST AUGUSTINE.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 606.)

THE interesting article on this subject by Mr P. E. More leads up to a rather startling conclusion which does not seem to me to be altogether consequent on that which has gone before. The spiritual history of St Augustine is beautifully unfolded before us by the writer, and the suggestion that somewhat of his early Manicheanism remained in his religious consciousness and tintured even the *De Civitate Dei* is well worthy of consideration.

But the last two or three paragraphs, in which the author summons Augustinianism and Pelagianism to the bar and pronounces judgment between them, are to my mind less satisfactory. Pelagianism is certainly condemned. It is, says the writer, an attempt "to comfort mankind by slurring over the gulf between the human and the divine." Yet is not Augustinianism thereby justified. There are "whole tracts of thought and exhortation that refuse to take their place in the system of St Augustine." The fallacy that may be suspected to lie in his premises may be found "in that primary assumption of an infinite, personal God which was accepted by both St Augustine and Pelagius."

¹ As I was at pains to point out (*Studies in Humanism*, p. 16 n).

This is very disappointing, and even more so is the startling conclusion that "we are all Pelagians to-day, and our end, unless some incalculable force changes the current, may be foreseen in the present tendency to substitute a so-called Christian sociology for theology."

I venture to suggest that here the author is introducing something which belongs to an entirely different plane of thought from the whole of his previous argument. The question at issue between St Augustine and Pelagius, between the Calvinist and the Arminian, is one which might suggest itself to the mind of the solitary dweller on a desert island: a question between his own soul and God alone, the difference between the socialist and individualist having vanished into nothingness.

This is not the hopelessly insoluble question (referred to in the beginning of this article) as to the origin of evil. It is the question, difficult but perhaps not utterly insoluble, of the origin of *good* in that most mysterious organism, the soul of man. The tendency to evil, whencesoever derived, we all see and acknowledge: but whence comes the possibility of doing good? "*Gratia irresistibilis: gratia efficax*": no one who has read the *Lettres Provençales* will forget the controversy turning on these words. Of course, I am not now dreaming of presumptuously entering into that mighty argument. Only I venture to suggest that some help towards a solution of the problem may be obtained from the Quaker doctrine (formulated in Barclay's *Apology*) that there is in every man a Divine seed, or what he calls *Vehiculum Dei*: something which came from God and bears witness to its Author. Like a seed it may grow and flourish and become a great tree. Like a seed it may fail to germinate, may decay and "abide alone." Man's free-will is in some mysterious way the cause of the difference between the success and the failure of the Divine Husbandman.

"Fellow-workers together with God": that is what we are invited to be. O my soul! spend not thy strength upon that endless question as to the origin of evil which men have asked for 4000 years, and may ask for 4000 years more without getting any nearer to the answer, but rather meditate on the mystery of the origin of good in thee and thy fellows: this "power within us not ourselves which makes for righteousness."

Though Manicheism as a theory of the universe be false, as a kind of dramatic representation of the antagonism between two hostile spiritual powers, it may have a meaning for us, as it had for St Augustine. Good and evil: both are mighty: both claim our allegiance. It is for us, to each of whom the Divine Maker has given some apprehension of His nature, to fight in His name against the enemy in our own hearts and in the world around us.

THOS. HODGKIN.

"LAW."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 654.)

PROFESSOR F. J. C. HEARNshaw has certainly informed me that a large misuse of the term "law" has been made of which I was not aware. I note, however, with some consolation for my ignorance, that in his opinion a jurist like Sir William Blackstone was similarly "befogged," and that a scientist like Montesquieu was likewise "confused." Also that John Stuart Mill, the Duke of Argyle, Dr Salmon, Mr Alfred R. Wallace, and Professor Tyndall were all guilty in their writings of "in-exactitudes" similar to mine in their use of the term "law," and that even Sir Oliver Lodge needs to have his meaning explained for him by Professor Hearnshaw.

I have never studied jurisprudence, and consequently was ignorant of the difficulties experienced by jurists in arriving at a workable definition of the word "law" which would suit the requirements of their profession.

I am glad, however, to learn now that by restricting the connotation of the term to phenomena, they did not deny "the existence either of secondary causes or of the great First Cause by whose fiat the established uniformity had been instituted." I therefore frankly admit that my impression that Professor Hearnshaw argued on the presupposition that there is no moral or spiritual meaning in the world at large, was incorrect.

I also find in his article that "Jurists who accept the wider view, as stated by Holland, include within the scope of the sciences which deal with the rules of human action, first, *Divine law*—that is, 'the body of commandments which express the will of God with regard to the conduct of His intelligent creatures,' whether these commandments are expressly revealed or are indirectly made known through the conscience."

This is exactly "the moral law" to which I referred in my article on "The Forgiveness of Sin," for it covers the sins of Cain and of Noah, although at that time no law against murder or drunkenness had been formulated in words.

My article was not written on "law" as such, but on a widespread and pernicious opinion held by many that cause and effect do not work in the field of morals as in the field of physics.

Such persons commit sin in the expectation that, although in many cases retribution follows sin, nevertheless, they may escape the penalty of their act by uttering a few words of repentance. In other words, they act on the supposition that the moral or divine law is only "a more or less probable general statement."¹

No doubt there are laws which may be thus practically regarded. For instance, the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* promulgates a law at the head of "Discussions" in every issue, viz.: "The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—Ed." I was the original writer, and I made my

¹ The *Hibbert Journal*, July 1907, Professor Hearnshaw's discussion, p. 912.

reply to my critic ; nevertheless, the discussion has not ended, because that "general statement" has been rightly set aside by the editor who signed it, in admitting a further discussion of my article by Professor Hearnshaw in his article on "Law." But there are other laws, like the proverbial "law of the Medes and Persians, which altereth not."

St Paul placed the moral law under that category when he said, as a warning to sinners, "Be not deceived ; God is not mocked : for whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap. For he that soweth to his flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption." In so saying he obviously referred to an analogy between the physical law which regulates sowing and reaping and the moral law which regulates sin and its consequences.

My contention was that this sequence of cause and effect works out both in the field of physics and of morals with such certainty that it may be regarded as a law, and therefore it raises a difficulty as to how mere repentance can undo the evil caused by sin. The mechanically regular operations of natural forces act regardless of the repentance of the man who comes within the field of their operation. This is my reply to the question which Professor Hearnshaw asks me to answer. They make no difference between the wilful suicide who regrets his rash act, and the man, equally sorry for his carelessness, who has stumbled into deep water, for both are drowned, the law of nature being that any man who is submerged in water for a considerable time must die. Therefore, we find "no room for repentance" in that law. In the same way, a seducer, notwithstanding his repentance, cannot undo the damage he has done to an innocent life.

We might, therefore, despair in regard to redemption, were it not for the teaching of the Gospel that God, through the life and death of Christ, has made a way, outside the limits of our earthly experience, whereby He can not only forgive, but redeem penitent sinners from the consequences of their evil acts.

CHARLES T. OVENDEN,
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ENNISKILLEN.

THE CATHOLIC CHURCH : WHAT IS IT ?

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1908, p. 549.)

DOES not Monsignor Vaughan beg the point ? The Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church is built upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone, as St Paul says in his letter to the Ephesian branch of the Church.

Now when Jesus came into the parts of Cæsarea Philippi, He asked His disciples saying, "Who do men say that the Son of man is ?" And they said, "Some say John the Baptist ; some, Elijah ; and others, Jeremiah or one of the prophets." He said unto them, "But who say ye that I am ?

And Simon Peter answered and said, Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God. And Jesus answered and said unto him, Blessed art thou, Simon, son of Jonah : for no human being hath revealed this unto thee, but my Father who is in Heaven. And I also say unto thee, that thou art Peter, and upon this rock (namely, the great confession and central truth of Christianity, 'Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God') I will build my church ; and the gates of Hades shall not prevail against it." It is most important for members of the re-formed branches of the Catholic Church to ever keep in the forefront St Matthew's plain statement of fact that the Rock on which the Christ founded His Church was His Divine Manhood—on that and on that alone—because certain unfortunately have attempted to read into these simple words the erroneous idea that the "rock" was Peter, a meaning that is as grammatically faulty in the language of the original Greek as it is historically inaccurate in its interpretation.

"I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven : and whatsoever thou shalt enjoin upon earth, shall be enjoined in heaven ; and whatsoever thou shalt prohibit on earth, shall be prohibited in heaven." St Peter is addressed here as the representative of the apostles, on all of whom was conferred by the Messiah this "power of the keys," namely, authority, of which a key was the recognised symbolic badge, to unlock, to open the treasury of the Divine oracles, and to teach the truths of the Kingdom of Heaven.

THEODORE P. BROCKLEHURST.

GIGGLESWICK-IN-CRAVEN.

REVIEWS

The Reproach of the Gospel: An Inquiry into the Apparent Failure of Christianity as a General Rule of Life and Conduct, with special reference to the Present Time; being the Bampton Lectures for the year 1907.—By the Rev. James H. F. Peile, M.A., Fellow and Prælector of University College, Oxford, and Examining Chaplain to the Lord Bishop of Worcester.—London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.—Pp. xxiii + 199.

Christianity and the Social Order.—By R. J. Campbell, M.A., Minister of the City Temple, London.—London: Chapman and Hall, 1907.—Pp. xiii + 283.

New Worlds for Old.—By H. G. Wells.—London: Archibald Constable & Co., Ltd., 1908.—Pp. vii + 355.

WHILE these three books agree in insisting upon the common thesis that disinterested social service is the true principle of conduct in the industrial as in other spheres, they differ in several fundamental respects. The first is not, like the other two, an argument for Socialism; and while Mr Peile and Mr Campbell are concerned, as the titles of their books indicate, with the interpretation of Christian morality, and more particularly with its social significance, this question is not directly or explicitly discussed by Mr Wells. While both Mr Peile and Mr Campbell condemn actual, as contrasted with original and ideal Christianity, and both insist upon a literal, as distinguished from a metaphorical interpretation of the ethical teaching of the Gospels, Mr Peile does not agree with Mr Campbell in identifying Christianity with Socialism. The expositions of Socialism, again, offered by Mr Campbell and Mr Wells respectively differ at least in the emphasis placed upon the several elements in the socialistic method, especially in the place assigned to the psychological and ethical factor, the importance and priority of which is so emphasised by Mr Wells as to bring his final position into close approximation to that of Mr Peile. Finally, it may be noted here that the volumes differ materially in literary quality. From this point of view, they fall into two classes; for while all three books are written in a direct and untechnical style, and addressed to the general reader rather than to the specialist, Mr Peile alone attends to the literary form of the discussion. The other two books read like pamphlets; and Mr Wells has some particularly irritating mannerisms, and his humour is not always in the best of taste. Apart altogether from the

contrast with the others, Mr Peile's book challenges immediate recognition in respect of its unusual literary quality.

It is significant of the tendency of contemporary religious thought that the Bampton Lecturer should choose as his subject Christian ethics rather than Christian theology; it indicates that the centre of interest has changed from belief to life, from creed to conduct. Taking as the motto of his first lecture the saying of Mr H. W. Garrod: "If one could have one without the other, I believe it to be an easier feat to accept the dogma and refuse the ethics; indeed, a proof of it is that this is what the greater part of the world *really* does," Mr Peile says: "It cannot, I think, be questioned that the striking contrast between the lives of Christians and the rules which they profess to accept is the great religious difficulty of the present day" (p. 6). "The attitude of the laity to the Churches to-day is not determined by Higher Criticism or questions of Ceremonial (though indifference is probably confirmed by the way we manage these controversies), but by the unsatisfactory lives of professing Christians" (p. 17). "The weakness of our present position does not lie in the inadequacy of our definitions, but in the deadly fallacy of putting definition first and character second. . . . The road to Truth of Doctrine, which is the only guarantee for lasting unity of Doctrine, lies through reform of conduct. Now it is a hard saying, but a wholesome one, that the great majority of mankind have for centuries done everything with the Moral Rule of the Gospel except obey it. They have read it aloud in their churches and their homes; they have enshrined it in a magnificent system of worship; they have glossed and commented it, till it bears a suspicious resemblance to the code which they find most profitable and convenient; they have shaped and trimmed it to fit into a corner of an otherwise pagan existence" (pp. 21, 22). "The real and fundamental contradiction between Christianity and the world" is "the Ethical. . . . This contradiction presents an insurmountable obstacle to very many whom intellectual difficulties would not have much disturbed. Sensible men commonly allow themselves to be guided by authority in matters beyond the range of their personal knowledge and experience; but in the practical world they feel that they are qualified and obliged to judge. And the result is that they decline to make public profession of a creed which they see no prospect, and indeed have no intention, of carrying out in their lives. . . . They will not allow their instinctive honesty to be sophisticated by arguments which interpret the duty of obeying the spirit, and not the letter, of Christ's precepts as a justification for not obeying them at all; and which find in the dominant ethic of each succeeding age a legitimate development of the principles of Christianity" (p. 126).

Mr Campbell draws the contrast still more sharply between conventional, official, or dogmatic Christianity, "the Christianity of the Churches," on the one hand, and the true Christianity, the Christianity of conduct, on the other. It is for him identical with the contrast between the religion of the Pharisees and the religion of Christ. "Jesus contended

that the whole Pharisaic system was thus radically wrong because it divorced righteousness from right doing as between man and man. He held that the true service of God was the service of man, and that the kind of righteousness which left communal obligation out of count was no righteousness at all. . . . It might seem at first sight as though the issue thus declared so plainly between Jesus and the official representatives of respectable religion in His day were non-existent now, but if we think so we shall be greatly mistaken. Precisely the same issue does exist, and parties are ranging themselves in much the same way with much the same result. . . . What is there in common between the simple ethics of Jesus and the complex confessions of faith which now form the basis of Christian fellowship? Their very fundamental assumption is wrong, namely, the assumption that there is such a thing as an individualist salvation, and that it is vitally necessary to believe certain propositions in order to participate in the benefits of the Gospel message. . . . There cannot be such a thing as an individualist salvation, any more than an individualist righteousness. No man is saved until he is willing to be lost in the service of his kind, and there is no salvation worth talking about which does not imply becoming a saviour. . . . The conventional religion of His day commanded the doing of formal deeds; the conventional religion of our day commands the acceptance of formal creeds; and at the basis of both is this vicious individualism which asserts a righteousness in the sight of God apart from all question of one's value to the world" (pp. 125-127). One of the main causes of this unreality in religion, according to Mr Campbell, is the theological conception of "sin" as "a matter wholly between the soul and God, a corruption of human nature which pollutes us in the sight of the all-Father, no matter what our relations to our fellow-men may be" (p. 129). The evil of this view is that "it conduces to self-complacency, although at first sight it seems to do the very opposite. It is individualistic. It withdraws attention from the thing that really matters, namely, a rigid and searching examination of our conduct in relation to human society as a whole" (p. 132). "The one great thing that we need to get rid of in present-day Christianity is this false notion that sin against God is something different from sin against man, or that we can be individually justified before God, and made safe at some future judgment, without taking into account what is owing from us to a needy world" (p. 136). "Unless we do make clear the falsity of this view, we shall never secure that individual sensitiveness to social obligation which is the crying need of the hour" (p. 129).

In dealing with the situation thus described, it is necessary to distinguish carefully two separate questions, which are in great danger of being confused with one another and are not always kept clearly distinct in these volumes, namely, the question of the *original historical* significance of Christianity as "a general rule of life and conduct," and the question of its *present* significance *for us*. The burden of the argument of Mr Peirce and Mr Campbell alike is that the only solution of the problem of conduct

is to be found in a return to the original demands of Christianity upon the individual, and both alike seem to assume that the original and the present significance of the Christian rule of conduct must be identical. Yet both are forced to admit that this cannot be absolutely true, since the conditions of conduct are so different in the two cases. From this point of view it would be less misleading to speak of the Christian Principle or Spirit than of the Christian Rule of conduct, and to remember, throughout the discussion, that the application of the Christian Principle to our own conduct, the interpretation of the significance of the Christian ideal for us, must be the task of a moral judgment educated by moral experience as well as inspired by that ideal or principle in its eternal and essential content. On both questions the views of Mr Peile and Mr Campbell are rather sharply opposed, the latter identifying the original Christian ideal with Socialism and defining present duty in socialistic terms, while the former formulates the ideal in both references in terms of character rather than of conduct, and accordingly stops short of Socialism in both alike.

Taking the questions separately, and in the order stated above, we find Mr Peile insisting that "Christ's plain teaching as He spoke it," and "as we find it in the Gospels," is "a small body of positive precept: it seems to me perfectly clear in meaning, and almost wholly ethical, laying stress on character and on conduct as the necessary test of character" (p. 22). "The teaching of Jesus is intensely, almost exclusively, practical; it touches every part of daily life, and can only be fully carried out by those who are living and working in the world, those for whom it was intended. But for all that, Jesus was not what we call a Social Reformer; He does not give us rules for dealing directly with the social problems of to-day. He did not deal directly with the social and industrial problems of His own time, and seems to have taken little interest in them. He accepted civil government as it stood, whether Roman or Jewish, without desire to change or criticise it. The judge, the officer, the jailer, are forces to be reckoned with; and they are more than that—they are the representatives of justice. He has not detailed commands for us on economic questions, nor, what seems stranger still to us, on Slavery. The merchant, the soldier, the publican, master and servant, are taken as parts of the existing system. . . . Doubtless the cause of this indifference is partly to be found in the conditions of our Lord's human life and consciousness. . . . But whatever we may think of the limits of His foreknowledge, we must admit that He produced in the minds of His immediate disciples a belief that the world was destined speedily to pass away, and that therefore the amending of its institutions was not a business which demanded the thought and care of the Christian" (pp. 103, 104). "I shall therefore not think it necessary to dwell upon the precise attitude of our Lord, or of His immediate followers, towards the Roman or Jewish Government of their day; for I think the more useful course is to acknowledge frankly that He regarded social and political institutions as indifferent, *ἀδιάφορα*" (pp. 134, 135).

Mr Campbell, on the contrary, is equally convinced of the essential identity of primitive Christianity and modern Socialism. He tells us that the first influence that led him to identify himself with the Socialist movement was "the study of Christian origins, which led me gradually but irresistibly to see that the first Christian preachers did not know of any other gospel than that of a universal brotherhood on earth." The realisation that "the other-worldism of conventional Christian preaching . . . was totally absent from primitive Christian thought forced me, like so many others, upon what was practically the Socialist position without any first-hand acquaintance with the Socialist movement itself. I now regard Socialism as the practical expression of Christian ethics and the evangel of Jesus" (Intro., p. ix). "The objective of Socialism is that with which Christianity began its history. Socialism is actually a swing back to that gospel of the Kingdom of God which was the only gospel the first Christians had to preach. . . . I do not mean, of course, to make the foolish statement that primitive Christianity was identical with the Socialism of to-day; it was not, but it was far nearer to the Socialism of to-day than to the official Christianity of to-day. Indeed, we may say that its aim and purpose were so nearly akin to those of present-day Socialism, that the latter may, without the least exaggeration, be described as the inheritor of the true Christianity" (pp. 19, 20). "Nothing could be simpler and more inchoate than the social ethics of Jesus. . . . But the one outstanding fact upon which there cannot be two opinions is the fact that Jesus preached an ideal social order on earth when He preached the Kingdom of God, and that He was driven to do so by His clear perception of the ills under which His countrymen suffered in a time when justice for the oppressed was seldom to be had" (p. 185).

In spite of Mr Campbell's confidence, there can hardly be two opinions that his interpretation of primitive Christianity is the result of a hasty and unwarranted reading of the texts upon which he bases it. It implies a fundamental confusion of the problem of Jesus with that of the Prophet of the Old Testament, and of his conception of his work as Messiah with the conventional Messianic expectations of his time. It seems certain that he did not regard himself as the saviour of his people from the injustice which they suffered at the hands of their Roman masters; that he was not interested in the social or political problem as such, but on the contrary, for reasons suggested by Mr Peile, was entirely preoccupied with the problem of individual righteousness; and that the Kingdom of God which he sought to establish on the earth was an ethical kingdom which was independent, in his judgment, of any particular social, economic, or political conditions. Mr Campbell's inference from the story of the rich young ruler, that "the ideal social order would therefore be one in which there would be no question either of poverty or riches" (p. 77), seems quite unwarranted; the legitimate inference rather is that poverty and wealth are assumed by Jesus as conditions of conduct, and that the attitude of the individual to these conditions determines his moral

standing. Again, he argues that St Luke's version of the first beatitude: "Blessed are ye poor," was the original form of the utterance. "Luke is frankly socialistic in his way of presenting the Master's words; he is always thinking of the poor, their disabilities, and their sorrows" (p. 78). Such an interpretation seems very strained. What Jesus is thinking of, in all the sayings attributed to him in praise of poverty, is spiritual rather than literal poverty. He is not interested in the question of the just distribution of wealth. Poverty and wealth alike are for him the media of the spiritual life, the opportunities of good and evil for the will.

The plausibility of Mr Campbell's argument will be found, I think, to rest upon a confusion between two quite different senses of the term "Socialism," namely, Socialism as a spirit or ideal on the one hand, and Socialism as a particular method of realising this ideal, a particular form of social and economic order, on the other. If Socialism be defined, as it is by Mr Wells, as the substitution of "the spirit of service" for "the spirit of gain," it is with a good right that "we Socialists take up to-day the assertion the early Christians were the first to make, that mankind is of one household and one substance; the Samaritan who stoops to the wounded stranger by the wayside our brother rather than the Levite" (p. 291). But to use the same term in this large ethical sense and in the restricted technical sense in which we generally speak of "the Socialist movement," is fatal to clear thinking.

Before leaving the question of the interpretation of primitive Christianity, it is necessary to refer to the relation of the ethical to the dogmatic element. Here also the two writers under consideration are sharply opposed. In the Pauline theology the Bampton Lecturer sees the revelation of the true significance of the Gospel teaching, Mr Campbell its obscuration and distortion. "We now begin to find," says the latter writer, "the purely moral and social bearing of the original message mixed up with a somewhat elaborate theology, derived partly from Jewish rabbinism and partly from Greek philosophy. This was something quite new. Jesus Himself appears to have had no theology whatever, or, if He had, it was of the simplest. His sympathies and interests were entirely practical, although based upon an invincible belief in the wisdom and goodness of God. What He wanted, and fully expected to see realised, was an ideal Jewish Commonwealth. The theological conceptions afterwards associated with His person and work, especially in the Pauline epistles, were utterly foreign to His mind, and would probably have been quite incomprehensible to Him" (pp. 96, 97). Mr Peile, on the contrary, quotes with approval the statement of Wernle, that "It is just the Jesus of History that St Paul grasped with a deep and clear insight, as the Redeemer who leads . . . to the Fatherhood of God, and to moral freedom, and who, besides setting the high ideal before us, inspires us at the same time with strength and courage for its realisation" (p. 48); and thus, in spite of his initial disclaimer as to the comparative importance of the ethical and the dogmatic elements in Christianity, proceeds to re-establish the old dogmatic and ecclesiastical basis for the Christian ethic. It cannot be said that he

makes any real contribution to the defence of the Faith; nor is it easy to reconcile his acceptance of the results of the Higher Criticism with his allegiance to the old dogmatic theology. In neither book is there anything like a thorough investigation of the relation of the theological ethics of the Pauline epistles to the simpler ethical teaching of the Synoptists.

Passing to the second question, that of the significance of the Christian ideal *for us*, we find Mr Peile maintaining that the work of Christ "was to awake the individual to love and to make the individual realise his responsibility towards his brother; and thus Jesus did a work which beyond all others was for eternity; and still to-day He calls us back from the distracting maze of programmes and panaceas for the reform of the world, to the reform of our own selves, which is the reform which is chiefly needed" (quoted from Wernle, p. 105). "A revolution in human thought and feeling is needed before Society can be brought into accord with Christian principles. But . . . this revolution must be in its origin not outward, brought about by legislation or by violence, but inward and spiritual, essentially the reform of character, not of institutions. Doubtless with the reform of character institutions also would change, but in what direction and with what effect in detail it is not easy nor very useful to conjecture. . . . We can tell in many points what a really Christian Society would not be like; what it would be like we cannot tell with certainty, for want of experience. We have seen, I think, that it would not be realised in any actual or imaginary State of Nature, or Tolstoian Anarchy, which ascribes to human nature, untaught and undisciplined, a virtue which is denied it alike by experience and by the Christian doctrine of Sin. Still less perhaps can it be identified with the Social System now generally existing, with its maxims of expediency and compromise, its toleration of misery and oppression in some classes as the basis of ease and culture in others, and its acceptance of selfishness as the only and even as the right motive of human action. . . . Some change is needed. But all the more we must be on our guard against rashly identifying the spirit of Christianity with any of the definite schemes of political and social reform hitherto offered to us. It is easy to distinguish it from the pedantic individualism which has resulted in the horrors of unrestrained competition and monopoly. And indeed for the moment such thorough-going individualism is discredited. We are more tempted to turn to the rising sun of Socialism, a name of terror or of promise as it may be, but to-day indifferent to no one. And we do well to turn to it, and study it long and earnestly, for there is much in it that comes from Christ and makes for His cause. But Socialism, as we know it, has not always kept its policy true to its ideals. It has been tempted to make—nay, it has already made—its appeal to selfishness; and, so far, has become a disintegrating instead of an uniting force. The true Socialism is one aspect of Christianity, and cannot exist apart from it; but there is a pressing danger that in our enthusiasm we may entangle our Christianity in the details of a programme, and be content with the effort to make men act unselfishly in this or that against

their wills, instead of training the unselfish character to blossom into right action. In truth, all sincere political theories have their place in the system of the Christian State; it will use them all—the ideal of kingship, the ideal of aristocracy, the ideal of personal liberty, the ideal of common responsibility—in due balance and co-ordination; for not one of them is naturally alien and incapable of being Christianised” (pp. 171–173).

From this long quotation, which was necessary to the representation of Mr Peile’s carefully balanced position, it will be seen that he emphasises character at the expense of institutions. And from the point of view of Socialism itself we find Mr Wells admitting almost as much. “Unless you can change men’s minds you cannot effect Socialism, and when you have made clear and universal certain broad understandings, Socialism becomes a mere matter of science and devices and applied intelligence” (p. 282). His book differs from other presentations of the theory chiefly in its insistence upon the psychological and ethical factors in the socialistic movement, upon the paramount importance of the “Good Will,” enlightened by intelligence. But the correlative truth of the importance of institutions must never be forgotten. As Mr Campbell cogently argues, the Sermon on the Mount is impracticable—a mere counsel of perfection—“in such a society as ours to-day. I will defy any man to live by the principles of the Sermon on the Mount without coming to grief, so long as our present system is tolerated. What we want is a system wherein it could and would be practised without loss and ruin to those we love most” (pp. 155, 156). That, in a very real sense, character presupposes institutions, is admitted by Mr Peile himself. “We have no right for their sake, or for our own, to preach contentment to the poor, or bribe them into acquiescence, until we have given them the elementary justice of an equal opportunity of living the life which God intended for them. . . . Until that is secured, until the principle of justice is acknowledged and acted on, all philanthropic effort which teaches contentment, which aims chiefly at the maintenance of the established Social Order, and has not for its purpose a permanent moral improvement, is a wrong to the poor, and a specious anodyne for the consciences of the rich. It is such Philanthropy as this which our Lord pictures as sending men with fatal self-confidence to face the Judgment” (pp. 120, 121). From this point of view Socialism rightly insists, as Mr Campbell puts it, that “the highest kind of life is only possible when the material basis has been properly secured” (p. 174). Mr Peile’s argument for the importance of the Church as an ethical institution may be extended to the State, to the social and economic order; and it is one of the most valuable features of Mr Wells’s presentation of the subject that he insists with special emphasis upon the preservation and improvement of the family life as one of the primary ends of Socialism. In this sense we may say, with Aristotle, that the State is the presupposition of the moral individual, and that the development of character and of institutions must proceed *pari passu*.

JAMES SETH.

Studies in Christian Doctrine.—By James Drummond, LL.D., D.D., late Principal of Manchester College, Oxford.—London: Philip Green, 1908.

THIS learned and attractive book has many claims to the attention of all who care for good Christian theology. It is written in a serene temper befitting the pursuit of simple truth; it is full of beautiful words and ideas; and the discussion frequently rises into a strain of grave, quiet eloquence which forms a worthy vesture of convincing thought. Much of the higher *Lebensweisheit* is stored within its pages. Throughout the reader is able to yield himself to the drift of argument with the pleasurable consciousness of being in the hands of a master. So many write upon theology who either do not know, or cannot think; it does not need to be said at this time of day that Principal Drummond is one from whose scholarship and intellectual methods the most practised minds gain. We are under debt to him, therefore, for having placed before the public a continuous and reasoned exposition of Christian doctrine as he views it. No man can do a better service to his generation, if the doing of it be competent and impressive. Hence I think that I will best show my deep respect for Dr Drummond's work by criticising some of his opinions in as direct and precise terms as I can.

Perhaps it is worth saying that the word "Studies" in the title must not be interpreted as if the movement of the book touched only a few of the major points of doctrine. For practical purposes, it really is a system of Dogmatics. Doubtless, as the author reminds us in the preface, the volume contains no philosophical discussion of religious belief as such, no review of the fundamental problems of biblical criticism, nor any survey and estimate of modern schools of theology. But a sketch of Dogmatics may have a real completeness of its own without these accessories. And here all the normal topics composing the subject-matter of that discipline are set out in order and handled in a systematic way.

But the value of Dr Drummond's book is considerably lessened, I feel, by his application of a principle stated by him very early in these terms: "I am well aware that even within the confessional churches many theologians consider themselves only loosely bound by their standards . . . but till the standards are altered, they hold the field, against individual opinion, as the collective expression of the Church's thought. . . . It was with these publicly recognised doctrines that I had to deal, leaving to the critical historian an estimate of the views of individual thinkers" (p. vii.). The significance of this is plain. It means that Dr Drummond regards himself as free to pass by the greater portion of the research and discussion which make up the Evangelical Dogmatics of the nineteenth century, on the avowed plea that those who carried on that discussion adhered, in the majority of cases, to churches bound by such creeds as the Formula of Concord or the Westminster Confession, and are therefore so far disqualified. In the first place, however, this is quite unfair to the creeds

themselves. The Westminster Confession declares that "the supreme Judge, by which all controversies of religion are to be determined . . . can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking in the scripture"; and if the Judge, thus defined, bring new truth from time to time out of the scripture, it is surely meant that His voice is to be listened to. Furthermore, the attitude thus taken at the outset to modern evangelical theology has the result that Dr Drummond tends to overlook or discount many of the attempts made within the last hundred years to restate Christian belief by interpreting the Christian consciousness afresh; these attempts having been made, in an immense number of cases, by theologians whose chief aim was, while holding fast to the "positive" standpoint, to elicit and state more completely the Gospel as presented in the New Testament. In thinking of these writers, Dr Drummond's mind is preoccupied by their relation to the creeds they had signed, and implicitly he rather minimises the value of their contribution. But in their own minds, as Thomasius puts it, their relation to the Church is that of a child, not a slave. Thus, to take one example, a large number of the criticisms passed in this book upon the "two-nature" theory of Christ's person, or the purely forensic doctrine of the Atonement, are familiar to students of the best Protestant Dogmatic, and were promulgated long ago by men who did not consider that their hearty acceptance of the Reformed Faith debarred them from trying to improve its doctrinal statement. I do not propose at this point to outline an argument for the use of creeds, as symbols of religious agreement and bases of practical co-operation; but it is at least permissible to urge that Dr Drummond's principle, as he thus applies it in this book, is somewhat too harsh and doctrinaire. To bring objections to this or that dogma which its best friends have seen and provided for, by proving, or seriously believing they had proved, that such vulnerable parts belong not to the substance of the dogma but its form, is not a method that furthers the progress of discussion so much as might be wished; and to myself it is the disappointment of Dr Drummond's fine book. On the principle that a theory is as strong as its best and maturest statement, one might have expected him to take a different line. Hence at various points I feel that what may be called an inverted concern about orthodoxy has lowered the modern interest of his work. To say of modal theories of the Trinity little more than that "they have been condemned as unorthodox"; or of the Kenotic Christology that it has been "put forward in modern times by some theologians who contrive to maintain a reputation for orthodoxy," that it is rank heresy, and that neither Thomas Aquinas nor the Formula of Concord would have had anything to say to it, is, I must submit, *parum ad rem*. Not to speak of us Presbyterians, although we have our Declaratory Acts, it has no relevance to a Congregationalist theologian like Principal Garvie. The supreme question in regard to all such theories is not their relation to documents of the sixteenth or seventeenth century, but their actual value for the interpretation of the beliefs and experiences of a distinctively Christian mind.

One can only hail most of what Dr Drummond has written in the first three parts of his book with cordial agreement. At all events serious reservation would apply mainly to his chapter on the Trinity. It is unquestionable that, as he remarks, not a single passage exists in the New Testament "where it is affirmed that there are three persons in one God, or in one Divine substance"; but this is of less importance if we consider the theologian's function to be the explicit statement of what is implicitly present in the Christian consciousness. The Bible is literature, not dogma. Again, merely on grounds of exegesis the pages (127 ff.) are unconvincing in which Dr Drummond argues that even a rudimentary Trinitarian doctrine is foreign to the Bible. For if we start from such passages as 2 Cor. xiii. 14, or Rom. viii. 11, we can see alike the beginnings of the doctrine and the presuppositions on which it rests, and nothing could be clearer than that in the Pauline benediction in 2 Cor. xiii. 14 there is no idea of combining together the names of God Himself, a man, and an influence. St Paul appears to mean, rather, that in Christ God has been personally revealed and in the Spirit personally communicated to the souls of men. And I believe that in meaning this he goes on the principle, whether consciously or not, that God can be perfectly revealed in One who *is* that which He reveals. I should also take exception to the argument (p. 150) that if we say that God's love must have had an eternal object we must say the same thing about His creativeness; that not only the Son but the world is of necessity co-eternal with God. Is not this to prove too much? By parity of reasoning, would Dr Drummond not have to urge a similar inference as to the punitiveness of God? Yet surely when we try to do so it becomes clear the love of God and His punitiveness (supposing we believe that He does punish) do not belong equally to His essence. The Christian mind would say, I think, that He is love, but *may* create or punish. Dr Drummond's objections to the Trinitarian doctrine are undeniably put with great force and persuasiveness. They leave the impression that it is extremely difficult to believe in the Trinity; only a little less difficult, one would add quite seriously, than to disbelieve. In this chapter, be it noted, finally, there are many luminous hints for the student of the history of Dogma.

In an earlier chapter Dr Drummond gives an account of the Religious Element in man, from the point of view of theology, which it would be an impertinence in me to praise. He states with a new force the familiar argument that the religious feeling, which does not terminate in itself, points to an object or objects answering to it. "For the practical necessities of life," he writes, "we have to accept the laws of our intelligence as in the main to be depended on. If thus to accept them virtually involves belief in God, then it seems wiser to regard this fact as a proof of the Divine existence than to fall back on the utter impossibility of all knowledge. . . . In every investigation their trustworthiness is the one thing that we assume, and without it all progress would be impossible. We can only reason from that which is generally admitted to that which

is less so; and if anyone chooses to reply that our nature may be permanently and radically wrong in its construction, I cannot see that there is anything more to be said. But if anyone declines to fall back upon this hypothesis, to him it may be a convincing argument that, if there be an original and permanent provision for religion in our nature, and if the religious sentiments point to some supreme object, this is a legitimate evidence of the existence of some object answering to these sentiments" (p. 36). Dr Drummond's view of religion is one which will not go into "some neat little formula." Thus he keeps intellectualism firmly in its place. Hume's curious definition of religion as "the practice of morality and the assent of the understanding to the proposition that God exists" is typical of the kind of view which he criticises in an unanswerable way. And those sections which deal with the testimony of the religious element to doctrines and the possible sources of error may be commended to all theorists about religion who, in fear of falling into the Scylla of sentimentality, are close upon the Charybdis of intellectualism.

Passing now to the doctrines of the Person and Work of Christ, I may advert briefly to Dr Drummond's tendency to use what may be called the argument of "astronomical intimidation." Thus on p. 278 he asks why our tiny sphere was selected for the amazing miracle of the Incarnation; and that this consideration strongly influences his mind is proved by his returning to it, with emphasis, more than once (pp. 156, 165). But the implied objection is surely not in place in a religion that counts one spirit worth more than all the universe. If the manifestation of God to us has been unique (though as to its uniqueness we really have no information), we may judge that there is a unique necessity to which it is adapted. Man is not less great or less capable of Divine sonship because there may be creatures like him elsewhere. In this department of his subject, however (I mean the Christology), Dr Drummond appears to me to exhibit a real if somewhat perplexing desire to attach his conclusions to the teaching of the New Testament, while yet resolutely declining to go along with apostolic men in their main convictions about Christianity. There would be little exaggeration in saying that recent exegesis, conservative and critical alike, is agreed in finding that the writers of the New Testament are already well on the way to the loftiest predicates the later Church has ascribed to Jesus Christ.¹ That one party of moderns call this process a deification, and the other a recognition of essential divinity, matters little. In either case a religious estimate of Jesus is involved to which the categories employed in the present volume are totally inadequate. Jesus was, of course, pre-eminent in religious character and originality; He was also on any terms the man chosen to found a universal spiritual brotherhood; but these affirmations, if given out as fixing the limits of the truth, after all refer Him to the sphere of man, not of God. There are phrases in the Epistles which at least *prima facie* go much further than this, but Dr Drummond would reduce their significance by suggesting that they

¹ Cf. Holtzmann, *Neutest. Theol.*, i. p. 353.

were influenced by the imperial and religious language of the time, and are more or less illustrated by the practice of calling Plato a god, and Ptolemy a saviour, and Nero a vicegerent of heaven. This seems to me to have little force, so long as the conception of deity present in the New Testament is not proved to be equally versatile and elastic with that of paganism. The mere use of the name "saviour," "deliverer," or even "god," is of little moment; what really matters is the antecedent idea of deity on which men went, and what this was in the case of all the New Testament writers we know quite well. They were ethical monotheists. Bringing the problem to a head, however, Dr Drummond says in one place that we must ask "not whether the Apostles ascribed great prerogatives to the risen Christ, but whether they thought that He possessed these by virtue of His eternal nature, or on the contrary God *made* him Lord and Christ, had *raised* him from the dead, had *glorified* him, had *appointed* him judge of the world, had *given* a name above every name" (p. 265). Again, merely as a matter of exegesis, I should have said that the problem was not one of *either—or*, as Dr Drummond puts it, but rather of *both—and*. It is not the alternative that strikes me as I read the apostolic descriptions of Jesus Christ; it is the conjunction. Nothing is clearer in Phil. ii. 5–11, for example, than both sides: Christ has been by God highly exalted, yet His original nature was divine. In fact, the chief problem—or difficulty, or mystery—which the New Testament left to dogmatic theology is that of thinking out and construing to intelligence two things which the apostles simply put side by side—the true deity of Jesus Christ and His real subordination to the Father. Dr Drummond's reply would probably be that for good reasons he must refuse to bow to the dicta even of apostolic men. I should consider such a position worthy of great respect; but the point of view from which it is defended in this work appears to me to imply the further position that, even if the Incarnation had been a fact, we could never have been credibly informed of it. That is a philosophy of history and of life which I cannot but deem untenable.

In the ecclesiastical doctrine of Atonement Dr Drummond finds that amid much that is false and unchristian there is not a little that is sublimely true. He singles out such ideas as the heinousness of sin, the impossibility of earning God's favour, the solidarity of mankind, vicarious suffering (in a certain loose sense), and the representative character of Christ as the noblest member of the race. These are great conceptions, and their greatness does not suffer in Dr Drummond's deeply spiritual exposition. But neither does he at this point keep in view the best statements of "reconciliation"; and I am sorry that he should have allowed himself to speak of the idea of substitution as a "tossing off of our selfishness and sensuality upon another" (p. 354). In the theology of the Reformation, let it be remembered, as in St Paul, the thought of substitution is held and exhibited in the full light of personal union with Christ. I venture also to think it mistaken to suppose that the matter is virtually settled by pointing out that God does not need to be reconciled. This we shall all concede.

"Where reconciliation is spoken of in St Paul," says a recent advocate of the substitutionary view, "the subject is always God, and the object is always man." But this reconciliation is not for St Paul, as it is for Dr Drummond, a work done in our souls; it is a work accomplished by Christ in a death for sin. It is a free gift of God to men in the Cross; something that is real before they accept it and are changed. The love of God, according to the apostles, is not shown in His dispensing with an atonement, but in His providing at His own cost the atonement we sinners need. It is difficult to believe that the modern mind has reached a nobler conception of what love in God can be and do.

Space fails me now, however, to signalise a multitude of passages, in these and other chapters of his work, in which Dr Drummond will carry all his readers with him, enlightened and refreshed by a discussion in which rare mental and spiritual power is displayed in high and noble uses. His book not infrequently recalls the recent *System der christlichen Lehre* of Wendt, but the advantage in depth and spirituality is very decidedly on the side of the English writer. Its value to the preacher will be great; and in proof I may fitly conclude this notice with the quotation of these characteristic words, breathing such an air of faith and beauty as not soon to be forgotten: "It is the peculiarity of Christian discipleship that it is not obedience to a law, however sacred, or the acceptance of a theology, however true, but the impress of a Spirit and a communion of Love; and if that blessed image which has dwelt as a redeeming power in the heart of Christendom were to fade out of the memory, no teaching could take its place as an uplifting power, for the kindling touch of sympathy and love would be wanting" (p. 290).

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Through Scylla and Charybdis, or the Old Theology and the New.—

By George Tyrrell.—London: Longmans, 1907.—Pp. xii+386.

THIS is not altogether a new work, but mostly a putting together of papers which have appeared during a considerable period in various reviews, from the *Catholic World* to the *Quarterly Review*. There is added an introduction, and short notes on each paper. These papers are milestones in the march of the writer in his search for a reformed Christianity and an ideal Catholicism.

Mr Tyrrell has every right to claim a sympathetic treatment from reviewers. In England it falls to the lot of few to suffer for their religious opinions: Mr Tyrrell has done so, and he may fairly claim that one of the Beatitudes is on his side. But the path of the sympathetic reviewer of this book is not altogether easy. The author writes (p. 4): "The process through which I have reached my present position will appear as a wavering, rather than as a straight line—a result that should greatly facilitate the critic's task." One critic at least does not feel that his

task is thus made easier. Rather, it becomes more difficult to do justice to a writer who leaves open inconsistencies in his pages. In many ways Mr Tyrrell belongs to a very advanced school of religious liberalism. He is in a measure a pragmatist; he places the Divine will at the root of history; he draws a broad line of distinction between religion and theology; he insists strongly on the doctrine of Divine immanence; he speaks boldly as to the evils of priestcraft; he is set against papal infallibility. Yet he clings, as is perhaps natural to one trained in the Jesuit school, to much with which other liberals would willingly dispense. He sometimes, in my opinion, puts the new wine into very old bottles.

When Matthew Arnold died, the critics were mostly of opinion that his poetry would live, but that his theological papers were unimportant. Time has not confirmed this view. Every year shows the drift of liberal religious thought in the direction of Arnold. Dr Sanday has found great likeness between Harnack's religious views and Arnold's. And Mr Tyrrell almost throughout his book is preaching from Arnoldian texts, though with some reservations. Over and over again he insists on the distinction between revelation, or prophetic truth, and theology, or, as he calls it in a later chapter, theologism. Revelation, he holds, comes first as an impulse to activity, and later is crystallised in thought: but thought at best can only give an imperfect rendering of revelation. As Matthew Arnold said, the language of religion consists of words thrown out at a great reality, and not comprehending it. But theology, which tries to enclose the reality in a system, is in Mr Tyrrell's view everything that is bad. It is a pseudo-science. It is the foe, the bitter and persecuting foe, of all scientific knowledge of the world. It seems to be Dr White's book on the warfare of science with theology which has opened Mr Tyrrell's eyes to all the vileness of theologism. So set is he against it that he even objects to attempts to restate doctrine in the language of modern thought (p. 235); which is going rather far.

But when Mr Tyrrell comes to speak of revelation, he falls into a much more conservative tone. Sometimes he says that though revelation did not cease with the Apostles, yet its great and classical period then comes to an end (p. 324). But often he writes as if he thought the Christian inspiration limited to Apostolic times. Speaking of his latest position he writes (p. 4): "It is a return to the earlier and stricter view as to the unchanging, unprogressive character of the Apostolic revelation. It is a repudiation of all attempts to mitigate the supposed difficulties of this severer view by theories of development, dialectical or otherwise. It insists rigorously on the theological contention that the dogmatic decisions of the universal Church do not in any way add to or amplify the revelation which it is their purpose but to safeguard and reassert. . . . Understanding by 'dogma' a religious truth imposed authoritatively as the word of God, not as a conclusion of theological reflection, it rejects the very notion of the development, and still more of the multiplication of dogmas, and acquiesces cordially in the patristic identification of novelty and heresy."

Mr Tyrrell here uses the word dogma, much as does M. Le Roy, to signify religious truth of practical bearing. That is well enough, though doctrine is a better word for the purpose. But such is not the dogma of the churches and the theologians. Nor is Mr Tyrrell consistent in his use. We turn to another page (343) and learn that the doctrine of the Trinity, "One God with three Divine Persons," is not a theological development, but a prophetic utterance of the Apostolic revelation. This is of course a perversion of language: whatever the Apostles taught, it was not the doctrine of the Trinity thus formulated. It passes one's wit to discern how theology can be condemned and dogma of this sort saved. And it is even more curious to see that Mr Tyrrell seems to be drifting in the direction of that old-fashioned Protestantism which draws an impassable line between the New Testament as a book and all other books whatever.

Mr Tyrrell's view of the function of the clergy is very liberal. They are experts in theology as physicians are experts in regard to health, and so deserve respect. Also in the Church, as in all societies, it is the views of the exceptional few which are much more worthy of attention than the opinions of the crowd. But no one could condemn priestcraft more bitterly than Mr Tyrrell. If the priests as a class regard themselves as answerable only to "an absentee transcendent God," and to an "assize for whose sentence we must wait till the dawn of eternity" (p. 365), their existence is fraught with great mischief and danger, and it would have slain Christianity but for the deep truths which Christianity embodies. "It is all-important to keep distinct the invisible and spiritual hierarchy from the visible and official hierarchy of the Church; to see in the latter but the symbol and servant of the former; to see in the former Christ Himself, vicariously represented by the latter; to distinguish the pre-constitutional formless Church from the governmental form which it has elaborated for its own Apostolic needs" (p. 49). With most of this liberal English Christians will most cordially agree.

One turns naturally to passages dealing with the authority of the Church, since to a Roman Catholic writer this must always be the crucial matter. Mr Tyrrell strongly upholds the consensus of the Church against papal infallibility—against an interpretation "which finds the organ of Catholic truth in the miraculously guided brain of one man" (p. 355). His enthusiasm for his Church is based on his earnest acceptance of that doctrine of the Divine immanence which lies at the root of so many religious developments of our age. "Along with this sense of the Divine immanence has grown that of the authority of the general over the individual mind and conscience, as being a relatively more adequate organ and expression of God's truth and God's will; as furnishing a standard from which the individual may not fall short, and which he must first attain before he is competent to criticise and develop it" (p. 367). This is well put. And on this ground Mr Tyrrell would find many to agree with him in most sections of the Christian Church. It is not in politics alone that an undercurrent of socialism is making its way. And a modified

socialism may prevail under most systems of church government. Among the followers of Wesley it has easy course. How it is to be combined with the Roman hierarchy is less clear. But of course no one will think the worse of Mr Tyrrell because his own Church looms so large to his imagination that he scarcely sees any other. Secession from her he finds unthinkable. He has strongly protested against abuses in his Church, and has been by her rulers expelled; but he will not take another step in the path of Luther. He considers the best test of truth among those who depart from current and established modes of religious thought to be their agreement among themselves. "When it is clear that a counter-belief is gaining ground in such a way that it represents the 'consensus' of the future; when the same conclusion is reached simultaneously and independently by different thinkers, one may, and at times one ought, to follow the belief that lives in the spirit rather than that which stagnates in the formula" (p. 369). It is evident that Mr Tyrrell thinks that his own views are thus justified; and he is probably right as regards some of them. But surely this consensus is found at the origin of all important movements, whether good or bad: the *Zeitgeist* is not always on the right side. However, consensus is after all an excellent indication of rightness—perhaps the next best after the immortal test of fruits. And by it the great Reformers of the sixteenth century were abundantly justified.

I have touched on a few of the many interesting views embodied in these papers. If they do not set forth a clear and consistent way of thinking, they are full of suggestion and of the religion which appeals to the heart and conscience.

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OXFORD.

Les Evangiles Synoptiques, Traduction et Commentaire.—Par Alfred Loisy.
Chez l'Auteur, Ceffonds, près Montier-en-Der.—Haute-Marne: 1907.
2 vols. Pp. 1009+798.

WE all seem to feel that the historical occasions of religion and their documentary evidences cannot rightly fall under the direct jurisdiction of theology: for only if they do not, can theology appeal to them. Yet we also perceive that living, full religion ever springs, even if protesting, from great traditional bodies and conceptions; and such bodies, of necessity, tend to claim the benefits of history and to evade its tests and risks. But religious faith, itself ever so much more and other than a mere assent to the "Happenedness" of an occurrence at the depth reached by historico-critical evidence, cannot, by a sort of *sanatio in radice*, create such happenings. The Christian spiritual experience, and its guide and mouth-piece, the official Church, have the gift and duty of guarding the faith of the weak, of requiring slow, severely tested work from scholars, and of penetrating and proclaiming the spiritual substance of those happenings. Scholars, simply as such, have no competence in these deepest things. Yet scholars

cannot cease from working within their own sphere, at their own level, with the methods and tests immanent to their specific subject-matters.

M. Loisy's introduction discusses the ecclesiastical tradition and modern criticism; the second, first, and third gospels, the tradition of the gospels; the career and teaching of Jesus; the literary form, tradition of the text, and the extant commentaries. The commentary prefixes to each section a translation of the texts in question, and ever discusses each passage in the light of all its parallels. The brilliant introduction leaves an impression of a joyously destructive, over-confident *maëstria*, which is largely removed by any careful study of the commentary, especially that concerning the public life up to Cæsarea Philippi, vol. i. pp. 429-1009.

I will first describe the book's main critical principles; next, its chief negative historical contentions; and lastly, its chief positive conclusions and materials for a reconstruction.

1. If we compare M. Loisy's critical starting-points with those, say, of Heinrich Holtzmann, we find that both recognise two eye-witness documents as variously incorporated by all three synoptists; and that both measure the chronicling exactitude of the synoptic accounts by the degree to which they presumably utilise those documents. A singly attested act or saying is thus not necessarily less historical than a trebly attested one. For both critics, Mark is the oldest synoptist, and Matthew and Luke embody, besides those primitive documents, practically the whole of Mark. And for both, Matthew is not by Levi-Matthew, and Luke is not by the companion of St Paul.

But M. Loisy finds Matthew to be generally nearer to Jesus' original words than Mark, and Luke to be generally nearer to the aphoristic form of the sayings of our Lord than Matthew: *e.g.* Matt. xxiii. 1-36 as compared with Mark xii. 38-40, and Luke xiv. 34, 35, xi. 33 as compared with Matt. v. 13-16. But above all M. Loisy finds, more precisely and extensively than Holtzmann, Pauline influences in Mark, leading there to certain doctrinal interpretations and expansions of acts and words of Jesus; the Paulinism of Luke would be of a later, mostly attenuated kind.

2. The radicalism of the historical conclusions springs predominantly from the interaction of four convictions. (1) Mark's narrative is to be preferred, where this does not betray the Pauline influence. (2) There are no eye-witness sources beside the two documents mentioned. (3) The expectation of His own speedy second coming was held and taught by Our Lord Himself. (4) The interpretative expansions in Mark can be clearly traced. Practically all the supposed *a priori* anti-miraculous eliminations are thus explained.

(1) The condition of Jairus's daughter was not actual death, because Mark leaves the point undecided. The demoniacs did not proclaim Jesus from the first as Messiah, because only at Cæsarea Philippi did even Peter realise that Jesus was the Christ. The miraculous fishing in Luke v. 1-11 is symbolic not historical here, since it replaces the more ancient, quite simple vocation-narrative of Mark i. 16-20; it may come

from the primitive accounts of the Galilean apparitions, and be identical with John xxi. 1-14. Such symbolism and transference are certainly found in Luke iv. 16-30, where the rejection in Nazareth opens the ministry, whilst Mark (and Matthew) place it much later, in its historical place. Jesus appeared to His disciples first in Galilee, because Jesus Himself and the angel at the grave announce it (Mark xiv. 28, xvi. 7), and Matthew and John xxi. still have Galilean apparitions. Hence Luke is not simply historical in placing all the apparitions in Jerusalem.

(2) The end of Judas, the earthquake and subsequent miracles at Jesus' death, and the watch at the sepulchre in Matthew are secondary, because of their intrinsic improbabilities and their absence from Mark and Luke. The raising of the widow's son, the story of Zacchæus, and Jesus before Herod in Luke are secondary, as not reasonably referable to the primitive documents, penetrated with symbolism, and imitated from eye-witness accounts.

(3) The expectation of Christ's sudden and speedy Parousia is traced throughout the primitive records of Jesus' teaching. Sudden: see the parables of the waiting virgins, the waiting men-servants, and the master's sudden return; the comparison with the days of Noah; and the declarations that the Kingdom comes not in a way capable of being observed (Luke xvii. 20, 21), that the Son of Man's coming will be as a lightning-flash (Matt. xxiv. 27). And speedy: "Ye shall not finish (your round of) the cities of Israel, till the Son of man come" (Matt. x. 23); and "Some of you here standing shall not taste death until ye see the kingdom of God coming in power" (Mark ix. 1). Such an expectation still predominates in St Paul's epistles. But this clashes with most of the "little Apocalypse" (Mark xiii., Matt. xxiv., xxv.), where the Parousia comes after long-enduring signs and the preaching of the Gospel to all nations. The speech is composed of a Jewish apocalypse and of originally separate sayings of Our Lord. In Mark and Luke "the kingdom of heaven" consists of holy souls only; in Matthew it is like a field containing wheat and cockle, and a net holding fish good and bad, for here the kingdom has been identified with the now separately extant visible Church; indeed "Church" occurs in the Synoptists only here (xvi. 18, xviii. 17). These last two passages and the great commission of the Risen One (xxviii. 19, 20) express the consciousness of the Christian Church after its visible discrimination from Judaism predominantly by St Paul.

(4) The declaration as to the mysteriousness of the parabolic teaching in view of blinding the unbelieving Jews (Mark iv. 10-12) is a Pauline interpretation (*cf.* Rom. xi. 8) of the fewness of Jewish Christians; for it conflicts with the patent character and object of all the genuine parables. The conception of Christ's essential service consisting in His redemptive death (Mark x. 45, xiv. 24; *cf.* viii. 37) is a Pauline interpretation (*cf.* Rom. xv. 3; Phil. ii. 7, 8; Gal. i. 4, ii. 20); for it is still absent from the Lukan form of the first saying (Luke xxii. 24, 27), and Jesus' general teaching places that service rather in His general

devotedness to His mission in life and in death. The Last Supper was a solemnly simple Messianic meal, where the cup was blessed first with the words, "Take this and divide it among yourselves; for I say unto you that I will not drink henceforth of the fruit of the vine, until that day when I drink it with you new in the kingdom of God" (Luke xxii. 17, 18); and where the bread was blessed next with parallel words (Mark xiv. 22a; Luke xxii. 16). For the Parousia expectation, here too emphatically proclaimed, would exclude an order to repeat the act; Mark and Matthew are still without the order; the sacramental, institutional words, identical with those of 1 Cor. xi. 23-25, are declared by St Paul as received "of the Lord," in some mystical experience; and the two chalices in Luke are critically best explained by a conflation of the eye-witness account (which will have given the cup first) and St Paul's account (which takes the bread-breaking first, as specially symbolising the death of the true Paschal Lamb). The solemn night-trial before Caiaphas (Mark xiv. 54-65) is an expansion of an informal morning consultation there, since Luke still indicates the morning (xxii. 66), when alone the meeting would be valid. Thus Jesus is first condemned by the Jews as Son of God, before condemnation by Pilate as King of the Jews.

The elimination of the sepulture and empty tomb narratives (Mark xv. 40, xvi. 8) can hardly be grouped under any of the above headings, but is effected because of accumulated vaguenesses and improbabilities in the story itself; contradiction or non-support from previous Mark texts, from Matthew or from St Paul's epistles; and apologetic necessities traceable among the first two generations of believers. The elimination goes beyond Dr Holtzmann.

With respect to the genealogies and infancy-stories in Matthew and Luke, M. Loisy is backed by the majority of critics in holding them to be posterior to St Paul's time.

3. Even this short sketch cannot but leave the impression of ruin upon the average mind, and even trained scholars will readily understand much of the opposition exhibited by the official Church. Yet three sets of considerations materially limit or transform this first impression.

(1) Careful further study is sure to modify certain positions of M. Loisy, and he himself admits that some are less probable than others. But it is already a great advantage that he so strenuously maintains the eye-witness character of two documents underlying all three Synoptists, and even discovers them more often and clearly than do most of the severer critics. His reaction against Mark is, I think, excessive; many a graduated psychological detail appears in Mark alone. The *Parousia* question is of central importance; yet here M. Loisy has a formidable array of solid texts and facts at his back. And Catholic thinkers are already coming to see the spiritual greatness involved in the conviction thus attributed to Our Lord. Among the supposed Pauline expansions, I take that concerning the parabolic teaching to be critically assured. Much further study will be required as to the sepulchre-sections; I am not convinced by them.

The genealogies and prologues cannot be pressed as critically equal to the eye-witness documents.

(2) M. Loisy is probably at his best in the study of the discourses, and establishes convincingly the large majority of the aphorisms and parables as actually uttered by Our Lord; and the central events and acts of the public life and passion are fully maintained. And it is those discourses, joined to these deeds that are the abiding, deepest sources of Our Lord's help and power.

(3) The mysterious efficacy of Christ's death, for all who will accept and follow Him, is a deep reality, already proclaimed by St Paul. Christ's continuous real presence amongst His followers in and through the Holy Eucharist is a profound experience already taught by St Paul, and permeates the Fourth, the sacramental, Gospel. The germ of the Catholic Church was planted by Jesus Himself, in His continuous respectful presupposition of the Jewish Church, His institution of the Apostolic band, with Peter at their head, and His central doctrine of the Kingdom, as a social and visible as well as invisible association of all His followers. And the Church, as a separate institution, with elementary ecclesiastical grades, efficacious sacraments, and normative doctrine, is found especially in the Johannine writings, but already in St Paul and in parts of Matthew.

Thus the great Catholic truths are found springing up promptly from Jesus' own practice and precept. And such reinterpretations as criticism is rendering inevitable, will become less difficult as men get to realise and embrace what are research's surest conclusions—the overwhelming insistence upon hope and the future, in Jesus' actual teaching; and the immense conquests achieved by this, the transcendent element in the rich organism of the Christian spirit. A Christianity that is not creative would be no Christianity; to become like Him is to gain a world-conquering love and life.

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LONDON.

The Programme of Modernism: A Reply to the Encyclical of Pius X., Pascendi Domini Gregis.—Translated from the Italian, with an introduction by A. Leslie Lilley.—London: T. Fisher Unwin.

Il Programma dei Modernisti, risposta etc.—Roma, 1908.

Le Programme des Modernistes, réplique etc.—Paris: Émile Nourry, 1908.

Modernism: A Record and Review.—By A. Leslie Lilley, Vicar of St Mary's, Paddington.—London: Pitman & Sons, 1908.

Lendemain d'Encyclique.—Par Catholici.—Paris: Émile Nourry, 1908.

Christologie: Commentaire des Propositions xxvii-xxviii du Décret du Saint-Office "Lamentabili."—Par M. Lepin, Professeur à l'École supérieure de Théologie de Lyon.—Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne et C^{ie}, 1908.

THOSE who wish to know what "Modernism" really is should not fail to read *Il Programma dei Modernisti*, the Italian answer to the Encyclical.

This has been well rendered both into French and English, in the first case under the auspices of M. Nourry, in the latter under the editorship of the Rev. A. L. Lilley.

"The Programme" is, in the first place, practical, making a clear and definite appeal to the understanding of "the plain man." The philosophical question is, of course, not burked, but it is relegated to the second portion of the book. In fact, the apologia commences by showing that the question is not primarily one of philosophy, as it is made by the scholastically minded author of the Encyclical, but one of fact, history, and criticism. This is the certain ground on which the philosophy of the movement is founded, or, rather, from which it naturally arises. That philosophy is admittedly tentative and hypothetical, but the important point to be recognised is that the facts are such as cannot be fitted into the old scholastic categories, but demand a new synthesis. Authority is content to condemn the syntheses of all those whom it styles "Modernists," while itself offering none in their place—an attitude which is neither helpful nor convincing to those who have learnt to appreciate the importance of the questions that criticism has raised, and the futility of the archaic methods of harmonising, glossing over, and explaining away difficulties, of which a typical example is afforded by M. Lepin's pamphlet, the chief virtue of which consists in its freedom from that theological bitterness which unfortunately distinguishes so many anti-Modernist publications, even those which have issued from high quarters. The Encyclical and the Syllabus *Lamentabili*, which preceded it, have, however, done one good work. They have cleared the air by showing in unmistakable terms the absolute opposition of the Roman Curia to the application of scientific method to Scripture or history. The politic shrewdness of the late Pope suffered the impression to prevail that, in spite of the Syllabus of his predecessor, official Rome might be inclined, gradually and in the long run, to bow to the necessities of things, and come to some terms with modern thought—an illusion which was especially fostered by one of the last acts of the life of Leo XIII., in appointing the Biblical commission on the whole question which the "affaire" Loisy forced to the front. It was a time which encouraged the hopes of the "moderate" critics, and apologists for the Curial attitude, though their delusions were never shared by those who really appreciated the nature of the crisis. But Pius X. is of a very different mould from his predecessor. Mr Lilley's impression of him is that "he is almost a saint, with all the narrowness and intensity of a man of meagre intellect and strong conviction. He is all the more dangerous on that account." But, whatever the danger may be, it can affect nothing but the official system. In the long run it can only be better for the cause of truth that the baselessness of the "moderate" attitude should be exposed.

Another excellent result of this open declaration of war against the scientific method is that it has necessarily stiffened the backs of those who recognise that it cuts at the very foundations, not only of thought, but of

faith as well, and has made them realise that it is no longer possible to compromise, even to the extent of yielding that external submission which in the past had become a matter of custom and form. The editors of the *Rinascimento* refuse to abandon their work when summoned to do so by authority. Loisy submits no more: he continues to write, and is excommunicated. A collective reply to the Papal pronouncement is published in the sacred city itself and in the Italian tongue—surely an unprecedented event! It is thoroughly respectful in tone, but at the same time firm and uncompromising. All this may be disconcerting to many who have been accustomed to the old idea of absolute authority, but it is none the less a great gain from the point of view of sincerity. It is more than this, for it brings the questions out of the old miasmatic atmosphere of timid utterance and suppression into the healthy and bracing breezes of public discussion. In the best sense of the word it advertises the movement, for it enables the outsider to take cognisance of the pros and cons of the controversy. But, at the same time, there are very few who at present understand the actual position of the “Modernists,” or even make an effort to do so. There are many, both Catholics and Protestants, who, in the face of the situation, profess to be unable to understand why “Modernists” should still wish to remain members of their Church. That inability is not shared by Mr A. L. Lilley, who understands and appreciates the “Modernists” position far better than anyone else outside their communion. The claim that he makes is thoroughly justified: “One other merit I can claim for them (*i.e.* the collected articles of which his book is mainly composed) as an exposition of the attitude of the writers with whom they deal. They do not contain, I trust, a single note of the astonishment which is often expressed at the stubborn faithfulness to Rome of men who are labouring to restrain the excesses of Roman authority, and who have reaped for all result condemnation at its hands. That faithfulness maintained hitherto, and which will be maintained in spite of excommunication and anathema, is to me the most intelligible and the most necessary expression of their religious attitude.” But, further, the “Modernists” see, in the essential underlying principles and constitution of their Church, a standing witness against absolutism. Mr Lilley is the only non-Catholic, except, perhaps M. Paul Sabatier, who thoroughly appreciates this point of view. He says: “A Catholicism, with its implicit, if not always explicit, faith in a growing Divine revelation, could afford to distinguish, even if at times it had failed to do so, between the absolute spirit of that revelation and the contingent forms in which it had from time to time expressed itself. Protestantism, in its anxiety to preserve some fixed and authoritative nucleus of belief, had chosen arbitrarily among its contingent forms and given to some of them an absolute value. The Protestant was always timidly attempting to guarantee the absolute of faith by some historical or philosophical contingency. The Catholic had been trained to find the absolute of faith in that to which the universal conscience of humanity witnessed, *Quod semper, quod*

ubique, quod ab omnibus." It would be impossible to state the issue more succinctly or clearly. Again, it is not generally recognised by non-Catholics that the crisis is one which affects all churches, though it is more acute in the Roman Catholic, owing to the more perfect organisation of the reactionary elements. Mr Lilley is, however, quite clear on this point, as on others. "New conditions," he says, "have raised new problems. And as the new conditions are the same for all, so the new problems are the same for all."

One of the books recently published by M. Nourry, *Lendemains d'Encyclique*, also puts the issue very definitely. The author of this vigorous little volume thus sums up the effects, from the old theological standpoint, of the recognition of the mythical character of the early chapters of Genesis:—"The story of Adam and Eve is a myth. Rome knows it, but her dogma requires it to be history. If she were to allow this, she would not be relinquishing a mere legend, but sacred history, the root of her whole teaching. She would be surrendering to criticism the Fall of Adam and Eve, with its fatal consequences to their posterity; the creation of the world from nothing; the existence of a Personal Creator; the soul of man made in God's image; the unity of origin of the human race; the terrestrial Paradise; the perfection of man when he left the hands of God; original sin; the birth of knowledge from disobedience; the origin of sensual appetite, of suffering, and of death from the same source; lastly, the need of redemption and the promise of a Redeemer—that is to say, all the elements, *all the first principles* of the Christian faith. . . . The concrete facts, through which St Paul and St Augustine (who are responsible for the theory of original sin) imagined they had grasped those principles, have no existence."

It may, possibly, be urged that this point of view affects Rome only, owing to the absolute rigidity of her philosophical and theological system; that educated Protestants have, for the most part, recognised the mythical character of the early chapters of Genesis, while their faith in the redemption of the Cross runs in orthodox grooves. But Rome, at least, teaches a useful lesson in consistency. She insists, with unanswerable logic, that, where the old intellectualist position is maintained as regards the latter, it must hold good for the former, on which it is founded. The whole scheme of salvation, in the old-fashioned sense, depends upon at least as literal an acceptance of the Fall of Adam, with the original sin that resulted, as of the orthodox theories of the Atonement. If the ideas of original sin and of the Fall are interpreted in a spiritual and symbolical sense, as meaning the retrograde tendencies of man's nature, a like subjectivising of the conceptions of Redemption and Atonement must inevitably follow.

The fact is that we have come at length to the parting of the ways, and it is useless to attempt to disguise the truth any longer. Not only is "the day of partial heresies past," but the day of hoping anything in the near future from the official Church. This view is not pessimism; it is

simply looking facts in the face. It avoids the common error of identifying the Church with officialdom. As regards the Church at large there is room for hope. As Mr Lilley says: "That there are eyes to see the truth and voices to speak it is surely a most hopeful sign of the future of the Church of France. Still more hopeful is it that the eyes and voices are so many." Elsewhere, in writing of the Encyclical *Pascendi*, he says: "It is they and a large section of the younger clergy in France and Northern Italy, and even in Sicily—those who ought to know are bold enough to say, the majority of them—who will be straitened in mind and spirit by this action of authority." But, in his view, the repressive measures enjoined by the Encyclical are doomed to failure. The Curia may be able to a certain extent to suppress outward symptoms, but it cannot kill ideas. Its action can only recoil upon itself.

And, in saying this, there is no intention of denying that authority must always exist, in the proper sphere of its exercise. Those who express surprise that men should wish to remain in a Church, whose authorities have condemned the very grounds on which they profess to belong to it, forget that Modernists hold, for no mere arbitrary reasons, that, in condemning them on these grounds, authority has exceeded its powers.

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Studies in the Inner Life of Jesus.—By Alfred E. Garvie, M.A. (Oxon.), D.D. (Glas.).—Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

The Life of Christ in Recent Research.—By William Sanday, D.D., LL.D., Litt.D.—Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907.

Jesus and His Teaching.—By Erich von Schrenck. *Mag. Theol.* Translated by J. Warschauer, M.A., D.Ph.—James Clarke & Co.

The Life of Christ according to St Mark.—By W. H. Bennett, M.A., D.D., Litt.D.—Hodder & Stoughton, 1907.

L'Évangile. Synopse, Vie de Notre-Seigneur, Commentaire par Abbé Verdunoy.—Paris: J. Gabalda & Cie, 1907.

To Christ through Criticism.—By Richard W. Seaver, M.A., B.D.—T. & T. Clark, 1907.

The Apologetic of the New Testament.—By E. F. Scott, M.A. (Glas.), B.D. (Oxon.).—Williams & Norgate, 1907.

The One Christ—an Enquiry into the Manner of the Incarnation.—By Canon Frank Weston, B.D.—Longmans, Green & Co., 1907.

Christus Futurus.—By the Author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia*.—Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1907.

THE order in which the above books stand must not be taken as an indication of their relative merits, but has been adopted in view of their

subject-matter. The first five are not exactly "Lives," but studies in the Life and Teaching of Jesus. Of these, Dr Garvie's studies are the most important. They are not only the work of a scholar, but of a spiritual seer; of a man who thinks deeply as well as widely. The outlook is modern, but is balanced by distinctly conservative leanings. Indeed, two men constantly struggle for the mastery in this volume—the Scotsman and the German, the dogmatic theologian and the religious psychologist, and when the balance is not maintained it is the latter that usually goes under. His sources are mainly the Synoptic Gospels, but the Fourth Gospel, which he considers was written by John the Presbyter and not by the son of Zebedee, is laid under considerable tribute; indeed, to lean so heavily upon it weakens some of Dr Garvie's positions, as we shall see. He even admits that such sections as the high-priestly prayer are unhistorical. What better reason is there for believing the historicity, say, of the first chapter when both are alike cast in the historical mould? His defence, however, of the historical value of the Gospels as a whole as against the Religio-Historical school is convincing; for "an explanation that does not adequately account for the worth of Jesus Christ in His historical function and achievement is not historical" (p. 66). The historical valuation of Jesus is that He was Divine in a supreme and unique sense; for this was the impression made upon His early disciples and upon subsequent generations. But while Jesus was this, He was also perfectly human, fitting into a distinctly historical niche. This our author asserts and strenuously seeks to maintain, but has great difficulty in doing so at times on account of theological predispositions. This appears in the chapter on the Virgin Birth, an incident considered credible because of the sinlessness of Jesus, and because "no convincing evidence against the fact of the virgin birth can be found in the New Testament." But does not the fact that such a stupendous event has no place in the earliest tradition—a tradition belonging to an age in which the miraculous was the chief sign of divine manifestation—rule it out as unhistorical? To say that Mark leaves it out "because it did not fit in with his doctrinal scheme" is an unconvincing explanation. Then, the attitude of Christ's own mother, who never seems to have understood Him, is simply unthinkable if she held in her heart such profound knowledge. And certainly Jesus gives no hint that He was acquainted with Mary's secret, and used most frequently, when speaking of Himself, the title "Son of Man." Dr Garvie regards Jesus as having accepted His vocation—"a saviour from sin by the sacrifice of Himself"—at His baptism, and that His ideal from the first was not the successful Messiah, but the "Suffering Servant" of Isaiah's prophesy. Of course His work was to save from sin, for had He not taken up the Baptist's commission? but that it was to be accomplished through suffering was by no means clear at first; that idea seems to have been forced upon Him by subsequent events. One cannot help the impression that our author reads later experiences into this early episode. There can be traced two conflicting pictures of the Messiah in the Old Testament: the one portraying

him as a conquering and the other as a suffering person. Might not Jesus, being well acquainted with both—for He knew intimately the Scriptures—have accepted and adopted each conception in turn? He certainly opened His ministry with a note of gladness: His message was good news. At first He had a great measure of success, and it appeared as if there would be a wide response to His call. Up to a certain point in His ministry the idea of a successful Messiah was the more appropriate. But popularity waned, the people grew less enthusiastic and frequently hostile, the rulers actively opposed, and it became clear to His prescient eye that failure, at least for the present, was inevitable; that suffering and possibly death were unavoidable. Now the other picture of the Messiah rose before Him; God's anointed could be no other than the Suffering Servant of the Lord. It is true He speaks much of His death during His later ministry, but except in Mark ii. 19–20 (where Jesus, as a successor of John the Baptist, seems to anticipate that a similar fate might befall Him to that which had overtaken His forerunner) the Synoptists do not represent Him as referring to His decease until after He comes into conflict with the Scribes, from which point He begins to see that failure (at least from an earthly point of view) and not success is likely to mark His mission. The Temptation in the wilderness is regarded as pertaining to Ends and not to Means; but seeing that the former had already been chosen, it would appear that means were the point in debate; *i.e.* whether the Kingdom should come by material measures or by the direct power of God. As to the sphere of His vocation, Dr Garvie contends for a pre-Galilean ministry based upon statements recorded in the first chapter of St John: statements irreconcilable with the Synoptists. He, however, attempts a reconciliation by the rather far-fetched suggestion that Jesus' disciples were turning away from Him in consequence of His too open declaration of Messiahhood, and that in order to regain their adherence Jesus modifies His claim when they settle in Galilee. That Jesus should find His first disciples—fishermen of Galilee—in the vicinity of Jerusalem is antecedently improbable, although it must be admitted their ready response indicates some previous knowledge. But this might easily have been gained in Galilee, for Jesus, being presumably a building carpenter, would be known widely in that province. Dr Garvie uses St John's incident of the Samaritan woman to tone down the national exclusiveness of Jesus and to suggest that universalism was a note in His ministry from the first, seeming not to observe the fact that He said even to her, "salvation is of the Jews." There is more than a hint of special pleading in His treatment of the Syrophœnician incident, for Christ's unwillingness to grant the request of a Gentile woman is laid at other doors: "In His language He may not be expressing His own feeling or wishes, but simply echoing the opinions and sentiments of His disciples" (p. 194). That Jesus granted the woman's request, shows that He was susceptible to influences coming from all quarters, and (might it be added) willing to learn from a Gentile. Anyhow, the incident seemed to have marked a stage in His Universalism. The sections on the Limita-

tions of Christ's Knowledge and on the Perfection of His Character are excellent, and might be studied with the concluding chapter on the Person of Jesus. The writer rejects the several Kenotic theories, but accepts the doctrine of kenosis, which he regards as an eternal and not a temporary process, and the form of it expressed in the historical Jesus as but a phase of its continuous evolution. The kenosis involved a real limitation of our Lord's knowledge, except His knowledge of God as Father and of Himself as Son; in these it was perfect. In regard to His moral perfection, is it necessary (in order to preserve it) to assert that there was "no sinful tendency" in Him?—a statement which seems to place Him outside human conditions; for it is hard to see how there could have been any real temptation if there were no impulse, or temporary tendency in the wrong direction, to be resisted. On the conflict in Gethsemane our author is less satisfactory. That its essence was the fear of an "interruption of His filial communion with God" seems more than questionable, and to speak of these experiences as confirming the "objectivity of the Atonement" is to invest them with undue theological significance. The scene was primarily subjective. The crisis and its bitterness were personal. Jesus was drinking the cup for Himself; indeed in no other way could His experience have been real, and only by being real could it have had any inward merit or outward efficiency. In a word, Jesus did what humanity, or any other member of the race, *ought* to have done under the circumstances. The temptation, however, to refer further to this really able volume—and one evidence of its strength is the number of interrogation marks it compels—must be resisted.

Dr Sanday's book, which, with others he has recently published, should be regarded as containing prolegomena to his expected Life of Christ, is composite in character, but not disconnected, although the unity is in parts difficult to trace. The most important section is that entitled "Twenty Years of Research," the burden of which is to make known and discuss the growing influence of the Eschatological school in Germany. Dr Sanday, if not a complete convert to these views, has a strong leaning in their direction—"I doubt if we have realised to what an extent He (Jesus) conceived of the Kingdom of Heaven . . . as essentially future and essentially supernatural" (p. 120)—and thinks that the fuller recognition of the apocalyptic element in His teaching would supply a clue to the better interpretation of many things. But the Professor, while possessing an open mind, is none the less a critic. As Sir W. Ramsey has said, "Dr Sanday can respect and admire five-sixths of an author whose remaining sixth part moves him to indignation." Wrede he considers "wrong and distinctly wrong-headed," and even Schweitzer, for whom he expresses great admiration, he thinks overstates his case when he refuses to admit that Christ's idea of the Kingdom had any other than an eschatological content. The question of miracles is approached with all the author's sanity and fairness. He thinks that the "two ends"—the religious and scientific—most nearly meet in "answers to prayer," and in the power known to be resident in "personality." Prayer is an energy

that unites the soul within with the Power without; some souls have stood in more intimate relationship to that Power than others, and unusual (miraculous) things have frequently happened as a consequence. The power of "personality" over other beings and over natural phenomena is becoming well known, and the rationale of Christ's miracles lies "within the bounds of personality, of character and of will." But such activity is not necessarily arbitrary, for "miracle is not really a breach of the order of nature; it is only an apparent breach of laws that we know in obedience to other and higher laws that we do not know" (p. 216). But the question arises immediately, is a phenomenon so defined a miracle? Dr Sanday says "Yes," for "the essential part is the Divine act; and that, I think, is proved. . . . An act is no less Divine because it is fundamentally according to law." Quite true, but does not such a reply involve this objection? To speak of miracle as a "Divine act" carries the inference that an ordinary occurrence is not Divine. What seems to be needed is "some modification of statement." Would it not be better to use some other word than miracle, which implies an arbitrary interference with the ordinary methods of Divine action; a term more suitable to an age saturated with the idea of Divine Immanence, where nothing is natural and nothing is supernatural, but where everything is Natural-Supernatural?

We regret that space is inadequate to set forth the merits of Dr Schrenck's work, whose object is to portray "the Jesus who walked the earth," and who is not regarded as Divine in the orthodox sense—"in the genuine teaching of Jesus there is no trace of a claim to co-equality with God, or to pre-existence"—yet is a Person holding a unique relationship to God and fulfilling a unique mission. The form of Christ's teaching was Jewish, but it contained an eternal and universal element, for below the Messiah-consciousness was the God-consciousness. The former gave an apocalyptic shape to His conception of the kingdom; the latter furnished its religious and ethical elements, which were the deeper and more important. His central purpose was to bring men into filial relationship to the Father; an end, however, best facilitated in an eschatological manner. Our author has much to say that is fresh about Christ's teaching on The Law, Social Ethics, His own Death, and on the Last Things.

Dr Bennett's book is written with much of the beautiful simplicity that marks the Gospel narratives themselves. There is scarcely a word other than English used from beginning to end, yet there are evidences on every page of a wide and deep understanding of the subject. The work is more than St Mark's story put into modern language, for the reader is constantly meeting with suggestions which are little windows letting in a flood of light. For example, the fact that the disciples in their cures anointed the sufferers, and that Jesus used clay and spittle, shows that the Evangelist drew no "sharp line between the natural and the supernatural." Mark's picture of Jesus no doubt reveals a great wonder-worker—an august and imperial figure—but the student feels that

there are important features absent, and fails to see why he should be so deprived when the Second Document is coming through the fires of criticism with new credentials. To select and separate St Mark in this way appears, indirectly, to throw unnecessary doubts upon the Logia.

L'Évangile has upon it the imprimatur of the Roman Catholic Church, consequently the reader must not look for anything very radical in its pages. The author groups the incidents common to the four, three, or two Evangelists, as the case may be, and aims to give a consecutive account of the life of our Lord, adding explanations upon the more obscure points. The critical standpoint can be judged from the chapter on Inspiration. There is a human element in the Bible, but God makes the author write—makes him to conceive exactly and to express without error “all that God wishes and only what He wishes.” Those Roman Catholics who wish to obtain their knowledge of the Gospels from the books themselves rather than from their priests will find this volume useful.

Mr Seaver's volume, containing the Donnellan Lectures for 1905, is practical and not technical in its aim. The writer accepts fearlessly the accredited results of criticism, but very strongly combats critical extravagances. The chief questions dealt with are Authority in Religion, the Christ of History, Miracles, the Resurrection of Jesus, and the meaning of His Death—all of which are treated in a lucid, tolerant, and illuminating manner, and in a way that clearly proves that criticism does not hinder but helps to an understanding of these problems.

Mr Scott writes convincingly on his subject, and succeeds in showing that apology enters largely into the books of the New Testament, and that it has had much to do with moulding the form of their contents. The early Church had to defend itself against many foes. It had to prove the real Messiahhood of its Master, whose conception of that office was different from the one current in Israel, and to make it clear that a crucified Messiah best fulfilled the predictions of prophecy. It also had to defend itself against Judaism, Paganism, and Gnosticism; and how this was accomplished is traced in Gospels, Acts, and Epistles. Then the claim of Christianity to be the final and absolute religion had to be made rational, which is done in the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the Fourth Gospel. Nor is the subject of merely antiquarian interest, but is serviceable to-day; for essential Judaism—the tendency to replace faith by works—has its periodical recurrence. Paganism also, in the various forms of Naturalism, is recrudescent; while Gnosticism reappears whenever and wherever religion makes its primary appeal to the intellect.

Canon Weston's treatise is a valiant effort to make reasonable a great problem; and if the author fails in his attempt, his ability should be recognised. The discussion of the subject suffers because the writer limits it to the “Creeds of the Church and the Definition of the Council of Chalcedon.” The Athanasian interpretation is criticised because it makes the incarnated Logos the subject of Christ's manhood and thereby impairs His humanity; the theories of Nestorius and his followers are faulty

because they confuse the natures ; while the Kenotic theories lay too much stress upon the human elements in the Person. The author's theory is : "the Logos possesses a true consciousness of Himself as Son, omnipresent and omniscient, in virtue of which He has imposed upon Himself a law of self-restraint . . . adapted to the measure of His evergrowing manhood" (p. 161)—which is, after all, only a mild kenosis. He seeks to distinguish between the terms self-abandonment and self-limitation ; but to allow the one and deny the other to an unconscious babe in its mother's womb is to assert a distinction without a difference. As with all who attempt a metaphysical explanation of the mystery, Mr Weston is like a man on a tight-rope in constant danger of losing his balance. At one time the Godhead is in jeopardy ; for how could Christ know Himself to be God (as is asserted) if His consciousness were entirely conditioned by his manhood ? Next His manhood is in peril ; for "He cannot err," and also exercises the cosmic functions of the Logos. Again, it is the unity of the Person that is threatened ; for "He had two wills" and (in spite of word jugglery) a dual consciousness. These difficulties are avoided if the subject be viewed from the ethical rather than from the metaphysical standpoint. Our author has glimpses of this better way. Lifting himself up, as it were, with beaded brow from his mighty task, he says : "The solution lies for us at present, not in the psychological and metaphysical regions, but in the recognition of the plain facts of the Gospel narratives." Then why so much labour—so great a cry for so little wool ?

The author of *Christus Futurus* writes fervently, often eloquently, and with a deep understanding of the Gospel essentials. His aim is practical, consequently theological points only arise incidentally. His contention is that the Christian Gospel has been but partly apprehended and only partially accepted ; and that personal faith has been halting largely because corporate faith (an important point with the author) has hitherto been feeble. The Gospel method is salvation by joy, and not by pain and suffering as is so frequently asserted. Suffering is no more a part of God's plan than sin, and like sin is an intrusion, and would disappear, as would sin, if Christ's teaching were fully accepted. The subject of healing by faith is naturally dealt with, and it is argued that not only functional diseases, but organic disturbances, are curable by this means ; that there is reliable evidence of this outside the Bible, and if there be one well-authenticated case the principle is proved. But while mental therapeutics are regarded as part of the Gospel message, the ordinary means of healing are considered no less divine. That mental troubles are as amenable to "mind" treatment as physical, the exorcisms recorded in the Gospels prove. The writer believes in demoniacal possession, and that the Evangelists' accounts of "possessions" are literally true, although the present-day illustrations of his belief are more symbolical than literal, and certainly not the view (which the sacred records give) that a second entity resides in and dominates the personal ego. The book abounds in pregnant sayings, as for example, "No frivolous man is a persecutor" ; "Poverty never

weeps till it is checked in the act of generosity"; "Love is already lost when it draws the sword in its defence." The author is a practical mystic, whose passionate aim is to give to his fellows a Gospel of "life more abundant" and "joy unspeakable."

W. JONES DAVIES.

STOCKPORT.

St Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians: The Greek Text, with Notes and Addenda.—By the late Brooke Foss Westcott, D.D., D.C.L., Lord Bishop of Durham, sometime Regius Professor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1906.

St Paul's Epistle to the Thessalonians: The Greek Text, with Introduction and Notes.—By George Milligan, D.D., Minister of Caputh, Perthshire.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1908.

The Epistle of St Jude and the Second Epistle of St Peter: Greek Text, with Introduction, Notes, and Comments.—By Joseph B. Mayor, M.A. Camb., Litt.D. Dubl., Emeritus Professor of King's College, London; Honorary Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1907.

THESE three volumes are in the black binding with gold lettering made familiar by the famous commentaries of Lightfoot and Westcott. It is a great deal, but not too much, to say of the two latter works named above that they are worthy to rank in the series with those of the great Bishops. Yet I would not put them quite on the same level. The work of Westcott and Lightfoot has a distinction which is the mark of more than the combination of profound learning with rare literary skill: it has that indefinable glamour which is the product of genius. Only in the work of the greatest masters can this quality be found; but, lacking this (as in my humble judgment they do lack it), these commentaries provide practically everything which the student can require for the elucidation of the text. For this is the commentator's aim. He must show, as far as possible, how the texts come to be at all, and then he must show what they mean. If he can give us guidance as to their application to our own time, so much the better; if not, we must do that for ourselves. The main point is that he should enable us to understand the original text, giving such explanations, and bringing together such illustrations, as shall best conduce to this end. Unfortunately, Dr Westcott did not live to finish his work on the "Ephesians," and the editor, the Rev. J. M. Schulhof (who modestly suppresses his name on the title-page), has had a most difficult task, on the completion of which, as also on the judgment displayed in its execution, he is to be congratulated. The actual commentary is practically all of it from Dr Westcott's pen, but, as Mr Schulhof states in his preface, the editing was interrupted for some eighteen months by the discovery that the notes on Chapter II. were

missing. It is well that the suggestion to publish without them was not adopted, for they eventually turned up. The rest of the materials were left so incomplete that they have had to be largely supplemented, though the rule has been adhered to, "that beyond statistics and matter of common knowledge no conclusions should be advanced other than such as have the authority of Bishop Westcott himself" (p. 199). The introduction and notes are therefore more or less fragmentary, though they have been amplified by matter drawn from Dr Westcott's other books, from Dr Hort's posthumously published works, from private correspondence, and from other sources. The editor has also printed the Latin Vulgate version of the epistle, from Codex Amiatinus, and the English versions of Wiclif, as revised by Purvey, and of Tyndale. Students will find these useful for reference, but they are accessible elsewhere, and one would willingly go without them for the sake of fuller notes and discussions by the Bishop, had they been available. If only he could have expanded the brief notes on such topics as "Intellectual Claims and Gifts of the Gospel," "The Sacrament of Baptism," "Sin in the Pauline Epistles," "The Kingdom of God—Kingdom of Christ," "The Christian Society and the Apostolic Ministry"! But, as the editor remarks, "after all, it is the Commentary which matters." This posthumous work derives some additional interest from the confident assertion of certain recent critics (*e.g.* von Soden) that "Ephesians" cannot be ascribed to St Paul. Von Soden emphasises "the important fact that no knowledge of it is shown in the Epistle of Clement of Rome." But is it a fact? Here there are printed *in extenso* five passages which, according to Dr Westcott's *Canon of the New Testament*, do show a knowledge of "Ephesians" on the part of Clement. This list might receive one addition. In Chapter 46 Clement has the words μέλη ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλων, which, except in order, are identical with Eph. iv. 25, ἐσμὲν ἀλλήλων μέλη. Perhaps no one of the passages is a certain quotation, but taken together they go far to prove that Clement had "Ephesians" in his mind. A long array of other early authorities is given, but no reference is made to the so-called Second Epistle of Clement, which contains at least one clear citation.

Dr Milligan's work on the Epistles to the Thessalonians is especially welcome, since the need of it was great. The introduction and notes, as well as the actual commentary, are very full, and good use has been made of the inscriptions and papyri published in recent years, and also of "the convenient editions of later Jewish literature, which we owe to the labours of the contributors to Kautzsch's Apokryphen and Pseudepigraphen of the Old Testament in Germany, and of Dr R. H. Charles in England" (Pref., ix.). If we had not the author's word for it, we should never suspect that he was obliged to write far from a library, and had consequently great difficulty "in keeping abreast of the advances of modern scholarship." The genuineness is maintained of both epistles, which are dated from Corinth within a few months of each other about 50–51 A.D. Rejecting the theory that "Galatians" is the earliest of St Paul's letters, he adheres

to the traditional belief that the Thessalonian epistles hold that position, "and, if so, are in all probability the oldest Christian documents of importance that have come down to us." Besides much other valuable matter, the introduction contains a careful study of the Epistles' language, style, and literary affinities, leading to the conclusion that "the Apostle had an ample Greek vocabulary at his command, and, notwithstanding his Jewish origin and upbringing, had learned to use Greek as virtually a second mother-tongue. Not only did he speak freely in Greek, but apparently he thought in Greek, and was able to adapt to his own special purposes the words he found in current use." Further, "the general impression which they [the Epistles] convey is that for his 'Wortschatz' or stock of words, St Paul, when not directly indebted to the Greek Old Testament, was mainly dependent upon the living, spoken tongue of his own day, borrowing from time to time more or less consciously from ethical writers, but otherwise showing little or no dependence upon the literature of classical or later times." He is also of opinion that "St Paul must have been well acquainted with the actual words of Jesus, and in all probability had actually some written collection of them in his possession." "His whole 'gospel,' when not directly inspired by the living Lord Himself, . . . was firmly rooted in his knowledge of the life and words of the historic Jesus." A series of valuable additional notes is appended to the commentary proper. In that on "The Divine Names in the Epistles" there is a curious error, which is presumably a misprint. "Lord," it is said, "is found in all twenty-two times, eight times with, and four times without, the article." There is manifestly some confusion here, and a simple reckoning of the passages, which are given in full, shows that the total twenty-two is correct, while the other figures should be respectively fourteen and eight. Very interesting, too, are the notes on "The Biblical Doctrine of Antichrist," and "The Interpretation of 2 Thess. ii. 1-12," which, however, it is impossible to reproduce here. In the latter it is instructive to mark the summary dismissal of the once dominant Protestant view, that Antichrist is the Pope.

In internal arrangement the last book on our list differs of necessity from the other two. The two epistles are so short and the commentary so copious that the usual arrangement of the Greek text above with comment below is impracticable. Dr Mayor prints the epistles opposite to one another, "Jude" on the left-hand page, "2 Peter" on the right, marking their mutual relation by special type. "Jude" being much shorter than "2 Peter," it is evident there must be many blank spaces on the left-hand pages. Nevertheless, the two together occupy only fifteen pages out of a total of over four hundred and forty. It would be difficult to imagine anything useful for the study of these writings of which Dr Mayor has not availed himself. That one is dependent on the other is matter of common knowledge, though there is a difference of opinion as to the side on which the indebtedness lies. Dr Mayor gives the priority to "Jude," which he holds to be the genuine production of the Lord's

brother (who was not an apostle), and which he dates about 80 A.D., while "2 Peter" is not earlier than about 125 A.D. From this it follows that "the second Epistle is not authentic; but was written by someone who made use of the honoured name of Peter, as was done by others in the second century, with a view of commending to the Christian reader views which he regarded as important, and which he believed to be in accordance with St Peter's teaching." Dr Mayor considers that the reference in 2 Peter iii. 15 is to St Paul's Epistle to the Romans, and he argues that "2 Peter" had the same destination. The allusion in 2 Peter iii. 1 is to an epistle now lost. In 2 Peter i. 15, the writer, he thinks, points to the Gospel of St Mark. From a footnote on p. cxli. we learn that St Peter was not crucified "head-downwards," "which is merely a misinterpretation of ἀνωθεν which we find in the 'Acta Pauli' cited by Origen. . . ." Incidentally we gather that Dr Mayor still adheres to the date 45 A.D. assigned in his commentary on "James" as the date of that epistle, as also to the view that the Brethren of the Lord were sons of Joseph and Mary. There are full discussions of the apocryphal books used by Jude, and of the story of the Fallen Angels. Interspersed among the Paraphrases and Comments are various short essays somewhat after the manner of Professor Jowett, in his commentary on Thessalonians, Galatians, and Romans.

G. E. FRENCH.

WEST HATCH.

The Poems of William Wordsworth.—Edited, with an introduction and notes, by Nowell Charles Smith.—Three vols.—London: Methuen.

Biographia Literaria.—By S. T. Coleridge. Edited, with his *Æsthetical Essays*, by J. Shawcross.—Two vols.—Oxford: Clarendon Press.

SEVERAL important works recently published have served to direct attention to the artistic, literary, and philosophic activities of Wordsworth and Coleridge, to that conspiracy of budding minds which was among the most thrilling, the most fruitful, the most subversive in the history of English thought. Not without reason was a government spy sent down to the Quantocks to watch what was on foot. Mr Nowell Smith, in his pleasant edition of Wordsworth's poems, with its modest, scholarly notes, is concerned rather with results than processes. He gives us the completed thing, making here and there the just and necessary remarks which may enable us to put ourselves directly into touch with it or realise how it came to be just what it is. The studied simplicity with which these remarks are made must not conceal from us the pains of research that lie behind them. We congratulate Mr Smith upon the conclusion of his labours, and ourselves upon their result, as well as upon the attractive and eminently readable form in which it is presented to us. Mr Shawcross's concern is with the processes. He takes us into the poetic laboratory, or rather follows, as it became the chief interest of Coleridge himself to follow,

the philosophic presuppositions of those wonderful creative years. As philosopher, Coleridge now receives, as Mr Shawcross points out convincingly, far less than his due. The *Biographia Literaria*, his main contribution to æsthetic, which in its turn was the main sphere of his speculative activity, is very little read, and read rather as an incident in the Wordsworth-Coleridge relationship than for the sake of its original contributions to æsthetic theory. No doubt the principal reason of this is that most of what Coleridge contended for has been accepted; but a great deal must be put down to the essential unreadableness of the work itself. A philosopher, writing as a philosopher, does not expect to be criticised if he is ponderous or dull: he cannot, in fact, to philosophic readers ever be either, while he remains true to his theme. But Coleridge writes primarily as a *littérateur*, and the question whether what he writes is or is not readable constantly hovers in the background of his mind; the result (without any reference to the diffuseness and inconsequence of the work) is that, for the mere heaviness of its manner, no one would read the *Biographia Literaria* unless he were obliged. Yet if he be obliged, he will leave it feeling that the obligation has at least been mutual. The force and wealth of Coleridge's mind overcomes all hindrances and makes itself irresistibly felt; and though there is probably nothing in his philosophic theory which could not now be found better and more fully expressed elsewhere, the mere fact that his statements are isolated, original, often, one might almost say, prophetic (he is so far a Pragmatist as to anticipate the "Will to Believe"), gives them, for the student of philosophy, a peculiar interest and a peculiar value. The range of his influence comes out as clearly as in anything from its effect upon the language. That Coleridge was the first in England to see the need for such terms as subjective and objective may be regarded as accidental: his recovery of the old use of *sensuous*, as distinguished from *sensual* on the one side and *sensitive* on the other, is more important. More significant still is his invention of such a word as to "intensify," now so commonly upon our tongues that we could scarcely picture a time when it was unknown. But, of course, the centre of interest in the *Biographia Literaria* is Coleridge's conception of the imaginative activity of the mind in its relation to the other mental processes and to the world of reality which together they reflect, or create, or constitute, or reveal; and this is the theme which, in his able, sympathetic, and discriminating introduction, Mr Shawcross has chosen to elaborate. Both in this and in his exhaustive annotations to the work, Mr Shawcross shows himself intimately in touch, not only with all that Coleridge has written, and others have written about him, but with most of what he read. Yet the absorption which such thoroughness implies has never been allowed to issue in lack of judgment or to degenerate into special pleading. Coleridge's errors, failures, limitations are frankly pointed out, and there is a focus and measure of thought, not to say also an economy of words, in Mr Shawcross's genial essay which are not to be looked for in the work of the impetuous, splendid thinker he is elucidating. The leading conviction

with which one rises from a perusal of Coleridge's work is of the necessity of the inclusion of æsthetic and the experiences with which æsthetic deals in any speculation that is really to touch the heart of the philosophic problem. Beauty is compatible with so many qualities that are the reverse of good that it is easy to lose sight of what nevertheless is an ultimate fact, that goodness is not completely good till it brings beauty with it. The Greeks incorporated their sense of this in the word *καλός*, but the idea is not on the whole native to English minds, and our morality, strong as it is in root and stem, flowers rarely. Yet philosophy, if it is to achieve a true analysis of the parts, must be guided by a living experience of the whole: the abstract unity which reason points to is not enough. This must be reinforced, actualised, by intuition, the intuition for which the soul and the world appear together, as it were with their bloom upon them—a vision which is essentially the poet's vision, and whose object is in its ultimate sense the beautiful. The problem of objectivity and the real assumes, in this relation, its most delicate, most complex forms. Coleridge was at one with Schiller in proclaiming that the artistic imagination proceeded by universally valid laws, and the whole tendency of his thought was towards a conception of imagination which would find in it the most perfect, most inclusive organ for apprehension of the truth of things. Such a conception, however, he seems never to have fully reached; and the imagination, as he leaves it, is still conversant with a merely symbolic world; it is "the reconciling and mediatory power which incorporates the reason in images of sense, and organises, as it were, the fluxes of sense by the permanent and self-circling energies of the reason." Is, or is not, his recourse to the idea of symbolism a mechanical evasion, a cessation of thought just at the point where the problem becomes knottiest and the decisions most momentous? Here surely is the question which most needs answering. After all, what is a symbol?

BASIL DE SÉLINCOURT.

KINGHAM, CHIPPING NORTON.

Types of Tragic Drama: being a Course of Lectures delivered at the University of Leeds.—By C. E. Vaughan, Professor of English Literature in the University of Leeds.—London: Macmillan, 1908.

PROFESSOR VAUGHAN surveys a wide field in these lectures. He traces the development of tragic drama from the time of the Greeks to the present day, and passes in review several of the plays of Æschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Seneca, Racine, Alfieri, Shakespeare, Calderon, Goethe, Victor Hugo, Browning, Maeterlinck, and Ibsen. The modest reader, who would frankly confess that his study of drama does not range so widely as has Professor Vaughan's, may stand appalled at such a list. But he will be pleasantly reassured, and will find the book interesting

throughout, and not least so in those parts in which, as notably in the account of the classical revival, the author deals with a subject in which it is difficult to arouse interest by a short description. Professor Vaughan's appreciations are at once sympathetic and discriminating. In treating of such constantly debated questions as the meaning and value of the romantic and realistic aspects of drama, his point of view strikes us as moderate enough to disarm criticism, if it were not too just to provoke it. Further, his method of narrating the stories of the many plays he considers is such as to inspire the reader with something of the enthusiasm with which it is clear the author himself studied them.

The author claims that "the unvarying tendency of tragedy has been from the less to the more ideal, from the less to the more inward. It has been from action to character, from the outer regions of character to those which are more secret and impalpable; to purpose, motive, mood, temperament, and instinct." We think that the essential justice of this contention is demonstrated by Professor Vaughan in his history of dramatic development. It may perhaps be urged that the claim is a little of the nature of a vague generality which, in its application, is likely to lead to rather pedantic criticism, to summing up the qualities of dramatists under categories which do not go far to illuminate them. But Professor Vaughan is too fair-minded and appreciative a critic not to do justice to the individual character of genius, while, at the same time, he shows that he feels, and we think with reason, that development has been on the whole real progress; and that while drama, as indeed all art, must be conventional and selective, the tendency has been from narrower to broader conventions, and from a smaller to a larger selection. It will at least be allowed that in the natural course of things a larger experience has come within the sphere of art, and it may be hoped that, if something of chaos has at times been the result, it has been compensated for by a larger faith and humanity. Such would seem to be Professor Vaughan's view. In treating of the development of the drama of the Greeks, he claims that *Æschylus* is unrivalled as a master of dramatic situation, and, save for *Shakespeare*, the greatest poet of all dramatists; that *Sophocles* made the action more human, and at the same time showed a more essentially Greek spirit than did *Æschylus*, in whose genius there was something of a Hebraic element, alien to the general temper of Greece. He sees in *Euripides* a further growth of humanism, or, as we should perhaps rather regard it, the birth of the more purely romantic spirit; while in the breaking up of that perfect artistic form which the drama had assumed in the hands of *Sophocles*, we are left with something which, with all its defects, is capable of appealing to a wider sympathy and of opening the way for further development. There is no doubt little in Professor Vaughan's account, thus briefly summarised, that is not common ground for critics of Greek drama. But, leaving out of the question the excellence of his treatment, he was well advised in impressing the importance of this process in the ancient drama as he goes on to show

to how great an extent modern drama, both classical and romantic, proved a continuation of this movement. The drama of the revival, which drew its inspiration from the ancient models, was most directly influenced by the plays of Euripides and Seneca. It manifested itself in a form which we call classical, but which is in many of its aspects rather pseudo-classical, and is often far removed in spirit from the Greek classics to which it owed its birth. We know too how, while it sought to follow the high guidance of Aristotle, it bound itself by rules which are not as a matter of fact to be found in the *Poetics*. Professor Vaughan is rather concerned to point out—and it is the more significant aspect—how this drama, with all its limitations, reveals the continuity of that development which has already been traced from Æschylus to Euripides. He leaves us with the impression that it is in this rather than in their classical conventions that the plays of Racine and Alfieri are most significant in the history of the drama. He is again on firm ground when he shows that the revolt against the classical drama, as exemplified by Victor Hugo, was in reality less of a revolution than it professed to be, and that, while it emancipated itself from many conventions, it carried on much of the old material to a further stage of development. Professor Vaughan goes on to consider the question whether both in vastness of theme and subtlety of treatment the drama may not be in danger of endeavouring to transcend the limits set on it by the nature of the art, and has some suggestive comments to make on this question in treating of Goethe and Maeterlinck. The only exception we would take to Professor Vaughan's views is that we may think that he attaches too much importance to the spectacular element in drama, and too little to plot and action. In both these points we think he does rather less than justice to the teaching of Aristotle. Aristotle no doubt fully recognised the value of scenic effect, but he regarded the appeal to the imagination as of primary importance, indeed as all that was really required by the purpose of drama. Again, we think that Aristotle regarded plot more fully as an embodiment of thought and character than Professor Vaughan seems to allow. We may at least suggest these considerations, as, in face of some of the problems of drama that Professor Vaughan puts before us, we feel inclined to believe with the classical school that salvation lies by way of obedience to the precepts of Aristotle. But no doubt Professor Vaughan could make out a good case for his interpretation, or, at any rate, we may say of the *Poetics* as has been said of the Bible:

“Hic liber est in quo quaerit sua dogmata quisque :
Invenit et pariter dogmata quisque sua.”

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[Review will follow.]
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[Refers to an article in the *Revue Chrétienne*, 1907, by Ménégos, "Le Pardon Gratuit selon Jésus-Christ et la justice imputée selon saint Paul," with which author disagrees.]
Garvie (A. E.) Studies in the Pauline Theology. i. The Experience of Paul. Expos., March 1908.
- E *Bernard (J. H.)* St Paul's Doctrine of the Resurrection: A Study of 1 Cor. xv. Expos., May and June 1908.
[Exegetical.]
Denney (J.) The Cup of the Lord and the Cup of Demons. Expos., April 1908.
[Expository.]
- U *Ropes (J. H.)* "Thou hast Faith and I have Works." Expos., June 1908.
[Exegesis of St James ii. 18.]
- Y *Denney (J.)* He that came by Water and Blood. Expos., May 1908.
[Exegesis and exposition of 1 St John v. 6-8.]
- 8 *Hort (F. J. A.)* The Apocalypse of St John i-iii. The Greek text, with introduction, commentary, and additional notes. 48p. Macmillan, 1908.
[Review will follow.]
- 9 *Charles (R. H.)* The Greek Versions of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs edited from Nine MSS.: with the Variants of the Armenian and Slavonic Versions and some Hebrew Fragments. 324p. Frowde, 1908.
[Review will follow.]
Völter (Daniel) Die älteste Predigt aus Rom: Der sogenannte zweite Clemensbrief. 71p. Brill, 1908.
[This epistle, with 1 Clement, the Shepherd of Hermas, 1 Peter, and the Epistle of James, is a revision from a specifically Christian point of view of a document which in its original form belonged to a class of literature of a peculiar kind, presenting a Christianity without Christ, or the O.T. religion regarded as universalism.]
- Anon.* The New Elephantine Papyri. Church Q. R., April 1908.
- Gry (L.)* La composition littéraire des paraboles d'Hénoch. Le Muséon, vol. ix., No. 1.
- Preuschen (E.)* Das neue Evangelienfragment von Oxyrhynchos. Zt. f. neuest. Wiss., Heft 1, 1908.
- Winslett (E. O.)* Some Coptic Apocryphal Legends. J. Th. St., April 1908.
[Text and translation.]
- C **CHURCH** 14 "Social Problems, 20 " Polity, 42 " Liturgical, 50 " Sacraments, 60 Missions.
- Tufts (J. H.)* The Adjustment of the Church to the Psychological Conditions of the Present. Amer. J. of Th., April 1908.
[I.e., how the preacher is to respond to the new needs of to-day.]
- 14 *Campbell (R. J.)* Christianity and the Social Order. 283p. Chapman & Hall, 1908.
[See p. 910.]
- 15 *Crucker (Joseph Henry)* The Church of To-day: A Plea. 176p. Amer. Unit. Ass., 1908.
[The Church rests on human need; it is created and sustained by human need. It is the "Church of God" because it ministers to those supreme necessities of the spiritual life which God has implanted in human nature.]
- 18 *Masterman (J. H. B.)* The Rights and Responsibilities of National Churches (Hulsean Lectures, 1907-8). 88p. Clay, 1908.
- 31 *Stead (W. T.)* Sunday Observance in England. International, March 1908.
- 40 *Alston (A. E.)* and *Turton (Zouch H.)* Origenes Eucharisticæ: A Study of the Liturgy under the Light of recently published Documents. 83p. Wells Gardner, 1908.
- Brightman (F. E.)* The *Historia Mystagogica* and other Greek Commentaries on the Byzantine Liturgy, II. J. Th. St., April 1908.
[The text.]
- 41 *Bannister (H. M.)* Liturgical Fragments. J. Th. St., April 1908.
[A. Anglo-Saxon Sacramentaries. B. Irish Missal. C. Irish Hymns.]
- 53 *Révillé (J.)* Les origines de l'Eucharistie. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Jan. 1908.
[Third and last article, being a criticism of the Synoptic narratives of the Supper.]
- 60 *Farquhar (J. N.)* Christianity in India. Cont. R., May 1908.
[Foresees the final conquest of India by Protestant Christianity.]
- 70 *Martindale (C. C.)* School Missions. The Month, May 1908.
[Describes the work of some of these, and urges the adoption of similar work by Catholic schools.]
- D **DOCTRINE** 10 " God, 22 " Christ, 60 " Eschatology, 70 " Faith, 90 " Apologetics.
- Ermoni (V.)* Le mouvement théologique à l'étranger. R. du Clergé français, Feb. 15, 1908.
[Devoted entirely to an account of the "New Theology" in England, with special reference to Campbell's article in the *H. J.*]
- Henslow (G.)* Theological Obsession. Interpreter, April 1908.
[Pleads for clerical open-mindedness in receiving, and courage of conviction in publishing, new truths.]
- 2 *Bricout (J.)* Le développement du dogme. R. du Clergé français, April 1908.
[Sets forth the conditions of legitimate development against the Modernists.]
- Godryez (J.)* The Doctrine of Modernism and its Refutation. 128p. M'Vey, 1908.
[Aim is "to give a clear and systematic exposition of Modernism, paying special attention to its fundamental ideas, and by refuting the basic principles to show the errors and inconsistency of the whole system."]

- Smith (S. F.)* What is Modernism? The Month, March 1908.
[Criticism of Modernism as presented in the Programme of Modernism.]
- Douais (J. C.)* La liberté intellectuelle après l'Encyclique *Pascendi*. 43p. Beauchesne, 1908.
[A letter from the Bishop of Beauvais to a deputy, who has questioned him about the effect of the Encyclical on university teaching, etc.]
- Anon.* Lettere di un Prete Modernista: Appendice. Dalla Sospensione di R. Murri alla Scomunica di A. Loisy. 288p. Libreria Editrice Romana, 1908.
[Author shows in a series of letters that even amongst the Italian clergy the movement of reform has taken strong root.]
- Sabatier (Paul)* Modernism. Cont. R., March 1908.
[“Catholic modernism does not dream of deposing the seat of authority, but of transforming the very idea that authority has made of its own rôle, and consequently the species of submission due to it.”]
- Barry (William)* Rome and Democracy. Dub. R., April 1908.
[Religion must be made the heart of democracy, and democracy the hands of religion.]
- 3 *Twelve Churchmen.* Anglican Liberalism (Crown Theo. Lib.). 312p. Williams & Norgate, 1908.
[Amongst the writers are Dr F. C. Burkitt, Dr Rashdall, Prof. Gardner, Prof. Caldecott, and Rev. A. L. Lilley. Review will follow.]
- Burns (C. D.)* Theology, Old and New. Albany R., April 1908.
[Critiques Bishop Gore's *New Theology* and the Old Religion.]
- 4 *Bohater (J.)* Die Methode der reformierten Dogmatik (*Schluss*). Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 3, 1908.
- 22 *Durand (P. A.)* L'Enfance de Jésus-Christ d'après les Évangiles canoniques, suivie d'une étude sur les Frères du Seigneur. 287p. Beauchesne, 1908.
[Author's aim to give an answer to the question, what historic reasons are there for retaining in its integrity the Christian dogma which liberal Protestants are so light-heartedly pulling to pieces? The Virgin Birth is the chief object of his inquiry; other questions are secondary.]
- 26 *Smith (J. Gibson)* The Christ of the Cross; or, The Death of Jesus Christ in its relation to Forgiveness and Judgment. 303p. Gordon & Gotch, 1908.
[Critiques severely the expiatory theory of the Cross, and endeavours to establish the truth of the propitiatory theory.]
- Marshall (Newton H.)* Atonement and Progress. 182p. Clarke, 1908.
[Substance of sermons designed to bring the doctrine of the Atonement into relation with our present-day knowledge and ideas, and to show that it can live in an atmosphere altered by modernity.]
- Nash (Henry Sylvester)* The Atoning Life. 148p. Macmillan, 1908.
[Aims to make clear the lines of approach to the Atonement.]
- 67 *Petavel-Olliff (E.)* Une réforme urgente dans l'enseignement évangélique: Lettre ouverte à M. le Pasteur B. Saillens. 15p. Fischbacher, 1908.
[The traditional doctrine of eternal punishment is completely inefficacious: “conditionalism” will facilitate the conversion and salvation of souls.]
- 81w *Anon.* The Athanasian Creed. Church Q. R., April 1908.
[Concludes it was the work of the community of Lerins. Its present-day public recital is deprecated.]
- 90 *Bowman (John A.)* In Defence of the Old Faith: A Book for the People. 104p. Simpkin, 1908.
- E ETHICS. 1-9 *Practical Theology, Christian Ethics, Transition to General Ethics, 10 Theories, 20 Applied Ethics, Sociology, 23 Economics, 27 Education.*
- 6 *Arber (Edward), Ed.* The Sayings of the Wise, or Food for Thought: A Book of Moral Wisdom, gathered from the Ancient Philosopher, by William Baldwin, 1555 A.D. (Christian Lib. Series). 195p. Elliot Stock, 1908.
- Hutton (William Holden)* The Influence of Christianity upon National Character. Illustrated by the Lives and Legends of the English Saints. (Bampton Lectures, 1903.) 386p. Wells, Gardner, 1908.
- Mozley (J. Kenneth)* Modern Attacks on Christian Ethics. Cont. R., April 1908.
[Modern champions of non-Christian ideals in ethics singled out are Nietzsche, Shaw, Davidson, and Lowes Dickinson.]
- Foster (G. B.)* Concerning the Religious Basis of Ethics. Amer. J. of Th., April 1908.
- 10 *Royce (Josiah)* The Philosophy of Loyalty. 409p. Macmillan, 1908.
[An attempt to conceive duty in terms of the conception of loyalty, which is taken to signify “the will to believe in something eternal, and to express that belief in the practical life of a human being.”]
- Barbour (G. F.)* Green and Sidgwick on the Community of the Good. Phil. R., Mar. 1908.
[An attempt to combine the ideal of the Good Will as common with the Greek ideal of the good life in the complete idea of the Good as common and non-competitive has a solid basis in fact; for the very concreteness of this complete idea makes it necessary that not only the practical life of self-sacrifice, but the contemplative life should be pressed into the service of the Common Good.]
- Parodi (D.)* La Morale des Idées-Forces. Rev. Phil., April 1908.
[A full and eulogistic treatment of M. Fouillée's recent book.]
- Sharp (F. C.)* The Objectivity of the Moral Judgment. Phil. R., May 1908.
[Right means “demanded by my ideal of human relationships in matters of conduct, in so far as this ideal has been made a self-consistent one.” This ideal common sense believes to be one, and, therefore, universal. That belief is justified.]
- Mertens (Bertrand)* La genèse psychologique de la conscience morale. Rev. Phil., May 1908.
- Gauthier (P.)* L'indépendance de la morale. Rev. Phil., Mar., April 1908.
- Palante (G.)* Deux types d'immoralisme. Rev. Phil., Mar. 1908.
- Lessing (Theodor)* Studien zur Wertaxiomatik, II. Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 2, 1908.
[These studies based largely on Husserl's epistemological theory.]

Lottin (Joseph) La statistique morale et le Déterminisme. Rev. Néo-Scol., Feb. 1908.
Schinz (Albert) Jules de Gaultier's Theory of the Scientific Principles of Ethics. J. of Phil., May 21, 1908.

Orr (J.) Autonomy in Ethics.

Princeton Th. Rev., April 1908.

[Such a system, resting on reason only apart from religious sanctions, is "manifoldly defective and inadequate."]

Schwarze (H. K.) Die Ethik Herbert Spencers: Eine kritische Studie.

Vierteljahrssch. f.w. Phil., xxxii. 1, 1908.

[A detailed exposition and criticism.]

Gusti (Demetrius) Die soziologischen Bestrebungen in der neueren Ethik.

Vierteljahrssch. f.w. Phil., xxxii. 1, 1908.

20 *Urwick (E. J.)* Luxury and Waste of Life. 265p. Dent, 1908.

Meynial (E.) Du rôle de la logique dans la formation scientifique du droit.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., March 1908.

Ward (Wilfred) Mr Balfour on Decadence. Dub. R., April 1908.

[An appreciative estimate of Balfour's lecture.]

Roberts (Charles) Time Limit and Local Option: A Restatement of a Licensing Controversy. 2nd ed. 204p. King, 1908.

Anon. Temperance, Justice, and the Licensing Bill. Quar. R., April 1908.

[The entire scheme of licensing is obsolete, and should be recast to suit conditions which have changed out of all harmony with it.]

Hercock (R.) Legislation and Alcohol.

International, March 1908.

[Briefly recounts the temperance legislation of various States.]

Murray (Arthur Turnour) The Law of Hospitals, Infirmarys, Dispensaries, and other Kindred Institutions, whether Voluntary or Rate-Supported. 287p.

Murray, 1908.

Sellers (Edith) Foreign Solutions of Poor Law Problems. 176p. Marshall, 1908.

Collings (Jesse) Land Reform: Occupying Ownership, Peasant Proprietary, and Rural Education. Ill. new ed. 452p.

Longmans, 1908.

Sidgwick (Mrs Alfred) Home Life in Germany. 327p. Methuen, 1908.

Lafayette-Savay (Norbert) Emancipation: An Introduction to the System of Progressive Government. 161p.

Knickerbocker Press, 1908.

Anon. The Ideas of Mr H. G. Wells.

Quar. R., April 1908.

[Mr Wells is in earnest, but he is not certain what he is in earnest about. So he vacillates in a strange spiritual unrest; being, on the one hand, an anarchist, who would destroy a civilisation on which rests everything he loves and admires; and, on the other hand, a troubled, anxious, questioning spirit, seeking vainly for religious faith.]

Snowden (Philip) Social Justice and Evolution. Fort. R., April 1908.

Hoare (H. W.) The Impotence of Socialism: A Rejoinder.

19th Cent., April 1908.

Crozier (J. Beattie) A Challenge to Socialism. Fort. R., March, May 1908.

Mallock (W. H.) Persuasive Socialism.

19th Cent., May 1908.

Rensi (G.) Il Socialismo idealista.

Cenobium, Jan. 1908.

[Its basis is the same as that of the deepest Christian and the noblest pagan thought, the mystic faith that contemplation is superior to action and the spiritual the only worthy life of man. The question whether it is possible to be a socialist and a believer in God is pitiful and ignorant.]

Slaughter (J. W.) Psychological Factors in Social Transmission. Sociol. R., Apr. 1908.

Conder (C. R.) The Rise of Man. 368p.

Murray, 1908.

[Subject of the volume is the social history of mankind, studied by aid of the results of science and research which have accumulated so rapidly during the lifetime of the present generation.]

Mackenzie (W. Leslie) The Family and the City. Sociol. R., April 1908.

Carlyle (A. J.) The History of Freedom.

Sociol. R., April 1908.

[Criticism of Lord Acton's Essays.]

Robertson (John M.) The Tutelage of Races. Sociol. R., April 1908.

A Spectator. The Stage and the Puritan.

Fort. R., June 1908.

Anon. Catholic Social Work in Germany: i. Ketteler, the Precursor.

Dub. R., April 1908.

Nevinson (Henry) The New Spirit in India. Albany R., April 1908.

Carlyle (A. J.) Christians and the Social Problem. Interpreter, April 1908.

[Expressing socialistic sympathies.]

Lilly (W. S.) The Will of the People.

Fort. R., April 1908.

21 *Macdonald (J. Ramsay)* Socialism and Politics. Fort. R., June 1908.

Hobhouse (L. T.) The Prospects of Liberalism. Cont. R., March 1908.

23 *Gide (C.)* Malthus et sa doctrine.

R. du Christianisme social, March 1908.

Harty (J. M.) The Living Wage: A Reply. Irish Th. Quar., April 1908.

26 *Sommer (Friedrich)* Die Grundzüge einer Sozialaristokratie, ii.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 2, 1908.

27 *Meumann (Ernst)* Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die experimentelle Pädagogik und ihre psychologischen Grundlagen. 2 vols. 572 + 474p. Engelmann, 1908.

[An elaborate and important work. Professor Meumann is breaking quite new ground, and his treatment of the mental development of the child will be invaluable to educationalists.]

Richard (T.) L'enseignement des écoles et le progrès de la science.

Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1908.

[Elementary classical teaching does not create a state of mind favourable to scientific progress.]

Macdonald (J. Ramsay) The Education Bill: The Secular Solution.

Fort. R., April 1908.

Findlay (J. J.) On Behalf of the Education Bill. Albany R., April 1908.

Rees (W. G. Edwards) The Folly of the Secular Solution. Fort. R., May 1908.

Rogers (J. Guinness) An Educational Concordat. Fort. R., May 1908.

Anon. The Education Bill, 1908.

Church Q. R., April 1908.

Smith (S. F.) The Educational Situation Reviewed. The Month, May 1908.

- Begbie (H.)* The Key of Knowledge. International, Mar. 1908.
[Setting forth the spirit and ideals of true education.]
- Momigliano (F.)* L'insegnamento della Filosofia e la Scuola di Cultura Humana. Cenobium, Jan. 1908.
[On the need of the teaching of philosophy in the highest class of schools.]
- 28 *Ruyssen (M.)* Pacifisme et Patriotisme. Bull. de la Soc. franc. de Phil., Feb. 1908.
- La Vieuville.* Essai de psychologie Japonaise: La race des dieux. 183p.
Challamel, 1908.
- [Japan is an insoluble problem. Author believes that the present time must be considered as a decadence and the beginning of the end.]

F PASTORALIA. 2 Sermons.

- Moffatt (J.)* Materials for the Preacher. Expos., Apr.-June 1908.
- Anon.* A Devotional Companion to the Pulpit for the use of Ministers of Christ, 2nd ed. 144p. Elliot Stock, 1908.
(An Englishwoman) Short and Simple Family Prayers with Bible Readings. 201p. Elliot Stock, 1908.
- Parker (Joseph), ed.* Ungilded Gold; or, Nuggets from the King's Treasury: Selected Passages from the Bible arranged for Daily Devotional Reading. 376p. Clarke, 1908.
- 2 *Hunter (John)* De Profundis Clamavi, and other Sermons. 336p.
Williams & Norgate, 1908.
- Henson (H. Hensley)* Christ and the Nation: Westminster and other Sermons. 315p. Unwin, 1908.
[Eighteen sermons preached on special occasions, and before exceptional congregations.]
- Cooke (G. A.)* The Expansion of Jerusalem. Expos., June 1908.
[The annual sermon on Messianic prophecy preached before the University of Oxford (on Zech. ii. 1-5).]
- Driver (S. K.)* A Light to Lighten the Gentiles. Interpreter, April 1908.
[Sermon.]
- Jeffs (H.)* The Good New Times. 282p. Clarke, 1908.
[Addresses to men by one of the Sunday Afternoon Brotherhood speakers. The addresses deal with domestic, business, and industrial life, social reform, and other topics from the standpoint of the Christian morality and spirit.]

G BIOGRAPHY. 2 English.

- 1 *Mulot (R.)* Wilhelm Farel, der Reformator der französischen Schweiz. Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 3, 1908.
- de Pressensé (Mme. E.)* Lettres inédites. Rev. chrét., Mar. and April 1908.
- Dartigue (H.)* Auguste Sabatier à Strasbourg. Rev. chrét., April 1908.
- Ledermann (E.)* Edmond Demolins, sociologue et éducateur. R. du Christianisme social, Mar. 1908.
- 2 *Duncan (David)* The Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer. Ill. 621p. Methuen, 1908.
[Published under the authority of the trustees of Mr Spencer, in accordance with a direction in his will. We hope to review the book later.]
- Roentree (John Stephenson)* His Life

- and Work. Memoir by Phoebe Doncaster. 446p. Headley, 1908.
[In addition to the memoir, the volume contains a number of lectures and articles relating mainly to the history and distinguishing beliefs of the Society of Friends.]
- Duffy (the late Sir C. Gavan)* Personal Memories of James C. Mangan. Dub. R., April 1908.
- Ransom (A.)* Charles Bradlaugh. West. R., June 1908.
[Appropos of the new edition of Mrs Bonner's life of her father.]
- Welldon (Bishop)* and others. James Knowles: A Tribute from some Friends. 19th Cent., April 1908.
- Nicoll (W. Robertson)* My Father: An Aberdeenshire Minister, 1872-1891. 115p. Hodder & Stoughton, 1908.

H HISTORY. x Persecutions C Christian M Mediæval R Modern 2 English.

- Pollen (J. H.)* St Thomas Waterings. The Month, Mar. 1908.
[A study in London topography. St Thomas Waterings was once the execution place of South London.]
- Reich (Emil)* General History of Western Nations from 5000 B.C. to 1900 A.D. Vols. i., ii. Antiquity. 485 + 478p. Macmillan, 1908.
[Book I. of an extensive work which is to treat mainly of the general facts of historical development and the psychological motives underlying them.]
- x *Peeters (P.)* Le martyrologe de Rabban Sliba. Anal. Boll., tom. xxvii., fasc. ii.
- Arber (Edward), ed.* The Torments of Protestant Slaves in the French King's Gallies and in the Dungeons of Marseilles, 1686-1707 A.D. (Christian Lib. Series). 470p. Elliot Stock, 1908.
- v *Lilly (W. S.)* The Orthodox Eastern Church. Dub. R., April 1908.
[A discussion of Dr Fortescue's book.]
- C *Jones (H. S.)* The Catacomb of Priscilla and the Primitive Memorials of St Peter. J. Th. St., April 1908.
- Morey (C. R.)* The Beginnings of Saint Worship. Princeton Th. Rev., April 1908.
[To show, by a review of the archeological evidence, "that the essential features of the cult were all developed in the fourth century, and are due to the pagan influx with the forces it released on Constantine's recognition of Christianity."]
- Turmel (J.)* "La Sainte Vierge dans l'histoire." R. du Clergé français, Mar. 15, 1908.
[A reply to Herzog's rationalistic theory of the development of the cultus of Mary as Virgin.]
- Poncelet (A.)* Catalogus codicum hagiographicorum latinorum bibliothecarum Romanarum præter quam Vaticanæ. x. Codices bibliothecæ Vallicellane. Anal. Boll., tom. xxvii., fasc. ii.
- Turner (W.)* Celsus, the "Voltaire" of the Second Century. Irish Th. Quar., April 1908.
- M *Vacandard (E.)* Le "Baptême" des Cloches. R. du Clergé français, May 1, 1908.
[The substance of the article is taken from Father Thurston's "The 'Baptism' of Bells" in The Month, Sept. 1907.]

- R. *Ranke (Leopold von)* The History of the Popes during the Last Four Centuries: Mrs Foster's translation, revised in accordance with the latest German edition by G. R. Dennis. 3 vols. 548 + 573 + 500p.

Bell, 1908.

[Mrs Foster's translation was first issued in Bohn's Standard Library in 1848, and has passed through numerous editions. This edition is revised throughout, and a new and enlarged index has been added.]

- Adler (E. N.)* Lea on the Inquisition of Spain. Jewish Q. R., April 1908.

[With special reference to that part of the work which deals with the persecution of the Jews.]

- Clemen (O.)* Über die Verbrennung der Bannbulle durch Luther.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 3, 1908.

- Kaverau (G.)* Fünfundzwanzig Jahre Lutherforschung.

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft. 3, 1908.

- Warfield (B. B.)* The Westminster Assembly and its Work.

Princeton Th. Rev., April 1908.

I INDIVIDUAL CHURCHES AND WRITERS. C *Fathers* 2 R.C.

Church 3 Anglican.

- C. *Bethune-Baker (J. F.)* Nestorius and his Teaching: A Fresh Examination of the Evidence. With special reference to the newly recovered Apology of Nestorius (The Bazaar of Heraclides). 232p. Clay, 1908.

[Comes to the conclusion that Nestorius was not "Nestorian." Nestorius contended for the primitive faith in Jesus as at once both God and man, and did battle against teaching which seemed to him to do away with the real manhood of Christ.]

- Chapman (J.)* On the Date of the Clementines.

Zt. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 1, 1908.

- Jenkins (C.)* Origen on 1 Corinthians.

J. Th. St., April 1908.

[Quoting Origen's text where he refers to the Epistle.]

- Koch (H.)* Die Sündenvergebung bei Irenäus. Zt. f. neutest. Wiss., Heft 1, 1908.

- 2 *Gibb (John) and Montgomery (William), eds.* The Confessions of Augustine (Camb. Patristic Texts). 479p. Clay, 1908.

[A carefully annotated text, with an excellent introduction. Should be of great use to students.]

- Macarthur (J.)* St Augustine (Lib. of the Soul). 152p. Jack, 1908.

Turmel (J.) Comment St Augustine et Bossuet établissent l'autorité de l'Eglise.

R. du Clergé français, April 15, 1908.

- Walpole (A. S.)* Notes on the Text of the Hymns of St Ambrose.

J. Th. St., April 1908.

- Anon.* Fénelon's Flock.

Edin. R., April 1908.

- Anon.* Saint Dominic and Saint Francis: A Parallel. Dub. R., April 1908.

Fitzgerald (Percy) The Worldly Wisdom of Thomas à Kempis. Dub. R., April 1908.

- Rainy (Charlotte Ada), ed.* Jacob Boehme (Lib. of the Soul). 112p.

Jack, 1908.

Hilling (Nicholas) Procedure at the Roman Curia: A Concise and Practical Handbook. 355p. Wagner, 1907.

- Slater (T.)* The New Marriage Laws.

The Month, April 1908.

[Sets forth the scope of the recent Papal decree on betrothals and marriage.]

- Kellett (O.)* Laicization of French Hospitals. The Month, Mar. 1908.

[The measure is stated to have been disastrous; evidence is adduced to show that ignorance, negligence, peculation, and immorality prevail among the lay nurses.]

- Crosnier (A.)* Les convertis d'hier.

R. prat. d'Apolog., Feb. 15, Mar. 1, 1908.

[Recounting the spiritual history of such recent converts as Huysmans, Brunetière, Coppée, Bourget, and Retté.]

- Bertrin (G.)* La prétendue crise du Clergé français.

R. prat. d'Apolog., Feb. 15, 1908.

- A. L.* La clef de voûte de l'édifice catholique. Rev. chrét., Mar. 1908.

[The keystone was not laid in the doctrine of Papal infallibility. It will be laid when the Pope has acquired the power of perpetuating his policy by nominating his successor.]

- 3 *Palmer (W. Scott)* Liberal and Mystical Writings of William Law: with an Introduction. Pref. by W. P. Du Bose. 166p.

Longmans, 1908.

- Planque (G.)* Chez les Anglicans.

R. du Clergé français, Mar. 1, 1908.

[Written with a little malice, and a keen eye for Anglican difficulties. The writer is well informed as to the most recent happenings.]

- Hall (A. C. A.)* The Church in the United States. Church Q. R., April 1908.

[The Bishop of Vermont here sets forth its condition, its advantages and dangers.]

- 4 *Currie (Margaret A.), trans.* The Letters of Martin Luther. 482p. Macmillan, 1908.

[Review will follow.]

- Feldweg (G.)* Kann die Staatskirche irgendwie Gegenstand des Glaubens sei?

Th. St. u. Krit., Heft 3, 1908.

[Argues that the State Church best corresponds to the idea and nature of the Church.]

- Neel (J. E.)* Les origines du Christianisme social au sein du Protestantisme français.

R. du Christianisme social, Feb. 1908.

- Stapfer (E.)* Lettres au directeur de la Revue chrétienne sur la situation des réformés français. Rev. chrét., Mar. 1908.

- 9 *Anon.* A Dutch Blue-Stocking and Quaker of the Seventeenth Century.

Edin. R., April 1908.

[Anna von Schürmann.]

- Jones (Rufus M.)* Quakerism: A Religion of Life (Swarthmore Lecture). 47p.

Headley, 1908.

[This is the first of a series of annual lectures, each to be on some subject relating to the message and work of the Society of Friends.]

- Stephen (Caroline Emelia)* Light Arising: Thoughts on the Central Radiance. 193p.

Heffer, 1908.

[Miss Stephen writes from the point of view of rational mysticism. This volume forms a welcome sequel to her former work, *Quaker Strongholds*.]

- Grubb (Edward)* Authority and the Light Within. 143p. Clarke, 1908.

[Is the final test of Truth to be found in a Church, or in a Book, or in human Reason, or in a spiritual Intuition? The author, as a member of the Society of Friends, takes the last view.]

L LITERATURE. 2 English 3 German 5 Italian 9 Classical.

- Museus.* Poetry and Modern Thought. Cont. R., Mar. 1908.
- 2 *Ward (A. W.) and Waller (A. R.), eds.* The Cambridge History of English Literature, vol. ii The End of the Middle Ages. 551p. Clay, 1908.
- Bright (J. Wilson) and Ramsay (R. Lee), eds.* The West-Saxon Psalms: The Prose Portion or the "First Fifty" of the so-called Paris Psalter. 156p. Heath, 1907.
- Anon.* Dante in English Literature from Chaucer to Cary. Edin. R., April 1908.
- Archer (W.)* The Elizabethan Stage. Ill. Quar. R., April 1908.
- Museus.* Shakespeare and the Life to come. Cont. R., May 1908.
- Nicholson (Arthur P.)* Shelley "Contra Mundum." 19th Cent., May 1908.
- Smith (Nowell Charles), ed.* The Poems of William Wordsworth, with Introd. and Notes. 3 vols., 545 + 551 + 616p. Methuen, 1908.

[See p. 944.]

- V *Lubbock (Percy)* Coventry Patmore. Quar. R., April 1908.
- [A very appreciative estimate.]
- Salt (Henry S.)* Thoreau in Twenty Volumes. Fort. R., June 1908.
- W *Watson (William)* The Orgy on Parnassus. Fort. R., April 1908.
- Buckton (Alice M.)* Songs of Joy. 49p. Methuen, 1908.
- [This little volume by the authoress of *Eager Heart* contains much that is both poetical and suggestive.]
- Vincent (E.)* A Modern Judas, and other Rhymes. 258p. Kegan Paul, 1908.
- 4 *Lang (Andrew)* The *Chef-d'œuvre* of Monsieur Anatole France. Fort. R., June 1908.

- 9 *Kenyon (F. G.)* Greek Papyri and Recent Discoveries. Quar. R., April 1908.
- [The treasures of Egypt are not exhausted. If a casual scratching in a paltry village can give us back Menander, why should not similar chances give us Sappho, Simonides, Agathon, etc. ?]
- Verrall (A. W.)* The "Eumenides" of Eschylus: with Introd., Commentary, and Trans. 267p. Macmillan, 1908.
- Norwood (Gilbert)* The Riddle of the Bacchæ: The Last Stage of Euripides's Religious Views. 207p. Manchester Univ. Press, 1908.

M RELIGIONS. MYTHOLOGY. 4 Hinduism. 7 Judaism. 9 Demonology. 12 Occultism.

- Frazer (J. G.)* The Scope of Social Anthropology. 23p. Macmillan, 1908.
- [Inaugural lecture before the University of Liverpool. From an examination, first, of savagery, and second, of its survivals in civilisation, the study of Social Anthropology attempts to trace the early history of human thought and institutions.]
- Jevons (F. B.)* The Definition of Magic. Sociol. R., April 1908.
- [Discusses connection of magic and religion as dealt with on one hand by Hubert and Mauss, and on the other by Wundt.]

Saintyres (P.) Les vierges mères et les naissances miraculeuses: Essai de mythologie comparée. 280p. Nourry, 1908.

[Even the cultured public is ignorant of how numerous are the legends of divine children born of a virgin by a miraculous operation. Author gives us an exposition and analysis of all these stories, trying to determine their origin, or at least their connection with the rites and cults which support them.]

Bros (A.) and Habert (O.) Chronique d'histoire des religions.

R. du Clergé français, Mar. 15, 1908.

[Dealing with Australian religions, and the work of Van Gennep and of Spencer and Gillen.]

Hill (G. F.) Adonis, Baal, and Astarte. Church Q. R., April 1908.

[In connection with Frazer's *Adonis, Attis, and Osiris.*]

Morel (A.) Du sacrifice en Égypte. R. de l'Hist. des Rel., Jan. 1908.

- 5 *Abhedānanda (Sudāmi), ed.* The Gospel of Rāmakrishna. 436p.

The Vedanta Soc., 1908.

[Max Müller wrote a sketch of this Hindu saint's life in 19th Century of 1896. These are the exact words of the saint recorded *verbatim* by one of his disciples.]

- 7 *Montefiore (C. G.)* Liberal Judaism. Jewish Q. R., April 1908.

Eschelbacher (Joseph) Das Judentum und das Wesen des Christentums: Vergleichende Studien. Zweite Aufl. 170p.

Pöppelauer, 1908.

[This work, written by a rabbinical scholar, originated out of a series of addresses given in a society of Jewish students upon Harnack's *Wesen des Christentums.*]

Hirshberg (Samuel) and others, eds. Year-Book of the Central Conference of American Rabbis, containing the Proceedings of the Convention held at Frankfort, Michigan, 1907. Vol. xvii. 280p. 1907.

Bacher (W.) Die Ausdrücke mit denen die Tradition bezeichnet wird.

Jewish Q. R., April 1908.

[Investigates the use of such words as: 1. The verbs *קָבַל* and *קָבַץ*. 2. The nouns *קְבֻלָּה*, *קְבוּצָה*. 3. Verb *שָׁבַח* and its noun *שִׁבְחָה*.

4. Noun *הַלְחָח*, expression *הוֹרָה שֶׁעָלָה מִפֶּה*, etc.]

Berendts (A.) Analecta zum slavischen Josephus. Zt. f. neutest. Wiss. Heft 1, 1908.

Cohen (A.) Hebrew Incunabula in Cambridge. Jewish Q. R., April 1908.

Henriques (H. S.) Jewish Marriages and the English Law.

Jewish Q. R., April 1908.

Moffatt (J.) The New Schürer. Expos., March 1908.

[Review of the 1907 edition of the *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi.*]

Worman (E. J.) Two Book-Lists from the Cambridge Genizah Fragments.

Jewish Q. R., April 1908.

Lévy (Louis-Germain) Une religion rationnelle et laïque: la religion du xx^e siècle (Bibliothèque de Critique religieuse). 3rd ed. 113p. Nourry, 1908.

[Judaism stripped of the habits, institutions, and customs necessary to other times and in other climes must become the religion of the twentieth century.]

- 8 *Zweemer (Samuel M.)* Islam: A Challenge to Faith. Studies on the Mohammedan Religion and the Needs and Opportunities of the Mohammedan World from the Standpoint of Christian Missions. 295p.

Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1907.

Anon. Mohammed and Islam.

Quar. R., April 1908.

Bloch (E.) Études sur l'ésotérisme musulman (continuation).

Le Muséon, vol. ix., No. 1.

Vambéry (A.) The Emancipation of Women in Islam. International, Mar. 1908.

Davis (F. Hadland) The Persian Mystics. II., Jāmi (Wisdom of the East Series). 107p. Murray, 1908.

[Introduction and selections, in translation, from the works of Jāmi.]

Abdu'l-Baha. Some Answered Questions. Collected and translated from the Persian by Laura Clifford Barney. 344p.

Kegan Paul, 1908.

[Abdu'l-Baha is the chief teacher of Baháism, which has no clergy, no religious ceremonial, no public prayers; its only dogma is belief in God and in His manifestations (Zoroaster, Moses, Jesus, etc.).]

P PHILOSOPHY. 10 *Metaphysics*, 21 *Epistemology*, 33 *Psychical Research*, 40 *Psychology*, 60 *Logic*, 70 *Systems*, 90 *Philosophers*.

Fullerton (G. Stuart) and others. Essays, Philosophical and Psychological, in Honour of William James, by his Colleagues at Columbia University. 618p.

Longmans, 1908.

[This volume contains thirteen philosophical and six psychological essays. Amongst the former are "The New Realism," by Prof. Fullerton; "Consciousness, a Form of Energy," by Prof. Montague; "Perception and Epistemology," by Prof. Woodbridge; and "Substitutionalism," by Prof. Strong. Review will follow.]

Lalande (André) and Le Roy (Edouard) Philosophy in France (1907).

Phil. R., May 1908.

[Discusses Bergson's *L'évolution créatrice* and Hamelin's *Essai sur les éléments principaux de la représentation*. Also the movement of Catholic thought in "Modernism."]

- 10 *Woodbridge (Frederick J. E.)* Metaphysics: A Lecture delivered at Columbia University in the Series on Science, Philosophy, and Art, 1908. 26p.

Columbia Univ. Press, 1908.

[Metaphysics by a sort of inner development has been working out to a more objective view of things. The principle of Evolution has forced even idealism to recognise that intelligence, the mind itself, has had a natural history.]

Sharpe (A. E.) and Aveling (F.) The Spectrum of Truth. 93p. Sands, 1908.

[A conspectus of the characteristic attitude of the chief philosophical systems towards the great speculative questions with which philosophy is directly concerned. Written from the point of view of scholastic philosophy.]

- 13 *Lodge (Sir Oliver)* The Ether of Space.

Cont. R., May 1908.

[Matter has a psychical significance, since it can constitute brain, which links together the physical and the psychical worlds. Author thinks that the ether, with all its massiveness and energy, has also a psychical significance.]

Job (A.) La méthode en chimie.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar. 1908.

Driesch (Hans) The Science and Philosophy of the Organism. The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen, 1907. 329p. Black, 1908.

[A systematic presentation of those biological topics which bear upon the true philosophy of nature. Will be reviewed with the second volume yet to appear.]

Thomson (J. Arthur) Heredity (Progressive Science Series). 621p.

Murray, 1908.

[An introduction to the study of heredity. Author tries to avoid partisan handling of any theme, but does not conceal his general adherence to Weismannism. Prominence has been given to three kinds of conclusions—those reached by microscopic study of germ-cells, those reached by application of statistical methods, and those reached through experiment.]

Hartog (Marcus) Mechanism and Life.

Cont. R., April 1908.

D'Istria (F. Colonna) Bichat et la biologie contemporaine.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1908.

Dewar (D.) The Limitations of Natural Selection. Albany R., Mar. 1908.

[Natural selection, while quite capable of producing new species from those already in existence, is not able to account for all the phenomena of organic nature.]

Paulin (George) No Struggle for Existence. No Natural Selection: A Critical Examination of the Fundamental Principles of the Darwinian Theory. 261p.

Clark, 1908.

[Attempts to prove that Nature has made special provision for eliminating all excess of reproduction so as to avert a Darwinian struggle, and that individual qualities or variations play no part in her elimination.]

Forel (Auguste) The Senses of Insects. Trans. by Macleod Yearsley. 323p.

Methuen, 1908.

[A very thorough and interesting treatment.]

Duhem (P.) Le mouvement absolu et le mouvement relatif.

Rev. de Phil., Mar., April, May 1908.

- 19 *Keyser (C. Jackson)* Mathematics: A Lecture delivered at Columbia University in the Series on Science, Philosophy, and Art, Oct. 16, 1907. 44p.

Columbia University Press, 1907.

[An interesting presentation of modern mathematical points of view. "There is a world that is peopled with ideas, propositions, relations, and implications, in endless variety and multiplicity. That world is not the product but the object of thought, the entities composing it being no more identical with thinking than wine is identical with the drinking of it."]

Lloyd (Alfred H.) The Meaning of $\sqrt{-1}$. J. of Phil., Mar. 12, 1908.

Winter (M.) Importance philosophique de la théorie des nombres.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1908.

Tramer (M.) Stetigkeit der Geometrie und der Zahlen.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 2, 1908.

- 21 *La Direction.* Programme d'études pour le problème de la connaissance.

Rev. de Phil., May 1908.

[Problem of knowledge comprises (a) the psychology of knowing, (b) the origin of knowledge, (c) its validity, (d) its application to the

study of the world, the soul, God, and the ground of morals.]

Bradley (F. H.) On Memory and Judgment. Mind, April 1908.

[Discusses the ultimate value of memory as a test of truth. Memory must have a subordinate position and validity, otherwise we are reduced to total scepticism. The postulate as to memory's general correctness remains standing and valid, although the infallibility of memory must be rejected as illusory.]

Marvin (Walter T.) The Factual. Phil. R., May 1908.

[Problem of paper: Are there judgments of which "the factual" forms the complete warrant; and, if so, how are these judgments related to the remainder of our knowledge?]

23 Gardiner (H. N.) The Problem of Truth. Phil. R., Mar. 1908.

[Holds, with Russell, that some propositions, i.e. their objective meanings, are true, and some false, just as some roses are red and some white. The proposition, if true, bears, as such, a purely logical relation to the fact that it is true of, and this relation is not a process or event like the cognitive process through which it gets into our minds, but merely one that ideally holds or obtains.]

24 Hönigswald (R.) Zum Problem der philosophischen Skepsis.

Vierteljahrsch. f. w. Phil., xxxii, 1, 1908.

[Philosophical criticism overcomes epistemological scepticism, because it sets on one side the latter problem, which is none other than how a thing-in-itself can be known.]

28 Russell (B.) Mr Haldane on Infinity. Mind, April 1908.

[Criticism of Haldane's Presidential Address to Aristotelian Society.]

40 Billia (L. M.) L'objet de la Psychologie. Rev. de Phil., April 1908.

[The real, sole object of psychology is the self.]

41 Boodin (John E.) Consciousness and Reality: i. Negative Definition of Consciousness. ii. Consciousness and its Implications.

J. of Phil., Mar. 26, April 23, 1908.

[Why should we assume that consciousness is subjective? Other people's consciousness is not subjective to me. Nor is there any ground for speaking of mine as subjective. Whether facts are subjective or not must be determined on other grounds than their being conscious.]

Sellers (R. W.) Consciousness and Conservation. J. of Phil., April 23, 1908.

42 Calkins (Mary Whiton) Self and Soul. Phil. R., May 1908.

[The traditional doctrine of the soul conceives it either after a material analogy or as endowed with mere negations of corporeal characters. The doctrine of the self starts from the introspective study of the immediately realised self, and recognises in this self all the rich content of actual experience.]

44 Pierce (A. H.) The Subconscious Again. J. of Phil., May 7, 1908.

48 Boggs (L. Pearl) The Question in the Learning Process. J. of Phil., April 23, 1908.

Leroy (Marie E. B.) La psychologie infantile en 1907. Rev. Phil., April 1908.

De la Grasserie (R.) Sur l'ensemble de la psychologie linguistique. Rev. Phil., Mar. 1908.

54 Peillaube (E.) L'organisation de la mémoire: iii. L'évocation des souvenirs.

Rev. de Phil., April 1908.

55 Maldidier (J.) Les caractéristiques probables de l'image vraie.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., May 1908.

Bréhier (Émile) De l'image à l'idée: Essai sur le mécanisme psychologique de la méthode allégorique.

Rev. Phil., May 1908.

Bolton (Thaddeus) A Genetic Study of Make-Believe. J. of Phil., May 21, 1908.

57 Johnston (Charles H.) Ribot's Theory of the Passions. J. of Phil., April 9, 1908.

Maier (Heinrich) Psychologie des emotionalen Denkens. 851p.

J. C. B. Mohr, 1908.

[An elaborate work on the thinking that is developed from the emotional and practical side of mind, from the life of feeling and conation, the thinking which is operative in phantasy, and in the world of purposes and norms, and is most marked in æsthetic contemplation, in religious belief, in custom, right, and morality.]

60 Spalding (K. J.) On the Sphere and Limit of the Aristotelian Logic.

Mind, April 1908.

[Classification is the real, if implicit, basis of the Aristotelian logic.]

72 Warrain (F.) La raison pure et les antinomies. Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1908.

[Discusses Evellin's critical essay on the Kantian Philosophy.]

O'Sullivan (John M.) Vergleich der Methoden Kants und Hegels auf Grund ihrer Behandlung der Kategorie der Quantität. 129p.

Reuther & Reichard, 1908.

[Doctor's dissertation at the University of Heidelberg.]

Rademaker (F.) Kant's Lehre vom inneren Sinn in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. 46p.

Reuther & Reichard, 1908.

74 Bradley (F. H.) On the Ambiguity of Pragmatism. Mind, April 1908.

[Criticism of Dewey and James. In the end, truth, fact, and goodness are one, though we cannot perceive and verify this unity in detail, and therefore in and for the individual a relative divergence must be recognised. On the other hand, as soon as James attempts to deal with first principles, he seems to have adopted as against an immanent Reality a transcendent Ideal.]

Chide (A.) Pragmatisme et Intellectualisme. Rev. Phil., April 1908.

Strong (C. A.) Pragmatism and its Definition of Truth.

J. of Phil., May 7, 1908.

[Emphasises the difference between pragmatism as a theory of what truth means, and pragmatism as an account of why we think things true—of what thinking things true means.]

Stein (Ludwig) Der Pragmatismus: Versuch einer Geschichte des Terminus "Pragmatismus." II.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv, 2, 1908.

[Author suggests the name *Neu-Humismus* as more truly characterising the movement than the old term pragmatism. It is essentially the voice of Hume that speaks in pragmatism. A genetic theory of truth must concentrate upon the effort to get for truth a biological basis.]

Kallen (Horace M.) The Pragmatic Notion of *ἔλγ*. J. of Phil., May 21, 1908.

James (William) "Truth" versus "Truthfulness." J. of Phil., Mar. 26, 1908.

Schiller (F. C. S.) The Tribulations of Truth. Albany R., Mar. 1908.

[Reply to Russell's article on James's book. Russell, in common with other critics, ignores the pressing need of finding out whether what professions to be true is really true.]

Bush (Wendell T.) Provisional and Eternal Truth. J. of Phil., Mar. 26, 1908.

Strong (Anna L.) Some Religious Aspects of Pragmatism. Amer. J. of Th., Apr. 1908.

Lloyd (Alfred H.) Radical Empiricism and Agnosticism. Mind, April 1908.

[Formal knowledge by its definiteness and consequent complexity not only is never self-sufficient, and implies relatively to its form an unknowable, but also, showing in fact what among other things the unknowable points to, is rather social or factional than personal. Just the immediately real experience of the empirical agnostic is his unknowable.]

76 *Stern (Viktor)* Der materialistische Dualismus.

Arch. f. system. Phil., xiv. 2, 1908.
[Matter alone exists as real. The fact that the individual parts of matter can be at different times in different places enables us also to say that movement also really exists, and, further, as certain movements become conscious, and as such conscious movements are obviously more than mere movements, we can say that as there is a capacity of movement in matter, so there is a capacity of becoming conscious in movement.]

79 *Smith (Norman)* Subjectivism and Realism in Modern Philosophy.

Phil. R., Mar. 1908.
[The two most courageous and thorough-going attempts to establish realism have been those of Avenarius and of Beyson. Author gives a short but interesting sketch of the latter's position in his work *Matière et Mémoire*.]

Bode (B. H.) The Problem of Objectivity. J. of Phil., Mar. 12, 1908.
[Criticism of Montague's realism.]

Montague (W. P.) Consciousness and Relativity: A Reply to Professor Bode.

J. of Phil., April 9, 1908.
Graham (David) The Grammar of Philosophy: A Study of Scientific Method. 388p. Clark, 1908.

[A development of what is usually known as the Scottish Philosophy, or the philosophy of Common Sense.]

80 *Adam (J.)* The Religious Teachers of Greece Edited, with Memoir, by Adela M. Adam. (Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion.) 522p. Clark, 1908.

[A work of great interest and value. The last five lectures on Plato are especially original and suggestive. The Memoir of the author could not have been better done. Review will follow.]

84 *Wood (M. H.)* Plato's Psychology in its bearing on the Development of Will. II.

Mind, April 1908.
[Deals with Plato's view of (a) Thought and Reason, and (b) Will.]

Schiller (F. C. S.) Plato or Protagoras? Being a critical examination of the Prota-

goras speech in the *Theaetetus*, with some remarks upon Error. 29p. Blackwell, 1908.

[Contents that the speech is intended to give the argumentation by which Protagoras defended his doctrine of the relativity of the object of knowledge to the subject, and yields trustworthy evidence for the reconstitution of the actual doctrine of the historic Protagoras.]

85 *Smith (J. A.)* and *Ross (W. D.)*, eds. The Works of Aristotle. Trans. into English. Part II., De Lineis Insecabilibus, by Harold H. Joachim. Clarendon Press, 1908.

89 *Sertillanges (A. D.)* L'âme et la vie selon saint Thomas d'Aquin.

Rev. de Phil., Mar. 1908.

[On more than one point St. Thomas has anticipated modern ideas. He avoids the metaphysical difficulties of materialism and the physical difficulties of Platonism and Cartesianism.]

92 *Brochard (V.)* La Dieu de Spinoza.

Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar. 1908.
[After all, it is a Jewish conception which is the soul of Spinoza's system. The God of Spinoza is a very much improved Jehovah.]

94 *V MacCarthy (Desmond)* Nietzsche.

Albany R., April 1908.
Martin (Abbé J.) Un poète philosophe.

Rev. de Phil., May 1908.

[The poet-philosopher is Sully Prudhomme. Author discusses Hémon's recent book on Prudhomme's philosophy.]

Gardair (J.) Fogazzaro et Rosmini.

Rev. de Phil., April 1908.

W *Norero (H.)* La Philosophie de Wundt. Rev. de Méta. et de Mor., Mar., May 1908.

[Discusses Wundt's theory of scientific knowledge, his moral doctrine, and his metaphysic, but does not touch upon his psychology.]

V ART. 83 Sacred Music.

Müller-Freienfels (Richard) Zur Theorie derästhetischen Elementarerscheinungen. I. Vierteljahrssch. f. w. Phil., xxxii. 1, 1908.

Lalo (Ch.) Les sens esthétiques. I. Rev. Phil., May 1908.

Sentrout (Ch.) La vérité dans l'art.

Rev. Néo-Scol., Feb. 1908.
[Artistic truth is independent of strict realism even in the art of imitation.]

Cust (R. H. Hobart) Leonardo da Vinci (Miniature Series of Painters). 90p.

Bell, 1908.
Phillipps (L. March) The Function of Modern Art Criticism. Cont. R., May 1908.
Broussolle (J. C.) L'iconographie de la maternité de la Vierge Marie.

R. du Clergé français, May 1, 1908.
83 *Ellis (W. Ashton)* Life of Richard Wagner, vol. vi. 472p.

Kegan Paul, 1908.

[NOTE.—For an explanation of the system of classification adopted in the Bibliography, readers are referred to HIBBERT JOURNAL, vol. i. p. 630 sqq.]

G. D. H. and J. H. W.

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
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
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